IR 05000331/1986020

Insp Rept 50-331/86-20 on 861117-21.No Violations, Deficiencies or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Emergency Response Facilities,Related Equipment & Procedures

ML20210T615
Person / Time
Site:	Duane Arnold
Issue date:	02/06/1987
From:	Foster J, Ploski T, Snell W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20210T600	List: IR 05000331/1986020 ML20210T596
References
50-331-86-20, NUDOCS 8702180247
Download: ML20210T615 (43)

Text

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION-REGION III.

- Report No. 50-331/86020(DRSS)

Docket No. 50-331 License No. DPR-49 Licensee:

Iowa Electric Light and Power Company IE Towers Post Office Box 351.

Cedar Rapids,.IA 52406.

Facility Name:

Duane Arnold Energy Center

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Inspection At:

Duane Arnold Site, Palo, ids, Iowa Iowa and IE Towers, Cedar Rap Inspection Conducted:

November 17-21,~1986

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Inspectors:

T. Ploski 6 #7 Date Rfdff!7

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. Foster Date/

ld.Gd Approved By:

W. Snell, Chief 2/4/37 Emergency Preparedness Section Date Inspection Summary Inspection on November 17-21, 1986 (Report No. 50-331/86020(DRSS))

Areas Inspected:

Special,. announced inspection of the Duane Arnold Energy Center's emergency response facilities, related equipment, and procedures, involving observations by two NRC inspectors and six consultants.

Results:

No violations, deficiencies or deviations were identified.

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a gj2100247870206 G

ADOCK 05000331 PDR

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11.0 TECHNICA SUPPORTCENTER(TSC))

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> 1.' 1 Physical' Facilities-1.1.1 Design:

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'1.1.1.1!.TSC Size and Layout

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The TSC was situated in~3,675>sguare feet of office' space, mosti

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of which was being used as routine work, space for plant personnel.

l A dedicated TSC work! area-was located in one corner of;this space,

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utilizing lapproximately 25 percent of.the total. space!available.:

This area consisted of two conference: tables, telephones, maps c-aneventlog,andaprojectiondisplay.

DoseassessmentandfIeld survey team control were co.nducted in an office along a side wall,

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An adjacent office was set:aside for NRC use.

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The layout of the TSC results in a cluster of key aersonnel.around i

the conference table area.

The partitions and-dests used in the-

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normal operational office space were not reconfigured when the~TSC-

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was activated.

Further, engineerin'g support personnel did not have1 assigned workspaces.

During the exercise,.the result.of these two-

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circumstances was that support personnel' tended to cluster around I

tne open side of the conference. table area to hear briefings,_and j

to " float" around the TSC when not specifically tasked.

This work

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i pattern yields poor traffic flow through'the-TSC,.with excessive.

noise.and congestion around the conference. table area.

During the:

exercise, a communicator tasked with making initial offsite notification calls sought a telephane-in another relatively quiet.

and less congested corner of the TSC work space.than existed in-t the conference. table area.

There was-also inadequate-space for

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the review of plant-drawings.

During the exercise one engineer was even observed to be reading large scale. drawings on the-floor

rather than on deskspace.at the rear of the TSC.

The NRC' office i

was-adequately sized for two persons'.= The entire TSC workspace

was adequate to accommodate five-NRC personnel in addition to the-

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l licensee's TSC staff.

However, other than'the'small office reserved for NRC use, there were no other. pre-identified work stations for i

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NRC Site Team members.

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Based on the above finding ~s, this portion of the licensee's program

I is acceptable; however, the following items should be considered for improvement:

The licensee should utilize the available sp' ace'in a more

E efficient manner by reconfiguring partitions and desks to l

provide a pool of workstations that are assigned to the

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various technical support functions involved in TSC-l'

activities.

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Theilicenseelshould'~previde additional table'spac'e:for.the-

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' review of large scalejenpineering-drawings.

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The-TSC was'. located in a building attached to the~ main re' actor

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b building and three floors below the control room.

It was easilyx

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' accessible-from the control toom. ' Security was 'provided by the-,

plant. security, system.

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Based on the above findings,Lthis portion of-the. licensee's' program is acceptable.

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- 1.1.1. 3 ' Structure

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The TSC was built-in accordance with the Uniform Building Code, Zone:1.

An Uninterruptible Power Station (UPS) did not supply

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power to the facility _ lights, leaving only two. battery, operated.

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- t emergency lights as backup.

This is considered insufficient for

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j TSC operation, as discussed.further in Section 1.'1.3.3.

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- 1.1.1.4 Habitability / Environment i

t The TSC had an adequate and-functionally independent ventilation i

(HVAC) system with prefilters, particulate filters (HEPA), charcoal

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' filters, and two area radiation monitors (ARM). located:near,the

ventilation intake duct. 'A third ARM wa's located in the center'

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I of the TSC.. Upon declaration of an Alert or-' higher emergency class, t

procedures required personnel to' manually 11 ace the TSC ventilation system in the recirculation mode.

A TSC A(M reading above the

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i alarm setting of 1 mR/hr was also a basis for isolating the TSC

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ventilation.

Operating Instruction No.-729.2 "TSC HVAC System" l

was a step by step procedure which'would be used by security personnel to isolate the ventilation system.

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rocedureswhichhave Thelicenseehadthreesurveillancetest$eoperationoftheTSC

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been routinely performed to assure reliab ventilation system.

They included:

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TSC HVAC Filter Unit operation with heater on - this procedure

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required the TSC-ventilation to be run in the recirculation l-mode ten hours per month.

TSC HVAC filter unit heater output check - this test has been

i performed at two year intervals to assure that the inlet heater

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is capable of reducing relative humidity to less than 70 percent.

TSC HVAC filter unit HEPA and charcoal filter efficiency

-tests - this test has'been performed every 18 months or when

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a HEPA filter was changed to demonstrate the operability of.

i-the HVAC filter unit ~

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A shielding review had been performed which indicated that TSC personnel-would not receive greater than five rem to the whole-body or 25. rem to-the thyroid during the~30-day duration of'a postulated

' design basis accident. -The results of-this review were documented in a letter report to:the-licensee from the Bechtel'. Corporation entitled " Response to NUREG-0737,- Item II.B.2 - Shielding Review-forJDuane Arnold Energy Center, Iowa Electric Light and Power Company," dated August-1981.

Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's' program is acceptable.

1.1.1.5 Display Interfaces A.

Projection Displays Displays of plant a'nd radiological status were made in the TSC by projecting transparencies containing this information onto the translucent glass portion of the dose assessment room walls.

During the exercise, the display quality was observed to be poor.

(out of focus and obscured by glare), and nearly 180 degrees out of line of sight of key TSC personnel.

Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is acceptable; however, the following items should be considered for improvement:

Thelicenseeshouldrelocatetheprojectionscreenorthe

conference tables so that displays will be more directly O

visible by key TSC personnel.

The licensee should provide sufficient floor space for the--

projectortobemovedinordertoadjusttheimagesize.

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SPDS

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The SPDS workstation was located.behind the TSC conference tables, and against the wall of the room.

This location and '

the fixed angular orientation of the screen resulted in a high level of reflected glare from the overhead fluorescent lights.

SPDS user reference documentation was not stored in the immediate area of the SPDS nor in any nearby supplementary workspace.

Thesystemutilizedbezelmountedfunctionkeys to access top and second level displays, including Reactor Core Cooling, Cooling System Integrity,' Containment Conditions, Reactivity Control and Radiation Control.

Two additional bezel keys are used to access a display menu and a " dis 11ay-execute" function for numerically specified displays.

Eaci display i

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screen contained a' static. region of status information which-

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included color-coded indicators for the five. major subsystems,

-and status information on: vessel level, reactor _ power, mode,:

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and.the data acquisition. system.

Third: level SPDS displays were accessible b typ ng'.in the' number -

of the desired' screen followed by the " Disp _ay ezel key..

' Meteorological-data were. accessible by a function ke -code entry ~.

sequence. Finally, in' addition to the-24 operationa function keys there are 45 other-function keys that were utilized.for-displaygenerationandprogrammingpurposes.

Color-coding' was utilized in two ways'in'the SPDS--for the:

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portrayal of normal.or off-normal: status information, and-to

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distinguish.among.several different variablescin a multiparameter trend plot. These methods of usage were combined on the second level displays. On the. top; level display, bar graphs of. system

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variables were color-coded green for normal range values and red for off-normal. This was in contrast to second level displays where the bar graphs were'not coded according to this convention,- -

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but rather to.use multiple colors to distinguish the parameters

on trend plots.s If any of the values.were out of normal range,

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they would be annunciated with alphanumerics and red color coding

'in the subsystem status block. These usages were inconsistent from one levei to another, and could lead to confusion in an operational setting.

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Based on the above findings,;this portion of the licensee's program i

is acceptable; however the following items should be considered for-

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improvement:

The SPDS' terminal should have an anti-reflective glare filter

to reduce reflections from overhead fluorescent lights.

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The terminal should be mounted on a' tilt / swivel base, with a

supplementary work space on either side.of the display device.

SPDS support documentation should be. maintained at the SPDS

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workstation.

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The licensee should develop a consistent method of display _

access that carries through all levels of the display hierarchy..

The present system uses three different methods, only two of-which are described on-line.

SPDS' displays should have a consistent approach to color-codin.

In the present system,-the bar graphs on the.second level disp ays display, (i.e., green for normal and red for off-normal)p leve should use the same approach as the bar graphs on the to

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i :The<SPDS should be capable of generating a hard copy to capture screens that contain important-diagnostic information.'

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!1.1. 2-Radiological Equipment-and Supplies, 1.1.2.-1 Ra'diation Monitoring ~

Radiation levels in the TSC can be determined continuously via fixed F

monitors, a semi portable monitor and hand-held instruments. The.

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fixed monitors consisted of gamma detectors in the intake of the:

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TSC ventilation. system and within the TSC proper.

Concentrations-

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of particulates and radiciodines would be. assessed by. a continuous air monitor (CAM, a semi portable' unit), which is to be'placed into-

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operation.when the TSC is activated.: A Ifmited number of portable

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radiation' monitoring instruments and dosimeters were maintained in'

an emergency locker in the TSC;'however, adequate supplements were.

i availableinthe-0SC,whichwasessentiallyadjacenttotheTSC-

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,=(located only.about 50-100 feet down a connecting hallway). _

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Based on the above' findings, this portion of'the licensee'siprogram l

is' acceptable.

l 1.1.2.2 Protective Supplies

A limited supply of protective clothing and respiratory protective equipment was available in an emergency locker in the TSC. Additional

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protective clothing (approximately 750 sets) was'available'in portable i

lockers (mounted on wheels) that were located in the OSC. An

f additional supply of air purifying and. supplied air respiratory-

protective equipment was also located in the OSC.

Decontamination

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supplies and equipment,ined in the OSCas well as an adequate supply of potas

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iodide (KI) were mainta i-p lj '

Based on the above findings, this~ portion of the' licensee's program is acceptable.

