ML20245K042

Insp Rept 50-302/89-15 on 890603-0707.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations,Security,Radiological Controls,Lers & Nonconforming Operations Repts,Facility Mods,Onsite Events & Annual Emergency Drill

ML20245K042
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	08/01/1989
From:	Crlenjak R, Holmesray P, Tedrow J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20245K029	List: ML20245K026 ML20245K033 ML20245K042
References
50-302-89-15, NUDOCS 8908180287
Download: ML20245K042 (14)

See also: IR 05000302/1989015

Text

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,. gq dceo u

. p . 4 UNITED STATES

's S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

"o, "- REGION ll

g eg, [ 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W.

ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 -

Report No: 50-302/89-15

Licensee: Florida Power Corporation

3201 34th Street, South

St. Petersburg, FL 33733

Docket No: 50-302- License No.: DPR-72

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Facility.Name: Crystal. River 3 .

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Inspection Conducted: June 3 - July 7, 1989 .

InspectorJ:/ *

Date Signed

7 I f'

%gP.Q.Gs Holmes-RaySeniorResidentInspector bijn

(WJ. Tedrow esi nt In ector- Date igned

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Approved by: / . _ / /

R. C% enjak, Secj6ffh Chief ' Dat6 Signed

DivMion of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY

l Scope:

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.This routine inspection was conducted by two resident-inspectors in the areas of

plant operations, security, radiological controls, Licensee Event Reports and

Nonconforming Operations Reports, facility modifications, followup .of onsite

events, annual emergency drill, and licensee action on previous inspection items.

Numerous facility tours.were conducted and facility operations observed. Some of

these tours and observations were conducted.on backshifts.

Results:

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Two violations were identified: Failure to maintain correct battery .ei,

electrolyte level, paragraph 2.b; Failure to adhere to plant procedures, para-

graphs 2.b(6) and 4.b(2).

A non-cited licensee identified violation is discussed in paragraph 4.b(1).

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REPORT DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

• J. Anna, Supervisor Document Control ,

R. Arnold, Nuclear Team Instructor  ;

• J. Brandely, Manager, Nuclear Integrated Planning

• J. Campbell, Assistant Nuclear Maintenance Superintendent

• M. Collins, Nuclear Safety & Reliability Superintendent

• G. Cowles, Senior Nuclear Results Engineer l

• B. Hickle, Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations

• S. Johnson, Manager, Site Nuclear Services

• A. Kazemfar, Supervisor Radiological Support Services

• K. Lancaster, Manager, Site Nuclear Quality Assurance l

• W. Marshall, Nuclear Operations Superintendent

P. McKee, Director, Nuclear Plant Operations

• W. Nielsen, Assistant Maintenance Superintendent (Acting)

• J. Roberts, Assistant Nuclear Chemistry and Radiation Protection

Superintendent

• W. Rossfeld, Manager, Nuclear Compliance i

• F. Sullivan, M 9ager, Plant System Engineer l

• E. Welch, Manager, Procurement Engineer ,

• R. Widell, Director Nuclear Operations Site Support

• M. Williams, Nuclear Regulatory Specialist.

• K. Wilson, Manager, Nuclear Licensing )

Other licensee employees contacted included office, operations, engineering,

maintenance, chemistry / radiation and corporate personnel.

• Attended exit interview

Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the last

paragraph.

2. Review of Plant Operations (71707)

The plant began this inspection period in the process of cooling down from i

the hot standby (Mode 3) condition to initiate repairs to the reactor

coolant pump (RCP-1A/1C/10) mechanical seal packages. The plant reached the

cold shutdown (Mode 5) condition at 12:30 A.M. on June 4, 1989. Following

repairs to the pump seals, a plant heatup was commenced and the hot standby

condition reached at 4:30 A.M. on June 14. On June 16 a reactor startup was

performed and the reactor was taken critical at 11:16 A.M. followed by power

operation (Mode 1) at 12:03 P.M. At 1:25 P.M. on June 16 a loss of offsite

power occurred which resulted in a reactor trip (see paragraph 6.b of this

l report for details on the reactor trip). Following an investigation into

the causes and completion of the corrective actions for the reactor trip,

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another plant startup was commenced and the reactor was taken critical at

7:57 P.M. on June 17. Power operation was resumed at 8:55 P.M. on June 17.

