IR 05000331/1999003

Insp Rept 50-331/99-03 on 990303-0413.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maint,Engineering & Plant Support

ML20205T607
Person / Time
Site:	Duane Arnold
Issue date:	04/23/1999
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20205T606	List: IR 05000331/1999003 ML20205T601
References
50-331-99-03, 50-331-99-3, NUDOCS 9904270310
Download: ML20205T607 (17)

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION 111 Docket No: 50-331 License No: DPR-49 .

Report No: 50-331/99003(DRP)

Licensee: Alliant, IES Utilities, In ,

200 First Street i P. O. Box 351 Cedar Rapids, IA 52406-0351 Facility: Duane Arnold Energy Center l

Location: Palo, Iowa I

Dates: March 3 through April 13,1999 l

l Inspectors: P. Prescott, Senior Resident inspector

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M. Kurth, Resident inspector l

l Approved by: M. N. Leach, Chief l

Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects i-n 9904270310 990423 1 DR ADOCK O

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I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Duane Arnold Energy Center NRC Inspection Report 50-331/99003(DRP)

' This inspection report included the resident inspectors' evaluations of aspects of licensee operations, engineering, maintenance, and plant suppor i Operations ,

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• . The inspectors noted that operations personnel effectively communicated operational information and were knowledgeable of plant and equipment status. ' Operators performed an error-free power reduction on March 13 through 15,1999, for a control rod sequence exchange and main turbine bypass valve testing. Also, the ir.spetors noted safety-conscious operator performance during the power reouction for the main generator field ground (Section O1.1).

. The licensee conducted the standby liquid control pump operability test as a routine evolution knowing that previous testing problems existed. Also, operations personnel considered the high pressure coolant injection system discharge pressure momentarily pegging the gauge at 1500 psig as an expected condition, which the system engineer later clarified was not the case. These problems were not documented in the surveillance test procedures or covered in the pre-test briefs (Section 01.2).

Maintenan_rg .

. The inspectors observed that generally, pre-test briefings were thorough and emphasized attention to detail and procedural adherence. The inspectors verified that the standby liquid control pump and high pressure coolant injection surveillance test results met Technical Specification requirements (Section M1.2).

. The licensee was effective in determining that a failed coil for a solenoid valve resulted in the off-gas system flow isolation. The coil was replaced and the off-gas system was restored to normal operation (Section M2.1).

Enaineerinu

. Engineering and maintenance personne! were effective in identifying and temporarily fixing the source of excess off-gas flow. Also, the licensee was diligent and methodical in its efforts to identify the cause cf ine main generator field ground alarms (Section E1.1).

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• The licensee momentarily exceeded the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report standby liquid control pump discharge piessure limit during surveillance testing. The root cause was the less than desirable use of a gate valve to throttle discharge pressure. The

' licensee identified the problem in January 1997, and delayed its efforts to fix the problem based on a cost benefit analysis. The licensee subsequently decided to install a globe valve during the next refueling outage to fix the throttling problem i

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The "A" reactor water cleanup pump bearing failed due to an inadequate modification which provided insufficient oil (Section E1.3).

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Plant Support

. The inspectors determined that the radiation work permit supporting the removal and repair of the reacior water cleanup pump provided sufficient radiation protection instructions (Section R1.1).

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The inspectors observed a worker removing the pump in a contaminated area without wearing a face shield as recommended by the radiation work permit. The inspectors noted that a radiation protection technician did not take appropriate actions when the worker's face shield fell off and allowed the work to continue. The worker was surveyed after completing the job and no contamination was identified (Section R1.1).

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Report Details Summary of Plant Status'

The licensee operated the plant at 100 percent power at the beginning of the inspection perio On March 13,1999, the licensee initiated a power reduction to approximately 50 percent for control rod sequence exchange and turbine bypass valve testing. Full power operations

. resumed March 15,199 d

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On March 31,1999, at 9:38 p.m., the licensee commenced a reactor shutdown due to a main generator ground. The giound cleared with the reactor at 70 percent power. After the licensee reviewed the potential for locating the ground, it was decided to return the plant to fcil powe Operators commenced increasing reactor power at 2:00 p.m. Full power was reached on April 1,1999, at 7:00 On April 1,1999, at 11:55 p.m., operators reduced power to 94 percent due to problems with off-gas flow. Operators returned the plant to full power on April 2,1999, at 7:00 a.m. The unit

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operated at approximately full power for the remainder of the inspection report perio . Operations 01 Conduct of Operations 01.1. Observations of Routine Activities and Planned Plant Power Reductions Insoection Scope (71707)

The inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant activities. These reviews included observations of control room shift turnovers and operator performance during plant evolutions. The inspectors interviewed operations personnel regarding plant status and events and reviewed daily log The inspectors observed licensee activities during a power reduction for control rod sequencing and main turbine bypass valve testing. Also, a power reduction was observed for a main generator ground. This included observation of portions of operations' shifts activities, management and reactor engineering briefings, operator use of procedures, and coordination between control room and in-plant operator * On March 13,1999, operators initiated a power reduction to 50 percent for control rod sequence exchange and main turbine bypass valve testin On March 31,1999, the on-shift operators commenced a plant shutdown due to a main generator groun Observations and Findinas The inspectors observed that operations personnel effectively communicated operational information, maintained accurate records, and were knowledgeable of plant and equipment status. The inspectors observed that operations personnel cone'ucted

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effective shift tumovers and proper use of procedures. In general, the conduct of operations was appropriately focused on safet : Operations personnel performed an error-free power ceduction on March 13 through 15,1999. The inspectors noted good commarid and control by operations shift

- supervisors during the evolutio The inspectors noted safety-conscious operator performance for the March 31,1999, power reduction for the main generator field ground. There have been i.ntermittent grounds, usually of short duration, recorded on the main generator since January 1,1999. Licensee actions to identify the source of the intermittent grounds have been thorough, but limited with the main generator on-line This was the first time the ground had stayed in, so the licensee conservatively decided to take the generator off-line and make any necessary repairs. However, after the ground had stayed in for approximately 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, the ground cleared. Licensee management decided to return the plant to full power, due to the nominal probability of identifying the source of the groun Conclusions

.The inspectors noted that operations personnel effectively communicated operational l information and were knowledgeable of plant and equipment status. Operators performed an error-free power reduction March 13 through 15,1999, for a control rod sequence exchange and main turbine bypass valve testing. Also, the inspectors noted safety-conscious operator performance during the power reduction for the main generator field groun )

O1.2 Operators Particioation in Surveillance Testina Inspection Scope (71707)

On March 25,1999, the inspectors observed performance of the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system surveillance test procedure (STP) 3.5.1-05, "HPCI System Operability Test," Rev.1.' Also, on March 17 and 13, the inspectors observed performance of the standby liquid control (SBLC) pump surveillance test, STP 3.1.7-01,

• SBLC Pump Operability Test," Re i Observations and Findmas The inspectors observed that briefings conducted by operations personnel were adequate and emphasized attention to detail and procedural adherence. Control room operators were effective in coordinating and conducting the testing. However the ;

responsible non-licensed operator had not previously performed the SBLC pump surveillance test procedure and was not made aware of past difficulties associated in maintaiaing pump discharge flow for the test. As documented in Inspection Report 50-331/98013(DRP), the licensee has had a long-standing problem performing ,

the SBLC pump operability test due to the use of a gate valve to throttle pressure. On March 17,1999, the inspectors noted a momentary discharge pressure spike of 1600 pounds per square inch gauge (psig) and the iifting of the pressure relief valv Refer to Sechon E1.2 regarding discharge pressure design limitations and the valve arrangement used to control flow for testin c

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As the "A" SBLC pump was started, the non-licensed operator, who was performing the surveillance test for the first time, noted a rapid increase in discharge pressure and focused his attention on manipulating the valve to reduce pressure. He was unaware that pressure momentarily increased to 1600 psig. The licensee conducted the surveillance test as a routine evolution without alerting operators to the prior discharge pressure control problems. This resulted in the non-licensed operator being unprepared for the difficulty in controlling discharge pressure and the momentary pressure spike to ;

1600 psig going unnoticed. As detailed in Section E1.2, the Updated Final Safety ;

Analysis Report (UFSAR) design discharge pressure is 1400 psi The inspectors noted during the HPCI surve!!!ance test when the system was initiated, the control room discharge pressure gauge momentarily pegged high (1500 psig). The operators were focused on menitoring discharge flow and turbine speed and did not notice that the discharge pressure momentarily pegged high. In d;scussions with operations management, the momentary pressure spike was an expected conditio However, the inspectors noted in a subsequent discussion with the system engineer that the problem was thought only to occur if an immediate second HPCI system start was initiated. Although the licensee was able to datermine that the piping was designed to withstand the momentary discharge pressure spike, the inspectors were concerned that operators did not observe the pressure spike during testing and considered this to be an l expected condition. The spiking problem was not discussed in the pre-test brief or stated in the surveillance test procedur )

