ML20064A803

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Responds to NRC Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-369/90-13 & 50-370/90-13.Corrective Actions:Procedures Dealing W/Fuel Handling Will Be Enhanced by Adding Sign Off to Sections Which Ref Fuel Handling in Tech Specs
ML20064A803
Person / Time
Site: Mcguire, McGuire  Duke energy icon.png
Issue date: 09/10/1990
From: Tucker H
DUKE POWER CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
NUDOCS 9009280115
Download: ML20064A803 (5)


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' Duke fouer Company ' Htt B hkar .

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' ' - Cimrlotte, NC 28242 '

Nuclear Production  ;

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.C k DUKEPOWER c .  : September 10, 1990' s

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b U..S. Nuclear Regulktory' Commission

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' , ' ' ' Document Control Desk:

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Subject:

McGuire Nuclear Sta+ h., J a

Docket Nos. . 50-369,-370 Inspection Report Nos.--369, 370/90 .

Reply;to'a Notice of Violation l C Ge.ntlemen:

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j Pu'rsuant to 10CFR.201, please. find attached _ Duke Power Company's-responseLto. ,

J LViolation-369/90-13-02:and 369/90-13-03 for the McGuire Nuclear'Statio.n.-

H a Should there- be any questions concerning this matter, contact W. T. Byers: at -

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((704)373"6194. l

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,R Very truly your~s ,- j

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. Hal: .LTucker l iaM '.-i enov .wtb .-

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  1. \'[1 IAttachment o .s .

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'm xc: 'Mr. S..D. Ebaeter. i M . Regional! Administrator, Region II.

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U. -S. Nuclear, Regulatory Comission - '.

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.101'Marietta St., NW,. Suite'2900 Atlanta, ' Georgia - 30323 : J l

.Mr. ' Darl Hood 1 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor! Regulation Washington,:0.sc. 20555' hr. P. KL VanDoorn NRCJResidentEinspector-A '

McGuire Nuclec.' Station f7' i

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- 19009280115 900910 37 1
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^d' McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION D

' RESPONSE-TO VIOLATIONS

-violation 369/90-13-02: ,

! , Specification 3.9.11 states, in part:

Tne ael Handling Ventilation Exhaust System shall be operable

- whenever irradiated fuel 11s in the storage pool. With the Fuel Handling. Ventilation _ Exhaust System inoperable, suspend alli l m

operations. involving' crane operation with loads over the storage-  ;

. pool until the Fuel Handling Ventilation Exhaust System is-

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restored.to operable status.

Contrary to the alove, on July 10, 1990, while the Fuel Handling-Ventilation Exhaust System was inoperable, a control rod was; moved in'the storage pool.

4 This'is a-Severity' Level IV violation and applicable to Unit 1-only (supplement I).

Responses-

1. Admission or denial of violation:

Duke Power admits the violation.as stated.

2.; _The: reason for the violation.if admitted:

The, event was dueLto inadequate: work control 1and. group

, interface. . On July. 10, 1990,' a Maintenance (MNT) fuel

~ handler requestedothe Unit 1. Fuel' Pool Ventilation (VF)- -i system-be placed?inDthe~ filter mode.

The work 1 practice..for

'the MWT fuel handling crew has been to goLto,theicontrol' . H

room and requestionly-thatithe VF system be placed inifilter J mode. However, having the VFTaystem'in filter modeldoesinot- h 1 ' ensure 1the system'is meeting.its-Technical Specification  !

-(TS)-' requirements. The. maintenance fuel handler was not 1 viare of the; terms " operable'.' and " inoperable as it ref ers O to TS. -AfterLchecking:the control panel, the. Reactor

-operatorL(RO) informed the MNT fuel handler the Unit,1_VF was in; filter mode. The MNT fuel handler. told the RO he would: be Lmoving.a -dummy control rod assembly from one fuel i assemblyito another. The RO knew'the'MNT'fual handler was moving redummy control rod assembly and he also knew the- ,

Unit 1 VF' system:was inoperable; however, he did not realize u the MNT fuel? handler's job involved moving a load over the i storage pool area because of his limited fuel handling I experience. The RO was subsequently informed ~he Unit.1 VF l system;was required to be operable-when perfonsing this j work;  !

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3. The corrective: steps taken and the results achieved:

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(1)--operations' suspended any_further operations;in the Unit-l' spent, fuel-pool =until the VF_ system was< operable.-

(2) Operations-management discussed this event with a1 representative:from each operation shiftLwith an emphasis ontgroup interface.

- 4. The: corrective; steps which will be'taken to avoid further

. violations:

(1)-10perations will' enhance procedure enclosures! dealing with fuel handling by adding a sign-off to the steps of the sections which reference'the appliceble fuel handling-Technical' Specifications.

-(2) -The-Maintenance Fuel Handling Supervisor will cover:?he event with the Maintenance fuel handling technicians with an emphasis-on group interface.