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l 1.1.3 Non-Radiological Equipment and Supplies

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1.1.3.1 Records /Orawings j

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Records and drawings. maintained in the TSC included:. corporate and i

plant emergency plans andsimplementing procedures; State of Iowa emergency plans of both counties within the-10-mile.

emergency. plan;ing Zone (EPZ); NRC Region'III em d

t Emergenc Plann Technica Specifications; abnormal operating procedures; FSA

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Updated FSAR; large scale plant ~ layout drawings'and electrical,-

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piping and plant systems' schematics; a multi-volume ~ set of reference

materials on the dose assessment software; an'INPO Resources Manual; I

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-. licensee and local area telephone directories; and copies of offsite j

notification message forms.

Besides the complete set of. emergency _

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planimplementingprocedures(EPIPs), separate" emergency

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information handbooks"'of relevant'EPIPs'and forms were maintained-

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for each key TSC staff' position.

EPIP 6.1 included provisions for,

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the periodic inventory of reference materials maintained in the

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L TSC..The racks of plant. drawings and schematics were maintained L

through the licensee's administrative services. staff.

' Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program

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is acceptable.

l-1.1.'3.2 Support Supplies The TSC was provided with wall-mounted ten and 50-mile EPZ maps; a color-coded'10-mile EPZ evacuation subarea map; and.a large scale protective action decisionmaking flowchart.

The EPZ maps were appropriately labeled with-sector nomenclature.- Sufficient quantitles of standard office supplies were readily.available in the TSC, including several calculators.

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Basedontheabovefindings,this_portionofthelicensee's-program

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is acceptable.

1.1.-3.3 Power Supply Four main areas of power continuity were considered in evaluating the continued ability of the TSC to function in.a loss of station power accident, and thus meet the reliability criteria of -

Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737:- TSC Data Acquisition Systems; Ventilation '

and Cooling (HVAC); Communications, including telephone and radio;-

and Lighting.

The TSC did not have a dedicated power source of its own, such as a

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diesel.

Rather, the TSC'used a non-essential (i.e., not connected to the station diesels) power feed from the 480V. Load Center 1Bl.

Load Center 181 may receive its power from these two non-essential power sources in event of loss of the-main station generator:

back-feed through the station main and auxiliary transformers; or normal feed through the startup transformer.

Relative to data acquisition systems, the primary, real-time system for the TSC was the Safety Parameter Display System'.(SPDS) terminal.

The SPDS~ was normally powered from 480V Load Center 183, an " Essential" bus, capable of being powered from the Division 1 station emergency l

diesel generator.

However, the SPDS computer only had a ten minute capacity, " keep-alive" battery in the event of loss of the essential

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power normal feeder.

After restoration of essential power, (e.g.,

normal diesel startup and time-sequenced loading), the SPDS host-computer could be warm-booted and restored to operation.

The SPDS terminals-(Control Room and TSC) used host computer power only.

Thus the terminals may be used if essential. power is available to

the-host computer.. The licensee expressed concern about the-H p

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reliabilityTof the-SPDS when operating'on the t'10 minute'.' battery.

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The; inspectors noted.that SPDS; functions were planned:to be programmed

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into the "new" Plant Process Computer (PPC), a,VAX.8600 computer which twasintendedtobe.equippedwithanUninterruptiblePowerSupply'(UPS).

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The' existing PPC use'd a VAX:-L11/785' mini-computer to pr, vide'many-computer-assisted functions to the operators and engineering staff,

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including real-time data-acquisition. capability to the TSC and EOF.

The present PPC was powered from essential power 480V Load Center-1B3

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- as was the SPDS.

However,1the PPC, unlike the SPDS, fused an UPS as-its input; the UPS was powered from an AC/DC motor generator normally,-

or the station battery.in event of loss of essential. power.

If the-

system.would operate as designed,- continuity ofLpower would be-assured'-

for the PPC.

However, the inspectors noted two problem areas related to the PPC:

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The licensee expressed concern about the motor lenerator set reliability. A review of maintenance records slowed the set to have a relatively poor history of operation.

Peripherals, such as the. MIDAS terminal, associated with the

VAX - 11/785 in the TSC.used-local power for operation.

As has been noted, the TSC had all non-essential power.- Thus thelossofpowertotheTSCwouldcausethelossofthePfC-

capability in the TSC. (Some real-time.information available

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only on the PPC may be necessary:for the TSC to perform its.

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intended function.)

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Related to the meteorological data acquisition system, the analog I

to digital microprocessor (located.in the Intake Structure) obtained

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normal power from " essential" power; the only back-up power was

non-essential power via an automatic bus transfer switch.

The inspectors noted that the HVAC system for the TSC-also used 480V Load Center 181 as its only power source.

Thus the loss of non-essential power to Center-1B1 would cause a loss of all

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ventilation to the TSC.

The inspectors noted that the TSC. telephones received. normal power from 480V Load; Center 1B1 (non-essential),'and.were backed by-a dedicated battery with an approximate four hour capacity operated.

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j off of a charger on this Load Center.

This system was adequate.

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However, the licensee was uncertain whether telephone ringers and

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extensionindicators(lights)~alsooperatedonthebattery. system.

j The inspectors noted that the radio base station for field ~ team-

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communications used TSC normal. power; thus a loss of non-essential -

power would cause a loss of the base station.

A hand-held transceiver would then be used in lieu of the base station.

However, the licensee

.was uncertain whether the hand-held transceiver was capable of providing the same communications quality as the base-station when communicating with teams located anywhere in the EPZ.

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The inspectors noted that TSC lighting was non-essential power, and that only two emergency lighting devices were installed in the TSC.

The devices consisted of a two-light, battery pack unit that activated on loss of normal lighting in the TSC.

This light output would be inadequate for the entire TSC workspace.

Numerous flashlights would then have to be used to permit continued TSC operation.

In summary, the bulk of the TSC's equipment was found to. receive power from a non-essential power source (Load Center 181).

It is possible to postulate several single fault or single occurrence accidents that would result in a total loss of power to the TSC, thereby rendering the TSC staff incapable of performing their intended functions.

Therefore, the licensee must ensure that the following TSC equipment and systems can receive power from an essential power source:

HVAC system; radio base station for field team communications; new PPC (VAX Model 8600); MIDAS terminal used for offsite dose calculations; and TSC lighting.

This is an Open Item (331/86020-01).

In addition, the following items should be considered for improvement:

InconjunctionwiththeinstallationofthenewPPCin1987,

the licensee should install a static inverter on the input to the PPC to better ensure cor.tinuity of power to both the PPC and the SPDS.

The licensee should provide another backup power supply to

the meteorological data acquisition system.

The licensee should determine whether ringers and extension

lights would remain functional if TSC telephones would be battery-)owered.

An appropriate statement on this matter should tien be added to relevant emergency plan implementing procedures.

The licensee should determine the quality of communications

that would result if only the battery-)owered transceiver is available for communications between tie TSC and field survey teams.

Appropriate TSC staff and survey team personnel should then be advised of any limitations associated with the use of this backup communications system.

The TSC should be equipped with additional emergency lighting.

• 1.2 Information Management 1.2.1 Variables Provided 1.2.1.1 Regulatory Guide 1.97 Variables Several different data acquisition systems were being used by the licensee to access information necessary for performance of emergency response functions:

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Plant Process Computer feeding VAX - 11/785, with terminals

intheControlRoom(CR),TSC,andE0F; SPDS terminals in CR and TSC;

Meteorological data feeding MIDAS terminals the in CR, TSC,

and EOF, and a line printer in the CR; and Stack effluent radiological monitors and stack flows (KAMAN

System) feeding MIDAS terminals in the CR, TSC, and E0F.

The inspectors reviewed the Regulatory Guide 1.97 Conformance Report ofthelicensee(lettertoNRR,NG-85-2423 dated July 3, 1985) and the NRC contractor review of the licensee's submittal (EG&G Idaho, Inc., report published April 1986, "Conformance To Regulatory Guide 1.97, DAEC).

The latter report had not been received by the licensee prior to this inspection.

EG&G concluded that the licensee conformed to RG 1.97 instrumentation requirements with some exceptions, including several environmental qualification questions.

The inspectors noted that most RG 1.97 variables were available real< time in the TSC on the data feeders listed above.

Notable exceptions are as follows:

Chemistry analysis values, such as boron concentration and

radioactivity concentration in the primary coolant, would be transmitted verbally to the TSC.

Containment isolation valve position information was not

available on the SPDS.

Only the " initiated" signal for isolation of each of the Group isolations was available on the SPDS.

The

' inspectors noted that a PPC program entitled " QUERY" may permit interrogation of any of about 500 digital and about 500 analog signal values in the PPC, thus permitting the establishment of each valve's position.

However, this method is slow.

Also, the inspectors understood that the " QUERY" program was not typically employed by the licensee in accident response.

Reactor building ARM and " Radiation Exposure Rate Inside

Buildings" data were not available real-time to the TSC.

To obtain Area and Process Radiation Monitor (ARM, PRM)

readings, an operator called the "Back-Panel Communicator" would be stationed at the appropriate "back panel" in the Control Room.

This operator was part of the emergency response organization.

During the exercise observed with this appraisal, the Back-Panel Communicator recuired about 45 minutet no report for duty after the Alert ceclaration.

His first data set was available in the TSC about 15 minutes later.

Subsequent data sets were available in the TSC at 15 minute intervals, and about five to ten minutes after real time, depending on the number of data changes since the communicator's last report.

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Attachment-8 to EPIP 3.3.'

.The' procedure (in'clu'ded consideration of

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weather conditions. JTel_ephone.numbersifor organizations,, agencies,.

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and individuals that provide various' forms'of assistance including; medical aid were included in the Iowa: Electric (IE)/Duane Arnold

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Energy Center (DAEC) Emergency. Telephone' Book.

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- Weather information,. including severe weather advisories and!

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regional-forecasts,' would:be available:in the TSC via' telephone.

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- Offsite sources of this.information' included the National Weather.

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. Service (WS).0ffice in Des :Moines,EIowa and the Cedar RapidstFlight.

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. Service' Station (FSS).

Telephone numbers for. weather information

- were. included in the Emergency Telephone Book; however;.the numbers

~were difficult to find..EPIP 3.3 assigned the responsibility for..

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obtaining meteorological information to the Site Radiation-Protection 1

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icoordinator, but it did not explicitly address weather forecasts-

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and advisories.

The specific information needed in a useful-

" forecast,and advisory information to be obtained,were not listed

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in the procedure. The TSC staff who were interviewed were not

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familiar with.the types of information available from the NWS.-

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They were also unaware of any formal. agreement between the licensee

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and the NWS to establish procedures for~ obtaining information in the

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event of an emergency or to inform the NWS of what information might

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be needed. -As indicated in Inspection Report No. 331/86015, TSC staff

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- did not even attempt to acquire forecast meteorologicalsinformation i

during the 1986 exercise.'.

Based on the above findings, this portion of the. licensee's program i

is acceptable; however, the following items should be considered l

for improvement:

.I The licensee should establish an agreement with the NWS

or other 24-hour source of-forecast.and severe weather.

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information so that that organization-is aware of the

licensee's meteorological.information needs during'an j

emergency plan activation.

i EPIP 3.3'should be revised to. include specific g'uidance on

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the means of contacting.the source (s) of forecast and severe weather information, plus guidance on the types of weather information that are periodically needed during an emergency.

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plan activation.

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1. 2. l. 3 Relationship to Functional Needs.

