IR 05000331/1998012
| ML20154F490 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Duane Arnold  |
| Issue date: | 10/02/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20154F488 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-331-98-12, NUDOCS 9810090243 | |
| Download: ML20154F490 (17) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION lli 1 l
Docket No: 50-331 License No: DPR-49 Report No: 50-331/98012(DRP)
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Licensee: Alliant, IES Utilities In !
200 First Street l P. O. Box 351 i Cedar Rapids, IA 52406-0351 i i
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Facility: Duane Arnold Energy Center l
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Location: Palo, Iowa Dates: July 30 through September 4,1998 i
i l Inspectors: P. Prescott, Senior Resident inspector M. Kurth, Resident inspector Approved by: R. D. Lanksbury, Chief
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Reactor Projects Branch 5 i
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9810090243 981002 PDR ADOCK 05000331 i G PDR I
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ,
Duane Amold Energy Center i NRC Inspection Report 50-331/98012(DRP)
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. This inspection report included the resident inspectors' evaluation of aspects of licensee l performance in the areas of operations, engineering, maintenance, and plant suppor :
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Operations !
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. The conduct of operations continued to be professional. Good communicatien and l coordination between operations and reactor engineering personnel were noted during L the scheduled power reduction for turbine valve testing (Section 01.1). j
! i j . Based on interviews with licensed operators, ano the assessment of operator log
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entries for limiting conditions for operation associated with certain plant conditions, the
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operations training staff provided adequate training to operations personnel in support
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of improved Technical Specification implementation (Section 05.1). ,
. The licensee effectively used its corrective actions program to track and resolve l
questions that developed during improved Technical Specification training sessions to ensure consistent guidance was provided to operating crews (Section 05.1).
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. The licensee's historic review of operability of the torus water level transmitters l following the identification of out-of-tolerance calibration equipment was thorough l
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! Maintenance e in general, surveillance test and maintenance activities were conducted in an i
acceptable manner. The inspectors observed good planning for and execution of maintenance activities associated with the recidual heat removal and residual heat removal service water system maintenance outages (Section M1.1). l l
l . The licensee adequately addressed industry issues described in General Electric Service Information Letters (Section M7.1).
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. The inspectors noted that the temporary modifications in place had adequate safety i evaluations and proposed engineering resolutions. There were no significant l
longstanding temporary modifications in place for equipment important to safety.
l However, several of the temporary modifications for nonsafety-related equipment were not being addressed in a timely fashion. (Section E1.2 ).
. The licensee continued to effectively assess and test components and systems for year 2000 computer software readiness. The licensee's goal was to be year 2000 ready by l March 1999 (Section E2.1).
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Plant Support
- . The inspectors concluded that radiological practices observed during maintenance activities and daily walkdowns were adequate (Section R1.1).
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. Radiation protection personnel provided effective support during radiography activities - I that were conducted by contractors on August 26 and 27,1998. Adequate radiation '
area and high radiation area boundaries were estab!!shed and contre.Iled. Survey instruments were properiy used to ensure that the radioactive sealed source was in the l shielded position after each radiographic exposure (Section R4.1).
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Report Details
Summary of Plant Status
' The plant began this inspection period at 100 percent power. On August 15 and 16,1998, the ;j
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licensee reduced plant power to approximately 85 percent for several hours in order to conduct main turbine valve testing. The plant was operated at approximately 100 percent power for the remainder of the perio I. Operations -
i 01: Conduct of Operations 01.1 General Comments Inspection Scope (71707)
I The inspectors followed the guidance of Inspection Procedure 71707 and conducted i frequent reviews of plant operations. This included observing routine control room j
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activities, reviewing system tagouts, and attending shift tumovers and crew briefing The inspectors observed the August 15 and 16,1998, power reduction for scheduled turbine valve testin Observations and Findinas The conduct of operations personnel was professional. The inspectors observed strict use of procedures and thorough shift tumovers. Operations personnel performed a well-controlled power reduction for scheduled turt>ine valve testing. Operators and i reactor engineering personnel exhibited good coordination and communication during )
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the evolution.
