B11844, Forwards Summary of Seismic Interaction Program,Per 851024 Meeting.Review & Approval Requested Prior to 851115 Fuel Load Date

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Forwards Summary of Seismic Interaction Program,Per 851024 Meeting.Review & Approval Requested Prior to 851115 Fuel Load Date
ML20209H909
Person / Time
Site: Millstone Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 10/31/1985
From: Bishop R, Opeka J
NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO., NORTHEAST UTILITIES
To: Youngblood B
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
B11844, NUDOCS 8511110280
Download: ML20209H909 (28)


Text

.

NORTHEAST UTILITIES cenere onices semn street. serun. connecticut H RTFORD CONNECTICUT 06141-0270 L L 1J [,*",

' , . ' C'U 7 5~." (203) 665-5000 October 31,1985 Docket No. 50-423 B11844 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Mr. B. 3. Youngblood, Chief Licensing Branch No. I Division of Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

References:

(1) 3. F. Opeka letter to B. 3. Youngblood, " Seismic Interaction Program," dated August 8,1985.

(2) B. 3. Youngblood letter to 3. F. Opeka, " Request for Additional Information," dated September 17,1985.

(3) 3. F. Opeka letter to B. 3. Youngblood, " Seismic Interaction Program," dated September 27,1985.

(4) 3. F. Opeka letter to B. 3. Youngblood, " Seismic Interaction Program," dated October 15,1985.

Gentlemen:

Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3 Seismic Interaction Program In Reference (1), Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO) provided the Staff information regarding the seismic interaction program for Millstone Unit No. 3. In Reference (2), the Staff requested additional information regarding the utilization of historical earthquake data in the evaluation of non-seismic Category 1 piping systems. In a subsequent telecon concerning Reference (2) the Staff specifically requested that NNECO demonstrate quantitatively that the database of historical earthquake information is directly applicable to the seic,mic interaction program.

In Reference (3), NNECO further defined the seismic interaction program for Millstone Unit No. 3 and therein committed to provide additional information supporting this use of the historical database.

Representatives from NNECO met with the Staff on October 9,1985 to discuss the Staff's concerns regarding the seismic interaction program submittals (References (1) and (3)).

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. Reference (4) included information describing:

o The applicability of the historical database to Millstone Unit No. 3.

o A proposed program to demonstrate . that the load demand on equipment anchorage does not exceed the anchorage capacity.

This information was.provided to address concerns raised in the October 9,1985 meeting.

On October 24, 1985, representatives from NNECO met with the Staff to discuss information contained in Reference (4). The Staff requested NNECO to provide clarification regarding the discussion of equipment anchorage included in Reference (4) and to describe the Sargent and Lundy program for piping and support analysis in detail. Specifically, the Staff requested NNECO to provide acceptance criteria to be utilized for piping and supports and the basis for selecting the piping sample chosen for analysis, in response to the Staff's questions and in an effort to clarify the Millstone Unit No. 3 Seismic Interaction Program the following information is enclosed:

1. Attachment 1 is a summary of the three important aspects of the seismic interaction program and their interrelationships. These aspects are:
a. Methodology for demonstrating equipment anchorage adequacy for non-seismic Category I equipment in seismic Category I buildings.
b. Methodology for demonstrating adequacy of non-seismic Category I piping and pipe supports for all non-seismic Category I piping in seismic Category I buildings.
c. Methodology for performing plant walkdowns.
2. Attachment 2 describes in detail the piping sample selected for analysis and the basis for selection. Information contained in Attachment 2 clearly shows the basis for concluding that the piping sample is bounding in terms of load demand on supporting elements.

-3. Attachment 3 is the detailed criteria document which will be employed in the analysis of the bounding piping sample described in Attachment 2. l

4. Attachment 4 provides details on criteria to be used for evaluation of embedments and anchor bolts. This criteria will be utilized for both equipment and piping anchorage evaluations.

At the October 24, 1935 meeting, the Staff also questioned the current use by NNECO of seismic experience data base in addressing seismic interactions. As outlined in Attachment 1, the seismic e) perience data base will be utilized to Npplement the bounding analytical evaluations of equipment anchorages, piping and pipe ~ supports. NNECO believes that the seismic interaction program .

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. [ detailed 'herein fully addresses the requirements of U.S. NRC Regulatory Fx Guide 1.29 without reliance upon the additional information and insight provided by the seismic experience data base.

