IR 05000331/1997010

Insp Rept 50-331/97-10 on 970530-0717.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maint,Engineering,Plant Support & self-assessment & Quality Verification

ML20210R410
Person / Time
Site:	Duane Arnold
Issue date:	08/15/1997
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20210R375	List: IR 05000331/1997010 ML20210R371 ML20210R393
References
50-331-97-10, NUDOCS 9709030116
Download: ML20210R410 (14)

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION lil i

Docket No: 50 331 License No: DPR 49 Report N /97010(DRP)

Licensee: IES Utilities In First Street P. O. Box 351 Cedar Rapids, IA 52406 0351 Facility: Duane Arnold Energy Center Dates: May 30 July 17,1997 Inspectors: C. Lipa, Senior Resident inspector S. DuPont, Project Engineer M. Kurth, Reactor Engineer K. Riemer, Senior Resident inspector, Dresden Approved by: Michael J. Jordan, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 5

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9709030116 970015 PDR ADOCK 05000331 0 PM ,

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Duane Arnold Energy Conter NRC Inspection Report 50 331/97010(DRP)

i This inspection _roport included regional and resident inspectors' evaluation of licensoo operations, engineerin!), maintenance, and plant suppor CRCIAll001

l The licensoo idtntiflod that an inadequate tagout resultod in a loss of secondary

containment integrity. The licensee's identification of ths issue was prompt and demonstrated a questioning attitude. The licensoe's prompt response to the event resulted in restcration of containment integrity well within the tnchnical specification recluirements. This was a non cited violatio (Soction 01.3)

The licenseo identified that operators did not comploto a post tost valvo lino up prior to declaring the Drywell Airlock operable. This was a non cited vlotatio (Section 01.4)

• The inspectors concluded that the observed self assessment activities were offectivo. (Soction 07.1)

Maintenanen

The inspectors cetermined that work activities were well controllnd, properly pro-planned, and eff ectively perforrned. This was an improvement over past problems with work plann,ng as discussed in Section MB.4. (Section M1.1)

Emergent equipment issues (reactor core isolation cooling system and moisture separator rohoator) were promptly addressed. (Section M2.1)

In September 1996 the standby diosol generator was modo inoperable due to poor work planning and inadequate work instructions. This was a violatio (Section M8.4)

Ennineerino

• Engineering supptirt for omorgent equipment issues was offectivo. Repair offorts were well coordinated between Operations, Maints ~.anco, Radiation Protection, and Engineering personnel (Section M2,1).

• During testing following a maintenance activity, the licensee identified that a spare component had nt.t boon modified as expected. The inspectors were concerned that the licensee missed an opportunity in 1995 to improvo part of the modification process. (Section f 2.1).

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Plant Bunnort o' There were elo concerns identified in the plant support are Self Assenament and Quality Verification e As discussed in Sections 01.3,07.1, and Mt.2, the inspectors determined that the I:censee was effective in identifying problems and critically evaluating corrective actions.

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flenort Deiana Summarv Li Plant Status Following a 6hutdowrs to repair a main steam ino;ation valve (MSIV) lirnit switch, the plant was brought to fell pawor on May 31,1997. With the exception of two scheduled downpower evolt$ons for turbine valve testing, the plant was operated at approximately 100 peraent power until July 17,1997. On July 17, the plant was reduced to approximately 95 poodnt power for several hours to isciate the first stage reher.t:rs to

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re@ce b vse 6th on the moisture separator reheater first stage reherter drain tan Repalt af de M:mm bek was scheduled for July 20,199 l. Onorations 01 Conduct of Operations

- M.1 Q.nDeral Comments (71707)

The intrac+rs conducted frequent reviews of plant operations. This included obso' Aig routine control room activities, performing panel walkdowns, and at.c.idmg shif t turnovers, special briefings for infrequently performed evclutions, and crew briefings. The conduct of operations was professional. The licensee routinely maintained the control room in a " blackboard" condition (no annunciators were lit): The few exceptions were promptly corrected. Noteworthy observationc are d6 tailed in the sections below.-

