ML20141D737
| ML20141D737 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Duane Arnold  |
| Issue date: | 05/09/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20141D700 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-331-97-07, 50-331-97-7, NUDOCS 9705200186 | |
| Download: ML20141D737 (12) | |
See also: IR 05000331/1997007
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION lli
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Docket No:
50-331
License No:
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Report No.
50-331/97007
Licensee:
IES Utilities Inc.
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200 First Street S.E.
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P. O. Box 351
Cedar Rapids, IA 52406-0351
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Facility:
Duane Arnold Energy Center
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Dates:
March 18,1997 - April 25,1997
inspectors:
K. Riemer, Senior Resident inspector
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C. Lipa, Resident inspector
Approved by:
M. Jordan, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 5
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050
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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Duane Arnold Energy Center
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NRC inspection Report 50-331/97007
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This inspection report included resident inspectors' evaluation of aspects of licensee
operations, engineering, maintenance, and plant support. The inspectors identified
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examples of weaknesses in the areas of test control and corrective actions.
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Ooerations
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The inspectors concluded that the startup was well controlled and conducted in a
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slow and conservative manner. (Section 01.2)
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The inspectors identified examples of weak scaffolding control, including, storage
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of scaffold materials, erection of the scaffold, and subsequent operations
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department walkdown of the scaffold. (Section 02.2)
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Maintenance
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The inspectors identified that the test procedure for RHR service water was
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inadequate in that it was not consistent with the design basis. This constituted a
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violation. (Section M3.1)
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The i;censee identified a repeat occurrence of the use of incorrect acceptance
criteria during daily surveillances. This was an example of a violation. (Section
M1.2)
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The licensee identified that a document change form (DCF) was not incorporated
during an instrument calibration surveillance test. As a result, instruments were left
outside the as-left acceptance criteria. This was a repeat example of problems with
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control of DCFs and was an example of a violation. (Section M3.2)
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Engineerina
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The inspectors considered that engineering support was effective in identifying a
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degraded condition on the RHRSW pump before pump operability was affected.
Also maintenance and engineering coordinated effectively to promptly replace the
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pump. (Section E2.1)
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E[ ant Suonort
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The ingactors identified one example where turnover between firewatches was
inadequue (Section F1.1)
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Report Details
Summary of Plant Status
The plant was in a hot shutdown condition at the beginning of the inspection period due to
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leakage from a drywell cooler. The plant was returned to full power on March 22,1997.
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With the exception of a scheduled downpower evolution for turbine valve testing, the plant
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operated at approximately 100 percent power for the remainder of the inspection period.
1. Operations
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Conduct of Operations
01.1 General Comments (71707)
The inspectors conducted frequent reviews of plant operations. This included
observing routine control room activities, accompanying in-plant operators on daily
rounds, attending shift turnovers and crew briefings, and performing panel
walkdowns. The conduct of operations was generally considered to be
professional. One example of operator error during surveillance testing is discussed
in Section M1.2. Other observations are detailed in the sections below.
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01.2 Reactor Plant Startup From Maintenance Outage
a.
inspection Scone
On March 14,1997, the licensee performed a plant shutdown to correct a high
drywell leakap: ets concern. The high rate was caused by a well water leak from
a drywell caoler (reference NRC IR 50-331/97004). The licensee commenced a
reactor startup on March 18,1997; the inspectors observed in-plant and control
room startup activities.
b.
Observations and Findinas
The inspectors observed the following during the startup: effective shift
management oversight of the activities, formal communications between operators,
and strict procedural adherence. The inspectors did obsen.*e minor discrepancies
between the operating crews during the conduct of the reactor startup. For
example, one crew controlled pressure set adjustments in a more formal manner
than did the following crew. Also, not all crews consistently cal!cd out the receipt
of expected annunciators. The inspectors had no substard e concerns with the
crew differences but noted that they did not always matt.. operations management
stated expectations. The inspectors discussed their observations with operations
management.