. c. Conclusions The licenree conducted the SBLC pump operability test as a routine evolution knowing I l

that previous testing problems existed. Also, operations personnel considered the HPCI )

system discharge pressure momentarily pegging the gauge at 1500 psig as an expected

! condition, which the system engineer later clarified was not the case. These problems were not documented in the surveillance test procedures or covered in the pre-test i brief I

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O2 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment O2.1 General Plant Tours and System Waixdowns (71707)

l The inspectors followed the guidance of Inspection Procedure 71707 in walking down accessible portions of several systems. The systems chosen, based on maintenance work activities and probablistic risk significance, were:

. HPCI system

. SBLC system

. "A" core spray system  ;

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cases. The inspectors did not identify any substantive concerns as a result of these i walkdown l

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08 Miscellaneous Operations issues (92901)

The Severity Level IV violations listed below were issued in Notices of Violation prior to the March 11,1999, implementation of the NRC's new policy for treatment of Severity Level IV violations (Appendix C of the Enforcement Policy). Because these violations would have been treated as Non-Cited Violations in accordance with Appendix C, they are being closed out in this repor .1 (Closed) Violation (VIO) 50-331/97011-01: Failure to perform 50.59 safety evaluation prior to stop valve testing. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Action Requests (ARs) 8671 and 919 .2 (Closed) VIO 50-331/98002-01: Limiting condition for operation (LCO) time exceeded for well water containment isolation valves. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as ARs 8476 and 1083 .3 (Closed) VIO 50-331/98002-02: LCO time exceeded for well water containment isolation valves. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as ARs 8476 and 1083 .4 (Closed) VIO 50-331/98002-03: LCO time exceeded for well water cor,tainment isolation valves. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as ARs 8476 and 1083 .5 (Closed) VIO 50-331/98004-04: Failure to properly implement procedure prerequisit This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as AR 1142 II. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 General Comments inspection Scooe (62707 and 61726)

The inspectors observed all or portions of the surveillance test activities and work request activities listed below. The applicable test or work package documentation was reviewed. The inspectors focused on risk-significant work and surveillance activitie Maintenance Activities

• Corrective Maintenance Action Request A43068: Troubleshooting Generator Field Ground Alarm

• Preventive Maintenance Action Request 1107664: MO-2007, Residual Heat Removal Loop "A" Torus Cooling and Test Return Header isolation; Inspect and Lube Gear Box and Limit Switch

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• PMAR 1104573: Replace "A" SBLC System Accumulator Bladder

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PMAR 1104574: Replace "B" SBLC System Accumulator Bladder

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Corrective Maintenance Action Request A29236: Troubleshooting Condenser in-Leakage Surveillance of Activities

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STP 3.1.7-01, *SBLC Pump Operability Test"

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STP 3.5.1-05, "HPCI System Operability Test" i

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STP 3.7.7-01, " Bypass Valves Test" ' Qbservations and Findinas The inspectors noted that, in general, licensee personnel conducted the work associated with these activities in a professional and thorough manner. Technicians were knowledgeable of their assigned tasks and work document requirement '

Comments on specific items are detailed in the proceeding section M1.2 Surveillance Testina Activities Inspection Scooe (61726)

On March 25,1999, the inspectors observed the HPCI system operability surveillance test, STP 3.5.1-05, "HPCI System Operability Test," Rev.1 Also, on March 17 and 18,1999, the inspectors observed the SBLC pump operability surveillance test, STP 3.7.7-01, " Bypass Valves Test," Rev.1. This included a review of the Technical Specifications (TS), surveillance test procedures, attending pre-test briefings, observing the test, and reviewing the result Observations and Findinas The inspectors observed that generally, pre-test briefings were thorough and emphasized attention to detail and procedural adherence Testing was effectively coordinated between operators, engineering, and maintenance personnel. However, as detsited in Sections 01.2 and E1.2, the inspectors identified that during the SBLC pump sur.ullance test there was a momentary discharge pressure spike that was greater than the UFSAR design pressure. The licensee was able to demonstrate that the UFSAR pressure was a conserva'ive value and the system remained operabl The inspectors reviewed the surveillance testing criteria to ensure TS requirements were met. No discrepancies were note Conclusions The inspectors observed that generally, pre-test briefings were thorough and emphasized attention to detail and procedural adherence. The inspectors verified that the SBLC pump and HPCI surveillance test results met TS requirement .

