IR 05000331/1998009

Insp Rept 50-331/98-09 on 980610-0729.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Aspects of Licensee Operations, Engineering,Maint & Plant Support

ML20237C788
Person / Time
Site:	Duane Arnold
Issue date:	08/19/1998
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20237C776	List: IR 05000331/1998009 ML20237C774
References
50-331-98-09, 50-331-98-9, NUDOCS 9808240167
Download: ML20237C788 (14)

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i U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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. REGION 111

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Docket No: 50-331 License No: . DPR-49 l

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Report No: 50-331/98009(DRP)

Licensee: Alliant, IES Utilities In l 200 First Street J

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P. O. Box 351 )

Cedar Rapids, IA 52406-0351 Facility: - Duane Amold Energy Center Location: Palo, Iowa Dates: June 10 through July 29,1998 i

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Inspectors: M. Kurth, Resident inspector D. Pelton, Resident inspector Approved by: R. D. Lanksbury, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 5

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9808240167 980819 PDR ADOCK 05000331 e PM m (

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Duane Amold Energy Center NRC Inspection Report 50-331/98009(DRP)

This inspection report included resident inspectors' evaluation of aspects of licensee operations, engineering, maintenance, and plant suppor Operations

. Operators exhibited good working knowledge of plant equipment. Operators effectively communicated and coordinated surveillance test activities with plant personne (Section O1.1)

• Operation's personnel responded in an appropriate manner when a lightning strike i caused the reactor water cleanup pump, well water pump, and the control building chiller system: to trip. Operation's personnel restored the systems in a timely fashio (Section 01.2 )

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. On a daily basis, operation shift managers took a conservative and critical approach in controlling maintenance and surveillance testing activities, in particular, shift managers limited maintenance and surveillance testing activities conducted in sensitive equipment areas such that only one activity was allowed to occur at a time. Several personnel errors that occurred when workers accidentally bumped sensitive equipment, causing the initiations of half scrams, could have resulted in more significant plant challenges had it not been for the shift managers conservative approach. (Section 01.3)

Maintenance .

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• In general, maintenance and surveillance testing activities were conducted in an acceptable manner. The inspectors observed effective communications betweer: control room operators and instrument technicians during surveillance testing activitie (Section M1.1)

. Two examples of personnel errors occurred when instrument technicians accidentally bumped sensitive instruments causing the initiation of half scram signals. This was an attention-to-detail concem. (Section M4.1)

Enaineerina

. The licensee identified and corrected severalincorrect maximum and minimum average power range monitor setpoint values used in surveillance testing. The incorrect setpoint values represented an attention-to-detail concem. (Section E1.1)

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. Two examples were identified by inspectors where maintenance personnel exited the area and left behind work items that lay across the boundaries between contaminated and clean areas. The inspectors were concemed that this poor radiological housekeeping practice could lead to the spread of contamination into non-contaminated areas. (Section R1.2)

. A weakness was identified by inspectors when radiation protection personnel established

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a contamination boundary and failed to recognize that tools, rags, and plastic bags lay

acrcss the boundary between the clean and contaminated areas. This was an attention-to-detail concem. (Section R1.2)

. The fire brigade responded in a timely fashion when called upon and appropriately i extinguished a smoking transformer (277 volt to 120 volt) by directing isolation of its power source. (Section F4.1)

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Report Details Summary of Plant Status The plant began this inspection period at 100 percent power and remained at or near full power during the 7-week inspection report perio i 1. Operations 01 Conduct of Operat'ons 01.1 General Comments (71707)

The inspectors followed the guidance of Inspection Procedure 71707 and conducted frequent reviews of plant operations. This included observing routine control room activities, attending shift turnovers and crew briefings, reviewing log keeping records, and performing panel walkdown The conduct of operations was professional. Operators exhibited good working knowledge of plant equipment. The inspectors observed shift tumovers and noted effective discussions regarding the status of plant equipment, planned testing, and maintenance. Operators effectively communicated and coordinated surveillance test activities with plant personnel. Other noteworthy observations are detailed in the sections belo .2 Operators Response to Llahtnino Strike Inspection Scope (71707)

