ML20202E946
| ML20202E946 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Duane Arnold  |
| Issue date: | 01/02/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20202E929 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-331-97-17, NUDOCS 9802190093 | |
| Download: ML20202E946 (16) | |
See also: IR 05000331/1997017
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION lil
Docket No: 50 331
License No: DPR-49
Report No. 50 331/97017(DRP)
Licensee: IES Utilities Inc.
200 First Street S.E.
P. O, Box 351
Cedar Rapids, IA 52406-0351
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Facility: Duane Amold Energy Center
Location: Palo, lows
Dates: November 11 December 22,1997
Inspectors: C. Lips, Senior Resident inspector
M. Kurth, Resident inspector
Approved by: R. D. Lanksbury, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 5
9002190093 990102
PDR ADOCK 03000331
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Duane Amold Energy Center
t.'RC Inspection Report No. 50 331/g7017(DRP)
This inspection report included resident inspectors' evaluation of aspects of licensee operations,
eng'neering, maintenance, and plant support areas.
Operations
e The licensee's completed and planned actions for cold weather protection were adequate
to protect plant components and systems from cold weather. (Section 02.3)
- There was one instance of concom regarding operator attention to detsil during
performance of routine surveillance testing. An operator did not question the
unreasonably low filter train differential pressure during the standby gas treatment
surveillance test. Otherwise, the conduc' of operations was professional and focussed on
safety as evidenced by error free performance during infrequently performed evolutions.
These infrequently performed evolutions included receipt of new fuel and emergent repair
of a steam line draln. (Section 01.1)
- The licensee maintained the reactor core Isolation coolir.? system in the proper standby
readiness condition. Minor discrepancies were promptly ruolved. (Section 02.2)
Maintenance
e The inspectors identified that the licensee did not follow the procedural controls in the
engineered maintenance action process for an activity where relay coils were replaced
with those with a different voltage rating. (Section M1.2).
e The licensee promptly responded to 125 Vdc bettery charger problems. (Section M1.3)
- The licensee identified four examples where problems were encountered during routine
planned maintenance. The causes appeared to be related to weak pre-job planning or
new procedure revisions. T he inspectors concluded that problems were properiy hsndled
es they came up. Hmever, these problems represented an increase in the number of
work planning problems over that typically encounterei and resulted in safety-related
equipment being out of service longer than necessar';. (Section M1.4)
- The licensee promptly resolved the emergent equipment issues that occurred during the
period. Engineering department personnel provided appropriate support where
requested. Maintenance activities were property prioritized and completed in a timely
manner. (Section M2.1)
Enaineerina
e The inspec. ors were concemed whh the licensee's performance in planning and
implementing control building chiller 100 percent load testing. Specifically, the inspectors
were concemed that the licensee did not perform a safety evaluation pdor to the test and
did not have test controls in place during the test. (Section E1.1)
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Plant Suncort
e The licensee's Respiratory Protection Program was inadequatoY implemented. Several
individuals required to be quellflod to wear respirators had expired qualifications.
(Section R5.1)
e The fire watch performed duties appropriately. The required areas were toured in the
required times in accordance with the licensee's fire plan. The inspectors had no -
concoms. (Section F1)
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Resort Detalle
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' Summary of Plant Status
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}- The plant began this inspection period at 100 percent power. On December 5, igg 7, plant power
- was reduced to approximately 80 percent for several hours to allow repair of a steam leak. The
leak was in a steam line drain for the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system. The plant
, was operated at approximately 100 percent for the remainder of the period,
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- l. Operations ;
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01 Conduct of Operations ,
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- O ', ,1 General Comments (71707)
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I a. Inacection Scone
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The inspectors followed the guidance of Inspection Procedure 71707 and conducted
frequent reviews of plant operations. This included observing routine control room i
activities, accompanying in-plant operators on daily rounds, attending shift tumovers,
crew briefings and special evolution briefings, and performing panel walkdowns.
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bi Observations and Findinas
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The inspectors observed several routine crew briefings and two special briefings for
infrequently performed evolutions The two infrequent evolution briefings were for receipt
of new fuel and for a repair on the HPCI steam line drain. The inspectors observed good
communication and ivolvement among participants. There was appropriate emphasis
on safety. The evol nions were also well coordinated.
