ML20235Y465

Insp Rept 50-458/87-24 on 870916-30.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Previous Insp Findings,Fuel Pool Siphon Event,Licensee Action on NRC Info Notice,Surveillance Test Review,Operational Safety Verification & Refueling

ML20235Y465
Person / Time
Site:	River Bend
Issue date:	10/14/1987
From:	Chamberlain D, Jaudon J, William Jones NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20235Y453	List: ML20235Y451 ML20235Y457 ML20235Y465
References
50-458-87-24, IEIN-87-043, IEIN-87-43, NUDOCS 8710200371
Download: ML20235Y465 (9)

See also: IR 05000458/1987024

Text

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APPENDIX B

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COM111SSION

REGION IV

NRC Inspection Report: 50-458/87-24

Docket: 50-458

Licensee: Gulf States Utilities Company (GSU)

P. O. Box 220

St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775

Facility Name: River Bend Station (RBS)

Inspection At: River Bend Station, St. Francisville, Louisiana

Inspection Conducted: . September 16 through September 30, 1987

Inspectors: 4- > !h-/'h 7

D. D. Cliamberlain, Senior Resident Inspector Date

Project Section A, Reactor Projects Branch

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W. B. Jones, Residen Inspector Date

Project Section A, Reactor Projects Branch j

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P Jau n, Chief, Project Section A Date

J[Rea(_ctor rojects Branch

E Approved: ,M /d VO

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P. Jau 01, f, Project Section A Date

Re ctor rojects Branch

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Inspection Summary:.

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Insp'ection Conducted' September'16 thro'gh

u h ptember 30, 1987 ,

>(Report 50-458/87-24).

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-Areas'~ Inspected:.! Routine,'unanno'unced>inspectio$oflicenseeactionon i '  %,! (.

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previous inspection. findings, fuel pool sit,hdn event', licensee action on an NRC ' '

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Information Notice,[ surveillanceitest revkw, operational safety verification, ,:

and preparationifor refueling. -os o

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.Results: Within the areas inspected, two n'olations were identified (failure. '

to utilize the proper. revision 'of a surveniance test" procedure, paragraph 5, f((  :

'and inadequate. station' operating procedure paragraphl3)..

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3 DETAILS

1.. Persons Contacted

W. J. Beck,. Supervisor, Reactor Engineering

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J. E. Booker,. Manager, Oversight

• J. L. Burton, Supervisor, Independent Safety

' Engineering Group '

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E. M. Cargill,. Supervisor, Radiation Programs

• J. C. Deddens, Senior Vice President, River Bend

Nuclear Group

D. R. Derbonne, Assistant Plant Manager, Maintenance

• P. E. Freehill, Outage Manager

A. O. Fredieu, Assistant Supervisor, Operations

D. R. Gipson, Director, Quality Services

• J. D. Gore, Cajun Consultant

P. D. Graham, Assistant Plant' Manager, Operations  !

E. R. Grant, Director, Nuclear Licensing

• J. R. Hamilton, Director, Design Engineering

K..C. Hodges, Supervisor, Chemistry

G.-R. Kimmell, Supervisor, Operations (QA)

• R. J. King, Supervisor, Nuclear Licensing

'*I. M. Malik, Supervisor, Quality Systems

'J. H. McQuirter, Licensing Engineer

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V.'J. Normand,- Supervisor, Administrative Services

• H. H. Northrup, Supervisor, Warehousing

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• W. H. Odell, Manager, Administration l

• T. F. Plunkett, Plant Manager

• M. F. Sankovich, Manager, Engineering

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R. B.'Stafford, Director, Operations (QA)

K. E. Suhrke, Manager, Project Management

• R. J. Vachon,-SMior Compliance Analyst

v R. G. West, Supervisor, Instrumentation and Controls

.D. W. Williamson, Supervisor, Operations

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, The NRC inspectors also interviewed additional licensee personnel during

i the inspection period.

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* Denotes those persons that attended the exit interview conducted on

. September 30, 1987.

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2. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findi,ng

'(Closed) Violation (458/8571-01): Failure of surveillance test procedures ;

(STP) to meet Technical Specification (TS) requirements for calibration

within the specified value.

T sThe licensee has received a TS change to increase the trip setpoint value

for the scram discharge volume level instrumentation. This TS change

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allows the level float switches to be set within the range of the

instrument, but does not increase the TS. allowable limit. The remaining.

