IR 05000327/1991003
| ML20217B854 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 02/21/1991 |
| From: | Harmon P, Little W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20217B840 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-327-91-03, 50-327-91-3, 50-328-91-03, 50-328-91-3, NUDOCS 9103120253 | |
| Download: ML20217B854 (3) | |
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Report Nos.: 50-327/91-03 and 50-328/91-03 Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority 6t! 38A Lookout Place 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 Docket Nos.: 50-327 and 50-328 License Nos.: OPR-77 and DPR-79 Facility Name: Sequoyah Units 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: January 5, 199J - February, 5, 1991 Lead Inspector I '
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aP. Harmon, Senior Resident Inspector Opte Sfgned Inspector: Sec'.t ,Shaeffer, Res{ dent Inspector ,
Approved by: [
W. 5./Little, Chief, Project Section 1 j 4//
Dnte Signed ~
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TVA Projects SUMMARY Scope:
This announced inspection involved inspection effort by the Resident Inspectors in the area of operational safety verification including control room observations, operations performance, system lineups, radiation protection, safeguards, and conditions adverse to quality. Other areas inspected included surveillance testing observations, maintenance observations, review of previous inspection findings, follow-up of events, review of licensee identified items, and review of inspector follow-up item Results:
No violations were identifie One unresolved item was identified, pertaining to the adequacy of an event report 11-90-119, Near Miss To Entry Into a Mode Without Meeting the Conditions of an Associated.LCO. This event report detailed the circumstances surrounding the removal of a snubber from a section of RHR line without proper configura-tion contro The report did not fully address all aspects of the proble This URI is described in paragraph PDR ADOCK 05000327 o PDR
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The areas of Operations,- Maintenance, and Surveillance were- adequcte and fully capable to support current plant operations. The observed activities of the control room operators were professional and well execute Plant material conditions were observed to be excellent during daily tours
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REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees J. Bynum, Vice ' President, Nuclear Power Production
- J. Wilson, Site Vice' President W. Byrd, Manager, Project Controls / Financial Officer
- C. Vondra, Plant Manager
- R. Beecken, Maintenance Manager L. Bryant, Work Control ' Superintendent
- Cooper, Site Licensing Manager
- T. Flippo, Quality Assurance Manager J. Gates, Technical Support Manager
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- C, Kent, Radiological Control Manager W. Lagergren,.Jr., Operations Manager '
M. Lorek, Operations Superintendent R. Lumpkin, Site Quality Manager
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- M. Meade, Compliance Engineer
- R.~Proffitt, Compliance Licensing Manager R. Rogers, Technical Support Program Manager
- P. Trudel, Project Engineer R. Thompson, Licensing Engineer C. Whittemore, Licensing Engineer NRC Employees B. A. Wilson, Chief TVA Projects '
- W. .S. Little, Chief, Project Section 1
- Attended exit interview
. Acronyms and .initialisms used in this report are listed in-'the last
. paragraph, Operational Safety Verification (71707) Control Room Observations The inspectors conducted discussions with control room operators, verified that proper control room staffing was maintained, verified that access to the control room was properly controlled, and that operator attentiveness was commensurate with the plant configuration and plant activities in progress, and with on-going control room operations. The operators were observed adhering to appropriate, approved procedures, including Emergency Operating Procedures, for the on-going activities. The inspectors observed upper management in the control room on a number of occasion L
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The inspector verified that the licensee was operating the plant in a normal plant configuration as required by TS and when abnormal conditions existed, that the operators were complying with the appropriate LC0 action statements. The inspector verified that RCS leak rate calculations were performed and that leakt,e rates were within the TS limit The inspectors observed instrumentation and recorder traces for abnormalities and verified the status of selected control room annunciators to ensure that control room operators understood the status of the plant. Panel indications were reviewed for the nuclear instruments, the emergency power sources, the safety parameter display system and the radiation monitors to ensure operability and operation within TS limit The inspectors questioned operators closely regarding alarms, maintenance stickers and system status. Operators had exhibited less than adequate attention in previous discussions in this area. During interviews in this reporting period, each operator and each crew was well aware of all aspects of plant and system statu Formality in conmunications was observed to be improving. This area i
had been shown to be deficient in several instances in the past. The most notable example was during a reactor trip on November 23, 1990, when command and control and communications among operating crew members resulted in a preventable reactor tri Operations management has initiated several improvement processes that appear to be having a positive effect on control room communication This area will be followed closely in future inspection No violations or deviations were identife b. Control Room Logs The inspectors observed control room operations and reviewed applicable logs including the shift logs, operating orders, night order book, clearance hold order book, and configuration log to obtain information concerning operating trends and activities. The l TACF log was reviewed to verify that the use of jumpers and lifted l leads causing equipment to be inoperable was clearly noted and understoo The licensee is actively pursuing correction to conditions requiring TACF No issues were identified with these specific log Plant secondary chemistry reports were reviewed. The inspector verified that primary plant chemistry was within TS limit The implementation of the licensee's sampling program was observe Plant specific monitoring systems including seismic, meteorological and fire detection indications were reviewed for operabilit A review of surveillance records and tagout logs was performed to confirm the operability of the RP .