On June 29 the reactor was shutdown to repair an emergency diesel generator

and at 11:42 A.M. the hot standby condition was reached. At 8:15 P.M. on

June 29 another loss of offsite power occurred due to a fault in switchyard

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breakers (see paragraph 6.c for details on this event). Following restora-  ;

tion of offsite power, a plant cooldown was commenced on June 30 and the l

plant was placed in cold shutdown at 5:22 P.M. After repairs were completed

to the emergency diesel generator, a reactor startup was commenced and

criticality achieved at 7:22 P.M. on July 6 followed by the resumption of

power operation at 8:15 P.M. The plant remained in power operation for the

duration of this inspection period.

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a. Shift Logs and Facility Records l

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The inspector reviewed records and discussed various entries with

operations personnel to verify compliance with the Technical

Specifications (TS) and the licensee's administrative procedures.

The following records were reviewed: l

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Shift Supervisor's Log; Reactor Operator's Log; Outage Shift Manager's  ;

Log: Startup Manager's Log; Equipment Out-0f-Service Log; Shift Relief  !

Checklist; Auxiliary Building Operator's Log; Active Clearance Log; i

Daily Operating Surveillance Log; Short Term Instructions (STI); and l

Selected Chemistry / Radiation Protection Logs.

In addition to these record reviews, the inspector independently

verified clearance order tagouts.

l No violations or deviations were identified.

b. Facility Tours and Observations

Throughout the inspection period, facility tours were conducted to

observe operations and maintenance activities in progress. Some

operations and maintenance activity observations were conducted during

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backshifts. Also, during this inspection period, licensee meetings

were attended by the inspector to observe planning and management

activities.

The facility tours and observations encompassed the following areas:

security perimeter fence; control room; emergency diesel generator j

room;. auxiliary building; intermediate building; battery rooms; and, '

electrical switchgear rooms.

During a tour of the battery rooms on June 21, 1989, the inspector

noticed that the electrolyte levels on several battery cells for the

"A" and "B" Station Batteries (DPBA-1A and DPBA-1B) were slightly above

the maximum level marks specified on the cells.

This observation was immediately discussed with the nuclear shift

supervisor who declared the station batteries inoperable and

implemented corrective action to reduce the electrolyte level in the

affected cells to the proper level. From their initial investigation

into this event, the licensee believes this condition had existed since

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June.16 when a loss of. offsite' power occurred. During the loss' of

. offsite; power, the station batteries sunplied emergency power to the

vital busses for a brief. period of timc.

This event wn similar to an. event which occurred 'on February 1; 1989

(Licensee Event Report LER 89-04) when- the licensee identified this

same condition on the station batteries ad the fossil Unit 1 and 2

batteries.- The licensee's corrective action to prevent recurrence of

.this situation consisted of revising-surveillance procedures to prevent

overfilling of the battery cells. The licensee has also'contac.ted the

' battery manufacturer who stated that slightly increased ' electrolyte

levels . above the maximum level mark would not adversely effect the

operation or capabilities of the batteries.

Although a slightly increased electrolyte level in the battery cell

does not apparently adversely affect the capabilities of the station

battery, Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.2.3 requires that both

station batteries be operable and specifies in surveillance requirement 4.8.2.3.2.b.3 that 'the electrolyte level of each connected cell be

between the minimum and maximum level indication marks for the' battery.

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to be considered operable.' Failure to maintain the correct cell

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electrolyte levels in the station batteries rendered both batteries

inoperable and is considered to be a violation of TS 3.8.2.3.

Violation (302/89-15-01): Failure to maintain 'the correct cell

electrolyte levels in the station batteries which rendered both

batteries inoperable.