The inspectors observed the response of operations personnel during a lightning strike which affected several plant components and system Observations and Findinas On June 29,1998, a lightning strike on or near plant grounds tripped the "D" well water pump and the "B" reactor water cleanup pump. Consequently, the "A" control building chiller system tripped due to decreased well water flow. Operations personnel responded in an appropriate manner and restored the tripped systems in a timely fashion. Several

! crew briefs were conducted as the oncoming storm approached and passed over the facility. The crew briefs were concise and focused on maintaining plant stability during

! the stormy perio Conclusions Operations personnel responded in an appropriate manner when a lightning strike caused the "B" reactor water cleanup pump, "D" well water pump, and the "A" control building chiller to trip. All systems were restored in a timely fashio i ____-______- _ -

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O1.3 Operatina Shift Manaaers' Control of the Performance of Daily Work Activities inspection Scooe (71707) 3 i The inspectors observed the command and control of operating shift managers in allowing daily maintenance and surveillance test activities to be performe Observations and Findinas

, The operating shift managers, on a daily basis, took a conservative and critical approach !

in allowing maintenance and surveillance testing activities to be conducted. Normally, the maintenance and surveillance testing activities were scheduled at least 6 weeks in advance; however, due to periodic schedule changes and emergent equipment issues, it

..was necessary for operating shift managers to determine on a daily basis when and what plant activities were allowed to be perfomied for safe plant operations. For instance, the shift managers ensured that the performance of simultaneous maintenance and testing activities would not adversely affect the plant from operating safely. Shift managers conservatively delayed or postponed severa! maintenance or surveillance testing activities to maintain safe plant operations, in particular, shift managers limited maintenance or surveillance testing activities being conducted in sensitive equipment areas to only one activity at a tim Two examples of where this conservative operating philosophy enhanced plant safety were identified during this inspection report period. As detailed in Section M4.1, several personnel errors occurred when workers accidentally bumped sensitive equipment causing the initiation of half scram signals. These personnel errors could potentially have caused more than the initiation of half scram signals, that would then challenge plant equipment, if more than one activity had been allowed to occur at a time, Conclusions Operations shift managers, on a daily basis, took a conservative and critical approach in controlling maintenance and surveillance testing activities. In particular,' shift managers j limited maintenance and surveillance testing activities conducted in sensitive equipment areas such that only one activity was allowed to occur at a time. Several personnel errors that occurred when workers accidentally bumped sensitive equipment, causing the

initiations of half scrams, could have rcruited in more significant plant challenges had it not been for the shift managers conservative approac O2 . Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment O2.1 General Plant Tours and System Walkdowns (71707)

l The inspectors followed the guidance of Inspection Procedure 71707 in walking down accessible portions of several systems:

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. Emergency service water (ESW) system l . Residual heat removal service water (RHRSW) system

. Control rod drive system - hydraulic control units

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Equipment operability, material condition, and housebepine were acceptable in all cases. Several minor discrepancies were brought to the iiRnroe's attention and were ,

corrected. The inspectors identified no substantive concems as a result of these I walkdown l l

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07 Quality Assurance in Operations j t

0 Licensee Self-Assessment Activities (40500) )

l During the inspection period, the inspectors reviewed multiple licensee self-assessment activities, including operation committee meetings. The meetings cove.ed various areas, including engineering, maintenance, plant support, and operations activities. The meetings addressed procedure reviews, program weaknesses, performance trends, and self-assessment activities. Effective discussions were observed between operations and the individuals representing the various discipline Miscellaneous Operations issues (92901)

08.1 (Closed) Violation (VIO) 50-331/97012-01: Inadequate Corrective Actions When Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) Not Promptly Updated. The licensee determined that corrective actions were improperly characterized for revising EOP entry level condit!ons for secondary containment water level as a program improvement and therefore given a low priority for completion. The licensee had failed to ensure that the corrective actions received the properlevel of planning and implementation. The licensee responded by revising the EOP entry level conditions for secondary containment water levels and appropriate changes were made to plant instrumentation, procedures, and indications. All low priority corrective action requests were reviewed. No further examples of improper characterization were identified. Engineering personnel continued to take actions to reduce the number of open corrective action requests. This item is close . Maintenance l i

