ML20235Y465
| ML20235Y465 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | River Bend  |
| Issue date: | 10/14/1987 |
| From: | Chamberlain D, Jaudon J, William Jones NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20235Y453 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-458-87-24, IEIN-87-043, IEIN-87-43, NUDOCS 8710200371 | |
| Download: ML20235Y465 (9) | |
See also: IR 05000458/1987024
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APPENDIX B
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COM111SSION
REGION IV
NRC Inspection Report: 50-458/87-24
Docket: 50-458
Licensee: Gulf States Utilities Company (GSU)
P. O. Box 220
St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775
Facility Name:
River Bend Station (RBS)
Inspection At:
River Bend Station, St. Francisville, Louisiana
Inspection Conducted: . September 16 through September 30, 1987
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Inspectors:
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D. D. Cliamberlain, Senior Resident Inspector
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Project Section A, Reactor Projects Branch
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W. B. Jones, Residen Inspector
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Project Section A, Reactor Projects Branch
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rojects Branch
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Approved:
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f, Project Section A
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Re ctor rojects Branch
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Inspection Summary:.
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>(Report 50-458/87-24).
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Insp'ection Conducted' September'16 thro'gh h ptember 30, 1987
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-Areas'~ Inspected:.! Routine,'unanno'unced>inspectio$oflicenseeactionon
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previous inspection. findings, fuel pool sit,hdn event', licensee action on an NRC '
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and preparationifor refueling.
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.Results: Within the areas inspected, two n'olations were identified (failure.
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to utilize the proper. revision 'of a surveniance test" procedure, paragraph 5,
'and inadequate. station' operating procedure paragraphl3)..
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DETAILS
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Persons Contacted
W. J. Beck,. Supervisor, Reactor Engineering
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J. E. Booker,. Manager, Oversight
- J. L. Burton, Supervisor, Independent Safety
' Engineering Group
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E. M. Cargill,. Supervisor, Radiation Programs
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- J. C. Deddens, Senior Vice President, River Bend
Nuclear Group
D. R. Derbonne, Assistant Plant Manager, Maintenance
- P. E. Freehill, Outage Manager
A. O. Fredieu, Assistant Supervisor, Operations
D. R. Gipson, Director, Quality Services
- J. D. Gore, Cajun Consultant
P. D. Graham, Assistant Plant' Manager, Operations
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E. R. Grant, Director, Nuclear Licensing
- J. R. Hamilton, Director, Design Engineering
K..C. Hodges, Supervisor, Chemistry
G.-R. Kimmell, Supervisor, Operations (QA)
- R. J. King, Supervisor, Nuclear Licensing
'*I. M. Malik, Supervisor, Quality Systems
'J. H. McQuirter, Licensing Engineer
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V.'J. Normand,- Supervisor, Administrative Services
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- H. H. Northrup, Supervisor, Warehousing
- W. H. Odell, Manager, Administration
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- T. F. Plunkett, Plant Manager
- M. F. Sankovich, Manager, Engineering
R. B.'Stafford, Director, Operations (QA)
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K. E. Suhrke, Manager, Project Management
- R. J. Vachon,-SMior Compliance Analyst
R. G. West, Supervisor, Instrumentation and Controls
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.D. W. Williamson, Supervisor, Operations
The NRC inspectors also interviewed additional licensee personnel during
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the inspection period.
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- Denotes those persons that attended the exit interview conducted on
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. September 30, 1987.
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2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findi,ng
'(Closed) Violation (458/8571-01):
Failure of surveillance test procedures
(STP) to meet Technical Specification (TS) requirements for calibration
within the specified value.
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sThe licensee has received a TS change to increase the trip setpoint value
for the scram discharge volume level instrumentation.
This TS change
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allows the level float switches to be set within the range of the
instrument, but does not increase the TS. allowable limit.
The remaining.
STPs for reactor vessel low water levels and the automatic
depressurization timers have been revised to place the procedures in
compliance with the TS setpoint values.
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This violation is closed.
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3.
Fuel Pool Siphon Event
This area of inspection was conducted to review licensee actions in
response to a fuel pool siphon event which occurred on September 20, 1987.