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c.
Conclusions
Overall, the inspectors concluded that the startup was well controlled and
conducted in a slow and conservative manner.
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Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment
02.1 Enoineered Safety Feature System Walkdowns (71707)
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The inspectors used inspection Procedure 71707 to walk down accessible portions
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of the following ESF systems:
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e control building chillers
e high pressure coolant injection (HPCI)
e standby diesel generators (SBDG)
e reactor core isolation cooling system (RCIC)
e residual heat removal (RHR) system
o RHR service water (HHRSW)
e emergency service water (ESW)
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Equipment operability, material condition, and housekeeping were acceptable.
Several minor discrepancies were brought to the licensee's attention and were
corrected. The inspectors identified concerns with scaffolding installation and
storage as discussed below.
02.2 Scaffoldina in Contact With Safetv-Related Eauinment
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b.
Observations and Findinas
On March 31,1997, the inspectors identified that scaffolding erected to support
maintenance activities in the standby diesel generator (SBDG) was in direct contact
with panel 1C 93 (1G-31 load control panel). A horizontal scaffold brace had
scratched the paint on the back side of the panel. The inspectors reviewed
administrative control procedure (ACP) 1408.2, " Scaffold Control," and concluded
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that no procedural violation existed. The inspectors, however, discussed with
operations management their concern for the potential impact to the panel from
scaffold movement. The licensee corrected the situation and inspectors verified
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that the scaffolding was no longer in contact with the panel.
Subsequent to the inspectors' initial identification of the matter the ingnactors
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observed scaffolding in contact with the back of the same panel on April 9,1997.
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The inspectors again discussed the issua with operations management and verified
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that the situation was corrected.
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On April 8, the inspectors identified a concern with the licensee's scaffolding
storage in the Torus basement area. Specifically, stored ladder brackets were in
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contact with safety-related Torus level instrument tubing (LT 4397A and B). The
condition was corrected after discussion with operations management.
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c.
Conclusions
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The inspectors did not identify any specific operability concerns as a result of the
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scaffolding concerns discussed above, and the inspectors determined that a
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procedural violation did not occur. However, the inspectors concluded that the
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erection of the scaffold, and subsequent operations department walkdown of the
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scarfold, were examples of weak scaffolding control.
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07
QuaNty Assurance in Operations
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07.1 Licensee Self-Assessment Activities
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During the inspection period, the inspectors reviewed multiple licensee self-
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assessment activities, including:
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Action Request Screening Panels
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Monthly Safety Committee Meeting
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Monthly Quality Assurance Audit Exit
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Operations Committee Meetings
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The inspectors observed active management participation and concluded that the
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self-assessment activities observed were effective.
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08
Miscellaneous Operations issues f 92700)
08.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-331/94-07-00: Residual Heat Removal
(RHR) System Shutdown Cooling isolation. On May 29,1994, while lining up
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shutdown cooling, an isolation of the system occurred. The cause was reported to
be a pressure surge in the "B" reactor recirculation pump suction piping as a result
of opening the shutdown cooling isolation valve. Changes were made to Operating
Instruction 149, "RHR System," to prevent recurrence. No additional shutdown
cooling isolations have occurred since May 1994. The licensee plans to perform a
modification to provide a more permanent resolution to this issue, s;nce this is
currently considered an operator work around (Action Request (AR) 940066.05).
The inspectors had no further concerns. This item is closed.
08.2 (Closed) LER 50-331/95-04-00: Inadvertent Group 3 Isolations from invalid
Signals. The inspectors verified that appropriate corrective actions were
implemented. There was no violation of NRC Regulations. This item is closed.
08.3 (Closed) Violation 50-331/96013-03: Main Steam Line Radiation Monitors Not Set
Per TS. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's response letter dated April 4,1997,
and verified that corrective actions were implemented. This item is closed.
