ML20216G454
| ML20216G454 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Duane Arnold  |
| Issue date: | 04/09/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20216G437 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-331-98-03, 50-331-98-3, NUDOCS 9804200359 | |
| Download: ML20216G454 (18) | |
See also: IR 05000331/1998003
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ,
REGIONlli
Docket No: 50-331
License No: DPR-49
Report No: 50-331/98003(DRP)
Licensee: IES Utilities, Inc.
200 First Street SE
P. O. Box 351
Cedar Rapids, lA 52406-0351
Facility: Duane Arnold Energy Center
Location: Palo, Iowa
Dates: February 5 - March 17,1998
Inepectors: M. Kurth, Resident Inspector
K. Walton, Resident inspector
Approved by- R. D. Lanksbury, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 5
9804200359
DR 980409
ADOCK 05000331
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Duane Amold Energy Center
NRC Inspection Report No. 50-331/98003(DRP)
This inspection report included resident inspectors' evaluation of aspects of licensee operations,
engineering, maintenance, and plant support.
Operations
. The overall conduct of operations was professional as demonstrated by the rigorous use
of procedures and thorough shift turnovers. (Section 01.1)
. An operations shift supervisor did not take a generic approach when presented with
information regarding a suspect condition of a hydraulic control unit (HCU) nor did he
question the operability of the HCU. (Section 01.2)
. Operations personnel displayed a lack of attention to detail by unknowingly repositioning
an HCU solenoid housing during work activities. This resulted in several HCUs being in a
suspect condition. (Section O1.2)
. A suspect HCU condition was not identified by licensee personnel during plant tours.
(Section 01.2)
Maintenance
. The inspectors identified several examples of the licensee's failure to comply with the
procedure for restraining transient equipment or materials in Seismic Category I areas.
This resulted in a violation. (Section M1.3)
. The licensee promptly resolved emergent equipment material condition issues that were
identified during the inspection period. These emergent aquipment issues included a
steam leak in the offgas recombiner vault, a water leak from the high pressure coolant
injection pump, failed radiation monitors, and a failed pressure switch in the reactor
protection system. All of these equipment protdems were resolved well within the
associated Technical Specification allowable outage times. Personnel from the
engineering and maintenance departments provided good support and exhibited good
teamwork in resolving the issues. (Section M2.1)
Enaineerina
. Software support personnel installed new process computer software without consulting
with operations personnel and without fully evaluating the effect on plant monitoring
equipment. This resulted in a challenge to the operating crew when multiple APRM
comparison alarms were received and reactor power was reduced until the reason for the l
alarms could be determined. (Section E1.1)
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Plant Supoort
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Radiation protection personnel provided good support during the high pressure coolant
injection (HPCI) system and reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system surveillance
-tests. (Section R1.1)
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Report Details
Summary of Plant Status
The plant began this inspection period operating at 100 percent power and remained at or near
full power for the remainder of the period. Exceptions to this included scheduled down power
evolutions for planned testing activities, control rod sequence exchanges, load line adjustm3nts,
and, as detailed in Section E1.1, a momentary unscheduled power reduction due to operator
action in response to numerous plant process computer average power range monitor (APRM)
comparison alarms.
1. Operations
01 Conduct of Operations
O1,1 General Comments (71707)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors followed the guidance of Inspection Procedure 71707 and conducted
frequent reviews of plant operations. This included observing routine control room
activities, reviewing system tagouts, attending shift turnovers and crew briefings, and
performing panel walkdowns.
b. Observations and Findinas
The conduct of operations was professional. The inspectors observed rigorous use of
procedures and thorough shift turnovers. Overall, emergent equipment issues were
promptly addressed and conduct of operations was appropriately focussed on safety.
c. Conclusions
The overall conduct of operations continued to be professional, with an appropriate focus
on safety as demonstrated by the rigorous use of procedures and thorough shift
tumovers.
