IR 05000254/2018002
| ML18211A372 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Quad Cities  |
| Issue date: | 07/30/2018 |
| From: | Karla Stoedter NRC/RGN-III/DRP/B1 |
| To: | Bryan Hanson Exelon Generation Co |
| References | |
| EA-18-021 IR 2018002 | |
| Download: ML18211A372 (26) | |
Text
uly 30, 2018
SUBJECT:
QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000254/2018002 AND 05000265/2018002
Dear Mr. Hanson:
On June 30, 2018, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an integrated inspection at your Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2. On July 3, 2018, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. K. Ohr, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC has identified one issue that was evaluated under the risk significance determination process as having very low safety significance (green).
The NRC has also determined that one violation was associated with this issue. Because the licensee initiated condition reports to address this issue, this violation is being treated as a non-cited violation (NCV), consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy. This NCV is described in the subject inspection report. This inspection report also documents the closure of Licensee Event Report (LER) 05000254/2018002, Tornado Missile Protection Non-Conformance in Association with EGM 15-002. The information provided in the LER was the subject of a violation and an exercise of enforcement discretion documented in NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000254/2018001; 05000265/2018001 (Reference ADAMS ML18130A757).
If you contest the violation or significance of this NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Karla Stoedter, Chief Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-254; 50-265;72-053 License Nos. DPR-29; DPR-30 Enclosure:
IR 05000254/2018002; 05000265/2018002 cc: Distribution via LISTSERV
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated quarterly inspection at Quad Cities Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. Findings and violations being considered in the NRCs assessment are summarized in the table below.
List of Findings and Violations Failure to Have a Procedure Appropriate to Circumstances for Degraded Voltage Relays Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Section Aspect Mitigating Systems Green Not Applicable 71152 - Problem NCV 05000254/2018002-01 Identification and Open/Closed Resolution A finding of very low safety significance (Green) and a Non-Cited Violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was self-revealed on April 16, 2018, for the licensees failure to establish a preventive maintenance procedure for the safety-related degraded voltage relays that was appropriate to the circumstances. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure that the first-time functional test and calibration for relay 127-4-B24-1 (Procedure MA-QC-773-524, Quad Cities NOAD Unit 2 Tech Spec Undervoltage Relay and Degraded Voltage Relay Calibration)was at an appropriate frequency to ensure that the relay would perform its Technical Specification function.
Additional Tracking Items Type Issue Number Title Report Status Section LER 05000254/2017-004- Unit 1 HPCI Did Not Trip IP 71153 - Closed 00 Due to Wear Debris in the Follow-Up of Turbine Stop Valve Oil Events and Resetting Solenoid Notices of Enforcement Discretion LER 05000254/2018-001- Secondary Containment IP 71153 - Closed 00 Differential Pressure Follow-Up of Momentarily Lost Due to Events and Fuel Pool Radiation Monitor Notices of Spike Enforcement Discretion
LER 05000265/2018-001- Two Main Steam Isolation IP 71153 - Closed 00 Valves (MSIVs) Closure Follow-Up of Times Exceeded Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion LER 05000254/2018-002- Tornado Missile Protection IP 71153 - Closed 00 Non-Conformance in Follow-Up of Association with Events and EGM 15-002 Notices of Enforcement Discretion
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PLANT STATUS
INSPECTION SCOPES
.............................................................................................................
REACTOR SAFETY
..................................................................................................................
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
............................................................................................
INSPECTION RESULTS
......................................................................................................... 10 Problem Identification and Resolution IP
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
......................................................................................... 18
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
...................................................................................................... 18
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1
The unit began the inspection period operating at or near full power. On June 9, 2018,
operators reduced power on the unit to approximately 60 percent to repair a faulty linear
variable differential transmitter for control valve #1, and to return to service control rod
HCU 18-35 following repairs to its scram outlet valve. The unit was returned to full power the
next day, where it remained for the remainder of the inspection period, with the exception of
planned power reductions for turbine testing, control rod pattern adjustments, and other
short-term power changes as requested by the transmission system operator.
Unit 2
The unit began the inspection period shut down for Refueling Outage (RFO) Q2R24. On
April 7, 2018, operators synchronized the units main turbine generator to the grid and
commenced a power ascension to full rated thermal power. On April 9, 2018, the unit reached
full power where it was operated at or near for the remainder of the inspection period, with the
exception of planned power reductions for turbine testing, control rod pattern adjustments, and
other short-term power changes as requested by the transmission system operator.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in
effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with
their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-
rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared
complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met
consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection
Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed plant status activities described in
IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, and conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, Problem
Identification and Resolution. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records,
observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance
with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01Adverse Weather Protection
Summer Readiness (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated summer readiness of offsite and alternate alternating current (AC)
power systems.
Seasonal Extreme Weather (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions prior to the
onset of heat and drought conditions.
71111.04Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdowns (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following
systems/trains:
(1) hardened containment vent system lineup following modification installation and
implementation on May 7, 2018;
(2) B Standby Gas Treatment System during maintenance on A Standby Gas Treatment
System on May 24, 2018; and
(3) Unit 2 Standby Liquid Control System following planned maintenance on June 21, 2018.
Complete Walkdown (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the Unit 2
Residual Heat Removal System the week of June 21, 2018.
71111.05AQFire Protection Annual/Quarterly
Quarterly Inspection (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated fire protection program implementation in the following selected
areas:
(1) Fire Zone 1.1.1.5, Unit 1 Reactor Building, Elevation 666-6, Standby Liquid Control 4th
Floor West Area on June 25, 2018;
(2) Fire Zones 1.1.1.5A and 1.1.1.6A, Unit 1/2 Turbine Building, Elevation 6580/6780,
Reactor Building Ventilation Floors, 4kV Switchgear 13-1/24-1, MG Sets 1A and 2B
Areas on June 25, 2018;
(3) Fire Zone 1.1.2.5, Unit 2 Reactor Building, Elevation 666-6, Standby Liquid Control 4th
Floor West Area on June 25, 2018; and
(4) LTD [laundry, tool, and dry active waste] Building Levels 1 and 2 (Fire Area 121) on
June 25, 2018.
71111.11Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Operator Requalification (1 Sample)
The inspectors observed and evaluated operators in the control room simulator during
requalification training on June 11, 2018.
Operator Performance (1 Sample)
The inspectors observed and evaluated the Unit 2 startup from RFO Q2R24 on April 7, 2018.
71111.12Maintenance Effectiveness
Routine Maintenance Effectiveness (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of routine maintenance activities associated
with the following equipment and/or safety significant functions:
(1) standby coolant and service water, following multiple leaks from raw water systems
during the first quarter of 2018; and
(2) Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) following an unexpected trip on high engine
temperature on June 19, 2018.