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M1.1 General Comments Inspection Scope (62707)(61726)

The inspectors observed or reviewed all or portions of the following work activities. The inspectors also reviewed applicable portions of the Technical Specifications and the Updated Final Safety Analysis Repor * Core spray simulated auto actuation, Surveillance Test Procedure (STP) 45A007 '

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• Scram discharge volume high level scram testing, STP 3.3.1.1-09

• Diesel tire pump semiannualinsoection, Preventive Maintenance Action Request (PMAR) 1104879

• Heat tracing for hydrogen and oxygen sampling lines, Engineering Change Package 1608 i

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. . Discharge volume high water level functional calibration test, STP 3.3.1.1-11 !

• RHRSW pump installation

• Drywell high pressure switch calibration, PMAR 1105786

. Core spray ESW motor cooler inlet valve replacement, Corrective Maintenance l Action Request (CMAR) A48545 Observations and Findinas

< in general, maintenance and surveillance testing activities were conducted in an

acceptable manner. The inspector observed effective communications between control room operators and instrument technicians during surveillance testing activities. The inspectors also observed adequate use of maintenance practices and good coordination among departments. Noteworthy observations are detailed in the sections belo M4 Maintenance Staff Knowledge and Performance M4.1 Personnel Errors' Durina Mantenance and Surveillance Testina Activities Inspection Scope (62707)(61726)

The inspectors reviewed the circumstances surrounding several persunel errors that occurred during maintenarre and : urv6ance testing activities, i Observations and Findino1 Maintenance and surveilla .,e testir g activities were conducted in a safe manner and, in general, without the occurrence of personnel errors. However, on June 30 and July 14,1998, two personnel errors occurred when instrument and calibration (l&C)

technicians accidentally bumped sensitive instruments while performing various work activities that caused the initiation of half scram signals. In both cases, individuals were authorized by operations personnel to perform the work. The technicians were worldng in close proximity to sensitive instruments when the equipment was accidentally bumpe Both individuals immediately stopped work after initiating the half scram signals. The individuals were counseled and operations personnel reset the half scram signals. The I&C technicians completed the work activities without further problems. Action Request (AR) 982084 and AR 982105 were initiated to document the personrel errors and corrective actions that were taken. The inspectors were concemed with the workers'

attention-to-detail when working in close proximity to sensitive equipmen Also, on June 24,1998, a personnel error occurred when electrical maintenance personnel accidentally bumped a sensitive instrument causing the drywell fans speed to switch from regular speed to slow speed. The fans speed adjustment would normally occur if a valid high drywell pressure signal was received. In this case, with the approval of operation shift managers, electricians were performing corrective maintenance by

. Installing heat tracing to pipes that were in close proximity to sensitive equipment. The work area was very confining and did not allow much room to work. The corrective

- maintenance was stopped after the drywell fans switched speeds. The electricians were counseled and operations' personnel reset the drywell fans speed. The maintenance was continued without further problems or errors. The inspectors were concemed with the j

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workers' attention-to-detail while working in close proximity to sensitive instruments. The l~

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overall effect of changing drywell fan speed was minimal. There was a slight temperature change in different areas in the drywell; however, general drywell temperatures did not change. Also, operators responded immediately to reset the speed of the drywell fan Conclusions Maintenance and surveillance testing activities were conducted in a safe manner and, in

. genera!, without the occurrence of personnel errors. However, on two occasions

. personnel errors occurred when l&C technicians accidentally bumped sensitive l instruments that caused the initiation of half scram signals. This was an attention-to-detail concem. In both cases the I&C technicians were counseled and completed their work activities without further problem I 111. Enaineerina E1' Conduct of Engineering l E Aversoe Power Ranoe Monitor (APRM) Calibration 1 InsDeClion SCoDe (37551)