01.2 Conduct of Operations Personnel Reaardino Condition of Hydraulic Control Units (HCU) ,
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a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed licensee corrective actions in response to a failed HCU (26-39)
accumulator high water level switch and identified a potential operability concern with an
adjacent HCU (30-31). Interviews were conducted with operations personnel.
b. Observations and Findinas
As discussed in Section M1.2 of this report, NRC inspectors reviewed maintenance
activities performed to replace a failed HCU accumulator high water level switch. On
February 22,1998, NRC inspectors identified an operability concern with the adjacent
HCU (30-31). The inspectors found that the solenoid housing on the directional control
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valve (V-121) was positioned so that its electrical cannector and/or cable would interfere
with the limit switch actuator of the inlet scram valve (V-126).
The inspectors immediately discussed the finding with a licensed operator who was in the
reactor building. The operator indicated that the solenoid housing was designed to pivot
or swivel. The operator theorized that the solenoid housing was most likely bumped and
moved forward while operations personnel worked to manually isolate the adjacent HCU.
The next morning, the inspectors visually assessed the remaining HCUs and identified
three additional examples of solenoid housings and/or cables that were in contact with
the limit switch actuator of the inlet scram valve. Through interviews, the inspectors
discovered that the operator had discussed the issue the previous day with the
operations shift supervisor (OSS). The OSS concluded that the condition was isolated
due to work performed on the adjacent HCU. Also, the OSS did not question whether the
HCU was operable in this condition. The inspectors were concemed that the OSS did not
take a generic approach when presented with the issue, nor did he question whether the
The inspectors informed the operations shift manager (OSM) of the three additional
examples identified. Operations personnel, led by the OSM, visually assessed the HCUs.
The OSM and/or operations personnel, under OSM guidance, moved the solenoid
housings away from the inlet scram activators. The OSM and NRC inspectors discussed
HCU operability concerns. The OSM contacted the system engineer and initiated Action
Request (AR) 980472.
The system engineer, with the assistance of General Electric (GE) representatives, i
performed an operability determination and concluded that the four HCus in question
would have performed their safety function. Section E1.2 of this inspection report
provides further information regarding the HCU operability determination.
The inspectors identified through interviews that all 89 HCUs were isolated during the
September through October 1996 refuel outage. Therefore, if the solenoid housings had
been unknowingly mispositioned during the manipulation of HCU isolation valves, the
three additional examples identified may have existed since October 1996. The
inspectors were concerned that the issue was not identified previously by licensee
personnel during plant tours.
c. Conclusions )
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Operations personnel demonstrated a lack of attention to detail by unknowingly
repositioning an HCU solenoid housing during work activities. This resulted in several i
HCUs being in a suspect condition. Additionally, the OSS did not take a generic
approach when presented with the suspect HCU condition report by an operator or
question the operability of the HCU. The suspect HCU condition was also not identified
earlier by licensee personnel during plant tours.
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01.3 Control Room Staff Below the Technical Specification (TS) Minimum Reauirements
Licensee Event Report (LER) 98-01 (71707)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed information regarding the licensee's failure to maintain minimum
control room staffing requirements in accordance with TS 6.2.2.2.d. Interviews were
conducted with licensee staff.
b. Observations and Findinas
The inspectors verified through interviews that the on-duty shift technical advisor (STA)
was permitted by operations management to leave the site due to a family medical
emergency. Arrangements were made with the on-coming STA to arrive onsite earlier
than scheduled; however, for one hour and eleven minutes no STA was onsite. This
resulted in an operational condition prohibited by TS 6.2.2.2.d, which required an STA to
be onsite at all times when there was fuelin the reactor. The licensee did not plan to
take any corrective actions for this issue; however, in the future, when implemented, the
improved TSs will allow the shift crew composition, including the STA, to be less than
minimum for a period not to exceed two hours to accommodate the unexpected absence
of on-duty shift crew members.
The failure to maintain a minimum operating crew at all times when there was fuel in the
reactor was a violation of TS 6.2.2.2.d. This was considered a non-cited violation in
accordance with Section IV of the NRC Enforcement Policy (50-331/98003-01(DRP)).