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L The missing Regulatory Guide 1.97 variables of Area Radiation Monitors, and the absence of Process Radiation Monitors, as monitored'

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parameters available real time in the TSC, can impact the-ability of activities. perform real-time accident assessment and mitigation-i the TSC to l

The ' substitute activities of the "Back panel

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i Communicator," (i.e., verbal transmission of ARM and PRM data to.

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the TSC), was observed by the inspector during the exercise conducted

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pg

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,

,.

,

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.

,

.

l

'

'

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_

.

s

.

-

_

'

Some variables,.such as Standby Liquid Cont}ol' System (SLCS)'

' '

flow, were not available. :(See Section*1.2.1.*2 for further..

'

.

discussion.)

'

.s.

• ~~

Some variables were not currently available;Lh'owever,Lthe_

'

,

licensee'has committedito, upgrading-the system to make them

-

available.

Licensee letter NG-86-3368,'. dated November 3, 1986, included the " Integrated Living Schedule B."

This sschedule indicated that RG 1.97 issues will be completed

- prior to the Cycle 10=Startup,' currently scheduled for March 1988.

- '

s Based on-the above fin' dings, this portion of the' licensee's progras'

a is acceptable; however, the following items should be considered for<

"

improvement:

+

InconjunctionwiththeinstallationofthenewPPC,the.

' licensee should= install SPDS-algorithms that look at each of the containment group isolation valves, and a " Summary"

- Group Isolation indicator associated with the existing

" Initiated" signal to notify _the operator when all; valves

!

within each of.the groups has properly positioned..

Similarly, the licensee should. install analog to digital

-*

';

converters associated with the Area and Process Radiation Monitors to make these monitors' outputs available real-time

.

to-the new PPC and thus to the TSC and E0F via the SPDS. This enhancement would assist in real-time efforts at localizing radiological accident sources, such:as in the small break-LOCA outside of containment accident scenario.

.

1. 2.1. 2 Other Variables

_

For the few missing Regulatory Guide 1.97 variables not addressed in Section 1.2.1.1 above, such Flow, and SLCS Flow, the licensas Drywell Spray Flow, Torus Spray ee has: asserted that alternate R

instrumentation provides' adequate, substitate indication of the desired parameters.

The inspector reviewed all missing parameters a

in this category, and noted that substitute' instrumentation was-available.

For exampleg observation of drywell temperature and pressure was available in the TSC; initiation of spray flow'to the drywell would act to immediately reduce drywell pressure and temperature, the substitute indication (s) for drywell spray flow.

Other information available,in the-TSC included the results of offsite monitoring, weather information, evacuation time estimates, and emergency and medical assistance information.

Offsite monitoring teams would be controlled from the TSC prior to activation-of the E0F.

After the E0F was operational, communications between the EOF and the monitoring teams would be monitored in the TSC.

Evacuation time estimates were available in the TSC.in i

.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _. _

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

_-.____.________________-___-__-__________.-_______-__.__________._2.____-

_ - - - - _ _ _ - - _. - -. - _ _ _ _ _______--

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'

Lwith this a'ppraisal. ^pproximately; fifteen min'utes were: required

.

to transcribe:and verbally; transmit.to the TSC;all of the monitor

'

s

~ readings. JNo attempt was made by the'inspectorito determine:if-

_.

,

transcription: errors 1were made.

~

~

3,

?The~ licensee has installed a KAMAN effl0ent' monitoring. system

--

4-capable of real-time monitoring,of.the following:'

'

',

,e

.

.

-.

.,

.

.

.

.

j'

e'

Reactor: Building Vents'1, 2,'and 3-Particulate,_ Iodine,

-

L'

~ and: Noble Gas

_

,

Turbine Building l Vent - Noble Gas-

'

-

i

'Off gastStack - Noble Gas.

• Rad-Waste Building Vent - Noble Gas

(notcompletedatpresent)

Stack flows for each of above - CFM

'

,

,

i The licensee asserted that any-localized problem that'would be detectable by a local ARM.or PRM will ultimately.show up on the

i KAMAN. system.

However, the inspector noted that-local ARM /PRM

'

readings in real-time would enable TSC staff-to assess some -

,

!

accidents sooner, especially those occurring outside primary

'

containment, such as the interfacing system LOCA-and' fuel pool-

.

accidents.

Therefore, as stated in Section 1.2.1.1,.the. licensee

,

i should consider making available electronically to the TSC (and E0F)

ARM and PRM readouts that-would enhance accident' detection,

,

. assessment, and mitigation capabilities.

'

Individual containment valve position indications were'available

' '

"

! --

in the CR.

If the TSC staff wished to know the status of any valve position, or the status of a Group Isolation,'they would i

j have to call the CR.

At present, the inspector understood that

'

i the CR does not have a summary indication for each of'the nine J

Groups of Isolations, rather only individual valve. position.

!

indications.

It was further understood that this condition has:

i already been identified as a Human' Engineering. Deficiency (HED)

i during the DCRDR (Detailed Control Room Design Review), and that-

,

" summary" Group Isolation indicators will.be installed.

Since it

'

is important for the TSC to know the status of Containment-isolation-for accident assessment, the licensee should' consider the addition

<

of this " summary" indicator to the TSC data acquisition system, as

.

already mentioned in Section 1.2.1.1.

'

'

1. 2. 2 Data Acquisition s

.

.

!

At the time of this appraisal, a replacement computer system had.

been specified for Duane Arnold Energy Center (DAEC) along with.

,

corresponding software. The new.PPC was already in the acceptance testingprocess.

The replacement computer was a VAX 8600 with sufficient processing speed, main memory, disk storage, and

{

peripherals to assume all the current duties of the existing PPC

.

t i

'13

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- ardSPDScomputer ith 50 to 60 percent processor.capabilit'y. unused.

'

y'

Findings. reported.at the'. time of.this~ appraisal were based onithe existing ~ computer systems;and'how they were used to= support ERF functions..

,

'

Based on'.the aboveifin' dings', this: portion of the licensee's program

-

"-

is: acceptable.

!

11.2.2.1-Data Collection Method V

i Two computer systems were accessed at the TSC to monitor plan't

~

sensors. The.PPC' consisted of a General. Electric.4020 intelligent front-end that continuously: collected plant dataifrom some 500. analog i

'

c and 500 digital sensors and wrote-the data to a two megabyte.(MB)

solid state, shared memory area-(megastore) for access by.a

.

DEC.11 785-VAX' system. The DEC 11-785 routinely-read.the plant.

.

i data in'megastore and processed'it prior-to storing, reporting,

and displaying the information.

i Some '16 MBs main memory,1500 MB 'hard diskf a; tape drive, and other1

!

peripherals including VT100~CRT. terminals in the TSC were all part 1-of the DEC VAX 11-785 system. :This system is able to support plant.

i

' data acquisition, model calculations / processing,-storage, and display.as well as plume display.

Data reporting capability of the.PPC

!

included:

A daily plant status report that can be requested any time

'

using the VT100 terminals in the TSC.

a A menu selection of some 32 logs.

/

j

,

An option to obtain the analog-value'of a specified sensor.

'

I However,ty had several limitations.the inspectors noted that the present P L

capabili While the analog value of a L

given sensor could be displayed,.neither the sensor description nor

the units of measure of the sensor's ou.tput were available on the display.

Also, the present system did not provide TSC staff with the capability of obtaining a time plot of one'or.several sensors'

,

'

outputs.

'

I The other computer system providing support to the TSC was.the SPDS

,

.

computer, a DEC VAX 11-750 with three MB's main memory, 126 MB's

.

'

hard disk, and a Chromatics color graphics CRT located in the TSC.

'

i; This.systeai routinely monitored some.103 analog and 85 digital sensors.

,

i Data from plant sensors were gathered by some'five microprocessor

controlled front-ends and routed serially (RS232C) via fiber optics links to the DEC 11-750.

The front-ends were:

DIV I DAS; DIV II DAS; NON-DIV;.NON-DIV-DAS; and MET DAS.. Meteorological data were i

averaged and. transferred every 15 minutes to the PPC DEC.VAX.11-785

'

i

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!

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+

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, M a DECNETJfor ' tora e and disp 1ay. "The' primary' output' mechanism s

.

formthe SPDSLin the SC.was"a Chromatics colorgraphic-CRT. zThe

'

-

user would select a pre-determined output format for safety parametert

sets'using either function keys or touch screen features on the-

{-

-

'Chromatics~ terminal.

_

g

' Based.on'the above fin' dings,.this portion of the licensees pro ram q

is acceptable; however, the followingLitensishould'be considere for

,

[

improvement:

.

h

.

.

.

Analog. Data outputs-available vie computer to TSC staff should:

-

.

. list-the-sensor and~the units of m,asure' displayed.

_

.

1'

.

.

..

..

[

'

Time plots:of one or several sensors should be~availableivia

-

computer to TSC staff.

.

l 1.2.2.2 Time Resolution

'

.ThePPCfront-end(GE4020)llypledeverysensoratleastonceevery sam

+

15 seconds.

The SPDS norma sam)1ed all sensors at least once per

second. - Data. rates for both~ the P)C and the SPDS were~ considered

. low.to moderate and not; expected.to produce computer system throughput problems for either system.

. Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program.

-

is acceptable.

-

1.2.2.3 Isolation p

The existing PPC used analog and digital input scanners to the

.

~

4020 Process Computer which were not electrically isolated from. safety

equipment.

The 4020 computer is accessed by the VAX

.11/785 for the

-

TSC and E0F data acquisition systems.

~

The inspector was provided with Purchase S)ecification Schedule E-l'

for the upgraded Plant Process Computer (P)C) led to run in parallel'

scheduled for installation beginning April 1987 and schedu j-with the' existing PPC for the six, months beginning-July.1987.

The

,

-

Purchase Specification reflected that-Division I Cabinet-1C401 and F

Division II Cabinet IC402 were the DAS cabinets that provide will

termination to IE signals,for the SPDS.

All' signals used by-the

.

l

'

current SPDS were to be acquired and converted for use by the upgraded j

PPC, a VAX 8600 com) uter.-

In a fashion similar to the existing SPDS,-

e

,

that employs Fiber Optic Links between the SPDS Host Processor and

l

'

!

the DAS cabinets, the VAX 8600 processor will also employ fiber j -

optic links'to the DAS cabinets.

~

'

TheSPDSSafetyAnalysisReport(IEletterNG-84-0012/NG-83-4379, ions

,

dated January 3, 1984) submitted to-NRR for review prompted quest

.

concerning acceptability of electrical isolation devices,-(i.e., the

-

,

i

'15

g l,

.

-

.

.

= - -

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-.

- -

. - -

.

.

-

.

.

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.

.

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.

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2 fiber optic'l' ink's);

The licensee responded.tn the NRR request-F

.

"(letterNG-84-2724,7 dated July 6,~1984) for additional information,i

,

describing,the fiber optic. links as; acceptable.

A Final SER.has~~

'

o l=

-

'not been received.

.

~

LBased 'on the aforementioned ~information provided tio.the inspector, F ~

^

-

the electrical isolation of the existing.PPC from plant safety systems

'

-.

.is inadequate. !However',= if the installation oftthe upgraded PPC used.