The inspectors reviewed calculations for APRM setpoints to evaluate the accuracy of the i licensee's calculations. The review was initiated following the licensee's identification of possible inaccurate APRM setpoint values during surveillance testin Observations and Findinos On July 1,1998, l&C technicians performed STP 3.3.1.1-32, " Calibrations of APRMS,"

Revision O. The purpose of the quarterly surveillance test was to functionally test and )

calibrate the APRM inoperative, downscale, and flow biased upscale rod blocks and scram inputs. The surveillance test procedure was recently updated to include additional testing criteria to satisfy the requirements of the Improved Technical Specifications, which {

were to be implemented on August 1,1998. During the surveillance testing, I&C l technicians discovered that the minimum and maximum power level voltage setpoints, as written in Steps 7.1.10 and 7.1.16, were not the same as the trip setpoints, ras expecte The l&C technicians e, appropriately backed out of the surveillance test and initiated AR 982088 to determine the adequacy of the APRM setpoint calculation The inspectors discussed the discrepancy with engineering personnel and obtained the results of the APRM setpoint calculations. Engineering personnel agreed that the maximum and minimum setpoints should have been the same as the trip setpoint, and that nominal trip setpoints were provided rather than the actual setpoints. This was an attention-to-detail concem. Although the setpoint values were incorrect, the nominal

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l minimum and maximum APRM setpoint values were conservative and provided sufficient

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margin such that the incorrect values were less than the allowable values and the l analytical limits provided by General Electric. The licensee revised the surveillance test jL to include the correct maximum and minimum values. A review of the surveillance test

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and calculations identified that ordy the new testing points were incorrect. The inspectors did not identify any further problems with the revised calculated value Conclusions The licensee identified and corrected several minor incorrect maximum and minimum APRM setpoint values used in surveillance testing. These incorrect setpoint values represented an attention-to-detail concem. The inspectors did not identify any further discrepancies with APRM setpoint value IV. Plant Support R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls R1.2 Plant Radiological Conditions Inspection Scope (71750)(83750)

The inyectors reviewed the radiological conditions of the plant and assessed the control of contamination area boundaries. The inspectors also observed radiation practices of personnel performing work in the facility, Observations and Findinas During inspections of the radiologically controlled area (RCA), the inspectors observed ]

that, in general, contaminated areas were adequately posted and controlled. However, I the inspectors observed radiological housekeeping problems in several areas within the RCA. The inspectors identified several examples of items which had been left laying across contaminated area boundaries within the northwest comer room and reactor water cleanup pump room by maintenance personnel. The inspectors were concemed that this poor radiological work practice could potentially lead to the spread contamination into unposted areas. Examples ofitems found were anti-contamination suits and coats, rubber gloves, and a waste oil container. Radiation protection personnel responded to each example by removing the items or placing the items completely inside the contamination area boundary. Swipes were taken and no contamination was found in the ,

areas adjacent to the contamination area boundarie Also on July 1,1998, inspectors found tools, rags, and plastic bags on the torus hatch cover that lay across a contamination area boundary. The contamination area boundary

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was established in June 1998 when radiation protection personnel identified loose contamination on a section of the torus outer surface that included a portion of the torus hatch cover. Radiation prctection personnel fastened a yellow and magenta rope, along j with contamination area signs, to a handrail that was approximately one foot higher than 3 the torus hatch surface. The rope transverses the torus hatch surface and created a vertical plane to bound the contaminated area. The tools, rags, and plastic bags that lay across the contaminated area boundary had been placed on the torus hatch surface prior to establishing the contaminated area boundary. The inspectors were concemed with  ;

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radiation protection personnels' inattention-to-detail for failing to recognize that items lay l across the contamination area boundary when it was established. Radiation personnel

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responded by removing the items or placing the item completely inside the contamination area boundary. Swipes were taken and nc contamination was found on the torus hatch surface that was adjacent to the contamination area boundary. Also, yellow and magenta

. tape was placed on the torus hatch surface to clearly delineate the contamination area boundary.

