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Category:CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS
MONTHYEARML18039A9021999-10-15015 October 1999 Forwards LER 99-010-00 Re Occurrence of Plant Reactor Scram Due to Main Turbine Trip Which Resulted in Main Steam Moisture Separator.All Plant Safety Systems Operated as Designed in Response to Event ML20217E0711999-10-14014 October 1999 Grants Approval for Util to Submit Original,One Signed Paper Copy & Six CD-ROM Copies of Updates to FSAR as Listed,Per 10CFR50.4(c),in Response to ML18039A8961999-10-14014 October 1999 Forwards LER 99-009-00,re Manual Reactor Scram on Unit 2 from 54% Power,Iaw 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv).All Plant Safety Sys Operated as Designed in Response to Event ML20217D3261999-10-0808 October 1999 Responds to Re Event Concerning Spent Fuel Pool Water Temperature Being Undetected for Approx Two Days at Browns Ferry Unit 3 ML20217F7751999-10-0808 October 1999 Confirms 991006 Telcon Between T Abney of Licensee Staff & a Belisle of NRC Re Meeting to Be Conducted on 991109 in Atlanta,Ga to Discuss Various Maintenance Issues ML18039A8931999-10-0808 October 1999 Forwards LER 99-008-00,concerning HPCI Sys Being Declared Inoperable,Iaw 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v).There Are No Commitments Contained in Ltr ML18039A8881999-10-0808 October 1999 Provides Licensee Supplemental Response to NRC 980713 RAI Re GL 87-02,Suppl 1, Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical & Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors. ML20217B5481999-10-0101 October 1999 Requests Exception to 10CFR50.4(c) Requirement to Provide Total of Twelve Paper Copies When Submitting Revs to BFN UFSAR ML20212M1481999-09-28028 September 1999 Refers to Management Meeting Conducted on 990927 at Region II for Presentation of Recent Plant Performance.List of Attendees & Copy of Presentation Handout Encl ML20212F7751999-09-22022 September 1999 Requests Operator & Senior Operator License Renewals for Listed Individuals and Licenses ML20212D3651999-09-20020 September 1999 Forwards SE Accepting Licensee 990430 Proposed Rev to Plant, Unit 3 Matl Surveillance Program ML18039A8721999-09-10010 September 1999 Informs of Licensee Decision to Withdraw Proposed Plant risk-informed Inservice Insp Program,Originally Transmitted in Util 981023 Ltr.Licensee Expects to Resubmit Revised Program within Approx 6 Wks ML20211Q5731999-09-0909 September 1999 Submits Response to Administrative Ltr 99-03 Re Preparation & Scheduling of Operator Licensing Exams.Completed NRC Form 536,operator Licensing Exam Data,Which Provides Plant Current Schedules for Specific Info Requested Encl ML20211G6491999-08-26026 August 1999 Confirms Telcon with T Abney on 990824 Re Mgt Meeting Which Has Been re-scheduled from 990830-0927.Purpose of Meeting to Discuss BFN Status & Performance ML20210Q6931999-08-0909 August 1999 Forwards Updated Changes to Distribution Lists for Browns Ferry & Bellefonte Nuclear Plants ML18039A8371999-08-0606 August 1999 Forwards BFN Unit 2 Cycle 10 ASME Section XI NIS-1 & NIS-2 Data Repts, for NRC Review.Corrected Inservice Insp Summary Rept for Unit 3 Cycle 8 Operation,Included in Rept ML20210Q4421999-08-0505 August 1999 Informs That NRC Plans to Administer Generic Fundamentals Exam Section of Written Operator Licensing Exam on 991006. Authorized Representative of Facility Must Submit Ltr with List of Individuals to Take exam,30 Days Before Exam Date ML20210N1051999-08-0202 August 1999 Forwards SE Accepting Licensee 990326 Request for Relief from ASME B&PV Code,Section XI Requirements.Request for Relief 3-ISI-7,pertains to Second 10-year Interval ISI for Plant,Unit 3 ML20210G8991999-07-28028 July 1999 Discusses 990726 Open Mgt Meeting for Discussion on Plant Engineering Status & Performance.List of Attendees & Presentation Handout Encl ML18039A8181999-07-26026 July 1999 Forwards LER 99-004-00 Re Inoperability of Two Divisions of Plant CSS Due to Personnel Error During Surveillance Testing.Event Reported Per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) ML20210G8051999-07-22022 July 1999 Discusses DOL Case DC Smith Vs TVA Investigation.Oi Concluded That There Was Not Sufficient Evidence Developed During Investigation to Substantiate Discrimination.Nrc Providing Results of OI Investigation to Parties ML20210F3031999-07-22022 July 1999 Submits Rept Re Impact of Changes or Errors in Methodology Used to Demonstrate Compliance with ECCS Requirements of 10CFR50.46.One Reportable non-significant Error Was Found During Time Period of 980601-990630 ML20209J0251999-07-16016 July 1999 Forwards SE Which Constitutes Staff Review & Approval of TVA Ampacity Derating Test & Analyses for Thermo-Lag Fire Barrier Configurations as Required in App K of Draft Temporary Instruction, Fpfi, ML20210B2671999-07-14014 July 1999 Confirms 990702 Telcon Between T Abney of Licensee Staff & Author Re Mgt Meeting Scheduled for 990830 at Licensee Request in Atlanta,Ga to Discuss Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Status & Performance ML20209E3421999-07-0707 July 1999 Confirms Arrangements Made During 990628 Telephone Conversation to Hold Meeting on 990726 in Atlanta,Ga to Discuss Plant Engineering Status & Performance ML20209E5511999-07-0707 July 1999 Informs That as Result of NRC Review of Util Responses to GL 92-01,rev 1 & Suppl 1 & Suppl 1 Rai,Staff Revised Info in Reactor Vessel Integrity Database & Releasing Database as Rvid Version 2.This Closes TACs MA1180,MA1181 & MA1179 ML20196J3531999-06-30030 June 1999 Responds to Re Boeing Rocket Booster Mfg Facility Being Constructed in Decatur,Al.Nrc Has No Unique Emergency Planning Concerns Re Proximity of Boeing Facility to BFN ML20196G9111999-06-28028 June 1999 Discusses Completion of Licensing Action for GL 96-01, Testing of Safety-Related Logic Circuits ML18039A8081999-06-28028 June 1999 Forwards LER 99-004-00 Re Esfas That Occurred When RPS Motor Generator Tripped.Rept Is Submitted IAW Provisions of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) as Event of Condition That Resulted in Automatic Actuation of ESF ML18039A8111999-06-25025 June 1999 Requests Permanent Relief from Inservice Insp Requirements of 10CFR50.55a(g) for Volumetric Exam of Bfn,Unit 3 Circumferential RPV