An NRC Region IV section chief was dispatched to the site to assist the
resident inspectors with the review of this event.
A description of the
event and subsequent event analysis / corrective actions by the licensee is
documented below:
a.
Event Description:
The licensee was making preparation for the first
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refueling at River Bend Station.
The drywell head and reactor vessel
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head had been removed and on September-19, 1987, the cteam dryer
assembly _was removed from the reactor and placed in the dryer storage
pool.
No spent fuel had been removed from the reactor, therefore no-
spent fuel was being stored in the upper or lower fuel storage pools.
The upper fuel storage / dryer storage pool was isolated from the
reactor cavity (gates closed), and on September 20, 1987, the water
level had been lowered to accommodate placing the large dryer
assembly in the pool.without overflowing the pool.
After placing the
dryer assembly in the pool, the water level did not. increase as much
as expected (the actual increase was only 1 or 2 inches).
The
operations shift crew then decided to raise the water level back to
the normal level.
At approximately 3iOO a.m. (CDT) on September 20,
1987, an operator and a foreman were dispatched to transfer the fuel
pool purification system from the recirculation mode on the upper
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fuel storage pool to a lineup which would provide makeup from the
condensate storage tank (ST) in order to refill the upperfuel storage
pool.
Station Operating Procedure (50P) 0091, " Fuel Pool Cooling &
Cleanup" contained a section.to add water to containment pools
through the fuel pool purification pump.
The sequence described in
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this section was to be used to add water to the upper fuel storage
pool and provide; for opening the two supply valves from the CST and
then closing the suction valvc from the upper fuel storage pool.
It
was apparently not recognized that opening the CST valves with the
fuel pool suction valve open provided a potential siphon path from
the upper pool to the CST since the upper pool water level is 70-80
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feet higher than the water level in the CST.
Also, it was apparently
not recognized that the removable anti-siphon plug had nnt been
removed from the upper fuel storage pool suction line; therefore,
there was no anti-siphon protection on the upper fuel storage pool.
The operators were apparently concerned with over filling the upper
fuel storage pool and decided to orily partially open the CST makeup
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valve and watch. pool level to see how' fast level increased.
The
operators were in contact with the control room, and level was being
monitored on a level indicator in he control room.
However, since
the level indicator has a narrow band (+12 1/2 to -12 1/2 inches) and
it was pegged downsc.:le, a reduction in pool level would not have
been observed.
At about 3:00 a.m., the operator opened the CST
makeep valve about 30 percent.
No increase in level was reported, so
the valve was further opened to 50 percent.
About 15 minutes after
opening the valve a radiation alert alarm (about 1.6 millirem) was
received in the control room, and about the same time the auxiliary
control room notified the main control room that the CST level was
increasing.
The operator at the CST makeup valve was then instructed
to close the suction valve from the upper pool which isolated the
siphon path to the CST.
A high radiation alarm (about 82 millirem)
was subsequently received in the control room as the steam dryer was
partially uncovered when the upper fuel storage pool water level
decreased about 6 to 7 feet.
This reduction in pool level would not
have uncovered any fuel in the, upper fuel storage pool if fuel had
been stored in that pool.
The high radiation alarm cleared at about
3:50 a.m., as the pool level was being restored after the operator
closed the upper pool suction valve.
The upper fuel pool level was
fully restored at about 5:55 a.m. and the CST makeup was secured.
At
this time,- recovery from the upper pool siphon event was complete.
The licensee then initiated a condition report to cause an analysis
of the event and to delineate required corrective actions.
The SRI
was on site September 20, 1987, and reviewed the event with
operations staff at that time.
No fuel movements were planned for
that day and the event was again discussed with plant management on
September 21, 1987.
The plant manager stated that he did not intend
to allow any fuel movements until this event war. fully analyzed and
corrective actions implemented.
The SRI inform?d licensee management
that the NRC also wanted to be fully satisfied with corrective
actions prior to the start of fuel movements.
b.
Event Analysis / Corrective Actions:
The licaasee submitted an INP0
significant event notification of this event on September 24, 1987,
and submitted a voluntary report to the NRC on September 29, 1987.