.

isolation equivalent.to the existing SPDS, and if such isolation is.

appropriately: verified,PPC scanning, equi ment in e,arly 1988, this ;'

ivalidated, and documented upon completion

-

of. removal of. existing

'

>

j portion of the licensee's. program will tien be adequate.'

Therefore,the'licenseemustensurethatthe:newPPC:(VAX8600)will:

L

.be electrically isolated :from plant safety systems, and that such -

isolation will be adequately verified,. validated and documented.

ThisisanOpenItem(331/86020-02).

_

,

1.2.3 Data Communications'.

1.2.3.'1 Capacity

{

See-Sections 1.2.2 and 1.2.2.1.

.

1-1.2.3.2 - Error Detection.

o See Sections 1.2.1.3,-1.2.2.1, 1.2.4.1, and 1.2.6.2'.-

l 1.2.3.3 Transmission between-ERFs Data communications from the PPC and SPDS were RS232 to TSC

'

i peripherals and employed industry standard error checking i.

techniques.

Time synchronization was reported to be done manually

.

L.

once per week by licensee personnel calling the National Bureau of p

Standards in Colorado for Greenwich Standard Time.

,

..

Based on the above. findings, this portion of.the licensee's-program

]

'

is acceptable.

$

1.2.4 Data Analysis

,

l 1.2.4.1

Reactor Technical Support L'

The SPDS was the primary data acquisition system available'to-i the TSC staff and the only electronic data base available for.

trending (ofplantthermal-hydraulicparameters.

The SPDS can

display Level'2 Display) selected variables, such as drywell

,

temperature, pressure,=and high range:. radiation"for the past i

!

30 minutes..: Selected radioactivities; including station offgas L

stack activity, may be also trended.

MIDAS provided-this trending.

capability for all stack release rates.

Since the primary use of

,

i

'

-

_

---

-.4

__---._-_.-.---____.----.,--_.___.-_-a_.

. - - - - -. -. - -.

..

. -... -. - -

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.

-

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~ trending is to. extrapolate into.the future, ailarger history.than:

.

~ 30 minutes is needed for more accurate. trending. -The inspector:.

'

'

'

-

understood,that-the new PPC.had sufficient unused capacity to allow

.for the: storage-of.several.hourslof' parameter data LNo direct classification.~assis'ta'nce' was provided operators by the.

JSPDS through.the use of algorithms that consider Emergency Action-Level-(EAL) setpoints. ^At present,-setpointssin the SPDS related,

only to Technical Specificationiand Emergency OperatingProceduce-

'

(EOP)setpoints;

~

-

-

- '

~

_

SPDS Level ~3 displays were X -iY: plots of two. variables;;the SPDS~

SER reflects thatithere were currently three= plots available:. PPV'

'

Saturation. Limit;iTorus Load Limit;1and Heat. Capacity Temperature ~

Limit.

.

Based on the above_ findings, this portion of the licensee's' program

!

~

is acceptable; however,' the following items should be considered for improvement:

• '

-The new PPC should provide the: licensee's emergency response-

~

organization with the capability of readily obtaining

~

historical plots of plants parameters that-are several-hours, rather than only 30 minutes, in duration.

SPDS displays should-also inc1'ude setpoints associated with

the plant's EALs to facilitate timely emergency classification.-

The licen'see should add other operational curves to the SPDS's

• -

level three displays pressurelimitcurve)(toenhanceaccidentmitigationsuch as the drywel capabilities.

• 1.2.4.2. Dose Assessment The licensee had the same dose assessment'c'apabilities in the'CR TSC and E0F. Theprimarydoseassessmentmethodwasthevendor-supplied, MIDAS model, w1ich was run on the plant VAX computer from-terminals located in the CR, TSC, and E0F.

A manual dose calculation method based.on MIDAS parameters was available as a backup to MIDAS.

I EPIP-3;3, Revision.2 and CPIP-2.1 ~ Revision 5 both entitled " Dose AssessmentandProtectiveActionkecommendations"providedstepby step instructions on how to perform calculations using MIDAS and the manual. backup method.

The MIDAS computer c:de was supplied to the licensee along with a six volume user's manual. MIDAS had an accident calculation mode.

and a routine environmental calculation mode.which would be used for 10 CFR 50 Appendix I calculations. ~In-the accident calculation.

mode, MIDAS had six calculation options-available as. listed below:

-

N

- -

-

.

.

m..

.m

-

.

...

.

-.

m

-.-....

- -

L,

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0ption A - For a monitored release of radioactive material

• -

with the Standby Gas Treatment System (SBGTS). operating, and

. automatic entry of release rate and onsite meteorological' data.'.

.

' Option B'

Same as 0ptio~n~A, exceptISBGTS;is-not operating.

-

i

~~

<

Option C'- For a monitored release of radioactive: material,.

-with SBGTS operational:and manual input of release: rate ~and:

meteorological' data.

• .

Option D - Same ~asL 0ption' C, exceptL SBGTS is:not operating.

~

OptionE-Thisoptionuseddefaultlaccidentsource: terms

'

-*

(e.g., LOCA, control rod drop accident).

Option F.- This option allowed the userssto manually set'

parameters specific to the current situation-(e.g., isotopic

mixbasedonstack;sampleanalysis). This~ option was not,-

however, available.to the CR.

AvailableMIDAScalculationmodesandbackupcalc01ationmethods did not clearly address-unmonitored release pathways, such as:

through portions of the plant ventilation system which exhaust non-contaminated air during normal operations but which may become contaminated.during an accident due to sample failure or improper

.

ventilation system line up.

The licensee must have adequate

.

!

provisions for gene' rating offsite dose projections for releases that'

i enter the environment through unmonitored pathways.. This is an Open Item (331/86020-03).

MIDAS and the manual calculation method were capable of calculating.

'

doses from releases out of the three reactor building vents,ilding the turbine building vent, and the offgas stack.

The reactor bu

-

and turbine building vents were considered ground level = releases while the offgas stack was considered an elevated release.

Release concentrations from the release points and vent / stack flow rates were determined using the KAMAN effluent monitoring systems and

,

automatically were inputted into the MIDAS program.

The isotopic

mix in options A through E was determined by a General Electric study.

'

(A more complete discussion on source term is found in Subsection A.).

MIDAS used either'a straight-line Gaussian atmospheric dispersion model.or a plume trajectory atmospheric dispersion model.

Meteorological data-(windspeed and stability) is: automatically inputted-into MIDAS.

(A more complete discussion of MIDAS's i

atmospheric dispersion models is found in Subsection B considered building wake correction factors, plume rise). MIDAS

,

, dry deposition, and rainfall washout.

Radioactive decay from the time of reactor shutdown and during plume transit is also considered, o

a

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JAsdiscussedNeviously,;thelicensee!s' manual:dosecalculation

'

'

-method was based on dose factors' computed by MIDAS. LAl sample dos ~e'

,

calculation using MIDASiand,the manual; method showed.less than a

1.5-factor difference between the two methods for both whole-body _

!-

and thyroid. dose. :TheEdifference was attributed to the combining

'of; stability classes.for the manual method from seven classes to;

-

four classes.

,

i-In theLaccident. calculation mode,' MIDAS had the' capability to-

-

x

!<

. calculate whole-body and thyroid doses out to:50 mi_les; however,--

F particulate deposition _and subs _equent whole-body doses and. ingestion ~

doses from.this deposition can not be calculated out to 50 miles.

-

MIDAS did have the capability to perform ingestion p(Appendix I_

athway doses

'when in the routine environmental calculation mode s

,

l calculations):

.

.

L Based on exercise observations,zfield monitoring team data'were-I-

effectively.used by dose.. assessment.personaal in tha TSC and E0F.

L

.FielddatawerecomparedtoMIDAS-doseprojections.duringthe

exercise and efforts were made to resolve any' discrepancies.

In one

situation, a controller gave errant positive offsite readings.to a

[

field team prior to the' major release.

This caused the Radiological

-

Assessment Coordinator in the E0F-to recheck release rate data to L

assure a release had not occurred yet..The licensee staff followed

1-EPIP-3.3andCPIP-2.1duringthe. exercise-as-theyrelatedtoxfield team control., The licensee s communications with state

'

controlling the State of Iowa field teams was effective. personnel

!

The MIDAS computer code was verified by the vender who supplied the'

code to th~e licensee. The verification test procedures developed by i

the' vender and the final acceptance test report were reviewed and 1-

found to be adequate.

l A.

Source Term i

Principal pathways by which airborne radioactive materials can be-

!

released to the environment from the plant consisted of the Reactor Building vents (three parallel vents, two of which are typically.in i

service during normal operation); the Turbine Building vent; and the main plant stack. -The building ventilation flow rates were approximately 100,000 cfm for.the Reactor Building (with two to,,

'

three exhaust fans running),-approximately 50,000 cfm for the Turbine

'

Building and approximately 5000 cfm for the main stack.- Following~-

1-Standby Gas Treatment System initiation, the Reactor Building vents -

'

I wouldbe.isolatedandthebuildingexhaust(4000cfm)wouldbe

[

discharged via the main' stack. -Stack flow rates were continuously-monitored by the MIDAS computer program and associated hardware.

I All'five of the release pathways mentioned above were continuously

monitored via a vendor-supplied monitoring' system (KAMAN Instrument l

Corp.) for noble gas releases ranging in concentration from-1.0 E-7

[

to 1.0 E+5 pCi/cc.

i

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,

.

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-

.

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-

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-

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LThe'1ower half of this' range was monitored by way of-a-beta

-

,

scintillatoridetector, while-the,upperEhalf wa's monitored.byltwo

-

,

GM detectors having-overlapping ranges.

The noble: gas concentration

>

.

-in,each release pathwayfwas available onJa continuous basistvia the

'

. MIDAS computer program.

In addition to the above release

'the.new Radwaste Building (in late:stagesfon construction; points, during' -

-

'

'

~

thisl appraisal) will also have a KAMAN systemLinstalled on.its; vent. tThe system.will; consist of a low range! noble. gas detector:

and particulate /radiciodine_ sampler.

-

u

.

.

.

, ^ <

~

_

"

'All five vents'had. particulate and radioiodine sampling. capability.

Three' filter / silver. zeolite cartridge sampling units were operated. '

'

in parallel.on each waste stream...Onlyuto-initiated sampling by the one sampler.was operated at-a time; An alarm on a gamma-detector a

' In addition to sampling' capability, the Reactor Building =

next. unit.

.

l vents'had real-time radioactive and: particulate monitoring capability up to 1.0.E-4 pCi/cc. The licensee only used results from these

'

~ monitors as semi quantitative indicators of~a release. 10ata from thesemonitorswastransmittedtotheMIDAS~ System;howeverbthe output ~ signal was suppressed and' because of.its semi quantitative

'

nature,: can only be made available on a MIDAS terminal by those

individuals familiar with the limitations of these data.

~

,

l The inspector reviewed the calibration of-the high1 range channel of-.

the five-identical monitors and determined that the vendor (KAMAN)

)

{-

had provided an initial calibration based on a gaseous source (Xe-133) and sealed point sources (Co-60, Ba-133 and Cs-137).

The i

gaseous source had been used to determine the precise relationship'

,

between reactor output and noble gas concentration, as well as a

,

data point for emergency response.