NNECO is confident that the information and commitment to perform the above described analysis will allow the Staff to accept our program regarding the seismic interaction issue. Due to our need to resolve this matter prior to November 15,1985 fuel load date, we request that you review and approve this submittal to support the fuel load date.

i Very truly yours, NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY l- et. al.

BY NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY Their Agent

  1. >cA J. F. Opeka Senic.- Vice President w s By: R. W. Bishop Secretary l

l STATE OF CONNECTICUT )

) ss. Berlin

, COUNTY OF HARTFORD )

Then personally appeared before rre R. W. Bishop, who being duly sworn, did state that he is Secretary, of Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, an Applicant herein, that he is authorized to exer:ute and file the foregoing information in the name and on behalf of the Applicants herein and that the statements contained in said information are true and correct to the best of his . owledge and belief.

/ i Natary Public L (/

.O

p~m-Attachn.ent 1 -

Due to the_ number of submittals made on NNECO's Seismic Interaction Program

- and considering the. evolution in program emphasis, the following is a summary of -

the entire effort.

The Seismic -Interaction Program for Millstone Unit 1No. 3 consists of three distinct tasks:

~

o -Demonstrating the adequacy of equipment anchorages for non-seismic equipment in seismic Category 1. buildings.

o - Demonstrating the structural integrity of piping _and supports for selected subsystems, o Perform walkdowns to identify swing / sway interactions between non-seismic Category I piping and equipment and seismic Category 1 piping and equipment.

~

Non-seismic Category I equipment in seismic " Category I buildings will be reviewed to. assure the seismic adequacy of its anchorage. The structural integrity of equipment anchorage will be determined by one of three methods:

1. , Verify that the equipment anchorage has been explicitly qualified.
2. Compare the anchorage detail to, explicitly qualified anchorages.
3. -For anchorages which are not seismically designed and. are not similar to seismic anchorages,' calculations will be performed to demonstrate adequacy.

For equipment anchorages evaluated by method 3 above, an effort will be made to group typical anchorage details and. perform bounding calculations. The manner in which ' ~ structural integrity is demonstrated for each piece of interacting equipment will be documented. Acceptance criteria for equipment anchorage evaluations will be consistent with the piping and support criterion

. (Attachment 3) and anchor bolt and embedment criteria (Attachment 4).

The structural integrity of piping and supports will be addressed through a program developed and implemented by Sargent and Lundy. A set of piping subsystems has been selected to be representative' of pipe sizes, hanger configurations and1 operating conditions. As discussed in more detail in Attrachment 2, these selected subsystems are bounding. Each of these selected subsystems will be- analyzed for the combined loadings of weight, thermal expansion and safe shutdown earthquake including effects of seismic ancher motions. The response spectrum method of _ analysis will be used. Code Case N411 damping will be utilized in the subsystem analysis. Increased damping

.up to 8 percent of critical may ' be used in limited cases where justified as detailed in Attachment 3. Time history analysis will be run on a limited basis to validate assumptions made in the response spectrum analysis, namely that one way supports (rod hangers, sliding supports) do not experience significant uplift.

Restraint loads and pipe stresses will be calculated u:ing dynamic analysis results. They will be. compared to the failure capacities associated with each

e,_...,,. , . . m subsystem to assess the inherent . margin of safety in the design. Maximum dynamic lateral displacements of the subsystems will also be computed. These displacements will be used to confirm interaction criteria utilized during plant walkdowns.

The criteria document for this analysis effort is included as Attachment 3. Any deviation . from this document will be justified on a case-by-case basis.

Attachment 4 contains information which substantiates the anchor bolt factors of safety used in the criteria document.

Seismic interaction walkdowns are currently being conducted to identify swing / sway interactions between non-seismic Category I piping and equipment and seismic Category 1 piping and equipment. The two program tasks described above assume that equipment and piping do not lose anchorage and/or fall down.

Plant walkdowns are prescribed to identify all swinging interactions within a 6". side-to-side deflection envelope. The maximum deflections calculated during the Sargent and Lundy effort will be compared to the 6" criterion and any exceedences will be reconciled.

All interactions will be evaluated considering the local flexibility of the interacting equipment / piping. These reviews will also address restrictions such as penetrations and interferences with structures which would limit displacements. In all cases interactions with active seismic Category I components will be prevented.

