B11090, Forwards Status of Chemical Engineering Branch Draft SER Open Items Re Fire Protection,Discussed at 840307 Meeting. Responses Formalize Commitments & Will Be Incorporated Into Next FSAR Amend
| ML20087N403 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 03/23/1984 |
| From: | Counsil W NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO., NORTHEAST UTILITIES |
| To: | Youngblood B Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| B11090, NUDOCS 8404030420 | |
| Download: ML20087N403 (44) | |
Text
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/ General Offices e Seiden Street, Berlin. Connecticut v.= cowcteur too m ena co-= P.O. BOX 270 l aw:==>w"i nmw cc*"
- * * * ' ' " " " " " " HARTFORD. CONNECTICUT 06141-0270 (203) 666-6911 L ' J C*'v "U.'17,'ce"."
March 23,1984 Docket No. 50-423
-- B11090 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
- Mr. B. J. Youngblood, Chief Licensing Branch No.1 Division of Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20355
Reference:
(1) B. J. Youngblood to W. G. Counsil, Draf t SER for Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3, dated December 30,1983.
Dear Mr. Youngblood:
Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3 NRC Chemical Engineering Branch (Fire Protection)
Review Meeting, March 7,1984 A meeting was held between the NRC-CMEB (fire protection section) and Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO) in Bethesda, Maryland on March 7, 1984 to discuss eight (8) Draf t SER items contained in Reference (1). Six of these were open items and two were confirmatory items from the February 16, 1984 meeting. A status of each open item was noted as defined by one of the following three categories:
Closed - No further NNECO input or action is needed to resolve the NRC concern.
Confirmatory - NNECO must provide the requested information on the Millstone 3 docket, either by a letter or FSAR amendment.
Open - No resolution possible at this time, NNECO to address.
Attachment I provides the status of those Draf t SER Open items. It was agreed that NNECO will transmit a letter to the NRC providing a written response on each of those Draf t SER open items by March 28,1984. NNECO also agreed to provide all additional information as committed to in confirmatory items as the information becomes available. The attached responses to the open items (Attachment II) formalize the above commitment given orally at the ireeting.
The responses will be incorporated into the FSAR in a future amendment.
8404030420 840323 M
{DRADOCK05000 k/ g (Q
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3- If 'you have any concerns related to the information contained herein or any
-questions related to our responses, please contact our Licensing representative directly.
Very truly yours, NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY ET AL By Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, their Agent At W. G.~Counsil Senior Vice President
-STATE OF CONNECTICUT)
) ss. Berlin COUNTY OF HARTFORD )
^
Then personally appeared before me W. G. Counsil, who being duly sworn, did state that ha is Senior Vice President of Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, Applicant - hereia, that he is authorized to execute and file the foregoing information in the name and on behalf of the Applicants herein and that the statements contained in said information are true and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief.
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'No.tary Pubp .. i My Commission Expires Marct: 31,1988 l
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ATTACHMENTI Status of the NRC-CMEB (Fire Protection)
Draf t SER Open items Discussed at the Meeting
'with the NRC-CMEB March 7,1984
- Item No. Description Status
. FP-2 Potential Systems Interactions Closed FP-3 Qualification of Fire Barriers Closed FP-12 Installation of Fire Detectors Closed FP-17 Hose Station Standpipe Diameters Open FP-18 Control Room Console Smoke Detectors Open FP-19 Cable Spreading Room Protection Open
- FP-20 Switchgear Room Floor Drains Closed FP-21 Emergency Diesel Generator Day Tanks Closed t
9 7
~~ ,- - - - - - - -
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- ~ - - - - -
ATTACHMENT II Responses to the Draf t SER Open Items Item No.
FP-2 FP-3 FP-12 FP FP-18 FP-19 FP-20 FP-21
Open Items Chemical Engineering Branch - Fire Protection FP-2 Potential Systems Interaction (Draf t SER Section 9.5.1.1)
We are concerned whether the mechanisms by which fire and fire fighting systems may cause the simultaneous failure of redundant or diverse trains have been adequately considered in the design. We will require the applicant to identify the mechanisms that were considered in the fire hazards analysis and the measures taken to preclude the fire or fire-suppressant-induced f ailtre of redundant or diverse safety trains and to document the procedures. This is an-open item.
Response (2/84)
Section C5.b.1 of the Standard Review Plan CMEB 9.5.1 states:
" Fire Protection features should be provided for structtres, systems, and components important to safe shutdown. These features should be capable of limiting fire damage so that:
- a. One train of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions frem either the control room or emergency control station (s) is f ree of fire damage, and
- b. Systems necessary to achieve and maintain cold shutdown from either the control room or emergency control station (s) can be repaired within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />."
To meet the guidelines of Position C5.b.1, one of the following means of ensuring that one of the redmdant trains is free from fire damage is suggested,
- a. Separation of cables and equipment and associated circuits of redmdant trains by a fire barrier having a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rating.
- b. Separation of cables and equipment and associated circuits of redundant trains by a horizontal distance of more than 20 feet with no intervening f combustibles or fire hazards. In addition, fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system should be installed in the fire area, or
- c. Enclosure of cables and equipment and associated circuits of one redundant train in a fire barrier having a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> rating. In addition, fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system should be installed in the fire area.
It _
- guidelines listed above cannot be met, then alternative or dedicated shutdown methods should be provided.
Millstone 3 Fire Protection Evaluation Report Section 6.2 lists the function required and equipment available to achieve and maintain safe shutdown. From E .this list, each fire area was evaluated to assure that redundant components / systems required for safe shutdown are separated by fire barriers
. having a fire resistance rating of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />. Some isolated cases exist where the 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> barrier option was not used, and in this area one of the two options was utilized or 'a deviation was/will be requested.
'FP2-1
. u.-
Open Items Chemical Engineering Branch - Fire Protection FP-2 Cont.
- This approach provides assurance that a fire in any one fire area does not effect the abiitty to achieve and maintain safe shutdown at Millstone 3.
'In addition to the redundant train / fire analysis noted above, NNECO evaluated the effect of fire suppression activities. This evaluation was conducted to assure
- that at least one method of achieving and maintaining safe shutdown was free
- from the effects of the firefighting system activities. Further, additional saf_eguards were incorporated into the design to reduce the possibility / effects of inadvertent operation.
- As an example, the CO2 system, which provides protection for the Cable Spreading Room,-East and West Switchgear Rooms, North and South Tunnels, Normal- Switchgear Room, and East and West MCC Rod Drive Areas, have cross-zoned detection incorporated into their design. This detection scheme eliminates the possibility of. a failure in one detector causing the CO2 system to
. inadvertently operate. In addition, each discharge nozzle was or will .be field checked to assure that discharging CO2 would not directly impinge on sensitive electrical equipment.
The combination of field verification, proper system design, and separation of redundant safe shutdown components by rated fire barriers, assures that at least
, ~ one method of achieving and maintaining safe shutdown would be free from the effects of fire or fire suppression activities.
t Status (2/84)
Confirmatory.
~
Revised Response (3/84)
- Section C5.b.1 of the Standard Review Plan CMEB 9.5.1 states:
'.' Fire Protection features should be provided for structures, systems, and components important to safe shutdown. These features should be capable of limiting fire damage so that:
- a. One train of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown
. conditions from ' 'either the' control room or - emergency control
- - station (s) is f ree of fire damage, and -
r . .
