IR 05000331/1985016
| ML20137Y539 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Duane Arnold  |
| Issue date: | 11/22/1985 |
| From: | Patterson J, Phillips M, Matthew Smith, Williamsen N NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20137Y535 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-331-85-16, NUDOCS 8512110071 | |
| Download: ML20137Y539 (20) | |
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s - % f. U.S.~ NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION . +m " REGION III , W s t
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~ Report No'. 50-331/85016(DRSS) .
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n Docket No. 50-331 Licerige No DPR-49 <
% e Licensee: Iowa Electric Light and Power Company N '** '
IE Towers '
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P.O. Box 351 -- Cedar Rapids, IA 52406 - -
, Facility Name: Duane Arnold Energy Center Inspection At: .Duane Arnold Site,, Palo, IA O
Inspection Conducted: October 28-30,'1985 - * Inspectors: . Patterson b% NOV, Y/ lN$ ,
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M. Smith , , Approved By: Chief .
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Emergency Preparedness Section,,4 Date -
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Inspection Summary: .!f
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Inspection on October 28-30, 1985 (Report No. 50-331/85-016(DRSS)) y s Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of the Duane Arnold Energy seven NRC Center emergency representatives ofpreparedness key functionsexercise involving and locations during observations the exercis by 'po The inspection involved 154 inspector-hours cn site by three NRC insp6ctors,and
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four consultant ~ *
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Results: No violations, deficiencies, or deviationi'were identified; however, ' weaknesses were identified as summarized in the App 6n' di . ~ , .
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8512110071 851127 1 PDR ADOCK 0500 O s ,
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r m MW . DETAILS h $'ik - _ ~ w ., Persons Contacted
' lNRC Observers and Areas Observe J..Patterson, Technical. Support Center.(TSC) and Emergency
.0perations Facility (EOF)
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F._ Victor, Control Room - # G. Arthur, TSC - . A N.'Williamsen, Operational Support Center (05C), and Post Accident
' Sampling System (PASS) ;
R. Traub, EOF' M.- Smith, EOF.and Emergency News Center (ENC)
.T. Lonergan, Offsite Monitoring Teams , y lJ. Wiebe,.TSC N" '
_ Iowa Electric' Light and Power Company Personnel and Area Assigned-R'.lLatham, Vice President, Corporate Affairs, ENC-R. McGaughy, Manager, Nuclear Generation, EOF
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P. Wood, Director, Nuclear Generation, EOF D. Wilson, Manager, Nuclear Licensing, E0F D. Mineck, P1 ant Superintendent, TSC
'R. Lessly, Manager, Design Engineering, E0F
. - - W. Miller, Technical Services Superintendent, TSC L H. Giorgio, Radiation Protection Supervisor, TSC D. Hingtgen, Emergency Planning Coordinator, Corporate i G. Taylor, Senior. Engineer, Dose Assessment, EOF ! R.' Potts, Operations Shift Supervisor, A - Control Room .' F.-Van Etten, Operations Shift Supervisor, B - Control Room D. Langer, Public Information Coordinator, ENC All the above listed individuals attended the exit interview on
' October 30, 198 '
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' LGeneral E 'An exercise of the licensee's Duane Arnold Energy Center and! Iowa'
- Electric Light and Power Coporate Emergency Plans was conducted at the Duane Arnold Energy Center on October 29, 1985, testing the integrated L ^ responses of the licensee, State, and local organizations to a simulated
_ emergency involving-the simulated release of radioactive material to the '
' environment. Attachment 1 describes the scope and objectives for this-
- , exercise. Attachment 2 describes the exercise narrative summary and an g" outline of the sequence of events. This exercise was a full participation
,: -exercise for Linn and Benton Counties and the State of Iowa.
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. '.. , m l , ' 13.- General Observations / , i .l
"' : Procedures: i I
L This exercise was conducted in accordance with.10 CFR Part 50,' i= ' Appendix ~El requirements-using the licensee's Emergency Plans and * the Emergency' Plan-Implementing Procedures (EPIPs) used by the site ,
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opersonnelfand the Corporate Plan Implementing Procedures used b ,o 3 .
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corporate personne ,
- ' Coordination
._The licensee's response was co'ordinated, orderly,.and timely. I the events had been real, the actions taken by the licensee would have been sufficient to permit the State and-local authorities to V Vi take appropriate action *y
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. c.- .0bservers ,
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-Licensee observers. monitored and critiqued this exercise along with
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seven NRC observers and several Federal Emergency Management l Agency
~(FEMA) observers.' FEMA observations on the responses of the State ,
a and local governme'nts will.be provided in a separate repor / i ' Critique' J
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-The licensee held a' critique.the day after the exercise on ?