Information gained from the experience database is used in conjunction with the -

above efforts. As the Seismic Interaction Program has evolved the role of the experience database methodology has deminished. However, the database does show that properly supported equipment and piping maintains its structural integrity during strong motion earthquakes. Further this program benefits from the database information regarding the severity of seismic interactions and the knowledge of configurations which have not performed wellin past earthquakes.

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Attachment 2 Selection of Piping Subsystems for Analysis 1.0 Introduction 2.0 Selection Criteria 3.0 Conclusion

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Selection of Piping Subsystems for Analysis (1.0 - Introduction -

. In~ order to evaluate the structural integrity of Non-Seismic Category I pioing ' and supports' installed in safety-related areas of Millstone 3, a

-sample of 22 piping subsystems was selected for analysis.- The analysis intends to demonstrate the structural integrity of Non-Seismic Category I

~

piping . for the .SSE _ event such that unacceptable. seismic interaction

between Non-Seismic Category I and Seismic Category I equipment will not occur. Piping subsystems were selected for analysis utilizing a selection criteria designed to ensure that the subsystems would bound the worse case condition in the plant. Details of the subsystems are provided in Table 1.

Of the 22 piping subsystems,-17 were selected in the large bore area,2 are small bore and 3 are fire. protection. The information provided on the tables and figures regarding the subsystems analyzed :is based on the 17 large bore subsystems only. The 2 small bore subsystems were selected to validate the assumption that the structuralintegrity of small bore piping and supports is ensured through conservative design methods and is bounded by the large bore analyses.

The information presented regarding the total numbers of supports is based on engineered piping and does not include contractor routed fire protection and floor and ceiling drains. In order to ensure that the sample is bounding, 3 additional fire protection systems were selected in accordance with the criteria in Section 2.0. Floor and ceiling drains are bounded by the selected subsystems in accordance with the criteria.

2.0 Selection Criteria The selection criteria are defined and their application discussed below.

The criteria considers all major. parameters which influence the dynamic behaviour of piping and the load demand on its supporting structures.

2.1 Pipe Size The total scope of Non-Seismic Category I piping in safety-related areas is best addressed by evaluating the supports involved. Table 2 demonstrates the distribution of supports by building and pipe size. Note that a large percentage of pipe supports (45 percent) encompasses 1 inch and less nominal diameter piping. Supports for 6 inch and greater piping only account for 7. percent of the total population.~ Since the large piping systems are assumed to have the greatest energy, highest susceptibility to structural failure and most damage potential during the seismic event, the piping subsystems selected are primarily concentrated in the larger piping diameters as demonstrated in Figure 1. Figure 2 demonstrates that the

. percentage of selected systems are skewed towards the larger diameters even when compared to the total number of large bore supports (NPS>

2 inch).

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2.2 Support Type The distribution of support types for_ large bore piping is provided in

' Table 3. The piping subsystems were selected on the basis of greatest

' flexibility such that the load demand on rigid-type supports is conservative.

nTherefore subsystems with a large amount of sof t supports (i.e., spring hangers, rod hangers) and fewer hard supports (i.e.,- rigids and sliding supports) were selected as demonstrated in Figure 3.

2.3 - Seismic Severity Piping subsystems were generally selected in areas of highest seismic

- acceleration. As demonstrated in Figure 4, the auxiliary building and containment structure tend to bound the other safety-related buildings when peak G values are compared. ' A review'of Table 2 indicates that these 2 buildings have a large percentage of Non-Seismic Category I piping, therefore 'most subsystems were taken from these buildings. In order to round out the sample, a few subsystems were chosen in other buildings.

- 2.4 Damate Potential The auxiliary building and containment have the least amount of separation between Non-Seismic Category I piping and safety-related equipment which emphasizes the need to select subsystems from these buildings.

. 2.5 System Temperature A representative cross section of operating temperatures was considered in the selection process.

2.6- Piping Material The subsystems selected contain both carbon and stainless steel material.

2.7 Pipe Fittings A representative cross section of pipe fitting types is contained in the selected subsystems. Although the majority of Non-Seismic Category I piping utilizes welded joints (butt welded. large bore and some socket welded small bore) the fire protection system contains mechanical joints in some areas. Therefore, fire protection subsystems were added to the list considering other applicable criteria, e.g., seismic severity, damage potential, etc.

2.8 Construction Specification The majority of Non-Seismic Category I piping is designed and installed in '

accordance with a standard specification. The notable exceptions to this are again the fire protection and roof and floor drains. Due to its piping geometry and construction, fire protection is unique enough to warrant additional consideration. Therefore additional fire protection subsystems l

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. the other selected subsystems.

