IR 05000327/1997300
| ML20202H195 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 02/05/1998 |
| From: | Peebles T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Zeringue O TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| References | |
| 50-327-97-300, 50-328-97-300, NUDOCS 9802200319 | |
| Download: ML20202H195 (18) | |
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FEBRUARY 5, 1998
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Tennessee Valley Authority'
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- ATTN:
Mr. 0. J.-Zeringue Chief Nuclear Officer and ---
. Executive Vice President 6A Lookout Place-1101 Market Street Chattancaga,)TN 37402-2801
- SUBJECT:
MEETING SUMMARY - TO DISCUSS SEQUOYAH'0PERATOR LICENSING-EXAMINATION REPORT NOS.. 50-327/97-300 AND 50-328/97 300
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Dear;Mr. Zeringue:
-This letter refers to the management meeting conducted at our. request at the
. Region II' office' January 21.-1998.
The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the'results your recent operator licensing examination and your operator licensing training program.
'The first enclosure is a. listing of amended paragraphs of the associated examination report, numbers 50-327/97-300 and 50-328/97-300.
These changes were' discussed during the meeting.
The second enclosure-is your handout for-
-the meeting.-
It is our opinion that this meeting was beneficial'and provided -
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a better understanding of TVA's activities associated with the Sequoyah
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facility.
In accordance with-Section-2.790(a) of-the NRC'.s " Rules of Practice," Part 2.
- Title 10. Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and its enclosures will be placed in the NRC Public Document' Room.
.Should you-have any questions concerning this meeting, please contact us.
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Sincerely
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ORIGINE SIGNED BY
'IHCHAS PEERLES
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Thomas A. Peebles. Chief Operator Licensing and Human Performance Branch f
Division of Reactor Safety g
I Docket Nos.:50-327. 50-328
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d,.*J License Nos. DPR-77. DPR-79 5"Q J ~ Acvs l
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Enclosures:
(See page 2)
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Enclosuresi.
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Amended paragraphs for Examination Report Nos.
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50-327/97-300 and 50-328/97-300 s
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Licensee-Presentation Handouts 3.; List of-AttendeesL-
- cc w/encls:
-0.'J. Zeringue. Senior.Vice-President -
Nuclear Operations-
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-Tennessee Valley: Authority t.
6A1 Lookout Place
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1101 Market Street iChattanooga.: TN: 37402-2801
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' Jack An Bailey. Vice President
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p Engineering and-Technical Services-
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- Tennessee Valley Authority
6A Lookout Place
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- 1101 Market-Street Chattanooga TN-37402-2801
'Masoud Bajestani tSite Vice President
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'Sequoyah Nuclear Plant
- Tennessee Valley Authority.
- P. 0.
- Box 2000 Soddy Daisy.LTN.137379
,-Ceneral: Counsel-Tennessee' Valley Authority ET 10H-400 West Summit-Hill: Drive 1 Knoxville. TNE37902-
"Raul R.; Baron. General Manager Nuclear Assurance Tennessee Valle 4J Blue Ridge; y Authority
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11101= Market Street Chattanooga. TN-37402-2801
.-Mark J. Burzynski.-Manager-
- Nuclear Licensing'
rTennessee Valley Authority 4J' Blue 11dge
- 1101 Market. Street 2
, Chattanooga. TN 37402-2801
.a-(cc w/cncis cont'd'--See page 3)
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(cc w/encls cont'd)-
Pedro Salas. Manager-Licensing and Industry Affairs Sequoyah Nuclear P1 ant Tennessee Valley Authority P..O. Box 2000 Soddy-Daisy. TN 37379
'J. T. Herron. Plant Manager Sequoyah Nuclear Plant-Tennessee Valley Authority
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P. O. Box 2000-Soddy Daisy.-TN 37379-
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Michaal H. Mobley. Director Division of Radiological Health
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3rd Floor. L and C Annex 401 Church Street Nashville. TN 37243-1532
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County Executive Hemilton County Courthouse
' Chattanooga TN 37402 Distribution w/encls:
J. R.: Johnson.- RII
.M. S. Lesser. RII
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P.= A. Taylor. : RII
R. W. Hernan. NRR-F. Hebdon.-NRR-H. L. Whitener. RII C.-F. Smith, RII~
E. D. Testa. RII D H. Thompson RII-L. S. Mellen RII
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PUBLIC
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NRC Resident Inspector; Operations-U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1260 Nuclear Plant Road
Spring City. TN 37381 i
'NRC Resident Inspector Se U.quoyah Nuclear Plant
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S, Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2600 Igou! Ferry Road-Soddy-Daisy. TN 37379 ortzca azzions muscar azz,cas_
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OPERATOR LICENSING EXAMINATION REPORT NOS. 50-327/97-300 AND 50-328/97-300 AMENDED AS FOLLOWS
Examination Report Section 05.1 Initial Doerator Licensino Examinations.
Doeratina Test, b)
AS ORIGINALLY SENT In another case. the RO candidates were required to parallel and lcad a DG.