Welds,Per GL 98-05 ML20196F8741999-06-23023 June 1999 Forwards Safety Evaluation Accepting Util Response to GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves ML20196F8131999-06-22022 June 1999 Forwards Rev 24 to Security Personnel Training & Qualification Plan,Per 10CFR50.54(p).Rev Withheld ML18039A8051999-06-22022 June 1999 Forwards LER 99-003-00,re Automatic Reactor Scram Due to Turbine Trip.Rept Numbered 99-001 Should Be Deleted & Replaced with Encl Rept as Result of Error Noted in 990614 Rept ML18039A8031999-06-18018 June 1999 Responds to NRC Staff Verbal Request Re TS Change TS-376, Originally Submitted on 970312, & Proposed Changes to TS to Extend Current 7-day AOT for EDGs to 14 Days ML18039A7931999-06-0101 June 1999 Provides Summary of Major Activities Performed at BFN During Scheduled Unit 2 Cycle 10 Refueling Outage ML20195D3321999-06-0101 June 1999 Informs That Cb Fisher,License OP-5525-4,can No Longer Maintain License at Plant Because of Physical Condition That Causes Licensee to Fail to Meet Requirements of 10CFR55.21 ML18039A7911999-05-24024 May 1999 Informs That by Meeting Test Criteria Established by Test Based on Ansi/Ans 3.5-1985 (License Amends 254 & 214) power- Uprate Simulation Acceptable for Operator Training ML18039A7891999-05-24024 May 1999 Informs That Oscillation Power Range Monitor Module Has Been Enabled for Current Cycle of Operation Following Unit 2 Cycle 10 Refueling Outage Which Was Completed on 990509 ML20195B9361999-05-24024 May 1999 Informs That Do Elkins,License SOP-3392-6,no Longer Needs to Maintain License as Position Does Not Require License ML20206U6551999-05-14014 May 1999 Informs That ML Meek & Wd Dawson Will No Longer Need to Maintain SRO Licenses at Plant,Due to Termination of Employment,Effective 990521 ML20206Q8421999-05-10010 May 1999 Forwards Medical Info on DM Olive,License SOP-20540-2,in Response to NRC 990428 Telcon.Encl Withheld from Public Disclosure IAW 10CFR2.790(a)(6) ML18039A7771999-05-0606 May 1999 Forwards LER 99-003-00,providing Details Re Plant HPCI Sys Being Declared Inoperable Due to Loose Electrical Connection.Ltr Contains No Commitments ML20206G6611999-05-0404 May 1999 Forwards SE Accepting GL 88-20,submitted by TVA Re multi-unit Probabilistic Risk Assessement (Mupra) for Plant, Units 1,2 & 3 ML18039A7741999-04-30030 April 1999 Forwards Proposed Rev to BFN Unit 3 RPV Matl Surveillance Program,For NRC Approval ML20206H5901999-04-30030 April 1999 Forwards Notification of Revs to BFN Unit 2 Emergency Response Data Sys Data Point Library.Revs Were Implemented on 990413 DD-99-06, Informs That Time Provided by NRC within Which Commission May Act to Review Director'S Decision (DD-99-06) Has Expired.Decision Became Final Agency Action on 990423.With Certificate of Svc.Served on 9904281999-04-28028 April 1999 Informs That Time Provided by NRC within Which Commission May Act to Review Director'S Decision (DD-99-06) Has Expired.Decision Became Final Agency Action on 990423.With Certificate of Svc.Served on 990428 ML18039A7681999-04-27027 April 1999 Requests Relief from Specified Inservice Insp Requirements in Section XI of ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code,Per 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i).Relief Requests 2-ISI-8 & 3-ISI-8,encl for NRC Review & Approval ML18039A7591999-04-27027 April 1999 Forwards Annual Radiological Environ Operating Rept Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant 1998. Rept Includes Results of Land Use Censuses,Summarized & Tabulated Results of Radiological Environ Samples in Format of Reg Guide 4.8 & NUREG-1302 ML18039A7651999-04-27027 April 1999 Forwards Rev 0 to TVA-COLR-BF2C11, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 2,Cycle 11 Colr. ML18039A7541999-04-23023 April 1999 Requests Approval of Bfnp Unit 3 Risk-Informed ISI (RI-ISI) Program,Per 10CFR50.55(a)(3)(i) & GL 88-01.Encl RI-ISI Program Is Alternative to Current ASME Section XI ISI Requirments for Code Class 1,2 & 3 Piping 1999-09-09
[Table view] Category:INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE
MONTHYEARML18039A9021999-10-15015 October 1999 Forwards LER 99-010-00 Re Occurrence of Plant Reactor Scram Due to Main Turbine Trip Which Resulted in Main Steam Moisture Separator.All Plant Safety Systems Operated as Designed in Response to Event ML18039A8961999-10-14014 October 1999 Forwards LER 99-009-00,re Manual Reactor Scram on Unit 2 from 54% Power,Iaw 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv).All Plant Safety Sys Operated as Designed in Response to Event ML18039A8881999-10-0808 October 1999 Provides Licensee Supplemental Response to NRC 980713 RAI Re GL 87-02,Suppl 1, Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical & Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors. ML18039A8931999-10-0808 October 1999 Forwards LER 99-008-00,concerning HPCI Sys Being Declared Inoperable,Iaw 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v).There Are No Commitments Contained in Ltr ML20217B5481999-10-0101 October 1999 Requests Exception to 10CFR50.4(c) Requirement to Provide Total of Twelve Paper Copies When Submitting Revs to BFN UFSAR ML20212F7751999-09-22022 September 1999 Requests Operator & Senior Operator License Renewals for Listed Individuals and Licenses ML18039A8721999-09-10010 September 1999 Informs of Licensee Decision to Withdraw Proposed Plant risk-informed Inservice Insp Program,Originally Transmitted in Util 981023 Ltr.Licensee Expects to Resubmit Revised Program within Approx 6 Wks ML20211Q5731999-09-0909 September 1999 Submits Response to Administrative Ltr 99-03 Re Preparation & Scheduling of Operator Licensing Exams.Completed NRC Form 536,operator Licensing Exam Data,Which Provides Plant Current Schedules for Specific Info Requested Encl ML20210Q6931999-08-0909 August 1999 Forwards Updated Changes to Distribution Lists for Browns Ferry & Bellefonte Nuclear Plants ML18039A8371999-08-0606 August 1999 Forwards BFN Unit 2 Cycle 10 ASME Section XI NIS-1 & NIS-2 Data Repts, for NRC Review.Corrected Inservice Insp Summary Rept for Unit 3 Cycle 8 Operation,Included in Rept ML18039A8181999-07-26026 July 1999 Forwards LER 99-004-00 Re Inoperability of Two Divisions of Plant CSS Due to Personnel Error During Surveillance Testing.Event Reported