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3 I No violations or deviations were identified, c. System Alignment The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the Auxiliary Faejwater System on Unit 2 to verify operability, flow path, water supply, power supply, and proper valve and breaker alignment. The inspectors verified that a selected portion of the containment isolation lineup was correc No deviations or violations were identifie Plant Tours Tours of the diesel generator, auxiliary, control, and turbine buildings, and exterior areas were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, potential fire hazards, control of ignition-sources, fluid leaks, excessive vibrations, missile hazards and plant !
housekeeping and cleanliness condition The plant was observed to be clean and in adequate condition. The inspectors verified that maintenance work orders- had been submitted as required and that followup activities and prioritization of work was accomplished by the license Plant material conditions and housekeeping status were good in most areas and excellent in several. Recent " Field Day" group cleanup efforts initiated by the Plant Manager removed trash and debris left over from the recent refueling outages, and resulted in a clean, well-maintained appearance throughout the plant. The large number of ladders throughout the plant indicates more effort should be applied to removing these items as soon as possible after work is finished, or building permanent ladders where continuous need is . obvious. The plant manager stated that efforts were underway to remove or replace ladders and to identify ladders in continuous us The inspector visually inspected the major components for leakage, proper lubrication, cooling water supply, and any general condition that might prevent fulfilling their functional requirement The inspector observed shift turnovers and determined that necessary information concerning the plant systems status was addresse No violations or deviations were identifie Radiation Protection The inspectors observed HP practices and verified the implementation of radiation protection control On a regular basis, RWPs were reviewed and specific work activities were monitored to ensure the activities were being conducted in accordance with the applicable
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RWP Workers were observed for proper frisking upon exiting contaminated areas and the radiologically controlled area. Selected radiation protection instruments were verified operable and calibration frequencies were reviewe The licensee has lowered the goal for reclaimable contaminated areas to 5% from the INP0 recommended goal of 10%. Presently, approxi-mately 6.8% of plant space is contaminate No violations or deviations were identified, Safeguards Inspection In the course of the monthly activities, the inspectors included a review of the licensee's physical security program. The performance of various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of daily activities including protected and vital area access controls, searching of personnel and packages, escorting of visitors, badge issuance and retrieval, and patrols and compensatory post The inspectors observed protected area lighting, -and protected and vital area barrier integrit The inspectors verified interfaces between the security organization and both operatior.s and main-tenanc The Resident Inspectors witnessed firearms training and qualification, interviewed individuals with security concerns, visited the central alarm station, and verified protection of Safeguards Informatio No violations or deviations were identified, Conditions Adverse to Quality The inspectors reviewed selected items to determine that the licensee's problem identification system as defined in Site Standard Practice SSP-3.2, Problem Reporting, Evaluation, and Corrective Action, was functioning. CAQR's were routinely reviewed for adequacy in addressing a problem or even A sample of the following documents were reviewed for adequate handing:
- Work Requests
- Conditions Adverse to Quality, CAQRs
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Radiological Incident Reports
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Problem Evaluation Reports
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Correct-on-the-Spot Documents
- Licensee Event Reports Of the items reviewed, each was found to have been identified by the licensee with immediate corrective action in place. For those issues that required long term corrective action the licensee was making adequate progress.
