IR 05000331/1987002
| ML20211M397 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Duane Arnold  |
| Issue date: | 02/11/1987 |
| From: | Jackiw I NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20211M353 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-331-87-02, 50-331-87-2, IEB-86-003, IEB-86-3, NUDOCS 8702270275 | |
| Download: ML20211M397 (11) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No. 50-331/87002(DRP)
Docket No. 50-331 License No. DPR-49
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Licensee:
Iowa Electric Light and Power Company IE Towers, P. O. Box 351 Cedar Rapids, IA 52406 Facility Name:
Duane Arnold Energy Center Inspection At:
Palo, Iowa Inspection Conducted: November 18, 1986 through February 2,1987 Inspectors:
J. S. Wiebe A. S. Gautam N. V. Gilles hf R[eactor I
. Jac iw, Chief 2-N-U Approved:
rojects Date Section 2C Inspection Summary Inspection on November 18, 1986 through February 2, 1987 (Report No. 50-331/87002(DRP))
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by the resident inspectors and a regional inspector of licensee action on previous inspection findings, operational safety, maintenance, surveillance, Licensee Event Reports, Bulletins, Design Changes and Modifications, Intermediate Range Monitor fuse failures, training and qualification effectiveness, and qualification of A
electrical splices.
Results:
No violations were noted. An administrative overexposure occurred to an operator who did not verify radiation levels prior to climbing on equipment to obtain information for an upcoming shutdown.
0702270275 870211 PDR ADOCK 05000331 G
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted R. Anderson, Assistant Operation; Supervisor H. Giorgio, Radiation Protection Supervisor
- M. Grim, Site Licensing Engineer R. Hannen, Assistant Plant Superintendent, Operations B. Hopkins, Plant Performance Engineer
- K. Howard, Plant Performance Supervisor
- L. Jenkins, Quality Assurance Engineer
- B. Lacy, Maintenance Superintendent
- R. McCracken, Quality Control Supervisor
- C. Mick, Operations Supervisor
- D. Mineck, Plant Superintendent, Nuclear
- R. Salmon, Technical Services Superintendent
- J. Smith, Technical Support Supervisor In addition, the inspector interviewed several other licensee personnel including Operations Shift Supervisors, Control Room Operators, engineering personnel, and contractor personnel (representing the licensee).
- benotes those present at the exit interviews.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Violation Severity Level IV (331/86006-01(DRP)): Lack of'
a.
Material Control to Prevent Use of Defective Static Inverter. The licensee instituted corrective action as follows:
(1) Corrective action taken and results achieved - The licensee has developed an inspection procedure to be performed as part of the maintenance procedure on replacement of static inverters.
The inspection procedure includes checking of the high voltage trip setting.
In addition, administrative controls under which the licensee plans and initiates maintenance work have been strengthened since the installation of the defective static inverter in August 1985.
Improvements include more thorough review of post maintenance testing requirements, requirements for maintenance planners to review the computerized maintenance history data, and more effective use of preventive maintenance procedures.
The licensee also reviewed and modified design change and maintenance procedures to provide additional controls over warehouse spares.
(2) Corrective actions to be taken - The licensee has achieved full compliance.
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(3) Date when full compliance will be achieved - the licensee achieved full compliance in March 1986.
Procedures in effect at that time ensured a defective unit would not be installed.
This violation is considered closed.
b.
(0 pen) Unresolved Item (331/86017-02(DRP)):
Inventory and Tracking of Special Nuclear Material. On November 25, 1986, a telephone conference was held with the licensee, regional specialists, and the inspector. The licensee was having trouble in precisely locating and inventorying detectors (containing special nuclear material) in the Local Power Range Monitors that had previously been cut up and stored in barrels on the bottom of the cask pool. The NRC concurred with the difficulties and determined that because of the high radiation levels associated with the detectors it was not necessary to determine the precise location of each detector.
The licensee agreed to the following course of action:
(1) Determine the total inventory of Local Power Range Monitors, Source Range Monitors, Intermediate Range Monitors, and Transverse Incore Probe detectors onsite by reviewing maintenance and purchasing documents.
(2) Confirm the inventory of detectors in the fuel pool (uncut),
reactor core and warehouse.
(3) Treat the cutup Local Power Range Monitors in the fuel pool as a " batch" containing the remaining detectors.
(4) Ship the batch of cutup Local Power Range Monitors off site for disposal along with any other detectors as desired.
(5) Establish the precise location of all remaining detectors and improve the mechanisms for keeping track of the inventory of detectors.
The above actions have been completed.
This item remains unresolved pending NRC specialist review for possible enforcement action and review of the licensee's mechanisms for keeping track of the inventory of detectors.