Per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) ML20210F3031999-07-22022 July 1999 Submits Rept Re Impact of Changes or Errors in Methodology Used to Demonstrate Compliance with ECCS Requirements of 10CFR50.46.One Reportable non-significant Error Was Found During Time Period of 980601-990630 ML18039A8081999-06-28028 June 1999 Forwards LER 99-004-00 Re Esfas That Occurred When RPS Motor Generator Tripped.Rept Is Submitted IAW Provisions of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) as Event of Condition That Resulted in Automatic Actuation of ESF ML18039A8111999-06-25025 June 1999 Requests Permanent Relief from Inservice Insp Requirements of 10CFR50.55a(g) for Volumetric Exam of Bfn,Unit 3 Circumferential RPV Welds,Per GL 98-05 ML20196F8131999-06-22022 June 1999 Forwards Rev 24 to Security Personnel Training & Qualification Plan,Per 10CFR50.54(p).Rev Withheld ML18039A8051999-06-22022 June 1999 Forwards LER 99-003-00,re Automatic Reactor Scram Due to Turbine Trip.Rept Numbered 99-001 Should Be Deleted & Replaced with Encl Rept as Result of Error Noted in 990614 Rept ML18039A8031999-06-18018 June 1999 Responds to NRC Staff Verbal Request Re TS Change TS-376, Originally Submitted on 970312, & Proposed Changes to TS to Extend Current 7-day AOT for EDGs to 14 Days ML18039A7931999-06-0101 June 1999 Provides Summary of Major Activities Performed at BFN During Scheduled Unit 2 Cycle 10 Refueling Outage ML20195D3321999-06-0101 June 1999 Informs That Cb Fisher,License OP-5525-4,can No Longer Maintain License at Plant Because of Physical Condition That Causes Licensee to Fail to Meet Requirements of 10CFR55.21 ML20195B9361999-05-24024 May 1999 Informs That Do Elkins,License SOP-3392-6,no Longer Needs to Maintain License as Position Does Not Require License ML18039A7911999-05-24024 May 1999 Informs That by Meeting Test Criteria Established by Test Based on Ansi/Ans 3.5-1985 (License Amends 254 & 214) power- Uprate Simulation Acceptable for Operator Training ML18039A7891999-05-24024 May 1999 Informs That Oscillation Power Range Monitor Module Has Been Enabled for Current Cycle of Operation Following Unit 2 Cycle 10 Refueling Outage Which Was Completed on 990509 ML20206U6551999-05-14014 May 1999 Informs That ML Meek & Wd Dawson Will No Longer Need to Maintain SRO Licenses at Plant,Due to Termination of Employment,Effective 990521 ML20206Q8421999-05-10010 May 1999 Forwards Medical Info on DM Olive,License SOP-20540-2,in Response to NRC 990428 Telcon.Encl Withheld from Public Disclosure IAW 10CFR2.790(a)(6) ML18039A7771999-05-0606 May 1999 Forwards LER 99-003-00,providing Details Re Plant HPCI Sys Being Declared Inoperable Due to Loose Electrical Connection.Ltr Contains No Commitments ML20206H5901999-04-30030 April 1999 Forwards Notification of Revs to BFN Unit 2 Emergency Response Data Sys Data Point Library.Revs Were Implemented on 990413 ML18039A7741999-04-30030 April 1999 Forwards Proposed Rev to BFN Unit 3 RPV Matl Surveillance Program,For NRC Approval ML18039A7681999-04-27027 April 1999 Requests Relief from Specified Inservice Insp Requirements in Section XI of ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code,Per 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i).Relief Requests 2-ISI-8 & 3-ISI-8,encl for NRC Review & Approval ML18039A7591999-04-27027 April 1999 Forwards Annual Radiological Environ Operating Rept Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant 1998. Rept Includes Results of Land Use Censuses,Summarized & Tabulated Results of Radiological Environ Samples in Format of Reg Guide 4.8 & NUREG-1302 ML18039A7651999-04-27027 April 1999 Forwards Rev 0 to TVA-COLR-BF2C11, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 2,Cycle 11 Colr. ML20206C8591999-04-23023 April 1999 Informs That Util Has Determined,Dr Bateman No Longer Needs to Maintain His License,Effective 990331,per Requirement of 10CFR55.55(a) ML18039A7541999-04-23023 April 1999 Requests Approval of Bfnp Unit 3 Risk-Informed ISI (RI-ISI) Program,Per 10CFR50.55(a)(3)(i) & GL 88-01.Encl RI-ISI Program Is Alternative to Current ASME Section XI ISI Requirments for Code Class 1,2 & 3 Piping ML18039A7581999-04-23023 April 1999 Responds to Item 4 of 981117 RAI Re TS Change Request 376 Re Extended EDG Allowed Outage Time,In Manner Consistent with Rgs 1.174 & 1.177 ML20206C1241999-04-21021 April 1999 Forwards Annual Occupational Radiation Exposure Rept for 1998, IAW TS Section 5.6.1.Rept Reflects Radiation Exposure Data as Tracked by Electronic Dosimeters on Radiation Work Permits ML20205T0971999-04-15015 April 1999 Submits Change in Medical Status for DM Olive in Accordance with 10CFR55.25,effective 990315.Encl Medical Info & Certification of Medical Exam,Considered by Util to Be of Personal Nature & to Be Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6) ML18039A7441999-04-0707 April 1999 Forwards LER 99-001-00,providing Details Re Inoperability of Two Trains of Standby Gas Treatment Due to Breaker Trip on One Train in Conjunction with Planned Maint Activities on Other.Ltr Contains No New Commitments ML18039A7431999-03-30030 March 1999 Responds to NRC 990112 RAI Re BFN Program,Per GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety- Related Movs. ML18039A7421999-03-30030 March 1999 Provides Results of Analysis of Design Basis Loca,As Required by License Condition Re Plants Power Uprate Operating License Amends 254 & 214 ML18039A7411999-03-30030 March 1999 Provides Partial Response to NRC 981117 RAI Re TS Change Request 376,proposing to Extend Current 7 Day AOT for EDG to 14 Days ML18039A7371999-03-26026 March 1999 Requests Relief from Specified ISI Requirements in Section XI of ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code,1989 Edition.Encl Contains Request for Relief 3-ISI-7,for NRC Review & Approval ML18039A7331999-03-26026 March 1999 Forwards Rev 4 to TVA-COLR-BF2C10, Bnfp,Unit 2,Cycle 10 COLR, IAW Requirements of TS 5.6.5.d.COLR Was Revised to Extend Max Allowable Nodal Exposure for GE GE7B Fuel Bundles ML18039A7291999-03-22022 March 1999 Forwards Revised Epips,Including Index,Rev 26A to EPIP-1, Emergency Classification Procedure & Rev 26A to EPIP-5, General Emergency. Rev 26A Includes All Changes Made in Rev 26 as Well as Identified Errors ML20204G8471999-03-19019 March 1999 Reports Change in Medical Status for Ma Morrow,In