IR 05000331/1987027

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Insp Rept 50-331/87-27 on 870803-0901.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Review of Info That Deficiencies Noted During Licensee QA Audit of Contractor Screening Program May Have Been Deliberate
ML20239A256
Person / Time
Site: Duane Arnold NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 09/14/1987
From: Creed J, Pirtle G
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML112211925 List:
References
50-331-87-27, NUDOCS 8709170225
Download: ML20239A256 (5)


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M U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION :gj

REGION III

Y Report No. 50-331/87027(DRSS) i ur*

Docket No. 50-331 License No. OPR-49 Licensee: Iowa Electric Light and Power Company W P. O. Box 351 C Cedar Rapids, IA 52406 7" w >

l Facility Name: Duane Arnold Energy Center ,

Inspection At: NRC Region III In-office Review at Glen Ellyn, Illinois f l

'nspection Conducted: August 3 to September 1, 1987 j m,

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Inspector: 3.% hb e 'N I Ft G. L. Pirtle Date Physical Security Inspector

Approved By:

p J. R. Creed, Chief S.1 b 9ltyl81 Date N

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Safeguards Section r;

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Inspection Summary "O

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Inspection on August 3 to September 1,1987 (Report No. 50-331/87027(ORSS)) '

Areas Inspected: Included a review of information that deficiencies noted ',.

during a licensee Quality Assurance audit of a contractor screening program A may have been deliberat i Results: The licensee was found to be in compliance with NRC requirements within the areas examined during this inspection. There was no confirmation that the security screening implementation deficiencies were deliberat !

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8709170225 8709147 1, 4 PDR ADOCK 05000331 Q PDR ,

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t DETAILS l

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1. Key Persons Contacted

  • K. Young, Assistant Plant Superintendent, Radiation Protection and Security, Duane Arnold Energy Center (DAEC)

K. Vanous, Corporate Security Director, Iowa Electric Light and Power Company (IEL&P)

  • D. Engelhardt, Security Supervisor (DAEC)

L. Willie, Assistant Security Supervisor (DAEC) +

C. Hill, Senior QA Engineer, Corporate QA Department (IEL&P)

  • J. Thorstsinson, Technical Support Engineer (DAEC)  !

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  • Denotes those key members of the licensee's staff present during the  ;

telephonic Exit Interview conducted on September 1, 1987. The names ,

j of the contractors involved are not included in the report details for ,e privacy purposes since no adverse actions of a deliberate nature were U confirmed.

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2. Exit Interview {1p 30703)

The inspector conducted a telephone exit interview with the licensee representatives denoted in Section 1 at the conclusion of the inspection on September 1, 1987. A general description of the sccpe cf the inspection was provided. Briefly listed below are the findings discusred during the exit interview. The details of these findings are referenced, as noted, in this repor Included below is a statement provided by or describing licensee management's response to the inspection finding No written material pertaining to the allegation was provided to the licensee or contractor representatives during the inspection effor The licensee representatives were advised of the information as described i in Section 3.a of the Report Details. They were also advised that no violations, unresolved items, or open items were noted during the

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inspection. Additionally, they were advised that falsification of X ,

security screening records was not confirme .

The Assistant plant Superintendent, Radiation Protection and Security, stated that he was familiar with the contractor management and personnel and was surprised to hear of the concern regarding potential record falsificatio The licensee representatives were advised that the inspection results were subject to NRC Region III management review and the final inspection report would contain the formal perspective for the inspection finding . l_ investigation / Allegation Review (IP 99014):

The following information was *eviewed by the inspector as specifically noted below:

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y a. Background: (Closed) Allegation No. RIII-83-A-0181. On March 24 -

1983, the Chief. Safeguards Section, NRC Region III received a telephone call from a Duane Arnold Energy Center (DAEC) employe The purpose of the telephone call was to advi e NRC Region III y that DAEC Corporate QA Auditors had discovered deficiencies in 4 a contractors security screening records that would require their employees' security access authorizations to be terminated until the deficiencies were resolved. The DAEC employee also stated that  !

the deficiencies might represent falsified records being submitted I to the licensee. .The information was referred to the Region III  !

Office of Investigation (01) for possible investigation. On (

February 20, 1987, the Region III OI office formally declined to ,

investigate, b. Allegation: Deficiencies found in a contractor's implementation .