3.
Operational Safety Verification The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the inspection period. The inspector verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components.
Tours of the reactor building and turbine building were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment
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in need of maintenance. The inspector, by observation and direct interview, verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.
The inspector observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls. During the inspection, the inspector walked down the accessible portions of the Emergency Diesel Generator System, the Essential Power Bus System, and the Direct Current Power System to verify operability.
On January 22, 1987, an operator entered the Reactor Water Cleanup Room in support of premaintenance activities for an upcoming refueling outage.
Although he contacted Health Physics, reviewed the radiation survey reports, and performed a general area survey; when he exited the room his Self Reading Dosimeter indicated he had received 260 milli-rem. This dose was in excess of the daily administrative limit of 150 milli-rem.
Investigation by the licensee revealed that the operator had climbed on top of a heat exchanger to get valve data without informing Health Physics and without surv6ying that area. The radiation level on top of
'the heat exchanger was approximately a factor of ten higher than the general area radiation levels. No regulatory limits were exceeded.
This item is considered open pending NRC specialist review (331/87002-01(DRP)).
One open item concerning an administrative overexposure was identified.
4.
Monthly Maintenance Observation Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and components listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with technical specifications.
The following items were considered during this review:
the limiting conditions for operations were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to in'tiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and, fire prevention controls were implemented.
Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance.
The following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed:
Primary Containment Electrical Penetration Splices Control Rod Drive Pump Scram Valve Micro Switches RHR Shutdown Cooling Suction Inboard Isolation Valve
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Following completion of maintenance on the RHR Shutdown Cooling Suction Inboard Isolation Valve, the inspector verified that this. systems had been returned to service properly.
No problems or concerns were identified.
5.
Monthly Surveillance Observation The. inspector observed technical specifications required surveillance testing on the reactor water level instruments and daily and shiftly checks and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that test results conformed with technical specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
No problems or concerns were identified.
6.
Licensee Event Reports Followup Through direct observation, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with technical specifications.
a.
(0 pen) Licensee Event Report (LER) 86020 (331/86020-LL):
Inadvertent Deluge of Standby Filter Units-Due to Inadequate Procedure.
During a functional test of the Standby Filter Units deluge system, the charcoal beds were sprayed with water when the deluge isolation valves were not reset prior to unisolating the deluge system water supply.
The procedure did not instruct personnel to reset the valves and there is no indication or alarms to indicate that the valves are not reset.
The licensee committed to revise the procedure to require resetting the valves prior to the next performance of the functional test.
The licensee is also considering providing indication of deluge isolation valve position in the control room. This LER remains open pending licensee revision of the procedure.
b.
(Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 86021 (331/86021-LL):
Reactor Water Cleanup System Isolation As a Result of Deficient Decontamination Work Control.
The isolation signal was caused by a worker who inadvertently bumped a Temperature Indicating Controller and thereby reduced its setpoint to the point where it tripped. The licensee instituted closer control of routine decontamination work in the plant. This LER is considered closed.
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c.
(Closed) Licensee Event Report-(LER) 86022 (331/86022-LL) and 86022 Revision 1~(331/86022-L1):
.High Pressure ~ Coolant Injection Valve Inoperability Due to Motor Winding Open Circuit. The valve operator motor was rewound. The cause of the open wir. ding cou'.d not be determined and no_ trends were.
evident in maintenar.ce records. This LER is considered closed.
d.
(Closed) Licensee Event Report ~(LER) 86023 (332/86023-LL):
. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Inoperability for. Repair of Pump Flow Meter. 'The flow meter was replaced and the system returned to service. No adverse trends were noted in maintenance records.
This LER is considered closed.
e.
(0 pen) Licensee Event Report (LER) 86024 (331/86024-LL):
High Pressure Coolant Injection System Isolation from Steam Flow Differential Pressure Switch Internal Leak. The switch was dried out and is being monitored three times a week for-moisture. Although the moisture. appeared to have initially affected the calibration of the switch, subsequent checks have found the switch in calibration even when moisture was detected in the switch. The switch will be replaced when a qualified replacement is received. An updated LER will be issued following examination of the switch to determine failure mode.
This LER remains open pending replacement of the switch and failure mode determination.
f.
(0 pen) Licensee Event Report (LER) 86025(331/86025-LL):
Reactor Scram From a High Intermediate Range Monitor Trip. The most likely cause of the scram was noise generated from inserting two Source Range Monitors simultaneously. The general integrated plant-operating instruction cautions against inserting all four Source Range Monitors simultaneously. The instruction then tells the operator to insert'one at a time in accordance with the specific operating instruction. However, the specific operating. instruction does not prohibit the insertion of more than one at a time.