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October 29,.1985-at the licensee's IE Towers in Cedar Rapids, Iow .
.The NRC critique immediately followed the licensee's critique. 'The :NRC Team Leader presented the preliminary exercise finding In addition, a public critique was held on October 30, 1985, to '
present both the onsite and offsite: preliminary findings by the NRC _and FEMA representatives, respectively.
' u 14 . ; Specific-Observations ' Control Room
- The exercise crew was knowledgeable, worked well together as a team, and continually explored various ways ~to resolve the problems as they 3 occurred. Both the Unusual Event and the ' Alert were properly classified. Notifications to the State a'nd. Counties were made in a ,).~
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. timely manner,.and emergency classification announcements were made r ~
within the plant. However, Public Address (PA) announcements'could s e 4 have been made at other times to keep essential plant personnel informed of deteriorating operating conditions or changes in s radiation levels in various portions of the plant.
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Transfer of. command and control to the Emergency Coordinator (EC)
:in the.TSC was conducted in an effective manner. Personnel
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' dosimeters were not read periodically by Control Room personnel, nor L )L
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S iwere announcements _made requesting this. Radiation habitability-monitoring surveys were made frequently and reported to the
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7 , h ", Operations 1 Shift Supervisor __(OSS).
E iCommunicationswiIhtheTSCwerewellmaintainedthroughoutthe Wy
' - . exercise. : Good, meaningful exchanges of technical information and L ' 'of~ plant conditions occurred-between the 0SS and the EC in the-TS _ .g Drawings;were brought out and reviewed prior to dispatching operators y -to try.to manually open Containment: Spray valves. These examples and ethers observed demonstrated good judgement-and initiative by Control ~ koom personnel in trying to control.and stop the emergenc :e " ? Technical Support Center (TSC)
1 - + . T ' The TSC was quicklyLstaffed 'and fully activated in-less than 30
~ .. minutes. 'Immediately following the PA announcement of.an Alert, the '
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,- evacuation alarm was sounded, followed by a voice announcement for
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all .non-essential-and contractor personnel to go to their assigned s
' assembly areas. The~ assembly, accountability, and evacuation o activities were carried out without:any noticeable flaws and were completed within'30 minutes.
. Several good discussions and briefings were held between the EC, f TSC Supervisor,> Technical and Engineering Supervisor,'and the Site 4 Radiatibn Protection Coordinator (RPC) prior to deciding upo y
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escalating to a General Emergency. The EC was actively involved n in discussions with.his EOF counterpart prior to de-escalation and
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m, recoveryfactivitie k None of the participants in the TSC had emergency title placards at M <their work spaces to~ identify their positions. . Initial briefings by
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}M- the EC made when addressing emergency classification changes were well done. However, more interim briefings to include a wider scope of i*%iP '
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activities should have been given by the EC or his immediate ' t' s'ubordinate. Status board ~information provided was timely and well f - maintained;lhowever, the status board should have included information regarding area contamination'. Follow-up by the TSC on the PASS sample delay should have been made sooner. There were no log entries or
status board entries in the TSC at 1252 which would have indicated ' the' difficulty the PASS team was having.at that time in obtaining a sample. Also,:no log entries were found concerning the repair team U '
. attempting i.d get to the Containment Spray Valve. Such information
' should have been. requested from the OSC if not' supplied through other
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> The TSC Communicator to the Control Room was not being utilized as i the position intended. There were too many direct communications ,
made to the Control Room by the EC and his support managers.- The . 'TSC log book was not monitored by the EC. It did not contain 1 sufficient information'to reconstruct the event The EC left the
'TSC at approximately 1320 and returned in almost 30 minutes while -
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' -a substitute took'over. No formal announcement was made to all TSC
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A 1 staff, either when he left or when he returned.