STPs for reactor vessel low water levels and the automatic

depressurization timers have been revised to place the procedures in

, compliance with the TS setpoint values.

This violation is closed. I

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3. Fuel Pool Siphon Event

This area of inspection was conducted to review licensee actions in

response to a fuel pool siphon event which occurred on September 20, 1987.

An NRC Region IV section chief was dispatched to the site to assist the

resident inspectors with the review of this event. A description of the

event and subsequent event analysis / corrective actions by the licensee is

documented below:

a. Event Description: The licensee was making preparation for the first :i

refueling at River Bend Station. The drywell head and reactor vessel  !

head had been removed and on September-19, 1987, the cteam dryer

assembly _was removed from the reactor and placed in the dryer storage

pool. No spent fuel had been removed from the reactor, therefore no-

spent fuel was being stored in the upper or lower fuel storage pools.

The upper fuel storage / dryer storage pool was isolated from the

reactor cavity (gates closed), and on September 20, 1987, the water

level had been lowered to accommodate placing the large dryer

assembly in the pool.without overflowing the pool. After placing the

dryer assembly in the pool, the water level did not. increase as much

as expected (the actual increase was only 1 or 2 inches). The

operations shift crew then decided to raise the water level back to

the normal level. At approximately 3iOO a.m. (CDT) on September 20,

1987, an operator and a foreman were dispatched to transfer the fuel

pool purification system from the recirculation mode on the upper j

fuel storage pool to a lineup which would provide makeup from the

condensate storage tank (ST) in order to refill the upperfuel storage

pool. Station Operating Procedure (50P) 0091, " Fuel Pool Cooling &

Cleanup" contained a section.to add water to containment pools

through the fuel pool purification pump. The sequence described in I

this section was to be used to add water to the upper fuel storage

pool and provide; for opening the two supply valves from the CST and

then closing the suction valvc from the upper fuel storage pool. It

was apparently not recognized that opening the CST valves with the

fuel pool suction valve open provided a potential siphon path from

the upper pool to the CST since the upper pool water level is 70-80 l

feet higher than the water level in the CST. Also, it was apparently

not recognized that the removable anti-siphon plug had nnt been

removed from the upper fuel storage pool suction line; therefore,

there was no anti-siphon protection on the upper fuel storage pool.

The operators were apparently concerned with over filling the upper

fuel storage pool and decided to orily partially open the CST makeup

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valve and watch. pool level to see how' fast level increased. The

operators were in contact with the control room, and level was being

monitored on a level indicator in he control room. However, since

the level indicator has a narrow band (+12 1/2 to -12 1/2 inches) and

it was pegged downsc.:le, a reduction in pool level would not have

been observed. At about 3:00 a.m., the operator opened the CST

makeep valve about 30 percent. No increase in level was reported, so

the valve was further opened to 50 percent. About 15 minutes after

opening the valve a radiation alert alarm (about 1.6 millirem) was

received in the control room, and about the same time the auxiliary

control room notified the main control room that the CST level was

increasing. The operator at the CST makeup valve was then instructed

to close the suction valve from the upper pool which isolated the

siphon path to the CST. A high radiation alarm (about 82 millirem)

was subsequently received in the control room as the steam dryer was

partially uncovered when the upper fuel storage pool water level

decreased about 6 to 7 feet. This reduction in pool level would not

have uncovered any fuel in the, upper fuel storage pool if fuel had

been stored in that pool. The high radiation alarm cleared at about

3:50 a.m., as the pool level was being restored after the operator

closed the upper pool suction valve. The upper fuel pool level was

fully restored at about 5:55 a.m. and the CST makeup was secured. At

this time,- recovery from the upper pool siphon event was complete.

The licensee then initiated a condition report to cause an analysis

of the event and to delineate required corrective actions. The SRI

was on site September 20, 1987, and reviewed the event with

operations staff at that time. No fuel movements were planned for

that day and the event was again discussed with plant management on

September 21, 1987. The plant manager stated that he did not intend

to allow any fuel movements until this event war. fully analyzed and

corrective actions implemented. The SRI inform?d licensee management

that the NRC also wanted to be fully satisfied with corrective

actions prior to the start of fuel movements.

b. Event Analysis / Corrective Actions: The licaasee submitted an INP0

significant event notification of this event on September 24, 1987,

and submitted a voluntary report to the NRC on September 29, 1987.