On December 5, igg 7, the inspectors identified one concem with a licensed operators
performance during a surveillance test. During monthly standby gar, treatment
surveillance testing, the operator was required to record filter train differential pressure.
The value indicated on the instrument in the control room was unreasonably low;
however, the operator did not question the reading. Subsequently, the inspectors
, questioned the operator on the reading when other data taken during the test conflicted
. with the differential pressure reading recorded eariier, The operator consulted with the
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shift supervisor who directed that the gage be tapped. The instrument responded and
indicated a readhg that was consistent with the other data. The inspectors were r
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- . concemed with the operators attention to detailin this case.
c; Conclusions
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' There was one instance of concem regarding operator attention to detail during
performance of routine surveillance testing. Otherwise, the inspectors found conduct of
operations to be professional and focussed on safety.
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02 C;:2:xl Status of Feelleties and Equipment
02.1 General Plant Tours ano System Walkdowns
- The inspectors followed the gu; dance of Inspection Procedure 71707 in walking down
sooessible portions of the following systems:
e Standby diesel generators
e River water supply -
Equipment operability, material condition, and housekeeping were noceptable in all
cases. Several minor discrepancies were brought to the licensee's attention and ware
corrected. The inspectors identified no substantive concems as a result of these
walkdowns.
07.2 Detailed Walkdown of the Reactor Core Isolation Coohna (RCIC) Systern
a. l tsoection Scone (71707)
During the inspection period, the inspectors followed the guidance of Inspection
Procedure 71707 and conducted a detailed walkdown of the RCIC system to verify its -
standby readiness condition. The inspectors reviewed system diagrams, Operating
instruction (01) 150, " Reactor Core isolation Codng System," the Updated Final Safety
Analysis Report (UFSAR) description, and maintenance history,
b. Observations and Findinas
The inspectors verified that the RCIC system components in the electrical lineup and
valve lineup were in the required position in accordance with 01150, * Reactor Core
Isolation Cooling System,' Attachments 1 and 2. The inspecters identified two globe
valves (V24-0059, RCIC Steam Supply Drain Line Trap DT 2408 Isolation and V24-0062,
RCIC Steam Supply Drain Trap Test Line Isolation) that were labeled as gate valves on -
the component database and system diagram (M 124). These minor discrepancies were
discussed with the licensee and prompt actions were taken to resolve the differences,
c. Conclusions
The inspectors concluded that the licensee maintained the RCIC system in the proper
standby readiness condition. Minor component database and drawing discrepancies
were promptly resolved.
02.3 - Cold Weather Preparations
a, lnspection Scope (71714)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's program for pro'. acting safety-related systems
against the effects of cold weather. The inspectors reviewed applicable licensee
documentation, Interviewed operations staff, and conducted plant system walkdowns.
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b. QhattyMens_and Findinns
Uoontee personnel completed integrated Plant Operating instruction (IPol) 6, " Cold
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Weather Operations," Revision 12, prior to the onset of cold weather.
The inspectors evaluated the intake structure, pump house, cooling tower valve houses,
cooling tower breaker houses, and the well water pump houses and found that they were
heated with unit heaters or portable heaters. Thermometers were vertfied to be in-place
at each location and were to be read by auxiliary operators during their daily routeds to
verify that area temperatures were adequate,
The inspectors verified that Attachment 1. * Plant Winterization Check List," of IPol 6 was
completed, signed and dated by the appropriate personnel. The inspectors identified no
discrepancies for cold weather preparations,
c. Conclusions
The inspectors concluded that the licensee's completed and planned actions for cold
weather protection were adequate to protect plant components and systems from cold
weather.
.OS Miscellaneous Operations lasues (92700, 92e03)
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, Od.1 (Closed) Inspection Follow Item (IFI) 50 331/9600410: The DAEC UFSAR defined the
rosloual heat removal system in the spent fuel pool cooling mode (RHF.4FPC) as the
! altemate cooling path for the spent fuel pool. Questioning by the inspectors determmed
that the valve had only been tested during the initial plant t"'+sp testing, in
October 1996 DAEC determined by walkdown that operations personnel would be able to
line up RHR SFPC within a reasonable time, estimated to be between 4 and 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
The licensee also determined that all valves in the system had been cycled except
V34-001. On October 15,1997, DAEC successfully cycled valve V34 001. This item is
closed.