01.2 Grid Disturlugi in30ection Scone On June 11,1997, a 345 KV line tripped open in Wisconsin, causing a grid disturbence that dropped voltage: and increased the megavar input to the DAEC main transformer. The resultant effect raised the transformer loading to greater than rated for less than one hour, causing main transformer oil temperatures to increase slightly (1 * C). The licensee indicated that the increased oil temperatures should not cause any long term negative effects to the transformer because the c0 temperatures did not exceed the transformer design limit o Conclusions The licensee documented the incident on Action Request (AR) 971550, performed a detailed analysisi and determined that the grid disturbance had no adverse effect on the main transformer. A more detailed root cause analysis was expected from the Mid American Power Pool (MAPP) within sixty days. The inspectors considered the corrective actions to be appropriat ___

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01.3 Secondary Containment Violation Due to Inadanuate Tacout pection ScoDa On June 24,1997, during a maintenance activity on valve CV35048, the licensee determined that the activity caused secondary containment to be inoperable. The licensee notified the NRC within four hours according to 10 CFR 50.72 and planned to submit a Licensee Event Report (LER) within thirty days. The inspectors reviewed applicable drawings, procedures, and tagouts and interviewed maintenance personnel, Observations and Findinas During maintenance on CV35048, drain valve to waste sludge tank, the valve

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internals were removed, which created an opening larger than allowed to maintain secondary containment integrity. The involved rnalntenance technicians and radiological protection technician noticed altflow and immediately contacted operations personnel. The licensee entered a one hour limiting condition for operation (LCO) according to technical specification 3.7.A.1.b, notified maintenance personnel to reassemble the valve, and initiated AR 971678. The LCO was exited within twenty minutes. The inspoctor reviewed the tagout procedure for the rework and determined it to be inadequate. The valve lineup had failed to properly isolate the line. Corrective actions included revision to the tagout process to require a review by engineering personnel of secondary containment integrity and performing a root cause analysis. The inspectors considered the corrective actions to be appropriat c. Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the licensee demonstrated a good questioning attitude and properly contacted Operations when air was found to be blowing out of the valve. These actions crian'ed operations personnel to promptly respond to the event and restore containment integrity within the TS LCO allowed duratio The tagout was inadequate by not preventing the violation of secondary containment. This non-repetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a Non Cited Violation, consistent with Section Vil.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (50 331/97010-01(DRP)).

01.4 Inadeouate Oooratione Close qui.flayiew of Surveillanca insoection Scone On May 27,1997, the licensee completed Surveillance Test Procedure (STP)

47A004, "Drywell Airlock Local Leak Rate Test," however, the " Post STP Completion Valve Line-up" was not completed prior to declaring the airlock operable. The inspectors reviewed the TS reautrements, STP requirements, and discussed the specifics of the event with operations personne .

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l Observatig,ns and Findinas On May 29,1997, the incomplete STP was discovered by maintenance department personnel during a subsequent review. The valve line up was performed satisfactorily and no valves were found out of position. Action Request 971517, written to document the occurrence, was closed following counseling of the individuals involved. Also, a note was placed in the Shift Orders to make others aware of the incident, Conclusions The inspectors verified that the airlock operability was not affected by the erro The failure to perform the entire STP was a violation of TS 6.8.1 which states that approved procedures will be followed. This non repetitive, licensee identified and corrected violation is being treated as a Non Cited Violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (50 331/97010-02(DRP)).

02 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment 02.1 Enoineered Safety Feature (ESP) System Walkdowns (71707)

The inspectors used inspection Procedure 71707 to walk down accessible portions of the following ESF systems:

e standby diesel generator o emergency service water o residual heat removal service water (RHRSW)

Equipment operability, mater'el condition, and housekeeping were acceptable in all cases. Minor discrepancies were brought to the licensee's attention and were corrected. .The inspectors identified no substantive concerns as a result of these walkdown Quality Assurance in Operations l

07.1 Licensee Self Assessment Activities Insoection Scone During the inspection period, the inspectors reviewed multiple licensee self-assessment activities, including:

o Safety Committee Meeting e Operations Committee Meetings e Action Requost (AR) Screening Meetings

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j b, Observations and Findinas The inspectors observed ngorous reviews of root cause analyses presented to the committees. There was activo management participation at the meetings, identified deficiencies woro being tracked by the licensee's An process, Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the self assessment activitios observod were effectivo, ll. Maintenanen M1 Conduct of Molntenance M1.1 General comments Insoection Scone (62707) (61726)