02 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment
O2.1 General Plant Tours and System Walkdowns (71707)
The inspectors followed the guidance of Inspection Procedure 71707 in walking down
accessible portions of several systems:
. Standby diesel generators
. High pressure coolant injection (HPCI)
. Standby gas treatment system
Equipment operability, material condition, and housekeeping were acceptable in all
cases. Several minor discrepancies were brought to the licensee's attention and were
corrected. The inspectors identified no substantive concerns as a result of these
walkdowns.
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07 Quality Assurance in Operations
O7.1 Licensee Self-Assessment Activities (71707)
During the inspection period, the inspectors reviewed multiple licensee self-assessment
activities, including:
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Safety committee meeting
- Action request screening meeting
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Quality assurance quarterly assessment
The inspectors did not identify any problems or concerns with the licensee's self-
assessment activities.
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07.2 Action Request System Review '
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the documentation methods used in the Action Request (AR)
system process. The evaluation included a review of procedure implementation and AR
records and discussions with licensee personnel.
b. Observations and Findinas
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The inspectors reviewed Administrative Control Procedure (ACP) 114.5, " Action Request
System," Revision 12, which described the methods used for documenting potential
problems and the AR process. This procedure described the use of ARs for problem )
identification and tracking of problem resolution. The procedure also indicated that an AR I
would be categorized as either Level 1,2,3,4, or 5 based on the importance and priority {
of the problem. Level 1 ARs were used to document the most severe and highest priority J
problems while Level 2,3,4, and 5 ARs documented problems of decreasing importance
and priority. Levels 1 through 3 required root cause investigations and Level 4 and 5 ARs
did not.
The inspectors evaluated the number of ARs written and made a cursory review of the
type of problems documented and determined that the threshold for writing ARs was ;
appropriate. A representative sample of all ARs was also reviewed in detail. No !
concems were identified.
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c. Conclusions
The AR system was being appropriately used for identifying issues and tracking of
problem resolution. The ARs reviewed adequately documented the licensee's evaluation
of potential problems.
08 Miscellaneous Operations issues (92700)
08,1 (Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-331/97-13-00: Inoperable Primary
Containment Isolation Valves Exceeded TS Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO). The
inspectors reviewed this issue in detail and cited three violations in Inspection Report
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(IR) No. 50-331/98002. Corrective actions will be reviewed before closing the violations.
This item is closed.
08.2 (Closed) Inspection Followup Item (IFI) 50-331/97014-03: High Suppression Pool
Temperatures During HPCI System Testing. The inspectors had raised concerns with the
temperature rise in the suppression pool during routine HPCI surveillance testing The
inspectors reviewed licensee documents and determinod that the suppression pool
temperature response was consistent with design documents. The inspectors also
verified that TS requirements were met. The inspectors had no further concerns. This
item is closed.
11. Maintenance
M1 Conduct of Maintenance
M1.1 General Comments i
a. Inspection Scope (62707) (61726)
The inspectors observed or reviewed all or portions of the following work activities:
. HPCI system quarterly operability test, Surveillance Test Procedure
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Quarterly functional test and calibration of average power range monitors (APRM),
- Daily instrument checks, STP 42A001
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Standby gas treatment system high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) and charcoal
filter efficiency tests, STP 47 LOO 3
- Core spray systems quarterly operability tests, STP 45A001-Q
Inspect and clean standby filter unit exhaust fan, preventive maintenance action
request (PMAR), 1102790
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Functional check and calibration of containment atmosphere dilution system,
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Reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system quarterly operability test,
- C source range monitor calibration, PMAR 1098510
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+ Reactor water clean up drain flush, corrective maintenance action request {
(CMAR), A31702 {
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b. Observations and Findinas '
In general, the inspectors observed adequate maintenance practices, appropriate use of
procedures, and good coordination among departments. In particular, HPCI and RCIC
surveillance tests were properly controlled and effectively coordinated between
maintenance and operations personnel.