The inspectors also observed conditions in the following areas:

-(1) Monitoring Instrumentation - The following instrumentation and/or

indications were observed to verify that indicated parameters were

in accordance with the TS for the current operational mode:

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l Equipment operating status; area atmospheric and liquid radiation

monitors;' electrical system lineup; reactor operating parameters;-

and auxiliary equipment operating parameters.

No violations or deviations were identified.

(2) Shift Staffing

The inspector verified that operating. shift staffing was in

accordance with TS requirements and that control room . operations '

were being conducted in an orderly and professional manner.

In addition, the inspector observed shift turnovers on various

occasions to verify the continuity of plant status, operational

problems, and other pertinent plant information during these

turnovers. '

A review of the licensee's requalification program .for licensed

operators was performed to ensure that operators who fail to

requalify are removed from licensed duties. Procedures TDP-203,

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Licensed Operator Requalification Training-Program, and TDP-113,

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. Remedial Training Programs, were.-reviewed. These procedures

require the training' supervisor t'o verbally notify .the Operations .

Superintendent within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> that a licensed operator has failed

to requalify and that the operator be removed from licensed

duti es . .. .-Following .this _ notification,- the Operations

Superintendent informs the individual and the Nuclear Shift

Supervisor (NSS) who m'akes an' appropriate entry into the NSS. log

book.

The . verbal notification is subsequently followed by. a written

description of required-: remedial training which - specifies -

limitations on' work activities 'which the individual is allowed' to

perform. These limitations include the removal of the individual

from the performance of licensed duties.

No violations or deviations.were identified.

(3) Plant Housekeeping Conditions

Storage of material'and components and cleanliness conditions of

various areas throughout the-facility were observed to determine

whether safety and/or. fire. hazards existed.

During plant tours, degraded cleanliness conditions were observed

in the "B" Decay Heat Pit and the Sodium Hydroxide Tank Room.

These conditions were discussed with licensee personnel who took

immediate action to clean up the areas.-

No violations or deviations were identified.

(4) Radiological Protection Program

Radiation protection control activities were observed to verify

that these activities were in conformance with the. facility

policies .and procedures, and in compliance with ~ regulatory

requirements. These observations _ included:

- Entry to and exit from contaminated areas, including step-off'

pad conditions and disposal of contaminated clothing;

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Area postings and controls;

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- Work activity within radiation, high radiation, and

contaminated areas;

- Radiation Control Area (RCA) exiting practices; and,

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Proper wearing of personnel monitoring equipment, protective

clothing, and respiratory equipment.

Area postings were independently. verified for accuracy by the-

inspector. The . inspector also reviewed selected Radiation Work

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Permits (RWPs) to verify. that the RWP was current and that the

controls were adequate.

No violations or deviations were identified.

(5) Security Centrol

In the course of the monthly activities, the inspector included a

review of the licensee's physical security program. The

performance of various shifts of the security force was observed

in the conduct of daily activities to include: protected and vital

area access controls; searching of personnel, packages, and

vehicles; badge issuance and retrieval; escorting of visitors;

patrols; and compensatory posts. In addition, the inspector

observed the operational status of Closed Circuit Television

(CCTV) monitors, the Intrusion Detection system in the central and

secondary alarm stations, protected area lighting, protected and

vital area barrier integrity, and the security organization

interface with operations and maintenance.

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During the loss of offsite power event which occurred on June 29,

a security alert was declared. This event was reviewed by a NRC

Security Specialist and is discussed in more detail in NRC

Inspection Report 50-302/89-16.

(6) Fire Protection

Fire protection activities, staffing and equipment were observed

to verify that fire brigade staffing was appropriate and that fire

alarms, extinguishing equipment, actuating controls, fire fighting

equipment, emergency equipment, and fire barriers were operable.

During a review of the Nuclear Operator (NO) logs on June 22, the

inspector verified fire brigade team member qualifications

utilizing the licensee's computerized qualification list dated

June 15. The inspector noted that one individual, of the four

listed in the N0 log as fire brigade team members during June 18

through June 22, was not listed on the computerized list. This

finding was discussed with licensee training personnel who

confirmed that the individual's fire brigade qualification had

expired May 31.