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An. incident of prompting was' overheard by the NRC observer when a Controller
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prompted the participants on which actions to take to fix a relay to the MOV-2000 valve. This occurred about 132 The physical-arrangement:of the-TSC does not coincide with Attachment 1 or EPIP'2.2 which described the physical layout in a ' sketch.'?The procedure'should be revised as soon as a more permanent Tarrangement of the TSC is agreed upon by management. The - arrangement.and the~ procedure should be identical before the 1986 annual'exerc.is JInitial dose' assessments were made in the TSC using a MIDAS
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computerized system with periodic updates on current meteorology conditions and-forecasts from the National Weather' Service. Dose
. assessment values on printouts were readily available for evaluation
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.by-the Site Radiation Protection Coordinator. The Offsite Team ;
Dispatcher and the TSC Communicator to Offsite agencies both did a professional job and maintained their efficiency throughout the exercise, until some of these responsibilities were transferred to
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the EOF. ' A Continuous Air Monitor (CAM) was started early in the TSC-and kept running.. The individual assigned to posting data
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sheets,, including radiation levels in various sections of the. plant,
' location of offsite teams, and weather conditions, did an excellant
' job throughout the exercise.
d s Overall,I the TSC:had a satisfactory performance; however, the following items 'should be considered for improvement: ' ~
?* -A' status" board should be used to listing the' condition of - Lreactor operating systems,'such as HPCI, RCS, etc. Also,'a
- list of priority items should be posted in full . view of all
- TSC personne These specific ' items listed should not be removed until the problem is solve ' .* A continuous log should be maintained in chronological order and kept current by a designated emergency response perso .
, '* -Emergency title placards or signs for all TSC positions and support groups'should be in place at their work stations.
g , <' )erational Support Center (OSC) and Post Accident Sampling System (' ASS) The OSC was activated promptly and with a minimum of confusion. The tag-board' task' assignment system worked well. The OSC Supervisor demonstrated very good command and control, as well as good' delegation , to his several assistants. The teams seemed well trained, and at times-even anticipated the OSC Supervisor's requests. Dosimetry for OSC personnel was well. documented,'and allowable doses were assigned
'to each. individual. Briefings held in the Security Office,-which
_ served as the OSC main office, were' generally thorough and well
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presented. Teams were briefed independently on their assignments and on ALARA considerations. Teams generally demonstrated good ALARA practice The status board was continually updated. The OSC Supervisor demonstrated good preparation for a shift change and utilized his staff to make up the list of changing personnel well in advance of
their need. He also advised his staff to be ready to brief their counterparts at shift change. Use of a TSC support staff member to go to the OSC and frequently brief the OSC staff, including any teams awaiting assignment, was a positive innovation which proved effectiv The onsite radiological control. team, on assignment to monitor leakage to the doors leading to the Rad Waste Building, received a
. good briefing, checked out their equipment, and were prompt in following OSC instructions and communicating back their survey results. However, one OSC team awaiting assignment (about 1135) did
_ not get clear instructions and directions, and amid some confusion was not dispatched for over an. hour. This unjustified delay involved vacillating directions from the OSC Supervisor as to who and what were to be sent to the second floor of the Reactor Building ' to manually or electrically shut the Containment Spray Valv Decontamination of a worker, who was contaminated by a spent resin slurry resulting from a hose rupture, could have been better demonstrate Initial debriefing at the Decontamination Facility near the Access Control Point (ACP) was thorough and well conducted. However, the Health Physics Technician (HP Tech.)
assigned to decontamination made several errors in assisting and monitoring the worker's removal of his inside-contaminated sui The HP Technician removed the reverse contamination " jump" suit and turned it inside out at the same time. Thus, the HP Tech. was
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was touching the contaminated side of the suit. The plastic sheet on which the contaminated clothes were placed was rolled up, but not taped. Thus loose contamination could have been easily spread if it unravelled. The frisker used often touched the worker's clothing, body and shoe Also, the contaminated man could have received better instructions from the HP Tech. as he went through the decontamination process. To summarize, this objective of the exercise was met, but the process needs improvemen The PASS team received a good briefing from the OSC Supervisor . including authorization by the EC for projected exposures up to 2 Each of the two-man team suited up in anti-Cs each with a Self Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA). Both demonstrated good knowledge of preparation for the task by starting an air sampler in the PASS panel room, plus frequent checks on their integrated dos , .