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No violations or deviations were identifie .All'of the above areas were adequate.to continue two unit operation . Surveillance Observations and Review (61726)
. Licensee activities were directly observed / reviewed to ascertain that
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surveillance of safety-related systems and components was being conducted in accordance with TS requirement The inspectors verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures; test instrumentation was calibrated; LCOs were met;
- test results met acceptance criteria and were reviewed by personnel other
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than the -individual directing the test; deficiencies were identified, as
. appropriate, and any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by - management personnel; and system restoration was adequate. For completed tests, the inspector verified cthat stesting frequencies 'were met and tests were performed by qualified
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' The following activities were observed / reviewed with no deficiencies identified:
SI 137.1, RCS Unidentified Leakage. Measurement ,
SI 666, River Temperature Limits Specified by NPDES Permit
- S1606, Balance. of Plant Temperature Monitoring System
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SI'130.1.2, Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2A-S, Quarterly Operability Tes LThe 'purpcse lof SI 130.1.2 is to assess the operational readiness of the TDAFWPJ 2A-S~ in accordance with Section XI testing requirement in p addition, operability of the suction miniflow and steam flow check valves is determined. During the: starting of the TDAFWP by opening 2-FCV-1-51,
-the pump . failed to come up to a : speed of at least 3970 rpm as required by-the procedure. The . control room ASOS and SOS were informed of the situation and' the tes't- personnel proceeded to adjust the speed approxi-
- mately 80 rpm until the , rated speed was attained. This speed adjustment is considered normal and nn other problems were identified during the
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tes The inspector also Lobserved compliance with the precautions an limitations listed in the procedure-and reviewed the configuration control for the SI.- LNo problems were identified.
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The area of surveillance scheduling and management was observed to be 1 adequate and-improvin No violations or deviations were identified.
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4.- MonthlyMaintenanceObservationsandReview-(62703) 1
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' Station ~ maintenance activities on safety-relat9 systems and components were observed / reviewed to ascertain-that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes and standards, and in confonnance with T.S.:
The following items 'were considered during this review: LCOs were met while- _ components or systems were removed from service, redundant >
components were operable, approvals were obtained prior _to_ initiating the !
work, activities were- accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected asi applicable, procedures used were adequate to control th activity troubleshooting activities were controlled and the repair records accurat'ely reflected the activities, functional testing and/or calibrations' were performed prior to . returning components or systems to service', _QC records. were maintained, activities were accomplished b qualified personnel, parts and materials used were properly certified, radiological controis were implemented - QC- hold points were established
. where requireo. and were observed, fire prevention controls were implemented, outside contractor force activities were controlled in accordance with the approved- QA program, and housekeeping was actively-pursued.
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The inspectors noted several instances of work'in progress being covered and controlled when workers were not- present at, the job site. This included bagging of parts', covering ~open pipes and equipment, roping off work areas, and cards in place with the work supervisor's name and phone number. This is' a marked improvement' from -previous work : practices which
?did not adequately control unattended work-in progres No violations-or deviations were identifie . LLicensee Event Report Fol_lowup-(92700)
The~following LERs were' reviewed and closed. The-inspector verified that reporting requirements had been met, causes had been identified,
-corrective actions appeared ! appropriate, generic applicability had been considered, the LER forms were completed,-.no unreviewed safety questions were-involved, and violations of regulations or Technical Specification conditions had .been identifie (Closed) LER 328/90-15, Firewatch Failed to Follow Procedures and Survey
- an- Area on His . Assigned Patrol Route With an . Inoperable Fire Barrier Penetratio ~This event was discovered during a.QA audit of the firewatch. program. A firewatch failed to perform his assigned patrol _ route by not surveying the Unit 2. pressurizer heater transformer -room on elevation 759 in the auxiliary building. The cause of the even.t was the firewatch failing to follow procedures and the relocation of the firewatch sign-off log (in-sidetheroom)forreasonsunknown,toelevation73 . . - --. - . - . - . . - .