Accordance with 10CFR55.25.Encl Medical Info & Certification of Medical Exam,Considered by Util to Be of Personal Nature & to Be Withheld from Pdr,Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6).Without Encl ML20207M0611999-03-11011 March 1999 Forwards Goals & Objectives for May 1999 for Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant,Units 1,2 & 3,radiological Emergency Plan Exercise.Plant Exercise Is Currently Scheduled for Wk of 990524 ML18039A6971999-02-22022 February 1999 Forwards Typed TS Pages,Reflecting NRC Approved TS Change 354 Requiring Oscillation PRM to Be Integrated Into Approved Power uprate,24-month Operating Cycle & Single Recirculation Loop Operation ML18039A6961999-02-19019 February 1999 Provides Util Response to GL 95-07 Re RCIC Sys Injection Valves (2/3-FCV-71-39) for BFN Units 2 & 3.Previous Responses,Dtd 951215,1016 & 960730,0315 & 0213,supplemented ML18039A6911999-02-19019 February 1999 Forwards Rev 3 to Unit 2 Cycle 10 & Rev 1 to Unit 3 Cycle 9, Colr.Colrs for Each Unit Were Revised to Include OLs Consistent with Single Recirculation Loop Operation ML20203B6031999-02-0404 February 1999 Requests Temporary Partial Exemption from Requirements of 10CFR50.65,maint Rule for Unit 1.Util Requesting Exemption to Resolve Issue Initially Raised in NRC Insp Repts 50-259/97-04,50-260/97-04 & 50-296/97-04,dtd 970521 ML18039A6741999-01-21021 January 1999 Responds to NRC 981209 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-259/98-07,50-260/98-07 & 50-296/98-07,respectively. Corrective Actions:Will Revise Procedure NEPD-8 Re Vendor Nonconformance Documentation Submission to TVA ML20199F6951999-01-0808 January 1999 Submits Request for Relief from ASME Section XI Inservice Testing Valve Program to Extend Interval Between Disassembly of Check Valve,Within Group of Four Similar Check Valves for EECW Dgs,From 18 to 24 Months 1999-09-09
[Table view] Category:UTILITY TO NRC
MONTHYEARML20059L5741990-09-19019 September 1990 Forwards Rev 2 to Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Cable Issues Supplemental Rept Corrective Actions,Sept 1990. Rept Revised to Clarify Cable Bend Radius & Support of Vertical Cable & Document Resolution of Jamming Issues ML20064A6871990-09-18018 September 1990 Requests Closure of Confirmatory Order EA-84-054 Re Regulatory Performance Improvement Program ML20059L4931990-09-17017 September 1990 Provides Addl Info Re 900713 Tech Spec Change 290 Concerning Hpci/Rcic Steam Line Space Temp Isolations,Per Request ML18033B5171990-09-17017 September 1990 Forwards Addl Info Re 900524 Tech Spec Change 287 on Reactor Pressure Instrument Channel.Schematic Diagrams Provided in Encl 2 ML20064A6851990-09-17017 September 1990 Responds to NRC Recommendations Re Primary Containment Isolation at Facility.Background Info & Responses to Each Recommendation Listed in Encl 1 ML20059K2971990-09-14014 September 1990 Responds to NRC 900208 SER Re Conformance to Reg Guide 1.97, Rev 3, Neutron Flux Monitoring Instrumentation. TVA Endorses BWR Owners Group Appealing NRC Position Directing Installation of Upgraded Neutron Flux Sys ML20059H3861990-09-10010 September 1990 Forwards Corrective Actions Re Radiological Emergency Plan, Per Insp Repts 50-259/89-41,50-260/89-41 & 50-296/89-41. Corrective Action:Plant Manager Instruction 12.12,Section 4.11.3.1 Revised ML18033B5031990-08-31031 August 1990 Forwards Financial Info Required to Assure Retrospective Premiums,Per 10CFR140 & 771209 Ltr ML20059E1741990-08-31031 August 1990 Informs That Plant Restart Review Board & Related Functions Will Be Phased Out on Date Fuel Load Commences ML20059D7061990-08-28028 August 1990 Requests That Sims Be Updated to Reflect Implementation of Program to Satisfy Requirements of 10CFR50,App J.Changes & Improvements Will Continue to Be Made to Reflect Plant Mods, Tech Spec Amends & Recommendations from NRC ML18033B4931990-08-20020 August 1990 Suppls Response to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-259/90-14,50-260/90-14 & 50-296/90-14.Corrective Actions: TVA Developed Corporate Level std,STD-10.1.15 Re Independent Verification ML20063Q2431990-08-20020 August 1990 Responds to 900807 Telcon Re Rev to Commitment Due Date Per Insp Rept 50-260/89-59 Re Electrical Issues Program ML20063Q2451990-08-17017 August 1990 Provides Revised Response to Generic Ltr 89-19 Re Request for Action Concerning Resolution of USI A-47, Safety Implication of Control Sys in LWR Nuclear Power Plants & Notification of Commitment Completion ML20063Q2441990-08-17017 August 1990 Advises That IE Bulletin 80-11 Re Masonry Wall Design Implemented at Facilities.Design Finalized,Mods Completed, Procedures Issued & Necessary Training Completed.Sims Data Base Should Be Updated to Show Item Being Implemented ML20059A4861990-08-16016 August 1990 Responds to Verbal Commitment Made During 900801 Meeting W/Nrc Re Control Room Habitability.Calculations Performed to Support Util 900531 Submittal Listed in Encls 1 & 2 ML20059A5141990-08-16016 August 1990 Provides Response to NRC Bulletin 88-008,Suppl 3 Re Thermal Stresses in Piping Connected to Rcs.Util Does Not Anticipate Thermal Cyclic Fatique Induced Piping,Per Suppl 3 to Occur in Plant.Ltr Contains No Commitment ML18033B4821990-08-14014 August 1990 Submits Revised Response to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-259/89-16,50-260/89-16 & 50-296/89-16.Extends Completion Dates for Commitments to 901203 ML18033B4831990-08-13013 August 1990 Responds to NRC 900713 Ltr Re Violations & Deviations Noted in Insp Repts 50-259/90-18,50-260/90-18 & 50-296/90-18. Corrective Actions:Craft Foreman Suspended for Three Days & Relieved of Duties as Foreman ML18033B4811990-08-10010 August 1990 Responds to NRC 900710 Ltr Re Power Ascension Testing Program.Four Hold Points Selected by NRC Added to Unit 2 Restart Schedule ML18033B4801990-08-0808 August 1990 Forwards Response to SALP Repts 50-259/90-07,50-260/90-07 & 50-296/90-07 for Jul 1989 - Mar 1990 ML20044B2121990-07-13013 July 1990 Clarifies Util Position on Two Items from NRC 891221 Safety Evaluation Re TVA Supplemental Response to Generic Ltr 88-01 Concerning IGSCC in BWR Stainless Steel Piping.Insp Category for Nine Welds Will Be Changed from Category a to D ML18033B4371990-07-13013 July 1990 Forwards Corrected Tech Spec Page 3.2/4.2-45 to Util 