IR 05000395/1979041
| ML19309D519 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Summer  |
| Issue date: | 01/11/1980 |
| From: | Kellogg P, Skolds J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19309D508 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-395-79-41, NUDOCS 8004100416 | |
| Download: ML19309D519 (8) | |
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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eE REGION 11
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101 MARIETTA sT., N.W., SulTE 3100
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ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303
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Report No. 50-395/79-41 Licensee: South Carolina Electric Power and Gas Columbia, South Carolina 29218 Facility Name:
V. C. Summer Docket No. 50-395 License No. CPPR-94 Inspection at Summe N2 ear Po
.r Station near Parr, South Carolina Inspector:
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Ad Dat'e S'igned Approved by:
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P. J ell Sectio /(hief, RONS Branch Da/eSigned
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SUMMARY
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Inspection on November 10 - December 31, 1979 by the Resident Inspector Areas Inspected This routine inspection involved 240 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of preoperational test procedures review, preoperational test witnessing, preoper-ational test results review and independent inspection effort.
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Results Of the four areas inspected, no apparent items of noncompliance or deviations identified in two areas; two aparent items of noncomplaince were found in were two areas (Infraction:
improperly positioned safety tags - paragraph 10.a.
Deficiency: failure to document a deficiency in MS hydro paragraph 7.)
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- 0. S. Bradham, Plant Manager
- J. G. Connelly, Assistant Plant Manager S. Smith, Maintenance Supervisor
- A. B. Harrison, Operations Supervisor K. Beale, Health Physics Supervisor D. Hembree, Assistant Startup Supervisor
- A. A. Smith, QA Site Coordinator C. L. Ligon, Administrative Supervisor
- A. Koon. Technical Staff Engineer
- K. Woodward, Shif t Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included operators, mechanics and security force members.
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Other Organizations C. W. Bowman, Westinghouse Startup Group C.
Bahnson
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on November 30, 1979 and December 20, 1979, with those persons indicated in Paragraph I above. The noncompliance was discussed with licensee management. The inspector attended the exit interview of E. Girard on November 29, 1979 and December 19, 1979, K. Walters on November 30, 1979 and T. Burdette on December 13, 1979.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings l
The inspector reviewed the corrective action taken by the licensee in response to the item of noncompliance identified in IE Report 395/79-37.
The corrective action appears to be adequate and this item is considered closed.
4.
Unresolved items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection. -
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5.
Preoperational Test Procedure Review The inspector reviewed the following preoperational test procedures:
CC-1 Component Cooling ED-2 DC Distribution System ES-00-E-05 7.2KV Switchgear ES-01-E-15 480V Switchgear SP-2 Reactor Building Spray Pump All-P7 (AH-30)
Computer Room HVAC AH-PIO (All-29)
Relay Room HVAC DG-2 D/G A Fuel Oil Transfer System ES-01-E-17 480V Switchgear ES-01-E-19 480V MCC The procedures were reviewed to ensure they were technically adequate and to ensure they were consistent with the commitments made in Chapter 14 of the FSAR and with Regulatory Guide 1.68.
The inspector had the following comments concerning the tests.
a.
CC-1 Steps 6.19 through 6.49 of CC-1 establish a " Normal Plant Operations" condition in the CCW system. Table 9.2-4 of the FSAR tabulates loads on the CCW system for " Normal Power Operations". CC-1 and Table 9.2.4 of the FSAR are not in agreement for this mode of operation in that CC-1 has both Spent Fuel Heat Exchanges and the Excess Letdown Heat Exchangers in service (along with other loads) and the FSAR has only one Spent Fuel Heat Exchanger and omits the Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger.
Attachment IX of CC-1 requires 195-214.5 gpm to the Reactor Coolent
Pumps (Upper Bearing, Lower Bearing e 0 Thermal Barrier). Section 9.2 of the FSAR requires a minimum or n gpm to the Reactor Coolant
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Pumps.
The required flow to the letdown heat exchanger according to the FSAR is 155-575 gpm. CC-1 adjusts the CCW flow to 1100-1210 gpm.
CCW flow to the RHR pumps is never checked in CC-1.
Step 6.48 of CC-1 should read:
" Note: This flow. should exceed the flow recorded in step 6.46..." instead of step 6.49.
The Safety Sujection Mode of operation per CC-1 is not the same as the Safety Injection Mode on Table 9.2-8 of the FSAR.
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Steps 6.64, 6.65, 6.71, 6.72, 6.76, 6.77, 6.78, and 6.79 of CC-1 assume that the following valves operate together:
9525A and 9524A 9687A and 9526A 9525B and 9524B 9687B and 9526B This is incorrect in that valves 9525A and 9687A 9526A and 9524A 9525B and 9526B operate together.
Step 6.88.1 should ensure "B" CC Booster Pump trips instead of starts.