The sealed point sources, along

a with the Xe-133 source, were used to determine the energy response.

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of the detector.

Following installation of the monitoring systems,

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the licensee performed an independent gas calibration with Xe-133

-

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in June 1982 encompassing =the entire range of the system.

Since'

'

that time, the primary calibration has been verified with point.

-

sources'(traceable to the primary calibration) on an annual basis.

The calibrations were accomplished by taking samples of pre-treatment offgas,analyzingonagammaspectrometer,injectingintotheKAMAN

.

monitor circuit and noting the response.

>-

'

A key part'of the overall source term evaluation was the ability

.

to aerform estimates of core damage. The licensee had two primary

'

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met 1ods.of doing this. The first method was described in CPIP-2.1, j

" Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendation" (Attachment 4,

" Failed Fuel estimate from High Range Monitors").

This was basically e

!

a " quick and dirty" procedure which related the drywell and torus i

high range, gamma monitor readings to a set of pre-calculated values i

corresponding to various accident-scenarios.

The second method was i

described-in PASAP 7.2, " Interpretation of Post Accident Sampling i

System Results ".and was based on radioiodine and Cs-137 concentrations, i

inreactor.coolantandnoblegasconcentrationsincontainment.

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presently formulated, the-procedure entailed a rather time-consuming hand calculation.

According to a licensee representative, the procedure was in the process of being. computerized..The method

.

described in the procedure did not appear to accommodate radionuclides other than those listed above.. The ability to assess the significance

'

of-the presence in reactor coolant of less volatile radioelements such as barium, lanthanum, and strontium (which are stronger indicators.

of. fuel melting) would enhance the licensee's ability to estimate core damage.

Although the Reactor Building, Turbine Building, and off gas stack release pathways are very important (and may cover the majority of pathways from design basis accidents), there are other release pathways that'could be postulated in both design basis and

.

beyond-design-basis accidents.

An example would be post-LOCA leakage through a partially failed-open main steam isolation valve.

Other unexpected unmonitored release pathways may become manifest during the course of other accidents, such as primary and secondary 4'

containment penetration seal / integrity breach pathways.

B.

Meteorology Onsite meteorological data for the plant were provided by instruments located on a tower in a field approximately 1/4 mile south of the main building complex. The current meteorological system, which

]

became operational about July 1985, replaced an earlier system.

Wind, temperature difference, and temperature measurements were i

obtained at nominal ten and 50 meter levels on the triangular tower that was a part of the previous system.

The tower included an internal stairway.

Dew point was measured at the ten meter level of the tower and precipitation measurements were made at ground level near the tower.

Specifications for wi-d and temperature difference sensors met the criteria p. vided in Table 1 of Regulatory Guide No.1.97, Revision 2.

Redundant sensors were provided for wind, temperature, and temperature difference measurements.

The sensors at each level were mounted on a common boom extending to the south of the tower. Wind and temperature sensors for the primary and secondary instruments were separated by approximately five feet and the anemometers and wind vanes were

,

separated by about 44 inches, with the anemometers being closer

'

to the tower than the vanes.

A complete set of spare instruments was maintained to permit sensor calibration with minimal interruption of data collection, and to replace sensors that fail.

Signals from the meteorological sensors were processed by equi 1 ment located in the plant intake structure, and were then sent to tie

.CR and the Plant Process Computer.

The intake structure was heated tut not air conditioned.

The power supply to the signal conditioning and Data Acquisition System (DAS) were not protected from power surges.

In the intake structure, analog signals from the instruments

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were conditioned and sent to the primary DAS,' where digital' values:

were extracted at ten second intervals.

Each meteorological

'

instrument had its own signal conditioner, but there-is only a, single primary DAS., Signals,from the primary DAS are sent:

to a secondary DAS-that prepares.15 minute averages which are,

recorded in the CR; and to the SPDS computer for display and transfer to the plant process computer where they undergo further processing and are entered into. meteorological data archives.

The primary source of electrical power for the meteorological sensor -

operation, signal conditioning, and DAS was.provided via a vital There was no conditioning plied through-the normal. light circuit bus.

Backup power was sup of the power supplied to the meteorolo ic~al system electronics, and the system did.not have an uninterruptib e power supply.

Howeverg the DAS was set'to reboot automatically following an interruption in power.

Spare signal conditioning electronics were available, but there were no spares for the DAS.

Further,'there were no provisions to obtain onsite meteorological data in the event of failure of the primary DAS even if the meteorological sensors and signal conditioning equ,ipment were operating properly.

Minimal data quality checking algorithms-(zero and range checks)-

were provided by the primary DAS.

The MIDAS program provided for

.

some additional checks on the data prior to entering data into the

'

meteorological data archives.

These checks included comparison of current values with previous values and comparisons of signals from corresponding sensors in the primary and secondary systems.

However, these checks were rudimentary.

For example, the tolerance for difference in wind speeds between primary and secondary sensors was ten mph, although the sensors were only several feet apart.

Average sensor values were computed for periods of one and 15 minutes if a a

sufficient number of valid readings were available.

The meteorological monitoring systems were calibrated on a semiannual

-

,

basis, with about a three month separation between systems.

The zero

'

and span checks and circuit card alignment were conducted quarterly.

,

Zero and span checks alone were conducted semi-weekly.

All of i

'

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these checks were performed per written procedures and instructions.

Additional system checks were performed by the-operational staff

-.

during CR shift changes and each morning on normal work days.

The

-

MIDAS data archive was checked about once a week to determine data

recovery.

The results of the data archive checks were recorded in

'

a data log.

'

The western-most set of sensors had been designated as the primary system.

As long as data from these sensors were considered to be valid, the primary system data would be entered into the archive.

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. system sensors would then.be-entered into the archive,Lif considered

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. valid. Otherwise, the archive-.will:show;no' valid data for the period.

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LD0ringtheappraisAl',~it3wasnotedthatdifferencesin; wind ~ speeds

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from sensors at each41evel were welltin excess of the. expected.

errors associated with measurement of random variables _given the n

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accuracy claimed for the-instruments..The, original observation was'

made:during northerly winds.

Further evaluation'of the wind speed

data'showed that.the difference in speeds was a function of: wind'

> direction,Jwith'thedifferencebeingnegligible;durinffecton-wind

, southerly winds. Thisiwas a clear indication of..a tower wake e speedmeasurements-when-thetowerwasfupwindoftheanemometers'.

Wind speed data contained;in a-document titled " Field-Verification

'

Test Report for Upgraded Meteorological System" also indicated that-

-

there was a tower. wake effect' problem.

-Examination of the data recovery logs'did not indicateithst there had been any significant^ problems with the ~ operation of the; meteorological instrumentation However, the logsidid. indicate that there had been problems in the: transfer of meteorological' data between'the primary DAS and the MIDAS 1 data? archive. This transfer-involves both the SPDS'(VAX-11/750) and plant process'(VAX-11/785),

computers. -Data summaries for the first ten months of 1986, as prepared by the MIDAS-program, indicated 7.15 percent missing data for joint frequency of wind direction, wind speed and temperature difference for the upper. level of the. tower, Land 8.33. percent' missing

' data for the lower: level.

Much of-the. data missing from the MIDAS-archive was available from the CR's printer output.

The Cedar Rapids Flight Service Station was listed as the. primary'-

backup source of meteorological information for use in-dose' -

assessment in the event of failure of the onsite' meteorological system. The Cedar Rapids data should be' reasonably representative-of conditions at the DAEC.

However, the table to convert routine meteorological' observations'provided.in EPIP 3.3-into temperature differences-for use in MIDAS was not an-accurate translation of the original table developed by Pasquill'and modifiedtby Gifford.

(The original table is reproduced as Table 13.2 in Atmospheric Science and Power Production (ASPP).

D. Randersoni ed. 00E/IIC-ZI601, U.S.-

Department of Energy,.1984, and~in F. A..Gifford,"1976, " Turbulent-Diffusion-Typiiig Schemes:

A Review,."Nucl. Saf., 17(1):71).-

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One-of the primary release pathways 't DAEC would be through the

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a plant'st100 m, stack. The wind speed at the-50 m level'of the tower-

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would not be. representative of the windspeed at that release height.

4:

MIDAS used a. power-law ~ relationship;to estimate,the release height

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wind.s The exponents in the relationship were selected on the~ basis W

of temperature difference.

However, the exponent values-contained

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in the program were approximately the same as values given for urban

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Law Exponent'as a Function-of; Roughness-and Stability.="'LAtmos.

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Environ l,;13:191-194)~and were inappropriate for this.appTiciIion,

' as.the rural' values would be more appropriate than the urban o

- values.

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In: summary, although the licensee has upgraded th'e.onsite ?

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meteorciogical monitoring, system,Eit-is not evident that'the~ system i-and relevant procedures:will provide representative.or.reliableu

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. meteorological inputs to dose calculations, as evident'by the:

i sfollowing six' factors:. wind speed,'and possibly wind direction-

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' measurements, for at least;the northerly.. direction are significantly; s

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affected by tower wake: effects on at.leastisome wind sensors. :The ~

reliability,of the data is suspect:becauseithe sensors' outputs

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signals are processed by heat sensitive; equipment that'is kept ein the-signal: plant's: intake structure whichsis not air conditioned..The

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conditioning and DAS were not protected from power surges.

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. Computerized meteorological data quality control checks-are generally ~

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too rudimentary to identify' and eliminate highly _ suspect data before- '

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if they.are available to the user.-. The power : law relationship' utilized R

to estimate wind speed at the off-gaststack height is inappropriate'

i for a rural situation.

In the event that the National-Weathers Service's current observations.taken:atLCedarLRapids would be utilized

'

i in the absence of onsite meteorological = data, the table in EPIP>3.3 used to convert routine observation information'into a stability

-

class is not an accurate translation of the scheme described in the

technical. literature.

The licensee must ensure that aforementioned six factors which can adversely' affect offsite dose calculations are

.

.

corrected or are adequately compensated for.

This is an Open Item

(331/86020-04).

i-1.2.5 Data Storage

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1.2.5.1 Storage Capabilities L

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The PPC DEC VAX-11-785 can store 30 minute data averages on hard

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disk for up to three months. :That historical data disk file can

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then be saved on magnetic tape to provide continuous data storage.

l This was reported to be an automatic and continuous process.

The

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SPDS did'not store data for more than 30 minutes in history files

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- unless directed to do so in a continuous mode or directed by the F

Loperator.

No problems should:be expected. based'on these data b

storage resources.

L Howeve'r, licensee personnel did not demonstrate familiarity with, or E

report any capability of either the PPC.or the'SPOS to retrieve and report or display user-selected historical data.-~The licensee must l

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developed procedures and provide.related training to appropriate

emergency response personnel to enable them to retrieve and display historical plant data that are stored using the PPC or SPDS. -This

F is an'0 pen Item (331/86020-05).

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1. 2. 6 :

- System Reliability-

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1.2.6.1-Computer-Based-Systems

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- Licensee personnel.have demonst' rated a trac'eable' availability 11og

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i no'such approach was maintained for the PPC.

fortheSPDS.-However[lityofacomputersystemremainsquestionable'

In~ general, the reliabi

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so long.as:its-historical availability:has not been well' documented.