08.4 (Closed) LER 50-331/97-01-00: Failure to Comply with TS for Main Steam Line
Radiation Monitors. This NRC identified issue was the subject of a violation in
inspection Report 50-331/96013. The inspectors had no further concerns. This
item is closed.
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11. Maintenance
M1
Conduct of Maintenance
M1.1 General Comments
a.
Insoection Scone (62703. 61726)
The inspectors observed or reviewed all or portions of the following work activities:
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Group i primary containment isolation logic test
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RHRSW quarterly surveillance
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RHRSW pump replacement
Safety related air compressor replacement
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Reactor recirculation Inbe oil pump repair
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b.
Observations and Findinas
As discussed below and in Section M3, the inspectors were concerned with several
examples of problems with test control.
M1.2 Reoeat Examole of incorrect Accentance Criteria Used for ESW Temneratures
a.
insoection Scone (40500. 61726)
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During a daily surveillance on April 8,1997, the licenses identified that incorrect
acceptance criteria had been used since February 9,1997. The licensee initiated
AR 971061971061 The inspectors reviewed this issue and the similarity to another issue
identified on December 81996.
b.
Observations and Findinas
On April 8,1997, operators performing STP 42A001, " Daily instrument Checks,"
identified that incorrect ESW temperature acceptance criteria had been used since
February 9,1997. Apparently, an operator documented the incorrect value in STP
42A001 on February 9,1997, and this incorrect value had been copied daily into
the STPs until identification on April 8,1997.
As discussed in inspection Report (IR) 50-331/96011, incorrect acceptance criteria
for ESW temperature had been used from October 25 until December 8,1996. The
licensee's practice prior to December 8 had been to record the ESW temperature
acceptance criteria on an uncontrolled document in the control room. After the
December 8,1996, finding, operations management directed that operators stop
using the uncontrolled document and instead, copy the acceptance criteria from
surveillance to surveillance.
The use of incorrect acceptance criteria from October 25 until December 8,1996,
was cited as a violation in IR 50-331/96013. The licensee's response to the
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violation discussed corrective actions to prevent recurrence; however, the actions
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did not prevent the use of the incorrect acceptance criteria from February 9 until
April 8,1997,
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Conclusions
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, The licensee's corrective actions for the use of incorrect acceptance criteria in
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December 1998 were ineffective in that incorrect acceptance criteria were again
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used from February 9 until April 8,1997. This is considered a violation of
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix 8, Criterion XVI. (50-331/97007-01)
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M3
Maintenance Procedures and Documentation
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M3.1 RHRSW Surveillance Testing Discrenancy
a.
Inspection Scone (62703)
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The inspectors observed the performance of surveillance test procedure (STP)
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45C001-0, "RHR Service Water Operability Test," Revision 8 on March 31,1997.
The inspectors reviewed the surveillance in detail, including, TS requirements, TS
bases, Operating Instructions, and test results.
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b.
Obrarvations and Findinos
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The inspectors identified a discrepancy between the surveillance test line-up and
the design basis. An analysis was performed in 1983 to reduce the TS required
flow rate from 2400 gallons per minute (gpm) to 2040 gpm. The analysis assumed
the flow rate of 2040 gpm was delivered to the RHR heat exchanger. During
surveillance testing per STP 45C001-0 on March 31, the licensee closed the
normally open RHRSW continuous strainer backwash valve before taking the
required pressure and flow readings. Closing the backwash valve prior to
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demonstrating adequate flow rate did not test the most limiting case. By design,
the backwash flow rate was apgoximately 200 gpm.
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ln re ,ponse to the inspectors' concerns, the licensee initiated AR 971037971037and
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performed an operability evaluation. Using actual test results, the licensee
demonstrated that there was sufficient margin to support design basis flow rate to
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the heat exchanger with the backwash valve open. The licensee also initiated
Document Change Form 97-T-0098, which revised the STP steps to ensure the
backwash valve was in the normally open position prior to demonstrating the TS
required flow rate for future testing.