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The firewatch did sign the firewatch log for the area, however, no inspection was mad Prior to this event, the Unit 1 pressurizer heater 4 transformer room on elevation 759 had recently been deleted from the required firewatch area and may have led to confusion about the need for a Unit 2 side inspection. Personnel error appeared to be the major cause of the event since all other firewatches for the same round and watch log location properly inspected the subject area on elevation 759 and logged it appropriately. The inspector reviewed the LER package and corrective actions taken. One specific action for this LER was to designate specific parties to perform periodic monitoring of the firewatch activities. This activity was discontinued due to the low incidence of deficiencies foun The inspector has observed numerous firewatch logs on his daily rounds and identified no further deficiencie The inspector has noted that QA monitoring of the activity has continued on a random basis and should help identify any future problems. This LER is close (Closed) LER 328/90-19, Improper Test of A Thermal Overload Heater on Valve 2-FCV-63-72 Resulted In an Operation Prohibited by TS The event involved the thermal overload heater (TOLH) on 2-FCV-63-72, containmant sump flow isolation valve, which was improperly tested after replacing the valve motor and overload. The licensee had performed SI-251.2 as the postmodification testing. However, the procedure was not updated to incorporate new motor data prior to the performance. The licensee determined that in this event, operability of the TOLH was not verified due to the test being performed using nonconservative values for the running and locked rotor currents. The overloads were capable of performing their rafety function, due to the fact that the overloads were sized correctly, and performed properly without adjustment when retested using the correct motor current value The cause of the event was attributed to a lack of attention to detail by a modifications engineer responsible for the work plan in that he did not obtain proper reviews on the work plan change form (WCF). In addition, the omission of the maintenance planning and technical (MP&T) section from the review cycle and an- inadequate design -review of the test deficiencies, by design engineering were contributing causes to the event. The inspector reviewed the corrective actions taken by the license These included: the
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reperformance of SI 251.2; ongoing revisions to the -modifications administrative instruction, AI-19, to include MP&T as lead in a review
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section on the WCF; training for modifications personnel emphasizing the requirements for the WCF review process; and training for design engineers to ensure reviews are conducted utilizing relevant design output documents. This item is close (Closed) LER 327,328/90-26, A Main Control Room Isolation Occurred as a Result of a Spurious Signal From an Indeterminate Sourc The event involved an A train CR isolation due to a spurious signal on the CR air intake radiation monitor (RM) 0-RM-90-125. Following negative results from an area survey, operations returned the ventilation system to normal. The licensee's troubleshooting to determine the root cause for i
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the spurious signal was r.ot conclusive. The event was attributed to electro-magnetic interference (EMI), from an undetermined source. No operational events or work in progress were identified as being a '
potential cause of the presumed EMI. The licensee has wrapped the affected cables for the subject RM with EMI shielding tape and has evaluated other RMs that have .had spurious signal indications and determined that the addition of shielding tape would be beneficial. The installation of the shielding will be completed by March 1,199 This item is close (Closed) LER 328/90-06, Two CVIs Were Caused by Containment Particulate Levels Increasing to a Value Too Close to the Alarm Setpoin The first of the subject CVIs occurred on March 7,1990 and was initiated from radiation monitor (RM) 2-RM-90-112A, upper containment high r adiation alam. After verifying an invalid alarm, a WR was written to troubleshoot and correct the problem. Af ter several repairs to connections and replacement of a power supply, 2-RM-90-112A was returned to service on March 12, 1990. On March 13, 1990, another CVI was initiated from de same instrument. Investigations after the second CVI indicated that the containment particulate level had slowly increased to the point that a spurious spike exceeded the setpoint and initiated the alarm. To correct the problem, the licensee replaced an alarm module which had a high reset value preventing the abrm from resetting. In addition, the radiation alarm setpoint was increased from 10 percent to 40 percent of the TS limit in order to preclude future event The inspector verified that the corrective actions listed in the LER have been adequately implemente This LER is close (Closed) LER 328/90-11, ?ontainment Isolation Valves Were Returned to Service Without A Proper Postmaintenance Test Because of Procedural Inadequacie The event involved an ERCW upper containment cooler CIV (2-FCV-67-131)