71111.13Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the risk assessments for the following planned and emergent
work activities:
(1) Work Week 18-14-04: Unit 2 Shutdown Safety Risk and Unit 1 online risk during the
week of April 2, 2018, and extent of condition review following discovery of silt in Unit 2
standby coolant line during Q2R24;
(2) Work Week 18-21-11: Unit 2 online risk change during planned reactor core isolation
cooling (RCIC) maintenance, Unit 1 emergent repair of a steam leak in the D Heater
Bay, Unit 1 Control Valve #3 LVDT emergent troubleshooting, and generator
maximum/minimum volts amperes reactive (VARs) testing on Unit 1 during the week of
May 21, 2018; and
(3) Work Week 18-25-02: Unit 2 online risk change during emergent Unit 2 EDG
maintenance following unplanned trip and both units online risk during severe weather
warnings during the week of June 19, 2018.
71111.15Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments (8 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following operability determinations and functionality
assessments:
(1) Issue Report (IR) 4124198: Received 902-3 H-11 During HPCI [high pressure coolant
injection] Run, Gland Seal Condenser High LevelUnit 2;
(2) IR 4130375: ATWS [Anticipated Transient Without a Scram] Pressure Transmitter
Loop DMeasuring and Test Equipment (M&TE) Evaluation 18-033-01;
(3) IR 4133173: 2-3928-20-0 Standby Coolant Line Silt Buildup;
(4) IR 4119551: Trending for Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Service Water (SW) and
Diesel Generator Cooling Water (DGCW) Suction Pipe Losses;
(5) IR 4118807: Q2R24 Vacuum Breaker 2-0220-105E Opening Force High at 5 pounds
force;
(6) IR 4140937: U1 125 Vdc Battery Preventative Maintenance Requirement (PMRQ)
17738-06 Not Performed in Entirety;
(7) IR 4147233: EQ [Environmental Qualification] FASA [Focused Area Self-Assessment]
EQ-79Q Conduit Seal Requirement Discrepancy; and
(8) IR 4148330: Common Cause of U1 and U1/2 EDGs Following Trip of U2 EDG During
Monthly Load Test.
71111.18Plant Modifications (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:
(1) Engineering Change (EC) 400666: Hardened Containment Vent Modification; and
(2) EC 340945: Anchor Darling Reactor Water Cleanup Valves Modification.
71111.19Post Maintenance Testing (8 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance tests:
(1) Unit 2 B Loop of RHR/Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) operability
tests following planned maintenance during RFO Q2R24 on April 1, 2018;
(2) Unit 2 B Core Spray operability test following planned maintenance during RFO Q2R24
on April 2, 2018;
(3) Reactor Vessel Class 1 and associated Class 2 system leak test following RFO Q2R24
on April 4, 2018;
(4) Control rod scram time testing following RFO Q2R24 maintenance on control rods,
control rod drive modules, and hydraulic control units on April 4, 2018;
(5) Unit 2 Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) closure time test following planned
maintenance during RFO Q2R24 on April 6, 2018;
(6) Unit 2 HPCI logic functional test following replacement of HPCI auxiliary oil pump auto
start relay on April 6, 2018;
(7) Unit 2 RCIC low pressure flowrate and operability test following planned maintenance
during RFO Q2R24 on April 7, 2018; and
(8) Unit 2 HPCI low pressure flowrate and operability test following planned maintenance
during RFO Q2R24 on April 7, 2018.
71111.20Refueling and Other Outage Activities (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated Unit 2 RFO Q2R24 activities that continued into the second
quarter (began on March 19, 2018) and completed on April 7, 2018. The inspectors
completed Sections 71111.20-03.01 d and e of IP 71111.20 to complete the sample,
which began in the previous inspection period.
71111.22Surveillance Testing
The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:
Routine (3 Samples)
(1) QCOS 6600-39: Unit Two Emergency Diesel Generator Largest Load Reject
Surveillance on April 2, 2018;
(2) QCOS 6600-48: Unit Two Division II Emergency Core Cooling System Simulated
Automatic Actuation and Diesel Generators Auto-Start Surveillance on April 3, 2018;
and
(3) QOS 6500-10: 4kV Bus 24-1 Second Level UV Functional Test on April 16, 2018.
In-service (1 Sample)
(1) QCOS 1000-04: RHR Service Water Pump Operability Test and QCOS 1000-06: RHR
Pump/Loop Operability Test on June 4, 2018.
Containment Isolation Valve (1 Sample)
(1) Unit 2 Reactor Water Clean-up System local leak rate test on motor operated valves
MO 2-1201-2 and MO 2-1201-5 on April 2, 2018.
71114.06Drill Evaluation
Emergency Planning Drill (2 Samples)
(1) The inspectors evaluated Technical Support Center/Control Room/Operations Support
Center participation during a simulated emergency planning drill associated with an
ATWS, loss of main condenser vacuum, and HPCI system steam line break on
May 1, 2018; and
(2) The inspectors evaluated radiation protection, operations, and security personnel
participation during a simulated medical drill on May 9, 2018.
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
71151Performance Indicator Verification (2 Samples)
The inspectors verified the licensee performance indicator submittals listed below:
(1) BI02: RCS Leak Rate Sample-2 Samples (April 1, 2017 - March 31, 2018).
71152Problem Identification and Resolution
Semiannual Trend Review (1 Sample)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program (CAP) for trends that might
be indicative of a more significant safety issue.
Annual Follow-Up of Selected Issues (2 Samples)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its CAP related to the following
issues:
(1) The inspectors recognized two condition reports written during RFO Q2R24 that
documented slow as-found MSIV closure times (IRs 4116642 and 4116647) for the
Unit 2 1C inboard MSIV and Unit 2 1A inboard MSIV, respectively. The licensee
performed an investigation and causal review under Equipment Corrective Action
Program Evaluation (ECAPE) 4116642, MSIVs 2-0203-1A and 2-0203-1C Closure
Times Exceeded the Maximum Technical Specification Limit of 5 Seconds. The
inspectors selected this sample for review based on operating experience at Quad Cities
with similar issues related to as-found MSIV closure times; and
(2) The inspectors recognized IR 4127290, Bus 24-1 Degraded Voltage Relays, which
documented the failure of relay 127-4-B24-1 to actuate within its Technical
Specification (TS) required band. The inspectors selected this issue for review based on
their review of the licensees work group evaluation, which documented operating
experience at Quad Cities demonstrating that these relays were susceptible to drifting
during performance of the first-time calibration and functional test following replacement.
71153Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion
Licensee Event Reports (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports which can be accessed at
https://lersearch.inl.gov/LERSearchCriteria.aspx:
(1) Licensee Event Report (LER) 05000254/2017-004-00, Unit 1 HPCI Did Not Trip Due to
Wear Debris in the Turbine Stop Valve Oil Resetting Solenoid;
(2) LER 05000254/2018-001-00, Secondary Containment Differential Pressure
Momentarily Lost Due to Fuel Pool Radiation Monitor Spike;
(3) LER 05000254/2018-002-00, Tornado Missile Protection Non-Conformance in
Association with EGM [Enforcement Guidance Memorandum] 15-002. This issue was
the subject of a previously documented violation and Enforcement Action (EA)
EA-18-021, which was opened in NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000254/2018001; 05000265/2018001 (ML18130A757) under Section 71111.15,
Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments; and
(4) LER 05000265/2018-001-00, Two Main Steam Isolation Valves Closure Times
Exceeded.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Problem Identification and Resolution IP 71152
Failure to Have a Procedure Appropriate to Circumstances for Degraded Voltage Relays
Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Section
Aspect
Mitigating Systems Green Not Applicable 71152 - Problem
NCV 05000254/2018002-01 Identification and
Open/Closed Resolution
A finding of very low safety significance (Green) and a Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was self-revealed on
April 16, 2018, for the licensees failure to establish a preventive maintenance procedure for
the safety-related degraded voltage relays that was appropriate to the circumstances.
Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure the first-time functional test and calibration for relay
27-4-B24-1 (Procedure MA-QC-773-524, Quad Cities NOAD Unit 2 Tech Spec
Undervoltage Relay and Degraded Voltage Relay Calibration) was at an appropriate
frequency to ensure that the relay would perform its TS function.
Description:
On April 16, 2018, during performance of the Unit 2 TS degraded voltage relay functional test
and calibration, the licensee identified degraded voltage relay 127-4-B24-1 was outside of
the TS Surveillance Requirements (SRs) (SR 3.3.8.1.1). The relay was found to actuate at a
value (3864 V) below the minimum TS value ( 3885 V; i.e. non-conservative). The degraded
voltage relays operate on a two out of two logic scheme; therefore, the degraded voltage
function would not have functioned within the TS allowed range. Additional analysis by the
licensee determined the safety function for the degraded voltage relay would have been met
based on the as-found value for the relay actuating above the design calculation limit. The
licensee documented the issue in IR 4127290, Bus 24-1 Degraded Voltage Relay Found
Outside of Tech Specs. The licensee noted the relay was in good physical condition and the
results of the testing were repeatable. In addition, the licensee was able to calibrate the relay
to within the TS setting tolerance.
In 2013, the licensee wrote IR 1569450, Bus 23-1 Degraded Voltage Relay Found Outside
Tech Specs. The inspectors noted that in IR 1569450, operations acknowledged a history of
degraded voltage relays drifting during the first functional test following replacement. In most
cases, the licensee has been able to calibrate the relay to within specification and subsequent
functional tests have been found within tolerance. The functional test and calibration
surveillance frequency is 18 months. Additionally, the licensee performs planned relay
replacements on a frequency of every 8 years. Because of the known issue of instrument
drift during the first functional test following replacement, operations requested that
engineering perform a review of the surveillance frequency and consider performing the
first-time functional test sooner than 18 months. Engineering reviewed the issue and added a
work order item to the recurring (every 8 years) replacement work instructions; the relays
were to be bench-tested and burned-in (i.e. energized), in the maintenance shop, for
month and calibrated prior to being installed in the plant.
The licensees evaluation of IR 4127290 included a historical review of both the specific relay
and the degraded voltage relays in general. The licensee noted relay 127-4-B24-1 was
replaced on an emergent (unplanned) basis in 2016, due to high contact resistance identified
during the performance of a surveillance. The functional test of the relay performed on
April 16, 2018, was the first time this relay was to be functionally tested following
replacement. Relay 127-4-B24-1 was not burned-in prior to its installation in 2016
because it was replaced on an emergent basis, and the action created from the issue in 2013
(IR 1569450) only added instructions to the recurring replacement work orders. The licensee
failed to identify the need to functionally test this relay after an appropriate burn-in period.
The failure to perform this test and calibration, sooner than 18 months, allowed the relay to
drift throughout the operating cycle until it was checked during the Q2R24 outage and it was
found outside of the TS-required range.
The licensees evaluation looked into the historical performance of degraded voltage relays
for both units going back to around 2002. The inspectors noted the relays had been found to
drift on at least eight occasions, three of which had drifted to outside TS requirements.
Corrective Actions: Relay 127-4-B24-1 was calibrated to within TS requirements. The
licensee created actions to perform 100 hour0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> burn-ins and subsequent calibration of relays
in their inventory to account for future emergent replacements. The licensee also planned to
have the burn-in and calibration testing performed by vendors for procurement of the relays
in the future.
Corrective Action Reference: IR 4127290: Bus 24-1 Degraded Voltage Relay Found
Outside of Tech Specs
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The licensees failure to establish a preventive maintenance
procedure for the safety-related degraded voltage relays (specifically 127-4-B24-1) that was
appropriate to the circumstances was contrary to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, and
was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor
because it is associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems
Cornerstone, and it adversely impacted the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability,
reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable
consequences. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure the first-time functional test and
calibration for relay 127-4-B4-1 was scheduled at an appropriate frequency to ensure the
relay would perform its TS function.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Significance
Determination Process (SDP) Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process For
Findings At-Power. The inspectors used Exhibit 2 - Mitigating Systems Screening
Questions, in SDP Appendix A, and answered, no to the questions in Section A of Exhibit 2;
the finding screened as Green.
Cross-cutting Aspect: No cross-cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because the
inspectors determined the finding did not reflect current licensee performance.
Enforcement:
Violation: Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and
Drawings, requires, in part, that activities affecting quality be prescribed by documented
procedures of a type appropriate to the circumstances. The licensee established procedure
MA-QC-773-524, Quad Cities NOAD Unit 2 Tech Spec Undervoltage Relay and Degraded
Voltage Relay Calibration, as the implementing procedure for performing preventive
maintenance for safety-related degraded voltage relays, an activity affecting quality.
Contrary to the above, from November 11, 2016 until April 16, 2018, the licensee failed to
establish a preventive maintenance procedure for the safety-related degraded voltage relays
(specifically, relay 127-4-B24-1) that was appropriate to the circumstances. Specifically,
the licensee failed to ensure the first-time functional test and calibration for relay
27-4-B4-1 was at an appropriate frequency to ensure the relay would perform its TS
function.
This violation is being treated as a NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement
Policy.
Observation 71152 - Semi Annual Trend Review
The inspectors reviewed recurring issues pertaining to the raw water system at Quad Cities
on both units for the last 6 months because both units had experienced raw water-related
leaks which had the potential to indicate the existence of a more safety significant issue. The
systems within the scope of the inspectors review included the safety-related DGCW
systems, the safety-related RHRSW systems, the non-safety related standby coolant
systems, and the non-safety related adjustable speed drive (ASD) cooling water systems.
The inspectors review focused on aspects of the licensees preventative maintenance
program and common practices for the various raw water systems, including periodic flushing
of pipes, heat exchanger cleaning, chemical inhibitor additions, ultrasonic testing (UT) and
inspections, gross scans, nondestructive examinations (NDE), and scheduled pipe repairs
and replacements. The inspectors compared their findings to those commitments made by
the licensee as a condition of license renewal and those actions taken in response to NRC Generic Letter 89-13, which addresses fouling of safety-related raw water systems. During
their review, the inspectors found the licensee had committed to performing monthly flushing
of stagnant sections of piping associated with the RHRSW and DGCW systems; this flushing
was to supplement other routine maintenance activities. If the flushing was unable to be
completed, an evaluation stating the licensees basis for not performing the periodic flushing
at the designated frequency was to be provided. The inspectors noted that while the licensee
was performing the periodic flushing of the stagnant sections of piping, they were not
performing the flushing on a monthly basis for all systems. For instance, the inspectors found
routine flushing was being performed on both the Units 1 and 2 DGCW systems but was not
being performed on the 1/2 DGCW system at the same periodicity; specifically, the 1/2 DGCW
system flushing was being performed on a 90-day frequency, whereas the Units 1 and 2
DGCW systems were being flushed on a 30-day frequency. In addition, the inspectors also
found that during the licensees initial UT exams in response to the generic letter that the
licensee had excluded the piping associated with the 1/2 DGCW system. Specifically, UT
exams were performed on both units RHRSW piping and the Units 1 and 2 EDG cooling water
piping, but was not performed on the 1/2 DGCW piping. The licensee captured the inspectors
observations in IR 4128065, Documentation for Monitoring 1/2 EDGCWP Piping.