The licensee attributed the root cause of the event to inadequate
procedural controls as to the potential impact of valve sequencing in
the procedure.
Corrective actions delineated in the voluntary report
were reviewed with NRC personnel, and the licensee commited to
complete certain specified actions prior to beginning of spent fuel
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movements.
The corrective actions completed or planned are:
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The licensee has revised SOP-0091 to provide for normal system
lineups with dedicated loops for upper and lower fuel storage
pools.
Any deviations from these normal system lineups will be
strictly controlled.
The procedure provides restrictions on
fuel movement while performing valve manipulations and provides
administrative controls for local monitoring of pool levels
during system realignments.
Also, strong precautions and
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cautions have been added in the procedure for certain evolutions
and for assuring that all anti-siphon plugs are removed.
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procedure is being tested by actual system operation for major
system alignments,
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'The anti-siphon plugs have been' removed and procedures have been
revised to provide strong administrative controls on
reinstallation and removal.
Normal operation will always be
with the plugs' removed.
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The fuel pool cooling / purification system has been analyzed by
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the licensee and independently by a contractor for all potential.
drain siphon pathways.
Any manipulation of these pathways will
be controlled via procedures with cautions and verifications.
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Training on all revised procedures related to this event will be
conducted for any individuals who will be required to use the
procedures. prior to such use.
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The licensee has demonstrated that all anti-siphon devices'are
clear of blockage,
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Prior to fuel storage in the lower fuel storage pool, the
licensee will drill a redundant anti-siphon hole in the suction
line of the lower spent fuel storage pool,'which has the
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removable anti-siphon plug.
This redundant hole has no design
provision for being plugged.
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During this refueling outage, if fuel is stored in the upper
fuel storage pool, the licensee will verify hourly by inspection
the upper fuel storage pool level and will maintain the level in
the normal band with level alarms (high/ low) cleared in the main
control room.
If the level is not in the normal band with
alarms clear a continuous watch will be placed at the upper fuel
storage pool until level is returned to the normal band.
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Soon after this refueling outage, a redundant anti-siphon hole
will be drilled in the upper fuel pool suction line which has
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the anti-syphon plug.
This hole will be at least 10 feet above
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the top of fuel storage racks.
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The licensee review of the event also revealed that the outage
schedule contained a note to remove the upper fuel storage pools
anti-siphon plugs prior to fuel movements.
The lower fuel pool
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anti siphon plugs had been previously removed prior to storage of new
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fuel in the lower spent fuel pool.
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The resident inspectors continue to monitor completion of licensee
corrective actions.
The apparent inadequacy of SOP-0091, which
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allowed a siphon path of the upper fuel pool to be established, has
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been identified as a' potential violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.a (458/8724-01).
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Licensee Action on a NRC Information Notice
This area of inspection was conducted to review licensee actions relative
to NRC Information Notice No. 87-43, " Gaps in Neutron-Absorbing Material
in High-Density Spent Fuel Storage Racks." The licensee accelerated
review of this notice to provide assurance that no problems would be
encountered'with storage of spent fuel during this refueling outage. The.
licensee analysis'of this notice conclude that the high-density storage
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racks at River Bend are acceptable for storage of spent fuel at this time
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because:
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An analysis shows that the 164 bundles to be stored during this first
refueling would remain subcritical' assuming no neutron absorbing
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material existed.
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b.
The neutron absorbing material has not been exposed to any
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significant gamma radiation which might cause shrinkage.
c.
Other plants with similarly designed and manufactured racks as River
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Bend (RB) (i.e.
Turkey Point) lead RB by three years in experience
with irradiated spent fuel racks. The licensee will monitor these
plants for any future potential for problems.
d.
The licensee has a long-term surveillance program of representative
samples to be evaluated for additional . assurance of detecting
performance that is not within acceptable limits,
e.
The licensee will continue to evaluate this issue as additional
information becomes available.
f.
Other plants with racks similar in design and manufacture to the
racks at River Bend have tested the neutron-absorbing material, and
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no failures have been identified.
The licensee initial actions in response to this notice are deemed prompt
and thorough. No violations or deviations were identified in this area of
inspection.