After paralleling the DG the candidates were faced with a low lube oil pressure annunciator. The DG should automatically trip in this condition.
The candidates chose to pull out the annunciator response arocedure and read the appropriate steps delaying emergency stopaing of the E.
The candidates had previously read the precaution statement w11ch stated. " Operating the Diesel engine with < 40 psi lube oil pressure ^could damage the eng'ne." The candidates did not take prompt manual corrective action upon failure of an
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automatic protective function.
AS AMENDED In another case, the R0 candidates were required to parallel and load a DG.
~After paralleling the DG, the candidates were faced with a low lube oil pressure annunciator. The DG alarm should have initiated at <40 psi and should have automatically trip)ed when pressure decreased to < 20 psi. The candidates chose to pull out tle annunciator response 3rocedure and read the appropriate steps delaying emergency stop)ing of the E.
The candidates had previously read the orecaution statement w11ch stated " Operating the Diesel engine with < 40 psi lube oil pressure could damage the engine." The candidates did not take prompt manual corrective action. The annunciator
- response procedure directed the DG be shutdown and local. conditions verified.
Examination Report Section 05.1 Initial Doerator Licensino Exammations.
Doeratinc lest, b)
AS ORIGINALLY SENT b.
Observations and Findinas
.The Emergency Operating Procedure (E0P) E-0, " Reactor Trip or Safety Injection", does not allow operators to control AFW flow until step 14. At Sequoyah, the Turbine Driven (TD)-AFW flow control valves fail open, causing S/G levels to rise uncontrollably until step 14 of E-0 is reached and the operators can take control.
During a S/G tube rupture scenario, the problem is multi)1ied because the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) is adding water t1 rough the tube break.
In one case, the candidates filled the S/G solid and were pumping water out the atmospheric dump valves (ADV). This is an undesirable situation.
If the ADV were to fail, the contents of the S/G and RCS would be released to the environment via an unisolable path.
During a LOCA ENCLOSURE 1
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2-OPERATOR LICENSING EXAMINATION REPORT NOS.
50-327/97 300 AND 50 328/97 300 AMENDED AS FOLLOWS
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scenario, the candidates also had difficulty reaching step 14.
Earlier in the scenario, they had transitioned out of E 0 and were subsequently required to transition to FR-Z.1. "High Containment Pressure" -due to the high containment pressure created by the LOCA.
During this event. the operating crew also filled the S/G solid.
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of the complicating factors in the desiga of the E0Ps is that they are based on the Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG) guidelines, which assume automatic level control for the AFW valves.
The WOG does not require the operators to check AFW flow until step.6 because
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overfilling is not a concern with automatic level control.
Additionaliy. the E0P users guide does not provide guidance to allow o)erators to secure AFW to a ruptured or faulted S/G.
In the ccse of
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t1e faulted S/G. this could lead to increased cooldown. increased containment pressure. and an increased oersonnel hazard if the creak is outside of containment.
Feedback fo'rms provided by o>erators during requalification scenarios also indicate they are laving difficulty controlling AFW flow and preventing overfill of the S/Gs.
AS AMENDED b.
Observations and Findinos
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The Emergency Operating Procedure (E0P) E-0. " Reactor Trip or Safety Injection" does not allow operators to control AFW flow until step 14. At Sequoyah, the Turbine Drivs.n (TD)-/JW flow control valves fail open, causing S/G levels to rise uncontrollably until step 14 of E-0 is reached and the operators can take control.
During a S/G tube rupture scenario the problem is multi)1ied because the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) is adding water t1 rough the tube break.-
In one case. the control roon, indications showed that the candidates filled the S/G and the rapid opening and closing of the atmosphe. M dump valves (ADV) showed they were close to releasing water. This is an undesirable situation.
If the ADV were to fail, the contents of the
.S/G and RCS would be released to the environment via an unisolable path.
During a LOCA scenario, the candidates also had difficulty reaching step 14.
Earlier in the scenario, they had transitioned out of E-0 and were subsequently required to transition to FR-Z.1. "High Containment Pressure", due to the ligh containment pressure created by
'the LOCA.
During this event, the control room indications also showed that the candidates filled the S/G. One of th complicating factors in the design of the E0Ps. is that they are based on the Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG) guidelines, which assume automatic level control for the AFW valves.
The WOG does not require the operators to check AFW flow until step 16 because overfilling is not a concern with automatic level control.