900706 Application for Amend to License DPR-52 Re ADS ML18033B4331990-07-13013 July 1990 Requests Temporary Exemption from Simulator Certification Requirements of 10CFR55.45(b)(2)(iii) ML20055F6091990-07-12012 July 1990 Provides Response to NRC Bulletin 88-003 Re Insp Results. No Relays Found to Have Inadequate Latch Engagements. Therefore,No Corrective Repairs or Replacement of Relays Required ML18033B4251990-07-10010 July 1990 Forwards Cable Installation Supplemental Rept,In Response to NRC Request During 900506 Telcon.Rept Contains Results of Walkdowns & Testing Except Work on Ongoing Cable Pullby Issue ML18033B4241990-07-0606 July 1990 Advises That Util Expects to Complete Implementation of Rev 4 to Emergency Procedure Guidelines by Mar 1991.Response to NRC Comments on Draft Emergency Operating Instructions Encl ML18033B4201990-07-0505 July 1990 Provides Basis for Closure of Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 4.5.3. Util Has Concluded That Analyses Presented in BWR Owners Group Repts Acceptable for Resolving Issue,Subj to Listed Conditions ML18033B4091990-07-0202 July 1990 Responds to NRC 900601 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-259/89-53,50-260/89-53 & 50-296/89-53.Corrective Actions: Condition Adverse to Quality Rept Initiated & Issued to Track Disposition of Deficiency in Chilled Water Flow Rates ML20043G4901990-06-14014 June 1990 Forwards Tabs for Apps a & B to Be Inserted Into Util Consolidated Nuclear Power Radiological Emergency Plan ML20043H3511990-06-14014 June 1990 Forwards Corrected Pages to Rev 15 to Physical Security Contingency Plan,As Discussed During 900606 Telcon.Encl Withheld (Ref 10CFR73.21) ML20043F4951990-06-11011 June 1990 Advises That Facilities Ready for NRC Environ Qualification Audit.Only Remaining Required Binder in Review Process & Will Be Completed by 900615 ML18033B3651990-06-0808 June 1990 Forwards Revised Page 3.2/4.2-13 & Overleaf Page 3.2/4.2-12 to Tech Spec 289, RWCU Sys Temp Loops. ML18033B3391990-06-0404 June 1990 Responds to NRC 900504 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-259/90-08,50-260/90-08 & 50-296/90-08.Corrective Actions: Individual Involved Counseled on Importance of Complying W/Approved Plant Procedures When Performing Assigned Tasks ML20043D3251990-06-0101 June 1990 Responds to NRC 900502 Ltr Re Notice of Violation & Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty.Corrective Actions:Snm Program Action Plan Being Developed & Implemented,Consisting of Improved Training for Control Personnel & Accountability ML18033B3551990-05-31031 May 1990 Forwards Response to 891219 Request for Addl Info on Hazardous Chemicals Re Control Room Habitability ML20043C1951990-05-30030 May 1990 Forwards Response to Generic Ltr 90-04 Re Status of Implementation of Generic Safety Issues ML20043C0601990-05-29029 May 1990 Forwards Response to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-259/90-12,50-260/90-12 & 50-296/90-12.Util Admits Violation Re Access Control to Vital Areas,But Denies Violation Re Backup Ammunicition for Responders ML18033B3351990-05-25025 May 1990 Provides Basis for Closure of Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 4.5.3, Reactor Trip Sys Reliability. Analyses Presented in BWR Owners Group Repts Acceptable for Resolving Issues Subj to Listed Conditions ML18033B3221990-05-21021 May 1990 Forwards Rev 1 to ED-Q2000-870135, Cable Ampacity Calculation - V4 & V5 Safety-Related Trays for Unit 2 Operation, as Followup to Electrical Insp Rept 50-260/90-13 Re Ampacity Program ML18033B3101990-05-18018 May 1990 Responds to NRC 900417 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-259/90-05,50-260/90-05 & 50-296/90-05.Corrective Action: Senior Reactor Operator Assigned to Fire Protection Staff for day-to-day Supervision of Fire Protection Program ML20043A6101990-05-15015 May 1990 Forwards Rev 16 to Security Personnel Training & Qualification Plan.Rev Withheld (Ref 10CFR2.790) ML20043A4091990-05-14014 May 1990 Forwards Rev 14 to Physical Security/Contingency Plan.Rev Withheld (Ref 10CFR73.21) ML20043A4081990-05-14014 May 1990 Forwards Rev 15 to Physical Security/Contingency Plan, Consisting of Changes for Provision of Positive Access Control During Major Maint & Refueling Operations to One of Two Boundaries.Rev Withheld (Ref 10CFR73.21) ML18033B2921990-05-0909 May 1990 Provides Info for NRC Consideration Re Plant Performance for Current SALP Rept Period of Jan 1989 - Mar 1990.Util Believes Corrective Actions Resulted in Positive Individual Changes & Programmatic Upgrades ML20042F7401990-05-0404 May 1990 Responds to Generic Ltr 89-19, Request for Action Re Resolution of USI A-47, 'Safety Implication of Control Sys in LWR Nuclear Power Plants.' TVA Will Finalize Calculations for Switch Setpoints Prior to Units Restart ML20042F7701990-05-0404 May 1990 Provides Results of Review of Util 890418 Submittal Re Supplemental Implementation of NUMARC 87-00 on Station Blackout.Implementation of 10CFR50.63 Consistent W/Guidance Provided by NUMARC 87-00 ML20042F3721990-05-0202 May 1990 Forwards Corrected Monthly Operating Repts for Jan-June 1989 & Aug 1989 - Jan 1990.Discrepancies Involve Cumulative Unit Svc Factors & Unit Availability Capacity Factors ML18033B2631990-04-12012 April 1990 Forwards Response to NRC 900212 Request for Info Re Power Ascension & Restart Test Program at Unit 2.Util Has Refined Power Ascension Program to Be More Integrated & Comprehensive ML18033B2551990-04-0909 April 1990 Responds to NRC 900309 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-259/89-16,50-260/89-16 & 50-296/89-16.Corrective Actions: Contractor Will Perform Another Check Function Review for Mechanical Calculations & Area Walkdowns Will Be Conducted ML18033B2431990-04-0202 April 1990 Responds to NRC 900302 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-259/89-43,50-260/89-43 & 50-296/89-43.Corrective Action: Surveillance Insp Revised to Prevent Removal of All Eight Emergency Equipment Cooling Water Pumps from Water 1990-09-19
[Table view] |
Text
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- b. i i TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY ;
1 P. O. Box 2000 )
Decatur, Alabama j l SEP 17 20 I J
l U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cos tission ATTN Document Control Detx !