being returned to service without a verification of isolation time as required by Surveillance Requirement 4.6.3.1. The CIV's molded-case circuit breaker (MCCB) was being changed out as corrective action to NRC Bulletin 88-10. The PMT specified in the WR for the breaker replacement was inadequate in that it only required a bench test of the new breaker prior to installation without a verification of isolation tim The PMT which should have been specified was SI-166.6, Testing of Category 'A' and
'B' Valves After Maintenance or Upon Release from a Hold Order, and although performance of this SI was discussed, a decision was made tc only bench test the circuit breaker prior to installatio This decision was concurred ' upon by Operations and the Quality Assurance Sectio Operations personnel later determined that stroke time testing should have been required and LC0 3.0.3 was entered until SI-166.6 was successfully performe In addition, the licensee reviewed the other WRs related to the MCCB replacement and determined that three additional CIVs had MCCBs replaced without a verification of stroke time performed on the valve Similar corrective actions were successfully performed on the additional
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findings. The root cause was attributed to ambiguous instructions in the procedures that allowed a misinterpretation of the PMT requirements after breaker replacement. The inspector reviewed the corrective actions taken by the licensee which included procedure revisions and also reviewed the adequacy of the LER. No problems were identified and all actions were completed. This item is close (Closed) LER 328/90-14, CVI Event Resulting From An inadvertent Ground On One of the Handswitches For the Radiation Monitor Isolation Valve The event involved a Unit 2, B Train CVI which occurred with the unit in mode The licensee was unable to establish an exact root cause for the even However, a conclusion was made that certain activities associated with modification work on the Unit 2 control panels may have lead to the CVI. During the modifications work, electricians were working in panels which house the CVI control handswitches. Any inadvertent ground or short induced on the switches would have caused the CVI. During the event, no control room indications on radiation monitor alarms were exhibited, therefore, an inadvertent ground on one of the handswitches would appear to be a probable cause. The inspector reviewed the LER package and corrective actions and identified no additional problem This LER is close (Closed) LER 328/90-17, Reactor Trip Caused by Low-pressurizer Pressure Resulting from Operator Actions Upon Loss of a Reactor Coolant Pum The reactor trip, at approximately 10% power, occurred as a result of-low-pressurizer pressure. Prior to the trip, the 6.9kv unit board 2D had de-energized, which lead to a loss of the number 4 reactor coolant pump (RCP). The loss of the unit board was determined to have resulted from sticking contacts on the fast transfer 62-224 rela The cause of the reactor trip was attributed to a misunderstanding by the operator of the consequences of losing one RCP, when below 35 percent power. In addition, poor communications and command and control by operations personnel were exhibited and contributed to causing the reactor tri The licensee revised Abnormal Operating Instruction (A01) 5, Response to Loss of RCP(s)
below P-8, on November 24, 1990 to implement administrative operational restrictions imposed as a result of Unit 2 reactor trip. The revision requires the operators to trip the reactor if power is greater than P-7 (10 percent) with an RCP off. This revision should clarify operator actions during subsequent similar events regarding loss of an RCP at low reactor power levels. The issue of inadequate communications and lack of command and control was discussed in NRC Inspection Report 327,328/90-3 A violation was issued regarding the requirements of Administrative Instruction Al-30, Conduct of Operations. These requirements were not followed in that the SOS did not take command of the event, and failed t ensure others properly carried out their dutie Corrective actions for the violation will be reviewed during subsequent inspection The inspector reviewed the LER closecut package, corrective actions and the revisions to A01-5. This LER is close l
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(Closed) LER 327/90-30, Automatic Start of the Auxiliary Feedwater System as a Result of a Trip on the 1A Main Feedwater Pump Turbin This LER addressed an automatic start of the Unit 1 AFW system due to a loss of the 1A MFP turbine from low oil pressure. Prior to the event, the subject unit lost the nonvitsi 120-volt a.c. preferred power board number 1 which resulted in a smal? secondary transient and a decrease in turbine load of 3 percen During the recovery process of clearing alarms, an abnormal alignment existed on the MFP system with the " reserve oil pump running" alarm. The reserve pump (2) had started on the loss of the preferred power board. Tte "as left" position of the MFP control switches was in the " start 1, stop 2" pump positio Af ter review of the annunciator response and applicable drawings, it was concluded that the control switch should be rotated to the " start 2, stop 1" position, in order to clear the " reserve oil pump running" alarm. Upon rotation of the switch, the number 2 oil pump unexpectedly tripped, and due to a 5 second delay in an autostart of the number 1 pump, the 1A MFP turbine tripped on