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c. Conclusions The conduct of operations continued to be professional. Good communication and coordination between operations and reactor engineering personnel were noted during the scheduled power reduction evolutio Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment ]
I O2.1 General Plant Tours and System Walkdowns (71707) i The inspectors followed the guidance of Inspection Procedure 71707 in walking down
accessible portions of several systems. The systems chosen, based on maintenance work activities and probabilistic risk significance, were:
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Equipment operability, material condition, and housekeeping were acceptable in all I I
cases. The inspectors did not identify any substantive concems as a result of these walkdown J 05 Operator Training and Qualification i
~ 05.1 .~ implementation of Imoroved Technical Specifications (ITS)
l Inspection Scope (71707) . .]
I The inspectors reviewed the training provided to operators for the implementation of ITS on August 1,1998. Interviews were conducted with licensed operators. A review
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of operator logs was conducted to verify that limiting conditions for operation (LCOs)
were property entered for various plant conditions as required by IT Observations and Findinos in January 1997, the operations training staff initiated ITS training sessions for operating crews. The operators attended quarterly training classes, including simulator sessions in 1997 and 1998. Initial training consisted of a general overview of ITS and its comparison with the current Technical Specifications (TSs). Each quarter the training focused on different ITS sections and at the end of each quarte.r operations personnel were tested.' Throughout the training sessions, questions were documented using comment resolution forms (CRFs). The CRFs were forwarded to individuals or groups for clarification and resolution. The CRF resolutions were entered in a database to ensure all operating crews were provided with consistent answers to question During the week of March 2,1998, three DAEC employees and five industry representatives from various nuclear plants performed a peer assessment of the ITS training program. Based on their review, the peer assessment team concluded that, in general, the ITS training program provided the necessary training for implementation of 3 i
ITS. The peer assessment team identified the need to provide additional training on changes in nominal set point values, and the use of in-service testing program values in ;
surveillance tests.' Also, the team identified the need to provide additional training to l non-licensed individuals, such as supervisors, engineers, and instrument and control technicians. The licensee used its corrective actions program (Action Requests [ARs])
to track the resolution of the peer assessment findings and the CRFs generated during
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the training session The inspectors questioned several licensed operators regarding ITS after its August 1, 1998, implementation. The operators were knowledgeable in the proper use of IT An assessment of operator logs was conducted to ensure the proper limiting conditions for operation (LCOs) were entered in accordance with plant conditions for that time period. Severalisolated minor administrative discrepancies were noted regarding data
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.l entry of LCO completion times in the proper column of the ITS LCO tracking form Operation's management provided instructions in the shift orders to correct the I discrepancies. The licensee planned to maintain an on-call list in the control room if questions developed regarding ITS. The on-call list consisted of ITS development team members, operations management, and licensing personne Conclusions Based on review of the ITS training course content, interviews with licensed operators, and the assessment of operator log entries for limiting conditions for operation associated with certain plant conditions, the operations training staff provided adequate training to operations personnel in support of ITS implementation. The licensee effectively used its corrective actions program to track and resolve questions that developed during ITS training sessions to ensure consistent guidance was provided to operating crew Quality Assurance in Operations 07.1 Licensee Self-Assessment Activities (40500 and 71707)
During the inspection period, the inspectors observed / reviewed multiple licensee self-assessment activities, including:
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. Operations Committee meetings The inspectors observed that licensee management was present and actively participated in the meetings. Items discussed were evaluated in a critical manner and committee members focused on a safe resolution to the issues discussed. The '
inspectors concluded that the self-assessment activities observed were effectiv .2 Torus Water Level Instmmentation Operability Inspection Scope (40500 and 71707)