- b. Systems necessary to achieve and maintain cold shutdown from either the control room or emergency control station (s) can be repaired
(~ within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />".
l _. To meet the guidelines of Position C5.b.1, one of the following means of ensuring
, l that'one of the redundant trains is free from fire damage is suggested.
l FP2-2 g
L= _.
Open Items Chemical Engineering Branch - Fire Protection FP-2 Cont.
- a. Separation of cables :and equipment and associated circuits of redundant
- trains by a fire barrier having a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> ratin'g.
~ b.- Separation of cables and ~ equipment and associated circuits of redmdant
, . trains by'a horizontal distance of more than 20 feet with no intervening combustibles or fire hazards. -In addition, fire detectors and an automatic
~
. fire suppression system should be installed in the fire area, or
.- : c. . Enclosure of. cables and equipment and associated circuits of.one redundant
' train in a fire barrier having a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> rating. In addition, fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system should be installed in the fire area.
If' the ' guidelines' listed above cannot be met, then alternative or dedicated '
~s hutdown methods should be provided.
Millstone- 3 Fire Protection Evaluation Report Section 6.2 lists the function required and equipment available to achieve and maintain safe shutdown. From-this . ; list, . NNECO evaluated . each ' fire area to assure that redundant components / systems required for safe shutdown are separated by fire barriers -
having a' fire resistance rating of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />. Some isolated cases were identified ;
f '.where safe shutdown equipment is not separated by 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire barriers. . These
'V - areas =either have alternative shutdown provided, or a deviation was/will be
- requested. ,-
o This= approach provides assurance that a fire in any one fire area does not effect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown at Millstone 3. ;
In addition to the redundant train / fire analysis noted above, NNECO evaluated the effect of fire suppression activities. This evaluation was conducted to assure
.that.at least one method of achieving and maintaining safe shutdown was free
- ~ from the effects of the firefighting system activities. - Further, additional safeguards were incorporated into the design to reduce the possibility / effects or
! inadvertent operation.. ~
T As . an ~ example,' thel CO2 - system, which provides protection .of the Cable .
Spreading Room, East -and -West Switchgear. Rooms, North and South Tunnels, O Normal Switchgear Room, and East and West MCC Rod Drive Areas,-have cross :
zoned t detection -- incorporated into their design. This ~ detection scheme
- i eliminates the possibility of a f ailure in one detector causing the CO2 system to : '
inadvertently operate. In addition, each discharge nozzle was or will be field
. . checked to' assure that discharging CO2 would not directly impinge on sensitive
. electrical equipment.
s It should be 'noted that CO2 'was chosen for this installation because of its uniqueness. CO2 Provides superior fire protection coverage without subjecting 4 / sensitive electrical components to water discharge from sprinkler systems.
5.
FP2-3
_ _. _ .a__,_-. .._._._a___.__.;._.. _..__-.._ _ __,_.__ _
Open Items Chemical Engineering Branch - Fire Protection FP-2 Cont.
The combination of field verification, proper system design, and separation of redundant safe shutdown components by rated fire barriers, assures that at least one method of achieving and maintaining safe shutdown would be free from the effects of fire or fire suppression activities.
Status (3/84)
-Closed.
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FP2-4
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Open Items Chemical Engineering Branch - Fire Protection FP-3 Qualification of Fire Barriers (Draf t SER Section 9.5.1.4)
~
The walls that separate buildings and walls and floor / ceiling assemblies used to enclose rooms containing safe shutdown systems are 3-hour-fire-rated.
x However, the applicant has not indicated all fire rated assemblies are tested in
- accordance ' with - ASTM E-119, " Fire Tests of Building Construction - and Materials." To assure that all fire rated assemblies will perform as indicated under fire conditions, we will' require the applicant to verify that all assemblies have been tested in accordance with ASTM E-Il9. This is an open item.
Response (3/84)
NNECO has reviewed NRC's concern with regard to the qualification of fire barriers as. providing three hour fire rated separation between:
(a) ' safe shutdown systems / equipment from any potential fires in non-safe shutdown areas; and,
- (b) redundant divisions or trains of -safe shutdown systems / equipment, such that they are not subject to damage from a common fire. .
As a result of this review, NNECO has verified that those three hour fire rated barriersf provided to assure compliance. with the above criteria have been constructed in accordance with designs qualified per the requirements of ASTM E-Il9, Fire Tests of Building Construction and Materials" (NFPA-251).
It should be noted that only those fire barriers constructed to provide the necessary separation to assure safe shutdown, as highlighted on the fire boundary drawings (S&W Nos.12179-EM-60A-2 through 60D-2) contained in Attachment A,
- have been included in NNECO's review. Additional types of fire resistant
- construction have been utilized throughout the plant, as indicated on the fire boundary drawings, in order to subdivide the larger fire areas into fire zones.
Thes_e fire barrier assemblies have not been specifically designed to meet the stated criteria and as such have not been considered in this review.
Three hour rated fire barriers at Millstone Unit No. 3 have been constructed in accordance with one of the following designs qualified per ASTM E-Il9.
Floor Slab Assemblies
~ Rated floor slab assemblies have been constructed as illustrated in Attachment B. These assemblies consist of a composite concrete floor slab, consisting of a 1 " corrugated steel decking covered with a minimum 6". of reinforced concrete,
- which is' supported by a fire coated restrained structural steel frame. This fire coating on the structural steel frame has been applied to a minimum thickness of 2" and is qualified to provide the required three hour fire rating (see Attachment
~
C 'for ~ technical data). This floor slab assembly is similar to Underwriters
- Laboratories (UL) approved floor slab design No. 902, as listed in their Fire
- Resistance Directory. - Also, the-individual components (structural steel and FP3-1
Open Items Chemical Engineering Branch - Fire Protection FP-3 Cont.
composite floor slab) are referenced as being approved for use in three hour fire rated construction in Section 6, Chapter 7, of the 14th Edition of the Fire
~
Protection Handbook, published by the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA).
Reinforced Concrete and Solid Concrete Block Walls Rated wall assemblies have been constructed utilizing either reinforced concrete (minimum thickness of 7") or solid concrete block (minimum thickness of 8").
Both of these_ designs are referenced in the NFPA Fire Protection Handbook as
- being approved assemblies for use in three hour fire rated construction.
Based on the above information, NNECO has determined that those fire barriers constructed to provide separation will perform as required under fire conditions.
Status (3/84)
Closed.
FP3-2
t.
ATTACHMENT A FIRE BOUNDARY DRAWINGS
- The following Drawings were provided to the NRC Staff at the Fire Protection a.. . Me'eting (3/7/84)
-1.. .SW Drawing No.12179-EM-60A-1
- 2. - SW Drawing No.12179-EM-60B-1
' 3. SW Drawing No.12179-EM-60C-1
- 4. SW Drawing No.12179-EM-60D-1 6
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ATTACHMENT B TYPICAL FLOOR SLAB ASSEMBLY FP3-4
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i ATTACHMENT C e TECHNICAL DATA i :. 4.