In addition to the inspectors observations in March 2018, the licensee initiated IR 4109288
documenting a degrading trend in raw water piping leaks. In response to the IR, the licensee
performed a review of leaks in non-safety related raw water piping and examined the impact
and risks to the site which were to be discussed during the sites July plant health committee
meeting. Of the non-safety related systems, the licensee focused on the standby coolant
system (supplied by Service Water), which developed a leak in March 2018, and the licensee
identified a 30 foot section of piping that needed to be replaced due to degradation and
severe wall loss. Following the replacement, the licensee assigned action items to inspect
and perform a gross scan of the Unit 1 standby coolant piping in order to prioritize
replacement, during the next Unit 1 RFO, of those portions of piping that are most at risk or
susceptible to leaks due to their horizontal, stagnant/low flow configuration. The licensee also
assigned action items, as a part of their extent of condition review, to perform UT
examinations on those temperature control valve bypass lines associated with the turbine
building closed cooling water, hydrogen addition, and adjustable speed drive cooling water
systems. The licensee also created an action item to perform a risk ranking of fire protection
and service water piping with recommended actions for mitigation.
Given the above issues identified by both the licensee and NRC inspectors pertaining to the
licensees raw water systems, the inspectors recommend a more in-depth review of the
licensees safety-related raw water systems be performed during the next biennial problem
identification and resolution inspection scheduled for September 2018 to determine if a more
significant issue exists. At the time of this inspection the identified leaks on the safety-related
systems had been corrected, therefore the inspectors concluded there was no immediate
safety concern. More specifically, the inspectors recommend the biennial inspection team
review the licensees aging management and Generic Letter 89-13 commitments for the
safety-related raw water systems, verifies the corrective actions initiated and implemented by
the licensee are timely and adequate to address a further degrading trend associated with raw
water systems, and performs a random sampling of systems important to safety which may
also be impacted by the degrading trend in raw water systems across the station.
Observation 71152 - Annual Sample Review
During ECAPE 4116642, MSIVs 2-0203-1A and 2-0203-1C Closure Times Exceeded the
Maximum Technical Specification Limit of 5 Seconds.
The inspectors assessed the licensees identification of root and contributing causes of the
problem, in addition to immediate and planned corrective actions.
Licensee evaluation ECAPE 4116642 determined the most probable cause of the slow
closure times were inherent delays associated with the Generation 3 style airpack
manifolds. The licensee had sent the removed airpacks off-site to Power Labs for failure
analysis following this event, and results of that analysis were not completed prior to the end
of the inspection period. The licensees corrective actions included replacing the associated
airpack manifolds for the 1A and 1C MSIVs and setting the as-left closure time low in the band
(i.e. 4 seconds) to allow for known timing drift over the operating cycle. The licensee also
planned a procedure revision to QCOS 0250-04, MSIV Closure Timing, which would require
adjusting as-left closure times to maintain an adequate margin to TS limits.
The inspectors noted the licensees evaluation documented that neither the vendor, nor any
other Exelon plant which use the Generation 3 airpack manifolds, have experienced similar
timing drift issues during operating cycles. The inspectors did not have any immediate
concerns because the MSIV as-left closure times during RFO Q2R24 accounted for the
known drift and should reasonably account for the drift phenomenon, even if the cause is not
completely understood. The licensee planned to update their evaluation upon receipt of the
failure analysis report from Power Labs.
The inspectors also assessed the licensees consideration of extent of condition and cause,
generic implications, common cause, and previous occurrences.
Quad Cities has had a known history of MSIV timing drift over the operating cycles dating
back to 2011. The inspectors noted that previous evaluations of the MSIV timing drift issues
were determined to be due to aging of MSIV actuator components, materials, and in some
cases, operating temperatures; however, in this case, the MSIVs that failed were replaced in
2016; their failure is not likely due to aging and their operating environment is not subject to
the temperature concerns affecting closure times. Extent of condition for this issue is
applicable to both units, as the Generation 3 manifolds are installed on both units, and they
are the most up-to-date manifolds available to the station.
The inspectors noted that following review of ECAPE 4116642, licensee management
recognized the need to update an operability evaluation written in 2017 that was based on
slow MSIV closure times during RFO Q1R24. The licensee revised EC 619951, Main Steam
Isolation Valves 1-0203-1A, 1B, 1C, 1D and 2-0203-1A, 1C, 1D and 2C. Engineering
Change 619951 was initially written in 2017 based on the inspectors concerns related to the
as-left closure times and causes determined in ECAPE 3990038, MSIV As Found Closure
Timing Out of Band. Once the licensee determined there was a new potential cause
(i.e. inherent delays associated with Generation 3 airpack manifolds) as documented in
ECAPE 4116642, it was appropriate to revise the operability evaluation under EC 619951.
The inspectors did not have an immediate safety concern with the licensees overall
conclusion of a reasonable assumption of operability.
The inspectors also noted that previous corrective actions to address the slow closure of the
MSIVs were not implemented cosistently. Corrective actions from 2013 Equipment Apparent
Cause Evaluation (EACE) 1485944, QCOS 0250-04 MSIV Closure Time Failed As Found,
included a corrective action (AT 1485944-30), which stated, in part, that QCOS 0250-04
would be revised to expand the margin to Technical Specifications for as-left conditions.
This was to account for drift during the operating cycle. However, the actual procedure
revision stated the unit supervisor would evaluate if the valve is to be re-adjusted to provide
margin This corrective action provided discretion on whether the valves would be
adjusted, but did not give guidance on how to determine if an adjustment was required. In the
case of Unit 2 MSIVs 1A and 1C, their as-left closure time was > 4.5 seconds in 2016. Based
on the MSIV actuators having just been replaced, the inspectors determined that, based on
the information known at the time, it was not reasonable to suspect the MSIVs would drift
during the operating cycle. Following the March 2018 event, the licensee planned a
procedural change under AT 4116642-32 that would require an adjustment to the as-left
MSIV closure time to maintain margin to TS limits.
In conclusion, there has been a history of slow as-found MSIV closure times at Quad Cities.
Dating back to 2011, the licensee observed an increase in the closure time drift over the
operating cycle (i.e. increase in closure times from as-left in one outage to the as-found test in
the next outage). There are multiple variables that could have impacted the MSIV closure
times, and the licensee has taken steps to identify and correct the cause of the slow closure
times (e.g. replaced components such as actuators and rebuilt solenoids that were part of the
actuators). Based on information the licensee has understood at the time of their
investigations, the inspectors determined that the licensees corrective actions have been
appropriate. Main Steam Isolation Valves 2-0203-1A and 1C actuators were replaced during
the previous outage (2016) with the most updated hardware, including the Generation 3
airpack manifolds. The inspectors determined that the drifting of these MSIVs over the
operating cycle was not within the licensees ability to foresee and correct; therefore, a
performance deficiency was not identified.
Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion IP 71153
Observation 71153 - Follow-Up of Events and
Notices of Enforcement Discretion
Licensee Event Report 05000254/2017-004-00, Unit 1 HPCI Did Not Trip Due to Wear
Debris in the Turbine Stop Valve Oil Resetting Solenoid.
This event was reported as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety
function due to the licensee identifying a condition that resulted in the unplanned inoperability
associated with the HPCI system. The licensee is required to report the unplanned
inoperability of single train systems because the inoperability could have prevented the
fulfillment of a safety function. The licensee determined that while HPCI was inoperable once
the steam isolation valves were closed in response to this event, the system remained
available via manual initiation. The inspectors did not identify a performance deficiency
because the cause of the inoperability was not determined to be within the licensees ability to
foresee and correct. No violation of regulatory requirements occurred.
Observation 71153 - Follow-Up of Events and
Notices of Enforcement Discretion
Licensee Event Report (LER) 05000254/2018-001-00, Secondary Containment Differential
Pressure Momentarily Lost Due to Fuel Pool Radiation Monitor Spike.
This event was reported as a condition that could have prevented a safety function due to the
unplanned inoperability of secondary containment when the reactor building pressure went
momentarily positive during the isolation of secondary containment following a refuel floor
radiation monitor spike. Reactor building pressure going positive is not an unexpected
condition during secondary containment isolation and the reactor building differential pressure
was restored within approximately 1 minute once the standby gas treatment system started,
as designed, following the initiating event. The licensee determined the secondary
containment did not lose its safety function through a subsequent evaluation; however, it was
inoperable for 1 minute during the event because of the failure to meet the TS Surveillance
Requirement (TS SR 3.6.4.1.1) to maintain a secondary containment vacuum greater than or
equal to 0.1 inch of vacuum water gauge. The cause of the event was determined to be a
detector failure within the radiation monitor, which was replaced and sent off-site for failure
analysis. The inspectors did not identify a performance deficiency or violation of regulatory
requirements since the cause was not within the licensees ability to foresee and correct.
Observation 71153 - Follow-Up of Events and
Notices of Enforcement Discretion
Licensee Event Report 05000254/2018-002-000, Tornado Missile Protection Non-
Conformance in Association with EGM 15-002.
The LER discusses a non-conforming condition associated with the three EDGs at Quad
Cities Nuclear Generating Station simultaneously becoming inoperable during a tornado
event. The licensee reported the event per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) for operation or a
condition prohibited by TS, since the design deficiency (i.e., non-conforming condition) existed
for a time longer than permitted by TS; 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) for a condition that resulted
in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant
safety; 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) for a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of
the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of
an accident; and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii) for an event where a single cause or condition
causes two independent trains or channels to become inoperable in a single system designed
to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
This issue was the subject of a previously documented violation and EA 18-021 which is
referenced in NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000254/2018001; 0500265/2018001
(ML18130A757) under Section 71111.15, Operability Determinations and Functionality
Assessments. The issue was reviewed and dispositioned in accordance with EGM 15-002
which granted the licensee enforcement discretion for meeting TS 3.0.3, General Shutdown
LCO, and TS 3.8.1, AC Sources -Operating, since the licensee implemented appropriate
compensatory measures and met the specified criteria for exercise of the enforcement
discretion.
By letter dated March 23, 2018, the licensee submitted a request to the NRC to extend the
expiration date for the period of enforcement for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station (QCNPS),
Units 1 and 2 from June 10, 2018 to June 10, 2020 (see Agencywide Documents Access and
Management System [ADAMS] ML18106A596). On May 3, 2018, the NRC granted approval
of the extension request after determining that QCNPS sufficiently described and documented
compensatory measures for identified nonconforming structures, systems, and components
(SSCs), provided assurance that compensatory measures will be effective and maintained
through the extended period for enforcement discretion, and provided a description of an
implementable plan for restoring the affected SSCs to compliance within the extended period
Observation 71153 - Follow-Up of Events and
Notices of Enforcement Discretion
Licensee Event Report 05000265/2018-001-00, Two Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs)
Closure Times Exceeded.
This event was reported as a condition prohibited by the plants TS due to the MSIV closure
times exceeding TS SR 3.6.1.3.6 limit of closing between 3 and 5 seconds. The two inboard
MSIVs (1A and 1C) closed within 5.3 and 5.6 seconds, respectively. Their respective
outboard MSIVs closed within the TS allowable time. The licensee determined that the MSIVs
did not lose their safety function because the UFSAR design basis accident analysis, in
Chapter 15, describes a safety limit of 10.5 seconds to be able to perform the safety function.
The TS limit ensures the MSIVs will always meet this 10.5 second requirement from signal
initiation to MSIV closure. The inspectors did not identify a performance deficiency or
violation of regulatory requirements. The inspectors reviewed other aspects of this issue
under Section 71152Problem Identification and Resolution of this report.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was controlled to protect from public
disclosure. No proprietary information was documented in this report.
- On July 3, 2018, the inspectors presented the quarterly integrated inspection results to
Mr.