Washington, D.C. 20555 i i
Gentlemen In the Matter of ) Docket Nos. 50-259
,- Tennessee Valley Authority ) 50-260 .
50-296 BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN) - RESPONSE TO NRC REC 0!MENDATIONS REGARDING PRIMARY (,0NTAIMMENT ISOLATION (TAC NOS. R00080, R00081, AND R00082) .
This letter 1s-in response to the NRC staff recommendations regarding primary '
containment. isolation at Browns Ferry. These recommendations were discussed in a working level meeting-between TVA and the NRC staff on July 10 ~and 11, 1990 and are documented in the NRC meeting notes, which were provided to TVA by letter dated August 17, 1990. Background information and responses to each '
recommendation are provided as Enclosure 1 to this letter. i t
A sunanary list of connitments contained in this letter is provided as Enclosure 2. If you have any questions, please contact Patrick P. Carter, i
Manager'of Site Licensing, at (205) 729-3570. ,
i Very truly yours, TE SEE VALLEY AUTHORITY i . .
[M E.'G. Wallace, Manager p, Nuclear Licensing and Regulatory Affairs i Enclosures-cet See page 2 j
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9009270o44 900917 -
fDR ADOCK 05000259 PDC An Equal Opportunity Employer R-/W[g ,
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- I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission j i
ec (Enclosures)) l Ms. S. C. Black, Deputy Director Project Directorate II-4 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint, North ,
"i 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852
]
NRC Resident Inspector Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Route 12, Box 637 i Athens, Alabama 35609-2000 ,
i
, Thierry M. Ross, Project Manager i U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike l Rockville, Maryland 208 Mr. B. A. Wilson, Project Chief U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 1
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ENCLOSURE 1 l l 3ROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT 1 RE8PONSE TO NRC REC 0fttENDATIONS i i CONCERNING PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION I l
l Eacksround:
l TVA and the NRC staff have had an ongoing dialogue rectrding the overall l Browns Ferry containment isolation valve configuration and specifically the !
configuration of the Reactor Building Closed Cooling Nater (RBCCW) system.
.j. (This configuration is shown on Figure 27 of TVA's July 13, 1989 letter.) .
These discussions were initiated after TVA submitted Technical Specification )
j No. 251 on August 2, 1983. This amendment proposed an update to Table 3.7.A, containment Isolation Valves, to reflect modifications to the plant and to better align the table with the BFN Appendix J program. ;
i One of the proposed changes was the inclusion of the two RBCCW isolation valves. The RSCCW system contains a single containment isolation valve on the supply and return piping. There is a check valve on the supply line outside ,
of containment and a remote manually operated valve on the return line outside of containment. The A-C powered valve does not receive a primary containment !
n olation signal but does have remote-manual control from the control room. ?
Thsse valves were not previously considered primary containsient isolation valves. j On Juna 15, 1989, TVA and NRC held a work'ing meeting to aiscuss TVA's program ,
f and to .'esole NRC s';aff concerns. Supplement 1 to Technt:a1 Specification No. 251 was subid*ted on July 13, 1989 to provide the specific information requested by the NRC staff on the docket in order for the NRC staff to complete their review. !
Information Notice 89-55 was issuei on Jt i 30, 1989 and postulates a scenario -
- in which a recirculation line failure (s Eigh Energy Line Break [NELB]) inside
- containment causes the loss of the RSCCW system integrity. The failure ;
mechanism is not specified. A et ,> sequent single failure of either of the -
4 single RBCCW containment isolat) m valves on the inlet or outlet piping would 3
cause the loss of containment it.tegrity. The pressurized post-accident
! containment atmosphere could displace water in the RBCCW piping and ultimately l l vent to the reactor building. Thus, NRC's position as stated in the
., Information Notice is that the RBCCW system should not be considered a closed system inside containment. ,
1
- TVA and the NRC staff held a working meeting at Browns Ferry on July 10, 1990, to review the RFN containment isolation valve configuration and the Appendix J program. TVA presented material to the NRC staff in that meeting which supports TVA's position that BFW's RBCCW containcent isolation valve ,
configuration is in conformance with Browns Ferry's licensing and design ;
basis. This information was summarised and is presented below. The primary HELB and missile protection-design objectives were to unsure that HELBs and missiles would not damage the primary containment vessel and to minimize the potential for a breach the primary containment. No consequential failure of safety related systems or the breach of other syste9's integrity were required to be postulated.
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- i ENCLOSURE 1 (Continued) Page 2 of 8 l BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR FLANT i l RESPONSE TO NRC RECOMMENDATIONS l CONCERNING PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION i l-Backaround (Continued)
1-The RFN licensing and design basis for the RBCCW containment isolation valve i, configuration was established in Final Safety Analysis Report (F8AR) Section l t 5.2.3.5, Isolation Valves, Section 5.2.4.6, Missile and Pipe Whip Prevention, ;
I FSAR Appendix A, Conformance to Proposed AEC General Design Criterion, the i Technical Specifications, and in the original Safety Evaluation Report ($1R) and its Supplements. A discussion of each is provided below:
i FSAR Section 5.2.3.5 stated that lines such as the closed cooling water :
lines, which neither connect to the reactor primary system nor are open i
into the primary containment, were provided with at lease one a-c powered valve located outside primary containment, or a check valve on '
the influent line inside the containnsnt. FSAR Figures 10.6-la and
-lb, RBCCW P&ID, clearly showed the containment isolation valve configuration. :
Section 5.2.4.6 summarised the design consideration given to missile and pipe whip prevention. All of the containment penetrations and isolation valves were protected from pipe whip by anchors located at or near the isolation valves. If a pipe leak should occur, means for .i detecting leaks were available so that proper action could be taken i before it could develop into an appreciable break. Nevertheless, the recirculation lines within the primary containment were provided with a ;
system of pipe restraints designed to liett excessive motion associated with pipe splic or circumferential break.
This section further stated that the design of the containment and piping systems considered the possibility of missiles being generated '
f om the failure of flanged joints, such as valve bonnets, valve stems, and recirculation pumpe, and from instrumentation such as thernovells.