PYROCRETE lO % STRUCTURAL STEEL FIREPROOFING f
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SELECTION DATA Steel (SSPC 6-63) Carbo Zinc @ 11/ Carbo Zine 11/ Carboline li;
'A Carboline 190HB 190HB GENERIC TYPE: Catalyzed magnesium oxychloride formula-tion. Crystal and powder component mixed prior to application. Steel (SSPC 3-S3) a) Carboline 193 Primer s) Carboline 193 Pnmer b) Carbomastic@l5 b) Carbomastic 15 GENERAL PROPERTIES: A lightweight reinforced, fire re- c) Pyroprim 772
)
sistive material for protection of structural steel on exterior or heavy duty use locations and/or to provide a thermal barrier Galvanizing Pyroprep 773 and for protection of urethane foam insulation. Its lower density Carboline 190H B NA l and ease of application make it preferred over poured in place TOPCOAT REQUIRED: For exterior applications, or for l concrete. Its high compressive strength, impact resistance,and interior applications where excessive humidity or chemical j hardness make it suitable for installations where softer ma- fume exposure is present, the following topcoats should be terials cannot be used. used, unless otherwise specified :
l l RECOMMENDED USES: Currently used in refineries, pulp a) Pyrocote 787 or.
I and paper mills, offshore installations, conventional power b) Carboline 1340 Clear and Pyrocote 788 Elastomer or plants, petrochemical plants, nuclear power plants, architec-c) Carboline 188 HB tural designs or where i hard durable fireproofing is required.
Other topcoats may be used as recommended. When topcoats NOT R ECOMMENDED FOR: Use over stainless steel and non- are applied directly to Pyrocrete 102, a seat coat, thinned 50%,
re- should be applied followed by a full body coat.
ferrous metals.(ambient fractory cement Pyrocrete 102 should temperatures not be used exceeding 200 as a,F).
COMPATIBILITY OF OTHER COATINGS: Consult Carbo-PHYSICAL DATA (Typical Properties) line Technical Service for suitable use of other coatingsystems.
Dry Density 68-70 lbs/ft' APPROVALS: Pyrocrete 102 has been tested in accordance Hardness (Shere O) 55-70 with ASTM E-119 by Factory Mutual, Underwriters Labora-Compressve Strength 2000 psi tories, and other qualified independent testing organizations.
CaeHic est of Pyrocrete 102 has also been approved under: BOCA No.
Thennel Expansion 4 3J x 10 inch / inch /*F RR 73-42; New York City MEA-20-75M; and numerous other (7x10* cm/cm/*C) jurisdictions. Pyrocrete 102 also meets EPA guid: lines for isspect Rosestance 20 feet pesads spray-en fireproofing.
Average Flexural Strength 1see psi SPECIFICATION DATA l Mexisnem Strain .002W inchesfech l lesaletion "K" facter 9.6 8TU inches /heer ftsop RECOMMENDED THICKNESS: Depends on desired rating st 75'F and assembly fireproofed. (Consult attached design detail). At l
l ASTM E-84 Results no time shall Pyrocrete 102 be applied at a thickness of less Flamespread 5 than 1/4 inches.
I $ mete Development O SHELF LIFE: Ona year minimum.
Feel costnhetsen 8 S W ehage 85 COLORS: Non-uniform off white to tan.
Coverage (1981h. Kit)* SS sq. ft. 91/4" ORDERING INFORMATION
- f60TE: Material losses during mixing and application will Prices may be obtained from Carboline Sales Representative or very and must be taken into consideration. Main Office. Terms - Net 30 days.
SUBSTRATES: Apply over properly primed steel or tiecoatb urethane foam insulation. SHIPPING WElGHT:
PRIMER REQUIRED: Crystal Component 35 lbs/ bag Powder Component 65 lbs/ bag interior Exterior Foam Pyropnme Tie-cote Pyroprime Tie-cote 100 Mit 775WB 775WS Shipped on pallets of 40 bags / pallet.
Dec. 80 Replaces July 77 FP3-7 l-_- .___-- ._- - _. _- __-
APPUCATION INSTRUCTIONS These instructions are not intended to snow product recommendations for spec 6fic service. They are issued as an and in determinmg correct surface preparation, msmeng instructions, and appiscatson procedure, it is assumed that the proper product recommende..ons have been made.
These 6nstruClions snould be foelowed Closely to 00tsin the mentmum serveCe from the materials.
The following information is to be used as a guide. For a more Pump Screw /Moyno Screw Moyno Piston detailed description, see specifi Application Instructions on (2L3-2L4) (2L3-2L4) l separate sheet. Power Gas or Electric Gas or Electric Air SUR FACE PREPARATION: Steel preparation prior to priming Other manufacturers include Muller (AG-4), Goldblatt Super.
should be done m accordance to the SSPC methods listed under tex, and Mr. Parts moyno pumps, the " Primer Required section ano the primers' respective For hose size, gun recommendations, tips, spraying. etc., see Product Data Sheets.
spe ific Application Instructions (separate sheet).
Prior to applying Pyrocrete 102, the substrate coating should be free of oil, grease, dirt. condensation or othercontamination. TROWEL: Pyrocrete 102 may be trowel applied using a stan-dard plasterers hawk and trowel.
LATHING: 3.4 lbs/sq yard galvanized or painted metal lath CURE TIMES: In low humidity, high temperature, or direct shall be installed per design detail on last page of these instrue.
tions. Lath may be secured by bending around flange and sun or wind, keep Pyrocrete surface damp for at least six hours after application. Apply 4. fine water mist spray as needed or securing through the use of stud welding, beam furring clips, or tie wire. Corner beads or screeds may be used for aesthetics wrap in polyethylene sheets.
as well as for application aids. Fresh Pyrocrate must be protected from raln, condensation or MIXING: Add ssven to eight gallons of cool potable water to a running water for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> at 70*F (21*C) after application to mortar mixer with rubber tipped blades. With mixer running prevent teaching of catalyst.
dis >olve crystal component for three minutes. Powder com- Normal dry times before topcoating Pyrocrete 102 of thick, ponent is then added slowly and mixed 5-10 minutes ,until a nesses of one inch or less at 70*F is five days. This time is de-homogeneous mortar-like consistency is achieved. Totai water pendent on thickness, humidity, and temperature. Pyrocrete MUST NO T exceed eight gallons per 100 lbs. kit. 102 must be dry and exhibit a minimum shore of "55" prior MULTIPLE COATS: If multiple coats are necessary to achieve to topcoating.
desired thickness, apply all coats within eight hours. If Pyrocrete 102 is to be left untopcoated for a period longer POT LIFE: Two hours at 75*F (24*C) and less at higher tem- than the normal dry times, it should be protected from rain perstures. Pot life ends when coating thickens and becomes by polyethylene sheeting, until topcoating can be completed.
unusable. CLEAN UP: Wet Pyrocrete 102 overspray or dripping must
- always be cleaned up with soapy or fresh water before it sets.
APPLICATION TEMPERATURES:
Cured overspray may require chipping and/or scraping to re-Serface er Ambiest Temp. Relative Humidity move, which should be fol! owed by a water washdown.
MAX L MIN MAX MIN i e Non-ferrous mPtals should be cleaned immediately with soap Interior or 20*F (-7*C) 95eF (35 C) 0% 90% and water.
l Sheltered Exterior 35'F (2*C) 95'F (35'C) 0% 90%
l STORAGE CONDITIONS:
SPRAY EQUIPMENT: Temperature:-20 to 150*F (-29 to 66*C) Humidity: 0-90%.