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M1.2 Appropriate Corrective Actions for Failed HCU Accumulator Hiah Water Level Switch l
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a. Inspection Scope (62707)
The inspectors reviewed maintenance activities performed to replace a failea HCU
accumulator high water level switch. Interviews were conducted with maintanance and
operations personnel.
b. Observations and Findinas
The inspectors performed a visual assessment of completed work activities after the
Instrument and Control technician replaced an HCU accumulator high water level switch.
The ir'spection was performed shortly after the level switch was replaced and the
associated control rod was considered operable. The HCU isolation valves were verified
to be in the proper position to consider the HCU operable. However, the inspectors
identified a potential operability concem with the adjacent HCU. The solenoid housing of
the directional control valve (V-121) was positioned so that its electrical connector and
cable could interfere with the limit switch a':tuator of the inlet scram valve (V-126).
Further information regarding this finding is detailed in Section 01.2.
c. _ Conclusions
The inspectors concluded that licensee corrective actions were appropriate following the
identification of a failed HCU accumulator high water level switch. However, the
insnactors found an operability concern with the adjacent HCU.
M1.3 Unacceptable Restrainina Methods for Transient Eauipment or Materials Used in the
Plant
a. Inspection Scope (62707)
The inspectors reviewed licensee corrective actions for improperly restraining unstable
equipment in Seismic Category I areas. Interviews were conducted with licensee
personnel, applicable procedures were reviewed, and routine plant tours were conducted.
The inspectors reviewed Administrative Control Procedure 1408.9, " Control of Transient
Equipment / Materials," Revision 3.
b. Observations and Findinas
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As documented in NRC IR No. 50-331/98002, the inspectors found two examples of
temporary equipment that was not restrained in accordance with plant procedures. The
licensee responded by implementing corrective actions which included properly I
restraining the equipment identified by the inspectors and initiating AR 980296 to increase
staff awareness on appropriate methods for securing temporary equipment.
Administrative Control Procede e 1408.9 provides guidance to plant personnel on the use )
and storage of transient equipment or materials used in Seismic Category I areas in the {
plant. Section 3.7(2) of ACP 1408.9 provides plant personnel with a list of unacceptable j
plant elements to be used for the restraint of unstable equipment, including conduits, I
small bore pipe (less than four inches), heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC)
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hangers, and safety-related equipment. The inspectors found several examples where
unstable trancient equipment or materials were restrained to unacceptable plant
elements. Some examples included:
On February 10,1998, a rolling cart was found restrained to a conduit in the
control room back panel area.
- On February 13,1998, electrical panel doors were found restrained to a conduit 'in
the reactor recircu!ation motor generator room.
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On February 20,1998, a ladder and two boxes of light bulbs were found
restrained to a conduit in the intake structure.
. On February 23,1998, a ladder was found restrained to a conduit in the Crack
Arrest Verification (CAV) area of the reactor building.
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On February 27,1998, a rolling cart was restrained to small bore piping (less than
four inches) in the control building chiller area. This example was of greater
concern than the other examples because earlier in the day operations personnel
found the cart restrained to a conduit. The individual recognized the improper
restraining method used; however, in correcting the problem, he restrained the
cart to it small bore piping.
- On Ma. 2,1998, two rolling carts, which included the cart identified on
Febmary 27, were restrained to control building chiller safety-related piping. This
example was of concem because it was repetitive.
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On March 2,1998, two HEPA filter units mounted on rolling carts were restrained
to HVAC hangers above the control rod drive repair room and close to safety-
related steam tunnel temperature monitors. The licensee was informed and
properly restrained the equipment that day.
On March 6,1998, the same two HEPA filter units restrained to HVAC hangers
that were found on March 2 were again restrained to HVAC hangers.
The inspectors reported the improperly restrained transient equipment and materials in
Seismic Category I areas to operations or maintenance personnel as the conditions were
identified. The transient equipment and materials were either properly restrained or l
removed by licensee personnelin order to comply with procedure requirements.