Table 14.2-20 of the FSAR requires the CCW Preoperational Test to verify and signoff in the Acceptance criteria that the CCW alarms function properly. CC-1 has no signoff in the Acceptance Criteria for a functional alarm check.
Section 9.2.2.3.1 of the FSAR (pg 9.2-28) states that during a-Safety Injection the operator has the following options when the RHR heat exchanger is put in service on the active loop:
(a) Close valves in crossover connection to nonessential circuit.
(b) Switch pump in active loop to high speed.
(c)
Isolate components in nonessential circuit except the spent fuel heat exchanger.
The inspector noted that Section 9.2.2.2 of the FSAR states that the capability of achieving a safe shutdown from normal operation or following an accident in not contingent upon availability of the high speed mode. Therefore, option (b) can be assumed not to be available to the operator. Option (a) would isolate the Spent Fuel Heat Exchangers, which would remove the cooling water to the Spent' Fuel Heat Exchangers.
Option (c) is availabic as long as the various areas of the plant are accesible to manually isolate the individual components. The inspector has asked the licensee to review this area and will take this issue up with NRR.
All of the above comments will be designated as Open Item (79-41-01)
pending licensee review and correctio..
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ED-2 In reviewing ED-2 the inspector noted that the FSAR, Section 8.3.2.1.5.6 states "A static transfer switch is provided for inverter No. 6 to switch the 120 volt vital a-c bus from the single input inverter to the 480-120 volt transformer". This is incorrect in that inverter No. 6 is a dual input. inverter. Section 8.3.2.1.5.5 of the FSAR states that "Upon loss of inverter output, automatic transfer of the inverter main dis;.ribution panel to the alternate supply is intiated." This is incorrect in that the transfer is a manual transfer.
This item will remain open (79-41-02) pending licensee review.
c.
ES-00-E-05 Step 6.2.3 should read "Open 230KV OCB 8892" instead of Open 230 KV OCB 8992.
This item was corrected by issuing a TCN.
d.
ES-01-0_15 In verifying that the interlock between various buses and tie breakers was operational an error was made in numerous steps in the procedure.
The interlock was to prevent two incoming breakers and the tie breaker from being closed simultaneously.
In verifying that the tie breaker opened automatically when the second incoming breaker was closed, one of the main incoming breakers was lef t open in the procedure in numerous steps. This was corrected by issuing a TCN.
Section 6.11 never checked that IB1-1C1 breaker would open when the IB1 breaker and 1B1-1C1 breaker is closed and you close the IC1 breaker.
This was corrected by issuing a TCN.
Section 6.14 never checked that the IB4-1C4 breaker would open when the IB4 breaker and IB4-IC4 breaker is closed and you close the IC4 breaker. This was corrected by issuing a TCN.
Steps 6.20.21 and 6.21.21 intiate a load sequence functional test.
This will be done during HFT. This item will remain open (79-41-03)
until it is successfully completed, c.
SP-2 The valve lineup called for in the procedure did not call for valve 6700-SF (Suction to RWST) to be opened. This was corrected by issuing a TCN.
There was no provision to measure the valve stroke time on valves 3002A and 3002 B as required by the test. This item was corrected by.
issuing a TCN.
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AH-P7 (AH-30)
No connents concerning procedure.
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AH-PIO (AH-29)
No comments concerning procedure, h.
DG-2 Table 14.1-14 states that the test will verify alarms. DG-2 does not check the alarms in the Fuel Oil Storage and Transfer System. This item will remain open (79-41-04) pending licensee review.
In reviewing DG-2 and the FSAR, the inspector noted that Section 3A of the FSAR states that the licensee is committed to Regulatory Guide 1.137 Revision O.
However, the Chemistry Sampling requirements being utilized are from Revision 1 of the Reg. Guide. The licensee indicated
that the FSAR is in error. This item will remain open pending FSAR revision (79-41-05).
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ES-01-E-17 No comments concerning procedure.
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ES-01-E-19 No connents concerning procedure.
6.
Preoperational Test Procedure Witnessing The inspector witnessed portions of the following preoperational testa:
ED-2 D.C. Distribution System SP-2 Reactor Building Spray RH-1 Residual Heat Removal CS-7 Boric Acid Pumps
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AH-P7 (AH-30)
Computer Room HVAC The inspector verified the tests were being performed in accordance with j
approved procedures and verified the acceptability of some test results.
Specifically, the inspector verified prerequisites were met, the procedure
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was on hand at the test site and data was recorded as required. Findings l
were acceptable with the following exception:
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a.
The inspector observed the RHR and Reactor Building Spray Pump sump l
vortex tests.
In observing' the sump during the performance of the
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teat, the inspector felt that there was not sufficient light available
to see the sump completely in order to verify the absence of any.
i vortices. However, since the RHR pumps and the Reactor Building Spray.
Pumps Showed no signs of losing suction up to full flow conditions the inspector accepted that portion of the test result.