Administrative procedure AI-2205, Administration of CR-3 Fire

Brigade Organization, Section 4.3 requires that the fire brigade

team be composed of four qualified fire brigade team members.

Failure to have four qualified fire team members on the plant's

fire brigade is contrary to the requirements of procedure Al-2205

and is considered to be a violation of TS 6.8.1.f.

Violation (302/89-15-02): Failure to properly implement plant

procedures as required by TS 6.8.1.

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This violation is similar to a violation cited in NRC Inspection

Report 50-302/88-01 (Violation 302/88-01-01 example C).

Apparently the licensee's corrective action was not sufficient to

prevent recurrence of this nonconformance.

l (7). Radioactive Waste Controls

Selected liquid and gaseous releases were observed to verify that

approved procedures were utilized, that appropriate release

l approvals were obtained, and that required surveys were taken.

No violations or deviations were identified.

3. Review of Maintenance (62703) and Surveillance (61726) Activities

Surveillance tests were observed by the inspector to verify that approved

procedures were being used; qualified personnel were conducting the tests;

tests were adequate to verify equipment operability; calibrated equipment

was utilized; and TS requirements were followed.

The following tests were observed and/or data reviewed:

- SP-168, Radiation Monitoring Flow Rate

Instrumentation Calibration;

- SP-317, RC System Water Inventory Balance;

- SP-321, Power Distribution Breaker Alignment and

Power Availability Verification;

- SP-417, Refueling Interval Integrated Plant Response

to Engineered Safeguards Actuation;

- SP-422, RC System Heatup and Cooldown Surveillance; l

and,

- SP-435, Valve Testing During Cold Shutdown. )

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In addition, the inspector observed maintenance activities to verify that

correct equipment clearances were in effect; work requests and fire

prevention work permits, as required, were issued and being followed;

quality control personnel were available for inspection activities as l

required; and, TS requirements were being followed.

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Maintenance was observed and work packages were reviewed for the following

maintenance activities: j

- Rebuild and static pressure test of reactor coolant pump mechanical

seals in accordance with procedure MP-166, RC Pump Seal Package

Refurbishment and Testing;

- Troubleshooting of Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST) level indicators

DH-7-LI, DH-37-LI in accordance with procedures MP-531, Troubleshooting i

Plant Equipment, SP-111, Valve Lineup Verification for Critical '

Instrumentation, and SP-162, Post-Accident Monitoring Instrumentation '

Calibration; '

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- Troubleshooting and replacement of BWST level switch DH-11-LS in

accordance with procedure MP-531, PM-231, Calibration of Level Switches

(LS), and SP-111;

- Replacement of BWST level switch DH-19-LS in accordance with

modification MAR 89-03-11-01 and procedure SP-111;

- Replacement of motor for motor operated valve MSV-55 in accordance with

procedures MP-402C, Maintenance of Limitorque Valve Operators Type

SMB-0 thru SMB-4, SMB-4T, SMB-5, SB-0 thru SB-4, and HBC Units, and

MP-405, Installing Repairing and Terminating Control Power and

Instrumentation Cables;

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Troubleshooting of vital bus transfer switch VBXS-1A in accordance with

procedures MP-531, PM-130, Static Inverters, and post maintenance

testing in accordance with procedure SP-455, Functional Test of Vital

Bus Redundant Transformers and Static Transfer Switches;

- Troubleshooting of a failed lockout relay (86B/ESA) for the "A"

Engineered Safeguards bus in accordance with procedure MP-531;

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Troubleshooting the failure of the "C" Reactor Building Cooling Fan

(AHF-1C) to start in accordance with procedure MP-531;

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Removal of electrolyte from the "A" and "B" station batteries

(DPBA-1A/DPBA-1B);

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Troubleshooting loss of crankcase vacuum for the "B" Emergency Diesel

Generator (EDG-1B) in accordance with procedure MP-531; and,

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Replace piston, firing pressure test and run in test on EDG-1B in

accordance with Colt Industries, Fairbank Morse Engine Technical

Manual.