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_'. The correct procedure for the PASS was followed by the Chemistry
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Technician, including a temporary version of PASAP 2.4, "Small Volume Liquid Sample." This procedure specified using an electrical " jumper" at the sampling point. However, only an Instrument Technician
.(I-Tech) was allowed to put a jumper across an electrical componen The only I-Tech. available was not qualified for SCBA use; hence, he could not perform this duty until permissible radiation levels were established. In the-interim the OSC Supervisor ordered the PASS panel to be used without the jumper. Later, when air habitability had been established, the I-Tech put the jumper on incorrectly, and the panel still would not provide a liquid sampl It took an additional try to readjust the jumpe Other delays in obtaining the PASS- sample included two changes in instruction to the Chem Tech. for the type and size of sample.to be drawn, and the need for a sign-off approval for an I-Tech to put the . jumper across the electrical. componen This authorization and need for the I-Tech to be trained on SCBA were serious errors that indicated lack of planning for this operatio With the dose rates varying from 4.5 R/hr at the PASS panel to 2.5 R/hr in the adjacent hallway, to 500 mR/hr approximately 20 feet away at Access Control, the team did not demonstrate good ALARA practice They retreated only to the hallway rather than to the 500 mR/hr are These tactics required the OSC Supervisor to obtain another request from the EC for higher exposure limits and consideration of bringing in another team to relieve this on Another PASS team was not activated, howeve The PASS sample should have been obtained and analyzed within three hours from the time the team was dispatched. Actual time involved took over five hours. This failure constitutes an exercise weaknes This item will be tracked by as Open Item No. 331/85016-0 Emergency Operation Facility (E0F)
The E0F was placed on standby at the Alert level and was fully activated at the Site Area Emergency at 1003. Communications were established with the TSC and technical support was provided by the EOF prior to full activatio Initial briefing to EOF staff by the Emergency Response and r<ecovery Director (ERRD) was thoroug Transfer of command and control responsibilities from the TSC was well done. All messages, internal or external, were received and-approved by the ERRD before distribution. This included news releases before they were presented at the Emergency News Cente Communications flow, administrative support, and message distribution were excellent. Status boards and logs were maintained on a continual, consistent basis throughout the exercise. Changes in plant status, radiological conditions, and protective action recommendations were announced immediatel The ERRD conducted frequent, thorough briefings, keeping the E0F staff well informed
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' throughout .the exercise. = The Radiological and E0F Manage Timmediately notified State and counties, through a dedicated line, . - .cf all'offsite team readings and protection. action recommendation This was thoroughly and efficiently performed throughout the , exercise. -Trending of_ plant parameters'was done and other key -
reactor-data was available, received, and acted upon through the -
-Technical and Engineering Support Grou . ~ = Dose assessment responsibilities were transferred smoothly from 'the TSC to the EOF at about 1010. Also' transferred was the . responsibility for and direction of the Offsite Radiological Monitoring Teams (RMTs). :The Radiation Assessment Coordinator (RAC)
Ldid a good job of directing the activities of the RMTs through the EOF Communicator. Without waiting until an offsite radiation release-occurred,' the RAC requested that a dose _ projection be~made based on torus radiation levels. 'This was worthwhile information generated 'just prior to the General Emergency being declared. The dose-assessment team was adaptable in modifying their actions in response
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to unexpected occurrences,'such as the MIDAS computer system keyboard lockout and the changing of color coding of the RMTs so that they would~not~ conflict with the State teams. (Both teams had blue and green designations originally). Due to the MIDAS lockout,'the dose assessment function was probably transferred with only a short delay back.to the-TSC.~ Within less-than about 30 minutes, the E0F MIDAS system was.again restored and was fully operabl The primary dose assessment operator had some problems in the mechanics-of operating.the MIDAS dose projection program. The RAC had to' assist'him frequently in computing the dose More hands-on
- training for this operator should be beneficial. The 12-hour default value.used in this exercise ~should be reevaluated for future dose assessment use, as recommended by Region III's earlier review of scenario data. The RAC requested an off gas stack line sampl Instead, he received data'~ based'on iodine content from a silver
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. zeolite cartridge. -It was not' clear if the RAC was ever notified that the data he received was not what he requested. While the Radiation-Data Plotter (RDP) was communicating to the offsite RMTs, ,
he did state'"this is a drill," before or after his message, whereas the EOF Communicator often forgot. This is more serious for offsite
. communications since 'outside reception of these radio communications could misinterpret the message to mean that a real emergency was in . progress; 'The meteorological / plume chart for the 10 mile EPZ was well maintained'and kept current ~throughout the exercise. The RDP even-made status announcements when there was a change or a new radiation level.in a_certain secto He did a very: good, diligent job in keeping the somewhat smaller EPZ map in the dose assessment office consistent with the larger EPZ map in the main EOF room. Protective " Action Recommendations (PARS) were appropriately and correctly . .
selected for th General Emergency and then, as conditions changed, adjusted as neeled. Good discussions were held between the ERRD, the-Radiological-and.E0F Manager, and sometimes the RAC before the final PAR was agreed upo et-h-e ws----2-%*--etww e----r-ew
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1The recovery and reentry phases of the exercise were well conducte It.was. obvious that'a great deal of effort and meaningfulf
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recommendations went into this phase. Downgrading from a General ' Emergency to the Alert status was made although containment air _was
. still. leaking based on the results of containment. air samples.
n Although conditions at the time were within the range of theLEAL requirements of an Alert, the' event should have~gone.right to ~, - recovery with these listed condition :A' conference call'was conducted with State and local agencies.to
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establish levels' reentry into the area. Other plans for plant
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recovery were discussed and demonstrate Shift changes were b -discussed,-but not demonstrate ~ ., <To conclude, this was a.very-well conducted E0F which' indicated E that those participating were well-trained, coordinated in effort, and efficient in skills; and'all displayed a very positive attitude i- 'and demeanor.