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M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment M2.1 Plant Material Condition Inspection Scope (62707 and 61726)

The inspectors followed licensee actions concerning the emergent work items detailed below to ensure appropriate operability evaluations were performed, TS were met, repairs were made, and root cause evaluations were determined where. appropriat Observations and Findinas The emergent equipment issues followed by the inspectors during the inspection period were:

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On March 31,1999, a main generator field ground alarm that would not clear was received. A plant shutdown was commenced. During the shutdown, at 70 percent power, the alarm cleared. Plant management reviewed the issue and decided to increase power to 100 percent operation. Although monitoring data was retrieved in the field, the cause of the ground could not be determined. The licensee planned to reduce reactor power on April 16,1999, to perform further testing to determine the cause of the main generator ground alar . On April 1,1999, an off-gas low flow alarm was received in the control room. A blown fuse de-energized solenoid valve SV-4108, which failed closed the off-gas system discharge control valve CV-4108, resulting in an off-gas flow isolatio The licensee reduced reactor power and promptly identified the failed coil of the solenoid valve. The coil and fuse were replaced and reactor power was returned to 100 percen l l Conclusions  ;

The licensee was effective in determining that a failed coil for a solenoid valve resulted in the off-gas system flow isolation. The coil was replaced and the off-gas system was restored to normal operatio M8 Miscel:aneous Maintenance issues (92903)

The Severity Level IV violations listed bele/.y were issued in Notices of Violation prior to the March 11,1999, implementation of the NRC's new policy for treatment of Severity Level IV violations (Appendix C of the Enforcement Policy). Because these violations would have been treated as Non-Cited Violations in accordance with Appendix C, they are being closed out in this repor M8.1 (Closed) VIO 50-331/97016-02: Failure to balance material accountability log. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as ARs 8464 and 1015 M8.2 - (Closed) VIO 50-331/98002-06: Testing on chiller without a safety evaluation. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as AR 1083 __- _ _

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M8.3 (Closed) VIO 50-331/98003-02: Unacceptable restraint methods. Thic violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as ARs 7929 and 1112 M8.4 - (Closed) VIO 50-331/98004-06: Inadequate work instruction and procedure. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as AR 1157 M8.5 (Closed) VIO 50-331/98008-05: Inadequate post maintenance testing. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as AR 1135 Ill. Enaineerina E1 Conduct of Engineering E Enaineerina Support on Emeraent issues l l Inspection Scope (37551)

The inspectors evaluated engineering involvement with several equipment problems that occurred during the inspection period. The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensee's controls for the identification and resolution of problem Observations and Findinas

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Since January 1999, numerous main generator field ground annunciators have been received in the control room. The cause has not been resolved; however, maintenance and engineering personnel have been diligent and methodical in their troubleshooting attempts. The licensee is working with vendor representatives to resolve the proble The licensee has been thorough in collecting and promptly analyzing the main generator ground data. A downpower was scheduled for April 16,1999, to perform further testing to determine the cause for the ground alar On March 14,1999, the licensee was able to identify and temporarily fix the excess off-gas flow. Maintenance and engineering personnel were effective in their troubleshooting efforts to locate the source of excessive in-leakage. The leakage was identified by releasing helium at suspected leak points and measuring downstream in the off-gas system process flow stream for detection of the helium. A %-inch vent / drain line for the steam seal supply huder bypass line pressure relief valve, PSV 11748, was found severed. The severed line was temporarily plugged at both ends and the off-gas flow went from 100 cubic feet per minute (cfm) down to its normal range of 20 to 25 cf The licensee planned to perform a permanent fix during the next scheduled outag Conclusions Engineering and maintenance personnel were effective in identifying and temporarily fixing the source of excess off-gas flow. Also, the licensee was diligent and methodical in its efforts to identify the cause of the main generator field ground alarm '

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E1.2 - SBLC System Gate Valve Makes Flow Testina Difficult Insoection Scooe (37551)