No violations or deviations were identified.

4. Review of Licensee Event Reports (92700) and Nonconforming Operations

Reports (71707)

a. Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed for potential generic

impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrective actions

appeared appropriate. Events that were reported immediately were

reviewed as they occurred to determine if the TS were satisfied. LERs

were reviewed in accordance with the current NRC Enforcement Policy.

(1) (Closed) LER 88-13: This LER reported that the control room

ventilation (HVAC) control air tubing did not meet seismic

, requirements. This report was previously discussed in NRC

Inspection Report 50-302/88-18. The licensee has issued a

I supplement dated February 20, 1989. The supplemental report

stated that similar problems were identified on the Decay Heat

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Closed Cycle Cooling (DC), Spent Fuel Cooling (SF) and Emergency

Diesel Generator (EDG) ventilation systems.

The licensee has completed modifications to the above systems to;

correct the identified problems. .The temporary modification has

been installed on the EDG room ventilation dampers (MAR

T89-01-20-01) to keep.these dampers open until a modification can 1"

be completed to seismically support the control air tubing (MAR

89-01-20-02).

(2) (0 pen)lLER 88-17: This LER reported the failure to perform post

maintenance testing for containment isolation check valves FWV-43

and FWV-44. This report was previously discussed in NRC

Inspection Report 50-302/88-29. The licensee has written

procedures SP-604, FWV-43, FWV-44 Leak Test, and SP-435, Valve

Testing During Cold Shutdown, to perform this post maintenance

testing but has not completed an evaluation to determine if other

containment isolation check valves are being properly tested..

This LER remains open pending completion of the evaluation. .

(3) (0 pen) LER 88-19: This LER reported the misalignment of a battery

charger This report was previously discussed in NRC Inspection

Report 50-302/88-31 and the licensee has issued a ' supplemental

report dated October 31, 1988. The licensee has revised procedure

CP-115. In-Plant Equipment Clearance and Switching Orders, to

allow only qualified operators to hang clearances and has reviewed

this event with operations personnel. The labels on the charger

power supply switches have been changed to more clearly. identify

their function. The licensee is presently evaluating the'setpoint.

for an alarm to alert operators when the station battery is

supplying the load. This LER will remain open pending completion

, of the evaluation.

(4) (0 pen) LER 88-20: This LER reported that a safety related snubber

was found inoperable. This report was previously discussed in NRC- j

Inspection Report 50-302/88-34. . The licensee. has revised i

procedure MP-120, Maintenance of Pressure Seal Gate Globe 'and

Swing Check Valves, to track the removal and replacement of

interferences. An analysis has been performed of the affected-

piping which concluded that the piping would maintain its pressure

and structural integrity. in the case of' a seismic- event. Other i

maintenance procedures will be - reviewed to ' detect similar i

deficiencies. This LER will remain open pending the review of -!

other maintenance procedures for similar deficiencies. . 'i

(5) .(0 pen) LER 88-22: This LER reported the inadvertent isolation of i

the Decay Heat Removal -' system. This event was previously- j

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discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-302/88-34. Although the

licensee has revised the necessary operating procedures OP-209, -!

Plant Cooldown, OP-202, Plant Heatup, and OP-404, Decay Heat _

Removal System, to reflect the new isolation pressure setpoint for j

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. this: system, the' following -~ corrective action -. remains to be

accomplished:

- A~ review of the automatic' closure circuitry will be. conducted

to determine any practical.. methods of reducing instrument

error; and,

- An evaluation 'of the need lfor an alarm to alert operators

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that pressure 'is approaching the automatic L . isolation-

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setpoint.

This .LER will remain open pending completion of corrective action..

b. The inspector reviewed Nonconforming Operations Reports (NCORs) .to

verify the following: TS are. complied with, corrective : actions as

identified in the reports or during subsequent ' reviews ' have been

accomplished or are being pursued .for completion, generic items are

identified and reported as required by 10 CFR Part 21, and items are

reported as. required by TS.