The inspectors performed an independent svaluation of the operability of torus water level transmitters. The following documents were reviewed: Technical Specifications, Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.97, American National Standard (ANS) 4.5, the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), and applicable Action Requests (ARs), Observations and Findinas On April 22,1998, during the refueling outage, the torus water level transmitters (LT) 4397A and B were calibrated using Surveillance Test Procedure (STP) 3.3.3.1-0 Subseg ently, on August 4,1998, the gage (P644) used for calibrating the torus level transmitters was found out-of-tolerance during recertificatio _- , _
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l The STP required an instrument accuracy of +/-1.163" or 0.14 percent. Gage P644 was found out-of-tolerance by 1.44" which did not meet STP 3.3.3.1-02 requirements for accurac The licensee conducted a review of all tasks that were performed using pressure I gage P644. Subsequently, on August 17,1998, the licensee determined that LT 4397A was outside the as-found limits of the STP and declared the LT inoperabl A 30-day limiting condition for operstion (LCO) was entered per TS 3.3.3.1. The "B" loop was also declared inoperable and a 7-day LCO was entered An AR was written to document the condition of the inoperable transmitters and to track the potential reportability of the condition. That same day, the "A" loop was recalibrated and the ,
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7-day LCO was exited. The "B" loop was recalibrated the following day and the 30-day LCO exite This issue was potentially reportable due to two loops of torus level indication being outside the surveillance procedure instrument accuracy requirements greater than the
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allowed LCO time. The TS required that these transmitters be calibrated every ,
24 months. However, no calibration accuracy is specified in TS. The level transmitters i
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are post-accident monitoring instruments required by RG 1.97, which endorses ANS 4.5. The ANS 4.5 document contained an accuracy guideline of +/- 20 percent of instrument span. Licensee correspondence with the NRC supported this accuracy
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guideline. The licensee's equipment database listed the +/-20 percent as the required i instrument accuracy. The current UFSAR description stated that instrument accuracy was six percent of fullinstrument scale. This was supported by calculations that ;
determined instrument loop inaccuracies totaled between 5.1 and 5.2 percent. This !
loop inaccuracy is within the ANS 4.5 guideline of 20 percen l When the maximum out-of-tolerance as-found condition of the level transmitters was added to the calibration instrument inaccuracies, the error totaled 5.32 percen Therefore, LT 4397A and B were within the UFSAR specified loop accuracy of 6 percent and had been in an operable condition since April 22,199 Conclusions The inspectors determined that the licensee's historic review of operability of the torus water level transmitter loops was thorough, following the identification of out-of-tolerance calibration equipmen l
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II. Maintenance !
M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 General Comments Inspection Scope (62707 and 61726)
The inspectors observed all or portions of the surveillance test activities and work request activities listed below. The applicable surveillance test or work package documentation was reviewed. Specific tests and woA request activities observeo are listed below-Maintenance Activities
. Corrective Maintenance Action Request (CMAR) A48517: stator winding cooling motor; troubleshoot cause of high vibration
. CMAR A40426 RHR: service water (RHRSW) discharge strainer continuoua
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flush line GBD-063-2"; replace pitted piping with new piping
. CMAR A38098 "A" RHR: pump discharge check valve V20-0003; inspect lap seat and repair as necessary Surveillance of Activities
. STP 3.3.1,1-16, Rev. O, "Turt>ine First Stage Pressure Permissive Calibration"
. STP 3.8.4-02, Rev. O, " Battery Connected Cell Checks"
. STP 3.7.7-01, Rev.1, " Bypass Valves Test"
. STP NS930001, Rev. O, " Main Turbine Operational Tests"
. STP 3.3.1.1-01, Rev. O, " Reactor Protection System (RPS) High Pressure Scram Calibration" Observations and Findinas in general, the work associated with these activities was conducted in a professional and thorough manner. Wo* was performed with the appropriate radiological control measures in place. Technicians were knowledgeable of their assigned tasks and wo*
document requirements. The inspectors noted good planning for and execution of the RHR and RHR service water system maintenance outages. Licensee response to emergent wo* during the RHR service water system maintenance outage was well coordinated. The inspectors focused particular attention on these two systems because of their probabilistic risk significance. The licensee displayed proper sensitivity to the risk significance of these systems by restoring them to an operable status in a timely fashio . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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The inspecter reviewed severallicensee responses to GE SILs to ensure adequate actions were implemented.