.- The. licensee must establish and maintain an availability /86020-06).

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log for~

H the present and the new PPC. :This is an Open Item.(331

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- A documentation review indicated an initial and continuing sensor

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through computer calibration process:for the SPDS.; A parallel:

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effort was not found for the'PPC. -The. licensee must establish'and..

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maintain a sensor 1through computer calibration process for the PPC; i

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-Thisis..anOpen. Item'(331/86020-07).

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Although. the licensee has planned to install'a new PPC:(VAX 8600),

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.therewereno_currentplanstoinstal_1.LaredundantVAXE8600Jo1

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I enhance PPC~ reliability.

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As an improvement; item,;the' licensee should consider the acquisition and installation of:a redundant VAX 8600 PC for the following reasons:

-The availability of.the PPC would then approach 100-percent:

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i-(for all except common mode failures - e.g., power-failure,.

.or a fire, flood,. earthquake, etc.);

preventative maintenance may.be scheduled without concern-

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-for the. temporary loss'of the sole PPC; I

software development can be performed on an identical computer

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(including testing and verification);

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programmers can train and test new software'without the concern

that their efforts'may cause a complete PPC crash;.-

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new operating systems or revisions to' existing operating

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systems may be 1mplemented and tested on the backup system to assess impacts prior to installation on the~ primary monitoring

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PPC; and

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excess resources of the second PPC computer will be available

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1.2.6.2

.-Manual Systems.

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- A system for manually collecting plant status data was in use,

whereby. the CR's back panel communicator read indicators and

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L transmitted this information to'an operator who then transmitted

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the data to the TSC and E0F.~ The~ verification procedure here-.

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essentially involved requests by the operator for validation of.

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iwhatLappeared in his-judgement to be deviant values.

Thus,1this:

system may. detect errors of commission (i.e?, values that'are e

. erroneously recorded) but~wil1 miss errors 1of' omission-(i.er, values, f that'should have changed but:were: not recorded as changed). ~' Since

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tthe operator may not be1 technically knowledgeable concerning.nuclearD

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reactors,< this verification mechanism is:particularly prone to errors,~ -

which may then be~~ incorporated into subsequent 4 data plotting and

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' decision-making processes.'

'

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this-portidnifethelicensee'sprogram

'

Based on the above' findings;following item should be considered for-is. acceptable;.however, the improvement:

To eliminate one source of human error.an( to improve the'

timeliness of data availability to decisionmakers, the licensee -

should. implement-an automated data collection-and transmissioni

. system to replace-the: manual system (back panel communicator:

-plus an operator) currently used to compile and transmit certain

' control room readouts to personnel in the-TSC and EOF.

1.2.7 On-Shift Dose Assessment.

~

1.2.7.1 Dose Assessment Proficiency Initial dose assessment performed in the CR involved.the use of.

the MIDAS

- EPIP 2.5 program, as described in Section 1.2.4.2. According to

Control Room Emergency Response Operation," the Operations Shift Supervisor'(OSS) has the responsibility for dose' calculations should a release be in progress. performing offsite Discussions with licensee' staff indicated that the'0SS usually delegated this task to the Shift Technical Advisor (STA). =Both the OSSs and STAS are trained in performing dose calculations using MIDAS and the backup manual method as specified in EPIP 3.3 (Dose Assessment and Protective ActionRecommendations).

The licensee has compared its MIDAS' dose assessment model outputs with

.

those from MES0 REM, the model used'by the State'of: Iowa.

Three test

'

cases were run, one with the release from the offgas stack (standby gas treatment off); a second with the release from the-offgas' stack (standby gas treatment on); and a third with a release from the-turbine building.

Comparison of the results between MIDAS and MES0 REM'

for whole-body..and thyroid dose rates were within'a factor of 1.5 for'

all cases-except one.

There was a factor'of three to seven difference

.(dependent on distance from the release-point) between MIDAS and MES0 REM for.the whole body dose rate calculations related to the offgas: stack-release with the standby gas treatment system on.

i Based-on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is acceptable; however, the following' item should be considered for improvement:

26

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The licensee should continue to interface with perso'nnel-from

.the State of Iowa to identify cases of-significant differences between MIDAS and MES0 REM results, and to decide how these cases will-be dealt with during an emergency situation.

1.2.7.2

. Dose Assessment Technical Adequacy

'

Using MIDAS, the STA could perform a dose calculation without interfering w.ith the immediate response to an accident. Without MIDAS, the user must rely on a hand calculation method described in EPIP-3.3.

Assuming one release point, walk-throughs indicated that hand calculations could be performed in approximately ten

'

minutes after effluent monitor-readings and meteorological data had been obtained.

If the accident. involves multiple release points, the hand calculations become more lengthy and time consuming and-could conceivably impact the OSS's or STA's ability to direct or assistinother-areas (e.g.,accidentmitigation)duringtheinitial phase of an emergency.

.

.

Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is acceptable; however, the following item should be considered for improvement:

The licensee should consider automating the manual dose

assessment procedure.

Programming the procedure on a hand calculator would eliminate the potential for human error and speed up calculations, particularly for a situation where there are multiple release points.

1.3 Functional Capabilities 1.3.1 Control Room Support Based on the exercise observations, the TSC staff adequately supported the Control Room staff in accident assessment and mitigation activities.

However, as discussed earlier-in this report, the TSC staff's capabilities would be enhanced if manual data collection and transmission provisions would be automated.

.

!

Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is acceptable.

1.3.2 Initial E0F Functions The TSC staff's capabilities to perform E0F staff functions prior-to the E0F becoming fully /86015 operational have been described in NRC previoussectionsofthisappra(DRSS).Also, as described in Inspection Report No. 331 isal report, the TSC contained appropriate plans, procedures, records, and equipment that were

.

necessary for TSC staff to perform the duties of their E0F counterparts, including:

offsite dose assessment; offsite protective action decisionmaking;l monitoring activities.

and coordination and

'

assessment of offsite radiologica

.

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Based on the'above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is acceptable.

2.0

'0PERATIONAL SUPPORT CENTER (OSC)

2.1 Physical Facilities 2.1.1 Design 2.1.1.1 Location The OSC was located on the ground floor of the Administration Building and encomaassed an area extending from the main security control point to t1e Health Physics (HP) access control area.

The OSC complex included a lunchroom, breathing air recharging station, personnel decontamination facilities, and a first aid room.

It was in close proximity to the TSC, being only about 50 to 100 ft down a hallway and on the same level as the TSC.

There were several facilities which, although not physically a part of the OSC, would be staffed with personnel under the cognizance of-the OSC Supervisor when activated.

These are the Offsite Relocation and Assembly Area (0RAA), located in the Palo School; the Offsite Radiological Analysis Laboratory (0RAL),-located in Cedar Rapids; and the Offsite Decontamination Facility (0DEF), located in Cedar Rapids adjacent to the ORAL.

The ORAA was equipped with a small complement of radiation survey instruments, protective clothing, and other supplies.

It was used primarily as an assembly area for non-essential licensee staff.

The ORAL and ODEF, because of their close physical proximity to the E0F, are discussed further in Section 3.1.2.

2.1.1.2 Alternate OSC Location At the time of this appraisal, the licensee had identified candidate sites for an alternate OSC, d in EPIP 1.3, " Plant and Site should the primary OSC become uninhabitable.

The ORAA was identifie Evacuation," as the facility to which all OSC staff should proceed in the event the OSC is not habitable.

According to licensee representatives, however, certain key OSC staff, such as the OSC Supervisor and possibly an Assistant OSC Supervisor, would relocate to the TSC.

In addition, neither EPIP 1.3 nor EPIP 2.1, " Activation and Operation of the OSC," contained specific guidance regarding what radiological or non-radiological conditions would warrant OSC evacuation and relocation.

The licensee must proceduralize guidance related to the evacuation and relocation of OSC personnel, including specifying:

what criteria warrant OSC evacuation; which supervisory and non-supervisory personnel would relocate to the TSC, ORAA, or some other location; and how OSC personnel accountability would be maintained during a i

relocation.

This is an Open Item (331/86020-08).

1

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'In addition to the above Open Item, the'following items should be considered for improvement:

Besides the offsite ORAA,te areas which may_also serve asthe. licen

identify one or more onsi an' alternate OSC.

,

The evacuation of OSC personnel and the re-establishment of-

OSC functions at another location should be an objective of the next annual exercise.

2.1.1. 3 Size, Layout, and Environment The OSC occupied about 3300 square feet and contained an area where command and control can be exercised, as'well as a holding / staging area for in plant teams.

Based on exercise observations made in conjunction with this appraisal, the facility was adequately suited as a point from which in plant teams can be formed. briefed, and.

dispatched since it contained adequate space and included the access =

control point for entry to the restricted area.

The OSC has not been-designed to be habitable (i.e., with additional shielding and special ventilation system)- in the same manner as the CR and TSC following amajoraccident.

Therefore, if a major accident were to occur, it is likely that the OSC would have to be evacuated to an alternate location as discussed in Section 2.1.1.2.

'

Based on the above findings,.this portion of the licensee's program is acceptable.

2.1.1.4 Display Interface Based on exercise observations, in plant radiological status information was readily available in the OSC to support the dispatch of teams into the plant.

Information updates occurred on a " batch" basis via dedicated telephone lines.

Status boards displaying

,

general plant information and in plant radiation levels were updated on a timely basis.

i Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is acceptable.

2.1.2 Radiological Equipment and Supplies 2.1.2.1 Radiation Monitoring The licensee had a capability to monitor direct radiation (with ortable survey instrumentation) and airborne radioactive materials p(with portable air samplers).

This was observed during the exercise; however, the inspector did not observe a continuous air monitor (CAM) in use in the OSC.

Given the lack of shielding and special i

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.

.

-ventilation for the OSC and the fact that airborne radiation events can undergo severe transients during an emergency, it was suggested in Inspection Report No. 331/86015(DRSS) that a CAM be operated within the OSC workspace after facility activation.

A' complement of monitoring instruments and air. sampling equipment

'

was maintained in emergency supplies cabinets in the OSC proper.

(additional equipment was maintained at access control) for use by in plant teams.

All equipment was. regularly inventoried, calibrated

,

!

and maintained.

,

Based on the above-findings, this portion of the' licensee's program is acceptable.

2.1.2.2 Personnel Dosimeters

.

.The licensee maintained an adequate number of dosimeters, both thermoluminescent and self-reading, at the OSC for all staff.

An inventory (of approximately 2000 self-reading dosimeters ranging from 200 mR full scale) to 500 R (full scale) was maintained within the OSC complex at the access control point.

A procedure existed for tracking doses received by in plant teams.

During the exercise, it was observed that two clerical personnel updated personnel exposure histories after each plant entry.

Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is acceptable.

2.1.2.3 Protective Supplies The OSC also served as the storage. location for the main supply of radiological protective clothing.

In addition to sets of protective clothing contained in OSC emergency cabinets for the in plant teams, there were ap3roximately 750 sets of protective clothing in portable lockers (on w1 eels) kept in the OSC.

Respiratory protective equipment, both air purifying and supplied air. types, were stored at the OSC's Access Control Point.

The licensee had an air compressor

!-

system (which supplied Grade D or better breathing air) for the

!