All NCORs were reviewed in accordance with the current NRC Enforcement

Policy.

(1) NCOR 89-121 reported that a fire service waterivalve (FSV-76) was

found .in the incorrect closed position. This was a redundant

flow path with no. loss -of normal system Lfunction._ The licensee

identified this situation during the performance of- a monthly;

surveillance procedureL(SP-367. Fire Service Valve Alignment and

Operability ' Check) which checks the f position of these valves.

The licensee took immediate actionato return the valve to the

correct open position. This matter is considered to be a licensee

identified Non-Cited Violation (NCV)..

NCV (302/89-15-03): ~ Failure to maintain a fire service water

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valve in the correct position as required by procedure SP-367.

(2)' NCOR 89-140 reported excessive reactor cool' ant pump seal leakage.

l On June 11, 1989' during a fill and vent of the. reactor. coolant .

system,' the licensee identified that the seal' leakage associated

with reactor coolant pump RCP-1C was approximately 1.25 gallons

per minute. No seal leakage should be evident. Upon discovering

this condition, the licensee suspended the plant startup and

investigated the cause for this . situation. From. post seal

installation job critiques, the. licensee discovered that the

maintenance procedure (MP-165, RC Pump Seal Cartridge Removal and-

Replacement) for performance of the reactor coolant' pump seal

package installation was not' adhered to. Although step 7.2.24 of

procedure MP-165,_ which requires that the adjusting cap for the

seal be positioned against the pump half coupling, had been signed

off as completed on June 10, the licensee's inspection revealed

that this step had in actuality not been performed..

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Failure to adhere to the requirements of procedure MP-165 is

contrary to the requirements of TS 6.8.1.a and is considered to be  ;

a violation. This violation is considered to be another example i

of the violat 4n discussed in paragraph 2.b(6) of this report. '

Although this riatter was identified by the licensee, it is being

cited as a violation due to the self-disclosing nature of the

event. 1

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5. Design, Design Changes and Modifications (37828) l

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Installation .of new or modified systems were reviewed to verify that the  ;

changes were reviewed and approved in'accordance with 10 CFR 50.59, that the

changes were performed in accordance with technically adequate and approved

procedures, that subsequent testing and test results met acceptance criteria

or deviations were resolved in an acceptable manner, and that appropriate

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drawings and facility procedures were revised as necessary. This review j

included selected observations of modifications and/or testing in progress. j

The following modification approval records (MARS) were reviewed and/or

associated testing observed: )

- MAR 89-01-19-01, Evaluation and Modification to Miscellaneous Safety

Related Air Handling Systems;

- MAR T89-01-20-01, Temporary Modification to EDG AH System; i

- MAR 88-06-17-01, Modification to AHF-17, 18 and 19 A and B Fan Dampers, j

and test procedures TP-1 and TP-2;

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MAR 87-07-23-03, Control Complex Ventilation Damper Upgrade, and test

procedure TP-1B;

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MAR 88-07-06-01, Gag CHV-56, 57, 58 and 59 in Position, and test

procedure TP-1A; and,

- MAR 89-01-26-02, EDG HVAC Modifications.

No violations or deviations were identified.

6. Followup of Onsite Events (93702)

a. At 11:25 A.M. on June 6 the licensee declared an Unusual Event when a

tornado was sited near the plant. No plant damage resulted from this

event and the . ;sual Event was exited at 11:45 A.M.

b. At 1:25 P.M. on June 16 a reactor trip from approximately 12% power

occurred. This trip occurred from a loss of offsite power supplied to ,

the Unit 3 startup transformer. The loss of offsite power event and

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reactor trip will be discussed in more detail in a separate report (NRC

Inspection Report 50-302/89-17). At 1:30 P.M. the licensee implemented

the enurgency plan and declared an Alert due to a sustained loss of

offsite power (15 minutes). Upon restoration of offsite power, the

emergency plan was exited at 5:35 P.M.