-08.2 (Closed)IFl 50-331/96006-04: The licensee had identified a potential UFSAR
discrepancy regarding the storage of fuel in the spent fuel pool and planned to obtain an
, analysis from an outside vendor. Holtec Intemational analysis Hl 971708, " Criticality
Safety Evaluation of the Spent Fuel Storegs Rocks in the Duane Amold Energy Center for
. Maximum Enrichment Capability" concluded that spent fuel could be safety stored in -
either type of storage racks used at DAEC A UFSAR change was completed and will be
- submitted with the next cycle UFSAR update. This item is closed.
11. Maintenance
M1 Conduct of Maintenance
M1.1 General Comments
a. - Inspection Scope (62707. 61726)
The inspectors observed or reviewed all or portions of the following work activities and
surymillances tests:
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- Relay coil replacements for containment isolation valve logic, corrective
maintenance action request (CMAR) A38242
e Monthly standby gas treatment system testing, STP 47LC01.M
e 125 Vdc battery charger maintenance, CMAR A36453
e 'A' and *B' control building chiller repair and testing
e Safety-related instrument air compressor repair, CMAR A38348
o HPCl/RCIC steam line drain leak repair
e Rod block monitor maintenance and testing
e Core Spray engineering change package
e 24 Vdc preventive maintenance, preventive maintenance action request
(PMAR) 1101482
M1.2 Failure to Use Enaineered Maintenance Action (EMA) Process for a Maintenance Activity
a. Inspection Scope (62707)
The inspectors reviewed CMAR A38249 Ger the CMAR was authorized for work by the
control room. The work involved replau,ig relays for several containment isolation
valves. The inspectors also reviewed the TSs, post maintenance testing, and operability
testing.
b. Observations and Findinas
The inspectors identified a discrepancy in the CMAR planning. The CMAR provided
instructions to replace existing 115 Vac relay coils with 120 Vac coils for several relays.
Although the co..s were being replaced with new coils of a different voltage rating, the
'EMA" block was marked *N' for not applicable. The inspectors were concemed that this
was not consistent wi.ii actministrative control procedure (ACP) 109.1, ' Engineered
Maintenance Action," Revision 6. The ACP specifies that the EMA process is used when
the change alters a component's model number, materiel specification, or design
characteristics.
The inspectors interviewed the maintenance planner, wo provided background
information to support the acceptability of the change in voltage rating. The inspectors
had no concems with the appropriateness of the change; however, the inspectors were
concemed that the EMA process as required by ACP 109.1 was not followed. This minor
violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section IV of the NRC
Enforcement Policy (50-331/97017-01(DRP)),
c. Conclusions
The inspectors had no operability concems with the work that was performed. However,
the licensee did not follow the procedural controls in this case.
M1.3 Ingpp..r_gble 125 Volt Direct Current (Vde) Battery Charaers Followina Preventive
Mejntenance
a. Inspection Scope (62706)
The inspectors observed partial performance of preventive maintenance per
CMAR A36453 on the Division i 125 Vdc battery charger 1D12. The CMAR involved
replacing the firing board, sensing current limit board and amplifier board. Discussions
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were held with electrical maintenance personnel, engineering personnel, and operations
personnel,
b. Observations and Findinas
on November ig 1997, electrical maintenance personnel performed preventive
maintenance on the Division i 125 Vdc battery charger (1D12) by replacing the firing
board, sensing current limit board, and amplifier board in accordance with CMAR A36453.
The vendor recommended this preventive rnalntenance in response to the licensee's
concem for their need to make periodic adjustments to the battery charger. When the
work was completed, restoration of the 1D12 battery charger was attempted. The
battery charger failed to operate. The licensee removed the 1D12 battery charger from
service at that time and attempted to restore the backup battery charger (1D120). The
backup battery charger could not be restored due to the failure of breaker 1D10-03 to
close and prevented connecting the battery backup charger to the 125 Vdc distribution
panel. The inspectors verified that the licensee appropriately entered a 12-hour Limiting -
Condition for Operation (LCO) in accordance with TS 3.8.B.2.b. The licensee promptly
responded by developing corrective actions to restore both battery chargers.
The licensee replaced the circuit boards that were changed out in the 1D12 battery
charger with circuit boards that were previously in use. The 1D12 cattery charger was
rectored and met all operating requirements for operability. The inspectors observed
good coordination between electrical maintenance personnel, engineering personnel, and
operations personnelin promptly restoring the 1D12 battery charger.