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c.
Conclusions
Although there were no operability concerns, the inspectors were concerned that
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the test procedure was inadequate. The inspectors concluded that corrective
actions were appropriate. This constituted a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix
B, Criterion XI. (50-331/97007-02).
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incorrect Accentance Criteria Used Due to Document Chanae Form (DCF) Not
incoroorated Durina Surveillance
a.
Insnection Scone
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On April 10,1997, the licensee identified that changes made to the main steam
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low pressure switches STP by a DCF were not incorporated prior to performance of
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the STP on March 25,1997. This was documented on AR 971137971137 The
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inspectors reviewed this issue and the corrective actions for other recent problems
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with control of DCFs.
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b.
Qhgervations and Findinas
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On February 23,1997,in response to NRC concerns regarding instrument setpoint
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values (reference IR 50-331/97004), the licensee issued a DCF to revise
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acceptance criteria and as-left values for main steam low pressure instrumentation
calibrated per STP 42A003-0. When the STP was performed on March 25,1997,
the DCF was not in the test package and, therefore, the old acceptance criteria
were used. As a result, all four pressure switches were left outside of the new
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acceptance criteria. The licensee documented that the switches were operable
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because they were within the allowable values. The instruments were promptly
reset to the new acceptance criteria on April 11,1997.
The inspectors were concerned with this issue because of the . similarity to other
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recent problems with control of DCFs. See irs 50-331/96-06,
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96-07, and 96011 for details. in the licensee's response to the violation in IR 50-
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331/96011, corrective actions were discussed that were expected to prevent
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recurrence of further problems with DCFs. The corrective actions are considered
ineffective in that this additional example occurred on March 25,1997.
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c.
Conclusions
The inspectors were concerned that control of documents change forms continues
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to be a challenge at Duane Arnold Energy Center. The failure of the test package
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performed on March 25,1997, to incorporate the new acceptance criteria was
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considered an example of a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI
(50-331/97007-03).
111 Enaineerina
E2
Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment
a.
Insoection Scoon (37551)
The inspectors evaluated engineering involvement in resolution of emergent material
condition problems and other routine activities. The inspectors reviewed areas such
as operability evaluations, root cause analyses, safety committees, and self
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assessments. The effectiveness of the licensee's controls for the identification,
resolution, and prevention of problems was also examined.
E2.1
increase in Vibration Levels on "A" RHRSW Pumo
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a.
Insoection Scone (37551)
On April 4,1997, during review of test results from STP 45 COO 1-0, "RHRSW
Operability Test," engineering identified increased vibration on the "A" RHRSW
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pump. Although the vibration values met the acceptance criteria, engineering
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recommended prompt pump replacement. The inspectors reviewed current and
past test results for this pump and observed the pump replacement.
b.
Observations and Findings
On April 4,1997, during final review of test results from the STP performed on
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March 31,1997, engineering identified an increase in vibration levels on the "A"
RHRSW pump. Engineering characterized this as an acute rubbing or looseness
condition developing on the pump. Operations considered the pump inoperable and
entered a 30-day LCO.
On April 9, the "A" RHRSW pump was replaced with a rebui!t spare. The
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inspectors observed that the pump replacement was well coordinated betweeh
operations, maintenance, and engineering. (Weaknesses identified with the post-
installation testing are discussed in IR 50-331/96006.)
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On April 11,1997, testing of the new pump showed higher than expected vibration
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levels. Engineering obtained additional vibration data and concluded that the high
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vibration was possibly due to storage of the pump in a horizontal position in the
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warehouse for over a year. Engineering performed en operability evaluation for
Operations and the LCO was canceled on April 18. h new pump was considered
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to be in " alert" and increased testing was scheduled. Weekly testing of the pump
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showed that the vibration appeared to be trending down, indicating improvement
over time, consistent with the licensee's operability evaluation.
c.