The licensee attributed the root cause of the event to inadequate

procedural controls as to the potential impact of valve sequencing in

the procedure. Corrective actions delineated in the voluntary report

were reviewed with NRC personnel, and the licensee commited to

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complete certain specified actions prior to beginning of spent fuel

movements. The corrective actions completed or planned are:

o The licensee has revised SOP-0091 to provide for normal system

lineups with dedicated loops for upper and lower fuel storage

pools. Any deviations from these normal system lineups will be

strictly controlled. The procedure provides restrictions on

fuel movement while performing valve manipulations and provides

administrative controls for local monitoring of pool levels

during system realignments. Also, strong precautions and

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cautions have been added in the procedure for certain evolutions

and for assuring that all anti-siphon plugs are removed. This_ l

l4 procedure is being tested by actual system operation for major

system alignments,

o 'The anti-siphon plugs have been' removed and procedures have been

revised to provide strong administrative controls on

reinstallation and removal. Normal operation will always be

with the plugs' removed.

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o The fuel pool cooling / purification system has been analyzed by  !

the licensee and independently by a contractor for all potential.

drain siphon pathways. Any manipulation of these pathways will

be controlled via procedures with cautions and verifications.

o Training on all revised procedures related to this event will be

conducted for any individuals who will be required to use the

procedures. prior to such use. .i

o The licensee has demonstrated that all anti-siphon devices'are

clear of blockage,

o Prior to fuel storage in the lower fuel storage pool, the

licensee will drill a redundant anti-siphon hole in the suction

line of the lower spent fuel storage pool,'which has the

removable anti-siphon plug. This redundant hole has no design .)

provision for being plugged.

o During this refueling outage, if fuel is stored in the upper

fuel storage pool, the licensee will verify hourly by inspection

the upper fuel storage pool level and will maintain the level in

the normal band with level alarms (high/ low) cleared in the main

control room. If the level is not in the normal band with

alarms clear a continuous watch will be placed at the upper fuel

storage pool until level is returned to the normal band.

o Soon after this refueling outage, a redundant anti-siphon hole

will be drilled in the upper fuel pool suction line which has j

the anti-syphon plug. This hole will be at least 10 feet above l

the top of fuel storage racks.

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The licensee review of the event also revealed that the outage

schedule contained a note to remove the upper fuel storage pools

anti-siphon plugs prior to fuel movements. The lower fuel pool i

anti siphon plugs had been previously removed prior to storage of new l

fuel in the lower spent fuel pool. '

The resident inspectors continue to monitor completion of licensee

corrective actions. The apparent inadequacy of SOP-0091, which l

allowed a siphon path of the upper fuel pool to be established, has

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been identified as a' potential violation of Technical

Specification 6.8.1.a (458/8724-01).

.4 . Licensee Action on a NRC Information Notice

This area of inspection was conducted to review licensee actions relative

to NRC Information Notice No. 87-43, " Gaps in Neutron-Absorbing Material

in High-Density Spent Fuel Storage Racks." The licensee accelerated

review of this notice to provide assurance that no problems would be

encountered'with storage of spent fuel during this refueling outage. The.

licensee analysis'of this notice conclude that the high-density storage i

racks at River Bend are acceptable for storage of spent fuel at this time l

because: l

a. An analysis shows that the 164 bundles to be stored during this first

refueling would remain subcritical' assuming no neutron absorbing j

material existed.

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b. The neutron absorbing material has not been exposed to any l

significant gamma radiation which might cause shrinkage.

c. Other plants with similarly designed and manufactured racks as River I

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Bend (RB) (i.e. Turkey Point) lead RB by three years in experience

with irradiated spent fuel racks. The licensee will monitor these

plants for any future potential for problems.

d. The licensee has a long-term surveillance program of representative

samples to be evaluated for additional . assurance of detecting

performance that is not within acceptable limits,

e. The licensee will continue to evaluate this issue as additional

information becomes available.

f. Other plants with racks similar in design and manufacture to the

racks at River Bend have tested the neutron-absorbing material, and  !'

no failures have been identified.

The licensee initial actions in response to this notice are deemed prompt

and thorough. No violations or deviations were identified in this area of

inspection.