During the investigation of the failure of breaker 1D10-03 to close, electrical maintenance
l personnelidentified a shorted diode in the battery backup charger. The diode was
i replaced and the backup battery charger was retumed to service. The inspectors
observed that electrical maintenance personnel effectively identified the cause of the
breaker failure and appropriately replaced the failed diode.
The LCO was exited shortly after declaring the battery chargers operable. A root cause
investigation was being conducted by the licensee regarding the failure of the
1D12 battery charger to operate. This is considered an inspection follow up item
(50 331/g7017-02(DRP)) pending the results of the root cause investigation.
c. Conclut19nt
The inspectors concluded that the licensee promptly responded to the 125 Vdc battery
charger problems. The inspectors will review the licensee's root cause investigation
when completed.
M1A Recent Work Plannino issues
a. luspection Scope (62707)
The inspectors observed routine maintenance activities, following the guidance of
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b. Observations and Findinas
During this inspection period, the inspectors observed that the licensee backed out of
several activities after they were started due to problems with planning of work activities
or procedures in another case, an LCO on the "A" control building chiller lasted longer
than expected due to coordination problems, in each case, the licensee identified the
wncem, documented the issue on an Action Request (AR), and ensured the plant was in
a safe condition.
The inspectors considered the licensee's actions in each case to be appropriate.
However, the inspectors were concemed with a potential adverse tren f in work planning
issues. The examples are listed below;
e Work planning problems during maintenance on the *A* control t'uilding chiller
resulted in exiting the LCO on day 21 of 30, which was much later than planned.
The licensee held a post Job critique and planned to implement several corrective
actions.
- During implementation of an engineering change package on a core spray
instrument, problems were encountered when testing per the new surveillance
procedure. The licensee backed out of the test and corrected the procedure.
- During scheduled work on the 24 Vdc system, problems with a new procedure
occurred. The licensee backed out of the activity and corrected the procedure.
- During surveillance testing of the rod block monitors, certain steps of the
procedure did not address how to handle data that did not meet acceptance
criteria. The procedure was corrected.
c. Conclusions
The inspectors concluded that problems in work planning and adequacy of procedures
were oroperly handled as they came up. However, these problems represented an
increase in the numt,er of work planning problems over that typically encountered and
resulted in safety related equipment being out-of service longer than necessary.
M2 Maintenance and Materiel Condition of Facilities and Equipment
M2.1 Plant Materiel Condition
a. InJspection Scope (62707)
The inspectors reviewed several emergent work items to ensure appropriate operability
evaluations were performed, TS were met, repairs were made, and root causes were
determined where appropriate.
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b. Observations and findinas
The inspectors noted that there were several emergent equipment issues during the
Inspection period, in two cases, the licensee entered a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> shutdown LCO, but
repairs were completed before power was reduced. The inspectors observed appropriate
licensee response in performing repairs and to determine the root cause. The examples
are listed below:
-e On December 3,1997, the "B" instrument air compressor (1K004) failed during
surveillance test NS30001, *lnstrument Air Compressors Monthly Functional
Test." The cause was an air Isak on a flHer, The licensee entered a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />
shutdown LCO according to T8, The maintenance was completed and the LCO
was exited before power reduction was commencodi (AR 972763)
e On November 19,1997, the li ensee encountered problems with the 125 Vdc
battery charger following maintenance, Ses Section M1.3 (or detslis. The
licensee entered a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> shutdown LCO according to TS. The LCO was exited
before power reduction was commenced. (AR 972655)
e On December 15,1997, the supply breaker for the Division i 125 Vdc battery -
charger opened unexpectedly during a preventive meintenance activity. The
breaker was declared inoperable and a new one was ordered. The Division I
loads were transferred to the altemate battery charger The inspectors vertfled
that the TS were met with the operable battery chargers.
(AR 972845)-
e On December 2,1997, an LCO was entered on the 'B' control building chiller
' when a large oil leak was discovered by a fire watch on rounds. This occurred
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i day after the "A" chiller was ret'imed to service following a 21 day
Out of service. The "B' chiller was repaired promptly. (AR 972760)
c. Conclusions
The licensee promptly resolved the emergent equipment issues discussed above.