The inspectors observed or reviewed all or portions of the following work activities:

• Standby diesel generator monthly surveillance, STP 48A001 M e Rod block monitor functional tost, STP 42C002 0

• Standby filter unit monthly test, STP 47 LOO 1 M e Local power range monitor (LPRM) calibration

• Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) pump maintenance Observations and Findinns An RHRSW maintenance " window" was planned in advance for pump coupling replacement, pump repack, and automatic vent repair. The maintenanco resulted in improved performance of the system while the licenseo maintained system unavailability tirne well within goals. The inspectors concluded that the planning and maintenance were well controlled and effective. This represented an improvement over past problems with work planning as discussed in Section M Other maintenance and surveillance activitios were also performed satisfactoril The inspectors observed proper procedure usage and sound maintenance practice Conclusions The inspectors concluded that work activities were well controlled, properly pro-planned, and offectively performe l

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M1.2 Inadeousto Tgchnical Soecification (TS) Reaulted Surveillances insocction Scong_(61726)

During the inspection period, the licenseo identified throo cases where TS survoillance requirements woro not properly completod. The inspectors reviewod the TS requirements, interim corrective actions, proposed long term correctivo actions, and results of revised testing. Tho inspectors verified that applicablo limiting conditions for operation (LCO) were mo Observations and Findinas The licensee had initiated a review of the improved Technical Specification (ITS)

swvoillance requirements as part of the project to implement ITS by December 1997. Through this effort, the licensee identified three casos where current surveillance test procedures did not moet the Current Technical Specification (CTS)

requiromonts. In each caso, the licensee corrected the surveillance proceduro, re-performod the tost, and mot the TS requirements. The licensoo also initiated an AR. The licensoe completed the testing where possible on-line, revised a test procedure to test at the next opportunity, and planned to report the issues according to 10 CFR 50.7 The three cases are described below:

On May 30,1997, the licenseo identified that the high pressure coolant injection steam leak detection time deley relay had not boon properly testod as required by TS Table 4.2 A. The STP was revised and the testing was promptly completed satisfactorily. (AR 971650 and LER 50 331/97 06)

• On June 24,1997, the licensoo identified that the modo switch to shutdown rod block logic had not been tested to assure that each of two channels provided a rod block as required by TS Tables 3.2 C and 4.2 C. The test that was performed ensured that a rod block was locoived when the modo switch was positioned to " shutdown," but did not test each channel independently. The function is required in modes 3 ond 4 (hot shutdown and cold shutdown). The licensee tagged the mode switch and plans to perform the testing at the next shutdown. (AR 971744)

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On June 25,1997, the licensoo identified that iod block monitor testing had not tested the multiplexing system input as required by TS Tablo 4.2 C, note (c). The licensee initiated AR 971308 and revised STP 42C002 0 to perform additional testing of 1) the local power range monitors (LPRM) count I circuit,2) the no-rod selected inputs, and 3) the edge-rod selected input. At l

the end of the inspection period, the test results were under review by the '

licensee to determino past operability of the rod block monitor. (AR 971821)

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. '. Conclualons The inspectors concluded that the licensee demonstrated effective self assessment in identifying the issues discussed above. This is considered an unresolved item (URI) pending further inspector review of 1) the significance of the findings. 2) the duration of missed surveHlances, and 3) the results of testing, when performed (50-331/97010-03(DRP)).

i M2 Maintenance and Materiel Condition of Facilities and Equipment l M2.1 Plant Materiel Condition I insoection Scone The inspectors noted that there were two emergent equipment issues during the inspection period in each case, the inspectors observed appropriate licensee

- response to repair and to determine root cause. The examples are listed below:

e The licensee identified a steam leak on a reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC)

flange. The repair required a short entry into an LCO to complete. The inspectors observed that the evolution was well coordinated between department '

• During monthly inspections of steam areas, the licensee identified a leak on a manway cover for moisture separator reheater first stage reheater drain tank (IT 91 A). This was promptly evaluated and plans were made to repair the leak on July 20. The inspectors observed several planning meetings and noted that planning was well coordinated between Engineering, Operations, Maintenance, and Radiation Protection departments, Conclusions -

The inspectors concluded that repair efforts were prompt and well:;oordinated between Operations, Maintenance, Radiation Protection, and Engineering departments. Engineering support for emergent equipment issues was effectiv M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues (92902)