Conclus' ions
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The inspectors considered that engineering support was effective in identifying a
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degraded condition before pump operability was affected. Also maintenance and
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engineering coordinated effectively to promptly replace the pump. The inspectors
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planned to review the licensee's root cause analysis for the increase in vibration -
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and the problem with the new pump's high vibration. This is considered an
inspection Follow-up Item (50-331/97007-04).
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IV Plant Suncort
F1
Control of Fire Protection Activities
F1.1
Inadeauate Turnover Between Fire Watches
a.
Inspection Scone (71750)
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. During plant tours and observations of maintenance activities, the inspectors
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examined fire barriers, emergency lighting, and control of flammable materials. The
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inspectors identified a concern with the turnover between two firewatches.
b.
Observations and Findings
On April 15,1997, during plant tours, the inspectors observed a person performing
the required 30-minute firewatch following hot work. When the inspectors
questioned the individual on the nature and location of the hot work that had been
performed, the individual stated that there had been a grinding activity, but he
could not identify the location. The inspectors discussed this concern with
maintenance supervision who indicated that the firewatch had relieved another
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firewatch who had been there during the grinding activity. Maintenance supervision
agreed that the firewatch turnover was inadequats.
In response to the inspector's concerns, the licensee initiated changes to
Administrative Control Procedure 1412.3, " Control of ignition Sources," to include
specific requirements for briefings to relieving firewatches.
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c.
Conclusions
The inspectors were concerned with the inadequate turnover between the
firewatches. The licensee's corrective actions were considered appropriate.
V. Manaaement Meetinas
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Exit Meeting Summary
The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the
conclusion of the inspection on April 25,1997. The licensee acknowledged the findings
presented.
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The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection
should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
Licensee
J. Franz, Vice President Nuclear
G. Van Middlesworth, Plant Manager
R. Anderson, Manager, Outage and Support
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P. Bessette, Manager, Engineering
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J. Bjorseth, Maintenance Superintendent
D. Curtland, Operations Manager
K. Peveler, Manager, Regulatory Performance
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INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
IP 37551:
Onsite Engineering
IP 40500:
Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in Identifying, Resolving, and
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Preventing Problems
IP 61726:
Surveillance Observation
IP 62703:
Maintenance Observation
IP 62707:
Maintenance Observation
IP 71707:
Plant Operations
IP 71750:
Plant Support
IP 92700:
Onsite Followup of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power
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Reactor Facilities
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IP 92901:
Followup - Operations
IP 92902:
Followup - Engineering
IP 92903:
Followup - Maintenance
ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED
Opened
50-331/97007-01
NOV Repeat Example of Incorrect ESW Acceptance Criteria
50-331/97007-02
NOV RHRSW STP Not Consistent With Design Basis
50-331/97007-03
NOV Repeat Occurrence Of Problem With DCF Control - Incorrect
Acceptance Criteria for Main Steam Low Pressure Swi'.ches
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50-331/97007-03
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Increased Vibration on "A" RHRSW Pump
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50-331/94007
LER
RHR System Shutdown Cooling Isolation
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50-331/95004
LER
Inadvertent Group 3 Isolations From invalid Signals
50-331/96013-03
Main Steam Line Radiation Monitors Not Set Per TS
50-331/97001
LER
Failure to Comply with TS for Main Steam Line
Radiation Monitors
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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
Administrative Control Procedure
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Action Request
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CFR
Code of Federal Regulations
Duane Arnold Energy Center
DCF
Document change form
Emergency service water
GPM
Gallons per minute
High Pressure Coolant injection
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Inspection followup item
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inspection report
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LCO
Limiting Condition for Operation
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LER
Licensee Event Report
NRC
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Public document room
Reactor Core isolation Cooling
Residual heat removal service water
SBDG
Standby diesel generator
Surveillance Test Procedure
TS
Technical Specification
Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
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