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: Emergency News: Center (ENC)
The ENC was activ'ated in a timely manner following the Alert declaration. . Press releases were frequent and provided adequate
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details regarding protective action recommendations and emergency
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classifications. -Plant ~ conditions were discussed during media - '
~ briefings._ Telephone questions and rumor control-activities were observed and tested. At- all times correct information was provide i
" In addition to~hard copy releases the licensee also conducted
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several media briefings at.the ENC. These briefings were
,- - satisfactorily coordinated with State and local personnel. The
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. ' briefings were generally. understandable and timely. However, plant-diagrams.were not used,__which would have assisted the spokesperson in his attempts'to explain plant conditions. -An.EPZ sector map, , used to' explain PARS, was difficult to see and could not have been photographed. Simplified plant system diagrams and evacuation maps, ' which are clearly v_isible from the media seating area, should be
.available and'use'd during briefing '
To summarize the Emergency News Center was well conducted and served as a vital: link in communicating the various aspects of the emergency _ lto:the public; Offsite Radiological Monitoring Teams (RMTs)
- The two teams were briefed and dispatched in a timely manner from E the OSC. The emergency kits for the two vehicles were checked and inventoried before the teams left the OSC. The radios for each team were checked for operability before leaving the OSC. The portable r radiation monitoring instruments were source-checked and battery-checked, and the. instrument calibration dates were found to
" be current. Properdosimetrywereissuedtoallpersonnel. The
dosimeters were ' zeroed" and readings plus dosimeter numbers were
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: recorded before the-teamsLleft. The proper maps were in the~ kit l ' : The teams demonstrated that they could follow the maps and quickly locate the sampling points. Team A was observed collecting and l evaluating the results of an air sample taken in the fiel Thi .-team performed this function:wel The' EOF Communicator kept the teams apprised of plant conditions, while the teams.provided information on unusual field observation '
Both the EOF and the RMTs demonstrated concern for good ALARA practices. ~No controller' prompting was_ observed. -The licensee should consider having all their offsite team vehicles equipped with four-wheel drive for the various weather and terrain, and permanently affix the radios. This was the case for Team A's ' vehicle. Team B had only a portable "walky-talky" radio, while Team A had, in addition to-its permanently mounted radio, a similar portable radio with a roof mounted antenna as a backup communications
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devic . Team B's only radio failed about 140 Team B remained " ineffective" for over lh hours. During this period in the exercise efforts were
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being made by the EOF to try to identify the leading edge and the dimensions of-the plume. Team B finally telephoned the EOF from
'Westpost Road and Highway 30 at 1503. A backup radio was supplied to Team.B by _ Team A at 1520. Contact should have been reestablished-sooner. Corporate EPIP 2.1, Dose Assessment and PARS, Section 4.5.12
' instructs the team to go to a telephone, contact the DAEC and request a spare radio. This instruction was not found in EPIP 3.2, Offsite Radiological Monitoring,.however. This is an exercise weakness and will;be-tracked as Open Item No. 331/85016-0 Team B was later observed to collect soil, water and vegetation _
: samples at several locations. Their sampling. techniques were poor ._for the phases of collection, packaging, and identification. Team B did not follow their procedures, namely, EPIP 2.6 and 3.2. Also, the team indicated an unawareness lof EPIPs 3.2 and 4.6.2 for sending samples to the Offsite Radiological Analytical Laboratory (0RAL).