Additionally, the E0P users guide does not provide guidance to allow opel tors to secure AFW to a ruptured or ENCLOSURE 1
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OPERATOR. LICENSING EXAMINATION REPORT NOS.- 50-327/97-300 AND 50-328/97-300 fMENDED AS FOLLOWS'
faulted S/G, In.the case of the faulted S/G. this could lead to-increased cooldown.- increased containment pressure, and an increased personnel hazard if the brec.-is outside of containment.. Feedback
' forms provided by operators during requalification scenarios also indicate they are having difficulty controlling AFW flow and preventing overfill _of the S/Gs,
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ENCLOSURE 1
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s Agenda Opening. Remarks M.' Bajestani
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Inspection Report Findings
.J. S. Summy
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Investigation Approach J. S. Summy
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Root Cause/ Contributing Factors J. S. Summy
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Corrective Actions J. S. Summy
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Discussion of Specific Issues and W. W. Hunt
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Corrective Actions
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Closing Remarks M. Bajestani-
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Opening Remarks Overview of Lessons Learned
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L Measures for Increasing Management Involvement in Training
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Measures for Strengthening Operator Training Program
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Inspection Report Findings NRC Pleased With Initial Examination Submittal-
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Quality of the Operator License Candidates
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- Poor performance demonstrated in all examination areas
- Unusually high failure rate on the written examination
- Senior reactor operator (SRO) upgrade candidates performance o.n walkthroughs Quality of Audit Examination and Remediation Processes
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- Discriminatory value of the audit examination did not meet current standards
- Candidate allowed to take second audit examination with no remediation Summy
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Investigation Approach Detailed Event Critique Performed
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- Integrated team (8 people - 3 weeks)
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- Various analysis techniques employed Barrier Analysis
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.- Change Analysis
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Interviews
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Summy
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Investigation Approach (Continued)
Assessmentof Training Programs
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- Self assessment using NRC Inspection Procedure 41500, " Training and Qualification Effectiveness" and NUREG 1220, " Training Review Criteria and Procedures" Analyzed accredited training programs including Initial Operator License
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Training Program
- Conducted by line organization (11 people - 3 weeks)
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Root Cause/ Contributing Factors
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Event Critique
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- Root cause Ineffective change management
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- Contributing factors Initial Operator License Training personnel continued business
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as usual Test writers overly concerned about test security
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Training more concerned about test development than potential
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impact to candidates
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Findings of Training Programs Assessment
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- Overall programs acceptable
- Training on administrative processes for RO/SRO programs
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did not fully address incumbent needs Summy
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s Corrective Actions Further Increase Management Oversight of Training
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- Training Advisory Board.
- Monthly Training Effectiveness Report Upgrade of the Initial Operator License. Training Program
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- Provide following trt.ining to Training Staff Higher cognitive level question construction
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Ensuring all distracters are plausible
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- Training Staff to attend NRC workshop on questien development-
- Upgrade examination bank questions to meet current standards
- Construct subsequent audit examinations to current standards Summy
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Corrective Actions (Continued)
Upgrade the Operator License Training Program with R.espect
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to Administrative Processes
- Validation of task analysis
- Change from primarily self study to classroom instruction Develop and Implement TVAN Administrative Process
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Related to Administration and Security ofInitial Operator
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License Examinations
- Technical validation of examination
- Time validation of exadlination Evaluated Performance of Job Performance Measures by Initial
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Operator License Candidates Against Operator Performance in Requalification summy
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Discussion of SpecificIssues and Corrective Actions Rod Insertion Limit Relation to Shutdown Margin
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Diesel Generator Operation
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Comrol of Reactor Coolant System Inventory
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Control of Auxiliary Feedwater
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Senior Reactor Operator Upgrade Performance on Specific
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Reactor Operator Tasks Candidate Allowed to Take Second Audit Examination
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Closing Remarks
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Broad and Detailed Examination of Problems
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Comprehensive Measures Established
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Increasing ManagementInvolvement
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LIST OF ATTENDEES EC
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B. Hallett, Acting Deputy Regional Administrator, Region II (Rll)
J, Munro, Senior Reactor Engineer, Operator Licensing Branch. Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)
C, Casto, Deauty Director, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS), Ri!
M. Lesser, C11ef, Reactor Projects Branch 6. Division of Reactor Projects (DRPL Ril T. Peebles, Chief, Operator Licensing and Human Performance (0LHP) Branch, DRS, Ril H. Shannon, Senior Resident InsSector Branch 6. Sequoyah, DRP, RII R, Baldwin. Operator Licensing Examiner, OLHP Branch, DRS, Rif M. Ernstes Operator Licensing Examiner, OLHP Branch, DRS, Ril
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P. Harmon. Operator Licensing Examiner, OLHP Branch, DRS, Ril
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G. Hopper, Operator Licensing Examiner, OLHP Branch, DRS, Ril
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,. L. Hellen. Operator Licensing Examiner, OLHP Branch, DRS, Rll D. Payne. Operator Licensing Examiner, OLHP Branch. DRS, Ril h Smith, Senior Reactor Inspector, OLHP Branch, DRS, Ril
- P, Steiner, Operstor Licensing Examiner, OLHP Branch, DRS, RII
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IB H, Bajestani, Vice President Sequoyah Site-J. Summy. Assistant Plant Manager P. Salas, Manager Site Licensing
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R. Driscoll, Training Nanager W. Hunt, Operations Training Manager H. Butterworth, Operations Manager
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ENCLOSURE 3
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