The design philosophy was that no missiles would penetrate the '
containment. In addition, a decoupling device was installed between the recirculation pump and motor to prevent destructive motor overspeed. A probabilistic study was initiated by General Electric to see if additional restraints to maintain pipe alignment after the pipe break in order to contain the pump missiles were warranted. The study
, concluded that incorporation of additional restraints would not provide i substantially greater protection for the health and safety of the :
public, whereas the cost was disproportionally increased for the !
concomitant minimal increase in overall safety. ,
Appendix A to the FSAR presented the interpretation, discussions, and conclusions on how the design of BFN con /ormed to the ABC proposed general design criteria at the time of the RFN design. During the ,
construction permit ligansing process, unit 2 was evaluated against the draft of the 27 General Design Criteria (GDC) which was issued on >
November 22, 1965. The design bases was reevaluated at the time of r
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O O Page 3 of 8 ENCLOSURE 1 (Continued)
BROWN 8 FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT
- ' RESPON8E TO NRC REC 0f9tENDATIONS i CONCERNING PRIMARY CONTAllWtENT ISOLATION i r
i l' Backaround (Continued): ;
initial FSAR preparation and license application against the draft of ;
the 70 GDC which were issued on July 10, 1967. Draft GDC 53, Containment Isolation Valves, stated that penetrations that require .I closure for the containment function be protected by redundant valving ,
and associated apparatus. TVA concluded that the design of the plant '
was in conformance with draft GDC 53, since pipes which penetrate the !
primary containment and which connected to the primary system, or were l open to the drywell, were provided with at least two isolation valves j in series. :
i Teche8 cal Specification Bases Section 3.7.D/4.7.D, Primary Containment Isolk, ion Valves, stated that double isolation valves were provided on, lines penetrating the primary containment and open to the free space of the containment. Automatic initiation was required to minimize the potential leakage pathe from the containment in the event of a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). .
Section 5.2.5, Isolation Valves, of the origins 1 Safety Evaluation I
Report concluded that the isolation valves and their control systems were reviewed to assure that no single accident or failure could result L l in a loss of containment integrity. The sole exception occurred in the case of instrument lines and that was found to be ecceptable. Section 14.0, Conformance with General Design Criteria, concluded that there was reasonable assurance that the intent of the GDC for Nuclear Power Plants, published in the Pederal Register on March 21, 1971, in the r final design of the station would be met.
The BFN licensing basis for postulation of IRLBs inside containment was established in F8AR 8ection 5.2.4.6, Missile and Pipe Whip Prevention, by receipt of, and tu response to, Questions 4.1.4 and 5.19 which were issued by .
the Atomic Energy Commission (ABC) on March 25, 1971, in the original Safety Evaluation and its Supplements, and in the reconstituted design baseline of i BFN unit 2. A discussion of each is presented as follows:
FSAR Section 5.2.4.6 and the responses to the NRC Questions provided the major design considerations for missile and pipe whip protection Emphasis was placsd upon prevention of the occurrence of pipe breaks through design, procurement, quality control, inservice inspections, and the detection of pipe leaks, Energy absorbing material added to the interior of the drywell, ,
Siding attached to the pressure vessel, and Physical separation of safety-related components.
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j . O O ENCLO8URE 1 (Continued) Page 4 of 8 BROWNS FERRY WUCLEAR PLANT RESPON8E TO NRC REC 0petENDATIONS CONCERNING PRIMARY CONTAllWEENT IS'LATION Bacharound (Continued):
The response to Question 4.1.4 referenced FSAR Section 5.2.4.6 and stated that it was never intended to clain BFN impervious to the i consequences of a whipping pipe, and it was because these consequences were not ignored that RFN was designed for the prevention of pipe failures. Further, since the plant was in final stages of 4 construction, it was necessary to consider installation complications, !
in addition to the contribution to safety, in the resolution of the ,
pipe whip issue. :
Question 5.19 requested BFN describe the sensures taken to assure that I the damage caused by component failure within primary containment, and I resulting in pipe whip and jet forces, would not remove from service t
more than one redundant subsection of a vital system. BFN responded l by referring to Question 4.1.4 and by stating that redundant l' subsections of vital systems were ' physically separated within the i primary containment to minimise the damage probability. It is ,
important to note that protection of non-vital systems was not questioned. The logical conclusion being that the AEC did not consider the protection of non-vital systems to be of major safety significance.
The NRC staff accepted the adequacy of BFN's designed protection .
against pipe whip during the initial licensing process as documented in Section 5.2.2 of the Safety Evaluation to the TVA BFN units 1, 2 and 3, dated June 25, 1972, in the revised section which was contained in Supplement 1, dated December 21, 1972, and in Section 3.0 of Supplement 4, dated September 10, 1973.
The NRC recently reviewed the reconstituted design basis for BFN concerning jet impingement inside primary containment as part of the i' Design Baseline Verification Program (DBVP). A presentation of this 2
topic was given to the NRC in Knoxville on March 6, 1989. NRC accepted TVA's position that. jet impingement loads did not need to be applied to structural steel as part of. the BFN design basis, as documented in Inspection Report 50-259, 50-260 and 50-296/89-07. The Inspection '
Report conclusions are as follows:
" Primary emphasis for jet impingement protection inside the drywell was directed toward protecting the primary containment.
In addition to the recirculation, main steam and reactor feedwater system restraints, further consideration to containment protection was provided by installation of honeycomb panels on the inside ,
surface of the drywell shell and jet deflectors over the main vent-openings to the wetwell. Protection of other equipment in ':he l
drywell is inherent in the plant arrangement of equipment.
l Redundant systems and devices are located on opposite sides of the drywell to minimize the concerns of dynamic forces associated with a pipe break. ... TVA's response to this item is acceptable and this ites is closed.
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- o. RNCLOSURR 1 (Continued) o Page 5 of g '
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BR1WNS FRRRY NUCLEAR PLANT l RRSPON8R TO NRC RRC0fGERNDATIONS I CONCRRNING PRIMARY CONTAlletRNT ISOLATION Backaround (Continued): !
While Browns Ferry and other similar vintage BWR RBCCW systems do not explicitly confom to current regulatory guidance, the Browns Ferry RBCCW
-]
configuration is considered acceptable and does not pose an undue risk to public health and safety. Without prejudice to its position regarding the design and licensing basis of RBCCW, TVA is providing the following. responses to the NRC staff's recomunendations in order to assist the NRC staff in justifying the Browns Ferrty RBCCW configuration when compared against current regulatory guidance.
Reaconaa to NRC Staff Rec - ndationat The following recommendations were provided by the NRC staff at the July 11, 1990 exit meeting and documented in NRC's August 17, 1990 letter to TVA.
TVA's response to each recommendatiou is provided as follows:
NRC Staff Recommendation
.i
" Mar.ual valves used as primary containment isolation valves should be locked (or sealed) and included within the BFN locked valve prnaram."
)
)
TVA Responses l
Normally closed uanual containment isolation valves will be locked closed in accordance with Procedure G0I-300-3, General Valve Operation. This procedure will be revised by November 30, 1990 to include valves 2-2-1343, 2-12-742, and 2-33-1070. .