On March 17,1999, the inspectors observed the SBLC system operability test, STP 3.1.7-01, "SBLC Pump Operability Test," Rev.1, and identified that the pump discharge pressure momentarily exceeded the UFSAR design pressure of 1400 psig (UFSAR 9.3.4.2). The inspectors reviewed the operability deterrqination performed by system engineering and the circumstances that led to a momentary discharge pressure spike of 1600 psi . Observations and Findinas The inspectors identified during the SBLC system test that the discharge pressure momentarily reached 1600 psig for the "A" pump operability testing. In accordance with UFSAR 9.3.4.2, the SBLC system design pressure between the explosive valves and the pump discharge is 1400 psig. The system engineer determined that the UFSAR design pressure was a conservative value and that the piping and associated equipment was hydrostatically tested in accordance with American National Standards Institute (ANSI) standards to 2100 psig for 10 minutes prior to initial operation. Also, calculations performed in accordance with ANSI standards demonstrated that the piping was capable of withstanding 4597 psig. Therefore, the licensee determined that the SBLC system remained in an operable conditio Also, the operations personnel performing the test were unaware that the discharge pressure reached 1600 psig. As documented in Inspection Report 50-331/98013(DRP),

the licensee has had difficulty in performing the test due to the use of a gate valve to throttle pressure. During this surveillance test interval, the non-licensed operator observed the discharge pressure rapidly increased and needed to focus his attention on adjusting the valve. Due to the location of the gauge and the valve, the operator ,

adjusted the valve and was unable to observe the pressure gauge. The non-licensed l operator assisting focused his attention on the test tank water level. The system alignment and equipment is arranged in such a way that operators have had difficulty completing the surveillance testin On January 8,1997, the licensee initiated AR 970009 to address problems associated with performing the test. The AR was closed with no further action taken based on a I cost benefit analysis. When the test was performed for the first and third quaders of ;

1998, ARs 980051 and 982475 were initiated to document the continuing throttling l problem. The licensee subsequently re-evaluated the problem and decided to install a

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globe valve for better throttling control. The valve installation is scheduled for the October 1999 refueling outage, Conclusions

- The licensee momentarily exceeded the UFSAR SBLC system discharge pressure limit during surveillance testing. The root cause was the less than desirable use of a gate ,

valve to throttle discharge pressure. The licensee identified the problem in !

' January 1997, and. delayed its efforts to fix the problem based on a cost benefit analysis. The licensee subsequently decided to install a globe valve during the next refueling outage to fix the throttling problem.'

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E Reactor Water Cleanuo (RWCU) Modification Error Causes Bearina Failure af Insoection Scooe (37551)'

The inspectors reviewed the circumstances behind the failure of the "A" RWCU pump on March 7,1999. The inspectors conducted interviews with maintenance and engineering personnel and reviewed documentation that supported the pump modification that was completed March 4,199 . Observations and Findinas On March 7,1999, operations personnelinitiated AR 14696 to document the cause of the "A" RWCU pump automatic shutdown. Upon inspection, the licensee determined that insufficient oil level caused the bearings to overheat resulting in bearing damag On March,4,1999, a modification, Engineered Maintenance Action' A48222, was made to change the "A" RWCU forced oil system to a fixed level oil system. The modification was made due to excessive oil leakage from the bearing box. During the modification 1 process, the system engineer measured the oil level to ensure that the bearings were j properly lubricated.- Also, the engineer relied on a reference drawing, l

- APED-G31-2906-008, Rev. 9, to verify the adequacy of the oil leve Subsequently, the licensee determined that the oil level should have been approximately

% inch higher. The engineer relied on reference drawing APED-G31-2906-008 that was not to scale. This misled the engineer to believe that the bearings would have been partially submerged in oil. The failed bearing was replaced and the fixed oil level was increase c.' Conclusions The "A" RWCU pump bearing failed due to an inadequate modification which provided insufficient oil

- E8 Miscellaneous Engineering issues (92902)

The Severity Level IV violations listed below were issued in flotices of Violation prior to the March 11,1999, implementation of the NRC's new policy for treatment of Severity Level IV violations (Appendix C of the Enforcement Policy). Because these violations would have been treated as Non-Cited Violations in accordance with Appendix C, they ,

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are being closed out in this repor E (Closed) VIO 50-331/97012-02: Inadequate corrective actions for loose emergency diesel generator fuel oil piping supports. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as AR 943 ~ E (Closed) VIO 50-331/98004-08: LCO for monitors was exceeded. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as AR 11769.-

- E8.3 (Closed) VIO 50-331/98008-06: Failure to sepad condition outside of design basis. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as AR 1275 l

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IV. Plant Suonort R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls R1.1 = Radiation Protection Support for the Removal of the RWCU Pumo

- Lnspeceon Scope (71750):