A review of the process computer alarm log shows that the trip signals did not initiate at the same time and took several seconds
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to reset. This is not consistent with other similar events in which
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about the same time.
It is therefor possible that a feedwater i
transient occurred and caused a power increase. The licensee is
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conducting a test on a simulator to determine if a feedwater transient is a possible cause.
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This LER remains open pending the results of the licensee's investigation of the noise on the Intermediate Range Monitors during
l the next refueling outage and the results of the simulator testing.
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(Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 86026 (331/86026-LL):
Unexpected Standby Filter Unit Auto-Initiation Due to Personnel
Error. The event was caused by electricians unintentionally l
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tripping the supply breaker for a Control Building Radiation Monitor. The electricians were installing the cover to the Instrument AC Distribution Panel and appeared to be performing their work in a reasonable and prudent manner. This LER is considered closed.
h.
(Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 86027(331/86027-LL):
Reactor Protection System Trip Resulting From Not Resetting the Trip Logic As Required by Procedure.
Following completion of surveillance testing, the reactor mode switch was changed from the
" Refuel" position to the " shutdown" position. As designed, this causes a Reactor Protection System trip. No rod motion occurred since all rods were already in; however, control rod drive water is discharged to the Scram Discharge Volume. The operator immediately reset the Reactor Protection System trip but failed to bypass the Scram Discharge Volume high level trip signal as required by procedure.
As the discharged water drained into the Scram Discharge Volume, another Reactor Protection System trip occurred on high level.
Formal disciplinary action was initiated. This LER is considered closed.
7.
IE Bulletin Followup For the IE Bulletin listed below the inspector verified that the Bulletin was received by licensee management and reviewed for its applicability to the facility.
If the Bulletin was applicable the inspector verified that the written response was within the time period stated in the Bulletin, that the written response included the information required to be reported, that the written response included adequate corrective action commitments based on information presented in the Bulletin and the licensee's response, that the licensee management forwarded copies of the written response to the appropriate onsite management representatives, that information discussed in the licensee's written response was accurate, and the corrective action taken by the licensee was as described in the written response.
(Closed)Bulletin 86-03 (331/86003-88): Potential Failure of Multiple l
ECCS Pumps Due to Single Failure of Air-Operated Valve in Minimum Flow Recirculation Line. The licensee does not have the subject single-failure vulnerability which could cause a failure of more than one ECCS train. This bulletin is considered closed.
No problems or concerns were identified.
8.
Design Changes and Modifications The inspector reviewed portions of the Duane Arnold Energy Center design change program to verify that design changes were made in accordance with l
10 CFR 50.59 and Technical Specifications.
The inspector reviewed the following four design change packages (DCP):
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DCP No. 1377 SRM and IRM Modifications. The modification allowed for monitoring of the loss of negative power to these systems.
This condition was previously undetectable in the control room.
DCP No. 1343 ECCS Pump Sequencing on the Essential Buses. The design change modified the circuitry of the RHR and core spray pumps to ensure proper pump sequencing when loading the emstgency diesel generators, regardless of the availability of offsite power.
DCP No. 1297 Steam Leak Detection - HPCI and RCIC. The modification added a time delay into the steam leak detection circuitry of the HPCI and RCIC systems to prevent system isolations due to spurious electrical signals.
DCP No. 1270 Containment Isolation on Offgas Vent Pipe High High Radiation. The modification added a signal for closure of primary containment vent and purge isolation valves upon detection of high radiation at the offgas stack.
For each of the design change packages reviewed, one or more of the following were verified:
review and approval in accordance with DAEC Administrative Control Procedures 1403.2/1409.1; adequate review and evaluation of post-modification test results; appropriate modifications to operating procedures; and changes to as-built drawings to reflect the modification.
DCPs 1270 and 1297 were included in the 1985 DAEC Annual Report of Facility Changes. DCPs 1343 and 1377 have not yet undergone formal closure.
No problems or concerns were identified.
9.
Internediate Range Monitor (IRM) Fuse Failure The inspector reviewed the licensee's actions with regard to General Electric (GE) Service Information Lctter (SIL) 445 concerning IRM fuse failure. The licensee has instituted the recommendations of GE SIL 445 as follows:
a.
Chassis fuses for the IRMs were verified to have a 1.5 amp rating.
Any fuses found to have a smaller rating were changed to a 1.5 amp fuse.
b.
The coil connection of the IN0P relay in each IRM channel was moved to allow the relay to monitor the loss of negative voltage. This will insure that a Reactor Protection System (RPS) trip signal is available upon loss of negative power.