5. Surveillance Observation

During this inspection period, the NRC resident inspectors reviewed the

surveillance test data packages for STP-000-3001, " Daily Fire Door

Position Check," performed on September 20, 1987, and September 22, 1987,

to verify fire door daily operability in accordance with TSs 4.7.7.2.d and

4.7.7.2.c. During the review of these procedures, the NRC resident

inspectors noted that the above two performances of this STP utilized i

official work copies issued August 26, 1987. On August 27, 1987, the

licensee issued Revision 2 to this procedure which incorporated minor

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ichanges, which did. not affect the acceptance ' criteria previously

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established,'and temporary change notices-(TCN) previously written,against *

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this procedure. . The111censee's ADM-0015, " Station Surveillance Test

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' Program," requires ~that,the individual. assigned to performLthe' test,

' utilize an official Work ~ copy of'the latest revision of the STP and anyl

associated TCNs. J The. administrative. procedure further requires-that the

a performer. verify the' document as current by checking against station

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? document' control or the. station. operating ~ manual.index maintained in the

l control room' prior to initial' start of the test. This. failure to. utilize

the latest revision of the STP was identified by the NRC resident.

' inspectors as !a' potential-violation.of Technical Specification 6.8.1.g-

l(458/8724-02). -The review of the test data revealed no pioblems with

actual. test pe'rformance.

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.6[ ' Operational Safety' Verification-

The~ resident inspectors continueito~ monitor control room activities and-

conduct during,the refueling outage. Control room activities and conduct d

.'were generally observed to be well controlled. Proper control room

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! staffing was maintained,~and access to the control room operational areas-

was controlled. . The required emergency core' cooling systems and support

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systems;were observed to be in operation for initial refueling _

. pre'parations.' Selected shift turnover meetings were observed,'and

information concerning' plant status was being covered in these meetings.-.

Plant tours were conducted,'and no problems were noted. . General' radiation l

protection and; security practices were observed, and no problems were

' identified.

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The resident inspectors also reviewed licensee actions on operational .

events-and' potential problems which included the fuel pool siphon event

discussed in paragraph 3 of this report. The result of the review of.one jl

other' selected' item is described below: '

o Local Power Range Monitor (LPRM) Removal: During this refueling

c outage the licensee planned to replace five defective'LPRM detectors.

The licensee had obtained an automatic machine for LPRM removal, t

-which is designed to withdraw the LPRM from the reactor vessel while

, cutting and dropping the'small (approximately 2-inch) pieces'into a-

storage cask. During the removal'of the first LPRM on September 25,

1987, the automatic machine failed with about.four feet of the LPRM

.left out of the storage cask. The LPR!i was fully extracted from the

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reactor vessel guide tube. This activity was conducted underneath

the, reactor vessel, which is isolated from any other work activities.

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Because of the high radiation levels in the area, the' licensee has

been very ca'utious and conservative with recovery of the stuck LPRM.

One entry was made on September 27, 1987, to cut the LPRM off and

b cover it with lead blankets, and another entry was made on q

September 30, 1987, to recover small pieces on top of the machine.

Recovery efforts are continuing, and the licensee has been able to

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limit worker radiation exposure. The resident inspectors will

continue to monitor licensee activities with the LPRM recovery.

' No violations or deviations were identified in this area of inspection.

7. Preparation for Refueling

The resident inspectors continue to monitor licensee preparations for

refueling. The licensee interface with the GE contractor for refueling

was discussed with licensee management, and the licensee issued a

memorandum which stressed that the senior reactor operator for refueling

would be in charge on the refueling floor for all internal core-

alterations. The GE personnel assigned to refueling are also being

facility certified for the equipment and procedures that they will use.

Selected outage meetings were observed and no problems were noted.

The SRI was informed by the licensee senior vice president on

September 30, 1987, that the outage management group had been realigned to

report functionally to the plant manager. This was done in order to

provide a centralized control of outage and operational activities. The

senior vice: president also stressed safety of operations as top priority

to all personnel in a memorandum dated September 30, 1987,.which described

the functional realignment.

No violations or deviations were identified in this area of inspection.

8. Exit Interview

An exit interview was conducted with licensee representatives (identified

in paragraph 1). During this interview, the SRI reviewed the scope and

findings of the inspection.

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