M8.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Reoort (LER) 50 331/95006; "B" Division group llt isolation due to a Failed Fuel Pool Radiati on Monitor. The licensee determined that a failed capacitor across the input to the radiation inonitor power supply was the cause. A replacement power supply was installed and the radiation monitor was

- returned to service - The inspector determined that the corrective actions were appropriate and that the failure was an isolated event. This LER is close M8.2 (Closed) insoection Followuo item (IFI) 50 331/95006-021 DisassemNed Supports on RCIC Piping. The inspectors verified that the supports discussed ir, inspection Report (IR) 50 331/95006 were properly corrected. The inspectors also concluded,

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after review of past records and observation of HPCI runs, that the bent discharge pressure gage needle was the resuit of a past event. This item is closo M8.3 (Closed) LER 50 331/95007: Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Turbine Trip Caused by Porssnnel Error. On July 25,1995, a technician caused the turbino trip while installing a relay block during a surveillanco test. The licensoo's corrective actions included evaluating the rnothod of installing the relay blocks, improvements were implemented in the relay block guidelino. The inspectors determined that the corrective actions were appropriate. This LER is close M8.4 Closed) Unresolved item 50 331/96006S31 Standby Dlosol Generator (SBDG)

Inoperable as a Result of Molntenance. This occurred on September 3,1996. The inspectors had no substantive concerns with the licensee's short term corrective actions as documented in IR 50 331/96 006. The inspectors subsequently reviewed the licensoe's root cause analysis and long torrn corrective actions. The

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inspectors concluded that the root cause analysis and long term co active actions were thorough. The licensee's long term corrective actions included the following l

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items: Maintenanco Directive (MD) 20 was revised to require rework evaluations

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on all equipment that is important to plant safety; plant management implomonted a plant wide standdown on September 19,1996, to discuss human performanco events and management expectations; procedure l.SE E158 001, " Electro-Mechano, Spood Element / Speed Indicator Models 10< 25, .vas revised to reflect performing the calibration for the speed indicator with the engino running:

procedure l.SS S519 001, "Syncro-Start Products, Spood Switch, Serps G 2," was

{ revised to clarify instructions for calibration of the speed switch; and training was

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conducted with maintenanco personnel concerning the issu A review of the inspection record revealed multiple prior inspection reports that documented NRC concerns with similar examples of work planning / execution errors and human performanco events. Inspection Reports 50 331/95 008,95 000,95-011, and 96 003 all documented examples of NRC conct a with weak work planning activitlos. Inspection Reports 50 331/95 013 a V 96 002 documented NRC concerns with human performanco and inattention 1: detailissue Additionally, the licensee's review of the above event identified soveral potential opportunities to have prevented its occurrence. The failure of correctivo maintenance action request (CMAR) A27938A to provide adequate instructions to appropriately perform the speed switch calibration constitutes a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1, which required that appropriate procedures for corrective maintenance operations that would have an effect on the nuclear safety of the facility be prepared and implomonted (50-331/97010-04(DRP)). However, no response to this violation is required since the licensee has already provided information ro0arding the reason for the violation, the corrective action taken, and complianco has been established, as described above. Unresolved item 50-331/96006 03 is close _

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lil_Ennineerina E1 Conduct of Engineering insoection Sqnge (37551)

The inspectors evaluated the involvement of engineering personnel in resolution of emergent material condition problems and other routine activities. The inspectors reviewed areas such as operability evaluations, root cause analyses, safety committees, and self assessments. The effectiveness of the licensee's controls for the identification, resolution, and prevention of problems was also examine \

E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment E Control of Warehouse Sentes that Reauire ModificationL insoection Scone During post maintenance testing, the licensee identified that a modification that had

- been performed on an installed component had not been completed on the " spare."