- Failure to follow these procedures is an exercise. weakness and will be tracked as Open Item No. 331/85016-0 . Exit Interview The. inspectors held an exit interview on October 30, 1985, with those t . licensee representatives denoted in Section 1 of this report. The inspectors discussed the scope and preliminary findings of the inspection-The licensee agreed to consider the items discussed. The inspectors
: determined from the licensee that none of the information discussed was-proprietary in! natur ~ Attachments:
1.' Exercise Scope and Objectives, Narrative Summary, and
' Outline of Sequence of Events
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L 1.0 SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES
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1.1- Scope The 1985 Duane Arnold Energy Center Emergency Preparedness Exercise, to
' be conducted on' October 29,.1985 will test and provide the opportunity to evaluate Iowa Electric. Light and Power Company, the State of Iowa and Benton a'nd Linn Counties' emergency plans and procedures. It will also test jeach emergency response organization's ability to assess and respond ~ to emergency conditions / and coordinate efforts with other agencies for ' .
protection of the health and safety of the publi Whenever practical, the exercise will inevporate provisions for " Free Play" on the part of the participant The scenario will depict a simulated sequence of events, resulting in a radiological release of sufficient magnitude to warrant mobilization of riate and ic. cal agencies to respond to the emergenc ,
: _Objoetis es M The Duane Arnold Energy Center (DAEC)1985 Emergency Preparedness Eurcise - Program objectives are - ba sed ' on the - Nuclear. Regulatory Commiss*on (NRC) requirements delineated in 10 CFR 50.47 and 10 CFR 50, Appermiir E. ~A65itional guidance provided in N_UREG-0654, FEM A-R EP-1, Revision 1, NURE(. -0696 and NUREG-0737 Suppicment 1 was also utilized in daveloping these objectiv~ The exerelse will have full-scale perticipation from both Linn and Benton F
Counties, and full-scale participation by the State of Iowa. This includes , ectivation of the State Rediological Field monitoring teams, participation at the~ Emergency News Center, and activation ,and operation of the State
- E OC. The warning system sirens and EBS notifications for the emergency planning zonehill not be activated during the exe.cise.- .,-
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* ' The purpose of the exercise is to evaluate the integrated capability of a major portion of the basic elements existing within the onsite and offsite emergency plans and emergency response organizations.. ' Die specific objectives of the exercise to be demonstrated are listed belo . lowa Electric Light and Power Company Objectives 1. . Demonstrate the adequacy of the DAEC Emergency Plan, . Emergency . Plan Implementing Procedures, Corporate Emergency . Response Plan, and Corporate Plan Implementing Procedures to , ensure compilance with 10 CFR 50.47 and NUREG-0654, Demonstrate the activation, staffing, and operation of emergency response facilitie ' Demonstrate the reliability and effective use of eme.Tency communications equipment and procedure '
4 Demonstrate proficiency in recognizing and classifying emergency
. cor,$ltion . ' Demonstrate the notification network to federal, state, and local, corporate, and plant personne . Demonstrate coordinstion with state and local emergency response organization . Demonstrate the ability to perform dose calculations utilizing radiological and meteorological information to determine the magnitude and impact of the release of radioactive materials to the environmen Demonstrate the transition of responsibilities between facilities as a result of escalating accident classificatio . Demonstrate familiarity with Protective Action Guides (PAGs) and recommendation of protective actions to offsite authoritie . Demonstrate tne. capability to obtain and anslyze samples utilizing the post-accident sampling syste ,
1 Demonstrate the mobilization of onsite and offsite radiological monitoring teams.
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g -. . 12. . A Demonstrate appropriate equipment, procedures, and communication
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1 Demonstrate - the capability, for offsite radiological monitoring to include collection and analysis of sample media and provision for communications and record keeping associated ~ with survey and monitoring activitie Demonstrate the ability to perform site assembly, accountability,
.and evacuation as appropriate. Note that construction workers in .
-the owner controlled area, but outside the protected area fence will not be evacuated, nor participate in the exercise in any way, so as not to impede construction progres '
1 Demonstrate. the ability to monitor and control emergency worker-exposure within the plant.- 1 Demonstrate -adequate equipment and procedures .for decontamination of emergency workers and equipment, as require . . Demonstrate the ability to coordinate news releases, handle public-Inquiries, and control rumor Demonstrate the ability to plan recovery operations and identify the nad for additional resources as require Demonstration of shift relief capabilities will be limited to a display of personnel assignment schedule Demonstrate decision-making and coordination with offsite agencies in de-escalating and terminating the emergency.