Engineering department personnel provided appropriate support where requested,
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- Maintenance activities were property prioritized and completed in a timely manner. The
- control building chillers continue to be a challenge at Duane Amold.
M8 - Miscellaneous Maintenance issues (92902)
M8.1 (Closed) Unresolved item (URI) 50-301/96004 0t Instrument Used for TS Reading Not
in Calibration Program. As discussed in Inspection Report No. 50-331/96004, there were
no vendor recommendations for periodic calibration of spent fuel pool level instrument
Ll3413c This instrument was installed by a modification in 1990 without establishing
calibration requirements. The inspectors verified that instrument Ll3413 was not required
to be calibrated. Additionally, the inspectors verified that the instrument was indicating
property by comparing its reading to readings from redundant local instrumentetion. The
inspectors also reviewed other instrumentation used for TS surveillances and found no
- additional examples where the instruments were not periodically calibrated. This item is
closed.
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M8.2 (Closed) Licensee Ev3nt Report (LER) 50-331/97-12-00: Spurious RCIC Steam t.eak
Detection Isolation. The licensee determined the cause of the isolation to be a spurious
signal from temperature switch TDS 2445A. The switch was replaced and tested
satisfactorily. This item is closed.
111. Enoineerina
E1 Conduct of Engineering
a. Inspection Scope (37551)
The inspectors evaluated cngineering involvement in resolution of emergent material
condition problems and other routine activities. The inspectors reviewed areas s' .:t as
operability evaluations, root cause analyses, safety committees, and self asst ssnients.
The effectiveness of the licensee's controls for the identification, resolution, and
prevention of problems were also examined.
E1.1 Testina on Control Buildina Chiller Without a Safety Evaluation
a. Inspection Scope (37551)
The inspectors reviewed the details of a 100 percent load test on control bu'.' ding chillers
on November 19,1997. This review was conducted during the testing and included
documents such as TS, UFSAR, tagout, and CMAR.
b. Observations and Findinas
l The licensee intended to perform a 100 percent load test on the 'A" chiller. Due to low
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natural heat load during winter conditions, the load needed to be artificially increased to
support this test. The licensee used tagout 971369 to fall open a control valve in the
heating loop to increase heat in the control building. The inspectors were concemed with
, several aspects of the chiller testing:
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e The testing was not described in the UFSAR; however, the licensee did not
perform a safety evaluation.
- There was no prncedure or acceptance criteria for the testing. The only controlin
place was a tagout on several valves in the control building heating loop.
e The shift supervisor had established informal monitoring of the contrn! room
temperature. However, no specific plans were made on what to do if
temperatures went too high. Additionally, steps were not taken to monitor the
other areas affected by the test.
e According to UFSAR Section 9.4.4.2, the control building ventilation system
serves the control room, cable spreading rocm, safety-related battery rooms, and
essential switchgear rooms. The inspectors were concemed that safety related
components in these rooms could have been adversely affected by the testing
unless a detailed review was performed prior to the test and formal controls were
in place during testing.
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The licensee's testing was successfully performed with negligible increase in control
building temperatures, The inspectors recognized that the licensee made a change to
the notisafety-related heating loop for the building. The inspectors need to review this
issue further to determine whether the licensee was in violation of 10 CFR 50.5g or
10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI. This is an unresolved item (URI)
(50 331/g7017-03(DRP)).
c. Conclusiqat
The inspectors were concemed with the licensee's performance in planning and
implementing control building chiller 100 percent load testing. Specifically, the inspectors
were concemed that the licensee did not perform a safety evaluation prior to the test and
did not have adequate test controls in place during the test.
E8 Miscellaneous Engineering lasues (92902)
E8.1 (Closed) IFl 50-331/9600211: Discrepancy Between Updated Final Safety Analysis
Report (UFSAR) and Plant Configuration. The inspectors had Identified a long term
tagout on the fire protection system. This resulted in the system configuration not
matching the UFSAR. The licensee decided to incorporate the long-term tagout and
l revised the drawing and UFSAR. This item is closed.