- K. Ohr, Site Vice-President, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
71111.01Adverse Weather Protection
- CY-QC-110-640; NPDES Temperature & Flow Determinations; Revision 7
- EN-QC-492-005; Extreme Heat Implementation Plan; Revision 4
- EN-QC-402-0001; NPDES Temperature Monitoring & Permit Documentation; Revision 5
- Ambient and River Temperature Data from HOBOlink for May 1 through May 27 and June 1
through June 4
- Logged Data for May 29-30, 2018 on Attachment 4 of CY-QC-110-640; Time Above the
Maximum Temperature Limits
- WC-QC-8003-1008; Quad Cities Station Units 1 and 2 Nuclear Plant Interface Requirements
(NPIRs); Revision 3
- OP-AA-108-107; Switchyard Control; Revision 4
- IR 4143338; Air Conditioning Not Working 345 kV Switchyard Relay House; 06/01/2018
- Constellation Generation Dispatch Operational Instruction 229; Advanced Nuclear Dispatch;
2/26/2016
- Constellation Generation Dispatch Operational Instruction 219; Nuclear Load Following
Congestion Relief Program; 11/18/2014
- QCOP 0010-02; Required Cold Weather Routines; Revision 44
- OP-AA-108-107-1002; Interface Procedure Between BGE/ComEd/PECO and Exelon
Generation (Nuclear/Power) for Transmission Operations; Revision 11
- OP-AA-102-102; General Area Checks and Operator Field Rounds; Revision 15
- OP-AA-108-107-1001; Station Response to Grid Capacity Conditions; Revision 7
71111.04Equipment Alignment
- QCOP 1600-33; Hardened Containment Vent System Lineup and Operation; Revision 0
- QCOP 7500-01; Standby Gas Treatment System (SBGTS) Standby Operation and Start-Up;
Revision 21
- QOM 2-1000-04; Unit 2 RHR Valve Checklist (South RHR Room); Revision 11
- QOM 2-1000-02; U2 RHR Valve Checklist (North RHR Room); Revision 13
- Unit 2 RHR Service Water Valve Checklist; Revision 23
- QOM 2-1000-01; U2 RHR Valve Checklist (2202-59A, North RHR Room); Revision 6
- QOM 2-1000-03; Unit 2 RHR Valve Checklist (2202-59B Rack, South RHR Room);
Revision 6
- QOM 2-1000-09; Unit 2 RHR Valve Checklist (Outside 2B RHR Corner Room); Revision 4
- QOM 1-1100-01; Unit 1 Standby Liquid Control Valve Checklist; Revision 10
71111.05AQFire Protection Annual/Quarterly
- Quad Cities Generating Station Pre-Fire Plan; FZ 1.1.1.5.A & 1.1.1.6.A; Unit 1/2 TB 658-0
/678-0 Elev. Rx bldg. Vent Floors, 4kV SWG
- R. 13-1/24-1, MG Sets 1A and 2B; July 2009
- Quad Cities Generating Station Pre-Fire Plan; FZ 1.1.1.5; Unit 1 RB 666-6 Elev. Stand-By
Liquid Control 4th Floor West; February 2013
- Quad Cities Generating Station Pre-Fire Plan; FZ 1.1.1.5.A & 1.1.1.6.A; Unit 1/2 TB 658-0
/678-0 Elev. Rx bldg. Vent Floors, 4kV SWG
- R. 13-1/24-1, MG Sets 1A and 2B; July 2009
71111.11Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
- License Operator Requal/Initial License Training; LOCT-1009-ACORE; Revision 26
- Licensed Operator Requal/Initial License Training; LOCT-0341-ECORE; Revision 10
71111.12Maintenance Effectiveness
- Maintenance Rule System Basis Document for Service Water
- WO 1476989-01; Replace Unit 1/2 Emergency DG Heat Exchange EC 382156; 09/19/2012
- OA & B DG Jacket Water Cooler; Eddy Current Examination Final Report; September 2012
- WO 1822946-01; Open/Inspect U-0 A Diesel Generator HX; 10/02/2017
- Supplemental 001619231-02; COM; Open/Inspect U-0 A Diesel Generator HX
- 00017765-01; COM; Open/Inspect Diesel Generator HX
- WO 1693225-01; Open/Inspect Diesel Generator B Heat Exchanger U1; 03/14/2015
- WO 1689732-01; Open/Inspect Diesel Generator Heat Exchanger; 03/15/2015
- WO 1916397-01; Open/Inspect Unit 2 EDG B CW Heat Exchanger; 03/23/2018
- WO 1916398-01; Open/Inspect Unit 2 EDG A CW Heat Exchanger; 03/26/2018
- Drawing M-69; Diagram of Service Water Piping Diesel Generator Cooling Water; Sheet 3;
Revision R
- QCOS 6600-42; Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generator Load Test; Revision 49
- Diesel Generator Trend Data Sheet on June 19, 2018
- WO 1921135-01; Perform U-2 EDG 6 Year Inspection; 10/19/2017
71111.13Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
- Work Week Safety Profile for Week of April 2
- Work Week Safety Profile for Week of May 22
- Work Week Safety Profile for Week of June 19
- RMA Checklists for Service Building, Turbine Building, Reactor Building, and Cable Tunnel,
Shift 1; 06/21/2018
71111.15Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
- IR 4124198; Received 902-3 H-11 During HPCI Run; GSC Hi Level; 04/07/2018
- IR 4133173; 2-3928-20-O Standby Coolant Line Silt Build-Up; 05/01/2018
- IR 4118807; PSU Q2R24 Vac Bkr 2-0220-105E Opening Force High at 5.0 LBF; 03/25/2018
- IR 4140937; U1 125 Vdc Battery PMRQ 17738-06 Not Performed In Entirety; 05/24/2018
- Diagram M-22; Diagram of Service Water Piping; Sheet Number 1; Revision EC
- QCOP 3200-09; Emergency Reactor Vessel Level Control Using Condensate/Feedwater or
Standby Coolant Supply (H.7.a); Revision 18
- QCOS 3900-01; Refuel Outage Standby Coolant Supply Header Flush and Valve Test;
Revision 23
- QCOS 6900-19; Station Safety Related Battery Monthly Surveillance; Revision 14
- Maintenance Rule System Basis Document for Service Water
- Plant Health Committee Presentation on Non-Safety Related Raw Water Piping; 04/30/2018
- ECAPE 3990885; 1-0220-105B SRVDL Vacuum Breaker Inadvertently Set to Open Above
Acceptance Criteria; 04/28/2017
- EC 619708; Evaluation of 1(2)-0220-105B Functionality with Higher Start to Open Set Point
as Documented in IR 4011514 and ECAP 399088-06
- EC 624575; EQ-79Q Conduit Seal Requirement Discrepancy; Revision 00
- IR 4147233; EQ-79Q Conduit Seal Requirement Discrepancy; 06/14/2018
- Drawing M-943; Diagram of Diesel Generator Lube Oil and Intake Air and Exhaust Piping;
Revision H
- IR 4148330; U2 EDG Trip During QCOS 6600-42; 06/19/2018
- Drawing M-69; Diagram of Service Water Piping Diesel Generator Cooling Water; Sheet 3;
Revision R
- IR 4119551; Trending for RHRSW and DGCW Suction Pipe Losses
- AH1031-40146166; Long Range Guided Wave Ultrasonic Pipe Screening Results;