)urpose of refilling self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA)

l 30ttles.

In the event that the air within the OSC would become contaminated, the licensee had a cascade system and reserve compressed air tanks sufficient to fill about 100 SCBA bottles.

l A sufficient supply of potassium iodide was maintained in the

!

First Aid facility within the OSC.

l Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program l

is acceptable.

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Non-RadiolodicalEquipmentand-Supplies

- 2.1.~3.1J_ Support Supplies Support supplies were primarily contained in four cabinets-in the-OSC.' A complete. package of material (including-references,te teams.

forms,

and procedures) was available to. support in plant and offsi

'First aid supplies.and. equipment were available in:the First Aid

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Room which was part of thel0SC complex'.

~A' supply-of basic tools was maintainedlin tool kits ~in the OSC emergency cabinets.

Specialized tools were not kept.'in:the OSC, but were available.~in various maintenance shops throughout the. plant.

Parts' inventoried for key plant. equipment were maintained on a computerized data base.

This' data base was accessible by plant maintenance engineering;~and-supervisory _ staff located in the TSC.

Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's' program

'is acceptable.

-3.0 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY-(E0F)

3.1 Physical Facilities 3.1.1 Design-3.1.1.1 EOF Size and Layout The EOF was located within 9,200 square feet of' office space that-was used by design engineering staff during normal work periods.

This area was reconfigured into E0F workspace by moving partitions, desks and chairs, and by hanging maps and display boards.

Separate work areas were provided for Radiation Assessment,; Engineering Technical Support, EOF Management, state, local, county, FEMA, and NRC personnel. A central EOF area was 3,124' square feet-in size.

An additional 1,288 square feet of closed conference. room and office-space was also available.

This area can be configured to yield three separate conference rooms.

The layout of the E0F concentrated the primary emergency response staff in a 720 square feet area, with three rows of desks.

The Emergency Response and Recovery Director (ER&RD) was located centrally in front, flanked by the Radiation and E0F Manager and a corporate-management representative. The second row of desks provided space for technical support personnel,The traffic flow was supported by.

while the third row was to be used by state and county officials.

walkways between desks.

During this appraisal, the licensee's Emergency Planning staff stated that plans were being developed to make the E0F a dedicated workspace, rather than an area reconfigured from its everyday use.

The licensee indicated that this change should be comp.leted prior

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to the 1987 annual exercise.

However, the licensee indicated that it remained uncertain whether the basic E0F layout would differ significantly from that seen during this appraisal.

Assuming that the future E0F layout will remain about the same as that observed during this appraisal, the following items should be considered for improvement:

Traffic in front of the status boards and displays should be

alleviated by providing a pathway behind the third row of desks.

On a floor with 9,200 square feet of space, it appears that

slightly less than 50 percent of that space is used for E0F functions.

More effective use of wall space for displays and lowered congestion in traffic areas would result from spreading out some of the functional areas to the space available.

It is especially important in designing the new E0F facility, that the licensee carefully evaluate the amount of square footage required for a fully staffed operation, prior to building any fixed walls that may limit space utilization.

Placing the VAX printer and Xerox machine in closer proximity

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would reduce the frequent movement between these resources, and would remove the printer from its potentially interfering position in a conference room.

I 3.1.1.2 Location The EOF was located on the 14th floor of the IE Tower Building in downtown Cedar Rapids, about 10.1 miles from the DAEC plant.

This location meets 0) tion 2 of Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737.

The location of the E0F was closen primarily because the IE Tower contained the licensee's corporate offices.

The Linn County E0C was located in the Cedar Rapids City Hall, one block southwest of the IE Tower.

This location facilitates interaction between the licensee, county, ion and city officials.

EOF security would be maintained by a combinat of building security and the Cedar Rapids Police Department.

Based on exercise observations, building security was adequate.

One potential problem with using dedicated office space as an EOF is the misplacement of information that would be important during l

an emergency, such as drawings and manuals.

The current practice for reconfiguring was to box all desktop items and remove them to storage.

A procedure with less potential for loss would involve storing materials within the desks, or in compartments located in

easy proximity to the EOF.

The Media Center was located on the sixth floor of IE Towers.

This facility had ample size and adequate layout.

One problem noted was the provisions for only three telephones in the adiacent waiting The number of phones is not sufficient for handling the area.

volume of media calls that would likely occur during an actual emergency.

r Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is acceptable; however, the following item should be considered for improvement:

The Media Center should be equipped with an adequate number of

telephones for use by media representatives during facility operation.

3.1.1.3 Structure The E0F was built in accordance with the Commercial Uniform Building Code, Zone 1.

Power is supplied by two different feed points on the grid.

Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is acceptable.

3.1.1.4 Habitability / Environment The E0F was located beyond 10 miles from the plant.

Therefore, no special protection factors for habitability are required per Table 1 of Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737.

Environmental conditions, including temperature, humidity and ventilation, were adequately controlled in the E0F with one exception.

The dose assessment room in the E0F was noted to be uncomfortably warm with poor ventilation during the exercise.

A portable fan was operated in this area but did not appear to solve the problem.

The E0F's lighting was adequate, and sound levels were acceptable durirg the exercise. Water and restroom facilities are available at the entrance to the E0F.

Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is acceptable; however, the following item should be considered for improvement:

The licensee should improve ventilation provisions in the

E0F's dose assessment workspace.

3.1.1.5 Display Interfaces The data displays available within the E0F were plant status, radiological status, an area map, ten and 50 mile EPZ maps, an organization chart, and a status flip chart.

Plant status and radiologicalstatuswerebackprojectedviatransparenciesontoa screen positioned to the left of the radiological dose assessment room.

During the exercise these displays were updated approximately every 15 minutes, and hard co)ies of the display contents were distributed to each staff mem)er as the data were updated.

The following points should be considered for improving the projectionsystem:

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The Xerox machine should be positioned away from the rear of

the display screen so that traffic for this resource will not obscurethescreenorblocktheprojectionbeam.

The pedestal stand of the projection screen should

be removed from protruding into the walkway, where it presently constitutes a personnel safety hazard.

Projected images should be enlarged so that occupants

of the third row of desks can easily read the display.

Highlighting techniques should be used to identify parameters

that are currently of interest.

An automated approach to this function would relieve the technical recorder of this very repetitious task.

The organization chart provided timely information on who was serving i

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in what capacity in the E0F.

However, this chart was positioned more

centrally than was necessary.

Moving the organization chart to a less i

central location would make more cental space available for other more important displays.

The status flip chart was located to the right of the ER&RD, and provided space for one flip chart page of events.

The chronology of events may be obscured with this system, since an important transition may take place across two pages.

The following items should be considered for improvement:

The chronology display may be improved by a system which

provides a visually continuous representation of event history.

Circulation of hard copies of event chronology information to

all E0F would permit people to refer to event history on an as-needed basis.

Offsite dose assessment data were available in the EOF from two sources--the dose assessment computer system and the field survey readings.

During the exercise, results of the compute, system modelingwereprovidedontheprojectedradiologicalstatusform.

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Wallmapswereusedtoprojectthepositionoftheplume,given prevailing meteorological conditions.

The dose assessment computer

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system and field monitoring team tracking took place in a small room thatwasseparatefrom,butadjacenttothemainE0Factivity.

Comments on the dose assessment room have been provided in Section 3.1.1.4.

3.1.2 Radiological Equipment and Supplies 3.1.2.1 Radiation Monitoring Since the E0F is located beyond ten miles from the plant, no s)ecial radiation monitoring capabilities are required.

The licensee lad an Offsite Radiological and Analytical Laboratory (0RAL) and an

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Offsite Decontamination' Facility (0DEF) located in Cedar Rapids, in a building called the Iowa Electric Systems Protection Warehouse.

The ORAL and ODEF were located on the second floor of the warehouse.

Activation and operation of the ORAL and ODEF were described in EPIP 2.6 and EPIP 2.7.

Adequate radiation monitoring equipment was available for the Offsite Radiological and Analytical Laboratory /0ffsite Decontamination Facility. A Canberra HPGE detector system, a Tennelec LB 1000 Alpha / Beta detector system, and an emergency-radiciodine counting system (NaI detector) were available for counting environmental samples (e.g., air, soil, vegetation)

brought to the ORAL b Post Accident Sampling and Analysis' Procedures (y field teams.

PASAPs) were available, to provide operating instructions and quality assurance programs for the above detector systems.

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l The ORAL /0DEF facility had an adeq)uate number of portable survey l

instruments (beta / gamma and alpha for surveying contaminated

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individuals sent to the ODEF for decon and for routine use in the analytical laboratory.

Portable air samplers were also available.

I All instruments had current calibration stickers, and have been

inventoried routinely according to PASAP 8.12, " Routine Maintenance of the ORAL and ODEF."

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The ODEF had a 500 gallon stora u tank to handle waste water from the decontamination showers.

Tank content would be sampled and

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analyzed prior to disposal.

Disposal would be done in accordance

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to PASAP 8.11, " Radioactive Waste control and Disposal from the DAEC Offsite Lab and the Decontamination Facility."

The licensee had plans to put an analytical laboratory in a new Training Center located adjacent to the plant.

This lab will be used as a backup to the ORAL for counting environmental samples.

The training center building was under construction at the time of this appraisal.

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Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is acceptable.

3.1.2.2 Protective Supplies i

Since the E0F is located beyond 10-miles from the plant, protective

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supplies (i.e. respiratory protection equipment,/0DEF located in decon supplies,

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protective clothing) are not required.

The ORAL j

Cedar Rapids did have an adequate inventory of protective supplies for personnel decontamination.

Supplies included protective clothing, i

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soap, and towels.

ODEF supp" lies have been routinely inventoried in accordance with PASAP 8.12 Routine Maintenance of the DAEC Offsite

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Decontamination Facility."

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Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is acceptable.

3.1.3 Non-Radiological Equipment and Supplies 3.1.3.1 Records /Orawings Records and drawings maintained on the same floor of the corporate offices that contained the E0F workplace included:

Several sets of the corporate and plant emergency plans and implementing procedures; the emergency plans of the State of Iowa and both counties within the 10-mile EPZ; NRC Region III emergency plan; plant Technical Specifications; FSAR and U) dated FSAR; DAEC Environmental Report; plant Emergency Operating )rocedures; a multi-volume set of reference materials on the dose assessment software; an INP0 Resources Manual; NRC Telephone Directory; standard handbooks for

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various engineering disciplines; large scale and microfiche sets

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of plant layout drawings and electrical, piping, and plant systems post-accident sampling procedures. schematics; associated microfiche re vendor catalogs; and In add

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of EPIPs and CPIPs, separate "er.nrgency information handbooks" containing relevant procedures snd forms were mintained for each key response position.

Emergency planning staff who were based l

neartheEOFworkspace,maintainedtheplans,relatedimplementing procedures, and handbooks.

A librariar maintained references kept in the library which served as the dosr assessment staff's and field team communicators' workstation during E0F operation.

The licensee's administrative services staff maintain d the large scale drawings and microfiche records.

Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program

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is acceptable.

3.1.3.2 Support Supplies i

The E0F was also provided with wall mounted ten and 50-mile EPZ maps; a color-coded 10-mile EPZ evacuation subarea ma r and a large scale protective action decisionmaking flow chart.