The inspectors interviewed training department personnel to determine if employees had
been provided adequate instructions regarding the control of transient materials or ,
equipment in the plant. The inspectors concluded that adequate training was provided l
during general employee training sessions.
The inspectors interviewed several plant employees to determine their general knowledge i
level of requirements for proper restraining methods of transient materials or equipment. l
Personnel were generally aware of the requirement to restrain transient equipment and J
materials; however, the many identified examples of improper restraining methods j
indicated that personnel may not fully understand why transient materials or equipment
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need to be restrained. Also, in some instances, ACP 1408.9, provided complex guidance
to personnel on proper restraint methods. Previous examples of improper restraining
methods used to secure transient equipment or materials were identified and
documented in IR No. 50-331/98002.
Failure to follow administrative procedure ACP 1408.9 is a violation of 10 CFR Part 50,
Appendix B, Criterion V (50-331/98003-02 (DRP)) as in the attached Notice of Violation.
Conclusions
The inspectors identified several examples of improperly restrained transient equipment
or materials in Seismic Category 1 areas. Previous examples of improper restraining
methods used to secure transient equipment or materials were identified and
documented in IR No. 50-331/98002.
M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment
M2.1 Plant Material Condition
a. Inspection Scope (62707)
The inspectors reviewed several emergent work items to ensure appropriate operability
evaluatiors were performed, TS were met, repairs were made, and root causes were
determined where appropriate.
b. Obseavations and Findinas
The following emergent equipment issues were identified d9rin': the inspection period:
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On February 22,1998, security personnel on fire watch rounds noticed higher
than normal temperatures and high humidity conditions in the RCIC area.
Operations personnel were promptly notified and a steam leak was identified in
the offgas recombiner vault. The leak.was isolated to the standby pressure
control valve (PCV 41508) which supplied steam to the "B" offgas preheater. The
line was isolated and the component was repaired. The system was tested
satisfactorily later the same day.
+ On February 12,1998, increased seal water leakage was identified on the HPCI
main pump casing after performing HPCI quarterly surveillance testing. The
licensee entered a 14-day LCO and completed repairs within 2 days
(CMAR A34492).
- On March 9,1998, while performing testing in accordance with STP 3.3.4.2-01,
" Anticipated Transient Without a Scram - Recirculation Pump Trip / Alternate Rod
insertion (ATWS-RPT/ARI) Reactor High Pressure Calibration," pressure
switch PS45938 failed to close within the specified pressure range.
CMAR A47223 was initiated and pressure switch PS45938 was replaced the next
day.
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On March 10,1998, while performing STP 42H004 A, "Kaman Extended Range
Effluent Radiation Monitors Annual Calibration (Turbine Building Exhaust Stack),"
a detector for one of the Kaman monitors failed to perform its intended function.
The licensee entered a three-day LCO to establish alternate sampling and a
seven-day LCO for completing repairs. CMAR A47251 was initiated and repairs
were completed within two days. The LCOs were subsequently exited.
c. Conclusions
The licensee promptly resolved emergent equipment material condition issues that were
identified during the inspection period. These emergent equipment issues included a
steam leak in the offgas recombiner vault, a water leak from the high pressure coolant
injection pump, failed radiation monitors, and a failed pressure switch in the reactor
protection system. All of these equipment problems were resolved well within the
associated TS allowable outage times. Personnel from maintenance and engineering
departments provided good support and exhibited good teamwork in resolving the issues.
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E1 Conduct of Engineering
E1.1 Inadeauate Communications Recardina Software Chanae to Plant Process Computer
Challenaes Operatina Crew
a. Inspection Scope (37551)
The inspectors reviewed information regarding a plant process computer software
change made without prior notification to operations personnel which resulted in
challenging the operating crew. Interviews were conducted with engineering and
operations department personnel. The inspectors reviewed ACP 102.14, " Software
Quality Assurance Program," Revision 5.
b. Observations and Findinas
The inspectors interviewed system engineering and software support personnelinvolved
in the software change. The system engineering personnel stated that the software
program was enhanced to compare individual APRM power levels to an average of the
summation of APRM power levels, rather tinn comparing each individual APRM to other
individual APRMs.
