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Insp Repts 50-424/97-03 & 50-425/97-03 on 970303-07. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Fitness for Duty & Physical Security Program for Power Reactors
	ML20137T711
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	04/04/1997
From:	; NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20137T649	List: ML20137T644; ML20137T673; ML20137T711;
References
	50-424-97-03, 50-424-97-3, 50-425-97-03, 50-425-97-3, NUDOCS 9704160149
	Download: ML20137T711 (7)
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION 11

Docket Nos: 50-424, 50-425

License Nos: NPF-68, NPF-81

Report Nos: 50-424/97-03, 50-425/97-03

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Licensee: Southem Nuclear Operating Company

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. Facility: Alvin W. Vogtle Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2

Location: P. O. Box 1295

Birmingham, AL 35201

Dates: March 3 - 7,1997 ;

Inspector L. Stratton, Safeguards inspector

Other NRC

Personnel: B. Manili Licensing Reviewer, Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Approved by: P. Fredrickson, Chief

SpecialInspection Branch

Division of Reactor Safety

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9704160149 970404

PDR ADOCK 05000424

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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Alvin W. Vogtle Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2

NRC Inspection Report 50-424/97-03, 50-425/97-03

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This routine announced ins >ection was conducted in the area of plant support by a regional

safeguardo specialist. The specific areas evaluated were Fitness for Duty and the Physical

Security Program for Power Reactors.

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Two Unresolved items of 10 CFR 26 were identified for failure to maintain i

confidentiality of an individual's preliminary positive chemical test result and ,

discussion of personal information with individuals other than those specified in !

10 CFR 26.29(b). )

o The licensee's deployment strategy documented in the Vogtle Security Response Plan

directly conflicted with the current PSP and was identified as a violation of regulatory ;

requirements.

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ENCLOSURE 2

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S1 Conduct of Security and Safeauards Activities

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S1.3 Fitness for Duty I

a. Inspection Scope (81502) i

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The inspector reviewed the licensee's process and procedures which implemented i

10 CFR 26. I

b. Observations and Findinas

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On March 3,1997, the inspector reviewed randomly selected Fitness for Duty (FFD)

records for individuals that the licensee had for-cause tested for drugs and alcohol for !

the period of June 1,1996 to March 3,1997, at the licensee's corporate office located I

in Birmingham, Alabama. During review of the FFD records, the inspector noted the

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following circumstances with respect to an individual's records-

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On September 13,1996, the individual, due to aberrant behavior, was referred

by his supervisor to be given a for-cause chemical test. The test results were

negative for drugs and alcohol. The individual was placed on administrative

leave based on the supervisor's identification of aberrant behavior.

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On October 2,1996, the individual was referred to the licensee's Employee i

Assistance Program (EAP) facility for a FFD evaluation. Based on the

interview and other associated tests, the recommended action plan by the EAP

facility was that the individual participate in an outpatient program. The !

individual continued to be on administrative leave. ;

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The individual's record documented that on two occasions, followup drug and ;

alcohol tests were conducted on January 13,1997 and February 17,1997.

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The first followup specimen performed on January 13,1997, resulted in a

presumptive positive for amphetamines. As a result of the presumptive !

positive results, the split sample was forwarded to the Health and Human

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Services (HHS) certified laboratory for confirmatory testing. On January 20, l

1997, the Medical Review Officer (MRO), based on the confirmatory test, {

certified the results of the split sample as negative. '

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The second followup test, which was performed on February 19,1997, also

resulted in a presumptive positive for amphetamines. The split sample was

forwarded to the HHS certified laboratory for confirmatory testing. On !

February 25,1997, the MRO certified the results of the split sample as

negative.

During further review, the inspector interviewed licensee representatives and

determined that on February 27,1997, the licensee conducted a teleconference

meeting to include selected staff members of the Georgia Power Company / Southern

Nuclear legal staff, in addition to two Labor Relation employees. The meeting

ENCLOSURE 2

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l discussed, among other topics, the status of the individual's February 1'/,1997

preliminary positive test results.

10 CFR 26.24(d)(1) states in part, access to the results of preliminary tests must be

limited to the licensee's testing staff, the Medical Review Officer (MRO), the Fitness-

For-Duty Program Manager, and the employee assistance program staff, when

appropriate.

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The licensee's failure to limit access to the employee's preliminary positive test results l

of February 17,1997 to those individuals specified in 10 CFR 26.24(d)(1) is identified j

as an Unresolved item (URI) and is being further reviewed by the NRC (50-424, i

50-425/97-03-01). '

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Additionally, during discussions with licensee representatives at the February 27,1997

meeting, the inspector determined that on December 30,1996, a Labor Relations :

employee had conveyed to a union representative that the individualin question had

"a positive drug test." The inspector determined, during review of FFD records, that

the individual's drug and alcohol tests had been negative. The Labor Relations

employee stated "they had corrected the mistake on December 31,1996." Upon

further discussion, the Labor Relations employee informed the inspector that the

Health Services Coordinator, a FFD staff member, had informed Labor Relations that

the individual had been positive for drugs.

Licensee procedure SH-FFD-003, " Standard Operating Procedure," Revision 6, dated

June 22,1996, Section 3.4 states in part that management and or supervisors shall

not be informed of any drug test results not reviewed and confirmed as positive by the

MRO as required by NRC Rule 10 CFR 26.

10 CFR 26.29(b) specifically requires that the licensee shall not disclose personal

information collected and maintained to persons other than assigried MROs, other

licensees or their authorized representatives legitimately seeking the information as !

required by this part for unescorted access decisions.