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Preoperational Test Procedure Results Review The inspector reviewed the results of MS-01-H-1 Main Steam Hydrostatic Test. The results were reviewed to ensure that the data meets the acceptance criteria, any deviations are properly identified and resolved, the review procedures are being followed and that the results are adequately evaluated.
Findings were acceptable with the following exceptions:
Step 3.2 of MS-01-H-1 states in part that the water in the Condensate a.
Storage Tank and the Steam Generator shall be verified to be in speci-fication with the water chemistry requirements listed in that step.
The hydraziene specification was75-150 ppm. On September 21, 1979 a sample of the Condensate Storage Tank indicated a hydraziene concen-tration of 153 ppm. Paragraph 4.4.1 of SUM B-1 " Preparation of Phase I Start Up Instructions" states in part that the Test Supervisor will the actions taken in connection with deficiences noted during assure the conduct of the test. are properly documented within the test
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instruction. Contrary to the above, no documentation existed to state what had been done in the evaluation of the out of specification chemistry reading.
This is considered t <> be an apparent item of noncompliance (79-41-06).
8.
Independent Inspection Effort - FSAR Review The inspector reviewed portions of the FSAR to verify various commitments made in the FSAR. Findings were acceptable with the following exceptions:
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Appendix 3A of the FSAR, under Regulatory Guide 1.137, states that a.
af ter final soil grading, corrosion current tests will be performed on the Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage Tanks and an appropriate corrosion protection system installed. The inspector has asked the licensee to indicate when this test will be performed. This item will remain open
pending licensee evaluation (79-41-07).
b.
Page 9.5-23a of the FSAR has a discontinuity in the description of the diesel generator. This item will remain open pending FSAR revision (79-41-08).
c.
Figure 10.4-8 of the FSAR is not the latest revision to the drawings and significant changes have been made to the system. This item will remain open pending FSAR revision (79-41-09).
9.
Independent Inspection Effort - %Idy Current Testing of Steam Generators The licensee is in the process of performing eddy current testing on all steam generators.
Preliminary results of the testing is inconclusive at this time. This item will remain open (79-41-12) pending further inspector followup.
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10.
Plant Tour The inspector toured the plant at various times to observe construction activities, housekeeping, maintenance, equipment preserv*ation and logbooks.
Findings were acceptable with the exception of the following:
a.
On November 30, 1979, while touring the Reactor Building the inspector noted that. the following red tags were incorrectly placed:
Tag Number 11 128-79-9 for valve 9584B was placed on valve 9589B
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Tag Number 11 128-79-10 for valve 9589B was placed on valve
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9594B Tag Number 11 128-79-11 for valve 9594B was placed on valve
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9584B Tag Number 11 151-79-1 for valve 9587A was placed on valve 9590A
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Tag Number 11 260-79-2 for valve 9584B was placed on valve 9589B
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The ins'pector notified the shift supervisor and had the tags placed on the correct valves. Paragraph 3.5 of Administrative Procedure 204.1,
" Safety Tagging" states in part that safety tags should always be placed on the equipment, valve, switch or device named on the tag.
The incorrectly placed red tags is considered to be an apparent item
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of noncompliance (79-41-10).
b.
The inspector toured the Fuel liandling Building on December 7,1979, to verify proper security, cleanliness. amd proper storage of the new fuel.
The inspector noted that two fire extinguishers on the main level of the Fuel liandling Building were last inspected on August 27, 1979. The fire extinguishers are supposed to be inspected monthly.
The Shift Supervisor was informed and the fire extinguishers were inspected. The fire protection system in the Fuel Handling Building was operational at this time. The fire extinguishers were found to be operational when inspected.
c.
The inspector. noted that the Diesel Generator Building Ventilation System on the 427' level of the Diesel Generator Building had been taken apart and when put back together, bolts were missing from a joint in the ductwork, some bolts that were installed were loose and that the ductwork was crooked. It appears that the ductwork was taken apart in the performance of another job in the vicinity of the ventila-tion system. The ventilation system had been turned over to Start Up and had been flow balanced.
This is the second example noted by the inspector of a safety related system being tampered with after final construction and turnover.
(See inspection report 79-28). This item will remain open pending inspector review of licensee corrective action (79-41-11).
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11. Meetings The inspector attended an Emergency Planning Conference with officials a.
from the State of South Carolina and the NRC, Region II in Columbia, South Carolina on December 5, 1979.
Respcasibilities of various organizations as well as the Resident Inspector discussed.
b.
The inspector met with the local news media on December 5, 1979 and discussed the Resident Inspector Program.
12.
Open Items The following open items were reviewed:
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a.
79-07-02 Preoperational ES-00-E-05
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79-25-01 Vibration Measurements c.
79-25-02 Acceptance Criteria d.
79-25-04 Tube Sheet Pressure
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79-25-05 RCP starting pressure f.
79-28-01 Bolt thread engagement g.
79-28-08 Bolts missing I
The inspector reviewed the corrective action taken in all of the above
items and considerd the above items closed.
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