I f The inspectors also reviewed the radiological practices of personnel working in the RCA and noted that radiation worker practices were acceptable. Personnel properly donned protective clothing. In addition, the inspectors also found that individuals were knowledgeable of radiological conditions in work area Conclusions Personnel were knowledgeable of radiological conditions and requirements. However, the inspectors observed radiological housekeeping problems in the RCA that challenged effective contamination controls. Specifically, inspectors identified two examples in which potentially contaminated items were left laying across contamination area boundaries by

, maintenance workers. Also, radiation protection personnel established a contamination l area boundary and failed to recognize that tools, rags, and plastic bags lay across the l boundary. These were attention-to-detail concem 'R8 Miscellaneous Radiation Protection and Chemistry Control issues (92904)

R (Closed) VIO 50-331/97014-04: Failure to Maintain Current Respirator Qualification The licensee determined the cause to be an inadequate tracking process to notify responsible individuals and supervisors to ensure they maintained their current respirator qualifications. The tracking mechanism was modified and individuals lacking respiration qualifications were re-qualified and tested satisfactorily prior to assuming their next watch. This item is close F4 Fire Protection Staff Knowledge and Performance F Fire Briaade Response to Smokina Transformer Inspection Scope (64704)

The inspectors observed and assessed the response of fire brigade personnel to a smoking transformer in the diesel fire pump roo Observations and Findinas On July 1,1998, maintenance personnel contacted the control room to report that a 277 voit to 120 volt transformer, located in the diesel fire pump room, was emitting smoke. Control room personnel dispatched the fire brigade. The fire brigade immediately responded and within several minutes extinguished the smoking transformer by directing isolation of its power source. The transformer supplied power to a visual fire evacuation alarm and an electrical outlet. At the time of the incident, an industrial" shop-vac" was in use and plugged into the electrical outlet. The smoke was due to the electrical 10 .

F overloading of the transformer. A maintenance request (CMAR A41963) was written to rewire the circuitry to prevent overloading the transformer in the futur The fire brigade responded in a timely fashion and acted appropriately to extinguish the smoking transformer by isolating its electrical source. Fire brigade members were appropriately dressed in the appropriate fire fighting gear, including self-contained breathing apparatus equipment, if needed. A fire brigade member established a reflash watch for 30 minutes after the smoking transformer was extinguishe Conclusions The fire brigade responded in a timely fashion when called upon and appropriately l extinguished the smoking 277 volt to 120 volt transformer by isolating its power sourc V. Manaaement Meetinos X1 Exit Meeting Summary -

The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on July 29,1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identifie ,

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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee -

J. Franz, Vice President Nuclear G. Van Middlesworth, Plant Manager R. Anderson, Manager, Outage and Support J. Bjorseth, Maintenance Superintendent D Curtland, Operations Manager R. Hite, Manager, Radiation Protection M. McDermott, Manager, Engineering K Peveler, Manager, Regulatory Performance I

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INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551: Onsite Engineering IP 40500: Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in Identifying, Resolving, and Preventing Problems -

IP 61726: Surveillance Observation

IP 62707: Maintenance Observation IP 64704: Fire Protection Program IP 71707: Plant Operations IP 71750: Plant Support IP 83750: Occupational Radiation Exposure IP 92901: Followup - Operations IP 92904: Followup - Plant Support ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Closed 50-331/97012-01 VIO Inadequate corrective actions when EOP not promptly updated 50-331/97017-04 VIO Failure to maintain current respirator qualifications

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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED APRM Average power range monitor A Action Request CFR Code of Federal Regulations

. CMAR- Corrective Maintenance Acilon Request DAEC Duane Amold Energy Center DRP Division of Reactor Projects

'EOP Emergency Operating Procedure ESF Engineered safety feature ESW- Emergency service water l&C Instrument and calibration IP inspection procedure NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission PMAR Preventive Maintenance Action Request RCA Radiologically controlled area RHRSW Residual heat removal service water STP Surveillance Test Procedure VIO Violation

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