5. .The'date when full compliance.will be achieved:

McGuire.will be in-full compliance 11/1/1990.

Violation 369/90-13-03:

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Technical Specification 4.5.2.c-requires:

Each. Emergency Core Cooling System, subsystem shall be demonstrated operable by a visual inspection which verifies-that no loose debris (rags, trash, clothing, etc.) is present in the?

containment:which could be transported to the ContainmentLSump-

.and:cause restriction of the~ pump' suctions during LOCA' conditions. -The visual inspection shall besperformed:

-(l) For all accessible areas of the containment pricr to:

establishing containment' integrity,.and n.

1( 2 ) ' Of the areas affected within containment at the completion W :of each containmant entry.when containment integrity is

-established.

b Contrary to the.above, on two occasions, loose debris was'found

'in the Upper-Containment fol10 wing the' completion--of-the 0- containment. cleanliness'inspeccion. -The iirst' instance, during

', ' June, 1989, waslnot1 recognized at a Technical Specification

! violation and subsequently was not reported. The second

. occurrence took place'during May, 1990. In neither case had successful completion of the Techni. cal Specification Surveillance requirements been met.

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This is a! Severity Level IV violation applicable to Unit 1 only) y (Supplement.I).

j Response = 1 l 1. 'Admissionlor' denial of violation: ,

t DukeLPowerLadmits the violation as stated.

2.- The reason:for the violation if admitted:

h L on MayLil, 1990, Quality Assurance (QA) personnel.and-Janitorial Service (K-Mac)' personnel performed a cleanliness

-inspection _ of upper _ and lower containment in preparation .tx) t

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entering ModeJ4. PT/3/A/4800/03F, Containment cleanliness Inspection, was used document the inspection-in' upper and .

4 lower, containment. Q1 personnel signed off,the procedure i p l steps and the= containment cleanliness acceptable step-in the E Mode-4-checklist of OP/1/A/6100/01,' Controlling Procedure W for Unit lStartup. On May 22, 1990, after Unit l had entered

ModeT3, a Radiation-Protection-(RP) technician discovered 4 various unsecured itemsLin upper containment.= The' Reactor _ j
Building-Coordinator (RBC) entered upper containment and' y discovered three additional-items that-should have been H removed. The QA~ personnel did not document the loose  ;

material: located in upper containment. QA personnel i believed that~RP personnel would' remove.their items prior to L startup of the unit'. QA personnel: stated their-focus while performing the procedure was to identify _ maintenance generated items-left from the outagesandLthey did not look- ,

L :for'RP. items. This.mindset led to the failure to fellow '

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4 procedure.

3. TheLeorrective steps taken and the resultsiachieved:

l Corrective steps taken for the occurrence in:1989: i (1) The identified mop heads-in Unit 1 containment were=

removed immediately.

~(2) : Station Directive 3.1.8 was reviewed 1x) assure-

' requirements 'for the recorded' entry of each individual

  • and the accountability of all materials. q (3) Management requested a review of these controls with
  • employees through regular > supervision meetings to A emphasize the importance of no loose materials in the containment' buildings during operational modes.

$ (4) 'An INFORM (Information Needed for McGuire) Bulletin was issued to'all station _ personnel highlighting changes 1to Station Directive 3.1.8.and re-emphasizing housekeeping responsibilities for the Reactor Building.

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, w corrective? steps ~taken for the occurrence in 1990:

~i y, (1). ! Operations (OPS)' ara RP personnel and the RBC removed:

=the' loose itemsJfrom upper-containment.

g OPS and RP personnel entered ~ lower containment outsidec d

~ (2) the. crane < wall and inspected for loose material. 1 g . ,

o. (3) This event?was discusred with the personnel involved

. including appropriate QA_ personnel. .

-(4) This'eventLwas discussed with_the Shift Managers to l ensure that' consistent requirements are applied until L'

1. .the guidance from corrective step l' below is' determined 1

y and;can be? implemented. .

4. TheEborrectiveistepswhichwillbetakencoavoidfurther. I violations: .

-(l) = Integrated Scheduling (IS) and OPS personnel will  ;

obtain specific guidance asuto what items may remain-in -t

. containment and what methods are' acceptable to secure

, ' items remaining in containment.

"(2) OPS, QA,LIS-and RP-personnel will revise

-PT/1/A/4800/03F and PT/2/A/4800/03F, Containment l Cleanliness Inspection, to provide a clear

-understanding of the responsibilities of'all station l groups:pertai,ning to_ performing the procedure. y l (3)' IS; personnel will: evaluate changing Station LDirective

.3.1.8, Access'to the, Reactor Building, based on=the f

p results-of corrective'stepol.

( 4) OPS will evaluate changing PT/1/A/4800/03F_and

'PT/2/A/4800/03F based'on the results of corrective step-1.

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4 L S .- iThe date when full compliance will be achieved:  !

McGuireWill be.in-full compliance prior to completion of- d 2 Unit 2^end of cycle 6 refueling outage. ,

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