As a result, the LCO for the maintenance activity expired and another LCO was entered to close and block drywell vent and purge valves. The inspectors verified that applicable TS requirements were met and followed up on the similarity to another issue with a spare component from 1995, .Qbservations and Findinga During routine preventive maintenance, the licensee replaced the off gas radiation monitor drawer. After replacement, the post maintenance testing determined that it had not been modified in accordance with Design Change Package (DCP) 1377 in 1987. The drawer was subsequently replaced with a properly modified drawer and it was satisfactorily tested. Subsequently, the licensee initiated an AR, reviewed other installed drawers, and determined that there were no additional problem Additionally, warehouse stock was evaluated and labelled to prevent inadvertent installation of unmodified spare component The inspectors were concerned that this issue was similar to an issue from 1990 in which an unmodified spare feedwater controller was installed and this condition was not detected until a water level transient occurred following a scram. In that case, a feedwater regulating valve locked up due to the lack of an installed resisto (See IR 50 331/95004 for details.) In 1995, the licensee reviewed other controllers for necessary modifications; however, there was no effort initiated to revise the modification process to prevent unmodified parts from being installed in the plant until a self assessment in 1997. As a result of the self assessment, the licensee added a step to the modification process that requires tagging items in the warehouse which require modification prior to installation in the plan _ - - _ _ _ - - _ - - - _ - - - _ - - _ _ _ _ _ - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - _ _ .

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The revised modification process is focussed on future modifications and does not

" assure that part modifications have been installed on all warehouse spares. The inspectors were concerned that the licensee missed an opportunity in 1995 to improve the modification process to address modificatica to warehouse spare The licensee in addressing the AR had established a solutions team and was evaluating the need for additional efforts to prevent unmodified spares from being

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Installed in the plant in the future. The inspectors had no further concerns as this problem la being addressed by the licensees corrective action progra !

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LV Plant D99911 t

] S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguard Activities i

S Insttentlig_Sagurity Guard jicona i i

On June 16,1997, the licensee identified that a member of the security force, i posted as a compensatory measure, was observed to be inattentive to duties. The

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licensee reported the event according to 10 CFR 73.71 and initiated Action Request ,

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(AR) 97160). The licensee also inspected the barrier and determined that no unauthorized ontry had occurred.

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The inspectms discussed the event with the Region lli physical security inspector

who will review corrective actions during the next routin9 security inspectio Pending additionalinspection of the event, this is an unresolved item (URI)

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i V. Manaaement Meg 11ngs X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on July 17,1997. The licensee acknowledged the findings presente The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection 75ould be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identifie ,

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I PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED LicentAR J. Franz, Vice President Nuclear l

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G. Van Middlesworth, Plant Manager R. Anderson, Manager, Outage end Support

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J. Bjorseth, Maintenance Superintendent I

D. Curtland, Operations Manager l R. Hite, Manager, Radiation Protection M. McDermot, Manager, Engineering K. Peveler, Maneger, Regulatory Performance l INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED I

IP 37551: Onsite Engineering IP 61726: Surveillance Observation IP 62707: Maintenance Observation IP 71707: Plant Operations IP 71750: Plant Support IP 92700: Onsite Followup of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor Facilities IP 92901: Followup - Operations IP 92902: Followup Engineering IP 92903: Followup - Maintenance ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED Opened 50-331/97010-01 NCV Secondary Containment Violation 50 331/97010-02 NCV Failure to Perform Post STP Valve Lineup 50-331/97010 03 URI Failure to Properly Perform TS Required Surveillances 50-331/97010-04 NOV Maintenance on Emergency Diesel Generator Renders Eauipment Inoperable 50 331/97010 05 URI Inattentive Security Guard Closed 50-331/95006-00 LER Group IllIsolation Due to a Failed Fuel Pool Radiation Monitor 50 331/95006-02 IFl Disassembled Supports on RCIC Piping 50-331/95007-00 LER RCIC Turbine Trip Caused by Personnel Error 50-331/96006 03 URI SBDG Inoperable as Result of Maintenance

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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

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- AR - -- Action Request .

=CMAR Corrective Maintenance Action Request-CTS- : Curred Technical Specifications DAEC Duane Arnold Energy Center DCP Design change package DRP Division of Reactor Projects IFl- Inspection followup item IR inspection report ITS improved Technical Specifications KV Kilovolts-r LCO Limiting Condition for Operatloa LER Licensee Event Report

- LPRM - Local power range monitors MAPP Mid American Power Pool MD Maintenance Directive NCV Non-cited violation  ;

NOV- Notice of Violation _

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NRC; Nuclear Regulatory Commission RCIC Reactor Core Isolation Cooling RHRSW Residual heat removal service water

.STP Surveillance Test Procedure TS Technical Specification URI Unrasolved item

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