1 Mfg & Glover Stallion Essick FM-9 or Spee-Flo For more detailed information please consult specific Carbo-Model or "Pyrocreter" FM5E Commander 11 line Application Instructions.
l To the best of our knowledee the technical dite contamed herein are true and accurate et the dote of issuance and are subrect to change i
without onor notice. User must contact Carbotene to venfy correctness before specityeng or ordering. No guerentee of accuracy is given or
- implied We guerentee our products to conform to Carbolene quality conttol. we assume no responsibility for coverage, performance or ensuries l resulting from use. Leability, if any, is limited to rectacernent of products. Prices and cost date if shown, are subeect to change without prior l notice NO OTHE R WARR ANTY OR Gu AR ANTEE OF ANY KINO IS M ADE BY THE SELLER. EXPRESS OR IMPLIED. STATUTORY.
i BY OPER ATION OR LAW. OR OTHERWISE. INCLUDING MERCHANTABiblTY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICuLAR PURPOSE.
carboIInse FIREPROOFING PRODUCTS Div 350 MANLf V DOUSTRiAL CT. sT LouS MO 63ue i FP3-8
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SELECTION DATA Steel (SSPC 6-63) Carbo Zinc @11/ Carbo Zinc 11/ Carboline G; GENERIC TYPE: Catalyzed magnesium oxychloride formula-tion. Crystal and powder component mixed prior to application. Steel (SSPC 3-63) a) Carboline 193 Primer a) Carboline 193 Pnmer GENERAL PROPERTIES: A lightweight reinforced, fire re-sistive material for protection of structural steel on exterior or heavy duty use locations and/or to provide a thermal barrier Galvanizmg Pyroprep 773 and for protection of urethane foam insulation, its lower density Carboline 190HB NA and ease of application make it preferred over poured in place TOPCOAT REQUIRED: For exterior applications, or for concrete. Its high compressive strength, impact resistance, and interior applications where excessive humidity or chemica' hardness make it suitable for installations where softer ma- fume exposure is present, the following topcoats should be terials cannot be used, used, unless otherwise specified:
RECOMMENDED USES: Currently used in refineries, pulp a) Pyrocote 787 or, l and paper mills, offshore installations, conventional power j b) Carboline 1340 Clear and Pyrocote 788 Elastomer or plants, petrochemical plants, nuclear power plants, architec- c) Carboline 188 HB tural desigri or where a hard durable fireproofing is required.
Other topcoats may be used as recommended. When tr pcoats l NOT RECOMMENDED FOR: Use over stainless steel and non- are applied directly to Pyrocrete 102, a seal coat, thinned 50%,
re- should be applied followed by a full body coat.
ferrous fractory metals. Pyrocretetemperatures cement (ambient 102 should exceeding not be used 200as a,F).
COMPATIBILITY OF OTHER COATINGS: Consult Carbo-PHYSICAL DATA (Typical Properties) line Technical Service for suitable use of other coatingsystems.
Dry Density 60 70 lbs/ft3 APPROVALS: Pyrocrete 102 has been tested in accordance Hardness (Shore D) 65 70 with ASTM E 119 by Factory Mutual, Underwriters Labora-Compressrve Strength 2000 psi tories, and ottler qualified independent testing organizations.
Coefficient of Pyrocrete 102 has also been approved under: BOCA No.
Thennal Expensiaa 3.9 x 10* inch / inch /*F RR-73-12; New York City ME A 20-75M: and numerous other (7x10* cm/cm/*C) jurisdictions. Pyrocrete 102 also meets EPA guidelines for impact Resistence 20 feet pounds spray-on fireproofing.
i Average Flexoral Strength 1000 pai SPEClFICATION DATA
" I"
- RECOMMENDED THICKNESS: Depends on desired rating lassistica 'K factor 9.6 BTU est ft2.F and assembly fireproofed. (Consult attached design detail). At no time shall Pyrocrete 102 be applied at a thickness of less ASTM E44 Results Flamespread 5 than 1/4 inches.
Smoke Development 0 SHELF LIFE: One year minimum.
g g,,", 8.5%
COLORS: Nonsniform off white to tan.
Coverage (108 th. Kit)* 96 sq. ft. 91/4" ORDERING INFORM ATION
- NOTE: Material losses during mixing and application will Prices may be obtained from Carboline Sales Representative or very and must be taken into consideration. Main Office. Terms - Net 30 days.
SUBSTRATES: Apply over properly primed steel or tiecoated SHIPPING WElGHT:
urethane foam insulation.
Crystal Component 35 lbs/ bag PRIMER REQUIRED: Powder Component 65 lbs/ bag interior Extenor 100I W Foam Pyroprime Tie-cote Pyroprime Tie-cate 775WB 775WB Shipped on pallets of 40 bags / pallet.
I I
Dec. 80 Replaces July 77 FP3-9
APPLICATION INSTRUCTIONS Tnese instructions are not entended to show product recommendations too specific service. They are issued as an aid m determining correct sueface preparation, maxing instructions, and appl 6 cation procedure, it is assumed that the proper product recommendations nave been mace.
These instructions should De followed closety to octain the enaximum servecc from the materests.
The following information is to be used as a guide. For a more Pump Screw /Moyno Screw Moyno Piston detailed description, see specific Application Instructions on (2L3-2L4) (2L3 2L4) separate sheet. Power Gas or Electric Gas or Electric Air SURFACE PREPARATION: Steel preparation prior to priming Other manufacturers include Muller (AG-4), Goldblatt Super-should be done in accordance to the SSPC methods listed under tex, and Mr. Parts moyno pumps.
the " Primer Required' section and the primers' respective For hose size, gun recommendations, tips, spraying. etc., see Product Data Sheets.
specif Application Instructions (separate sheet).
Prior to applying Pyrocrete 102, the substrate coating should be free of oil, grease, dirt, condensation or other contamination. TROWEL: Pyrocrete 102 may be trowel applied using a stan-dard plasterers hawk and trowel.
LATHING: 3.4 lbs/sq yard galvanized or painted metal fath CURE TIMES: In low humidity, high temperature, or direct shall be installed per design detail on last page of these instrue.
tions. Lath may be secured by bending around flange and sun or wind, keep Pyrocrate surface damp for at least six hours after application. Apply a fine water mist spray as needed or securing through the use of stud welding, beam furring clips, or tie wire. Corner beads or screeds may be used for aesthetics wrap in polyethylene sheets.
as well as for application sids. Fresh Pyrocrete must be protected from rain, condensation or running water for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> at 70*F (21*C) after application to MIXING: Add seven to eight gallons of cool potable water to a mortar mixer with rubber tipped blades. With mixer running prevent leaching of catalyst.
dissolve cryst l component for three minutes. Powder com- Normal dry times before topcoating Pyrocrate 102 of thick-ponent is then added slowiy and mixed 5-10 minutes until a nesses of one inch or less at 70*F is five days.This time is de-homogeneous mortar-like consistency is achieved. Total water pendent on thickness, humidity, and temperature. Pyrocrete MUST NOT exceed eight gallons per 100 lbs. kit. 102 must be dry and exhibit a minimum shore of "55" prior MULTIPLE COATS: If multiple coats are necessary to achieve to topcoating.
j i desired thickness, apply all coats within eight hours, if Pyrocrete 102 is to be left untopcoated for a period longer POT UFE: Two hours at 75'F (24*C) and less at higher tem. than the normal dry times, it should be protected from rain peratures. Pot life ends when coating thickens and becomes by polyethylene sheeting, until topcoating can be completed.
unusable. CLEAN UP: Wet Pyrocrete 102 overspray or dripp!ng must always be cleaned up with soapy or fresh water before it sets.
APPLICATION TEMPERATURES: Cured overspray may require chipping and/or scraping to re-Serfees or Alnbioet Temp. Relative Hum.dity i move, which should be followed by a water washdown.