' Observations and Findinos In July 1998, the "D" RHRSW system pump motor shorted upon manual ir9i!ation due to winding insulation degradation. The licensee conducted a root cause investigation and determined that a potential contributing factor was the less than adequate predictive maintenance that was being performed on that mo?.-- Based on the root cause evaluation, the licensee determined that GE SIL No. 484, Supplement 2, issued September 7,1993, provided recommendations to perform tests to predict winding insulation degradation prior to failure. The licensee planned to perform the additional testing shortly after the GE SIL issuance; however, for reasons unknown, the licensee did not follow through and perform the additional testing. This prompted the inspectors
- to review additional GE SILs and licensee responses to ensure adequate actions were implemente Seven GE SILs issued between 1996 and 1998 were also reviewed. The licensee followed actions outlined in Administrative Control Procedure (ACP) 102.1, " Review of Industry Related Documents." The GE SILs were entered in the AR system for review and tracking purposes. The ARs were assigned to the appropriate individuals or groups and commitments that were made were tracked through implementation. The licensee properiy addressed and implemented recommendations for the GE SILs and no discrepancies were note Seven GE SILs issued between 1990 and 1992 were also reviewed. The inspectors identified a minor discrepancy in the licensee's response to GE SIL No. 514, "Back Connected Circuit Breaker Short Circuits," issued May 7,1990. The GE SIL was issued to caution licensees that an electrical short could occur during the repair or reassembly of energized mounting studs associated with back connected circuit breakers. The licensee uses the same back connected circuit breaker described in the SIL in its reactor protection system power distribution panel 1Y30. The licensee committed to implement the GE SIL recommendations shortly aN r the GE SIL was issued. The licensce revised its molded case circuit breaker maintenance procedure in accordance
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with the GE SIL recommendations by including torque values for the energized mounting stud bolts and nuts and added a procedural caution statement waming of the potential for damaging the inner insulator during reassembly. However, the inspectors identified that the licensee failed to include a gap tolerance check between the outer and inner insulator in the maintenance procedure. If tha insulator gap is greater than the tolerance, this will increase the probability that an electrical short could result from the energized bar contacting the distribution panel. The licensee was not able to deter.nine why the GE SIL recommendations were not entirely implemente The licensee explained that the mounting stud assembly is received from the vendor properly sized so that the outer and inner insulator fit snug during installation. Also, it is uncommon to disassemble and reassemble the energized mounting stud addressed in the GE SIL. Although the probability of an electrical short is increased if the insulator gap is greater than the recommended tolerances, the overall probability of an electrical short is low due to the infrequency of disassembling and reassembling the mounting stud and causing damage to the insulato Selected GE SIL recommendations were included in General Maintenance Procedure GMP-ELEC-14. " Molded Case Circuit Breakers," Section 5.4, " General Electric Circuit Breaker Installation." The electrical maintenance supervisor, upon further review, determined that the back connected circuit bre9ker and mounting stud were separate components and the mounting stud would not be removed if a breaker was installed; therefore, the GE SIL recommendations were not applicable to the breaker installation section. Action Request 98-1545 was initiated to resolve where in the maintenance procedure the GE SIL gap tolerance check should be adde As detailed in NRC Inspection Report 50-331/98003(DRP), the inspectors identified wire interference concems on several control rod drive hydraulic control units. This condition could have been prevented if the licensee had responded to GE SIL No. 3 which addressed this concem. This prompted the licensee to review its responses to the first 50 GE SILs issued. This review is currently in progress. The licensee plans to address any concems noted, through its corrective actions program. The inspectors will continue to periodically review industry related documents to ensure that adequate i actions are implemente Conclusions The licensee adequately addressed industry issues described in GE SILs issued in the mid-1990's to the present by using its corrective actions program to ensure responses ,
were adequate and property implemente .
M8 Miscellanecca Maintenance issues (92903)
M8.1 (Closed) Unresolved item 50-331/98004-07: Reference use procedures meeting 10 CFR Part 50. In inspection Report 50-331/97016, the inspectors documented a l potential concem with modification work on the high pressure coolant injection syste l The work package was not readily available at the job site. The licensee required the work package instructions to be " reference use" rather than " continuous use." The
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licensee's procedure use and adherence procedure, ACP 101.01, treated many ;
procedures as " reference use." Only surveillance and special test procedures were l specified to be " continuous use." A reference use procedure was not required to be at i the job site and steps (if in small segments) could be performed from memory and signed off at a later time. The inspectors wers concemed that the licensee's procedure adherence policy may be too liberal given the large number of " reference use" procedures and the latitude given to personnel to perform steps out-of-sequenc However, no violation of NRC requirements was identified.