01/07/2016
- AH647-317786; Long Range Guided Wave Ultrasonic Pipe Screening Results; 05/27/2011
- AM3117-430701; Long Range Guided Wave Ultrasonic Pipe Screening Results; 11/15/2012
- IR 1147536-03; Quad Cities Pre-NRC Triennial Heat Sink and GL 89-13 FASA
- IR 1223380; NRC Triennial Heat Sink Inspection Check-In; 04/03/2015
- IR 1256838; (LR) Surveillance Procedures Crediting Aging Management; 08/29/2011
- IR 2678958; 1/2 EDGCWP Failed Suction DP QCOS 1000-47; 06/08/2016
- IR 2709786; Buried Pipe: DGCWP/RHRSW Common Suction Piping Degradation;
08/29/2016
- IR 2725625; Degraded Piping Does Not Satisfy Single Failure Criterion; 10/07/2016
- IR 4119551; Trending for RHRSW and DGCW Suction Pipe Losses
- IR 4142949; DGCWP NPSH Limit in QCOS 6600-06 Too Conservative; 05/31/2018
- ATD-0189; Diesel Generator Cooling Water (DGCW) System Hydraulic Model Calibration;
Rev 0C
- CW Maintenance Rule System Basis Document
- EC 370226; OP Eval for 1/2 EDGCWP Suction PressureIR 759807
- EC 390027; Document Changes Considering Ultimate Heat Sink Elevation of 564; 04/26/2013
- EC 399474; Roll Up Evaluation for Buried Pipe NEI 09-14 Initial Inspection; 02/25/2015
- EC 405859; 1/2 EDGCWP Failed Suction DP Per QCOS 1000-47; 10/11/2016
- EDG Maintenance Rule System Basis Document
- ER-AA-340; GL 89-13 Program Implementing Procedure; Revision 8
- ER-AA-5400; Underground (Buried) Piping and Raw Water Integrity Management Programs
Guide; Revision 10
- G-Scan Assessment of Service Water Piping System; 05/30/2007
- LR AMP B.1.13A Open Cycle Cooling Water Program Binder
- M-22; Diagram of Service Water Piping Diesel Generator Cooling Water; Revision AA
- M-3143; Residual Heat Removal Service Water System; Revision M
- QCOS 1000-47; 1C and 1D RHR Service Water Pumps, And 1/2 DGCW Pump Suction
Pressure Surveillance; Revision 8
- QCOS 6600-06; Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump Flow Rate Test; Revision 46
- QDC 3900-M-0591; Quad Cities Water Volume of the Ultimate Heat Sink After Loss of the
Normal Heat Sink; Revision 0
- QDC-1000-M-131; NPSH Availability vs. Requirements for DGCW and RHRSW Pumps;
Revision 4
- QDC-1000-M-131; NPSH Availability vs. Requirements for DGCW and RHRSW Pumps;
Revision 4A
- Quad Cities Response to Generic Letter 89-13; 01/29/1990
- Quad Cities Station GL 89-13 Program Basis Document; Revision 5.10
- Quad Cities Station Supplemental Response to Generic Letter 89-13; 06/28/1991
- Quad Cities Station Supplemental Response to Generic Letter 89-13; 11/14/1990
- RHRSW Maintenance Rule System Basis Document
- WO 1378226; 1C/1D RHRSW Pump DGCWP Suction Test; 02/20/2012
- WO 1765702; 2A/2B RHRSW Pump DGCWP Suction Test; 09/11/2015
- WO Intake Sounding Inside and Outside of Forebay; 11/08/2017
71111.18Plant Modifications
- MIDACALC Results QUA-2-1201-5 (QUA-2); DC Motor Operated GL96-05 Gate Valve;
03/16/2018
- MOV Post-Test Data Review Worksheet; Quad Cities Unit 2; QUA-2-1201-5; 04/02/2018
- Calculation NED-M-MSD-075 Addendum 8, Revision 2B; The Thrust Seismic Limits of the
Quad Cities Non-Mark 1 MOVs; 03/16/2018
- Short Form Item Equivalency Evaluation Standard Item Equivalency Process NISP-EN-02
Form 2: Replacement Stem/Wedge Assembly; Revision 0
- EC 623484; Review of Flowserve Weak Link Report RAL-70296 For Application on
MOV 1(2)-1201-5; Revision 0
71111.19Post Maintenance Testing
- WO 4672439; HPCI Logic Functional Test; 04/06/2018
- WO 1960065; HPCI LP Flow Rate Test; 04/07/2018
- WO 1960064; RCIC LP Flow Rate Test; 04/07/2018
- WO 4767584; MM Section XI Support Adjusted During Troubleshooting; 04/03/2018
- IR 4098943; 2A RHR HX Leak at Gasket of SW Head; 01/30/2018
- IR 4117639; PSU U2 HPCI Logic Test Discrepancy; 03/21/2018
- IR 4121714; PSU 2C RHRSW Pump High Vibes IST ALERT; 04/01/2018
- IR 4123043; PSU: 2-1001-68A Valve Leakage Identified; 04/04/2018
- IR 4123052; PSU: Leaking Union in Line 2-02358-3/4 on B Recirc Pump; 04/04/2018
- IR 4124198; Received Gland Steam Condsr Hi Level Alarm During HPCI Run; 04/07/2018
- IR 4122999; PSU 2-0220-46 AOV Seat is Leaking 12-13 gpm; 04/04/2018
- QCOS 1000-04; RHR Service Water Pump Operability Test; Revision 61
- QCOS 1000-06; RHR Pump/Loop Operability Test; Revision 58
- QCOS 1400-01; Core Spray System Flow Rate Test; Revision 48
- QCOS 0201-08; Reactor Vessel Class 1 and Associated Class 2 System Leak Test;
Revision 68
- QCOS 0300-27; Control Rod Scram Timing During Vessel System Leak Test (J.7.a);
Revision 12
- MA-AA-716-010-F-02; ASME Code, Section XI (WO 1735838-01); Revision 1
71111.20Refueling and Other Outage Activities
- IR 4119766; U2 Potential MSL Vibration Concern Walkdown Results; 03/27/2018
- IR 4120040; PSU: Resolution of Potential MSL Vibrations; 03/28/2018
- IR 4122389; PSU Update and Actions on IRS Related to the Full Scram; 03/19/2018
- IR 4122400; PSU Unapproved Solenoid Installed 2-2301-32; 04/02/2018
- IR 4122465; Intentionally Abbreviated Maintenance for 2-1402-8B; 04/01/2018
- IR 4122494; PSU Troubleshoot U2 RPS Relay 2-0590-108B; 04/03/2018
- IR 4122498; PSU U2 Troubleshoot Relay 2-0590-108D; 04/03/2018
- IR 4122499; PSU U2 Troubleshoot Relay 2-0590-108F; 04/03/2018
- IR 4122500; PSU U2 Troubleshoot Relay 2-0590-109B; 04/03/2018
- IR 4122501; PSU U2 Troubleshoot Relay 2-0590-109D; 04/03/2018
- NF-AA-330; Unit 2 Q2R24 Core Verification 03/31/2018-04/01/2018; Revision 14
- Q2R24 Raw Water Management Plan; Revision 1
- Q2R24 Shutdown Safety Contingency Plans; Revision 1
- Q2R24 Shutdown Safety Plan; Revision 1
- QCAP 0260-03; Screening for the Potential to Drain the Vessel; Revision 13
- QCGP 3-1; Reactor Power Operations; Revision 86
- QCOP 0201-13; Reactor Level Upper Wide Range Reference Leg Extension Use and
Control; Revision 11
- QCOP 0201-14; Reactor Vessel Level Control Using a Local Pressure Gauge; Revision 12
- QCOP 1000-05; Shutdown Cooling Operation; Revision 53
- QCOP 1000-17; Shutdown Cooling Reactor Temperature Trending; Revision 15