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An evaluation of procedures for establishing the operability of a safety related instrument channel after its loss was conducted.
These procedures insure that Technical Specification required testing is completed upon completion of a fault repair.
No problems or concerns were identified.
l 10. Training and Qualification Effectiveness During the inspection, several events were reviewed to evaluate their relationship to training and qualification effectiveness.
. Paragraph 3 of this report discusses an administrative overexposure which
' occurred because an operator climbed on top of equipment after consulting only general area survey maps and only performing a general area survey.
More thorough training or refresher training may have prevented this event.
Paragraph 6.f of this report discussed Licensee Event Report 86025 concerning a Reactor Scram From a High Intermediate Range Trip. Although the licensee has not yet conclusively determined the cause of the reactor trip, it occurred at the same time as an operator inserted two Source Range Monitors. The procedure cautions against inserting all four Source Range Monitors because of possible Intermediate Range Monitor noise and then tells the operator to insert one Source Range Monitor at a time in accordance with the specific operating instruction.
Although the specific operating instruction does not prohibit insertion of more than one Source Range Monitor, more thorough training or refresher training concerning the purpose of the caution may have prevented this event.
Paragraph 6.g of this report discusses Licensee Event Report 86026 concerning an unexpected Standby Filter Unit auto-initiation due to personnel error. The inspector determined that this event does not reflect on training and qualification effectiveness since the electricians involved appeared to the performing their work in a reasonable and prudent manner.
l Paragraph 6.h of this report discusses Licensee Event Report 86027 concerning a Reactor Protection System trip resulting from not bypassing the Scram Discharge Volume high level trip signal as required by procedure. The licensee determined that since the operator knew that there was a possibility of getting a Scram Discharge Volume high level, trip, he should have known of the requirement to bypass the trip. The licensee therefore initiated formal disciplinary action. Although it
could be argued that additional training of this operator could have l
prevented this event, it appears that as a result of his inattentiveness
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or attitude, the operator did not put his training to use. The inspector therefore does not consider this event as reflecting on training and qualification.
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l During the inspection period the NRC gave requalification exams to ten l
operators. One individual failed the exam. This individual had also
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failed the licensee's quarterly requalification exam. _ This correlation provides evidence that the licensee's program adequately identifies weak operator knowledge.
The inspector determined that two events that were reviewed during the inspection period reflected negatively on training and qualification effectiveness. The results of the NRC's requalification exam reflects positively on the licensee's requalification program.
11. Qualification of Electrical Splices On December 5,1986, the licensee was informed that failures of nylon-insulated butt splices had occurred recently during qualification tests conducted by a testing lab for another utility.
Based upon the oral information, the licensee concluded that the qualification test conditions were more severe than those required for the Duane Arnola Energy Center and therefore that the test failures were not necessarily relevant to the butt splices installed at the Duane Arnold Energy Center.
On December 9, 1986, the licensee received oral information which indicated that as a result of an error at the test facility, the test conditions were less severe than those required for the Duane Arnold Energy Center.
This information was immediately reviewed by Iowa Electric management and a plant shutdown was initiated.
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The inspector (a Region III specialist also participated in portions of this review) reviewed the Maintenance Action Requests for the work. A minor concern involving Quality Control Inspector signatures was resolved by the licensee. The inspector, with two licensee electricians to remove junction box covers and open conduit, also walked down three randomly chosen circuits (requiring environmental qualification) from the component to the drywell penetration to verify that the scope of the
licensee's work was adequate to assure that all splices were included.
The inspector determined that the splices found either had already been reworked or were on the licensee's list to be reworked.
The licensee replaced the nylon insulated butt splices located in the drywell penetration boxes with nuclear grade butt splices and an environmentally qualified tape seal was applied. The butt splices in other potential High Energy Line Break areas were not replaced but the tape seal was applied. The licensee is continuing to review whether the nuclear grade butt splices meet the criteria of IEEE-323-1974.
If any deficient or questionable butt splices are determined to be located in non-High Energy Line Break areas, they will be upgraded during the next refueling outage. Justification for continuing operation until the refueling outage was provided to Region III by letter NG-86-4544 from R. W. McGaughy to J. G. Keppler dated December 19, 1986.
Preliminary review by Region III specialists indicates that the justification is adequate.
The issues noted above will be reviewed by NRC during the environmental qualification inspection scheduled for the next refueling outage.
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12.
Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representative (denoted in Paragraph 1)
throughout the inspection period and at the conclusion of the inspection on February 2,1987, and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The inspector also discussed the likely information content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector. The licensee did not identify any such documents or processes as proprietary.
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