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DUANE ARNOLD ENERGY CENTER I- 1985 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE SCENARIO
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NARR ATIVE SUMMARY , The scenario for this exercise consists of a sequence of events resulting in a release of radioactivity of sufficient magnitude to warrant the declaration of a General Emorgency. Initial conditions are established as follows:
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DAEC is at 100% power and full core flow and has been operating at these steady-state conditions for six week The transfer of Spent Resin to Hittman for transport and offsite disposal is scheduled to begin at 0800,'10/29/85 and requires approximately 14 hours for com pletio Eme gency Dicsel Generator "B" is out of servlee for a major overhaul and repair / replacement of fuel injectors. A seven day LCO has been in effect since C500,10/26/85. Required surveDiances for today were started at 060 Surveillances presently in progress are STP 45G002 (Standby Diesel Generators Dany Operability Test) on "A" Diesel Generator and STP 45A002-M (LPCI System Monthly Operabillty Tests) on the "A" loop of RH All electrical system line-ups re normal with no major electrical switchgear or transformers out of servic The outer &ywell access 6:,or w *s dsmaged during the last refueling outage _ and is removM pending arrival of repair parts that have been on order for 6 mont h The initial seq;ence invclves Diesel Generator "A" failing its DaDy Operability Test due to.an inability to pick up rated load due to problems with the speed governor. It must be decla-ed inope able. This totalloss of Diesel Generators will prompt the declaration of UNUSU AL EVEN Concurrently, irdications are received that Safety Valve PSV-4403 is leaking by the seat. A short time later, a hose ruptures during the transfer of spent resin which results in water and resin being sprayed. The ruptured hose is quickly isolated but the general area radiation level is approximately 1000 mr/hr in this uncontrolled area. This should cause the declaration of an ALERT. Ack$ltionally, the HP Technician at the scene will be minorly contaminated and require decontamination onsit Gradually worsening loop flow in egularitics, indications of a degrading jet pump, are noted by the Control Room. During the performance of STP 45A002-M lt is discovered that MOV 2000, Containment Spray inboard valve, is mechanically bound and will not move. This results in a partial loss of containment spray capability ("A" loop of RHR).
Jet pump #12 catastrophically fails. Debris from the ramshead'section is carried into the fuel region where is impinges on fuel cladding and lodges in flow channels. The resulting fuel damage results in a Group I Vain Steam line isolation on three times normal high radiation. The reactor scrams and the main turbine trips. A severe reactor level transient occurs, however, level is quickly restored by successful HPCI and RCIC
; initiations. Indications are that an incomplete scram has occurred and power
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generation continues at approximately 3% to 4%. A Site Area Emergency will be declared as Torus radiation levels rapidly increase to 400 R/hr due to the normal cycling of the relief valves with existing fuel demag Conditions in the reactor are stabilized and all control rods are eventually inserte Safety Valve PSV-4403, which has been leaking, finally fails open. Drywell pressure and temperature rapidly increase and drywell conditions warrant the declaration of a General Emegency when it is discovered that "B" loop of RHR Containment Spray is also inoperable due to stripped gearing on MOV 1903 and the inability of the manual operator to engage the valve. A short time later, the inner Drywell Access Door seal begins to leak and the radiological _ release through SGTS begirs. The magnitude and direction of the plume will warrant a reco'mmendation for the evacuation of a la ge portion of the city of Cedar Rapids. The release is terminated when MOV 1903 is repaired, containment spray caprsbility is restored and the dywell is depressurize Plant conditlocs are stable and shutdawn cooling is established. Offsite radiation levels decrease. The emergency may be de-escalated. Re-entry and recovery operations are dis cusse I i
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DUANE ARNOLD ENERGY CENTER
'M 1985 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE EXERCISE' SCENARIO SEQUENCE OF EVENTS l Approximate Scenario *
Time Time Key Events
.0745 00/15 initial conditions are established as follows:
DAEC is at 100% power and full core flow and has been operating at steady-state conditions for six week The transfer of Spent Resin to Hittman for transport and offsite dispasal is scheduled to begin at 0800, 10/29/85 and requires approximately 14 hours for completion.
, , Emergency Diesel Generator "B" is out of sevice for a major overhaul and repair / replacement of fuel injectors. A seven day LCO has been in effect since 0900, 10/26/85. Required surveDiances for today were started at 0600. Su veillances presently in progress are STP 45G002 (Standby Diesel Generators Daily Operability Test) on "A" Diesel Generator and STP 45A002-M (LPCI System Monthly Operability Tests)on the "A" loop of RH All electrical system line-ups are normal with no major electrical switchgear or transformers out of servic The outer drywell access door was damaged during the last refueling outage and is removed pending arrival of repair parts that have been on order for 6 month /00 Commence 1985 Emergency Preparedness Exercise.