The inspectors assessed the adequacy and support of radiation protection activities during the removal of the RWCU pump. The inspectors evaluated the radiation work control package and observed portions of the RWCU pump removal. Radiation Work i Permit (RWP) 153, Job Step 7, was used to provide instructions to workers performing the maintenanc Qbservations and Findinas The inspectors observed that controls were in place to minimize the spread of contamination. Radiation Work Permit 133, Job Step 7, provided sufficient radiological protection instructions to workers to support the removal and repair of the RWCU pum In accordance with RWP 133, Jcb Step 7, a high efficiency particulate air filter unit was used to direct air flow away from the workers. A radiation protection (RP) technician was staged in the pump room to spray pump intemals to minimize the spread of airborne contamination. When removed, the pump was contained in plastic to minimize L the spread of contamination during transport to the machine shop.

b The inspectors noted that, in general, maintenance workers wore the proper protective clothing to prevent personnel contamination. However, the inspectors identified that a maintenance worker was not wearing a protective face shield, as required, during the l

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breach of the pump cavity. In accordance with RWP 133, Job Step 7, face shields should have been worn during the breach of the pump cavity. The individualinitially wore a face shield; however, it fell off during efforts to remove the pump.- Also, the worker scratched his face and was bleeding. The radiation RP technician stationed in the contaminated area, conservatively decided not to place the face shield back on the worker because it landed on the contarninatJ floor; however, the RP technician did not

. have additional face shields readily available for replacement. The RP technician allowed to the work to continue because the job was near completio After the pump was removed, the individual's face was surveyed. No contamination was

. identifiex1. The scratch was treated by riant personnel. The inspectors discussed the issue with the RP technician and she acknowledged the need to stop work, if necessary,

to obtain the appropriate protective gear a nd the need to stop work and treat an individual if an injury is observed. The RF manager explained it was his expectation that

. Job activities are stopped, as in this example, to ensure the proper radiological protection instructions were followed. Also, it is the responsibility of every worker onsite

' to follow radiation protection guideline Conclusions

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' The inspectors' determined that the RWP supporting the removal and repair of the

~ RWCU pump provided sufficient radiation protection instructions. The inspectors

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E observed a worker removing the pump in a contaminated area without wearing a face shield as recommended by the RWP. The inspectors noted that an RP technician did not take appropriate actions wtan the worker's face shield fell off and allowed the work to continue. The worker was surveyed after completing the job and no contamination was identified; V. Manaaement Meetinas X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on April 13,1999. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identifie i

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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee R. Anderson, Manager, Outage and Support J, Bjorseth, Maintenance Superintendent D. Curtland, Operations Manager J. Franz, Vice President Nuclear R. Hite, Manager, Radiation Protection M. McDermott, Manager, Engineering K. Peveler, Manager, Regulatory Performance G. Van Middlesworth, Plant Manager

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INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551: lOnsite Engineering -

IP 61726: Surveillance Observation IP 62707.: Maintenance Observation IP 71707: Plant Operations

' IP 71750: Plant Support .

IP 92901: Followup - Operations:

IP 92902: Followup - Engineering .

IP 92903:. . Followup - Maintenance ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED,'AND DISCUSSED Opened Non Closed 50-331/97011-01' VIO ' Failure to perform 50.59 safety evaluation prior to stop valve testing 50-331/97012-02 VIO Inadequate corrective actions for loose emergency core cooling system fuel oil piping supports 50-331/97016-02 VIO Failure to balance material accountabiiity log

- 50-331/98002-01 VIO LCO time exceeded for well water containment isolation valves

50-331/98002-02 'VIO LCO time exceeded for well water containment isolation valves 50-331/98002-03 -VIO LCO time exceeded for well water containment isolation valves !

50-331/98002-06 VIO Testing on chiller without a safety evaluation 50-331/98003-02 VIO Unacceptable restraint methods 50-331/98004-04 VIO Failure to properly implement procedure prerequisite

'50-331/98004-06 ' VIO Inadequate work instruction and procedure

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'50-331/98004-08 VIO LCO for monitors was exceeded

'50-331/98008-05- VIO inadequate post maintenance testing

--50-331/98008-06 VIO' Failure to report condition outside of design basis Discussed

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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED l ANSI American National Standards Institute AR Action Request CFM Cubic feet per minute CFR- Code of Federal Regulations DAEC Duane Arnold Energy Center

'DRP Division of Reactor Projects .

HPCI High pressure coolant injection.-

IP Inspection procedure NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission PMAR Preventive Maintenance Action Request PSIG Pounds per square inch gauge RP Radiation protection I RWCU Reactor water cleanup '

RWP Radiation work permit

'SBLC Standby liquid control STP Surveillance Test Procedure-TS- Technical Specification UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report VIO - Violation l

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