! Since the time of the inspectors' concems, there have been no further examples of events initiated or exacerbated by a procedure being categorized as " reference use." l
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l E1 Conduct of Engineering l
! E General Comments (37551)
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! The inspectors evaluated engineering involvement in the resolution of emergent i material condition problems and other routine activities. The inspectors reviewed areas such as operability evaluations, root cause analyses, safety committees, and self-l: assessments. The effectiveness of the licensee's controls for the identification,
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resolution, and prevention of problems was also examine !
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E1.2 Review of Outstandina Temoorary Modifications (TMs) Inspection Scope (37551)
The inspectors performed a review of outstanding TMs. Adequacy of safety evaluations, duration of the TMs, compliance with the TM procedure, and revisions to applicable drawings were checked. Licensee management's oversight of the process was also reviewe Observations and Findinos A review of outstanding TMs was conducted. Engineering evaluations and proposed corrective actions for the TMs were considered to be adequate. Only 2 of the 19 TMs were related to equipment important to safet However, the inspectors had a concem with oversight of the TM process. Of the 19 TMs in place,2 were over 3 years old,1 was 2 years old, and 4 were over 1 year old. The administrative control procedure (ACP) for TMs, ACP 1410.6, " Temporary i Modification Control," stated that if a TM is initially extended (greater than 6 months),
l then plant manager approval was required prior to installation. None of the TMs greater than 6 months old had the plant manager's approval for installation f
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documented. The only procedural guidance for controlling the duration of a TM consisted of the responsible engineer coordinating maintenance or modification work to ensure TMs are resolved in a timely manner. Adequate control of TM duration was not eviden Licensee management's administrative tool for maintaining oversight of TMs appeared adequate. The process consisted of the plant manager reviewing TMs in the " Quarterly Status of Equipment issue Resolutions," prepared by the engineering manage Relevant information is given on the TM such as resolution status, impact on system performance, safety impact, and age. However, it did not appear that sufficient attention was being given to the proces The inspectors discussed the concern of the timely resolution of some of the TMs with the system engineering supervisor. The system engineering supervisor subsequently issued an action request that addressed the inspectors' concems over the timeliness of resolving outstanding TMs. Several actions were developed with ARs to track progress efforts to ensure more timely resolution of future equipment issues. Some procedural enhancements have already been initiate The inspectors identified a discrepancy in the review of control room drawing Temporary Modification 98-028 was not reflected in the drawings. The TM wcs associated with recorders of generator gross megavars. The project engineer identified a potential fire hazard with the original wiring in the recorders. The wiring was reconfigured. However, the inspectors identified that the corresponding drawing, M155-038, Sheet 2, did not reflect the actual plant configuration. The licensee immediately corrected the drawing to reflect the TM. The licensee, based on its initial investigation, determined that the markups had been made to Revision 18 of the control room drawing in May 1998. However, the current control room drawing, Revision 19, did not contain the required markups because when the Revision 18 drawing was replaced, the markups were apparently discarded with the drawing. The licensee's failure to maintain the drawings current constitutes a violation of minor significance and is not subject to formal enforcement action. Subsequently, the licensee performed a review of all TMs that required drawing markups. One other drawing discrepancy was identified and correcte Conclusions The inspectors noted that the TMs in place had adequate safety evaluations and proposed engineering resolutions. There were no significant longstanding TMs in place for equipment important to safety. However, several of the TMs for nonsafety-related equipment were not being addressed in a timely fashio i
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E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment E2.1 - Yaar 2000 (Y2K) Preliminary Readiness Assessment Inspection Scooe (37551)
The inspectors reviewed the status of the licensee's Y2K readiness project pla Observations and Findinas The licensee started its Y2K assessment program in the summer of 1996. Licensee l personnel and contractors (Electronic Data System [EDS]) performed initial assessments of computer software. Software procurement procedures were developed and implemented to ensure that purchased software was Y2K ready or compliant, and, if not Y2K ready or compliant, an AR was written to track and resolve the problem. In the fall of 1997, licensee personnel began assessing Y2K issues in embedded
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systems. Based on its initial assessments, the licensee identified over 1100 individual components that warranted assessment and testing to ensure Y2K readines ,
Currently, the initial assessment for embedded systems and software programs has ;
been completed. Remedial efforts and testing are underway to ensure all software and
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embedded systems are Y2K ready or compliant. The Y2K assessment team consists ;
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of eight members from various disciplines dedicated full-time to addressing Y2K issue An oversight committee consisting of members from operations, engineering, maintenance, and plant support departments meets periodically to assess the Y2K program status. Also, the licensee plans on conducting periodic meetings with the site vice president to provide Y2K program status update The licensee was confident that all software and embedded systems would be Y2K ready by March 1999. Engineering personnel concluded that the plant's greatest vulnerability will be extemal to the plant, such as the possible loss of offsite power or
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the loss of telecommunications. The licensee was developing contingency plans to +
ensure that the plant operated safely independent of extemal vulnerabilitie l Cpcclusions
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Tlie licensee continued to effectively assess and test components and systems for Y2K computer software readiness. The licensee's goal was to be Y2K ready by March 199 !