On March 3,1998, the software enhancement was installed without notifying the
operations staff and immediately the operating crew received plant process computer
APRM comparison alarms. The inspectors determined that software support personnel
assumed the revised software would not affect plant process computer data. When the
enhanced software was installed, the APRM comparison alarm point was changed from
five percent to 1.25 percent The operating crew responded conservatively and reduced
reactor power until the cause of the alarms was determined. Reactor power was
increased to 100 percent within one hour after the software change. The inspectors were
concemed that plant process computer software changes were initiated without any prior
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notification to operations personnel which resulted in a challenge to the operating crew.
The licensee held a fact finding meeting with involved personnel to determine the root
cause.
The operations supervisor discussed his expectations that operations personnel be
informed of software changes before their installation. The inspectors noted that the
licensee was revising ACP 102.14 to reflect the need to inform users of software
changes.
c. Conclusions
Software support personnel installed new process computer software without consulting
with operations personnel and without fully evaluating the effect on plant monitoring
equipment. This resulted in a challenge to the operating crew when multiple APRM
comparison alarms were received and reactor power was reduced until the reason for the
alarms could be determined.
E1.2 Operability Determination for Suspect HCUs
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's operability determination performed after four
HCUs were identified by the inspectors that had the insert directional control valve
solenoid housing and associated cables in contact with the position plate of the insert
scram valve. The inspectors conducted interviews with system engineering, operations,
and licensing personnel.
b. Observations and Findinas
On February 22 and 23,1998, the inspectors identified four HCU insert exhaust solenoid
housings and associated cables that were in contact with the position plates of the inlet
scram valves. The licensee performed an operability evaluation to determine if the HCUs
would perform their intended function. The licensee concluded that the HCUs would have
performed their safety function. Although unlikely, the worst consequences would have
been that: (1) the directional control valve solenoid would be displaced when the scram
valve actuated, resulting in a small primary containment leak which could be manually
isolated; and/or (2) the directional control valve wiring would be damaged, causing an
electrical short in the reactor manual control system, thereby disabling the operating
crew's ability to insert or withdraw any of the control rods using manual controls.
Corrective actions were taken to secure (tie wrap) the solenoid housing cables to the
HCU support frames, thus preventing the solenoid housings from swiveling. The
inspectors confirmed corrective actions were taken for all 89 HCUs. Also, the lierasee
initiated a request to schedule an inspection of the HCUs every year to verify the solenoid
housing cables were secured and that no solenoid housings and/or cables were in
contact with the insert scram valve position plate. The inspectors had no concerns
regarding the operability determination.
The system engineer identified that GE Service Information Letter (SIL) No. 3, issued
July 31,1973, discussed the subject problem and recommended specific corrective
actions to be taken. The licensee was unable to find supportive documentation to
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determine if a response was made to the SIL. Tne inspectors were concerned that
recommended long term corrective actions were not previously implemented to prevent
this condition.
c. Conclusions
The inspectors had no concems regarding the HCU operability determination. Immediate
corrective actions and long term correctiv' actions were instituted when the condition
was discovered. The inspectors were concemed that recommended long term
corrective actions were not implemented as recommended in GE SIL No. 3 to prevent
this condition.
IV Plant Support
R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls
R1.1 Good Radiation Protection Support for HPCI and RCIC Surveillance Tests
a. Inspection Scope (71750)
The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of radiological controls in accordance with
inspection Procedure 71750. This included observing radiological control work practices
supporting the February 11,1998, HPCI surveillance test and the March 6,1998, RCIC
surveillance test.
b. Observations and Findinas
On February 11,1998, the inspectors observed the pre-test briefing and portions of
Surveillance Test STP 45D001-0, "HPCI System Quarterly Operability Test." On
~ March 6,1998, the inspectors observed the pre-test briefing and portions of Surveillance
Test STP 45E001-0, "RCIC System Quarterly Operability Test. The inspectors observed
that radiation protection personnel provided a thorough pre-test briefing and informed
individuals of potential changing radiological conditions during the test and the necessary
precautions to be taken. Radiation protection personnel provided good support in the
field during the test and properly controlled areas where radiation exposure rates
increased.
c. Conclusions
Radiation protection personnel provided good support during the conduct of HPCI and
RCIC surveillance tests.