low oil pressure. The unit automatically ran back to 65 percent of rated load and was stabilized by the operators at 60 percent. The cause of the event was later determined to be a faulty mechanical latch on the operator coil of .the operate / reset relay for the number 2 main oil pum Corrective actions for the event was to replace the f611ed relay and functionally. test the eight latching relays in the main oil pump's circuits of both units' MFP turbines. The inspector reviewed the LER package, corrective action, and concurs with the licensee's classification of this event as an isolated failure. Other AFW unanticipated starts were reviewed by the inspector and no similarities were identified with this event. This LER is close (Closed) LER 327/90-09, Automatic Start of the Auxiliary Feedwater System as a Result of a Unit Operator Failing to Adhere to Procedure Precaution The subject LER addressed an automatic start of the Unit 1 AFW pumps in Mode 3 due to a combination of two MFP trip signals which completed the logic to start the pump The IB MFP was in a test situation with the trip circuit energized before the even An operator was preparing to place the A MFP on the turning gear. The MFP must be placed on the turning gear for approximately one hour prior to placing the pump in service to avoid any thermal damage to the shaf t. When difficulty was encountered in placing the A MFP on the turning gear, the unit operator instructed the CR auxiliary operator to energize the trip circuit in efforts to facilitate turning gear operatio In doing so, the logic was complete with both MFP trip signals in and AFW was subsequently starte Placing the MFP on the turning gear is controlled by System Operating Instruction (S0I) 2.1 and 3.1, Condensate and Feedwater System. This instruction was being used by the operator and contains precautions in different locations, to ensure that at least one MFP trip bus is deenergized when below Mode 2 to ensure that an inadvertent ESF actuation does not occu The licensee determined that the event was due to operator personnel error and inattention to detail . The AFW system responded as designed and no other problems were note The inspector
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reviewed the LER closecut package, corrective actions taken, and the applicable instruction. No further concerns were identified. This LER is i
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close . Event Follow-up (93702) On October 15, 1990, at 3:00 a.m., the licensee discovered that an operational mode or condition change may have been made on Unit 2 without having met the conditions of TS LC0 3.9. This LC0 requires two operable RHR loops while in Mode 6, Refueling, when RCS water level is less than 23 feet above the vessel flange. Unit 2 had entered this condition of decreased RCS water level after a snubber had been removed from a section of the RHR injection lin The snubber removal was not documented and tracked in the configuration control program, and therefore the true status of the RHR loops was not fully know Investigation into this event disclosed that the required RHR loops had in fact been operabl As such.-there was no actual violation of TS requirements or reportability obligation The event report prepared on this event was lost and not available until January 16, 1991. The inspector's review of this report, 11-90-119, determined that several questions remain to be resolved, some of which may involve regulatory actions. The licensee has agreed to revisit this event report and address the issues:
- The event report did not fully address several areas, and the licensee has agreed to revise the incident Investigatio * The lack of configuration control for snubbers indicates a weakness in the progra The inspector questions whether the configuration control procedure is adequate if it allows Operators di;cretion as to whether snubbers and hangers will be tracked in a formal syste * The event report did not conclude how the impact evaluation performed by Work Control failed to control this mode / condition chang Is the work control / planning area adequate to prevent further problems of this type?
- The event sequence was not well described in the repor Root causes and corrective actions were thin at bes These concerns are identified as unresolved item URI 327, 328/ ,
91-03-01, Event Report on RHR System Snubber Remova !
7. ExitInterview(30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on February 6,1991, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1. The Senior Resident Inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspec tion findings listed belo The licensee acknowledged the l
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inspection findings and did not identify as proprietary any of the niaterial reviewed by the inspectors during the inspectio Inspection Findings:
No violations or Non-cited violatiors were identifie One unresolved item was identified:
URI 327,328/91-03-01, event Report on P4R System SnubDer Remova During the exit interview, licensee management syreed to revise the event report dealing with URI .327,328/91-03-01. Additio1al topics discussed included the inspectors' impressions and coiciusier.s relating to plant ,
housekeeping and cleanliness, and results of interviews with control room operators regarding their cognizance of plant statu .During the reporting' period, frequent discussions were held with the Site .