- 2.9 - Concentrated Mass The selected subsystems include a representative cross section of

. concentrated in-line masses such as valves and flanges.- The effect of eccentric masses was also considered in the selection process.

2.10 Piping Geometry The routing of the subsystem was considered in the selection process. A representative cross section of vertical and horizontal routings was accomplished. To further ensure.that the selected subsystems bounded the

-worst plant condition for seismic integrity, ali 6 inch nominal.and greatei-Non-Seismic Category I piping systems in safety-related areas were

. reviewed on'a~ case-by-case basis utilizing the above criteria. In each case the Non-Seismic Category I piping was judged to be bounded by one or-more of the selected subsystems.

3.0 Conclusion The piping subsystems in Table I have been selected in accordance with the criteria outlined in Section 2.0 of this attachment and therefore bound all Non-Seismic Category I piping concerning the issue of structural integrity iduring the SSE event.

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TABLE 1 !s A

PIPING SUMSTEM IWONIATION d

Elevation Pipe Size Rod Subsystem Buildina . Rigid . Sliding Spring ;C-Maximus/ Minimum h Temperature

  • Material Maximum / Minimum Anchor Supportr j!aggr Support h .If AI-88A Auxiliary 33' to 7' . Boron Recovery Hot SS 12" 0 3 0- 0 5 AI-1105 Auxiliary 17' to 5' Auxiliary condensate Cold CS 4", 3" 3. 0 10 -. 1- 0 /~

AI-110V Auxiliary 17' to 8' Auxiliary Condensate Cold CS 3" 2 7. 3 7 0

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AI 110Q-1 Auxiliary 28' to 20' Auxiliary Steam Hot CS 8", 4" 2 4 8 0 2 AI-110G Auxiliary 13' Auxiliary Steam Hot CS 8", 6" 3 1 2 4 0 AI-110R-1 Auxiliary 102' to 13' Auxiliary Steam Hot CS 6", 3" 2- 6 -3 7 5 and B-2 i;

SL-14 Containment 66' to (-)9' Chilled Water Cold C5 4", 2)" 1 2 2 4 0 i AI-110L Auxiliary 59' to 37' Containment Vacuus Hot SS 4" 4 0 3 0 4 AI-110Y Auxiliary 76' to 58' - Gaseous Vents Hot SS 6", 4", 3" 3 0 11 0 0 AI-110N Auxiliary 95' to 12' Auxiliary Steam, Cold SS 8", 4" 2 0 0 1 3 Containment Tacuum AI-91G-1 Auxiliary 102' to 61' Gaseous Waste Hot CS 6", 4" 3 0 15 1 0 SL-21 Containment 315 to 3' -Chilled unter . Cold CS 3", 2" 1 0 3 4 0 AI-91G-2 Auxiliary 61' to 34' Gaseous Umste, Not C5 8", 4 1

li" 1 9 5 0 Boron Recovery AI-1101 Auxiliary 102' to 10' Auxiliary Steam Hot CS 6" 1 3 1 2 0 ,

AI-941 ESF 32' to 16' Auxiliary Steam Hot CS 4", 3" 2 '

1 5 6 0 AI-107I Containment 5' to (-)11' Chilled Water cold CS 10", 3" 5 0 5 14 0 SL-3A Containment 40' to 24' Fire Protection Cold CS (later)

Sprinkler Piping

  • SL-4A Auxiliary (later) Fire Protection Cold CS (later)

SL-5A Fuel (later) Fire Protection Cold CS (later)

SL-6A (Cold small bore subsystem to be determined later.)

SL-7A (Hot small bore subsystem to be determined later.)

'Not is defined as greater than 150*F.