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IV. Plant Suppod
R5 Staff Training and Qualification In Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls
R5.1 Expired Resolrator Qualifications
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed qualification requirements and records to determine whether
licensed and non licensed operators had maintained qualifications consistent with the
licensee's program. This included a review of administrative control procedure
ACP 1411.20, " Respiratory Protection," Revision 5. The inspectors also reviewed the
accessibility of corrective lens inserts for respirators where required.
b. Observations and Findinag
The inspectors identified that two licensed operating shift supervisors (OSS) and one shift
technical advisor (STA) had expired qualifications for radiological mask fit. Special
Order 97-01 required that members of certain job classifications, such as OSS and STA,
must be respirator and self-contained breatning apparatus qualified. ACP 1411.20,
Section 3.3(1)(b), required individuals to have been fit tested for respiratory protective
devices within the previous 12 months plus 30 days, in the case of the two OSS's and
the STA mentioned above, the mask fit was overdue by less than 1 nionth,2 months, arid
5 months, respectively. ACP 1411.20, Section 3.1(6)(a) required that respirator users
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shall maintain current respirator qualifications. The failure to maintain current respirator
qualifications in accordance with ACP 1411.20 was a violation (50-331/g7017-04(DRP)).
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The inspectors also noted discrepancies in the training records for several personnel from
other departments. The licensee initiated AR 972919 to review the issue and determine
corrective actions,
c. Conclusions
The inspectors were concemed that the licensee did not maintain control of personnel
respirator qualifications in accordance with program requirements.
F1 Control of Fire Protection Activities
a. InsDection ScoDo (71750)
The inspectors accompanied a fire watch on routine rounds to evaluate adherence to the
licensee's fire plan,
b. Qtti3Iygtlons and Findinal
The inspectors observed that the fire watch performed duties appropriately. The required y
areas were toured in the required times and Iri accordance with the licensee's fire plan.
The inspectors had no concems.
As discussed in Section M2.1, a fire watch on rounds identified an oil leak on the control
building chiller. This was promptly communicated to the control room and enabled a
quick response to the problem.
V. Mananoment Meetinas
X1 Exit Meeting Summary
The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at
j the conclusion of the inspection on December 22,1997. The licensee acknowledged the
findings presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined
during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was
identified.
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
Licensee
J. Franz, Vice President Nuclear
G. Van Middlesworth, Plant Manager
R. Anderson, Manager, Outage and Support
J. Bjorseth, Maintenance Superintendent
D. Curtland, Operations Manager
R. Hite, Manager, Radiation Protection
M. McDermot, Manager, Engineering
K. Peveler, Manager, Regulatory Performance
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INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
IP 37551: Onsite Engineering
IP 40500: Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in Identifying, Resolving, and Preventing
Problems
IP 61726: Surveillance Observation-
lP 62703: Maintenance observation
IP 62707: Maintenance observation
IP 71707: Plant Operations
IP 71750: Plant Support
IP 71714: Cold Weather Preparations
IP 92700: Onsite Followup of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor
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Facilities
IP 92901: Followup Operations
IP 92902: Followup - Engineering
IP 92903: Followup Maintenance
ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened
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50 331/97017-01 NCV Failure to follow EMA process
50-331/97017 02 IFl 125 Vdc battery charger failures
50-331/97017 03 URI Testing of control building chiller without SE
50 331/97017 04 VIO Failure to maintain current respirator qualifications
Closed
50 331/96002 11 IFl Discrepancy between UFSAR and plant configuration
50-331/96004 01 URI instrument used for TS reading not in calibration program
50-331/96004 10 IFl Inconsistencies in spent fuel pool cooling mode
50 331/96006-04 IFl Spent fuel pool rack criticality analysis
$0-331/9712 00 LER Spurious RCIC steam leak detection isolation
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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
-ACP' Administrative Control Procedure
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CMAR Corrective Maintenance Action Request
DAEC Duane Amold Energy Center
EPAA Engineered maintenance action
HPCI High pressure coolant Injection
IFl inspection followup item
IP inspection Procedure
' Pol Integrated Plant Operating Instruction
IR inspection Report
LCO Limiting condition for Operation
LER Licensee Event Report
NCV Non cited violation
NOV Notice of violation
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NRR' Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulations
01 Operating Instruction
OSS Operations Ehlft Supervisor
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RCIC Reactor core isolation cooling
RHR SFPC Residual heat removal-spent fuel pool cooling
l STA Shift technical advisor
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STP Surveillance Test Procedure
TS Technical Specification
UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
URI Unresolved item
Vac Volts altomating current
Vdc Volts direct current
16
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