MIN MAX MIN MAX Non-ferrous metals should be cleaned immediately with soap Interior or 20*F ( 7'C) 95'F (35'C) 0% 90% and water.
Sheltered Exterior 35*F (2*C) 95'F (35*C) 0% 90%
STORAGE CONDITIONS:
SPRAY EQUIPMENT: Temperature:-20 to 150*F (-29 to 66*C) Humidity: 0-90%
Mfg & Glover Stallion Essick FM-9 or Spee-Flo For more detailed information please consult specific Carbo-Model or "Pyrocrater" FM5E Commander il line Application Instructions.
l 1
l l
i To the best of our knowledge the technecal data contemed herem are true and accurate at the date of issuance end are subsect to change l
without pnor notice. User must contact Carbohne to verify correctness before specifyme or ordermg No guarantee of accuracy is given or imphed. We guerentee our products to conform to Carbohne quanty control. we assume no responsibehty for coverage. performance or mauries t
resultmg from use. Leanihty, if any. is hmited to replacement of products Proces and cost date of shown, are subiect to change without crear l notice. NO OTHE R WARRANTY OR Gu AR ANTEE OF ANY KIND IS MAoE BY THE SE LLE R. DtPRESS OR IMPLIE D STATUTORY.
i BY OPER ATION OR LAW OR OTHERWISE. INCLUDING MERCH ANTASILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
' car boIIne.
FIREPROOFING PRODUCTS OfV~
350 MAMV POUSTmAL CT. sf Lotsi Mo 63184 FP3-10
=- -. . . . - .
Open Items Chemical Engineering Branch - Fire Protection 4
FP-12 Installation of Fire Detectors (Draf t SER Section 9.5.1.5)
The applicant's Fire Protection Evaluation Report does not indicate that fire
' detectors have been selected and installed in accordance with NFPA 72E. We will require the applicant to select and install early warning fire detectors as a
-- minimum in accordance with NFPA 72E. This is an open item.
Response (2/84)
Millstone 3 Specifications for Fire Detectors (smoke, heat and ultra-violet types) requires that the - supplier / vendor . provide UL listed and/or FM approved equipment. Furthermore, 'the specification also requires that the detectors provided are suitable for the environment to which they (detectors) will be
' installed.
-Selection of the type of detectors to be installed in the plant was based on the bwning characteristics of materials within the protected areas. In areas, where high concentrations of cable are present, a combination of photoelectric and c ionization type smoke detectors are installed. In areas where oil represents the major fire hazard, either smoke heat, UV detectors or a combination of fire detectors and systems are installed. Each detecton system provides an early
--warning signal toLthe main fire control panel. In some cases, the detection system also activates the area's suppression system as well.
- With' regards to the detection system's design .and installation, the applicable
. guidelines of both NFPA 72E and the manufactwers technical recommendations have been considered when developing the design criteria. In accordance-with NFPA ' 72E -- codes requirements, Engineering - judgement was employed in developing ' design criteria . and determining actual installation locations.
m . Installation locations were determined using the following considerations in order 1 to establish consistent Engineering judgement.
1 Types of Postulated Fires:
L : Selection as to the type of detector to be used was based on the type of postulated fire (smoldering,large free bwning, etc.) for in each area.
, Ceiling Construction / Shape:
h 4: Ceiling configuration and types (smooth,' girder and beam construction) were considered when determining detector locations.
~ Ceiling Height:
Ceiling heights varied throughout the plant. Reduced spacing of ' detectors was considered on a case by case basis depending on ceiling height.
.. Ventilation Effects:
i'
-FF12 a.
Open Items Chemical Engineering Branch - Fire Protection i
FP-12 Cont.
The direction of air' movement throughout each area was considered when determining detector locations. In addition, the possible effects of stratification were also considered.
Locations of Hazards:
The amount of combu,stible material, burning characteristics and the projected fire plume- and resultant smoke distribution paths were considered when evaluating detector locations. In areas, where no or limited combustible loading was present, and no heat or smoke was anticipated, no detectors were deemed necessary for that immediate area.
Considering the applicable guidelines of NFPA 72E, the manufacturers recommendations and sound engineering judgement, it is NNECO's position that Millstone 3 fire detection system design will provide a reliable early warning of a fire condition. The above referenced information satisfies the intent of BTP 9.5.1 Section C.6.a requirements. ,
Status (2/84)
Confirmatory.
' Additional Response (3/84)
The~ fire detectors location drawing (SW Drawing No.12179-EE-51P-2A) was provided to the NRC Staff at the Fire Protection Meeting.
[ . Status (3/84)
Closed.
4 FP12-2
Open Items Chemical Engineering Branch - Fire Protection FP-17 Hose Station Standpipe Diameters (Draf t SER Section 9.5.1.5)
BTP. CMEB 9.5-1, Section C.G.c, recommends standpipes to be sized four inches in diameter for multiple hose station supplies and two and one-half inches in diameter for single hose station supplies. The applicant has provided standpipe of L a smaller size. We will require that applicant to either verify that the smaller sized standpipe is capable of providing the 500 gpm hose streams at adequate pressure for manual fire fighting operations, or increase the size of the piping in the standpipe system. This is an open item.
Response (3/84)
NNECO has evaluated BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Section 6.c.4 guidelines which address standpipe and hose station recommendations. In response to the referenced
. guidelines, NNEGO is offering the following comments / clarification for your review.
Millstone Unit No. 3Ps standpipe system is designed as a Class 3 service which provides both 2h" and in" hose connections. The piping utilized for Millstone Unit No. 3's standpipe supply system is four inches (4")in diameter
_H--
c and is cap 6bic of providing a minimum flow of 500 gallons per minute with a residual pressure of 65 pounds per square inch at the top-most outlet.
1 In buildings having large areas which required additional hose stations throughout the building, multiple hose station connections (2h and in inches)
.have been provided, in accordance - with the guidelines of NFPA 14-
'" Standpipe and Hose Systems". NNECO trusts that _ the above information
, will satisfy any concerns with regard to Draf t SER Question FP-17.
Status (3/84)
- Open.
FPl7-1 agg g----mwt. -
inkwe ,%--W ee-+-s94r e 8A
Open Items Chemical Engineering Branch - Fire Protection
Smoke detectors are not provided inside control room cabinets and consoles. We will require the applicant to install such detectors in accordance with our guidelines in BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Section C.7.b. This is an open item.
Response (2/84)
NNECO has evaluated the guidelines of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Section C.7.b to Millstone 7s control. panel design with regards to smoke detection within the control cabinets. As a result of this evaluation, it is NNECO's position that an equivalent level of fire detection / protection for the control cabinets has been provided and therefore, NNEC0 is requesting that a deviation to BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Section C.7.b guidelines be granted based on the following information:
Control Room Fire Protection Features ,
Millstone 7s Control Room .has been provided with a general area smoke '
- detection system. This detection system utilizes a combination of photoelectric and i_onization type smoke detectors in order to provide an early warning of a
. smoke / fire condition (refer to the attached & awing for the detector layout).
Since the major fire loading within the control cabinets is cable insulation, which represents a smoldering type fire, detectors are located at the ceiling level of
, the room utilizing the applicable sections of NFPA 72E as guidance. In addition, cable tray arrangements and ventilation paths, both in the room and control cabinets'were considered when determining the appropriate detector location.