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ie TABLE 2 Y NON-SEISMIC CATEGORY I PIPINO SUPPORTS IN SAFETY-RELATED AREAS _

Emergency Hydrogen ' Main Steam Pipe Size / Auxiliary Control Containment Intake Diesel Generator Safety Features Fuel Recombiner Valve Buildim Buildim Buildirut Structure Structure Enclosure Buildirig Buildirur Buildim - Buildim TOTAL

.125" 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2

.5 " 113 0 84 0 0 21 9 0 75 302

.75 " 471 49 211 17 2 28 133' 41 1,022 70 1' 359 71 153 9 12 164 97 43 15 923 1.5 " 79 32 23' 3 0 5 101 0 1 244 2* 273 16 164 6 0 87 76 2- 13 637 j 2.5

  • 203 15 14 0 7 0 31 0 0 270 s 3* 245 0 132 25 5 6 71 0- 37 521 48 35 8 0 154 16 6 26 104 0 46 710

) 6* 107 0 21 0 0 7 25 0 2 162 8' 54 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 54 to" 57 0 46 0 0 11 0 0 0 114 12" 16 0 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 23 TOTAL 2.337 183 1,002 76 32 362 647 86 259 '4,984 1 _ __ _

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. ... 3 TABLE 3 H NON-SEISMIC CATEGORY I '

LARGE BORE PIPING SUPPORTS -

IN SAFETY-RELATED AREAS BY HANGER TYPE Spring - Rigid Rod Sliding . ,

Pipe Size / Hanger Type Ancher Hanger Restraint Hanger Support Snubber TOTAIS ~

2}" 6 2 131 93 37 1 270 3" 43 8 112 151 207' O 521 $

4" 57 24 196 190 234- 9 710 6" 11 11 42 45 53 0 162 8" 5 5 30 6 8 0 54 <

10" 6 ~3 9 30 66 0 114 12" 3 8 3 7 2 0 23 TOTAL 131 61 523 522 607 10 1,854 l

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ATTACHMENT 3 MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION - UNIT 3 NORTHEAST ~ UTILITIES SERVICE CORPORATION PROJECT NO. 7450-00 DESIGN CRITERIA DC-ME-01-NE

-DESIGN CRITERIA POR EVALUATION OF NON-SEISMIC CATEGORY I PIPING IN SEISMIC CATEGORY I BUILDINGS i

t

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NORTHEAST UTILITIES SERVICE COPRORATION MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION -' UNIT 3 DESIGN CRITERIA FOR EVALUATION OF NON-SEISMIC CATEGORY I PIPING IN

' SEISMIC CATEGORY I BUILDINGS DC-ME-01-NE TABLE'OF CONTENTS PAGE 1.0 Scope ................................................ 1 2.0' References............................................ 2 3.0 Functional Requirements............................... 1-2 4.0 Design Requirements................................... 2

4. l' Design Basis.......................................... 2 4.1.1 Non-Seismic Category I Piping.................. 2 4.2 Evaluation Basis...................................... 2 4 .' 2.1 Selection of Typical Subsystems................ 2 4.2.2 Analysis Methodology........................... 3 4.2.2.1 Piping................................ 3-5 4.2.2.2 Piping Supports....................... 5-6 4.2.3 Load combination............................... 6 4.2.4 Acceptance Criteria............................ 7 o

4.2.4.1 Piping................................ 7 4.2.4.2 Supports.............................. 7-8 4.2.4.3 Equipment............................. 8 4.3 Generic Recommendation................................ 8 PJ0:beb 10/31/85 2.18 f

,..7-- ;;= .- ---- - - -- - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - -

ISSUE

SUMMARY

Revision Page No. Prepared Reviewed Approved Number Date Revised Reason By By By

Page 1 NORTHEAST UTILITIES SERVICE CORPORATION MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION - UNIT 3 DESIGN CRITERIA POR EVALUATION OF NON-SEISMIC CATEGORY I PIPING IN SEISMIC CATEGORY I BUILDINGS 1.0 SCOPE This design criteria establishes the methodology for evaluating the seismic adequacy of Non-Seismic Category I piping and sup-ports in Soismic Category I buildings.

2.0 REFERENCES

2.1 ASME B.31.1 Power Piping Codo 2.2 US NRC Regulatory Guide 1.29, Soismic Design Requirements 2.3 Final Safety Analysis Report, Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3 2.4 ASME Codo Section III, 1983 Edition, Summer 1985 Addenda 2.5 AISC Code, Eighth Edition 2.6 NUREG 1061, " Report of the US NRC Piping Review Committee",

Volume II 2.7 EMD-TP-1, " Lesson Plan for Training Personnel in Piping Analy-sis 3.0 PUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS It is required by NRC regulation (Reference 2) that plants under construction ovaluate the interaction of non-safety and safoty-related systems during normal operation, transients, and design basis accidents to assure that any intoraction betwoon such systems will not result in excooding the acceptance cri-teria for any design basis event.