- QCOP 1000-24; Draining Reactor Cavity and Vessel to the Torus; Revision 22
- QCOP 1000-44; Alternate Decay Heat Removal
- QDC-0200-N-2257; Decay Heat and Related Calculations
71111.22Surveillance Testing
- MA-QC-773-524; Quad Cities NOAD Unit 2 Tech Spec Undervoltage Relay and Degraded
Voltage Relay Calibration; Revision 9
- QCOS 6500-10; Functional Test of Unit 2 Second Level Undervoltage; Revision 35
- QCOS 6600-39; Unit Two Emergency Diesel Generator Largest Load Reject Surveillance;
Revision 29
- QCOS 6600-48; Unit Two Division II Emergency Core Cooling System Simulated Automatic
Actuation and Diesel Generators Auto-Start Surveillance; Revision 34
- QCTS 0600-19; Reactor Water Clean-Up System Local Leak Rate Test MO-1(2)-1201-2,
MO-1(2)-1201-5; Revision 16
- IR 4122675; 2B CS Pump Start Delay Didnt Meet Criteria in QCOS 6600-48; 04/03/2018
- IR 4122650; PSU LL RCIC 2-1301-16 Cycling During QCOS 6600-49; 04/03/2018
- QCOS 1000-04; RHR Service Water Pump Operability Test; Revision 61
- QCOS 1000-06; RHR Pump/ Loop Operability Test; Revision 58
71114.06Drill Evaluation
- Quad Cities 2018 2nd Qtr PI Drill
- Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS) FormUtility Messages 1 through 5 for Quad
Cities 2Q18 PI Drill; 05/01/2018
- Reactor Plant Event Notification Worksheets for Quad Cities 2Q18 PI Drill; 05/01/2018
- Dose Assessment for Quad Cities 2Q18 PI Drill; 05/01/2018
71151Performance Indicator Verification
- Plan of the Day; 03/01/2017 - 04/31/2017
- RCS Leakage Excel Sheet Data for 03/01/2017 - 03/31/2018
71152Problem Identification and Resolution
- IR 1569450; Bus 23-1 Degraded Voltage Relay Found Outside Tech Specs; 10/08/2013
- IR 3943740; 2nd Lvl UV Relay 2-6706-1274-B241 Contacts Found Degraded; 11/21/2016
- IR 4116642; U2 1C Inboard MSIV Slow to Close During QCOS 0250-04; 03/19/2018
- IR 4116647; U2 1A Inboard MSIV Slow to Close During QCOS 0250-04; 03/19/2018
- IR 4119789; Snubber: Lisega 3062 (22.45K) S/N 61290-45 Funct F; 03/27/2018
- IR 4119963; Intentionally Abbreviated Maintenance on 2-1001-19B; 03/28/2018
- IR 4121737; Unexpected Trip of GCB 3-4 in 345 kV Switchyard; 04/01/2018
- IR 4121976; PSU 2C RB Exhaust Fan Restarted During QOS 6500-02; 04/02/2018
- IR 4122018; PSU NDE Found Rejectable Indications on 2-2305-G-102.2 Welds; 04/02/2018
- IR 4122142; PSU: U2 Torus to Drywell Vacuum Breaker Binding; 04/02/2018
- IR 4117240; PSU Q2R24 ATWS Relay Failed During WCOS 0202-22; 03/20/2018
- IR 4121976; PSU 2C RB Exhaust Fan Restarted During QOS 6500-02; 04/02/2018
- IR 4122142; PSU: U2 Torus to Drywell Vacuum Breaker Binding; 04/02/2018
- IR 4122650; Q2R24 LL: RCIC 2-1301-16 Cycling During QCOS 6600-48; 04/03/2018
- IR 4123107; PSU Q2R24 Class 1 and RCPB System Pressure Test Results; 04/04/2018
- IR 4124236; U2 Received APRM High-High or Inoperable Alarm APRM 1; 04/07/2018
- IR 4125393; AO 1-1301-12 was Outside IST Acceptable Range QCOS 1300-06; 04/11/2018
- IR 4126579; Revision to QCOS 5750-19; 04/13/2018
- IR 4127121; Unexpected Alarm Unit Aux Transformer 11 TroubleGas Accum; 04/16/2018
- IR 4128358; Local Switch for 1-5742A & 1-5742B had Disconnected Lead; 04/18/2018
- IR 4129537; Potential Single-Point Vulnerability for HPCI Logic; 04/22/2018
- IR 4129590; U-1 CRD HCU Bank 2 Fuse Issue; 04/22/2018
- IR 4123052; PSU: Leaking Union in Line 2-02358-3/4 on B Recirc Pump; 04/04/2018
- IR 4131338; LSL 1-0263-147-1B Setpoint is Nonrepeatable; 04/26/2018
- IR 4131386; OOT, LSL 1-263-147-1B, Trend Code B3; 04/26/2018
- IR 4131414; U2 Received 901-3 A2 MSL High Radiation Alarm; 04/26/2018
- IR 4133220; Received Unexpected Alarm 902-8 C-11 MPT 2 Trouble; 05/01/2018
- IR 4133360; EO ID 1C EDG SAC Pressure Low Out of Band; 05/02/2018
- IR 4136322; Follow UP to IR# 4135027U2 SBO I/O Loss Alarms; 05/10/2018
- IR 4136827; Reactor Building Ventilation Building DP Degrading Trend; 05/11/2018
- IR 4138379; 1-1001-182D Stuck Partially Open; 05/16/2018
- IR 4140236; CREV Surveillance Partial Performance; 05/23/2018
- IR 4140381; QCOP 0060-06 Lacks Detail on Controlling SFP Level; 05/23/2018
- IR 4140438; Steam Leak Source Identified 2D2 Heater Vent; 05/23/2018
- IR 4142048; 1B MSL Radiation Monitor Erratic; 05/29/2018
- IR 4142219; U-2 SBO Diesel Generator Trip; 05/29/2018
- IR 4142580; HCU 18-35 Drifted to Position 00; 05/30/2018
- WO 1943689; Walkdown/Adjust Misc. Leaks During Shutdown and Hydro to Support OU;
04/09/2018
- IR 4139810; Pre-Conditioning Concern for RCIC 2-1301-12/13; 05/21/2018
- IR 4127290; Bus 24-1 Degraded Voltage Relay Found Outside of Tech Specs; 04/16/2018
- OPEX 2397082-19: 10 CFR Part 21 Applicability Determination for EN 50900; 04/21/2015
- Information Notice 2018-02; Testing and Operations-Induced Degradation of 3-Stage Target
Rock Safety Relief Valves; 02/26/2018
- QDC-6700-E-1498; Second Level Undervoltage Relay Setpoint; Revision 1
- QDC-6700-E-1498; Second Level Undervoltage Relay Setpoint; Revision 1A
- MA-QC-773-524; Quad Cities NOAD Unit 2 Tech Spec Undervoltage Relay and Degraded
Voltage Relay Calibration; Revision 10
71153Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion
- Exelon PowerLabs Report QDC-67419; Failure Analysis of the 1-2399-SV8 HPCI Trip Reset
Solenoid Valve
- IR 4091460; Extent of Condition IR 4072162; 01/08/2018
- IR 4072162; Unit 2 HPCI Did Not Trip During QCOS 2300-05; 11/07/2017
- WO 4709406; Unit 1 HPCI Did Not Trip During QCOS 2300-05; 11/09/2017
- Diagram 4E-1533; Schematic Diagram HPCI Turbine Motor Gear Unit Speed Exchanger and
Auxiliary Valves; Revision AP
- Diagram 4E-1527-5H2; Schematic Diagram HPCI System Sensors and Auxiliary Relays;
Revision Q
- Diagram M-46; Diagram of HPCI Turbine Lubricating and Hydraulic Oil System and Pump
Seal Cooler Piping; Sheet Number 3; Revision G
- QCOS 2300-05; HPCI Pump Operability Test; Revision 79
- ECAPE 4072162; Unit 1 HPCI Did Not Trip During QCOS 2300-05; 12/07/2017
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