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IV. Plant Support
R1 Radiological Protection f
R1.1 Daily Radioloalcal Work Practices i
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i Inspection Scope (71750)
l The inspectors observed radiological worker practices during various maintenance l
activities detailed in this inspection report and also monitored radiological practices during daily plant tours.
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I Observations and Findinas - j l
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Without exception, the inspectors observed that radiation protectio's technicians were j actively involved at the job sites and were taking appropriate actions and performing .
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surveys in accordance with good ALARA practices. No deficiencies were identifie l l- Conclusions ,
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The inspectors concluded that radiological practices observed during maintenance - ,
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' i R4 Staff Knowledge and Performance in Radiological Protection l
R Radioloalcal Protection Support for Radioaraphy Activities {
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l Inspection Scope (71750) ;
i Tho inspectors observed radiological protection controls used for radiography L operations that were conducted onsite August 26 and 27,199 ; Qparrvations and Findinas On August 26 and 27,1998, with the support of radiation protection personnel, I contractors performed radiography activities in the turbine building. The licensee provided an adequate prejob brief prior to the start of radiography activities. Radiation protection personnel effectively established and maintained control of the radiation and l
high radiation boundaries during radiography operations. The radiographer and assistant radiographer wore the proper dosimetry, which included an electronic l
! dosimeter, a self-reading pocket dosimeter, an alarming rate meter, and a film badg The licensee and contractor adequately used survey instruments to ensure the radioactive sealed source was in the shielded position after each radiographic exposure.
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c. Conclusions :
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Radiation protection pers'onnel provided effective support during radiography activities j that were conducted by contractors on August 26 and 27,1098. Adequate radiation ;
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area and high radiation area boundaries were established and controlled. Survey ['
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j V. Mananement Meetinas X1 Exit Meeting Summary
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The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on September 3,1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings i presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the
,, inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identifie . l
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED I I
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i Licensee i 1 i J. Franz, Vice President Nuclear l j G. Van Middlesworth, Plant Manager i j R. Anderson, Manager, Outage and Support ;
i J. Bjorseth, Maintenance Superintendent D. Curtland, Operations Manager R. Hite, Manager, Radiation Protection .
M. McDermott, Manager, Engineering K. Peveler, Manager, Regulatory Performance
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l- INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED i
IP 37551: Onsite Engineering IP 40500: Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in identifying, Resolving, and Preventing Problems IP 61726: Surveillance Observation IP 62707: ' Maintenance Observation IP 71707: Plant Operations IP 71750:- Plant Support IP 92901: Followup - Operations ,
IP 92903: Followup - Maintenance t f
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ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened
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50-331/98004-07 URI Reference use procedure meeting 10 CFR Part 50 Discussed None ;
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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED J
ACP Administrative Control Procedure ALARA As Low As Reasonably Achievable ANS- American National Standard AR Action Request CFR Code of Federal Regulations CMAR Corrective Maintenance Action Request CRF Comment Resolution Form DAE Duane Amold Energy Center -
DRP Division of Reactor Projects GE General Electric IP inspection Procedure IR inspection Report ITS Improved Technical Specification
. LCO Limiting Condition of Operation LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident LT Level Transmitter l NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission -j
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RG Regulatory Guide RFIR Residual Heat Removal
, 'RHRSW Residual Heat Removal Service Water RPS- Reactor Protection System RWCU Reactor Water Cleanup i TM Temporary Modification i TS Technical Specification I UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report !
URI Unresolved item i l
Y2K Year 2000 i
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