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of screening might represent documents that had been falsifie c. NRC Review Actions: Between August 3 and 5, 1987, the inspector I* !

interviewed by telephone the Iowa Electric Power and Light Company i: l

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Senior QA Engineer, the Corporate Security Director, and the DAEC @4 l Assistant Security Directo '

l Interview results showed that the Senior QA Engineer was a member i of the QA audit team that performed the audit for the contractor 1 on March 23, 1983. The QA Engineer had. reviewed the audit report, based upon the inspector's request, and provided the following

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information:

l (1) Only two personnel from the contractor were badged for access to the DAEC site at the time of the audi (2) Six findings were noted during the audit. The findings pertained to (a) incomplete employment history records; (b) not all i

screening documents received by the contractor from other

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agencies were legible; (c) p;ychological test administration was not observed as required by DAEC procedure (tests were mailed to the two persons); (d) the screening procedure used by the contractor had not been submitted for DAEC formal review and approval; (e) one of the individuals had some employment data missing from October 1979 to August 1981; and (f) the contractor's procedure in use did not meet all of DAEC's screening requirement (3) The senior QA Engineer stated that the reason for the deficiencies, in her judgement, was due to the company's lack of experience and >

understanding in screening personnel for cccess to nuclear plant She further stated that tne company was created about 1981, and the March 1983 audit was the first audit they had conducted for the compan In her judgement, the company's management was cooperative and she did not feel that the deficiencies noted were deliberate in natur (4) The senior QA Engineer also stated that the two contractor employees with access to the DAEC site nad terminated employment a couple of weeks after the audit and have not been back to the

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l site since that time. Before the contractor's personnel would a !

be granted future access to the DAEC site, a complete audit of -

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their program would be performed by the QA departmen o (5) The senior QA Engineer stated that prior to January 1,1988 l (exact date unkncwn), her office will audit all contractor security screening programs on an annual basis regardless of previous audit findings. The change in audit frequency was ,

not implemented because of the contractor's audit finding ,

i The Corporate Director of Security stated during a telephone 7 interview that the site secu'ity section was advised of the contractor's audit deficiencies and directed to remove the two l persons access to the DAEC site until the issues were resolve {

He further stated that company practice requires such action when 1 an audit of a contractor's security screening program notes o j deficiencies in the progra Telephone interviews with the DAEC assistant Security Director l confirmed that the two contractor employee's access to the DAEC ]

site was removed when the site was advised of the screening l deficiencies. The two personnel were administered polygraph j examinations and passed the examination, so their access to the DAEC was reinstated. (At the time of the incident, satisfactory polygraph examination results were an authorized option for access to the plant.) The Assistant Security Director also confirmed that the two personnel completed their job assignment a few weeks after their access was reinstated and no personnel from the contractor firm have had a need to return to the site since the l A review of the March 23, 1983 Record of Conversation between the NRC Region III Chief Safeguards Section and the licensee empicyee showed that, in the judgement of the Chief, Safeguards Section, the {

licensee took adequate action to resolve the security anomal I Conclusion: Based upon the information reviewed, it does not appear as though any screening records were falsified by the i contractor. The licensee's security screening program QA audits I identified the deficienc Further, the QA audit program appears j to be effective since an audit of another contractor found similar l deficiencies during November 1986. The root cause for these  :

deficiencies was due to personnel performing the screening not ,

l having a copy of the screening procedure available for review or guidance. The deficiencies noted pertained primarily to verification of periods of employment. In both cases, the DAEC practice of denying access until audit deficit:ncies were resolved was implemented. The annual audits of contractors screening i programs should also identify future progr m deficiencies in a '

timely manner and encourage contractors to closely monitor implementation of the security screening progra . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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mO Although deficiencies in a contractor's screening program may constitut?

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a violation of the security plan, the deficiencies were fourd by the  ;

licensee, reported to the NRC, and resolved in a timely manner, i Therefore, the incident appears to meet the criteria of 10 CFR Part 2, 1 Appendix C,Section V as a licensee identified violation. No additional enforcement action apnears warranted. No programmatic or site generic weaknesses were noted since the two contractor firms were the only '

contractors audited who had deficiencies of such a scope that access i authorizations were terminate '

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