Director, Plant Manager and other managers concerning inspection finding l l List of Acronyms and Initialisms l ABGTS - Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System I ABI - Auxiliary Building Isolation ABSCE - Auxiliary Building Secondary Containment Enclosure AFW - Auxiliary Feedwater Al -
Administrative Instruction A01 - Abnormal Operating Instructicn AVO - Auxiliary Unit Operator AS0S - Assistant Shift Operating Supervisor ASTM - American Society of Testing and Materials BIT - Coron Injection Tank BFN -
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant C&A - Control and Auxiliary Buildings CAQR - Conditions Adverse to Quality Report CCS - Component Cooling Water Systea CCP - Centrifugal Charging Pump CCT Corporate Commitment Tracking System CFR - Code of Federal Regulatfo COPS - Cold Overpressure Protection System CS - Containment Spray CSSC - Critical Structures, Systems and Components CVCS - Chemical and Volume Contro' System CVI - Containment Ventilation Isolation DC -
Direct Current DCN - Design Change Notice DG -
Diesel Generator DNE - Division of Nuclear Engineering ECN - Engineering Change Notice ECCS - Emergency Core Cooling System
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EDG -
Emergency Diesel Generator EI - Emergency instructions ENS -
Emergency Notification System E0P -
Emergency Operating Procedure EO - Emergency Operattig Instruction ERCW -
Essential Raw Cooling Water ESF -
Engineered Safety Feature q FCV -
Flow Control hlve FSAR -- Finai Safety Analysis Re9 ort GDC - . General Design Criteria G01 -
General Operating instruction GL -
Generic Letter HVAC -
Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning HlC -
Hand-operated Indicating Controller H0 -
Hold Order HP - Health Physics
- ICF - Instruction Change Forn 101 - Independent Design Inspectinn IN -
NRC Information Notice IFI - Inspector Followup Item IM -
Instrument Mair.tenance IMI -
Instrument Maintenance Instruction IR -
Inspection Report
KVA -
Ki lovolt- An'p KW -
Kilowatt KV -
Kilovol t
, LER - Licensee Event Report LC0 -
Limiting Condition for Operation 4 LIV -
Licensee Identified Violation LOCA -
Loss of Coolant Accident MCR -
Main Control Room I MI -
Maintenance Instruction MR - Maintenance Report MSIV - Main Steam Isolation Valve NB -
NRC Bulletin NOV- -
Notice of Violation NQAM - Nuclear Quality Assurance E'anual NRC -
Nuclear Regulatory Commission OSLA -
Operations Section Letter - Adainistrative OSLT - Operations Section Letter - Training OSP - Office of Special Projects PLS - Precautions, Limitaticns, and Setpoints PM -
Preventive Maintenance PPM -
Parts Per Million PMT -
Post Modification Test PORC - P1 tnt Operations Review Committee P0RS -
Plant Operation Review Staff 3 PRD -
Problem Reporting Document PRO - Potentially Reportable Occurrence QA -
Quality Assurance QC -
Quality Control RCA -
Radiation Control Area
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Ltctor Coolant train Tant kCP - ,
Re..t ter Coolant Pump 1 ,
'RCS - Reactor Coolant System RG - keulatory Guide RHR -
Radiation Monitor R0 - Reactor Operator RPI -
Rod Position Indication y RPM -
Revolutions Per Min 9te t RTD - Resistivity Temperature Device . Detector
"WP - Radiation Work Peymit .#
RWST - Refueling Water Storage Tank SER - Safety Evaluation Report SG -
'
SI -
Surveillance Instruction
,
SM] -
Special Maintenance Instruction
.I S0i - System Operating IM,tructions t : . SOS - Shif t Operating Supervisor
,
SQM -
Sec uoyah Standard Practice Mai.itWnce ,
SQRT -
Se.smic Qualification Review Tecm SR - Suveillance Requirement a SR0 -
Senior Reactor Operator SS0M1 - 3afety Systems Outage Modification Inspection
. SSQE - Safety System Quclity Evaluation t
f SSPS 4 Solid State Protection System STA - Shift Technical ACli;or
$TI - Special Test Instructhn 7ACF - Temporary Alteration Control Fonn TAVE -
Average Reactor Cool.nc 1amperature TDFM - Turbine Driver > Auxiliery Feeds:ater T1 -
Technical Instruction
-
TRE? - Reference Temperature e TROI' -
Tracking Open Items r ; TS - Technical Specifications
'
TVA -
hmnessee Valley Authority L VHI -
Upper Head Injection
. UU- -
Uriit Doerator
" URI -
Unresclved If.em U500 - 'Unrev6ewed Safety Questien Determination VDC -
Volts Direct Curre h' VAC - Volts A!ternating C'wrst WCG - Work Control Group
WP -
bork Plan WR -
Mark Request a t:
-
l l
.