Alarm annmciation of a detector will occur at both the main control board and the fire control panel. Both locations are provided with an audible / visual alarm to alert personnel of a smoke / fire condition.
l- Portable fire extinguishers have been provided throughout the control room area :
in accordance with the guidelines of NFPA 10 (Portable Fire Extinguishers).
Selection of the type of extinguishers provided was based on the postulated fire within the immediate area. In addition, hose stations and fire extinguishers have been provided ' in ' the adjacent area (Service Building) to support manual
[_
! firefighting efforts.
1 I-
- . The control room is manned on a continuous basis by NNECO's Operation
' Department. On each shift, selected operations personnel, who are f ully trained
- fire origade members, are assigned the responsibility of supporting Millstone 7s fire brigade assignment for that shift. It can be expected, that any fire within a j_ control cabinet will quickly be detected, controlled and extinguished by these-p . qualified fire brigade personnel.
L Control Cabinet Design Features t . .
l Millstone 7s control cabinets are constructed of metal and therefore are rated
,~
as non-combustible. The major fire loading within the cabinets is cable insulation which conforms to IEEE 383 requirements. Since the chemical FP18-1
. . .- - . . ~ .-
P Open items Chemical Engineering Branch - Fire Protection FP-18 Cont.
composition of the c- ble insulation offers an inherent fire retardent characteristics, a postulated fire _ within the . cabinets is_ expected to result in either self-extinguishing or of a slow burning, smoldering type.
Class IE circuits providing instrumentation and control functions are separated from their redundant class IE circuits as well as from non-class IE circuits in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.75. Separatien of redmdant circuits has
-been achieved by either distance or the employment of metal barriers / enclosures. The. electrical loads for the control cabinet wiring are of the low voltage type. Considering the characteristics of the cable insulation and the low voltage cwrents within the circuits, the potential for sufficient heat to be generated from an electrical fault to ignite adjacent cabling is remote.
- Natural ventilation paths within the control cabinets move in the upward direction toward the ceiling area. Louvers located in the bottom sections of the cabinets provide the means for air intake. Air exhaust and the removing of any.
heat build-up _ within the~ cabinet -is achieved by openings provided for cable e; routing 'at the top of the cabinet. This. upward ventilation path will not only
. remove -any heat generated but will also carry any products of combustion upward to the room ceiling area which is provided with smoke detectors, thus -
resulting in the detection and. early warning of a smoke / fire condition.
Control Cabinet Fire Scenario
' As previously discussed, NNECO has postulated that the only fire that is likely to occur is a smoldering, slow-bwning type fire. When evaluating the possible
' damage ~that- could result from such a ' fire, it was established that there are several means of detecting a fire at its'early stages.- Since the control room is manned on a ~ continuous basis, NNECO believes that credit for operations
. personnel's sense.of sight and smell should be considered as part of means for detecting a fire. Whether by the sight of smoke or smell of burning material, prompt operator action to control and extinguish the fire will occur. Considering the human factor and the installed early warning smoke detection system, it is NNECO's belief that an equivalent level of fire detection has been provided for
~
L the control cabinet in' lieu of installing smoke detectors within the cabinet themselves. It should be noted that even' postulating the worst case fire, one
.which is'not detected and is allowed to develop into a fire which causes major damage within. the control cabinet, safe shutdown capability would not be
- affected. ' Millstone 3's design for achieving safe shutdown has provided alternate safe shutdown capability from - dedicated control cabinets located in the switchgear rooms of .the Control Building (elevation 4'6"). Therefore, a loss of -
the' Control Room's main control cabinets would not ' affect the ability of the plant to achieve safe shutdown.
! Status 2/84 -
l - Open.
i FP18-2 .
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.E Open items Chemical Engineering Branch - Fire Protection FP-18 Cont.
Revised Response (3/84)
~ Smoke detection for the control room cabinets and consoles was discussed with the NRC at a meeting on February 16,1984. Based on the type of combustibles and continuous manning of the control room, it was agreed that the main control board was the only cabinet /enclostre of concern. It should be noted that even
-with a total loss of the main control board, safe shutdown capability would still exist. Sketch 1 illustrates a layout of the control room and the detection system concept.
The following information is presented for clarification and consideration.
o :The ventilation path within the main control board moves in an upward direction towards the ceiling area. Fixed open louvers located in the bottom of the control board provide the means for air intake. Air exhaust and the removal of any smoke / heat buildup is achieved by two 1890 cfm exhaust ducts located at the top (ceiling) of the main control board (refer
- to Sketch #2). The upward ventilation path will not only remove any
. smoke / heat generated but will also carry any products of combustion to the
' duct above.
- o. The' cable within the main control board is qualified to the requirements of IEEE 383 and therefore has inherent fire retardant characteristics.
o The Class =lE circuits which provide instrumentation and control imctions are separated from their redmdant Class IE circuits as well as from non-
- . . class lE circuits in accordance with Regulation Guide 1.75. Separation of W redmdant circuits . is ~ achieved by either distance or use of metal barriers / enclosures.
l o' . Wiring and cabling within the main control board are of low voltage.
.o -The type of fire postulated for this' area is a slow burning /smoliering type n _ fire,in which a large quantity of smoke would be generated with very little L . heat damage incurred.
on A ' general area: detection -system provides for both photoelectric and
, ionization smoke detectors within the control room (refer to Sketch #1).
o- .The control roomiis continuously manned by operations personnel. It must be recognized that the senses of sight and smell can realistically detect a smoke / fire condition. On each shif t, selected operations personnel, who are fully trained fire brigade members,'.will be assigned the responsibility
'FP18-3
. 8 sh Open Items Chemical Engineering Branch - Fire Protection FP-18 Cont.
of supporting Millstone Unit No. 3's fire brigade assignment for that shift.
It- can- be expected that any fire within the main control board will be
.quickly- det_ected, controlled, and extinguished by qualified fire brigade personnel.
NNECO concludes- that sufficient justification exists that the possibility 'of
- having an mdetected fire within the main control board is extremely remote.
Even with this, NNECO will commit to the installation of a detection scheme for the main control board to increase the level of protection. Because the main
. control board -is of enclosed metal design, one detection technique to be considered will be a duct detection system. NNECO concludes that this justification and position will completely satisfy the NRC's concerns.
Status 3/84 +
, O pen.
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^ ~s s \ DETELTORS ARE INSTALLED IN THE' CAB 4 WETS OR UINSOLES LAVORATORY TCHEN * -
l ECA CRATE' 6. THERE I5 HQ FALSE CELLING LOUVERED IN THE INST. Rt". RM. AND ALSO !
FALSE' CEILING THERE ARE NO 540KE DETECT 0Ri = .
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Open Items Chemical Engineering Branch - Fire Protection FP-19 Cable Spreading Room Protection (Draf t SER Section 9.5.1.6)
The primary fire suppresion in the cable spreading room is a total flooding automatic carbon dioxide system. We will require the applicant to provide an automatic fixed water suppression system as the primary fire suppression means in the cable spreading room with the carbon dioxide system as a backup to meet the guidelines of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Section C.7.c. This is an open item.
Response (2/84)
A discussion of cable spreading room fire protection was presented in the NRC-CMEB (Fire Protection) meeting. The discussion included a description of the design featurcs of carbon dioxide system and compliance with the BTP Guidelines. The NRC requested that NNECO provide information on disarming the carbon dioxide system and the water suppression system as a backup to meet the BTP Guidelines.
Status (2/84)
Open.