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080 /05 Indication is received that Safety Valve 'k ^ PSV-4403 is leaking by the seat (high tad ~ pipe temperatute alarm). The leakage is only slight and not significant at this tim Unusual Event "A" Diesel Generator has failed its daily su-veillance check and is declared inoperable. An Unusual Event should be-
' declared per EPIP 1.1 EAL A10: " Loss of both emergency diesel generators." + ,
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'00/15 Spent resin transfer is in progres ,
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:0845 00/45 HP Technician monitoring spent resin transfer > reports that a hose has ruptured and that resin and water have been
. ALERT sprayed. Pumping has been stopped and the
' hose is isolated. ' Radiation levels in th area are approximately 1000 mr/hr. The HP- Technician reports that he- is potentially contaminated (he wil.15 be decontaminated on sit No offsite '
assistance will be required.). l An Alert stould be declared per EPIP 1.1 EAL B19,
Any uncontrolled , increase in direct radiation levels greater than 1000 times norm al."
Safety valve PSV-4403 continues to weep . Intermit tentl How ever, drywell conditions remain unchanged, confirming that the Icak is small. If a leak rate check is done, the results will Indicate leakage of approximately 4-5 gp /00 Control Room .pers$nnel performing STP BS-7 note minor irregularities in core flo * Indication Oper~ators may attempt to balance flow /00- Flow irregularities become progressively 0930 01/30 worse. Operators may reduce power in an attempt to balance flow ' 01/30 Operators performing STP 45 A002-M report that MOV 2000 will not open with the control switc /45 Air ejector pre-treat m ent radiation monitor indicates a slight increase in off gas activitie >
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Significant damage occurs to -jet - pump-T #12. Debris from the ramshead is carried
' into the fuel region impinging on- fuel ' ,
cladding and lodging in flow channels. This results in- significant damage to the fuel
. cladding and release of gap activity. This additional y activity results in increased main ' steam- line radiation levels and' a Group.I isolation. The. reactor scrams and - - the turbine. trips. The system experiences a severe level transient, which causes Group II, III, and IV isolation signals. HPCI and RCIC start 'as a result of the low
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. reactor . water level, and restore and dt . control reactor. water level. SRVs cycle as
'%- required to control ' reactor pressur . Control rod position indication and reactor spower instrumentation indicate that an incomplete seam has occurred and that
- the reactor is continuing to -generate s approximately 3-4% powe /00 Torus radiation monitors increase to 60 r .,
R/hr. A Site Area . Emergency should be
' ' declared per EPIP 1.1 EAL C-25. "High '
radiological indications. 4 Torus monitor V reading at 400 to 1.5 x 10 R/hr."
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,. 1010 02/10 Control Room operators continue attempts to insert rods ' by. resetting scram and/or m anually - driving in control rod ,
HPC1/RCIC and feed system continue to maintain reactor water : level. . Torus ' I , temperature and radiation increase slightly due to relief valve (s) discharging to the suppression poot ARMS in HPCI and RC1C turbine' areas reflect increased radiation level /10-- Control rods are manually inserted into l 1.040 02/40 cor Operators' . will initiate RHR ' in Suppression Pool cooling mode If they've
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_ not already done so (Torus tempercture will remain less than 105 F).. Due to continued heat generation as a result of 'the incomplete scra m, reactor . pressure . y' remains high, and SRVs will cycle to
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control pressure.
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N Safety valve PSV-4403 continues to leak at peaks in the reactor pressure cycl l
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' ... .. 1020 02/20 The reactor is suberitical with approximately half the stuck rods
successfully inserte /25 HPCI isolates due to a leak on the system steam supplylin /40 All control rods successfully inserte /00 Safety valve PSV-4403 fails open. Drywell
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pressure, temperature, and radiation levels increase rapidly. Reactor level drops but is restored and maintained by RCIC and Reactor Feed Syste /05 Drywell conditions warrant declaration of a General Emegency, per EPIP 1.1. E AL DS
" Loss of 2 of 3 fission product barriers."
Operators a e unable to reduce drywell pressure because RHR .M OV 1903 is inoperative, resulting in a loss of containment spray capabilit Reactor pressure dops rapidly and LPCI and core spray begin to injec /30 Offgas radiation monitors increase, indicated that the drywell containment has been been breached and a release to the environment has begu /35- Dose assessment efforts, plume tracking 1335 05/35 and protective action decision maidng continu /35 RHR MOV 1903 is repaired and containment spray capability is restore /15 Containment is depressurized and the reactor is in cold shutdown. The release is terminate /30 Meteorological conditions shift and disperse the plume from the EPZ rapidl /45 All radiation levels within the ten-mile EPZ have returned to " background' value Post accident environment monitoring should continue in order to provide additional information in support of recovey effort . . - - . . _,
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1500- 07/00 . Re-entry and recovery discussion'should be
. in ' progress to : define' what efforts ar necessary to allow evacuees to return to ~ - their homes, and- to ~ restom DAEC to normal condition ' 08/30 The exercise is terminated.
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