05000269/LER-1982-002, Forwards LER 82-002/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Forwards LER 82-002/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

ML20050B033
Person / Time
Site:	Oconee
Issue date:	03/12/1982
From:	Parker W DUKE POWER CO.
To:	James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML20050B034	List: 05000269/LER-1982-002, Forwards LER 82-002/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl 05000269/LER-1982-002-01, /01T-0:on 820222,control Operator Moved Group 8 Control Rods Into Tech Spec Restricted Area to Clear Core Axial Imbalance Alarm.Caused by Operator Error.Rod Position Corrected & Computer Alarms Modified to Include Group 8 ML20050B058
References
NUDOCS 8204020520
Download: ML20050B033 (3)

LER-1982-002, Forwards LER 82-002/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Event date:
Report date:
2691982002R00 - NRC Website

text

r 1

DUKE POWEH COM PANY Powen 13usunwo 422 Sourn Cucacu Sturz7, CHAHIDTTE, N. C. ana4a

~-.

WI L L6 A p4 0, PAN s F R J R, ViC # P.t tic e se, igitPasos.C: ARE A 7C4 u,.= e.oooc,,o=

March 12, 1982 37 3-4o8 3 ~ )

1 Mr. Jarres P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator g

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission p

f Region II 4"

101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100 fj 2

Atlanta, Georgia 30303

?!,',, '\\k.

0 AD

{ %g

.y

$Mr/0gg A C[- I Re: Oconee Nuclear Station Docket No. 50-269 14 s 1

/

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

pQ, J73M ',l' Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report R0-269 9-02, *This report is submitted pursuant to Oconce Nuclear Station Technical Specification 6.6.2.1.a(2) which concerns an operation subject to a limiting condition for operation which was less conservative than the least conservative aspect of the limiting condition for operation established in the Technical Specifica-tions, and describes an incident which is considered to be of no significance with respect to its effect on the health and safety of the public.

Very truly yours, 4

i $. r William O. Parker, J.

JFK/php Attachment cc: Director Records Center Office of Management & Program Analysis Institute of Nuclear Power Operations U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1820 Water Place Washington, D. C. 20555 Atlanta, Georgia 30339 Mr. W. T. Orders NRC Resident Inspector Oconee Nuclear Station OFFICIAL COPY b

hb B204020520 820312 PDR ADOCK 05000269

//

S PDR

~__

DUKE POWER COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION UNIT 1 Report Number: R0-269/82-02 Report Date: March 12, 1982 Occurrence Date: February 22, 1982 Facility: Oconec Unit 1 Seneca, South Carolina Identification of Occurrence: Group 8 Axial Power Shaping Rods Operated within the Restricted Region of the Technical Specification Curves for greater than two hours.

l Conditions Prior to occurrence:

96% FP Description of Occurrence: On February 22, 1982, the Control Operator moved Group 8 control rods into the Technical Specification restricted region to clear a core axial imbalance alat~ that occurred during power escalation to 100% FP.

The Group 8 control roda remained in the restricted region for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> and 23 minutes before the Control Operator on the subsequent shift recognized that the Group 8 control rods were in the restricted region.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The apparent cause of this incident was a per-sonnel error in that the Control Operators did not 'inow or verify that the Group 8 control rod position exceeded Technical Specification limits.

Analysis of Occurrence: The basis of the APSR position limits (as it is for the imbalance, tilt, and in part, for the control rod position limits) is to prevent fuel cladding damage from exceeding the final acceptance criteria should a worst-case LOCA occur. This is accomplished by compliance with the core operating limits of Technical Specification Section 3.5 so that the linear heat rate values of Technical Specification Figure 3.5.2-5 are not exceeded.

According to the licensing analysis, all the core parameters (i.e., tilt, imbalance, control rod position, and APSR position) would have to be at their limits, and all the engineering uncertainty factors at their maximum values, for the linear heat rate to actually exceed the limit.

In this case only the APSRs were slightly outside their limit. Therefore, the actual linear heat rate would not have been e>pected to exceed the Technical Specification Figure 3.5.2-5 limits.

In addition, the computer's calculated values of maximum linear heat rate did not exceed the Technical Specification Figure 3.5.2-5 limits, since no alarms on linear heat rate were received.

It is concluded that the APSR position limit violation did not constitute operation outside the conditions analyzed for a LOCA and that the purpose of Technical Specification Section 3.5 was met.

Thus, the health and safety of the public were not affected by this incident.

_2-

Corrective Action

The Group 8 rods were moved to the allowable operating region. The startup procedure has been changed to require verification that all control rods, including Group 8, are within the proper position limita-tions prior to exceeding 80% power. At 80% power the rod position limita-tions become more restrictive.

The computer alarms and statalarms are being modified to include Group 8 position limits. This will give a computer alarm and a statalarm when either Group 8 or the Regulating Rods are within the restricted region. The Operations personnel have been counseled concerning this incident.

i