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c. At 3:15 A.M. on June 29 an Unusual Event was declared when a plant

shutdown required by the TS was commenced to affect repairs to the "B"

Emergency Diesel Generator. At 8:15 P.M., with the plant in the hot

standby condition, another loss of offsite power occurred. This event

occurred during a lightning strike which resulted in a fault in the 230

KV switch yard which isolated the Unit 3 startup transformer.

Plant equipment operated as designed and at approximately 8:25 P.M. the

alternate source of offsite power was utilized to provide power to the

"B" Engineered Safeguards busses. At 9:37 P.M. offsite power was

restored to the Unit 3 startup transformer and by 10:07 P.M. all plant I

loads were being supplied of f this transformer. The inspector arrived

in the control room shortly after the event be0an and verified stable

plant conditions and proper implementation of 'he licensee's emergency >

plan and compliance with the TS.

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7. Annual Emergency Drill

On June 21, 1989, the annual emergency drill was conducted by the licensee j

to verify the effectiveness of the Radiological Emergency Response Plan and

implementing procedures. In addition to the licensee, the participants in

the drill included the State of Florida, Citrus and Levy Counties, and the

NRC. The drill was observed by a number of personnel, including the NRC.

Details of tne drill, including the results of the critiques held on June

25, 1989 are discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-302/89-12.

8. Licensee Action on Previously Identified Inspection Findings (92702 & 92701)

a. (Closed) Violation 302/89-01-01, Failure to adhere to TS 3.6.3.1

requiring containment isolation valves be operable.

The inspector reviewed and verii-led implementation of the corrective

actions stated in FPC response letter dated March 14, 1989. l

b. (Closed) Violation 302/89-01-02, Failure to assure that conditions

adverse to quality are promptly identified and corrected.

The inspector reviewed and verified implementation of the corrective

actions stated in FPC response letter dated May 10, 1989,

c. (Closed) Violation 302/89-01-03, Failure to adhere to the requirements

of procedure OP-202.

The inspector reviewed and verified implementation of the corrective

actions stated in FPC response letter dated May 10, 1989.

d. (Closed) IFI 302/88-31-03: Review the licensee's completion of

em0rgency feedwater check valve (FWV-43/44) modifications and

completion of procedure changes to incorporate spectacle flanges.

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The licensee has completed modifications MAR 88-07-11-01/02 to install

the new type of check valves and has revised procedure OP-605,

Feedwater System. Valve Checklist I to incorporate the spectacle

Although the licensee has not 'yet completely closed the

.

l flanges.

l modification packages, the inspector considers the majority of the

I modification process complete and this matter is considered closed.

. . .

9. Exit Interview (30703)

l

l The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) at

the conclusion of the inspection on July 7, 1989. During this meeting, the

inspector sumarized the scope and findings of the inspection as they are

detailed in this report with particular emphasis on the violations.

The licensee representatives acknowledged the inspector's comments and did

not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by

the inspectors during this inspection.

Item Number Description and Reference ..

50-302/89-15-01 Violation - Failure to maintain the correct cell

electrolyte levels in the station batteries which

rendered both batteries inoperable.

50-302/89-15-02 Violation - Failure to properly

implement plant procedures as required by TS 6.8.1.

50-302/89-15-03 NCV - Failure to maintain a fire service f

water valve in the correct position as required by J

procedure SP-367. j

l

10. Acronyms and Abbreviations

BW;T - Borated Water Storage Tank i

CCTV - Closed Circuit Television '

CFR - Code of Federal Regulations

DC - Decay Heat Closed Cycle Cooling 1

'

1 EDG - Emergency Diesel Generators

l HVAC - Control Room Ventilation  :

LER - Licensee Event Report l

MAR - Modification Approval Record

NCOR - Nonconforming Operation Report

NCV - Non-Cited Violation j

NO - Nuclear Operator i

NRC - Nuclear Regulatory Commission

NSS - Nuclear Shift Supervisor

PM - Preventive Maintenance

RCA - Radiation Control Area

RWP - Radiation Work Permit ,

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1

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SF - Spent Fuel Cooling

SP - Surveillance Procedure

STI - Short Term Instruction

TS - Technical Specification

VIO - Violation

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