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The licensee's discussion of personalinformation collected and maintained to persons

other than assigned MROs, other licensees or their authorized representatives

legitimately seeking the information as required by this part for unescorted access

decisions is identified as an URI and is being further reviewed by the NRC (50-424, ,

50-425/97-03-02). l

c. Conclusion

The inspector identified two URis of 10 CFR 26, in that the licensee failed to maintain

confidentiality of an individual's preliminary positive chemical test result and

additionally discussed personal information with individuals other than those specified l

in 10 CFR 26.29(b).

ENCLOSURE 2

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S3 Security and Safenuards Procedures and Documentation

Security Proaram Plans

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S3.1

a. inspection Scooe (81700)

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The inspector reviewed the circumstances and documentation of a licensee 10 CFR '

50.90 proposal submitted on May 15,1996. ,

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b. Observations and Findinas ,

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During the period of February 5 - 8,1996, the NRC conducted an Operational

Safeguards Response Evaluation (OSRE) at the Vogtle facility. During the OSRE, as

part of the deployment strategy, the licensee deployed two officers from the Central ,

Alarm Station (CAS) to respond, which resulted in the CAS being left unmanned. A

shadow force was in place at the time this deployment strategy was utilized. The ;

OSRE report documented the licensee's response strategy planning and execution as

a strength; however, the report noted that abandoning the CAS during a contingency '

may not be in strict compliance with the licensee's current Physical Security Plan '

(PSP). During further discussion between the NRC and licensee representatives, it

was determined that in order for the licensee to continue to leave the CAS unmanned

during a contingency, a 10 CFR 50.90 change to the current PSP would have to be

submitted.

During this inspection period, the inspector identified that the licensee currently had i

the above deployment strategy in effect; however, the 10 CFR 50.90 submittal had not

been approved by the NRC.

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Section 6.6 A, of the licensee's PSP, Revision 33, dated September 12,1996, states i

that the Central Alarm Station (CAS) and Secondary Alarm Station (SAS) are

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continuously manned by at least one authorized person. :

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From January 1996 to March 1997, the Vogtle Security Response Plan, Revision 3, l

Phase 2, defined a deployment strategy that allowed the CAS to be left unmanned. '

This is noted as a violation of regulatory requirements (50-424, 50-425/97-03-03).

c. Conclusion

The licensee's deployment strategy documented in the Vogtle Security Response Plan :

directly conflicted with the current PSP and was identified as a vi6lation of regulatory !

requirements.

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ENCLOSURE 2

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V. Manaaement Meetinas

X1 Exit Meeting Summary

The inspector presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the

conclusion of the inspection on March 7,1997. The licensee acknowledged the findings and

presented the following additionalinformation for Unresolved item 50-424,50-425/

97-03-01 and dissenting comments for Violation 50-424,50-425/97-03-03:

Unresolved item 50-424, 50-425/97-03-01

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The discussion was, in my opinion [ legal staff], consistent with the spirit of the FFD Rule

, because it was directed at preventing abuse of over-the-counter drugs; and consistent with

the letter of the Rule because the discussion consisted of permissible disclosure under

26.29(b) to those licensee representatives who have a need to have access to the

information in performing assigned duties. Meaningful analysis of the issues presented

(including possible allegations of retaliation as well as FFD issues) required an understanding

of the evidence that the subject employee was violating his commitment not to use specific

medication. The human resources personnel, as well as counsel, needed access to that

personnelinformation to perform assigned dutles. The information did not result in adverse

action against the employee, and the information regarding the screening test was not used

inappropriately.

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Violation 50-424, 50-425/97-03-03

During the OSRE, the VEGP security system and tactical response force demonstrated the

ability to successfully protect against the design basis threat and the NRC documented this

result in official NRC correspondence. Both the system and response measures have been

maintained to that level of performance since then. Although VEGP personnel believe we

were in compliance with the subject security regulatory requirements as demonstrated during

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the OSRE, once the NRC clearly communicated their position on this subject earlier this

week, immediate compensatory actions were taken and are continuing to be followed. The

licensee has clearly shown a good faith effort to work with the NRC to resolve this issue and

will continue to pursue implementation of this strategy as originally demonstrated during the

OSRE and as submitted to NRR in May and November 1996.

The Security Department maintains a Deployment Plan for use in contingency training and J

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provides guidelines for use in actual security emergencies. (No deployment plan can cover

all scenarios or emergencies. Training security officers to respond to preplanned activities

increase the effectiveness of their response.) Contingency training provides a method of

expanding security response officer's knowledge base, and adds confidence for success;

therefore increasing the possibility of a successfulinterdiction. We believe the Deployment

Plan as written demonstrated during the OSRE is the best possible plan and fully meeting the

requirements to protect against the design basis threat for radiological sabotage.

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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED !

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Licensee i

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J. Beasley, Jr., General Manager, Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) )

P. Bizjak, Manager, Fitness for Duty (FFD) Program, Southem Nuclear

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Cornpany (SNC) l

A. Brockston, Health Services Coordinator, SNC

D. Huyak, Manager,' Nuclear Security, VEGP

B. Rooks, Health Services Specialist, VEGP

C. Steinspring, Manager, Plant Administration, VEGP

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M. Widmann, Resident inspector

INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED

IP 81700 Physical Security Program for Power Reactors.

IP 81502 Fitness for Duty

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ITEMS OPEN, CLOSED, DISCUSSED '

Opened

50-424, 50-425/97-03-01 URI Failure to protect confidentiality of a preliminary drug test )

50-424, 50-425/97-03-02 URI Failure to protect personal information

50-424, 50-425/97-03-03 VIO Failure to have the CAS manned continuously

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ENCLOSURE 2

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ML20137T711

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