1 NRC Staff Recomunendation:
" Auxiliary Boiler and Domineralized Water Systems utilized in-series check i valves for primary isolation. TVA could diversify the isolation arrangement by incorporating an associated block valve to establish a more positive means l of isolation (i.e., one check valve and one block valve)."
l TVA Response:
,. The auxiliary boiler and domineralized water block valves are currently tested L with the associated check valves in accordance with the current Appendia J l program as part of the testing for the containment isolation valves on these lines. Browns Ferry believes the domineralized water block valve is currently
- tested in the reverse direction. The valve would have to be disassembled to verify the installed direction. In addition, the line containing this valve
{ is not Seismic Class I. TVA intends to continued to test this block valve but i not to formally consider the valve a containment isolation valve. TVA vill
! submit a Technical Specification Amendment request to formally cite the auxiliary boiler block valve as a primary containment isolation valve. This Technical Specification amendment request will be submitted within one hundred twenty days after restart.
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O O ENCLOSURE 1 (Continued) Page 6 of 8 ;
BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT :
I REUPONSE 70 NRC RECOMtENDATIONS CONCERNING PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION i
6 Rannonne to MRC Staff Rect- -ndations (Continued):
NRC Staff Recommendation -
"For Residual Beat Removal . recirculation and pump test lines, one of the isolation barriers is the suppression pool. The staff does not consider the suppression pool an adequate barrier, and suggested that an existing test ;
valve in the piping run be designated the isolation valve." ,
i l TVA Response ;
L -
The RHR recirculation and pump test line isolation val' a is curtra . ; ';l in accordance_ with the current Appendix J program as phet of the 10,
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Av l the containment isolation valres on this line. It is TVA's undt 9 /a i f e s t ,e the use of the suppression pool as an isolation barrier is consissh ' : ,
plants of Browns Ferry's vintage. Citing the RER test line isolatru w ;e+ r; .
a containaant isolation valve would lead to an inconsistent applicatr<c d + .
l containment isolation valve philosophy at Browns Ferry. TVA intends to ,
continue to test the RER test line isolation valve but not to formally consider this valse a containment isolation valve.
NRC Staff Recommendationt "Some systens use two check valves in series as primary containment isolation. Although this arrangement was part of the original design basis, I
and as such is acceptable, it would not be acceptable if evaluated to the i current GDC. However, most of these systems already have a downstream manual valve that could be identified in the BFN Emergency Operating Instructions (such valves would not require Appendix J testing) as additional assurance for long term isolation."
TVA Response Energency Operating Instruction (E01) 2-301-3, Secondary Containment and Radioactive Release Control, will be revised to identify the valves which potentially could be used for the isolation of leaks from high energy primary systems into secondary containment. These changes will be included in the nazt issued revision of the 50Is. Similar changes will be incorporated into the units 1 and 3 E01s prior to the restart of each unit.
NRC Staff Recommendation:
"With regard to the adequacy of the Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RWCCW) System to function as a closed system, the staff suggested that TVA could take the actions listed below as a method to resolve this issues" >
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. I 0 ENCLOSURE 1 (Continued)
O Page 7 of 8 '
BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT RESPONSE TO NRC REC 009tENDA'" IONS CONCERNING PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION l
1 Response to NRC Staff Recomigadations (Continued):
. . 1 NRC Staff Recommendation, Iten la
" Assess the pipe restraint program for all drywell piping."
TVA Response:
The high energy piping inside the drywell is Seism.ic Class I . Seismic Class I piping restraints inside the drywell are being requalified during this outage as part of the Bulletin 79-14, control rod drive insert and withdrawal piping, small bore, or torus integrity long-term programs.
These restart programs have been reviewed by the NRC staff as documented in Supplement 1 to the Safety Evaluation Report (SER) on the Browns Ferry Nuclear Performance Plan - NUREG-1232, Volume 3, dated October 24, 1989. The l acceptability for restart of the Bulletin 79-14, control rod drive insert and i withdrawal piping, small bore, and torus integrity long-tern programs are documented in SER Sections 2.2.3.1, 2.2.3.2, 2.2.3.3, and 2.2.4 g4, respectively. These sections provide an adequate description of these programs. ;
NRC Staff Recommendations, Iten 2: *
" Identify those components or sources in the drywell which could become missiles that would endanger RSCCW integrity inside containment."
TVA Response: -
As discussed above, protection of RBCCW integrity inside containment was not considered in the original design of Browns Ferry. However, the overall design scheme for BFN minimised the number of valves inside the drywell to the l extent practical for reasons such as maintenance and equipment qualification.
l This design feature also service to limit the number of potential missile
- sources. A randomly generated missile (e.g., a valve stem) is considered to l have a very low probability of occurrence. The probability of this missile then causing of breach of RSCCW is even lower. Even if such an event occurred, the RBCCW outboard containment isolation valves vould still be available sur RBCCW system isolation. The probability of one of these valves failing concurrent with a missile generated breach of RBCCW is extremely low.
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O ENCLOSURE 1 (Continued) o Page 8 of 8 1
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- BROWN 8 FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT 1 RESPONSE TO NRC RECOfMENDATIONS j CONCERNING PRIMARY ".0NTAIIMENT ISOLATION Reanonne to NRC Staff Rac - andations (Continued):
NRC Staff Roccamendation, Item 3:
I '
" Establish procedures for manually isolating all coolers upon receipt of a valid isolation signal to minimize loss of RBCCW integrity." j l TVA Response: ,
'; i TVA has reviewed the practicality of manually isolenna the RBCCW drywell , ;
coolers upon receipt of a valid isolation signa', in order to maximize the curvivability of RRCCW system integrity. Thr, current plant design does not permit the man' sal isolation of the coolere. The valve arrangement is shown on FSAR Figure l',1.6-lb. S e discharge line from the RBCCW drywell coolers can be
- remotely isolated, however, the supply line cannot. The valve on the Mscharge line is non-safety related, not environmentally or seismically ,
i qtalified, fails opec, and is operated with non-safety related entrol air. t RBC W system operation after an accident is desirable since it provides one of '
two diverse cooling sources to the reactor recirculation pump seals. Proper r seal cooling minimizes the potential for seal leakage. The RBCCW coolers are alan the preferred method for removing heat from the drywell.
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bij 4 , ERCLOSURE 2
%'< , BROWN 8-FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT N .
SIN 9tARY OF C099 TIT? TENTS
, tii
-1.,-Jorma11y closed manual' containment isolation valves will be locked closed-i in accordance with Procedure G0I-300-3, General Valve Operation. This fp procedure will be revised by November 30, 1990 to include valves 2-2-1383, fs' 2-12-742, and 2-33-1070. g-
- 2. - TVA vill submit a-Technical Specification Amendment request to formally- N cite the auxiliary boiler. block valve as a primary containment isolation, ;
} valve. This request will be submitted within one hundred twenty days after restart.=-
q
- 3. . Emergency Operating Instruction (E01) 2-E0I-3, Secondary Containment and. i Radioactive Release Control, will be revised to identify the valven which !
potentially could be used for the' isolation of leaks from high energy l
- primary systems into-secondary containment. These changes will be .
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included in the next issued revision to the EDIs. Similar changes will be T inecrporated into the units 1 and 3 E0Is prior to *.he restart of each unit. j
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