Revised Response (3/84)
An additional discussion of cable spreading rocm fire protection was presented in the NRC-CMEB (Fire Protection) meeting on March 7,1984. The discussion included a description of the oesign features of carbon dioxide system and compliance with the BTP Guidelines. The NRC requested that NNEOO provide the following information on the carbon dioxide system:
- 1. Reliability
- 2. Training of operators
- 3. Disarming of carbon dioxide system
- 4. Carbon dioxide leakage into the control room The NRC Staff disagreed with the NNECO position on the cable spreading room protection.
Status (3/84)
Open.
FP19-1
Open Items Chemical Engineering Branch - Fire Protection FP-20 Switchgear Room Floor Drains (Draf t SER Section 9.5.1.6)
Floor drains have not been provided in the switchgear rooms to prevent damage to equipment from fire fighting water. We will require the applicant to provide floor drains to meet the guidelines of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Section C.7.e. This is an open item.
Response (3/84)
NNECO has reviewed the guidelines of Branch Technical Position CMEB 9.5-1
'and determined that the absence of floor &ains in the switchgear areas, on elevation 4'6" of the Millstone Unit No. 3 control building will not:
o cause unacceptable damage to safety-related equipment due to the utilization of fire fighting hand hose lines (BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Section C.5.a.14); or,'
o; adversely affect the ability of the plant to achieve safe shutdown (BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Section C.5.a.15).
' Thus, NNECO is requesting that a deviation be granted from the guidelines
~
stipulated in Section C.7.e of BTP CMEB 9.5-1.
NNECO's justification for the deviation request is based on the following.
lo" The switchgear areas are separated from each other and surrounding areas by three-hour rated fire barriers. Penetrations through these barriers have been .provided with three-hour fire rated penetration seals, doors, and i dampers.
o- Primary fire suppression capability in both the switchgear areas and cable l tunnels is provided by an automatic total flooding carbon dioxide system.
These CO2 systems are supplied from a low pressure carbon dioxide storage
, tank with sufficient capacity, approximately - 45 tons, for multiple
[ discharges. Carbon dioxide was chosen as the primary suppression agent over water, due to its superior penetration characteristics into covered l- cable trays and enclosed electrical equipment. Also carbon dioxide will g extinguish a fire without damaging adjacent equipment which commonly occurs with sprinkler systems.
o : Due to the extensive use of flame retardant cables (IEEE 383 qualified) and separation between the switchgear equipment, the postulated fire for this
- - area is a smoldering electrical type fire. Sufficient portable fire extinguishers have been provided in the switchgear areas of adjacent areas
. to control and extinguish the fire.
o Should- a fire develop of such magnitude that' Ih" hand hose lines are needed to control and extinguish the fire, 4" curbs have been provided to confine the flooding.- . These curbs have been provided between the I
.FP20-1 b o
sw Open Items Chemical Engineering Branch - Fire Protection FP-20 Cont.
switchgear ' areas and surrounding adjacent areas, as illustrated in the sketches contained in Attachment A. This curbing is sufficiently sized to
.contain the discharge from two IK" hand hose lines (60 gpm per hose line) for approximately 129 minutes within either switchgear area; see Attachment B for calculations. This will provide an additional 30 minutes of water discharge beyond the assumed maximum fire duration of 99 minutes for these areas as calculated in the " Fire Protection Evaluation Report"(Attachment C). Also any minor water accumulation (less than 2")
in the redundant switchgear area would not affect the operation of the switchgear equipment. - This is based upon a minimum three inch clearance that is maintained within the switchgear cabinets between the floor and any switchgear equipment / cabling.
o The design of the control building is- such that water piping has been limited to domestic water for the control room kitchen / bathroom and the 1,000 gallons in the HVAC system. Thus the effects of a pipe break relative to possible flooding in the switchgear area . is insignificant compared to the utilization of hand hose lines for manual fire fighting.
' It is therefore NNECO's position that the absence of floor drains in the control building's switchgear areas will not affect the plant's safety and sufficient
- justification exists to grant the requested deviation from Section C.7.e of BTP CMEB 9.5-1.
- Status (3/84)
Closed.
FP20-2
O ATTACHMENT A SKETCHES OF SWITCHGEAR AREAS, TUNNELS, AND CURBING FP20-3
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b ATTACHMENT B CALCULATION OF WATER CONTAINMENT VOLUME AND DISCHARGE CAPACITY r
l.
FP20-6 m
A. EAST SWITCHGEAR AREA A 6 TUNNEL
- 1. Total area = 5925 Total water volume = 1973 ft
- 2. Switchgear.= 89.5' x 58' 5191 ft Tunnel = 128.25' x 9.5' 1218 ft Subtotal = 6409 ft
- 3. Deductions:
2 Walls = [.833' x 36'] + [112 x 1.0'] 142 ft 2
Ramp Up = [9.71 x 3.333] x [.5] 16 ft Ramp Down = [4 x 11.2] + [(11.2 x 3.333)(.5)] 63.5 ft 3 BYS
- PNL [8.5 x 15.83]
3 EHS
- MCCIA [13.33 x 1.75]
3 'BYS
- PNL-1 [(4.83 x 8.54) + (3.17 x 4.83) + (3.33 x 8.00)] 83 ft .
3 BYS
- PNL-5 [(2.83 x 19.67) + (23.9 x 3.67) 143.4 ft 3 RPS
- JBRC [2.5 x 14.56] 36.4 ft Subtotal = 484.3 2
- 4. Total area = (2) - (3) = 6409 - 484 = 5925.0 ft
- 5. Total volume = . (4) (Height Curb) 3 (5925) (.333') = 1973.0 ft Note: Curb height is 4" above floor.
- 6. Total volume gallons = (1973)(7.84 gal /ft ) 15468 gal.
- 7. Duration of water discharge:
Assumption: Two 11" hose lines, flowing 60 gpm per nozzle 15468 * [2(60)] = 129 minutes 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, 9 minutes FP20-7
.. a. c B. WEST SWITCHGEAR AREA B G RINNEL
- 1. Total area = 6672.36 ft 2 Total volume = 2222 ft 2
- 2. . Area: Switchgear [100 x 55.5] 5550 ft Tunnel [195 x 9.5] 1852.5 ft 2
Subtotal = 7402.5 ft
- 3. Deductions:
Stairway [9.66 x 23] 222 ft Walls [40.0 x 1.0) 40 ft 2
Ramp Up [4.0 x 9.71] + [(3.33 x 9.71)(0.5)] 55 ft 2
3 EHS
- MCCIB2 (13.33 x 1.75) 23.3 ft 3 PYS
- PNL-1 [(8.58 x 7.75) + (4.75 x 6.25) + (1.42 x 3.33)] 101 ft Elec. Equip. Room [26.67 x 10.83] 288.84 ft Subtotal = 730.14 2
- 4. Total area = (2) - (3) = 7402.5 - 730.14 6672.36 ft
- 5. Total volume = (4) (Curb Height) 3 (6672.36) x (.333) 2222 ft Note: Curb height is 4" above floor.
- 6. Total volume gallons = (2222)(7.84 gal /ft ) 17420 gal
- 7. Duration of water discharge:
Assumption: Two 11" hosc lines flowing 60 gpa per nozzle 17420 4 [(2)(60)) = 145 minutes 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, 25 minutes FP20-8 s
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ATTAC11 MENT C i
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I FP20-9
ANALYSIS 25 Control Building El. 4 ft-6 in.