Edmapswerecorrectly labeled with sector nomenclature.

As the E0F was situated amidst normal workspace for corporate staff and was in the corporate office building, standard office supplies were readily available from the surrounding wnrkstations as well as from the licensee's normal office supply distribution points located in the building.

Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is acceptable.

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3.2 Information Management 3.2.1 Variables Provided 3.2.1.1 Regulatory Guide 1.97 Variables Most Regulatory Guide 1.97 Variables are not available in real-time in the E0F.

During the appraisal, a terminal associated with the present PPC was available in the E0F.

A MIDAS terminal was also available for use in generating dose projections based upon stack effluents monitored by the KAMAN system. Thus, the licensee has concentrated on providing those parameters necessary for performing radiological dose assessment.

It should be noted that only those parameters associated with a release are provided; those parameters that are source term related, (e.g., Drywell High Range Radiation)

were not provided real-time to the EOF.

Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is acceptable; however, the following item should be considered for improvement:

The licensee should install a terminal linked to the new PPC(VAX8600)intheEOFtoenhancereal-timeplantparameter availability to E0F staff.

3.2.1.2 Other Variables The comments made in 1.2.1.2 in relation to the TSC apply to the E0F, with substitution of ap of the section of EPIP 3.3. propriate section of CPIP 2.1 in place 3.2.1.3 Relationship to Functional Needs The Corporate Emergency Response Plan stated that the corporate organization provides three principal functions in response to an emergency at DAEC:

Performance of the radiological dose assessment function;

disseminate information; and

prime focal point for obtaining and providing requisite

engineering and support services to assist DAEC in establishing stable plant conditions.

The E0F will relieve the TSC of the dose assessment function when activated, normally after a Site Area Emergency declaration.

For a release through a monitored pathway, the real-time data acquisition system of the EOF is adequate to evaluate what is being released.

l However,theE0Fmustobtainanyplantstatusprojectioninformation from the TSC, rather than collecting such information independently, l

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verifyingtheprojectionwiththeTSC,andthenmodifyingdose assessment and protective action decisionmaking based on collective thinking.

If one considers the accident scenario of a large source in containment, but no releases occurring, or the scenario of an unmonitoredrelease,theabilityoftheE0Ftoprojectdosesbased upon source term evaluation cannot be done in real time.

The E0F staff must, instead, depend on telephone communications to obtain numerousparameters,thusmakingthedoseprojectionstime-late.

Requisite engineering and support services are to be provided by the EOF to DAEC to " assist in establishing stable plant conditions."

The available real-time variables do not permit the engineering staff to perform prompt evaluation of reactor accidents, including for example loss of reactor system or primary containment integrity, orfuelpoolaccidents.

Most required plant parameters, other than release rates or met data, must be obtained via tele) hone.

0)timum engineering and support services cannot be provided )y the E0F when hamstrung by the existing plant information systems' limitations.

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As indicated in previous sections of this report, the E0F staff's capabilities to provide additional timely support would be enhanced l

by the installation in the E0F of a terminal that would be linked

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to the NEW PPC.

Furthermore since the licensee plans to shift the software of the SPDS function, to the new PPC, E0F support to DAEC l

would increase, due to the E0F staff's ability to access and evaluate l

information stored in the SPDS.

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3.2.2 Data Acquisition

Plant )arameter monitoring in the E0F was performed by the PPC, inter

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as descri)ed in Section 1.2.2.

The E0F's VT100 CRT, DEC LA-210 pr and Tektronix 4107 graphics display terminal were all supported by DAEC's PPC. The Tektronix 4107 CRT was used to display plume calculation output and had a 4695 color hard copy device connected to provide a screen print record upon requested.

The VT100 generated reports as described for the TSC in Section 1.2.2.

The LA210 printer can be used by EOF personnel to generate hard copy of reports requested by the VT100 user.

l As indicated earlier, the licensee has begun measures to install l

l a new PPC at the DAEC.

The new PPC was scheduled to be fully operational in 1988.

It would not only process the same information as the existing PPC, but would also process information that is currently available through only the SPDS.

The new PPC apparently has information processing capacities that have not as yet been l

reserved for use.

Open items and improvement suggestions related to l

the PPC and SPDS have already been presented in this appraisal

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report, beginning with Section 1.1.1.6.

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3.2.2.1 Data Collection Methods The SPDS does not support the E0F.

The PPC supports the E0F as described in Section 3.2.2.

3.2.2.2 Time Resolution See discussion in Section 1.2.2.~2.

3.2.2.3 Isolation This subject is not applicable to the EOF since it merely used a terminal link to the existing PPC (VAX 11n85).

(See discussion in Section 1.2.2.3.)

3.2.3 Data Communications

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3.2.3.1 Capacity See discussion in Sections 1.2.2 and 1.2.2.1.

3.2.3.2 Error Detection See discussion in Sections 1.2.1.3, 1.2.2.1, and 1.2.6.2.

I 3.2.3.3 Transmission Between ERFs Data communications between the PPC and the E0F were implemented using p/ transmit data using a statistical multi) peripherals oint to point microwave technology.

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receive lexor in the E0F.

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Error checking functions have been built into tie firmware of the l

multiplexor/ modem system at the E0F.

The area of concern here is that microwave communications systems are more susceptible to eavesdropping than dedicated telephone lines because of signal reflections or uncertain distributions.

Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program i

is acceptable; however, the following item should be considered for

improvement:

The licensee should consider encrypting information transmitted

between the DAEC and the E0F to restrict information access by l

unauthorized persons.

3.2.4 Data Analysis l

3.2.4.1 Reactor Technical Support l

l E0F responsibilities have been structured in a manner to avoid a l

real-time necessity for reactor technical su) port.

However, the l

engineering staff assigned to report to the E0F was large, and had a wide range of experience and talent in many disciplines.

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licensee )lanned to relocate the normal workspaces of at least some of t1is engineering staff from the corporate offices to DAEC during 1987.

However, the inspectors understood that the emergency response workstations of most or all of these engineers would remain at the corporate offices.

The necessary categories of plant documentation and technical reference materials have been maintained in the corporate offices for routine and emergency response usage by this enginaering staff.

The inspectors understood that internal discussions were planned to take place in early 1987 regarding what plant records and reference materials would be maintained in the corporate offices, particularly on the same floor where the EOF was located, following the relocation of the engineering staff's normal workstations.

Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is acceptable; however, the following items should be considered for improvement:

The licensee should continue to maintain in the corporate

offices all plant documentation and technical reference materials that may be needed by engineering staffs who would still be expected to re emergency declaration. port to the E0F following an appropriate To enhance the value of the E0F's eng)ineering staff, at least

one terminal of the new PPC (VAX 8600 should be installed in the engineering staff's work area to provide this staff with a greater real-time data acquisition capability than is presently available to this staff.

3.2.4.2 Dose Assessment The licensee had established the same dose assessment capabilities in the E0F as in the TSC.

Therefore, the discussion in Section 1.2.4.2 applies here also.

3.2.4.3 Central Processor Capability See discussion in Section 1.2.4.3.

3.2.5 Data Storage 3.2.5.1 Storage Capabilities See discussion in Section 1.2.5.1.

3.2.6 Models and Systems Reliability and Validity 3.2.6.1 Computer-Based Systems I

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See discussion in Sections 1.2.6.1 and 1.2.6.2.

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3.2.6.2 Manual Systems A manual data analysis system for the presentation of trended information was used in the E0F.

During the exercise, a technical.

recorder plotted data received on the VAX terminal to show trends in variables of interest.

The accuracy of the plots depended on the accuracy of the inaut data (see Section 1.2.6.3) and on the performance of the tec1nical recorder. An E0F communicator verified the data received through telephone communication with the TSC.

Thus, t~e input data were verified; however, human error can be n

introduced in several ways, either by one of several communicators or by the technical recorder.

This could result in an incorrect presentation and subsequent analysis of parameter trends, which could, in turn, adversely affect emergency classification and protective action decisionmaking in the E0F.

Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is acceptable; however, the following item should be considered for improvement:

The licensee should increase the capabilities of automated

parameter trending in the E0F.

3.3 Functional Capabilities 3.3.1 TSC Support The Technical and Engineering Support Group in the E0F provided engineering and analytical support which may be needed to achieve stable plant conditions during an accident; coordinated the establishment of contracts with needed outside consultants and and provided plant support personnel.

These and additional experts;bilities are outlined in Section 2.8 of the Corporate responsi Emergency Response Plan.

Logistical support to the TSC was provided through the Support Services Coordinator.

The Support Services Coordinator duties were defined in Section 2.9 of the Corporate Emergency Response Plan.

When the E0F was fully operational E0F staff assumed the responsibilityforcommunicatingwIthoffsiteagencies,includin]

notification of emergency classification updates routine plant status updates andthestatusofprotectiveactIonrecommendations.

The responsibilities for dose assessment, field team coordination, and protective action recommendations would also transfer to the E0F upon the facility being declared fully operational.

Based on the exercise observation, the E0F staff were adequately capable of providing support to the TSC under accident conditions.

However, as previously discussed in in this report the lack of real-time 11 ant parameter data in the E0F could inhibit the ability of the Tecinical and Engineering Support Group to advise the TSC on mitigating actions concerning the accident.

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dose assessment capability.

The licensee's computerized dose assessment program (MIDAS) can be run from the CR, TSC, and E0F.

A manual backup dose assessment procedure based on the MIDAS program was available in all three facilities.

A comparison of the MIDAS model with the State of Iowa model was performed by the licensee.

Results of this comparison were discussed in Section 1.2.7.1 of this report.

As observed during the exercise, dose assessment results were properly incorporated into protective action decisionmaking.

Guidance on ma<ing protective action recommendations (PARS) was found in EPIP-3.3 and CPIP-2.1.

When the E0F is activated, the Radiological and E0F Manager, assisted by the Radiological Assessment Coordinator, was responsible for developing protective action recommendations.

The Emergency Response and Recovery Director must approve all PARS before they are given to offsite authorities.

Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is acceptable.

4.0 LICENSEE PERSONNEL CONTACTED

• R.McGuaghyElantSuperintendent Manager, Nuclear Division

• D. Mineck,

• D. Wilson, Director of Nuclear Licensing

• G. Harper Emergency Planner

• S. Marshall,EmergencyPlanner

• B. Sligh, Emergency Planner

• S. Swa11s, Licensing Staff

• H. Giorgio, Radiation Protection Supervisor

• J. Smith, Technical Support Supervisor

• R. Lessly, Engineering Staff

• W. Rothert, Engineering Staff

• P. Wildenborg, Engineering Staff

• B. Reid, Licensing Staff

• P. Swofford, Lead Contact, Radiological Equipment and Supplies C. Sutton, Lead Contact, Data Acquisition, Communicators, and Storage L. Hamerick, Lead Contact, Date Analysis, System Reliability G. Taylor, Lead Contact, Dose Assessment T. Gucciardo, Supervisory Engineer

• Indicates those who attended the November 21, 1986 exit interview.

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5.0 EXIT INTERVIEW.

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On November 21,'1986, the inspectors met with those licensee representatives identified in Section 4.0 to present and discuss their preliminary appraisal findings. 'The licensee' indicated that none of the matters discussed were proprietary in nature.

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