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F1 Control of Fire Protection Activities
F.1.1 Acoropriate Fire Watch Activities
a. Inspection Scope (71750)
The inspectors evaluated fire watch activities conducted in hot work areas to determine
the licensee's adherence to its fire plan. Also, the inspectors observed security personnel
performing routine fire watch rounds to determine the adequacy of their fire watchs as in
relationship to the licensee's fire plan.
b. Observations and Findinas
The inspectors observed that fire watch personnel performed duties appropriately. The
inspectors verified through interviews that fire watch personnel were knowledgeable of
where hot work was conducted and the need to visually assess the hot work area for a
period of time after work was performed. The inspectors had no concems.
As discussed in Section M2.1, a fire watch on rounds identified higher than normal
temperature and high humidity conditions in the RCIC area. This was promptly
communicated to the control room which enabled the licensee to quickly respond to the
problem.
V. Manaaement Meetinas
X1 Exit Meeting Summary
The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the
conclusion of the inspection on March 17,1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings
presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the
inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
Licensee
J. Franz, Vice President Nuclear
G. Van Middlesworth, Plant Manager
R. Anderson, Manager, Outage and Support
J. Bjorseth, Maintenance Superintendent
D. Curtland, Operations Manager
R. Hite, Manager, Radiation Protection
M. McDermot, Manager, Engineering
K. Peveler, Manager, Regulatory Performance
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INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
IP 37551: Onsite Engineering
IP 40500: Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in Identifying, Resolving, and Preventing
Problems
IP 61726: Surveillance Observation
IP 62707: Maintenance Observation
IP 71707: Plant Operations
IP 71750: Plant Support
IP 92700: Onsite Followup of Written Reportn of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor
Facilities
IP 92901: Followup - Operations
IP 92902: Followup - Engineering
IP 92903: Followup - Maintenance
IP 93702: Prompt Onsite Response to Events at Operating Power Reactors
ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened
50-331/98003-01 NCV Failure to maintain a minimum operating crew at all times when
fuelis in the reactor
50-331/98003-02 NOV Unacceptable restraint methods
Closed
50-331/97-13-00 LER inoperable primary containment isolation valves exceeded TS LCO
50-331/97014-03 IFl High suppression pool temperatures during HPCI Testing
50-331/98003-01 NCV Failure to maintain a minimum operating crew at all times when
fuelis in the reactor
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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
~ ACP Administrative Control Procedure
AR Action Request
. ARI Altemate Rod insertion
ATWS Anticipated Transient Without Scram
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
- CMAR Corrective Maintenance Action Request
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DAEC Duane Amold Energy Center
EMA Engineered maintenance action
EOC End of cycle
EOP Emergency Operating Procedure
GE General E!ectric
HCU Hydraulic Control Unit
HPCI High Pressure Coolant injection
IFl Inspection followup item
IP inspection procedure
IPOl Integrated Plant Operating Instructions
IR inspection report
LCO Limiting Condition for Operation
LER Licensee Event Report .
NCV Non-cited violation
NOV. Notice of Violation'
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NRR Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
O! Operating Instruction
- OSM Operations Shift Manager
- OSS Operations Shift Supervisor
QA Quality Assurance
- RCIC Reactor Core Isolation Cooling
RPT Recirculation pump trip
RRMG. Reactor recirculation motor generator
SAR Safety analysis report
SIL Service information Letter
STP Surveillance Test Procedure
TS Technical Specification
UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
URI Unresolved item
VIO Violation
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