Switchgear, West Floor Area Fire Area CB-1 '
Major Equipment 4.16 kV Switchgear (SR, NSR)(SS) 480 V Switchgear (SR)(SS)
Battery Chargers, Inverters, Panels (SR)(SS)
Auxiliary Shutdown Panel (SR)(SS)
Fire Protection The west floor area at El. 4 ft-6 in..is equipped with both detection and suppression capability. Detection is by smoke detectors and heat detectors. Suppression is by total flooding Co a. Dry chemical portable extinguishers provide backup protection from the adjacent areas.
Accessible extinguishing equipment outside this area consists of fire hose stations from the Tech Support Center El. 11 ft-6 in.
Design Features Figure 77A gives a physical description of this fire area.
Combustible Material M Combustible Material Quantity Btu /fta Cable Insulation 53,000 lb 103,755 MCC 480 kV 8 sect 145 4.16 kV Switchgear 41 sect 21,700 480 V Switchgear 11 sect 1,435 j Shutdown Panel 7 ft-6 in. 90 l Assumed Fire Duration l 3 hr, 35 min l
Postulated Fire The postulated fire is a cable insulation fire resulting from a transient ignition source or an electrical fault.
5-45 i
! FP20-10 l
l
Crnsequeness cf P:stulatsd Fira The smoka datsetien syst;n will detset cny fira. Tha hact detcetien system will actuate a total flooding low pressure co, extinguishing k system. Extinguishing the fire by automatic means will limit the extent of damage.
In the event of no operator action or failure of the co, system, any fire initiated in a cabinet or panel will be contained therein because it is all metal enclosed; thus the fire would affect only the components served by cabinet or the panel. Any cable insulation fire initiated outside a cabinet or panel will be limited and slow to spread because of design 1syout and the fire retardant characteristics of the cable itself.
A fire in this area could possibly affect equipment related to safe shutdown, but would not inhibit safe shutdown because of complete redundancy in a separate fire area.
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I 5-46 FP20-11 o _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
.r. ANALYSIS 26 e*
Control Building El. 4 ft-6 in.
Switchgear, East Floor Area Fire Area CB-2 Major Equipment.
4.16 kV.Switchgear (NSR, SR)(SS) 480 V Switchgear~(SR)(SS)
Battery Chargers, Inverters, Panels (SR, NSR)(SS)
Fire Protection The east switchgear floor area at El. 4 ft-6 in. is equipped with both detection and suppression capability. Detection is by smoke detectors and heat detectors. Suppression is by total flooding Cor . Dry chemical portable extinguishers provide backup protection in the immediate area.
Accessible extinguishing equipment outside this area consists of fire hose stations from the service building El. 24 ft-6 in.
Design Features
- Figure 77A gives a physical description of this fire area. 1 Combustible Material A Combustible Material Quantity Btu /fta Cable Insulation 44,230 lb 101,360 Motor Control Center 480 V 8 sect 170 4.16 kV Switchgear 45 sect 29,890 480 V Switchgear 6 sect 2,285 Assumed Fire Duration I hr, 39 min Postulated Fire The postulated fire is a cable insulation fire resulting from a transient ignition source or an electrical fault.
l 5-47 FP20-12
.- Crnsequ:nces of P:stulated Fire I The smoke detection system will detect any fire. The heat detection l 1
j i
system will actuate a total flooding low pressure co a extinguishing j system. Extinguishing the fire by automatic means will limit the extent of damage.
In the event of no operator action or failure of the co m system, any I fire initiated in a cabinet or panel will be contained therein because it is all metal enclosed; thus the fire would affect only the components served by the cabinet or panel. Any cable insulation fire !
initiated outside a cabinet or panel will be limited and slow to spread because of design layout and the fire retardant characteristics of the cable itself.
A fire in this area could possibly affect equipment related to safe shutdown, but would not inhibit safe shutdown because of complete redundancy in a separate fire area.
e m
5-48 FP20-13
r 4
Open items Chemical Engineering Branch - Fire Protection FP-21 Emergency Diesel Generator Day Tanks (Draf t SER Section 9.3.1.6)
The day tanks are not separately enclosed from the diesel generators, nor are they in a diked enclosure. We will require the applicant to meet the guidelines of BTP CMEB 9.5 1, Section C.7.i. This is an open item.
Response (3/84)
BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Section C.7.1 permits day tanks with a total capabity up to 1,100 gallons within the diesel generator area under the f ollowing conditions:
- 1. The day tank is. located in a separate enclosure with a minimum. fire resistance rating of three hours, including door penetrations. These enclosures should be capable of containing the entire contents of the day tanks and should be protected by an automatic fire suppression system, or
- 2. The day tank is located inside the generator room in a diked enc!osure that
. has sufficient capacity to hold 110% of the contents of the tank or is drained to a saf e location.
Present design includes a day tank with a capacity of 550 gallons, located within each diesel generator area.
Both diesel generator / day tank areas are completely redmdant and physically
' separated from each other and from other areas of _ the plant by fire barriers having.a minimum fire resistance rating of three hours. A dip pan design capable of holding 160 gallons of fuel for each day tank is provided for both areas. A preaction sprinkler system, activated by heat detectors,is also provided for each area. In addition, ultra violet (UV) fire detectors are installed to provide both a local alarm and annunciation in the control room. Fire hose stations, portable fire extinguishers, and a yard hy& ant fire protection system are all available for backup manual protection. Floor drains connected to an oil separator located outside of the area allow f or adequate &ainage in both areas (See existing design attachment I, sketch I).
' An evaluation was conducted to determine the ef fects of fire involving the diesel generator only, day tank only and combination diesel generator and day tank. It was concluded for all three fire scenarios that the end result would be the same.
The_ fire would render the specific diesel generator inoperative. It should be .
noted that .this conclusion is based on no operator action or f ailure of the installed preaction sprinkler system. Even if this occtrred, there would be no safe' shutdown consequences since the system (diesel generator / day tank) is
- completely redmdant and physically separated by a three hour . fire barrier.
Because of this redmdancy, the maffected generator / day tank would be capable
~ of providing on-site power.
FP21-1
o" Open items Chemical Engineering Branch - Fire Protection FP-21 Cont.
Although sufficient justification exists to assure that safe shutdown can be achieved, NNECO proposes to modif y the existing (Attachment I, Sketch 1) fuel collection system to provide a positive means of collecting / drainage / fuel oil
.(See Attachment I, Sketch II). The proposed collection system will be hard piped to an underground storage oil separator tant and the total capacity of this collection / drainage system will contain 110% of the day tank capacity. NNECO trusts that this proposed collection / drainage system concept will satisf y the fire protection concerns ior the Diesel Generator Rooms.
Status (3/84)
Closed.
FP21-2
Skatch 1 Sksteh 2 l
i ATTACHIENT 1 5
l Dir:sel Day Tank Diesel Day Tank -
l 550 cal. Capacity 550 Cal. Capacity Support Ribs -->
Support Ribs +
I 4- Drain Line Flame Arrestor Drain Valve i
i i 4- Drain Line E
i0 Floor Elev. 24'-6" Floor Eles. 24'-6"
', / !! ! " "I i i i i i l I M
"," f / / / / / / /
1 4 4" Drain Line e- 4" Drain Line i
Oil Separator Oil Separator i 500 Gal. Capacity 500 Cal. Capacity
) \ \
Float Switch
\p g,g g EXISTING DESIGN PROPOSED DESIGN CONCEPT _
(SECTIONAL VIEW) )
Ref. S&W Dwg. No. 12179-BS-48