Non-Solsmic Category I piping and its associated supports in-stalled in Category 1 buildings shall bo ovaluated to assure their structural integrity such that they will not fall and impair the capability of any safety related system to perform its intended function during and after the design basis soismic event (SSE).

^

1, Page 2 NORTHEAST UTILITIES SERVICE CORPORATION

t. MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION - UNIT 3 DESIGN CRITERIA FOR EVALUATION OF NON-SEISMIC CATEGORY I PIPING IN SEISNIC CATEGORY I BUILDINGS

)

4.0 DESIGN REOUIREMENTS 4.1 Design Basis 4.1.1 Non-Soismic Category I Piping Non-Soismic Category I piping (class 4) and supports that are not within a seismic subsystem are designed for normal operating conditions in accordance with B31.1 code.

4.2 Evaluation Basis Several typical piping subsystems which are bounding in terms of potential soismic interactions shall be selected and ovalu-ated to demonstrato sufficient margin against collapse of piping and support structure.

4.2.1 Selection of Typical Subsystems Sufficient number of subsystems shall be selected to be representative of the Class 4 non-seismic piping in the Millstone Unit No. 3 plant. As a minimum, the following shall be considered in the selection of typical subsys-tems

a. Size of pipo
b. Type of support used (Rod flanger, Pipe Pack, etc.)
c. Type of analysis method or design guidelines used
d. The temperature of the piping
o. Location in the plant (the severity of SSE load values doponding on location)
f. Pipo material
g. The type of pipo connection (wolded, throaded, etc.)

Page 3 NORTHEAST UTILITIES SERVICE CORPORATION NILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION - UNIT 3 DESIGN CRITERIA FOR EVALUATION OF NON-SEISNIC CATEGORY I PIPING IN SEISMIC CATEGORY I BUILDINGS The samplo shall be weighed towards larger pipe size, more sovoro soismic load areas and areas with potential interactions with seismic plant components.

4.2.2 Analysis Methodology 4.2.2.1 Piping Each of the selected piping subsystems shall be ovaluated for the following loads:

a. Weight Loads The piping shall be evaluated for dead weight load due to piping, insulation, contents and concentrated massos, such as valves, traps and strainers.
b. Thormal Loads Piping shall be analyzed for thermal expansion due to the maximum operating temperature of the line as specified by the system design. Thermal movement of equipment nozzles shall be considered in the analysis. Cold piping with mgximum operating temperature loss than 150 F and nozzle movoments loss than 1/8 inch nood not be analyzed for thermal loads.
c. Safo Shutdown Earthquake (i) Inortin Load Piping shall be ovaluated for soismic inertia loads using re-sponso spectra methods. The damping values shall be based on ASME Code Case N-411. For heavily insulated piping, damping up to 8%

may be justified on a caso by caso basis.

Page 4 NORTHEAST UTILITIES SERVICE CORPORATION NILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION - UNIT 3 DESIGN CRITERIA POR EVALUATION OF NON-SEISMIC CATEGORY I PIPING IN SEISNIC CATEGORY I BUILDINGS Spectra amplification due to equipment or slab flexibility shall be addressed in the response spectrum analysis.

(ii) Displacement Loads Piping shall also be evaluated for loads due to relative building displacements. If the difference between absolute values of the building displacement at all support locations due to any given seismic excitation is less than a sixteenth of an inch, then the displacement effects due to that excitation need not be considered.

(iii) Piping Uplift one way vertical restraints shall be reviewed for upward load. If uplift is indicated, acceleration time history analysis shall be performed on a limited number of subsystems to demonstrate no significant uplift at vertical one- way restraint locations.

4.2.2.2 Piping Supports All support hardware shall be evaluated by a detailed evaluation or using test data as defined below:

Page 5 r

NORTHEAST UTILITIES SERVICE CORPORATION MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION - UNIT 3 DESIGN CRITERIA POR EVALUATION OF NON-SEISNIC CATEGORY I PIPING IN SEISNIC CATEGORY I BUILDINGS

a. Standard Component Supports and Auxiliary Steel Standard component supports and auxiliary steel, except U-Bolts and U-Straps used to attach piping to supports, shall be evaluated in accordance with the require-ments of the ASME Code,Section III, Subsection NF (Reference 2.4).
b. U-Bolts and U-Straps Used to Attach Piping to Supports The ultimate strength of U-Bolts and U-Straps shall be determined from test data. As an alternative, the ultimate capability of the U-Bolt or U-Strap may be estimated using plastic analysis in accordance with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III, Appendix F (Reference 2.4).
c. Anchor Bolts Loads on anchor bolts shall be compared against the pull out or failure strength of the anchor bolt using a factor of safety of two. If the separation between adjacent anchor bolt violates minimum requirements, then the allowable anchor loads shall be scaled down using appro-priate reduction factors.

4.2.3 Load Combinations The following load combinations shall be used to combine the applicable loads:

=

Page 6 NORTHEAST UTILITIES SERVICE CORPORATION MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION - UNIT 3 DESIGN CRITERIA POR EVALUATION OF NON-SEISMIC CA7LGORY I PIPING IN SMISMIC CATEGORY I BUILDINGS Piping ASME Code = Pressure + Weight + Safe Shutdown Equation 9D Earthquake Piping Support Load Service = Thermal + Weight + Safe Shutdown Level D Earthquake NOTE: Seismic inertia loads and seismic building displacement loads are combined using the square root of the sum of squares (SRSS) method.

4.2.4 Acceptance Criteria 4.2.4.1 Piping Pipe stresses shall be compared against ASME Code,Section III, 1983 Edition Service Level D allowables to demonstrate that collapse will not occur . Any point in piping exceed-ing Service Level D allowables may be accep-ted by detailed evaluation showing sufficient margin against collapse of the piping subsys-tem. If unintensified stresses at any loca-tion exceed yield stress values, the collapse mechanisms of piping and load redistribution shall also be investigated.

All piping locations exceeding ASME Code,Section III, 1983 Edition, Service Level D allowables and the evaluation method used to accept the higher stress level shall be justified on a case-by-case basis and docu-mented in the final report.

Page 7 NORTHEAST UTILITIES SERVICE CORPORATION MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION - UNIT 3 DESIGN CRITERIA POR EVALUATION OF NON-SEISMIC CATEGORY I PIPING IN SEISMIC CATEGORY I BUILDINGS 4.2.4.2 Supports The structural integrity of any support or support component may be demonstrated by one of the following:

a. The load on the support or support component is below the Service Level D load capacity data sheets provided by the vendor,
b. Structural support members and connec-tions meet the requirements of ASME Code,Section III, Appendix F allowable values.
c. The load on component standard supports (catelog items) is below fifty percent (Factor of Safety of two) of the ultimate capacity.

All supports with any component not meeting the above requirements shall be assumed to be ine f fective. The ineffective support shall be removed and the piping subsystem chall be re-evaluated. Further, the supports shall be reviewed for the consequences of loads ex-ceeding the allowables.

4.2.4.3 Equipment Piping loads on equipment or tank nozzles shall be compared against Service Level D

( f aulted condition) allowables. All nozzles exceeding allowables shall be evaluated for structural integrity using the applicable code. Structural integrity of equipment anchorage shall be demonstrated by applying the appropriate criteria previously stated.

-g Page 8 NORTHEAST UTILITIES SERVICE CORPORATION NILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION - UNIT 3 DESIGN CRITERIA POR EVALUATION OF NON-SEISNIC CATEGORY I PIPING IN SEISNIC CATEGORY I BUILDINGS 4.3 Generic Recommendation Generic conclusions regarding the adequacy of the nonseismic-ally supported piping and supports shall be drawn from the analysis of the typical piping subsystems and supports. If cases are found during the evaluation which could cause overall collapse of the subsystem, including supports, or which results in large lateral deflections, corrective action shall be recom-mended on a specific or generic basis as appropriate.

PJO:beb 10/31/85 2.17

Attachment 4 Criteria for Evaluation of Anchor Bolts and Embedments o Drilled-in concrete anchor bolts (Hitti bolts) and Richmond inserts shall be evaluated against a factor of safety of 2.0 on ' ultimate anchorage capacity.* Shear / tension interaction, base plate flexibility, edge spacing,

- and bolt ' spacing .will be evaluated in the same manner as for. Seismic Category I applications.

o Nelson studs on embedded plates shall be evaluated by the same methods as those utilized for Seismic Category I applications.

  • Extensive testing has been performed on Hitti bolts at the Millstone 3 site to verify the minimum ultimate anchorage capacity.' The tested bolts were installed in accordance with the Millstone 3 procedure in concrete from actual pours at the site. The installation of Non-Seismic Category I Hilti bolts

- follows the same procedure utilized for Seismic Category I installations.

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