5.
Surveillance Observation
During this inspection period, the NRC resident inspectors reviewed the
surveillance test data packages for STP-000-3001, " Daily Fire Door
Position Check," performed on September 20, 1987, and September 22, 1987,
to verify fire door daily operability in accordance with TSs 4.7.7.2.d and
4.7.7.2.c.
During the review of these procedures, the NRC resident
inspectors noted that the above two performances of this STP utilized
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official work copies issued August 26, 1987.
On August 27, 1987, the
licensee issued Revision 2 to this procedure which incorporated minor
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ichanges, which did. not affect the acceptance ' criteria previously
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- established,'and temporary change notices-(TCN) previously written,against
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- this procedure. . The111censee's ADM-0015, " Station Surveillance Test
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' Program," requires ~that,the individual. assigned to performLthe' test,
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' utilize an official Work ~ copy of'the latest revision of the STP and anyl
- associated TCNs. J The. administrative. procedure further requires-that the
performer. verify the' document as current by checking against station
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? document' control or the. station. operating ~ manual.index maintained in the
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l control room' prior to initial' start of the test.
This. failure to. utilize
the latest revision of the STP was identified by the NRC resident.
' inspectors as !a' potential-violation.of Technical Specification 6.8.1.g-
l(458/8724-02). -The review of the test data revealed no pioblems with
actual. test pe'rformance.
.6[ ' Operational Safety' Verification-
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The~ resident inspectors continueito~ monitor control room activities and-
- conduct during,the refueling outage.
Control room activities and conduct
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.'were generally observed to be well controlled.
Proper control room
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! staffing was maintained,~and access to the control room operational areas-
was controlled. . The required emergency core' cooling systems and support
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systems;were observed to be in operation for initial refueling _
. pre'parations.' Selected shift turnover meetings were observed,'and
information concerning' plant status was being covered in these meetings.-.
Plant tours were conducted,'and no problems were noted. . General' radiation
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- protection and; security practices were observed, and no problems were
' identified.
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The resident inspectors also reviewed licensee actions on operational
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events-and' potential problems which included the fuel pool siphon event
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discussed in paragraph 3 of this report.
The result of the review of.one
other' selected' item is described below:
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Local Power Range Monitor (LPRM) Removal:
During this refueling
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outage the licensee planned to replace five defective'LPRM detectors.
The licensee had obtained an automatic machine for LPRM removal,
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-which is designed to withdraw the LPRM from the reactor vessel while
, cutting and dropping the'small (approximately 2-inch) pieces'into a-
storage cask.
During the removal'of the first LPRM on September 25,
1987, the automatic machine failed with about.four feet of the LPRM
.left out of the storage cask.
The LPR!i was fully extracted from the
reactor vessel guide tube.
This activity was conducted underneath
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the, reactor vessel, which is isolated from any other work activities.
Because of the high radiation levels in the area, the' licensee has
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been very ca'utious and conservative with recovery of the stuck LPRM.
One entry was made on September 27, 1987, to cut the LPRM off and
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cover it with lead blankets, and another entry was made on
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September 30, 1987, to recover small pieces on top of the machine.
Recovery efforts are continuing, and the licensee has been able to
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limit worker radiation exposure.
The resident inspectors will
continue to monitor licensee activities with the LPRM recovery.
' No violations or deviations were identified in this area of inspection.
7.
Preparation for Refueling
The resident inspectors continue to monitor licensee preparations for
refueling.
The licensee interface with the GE contractor for refueling
was discussed with licensee management, and the licensee issued a
memorandum which stressed that the senior reactor operator for refueling
would be in charge on the refueling floor for all internal core-
alterations.
The GE personnel assigned to refueling are also being
facility certified for the equipment and procedures that they will use.
Selected outage meetings were observed and no problems were noted.
The SRI was informed by the licensee senior vice president on
September 30, 1987, that the outage management group had been realigned to
report functionally to the plant manager.
This was done in order to
provide a centralized control of outage and operational activities.
The
senior vice: president also stressed safety of operations as top priority
to all personnel in a memorandum dated September 30, 1987,.which described
the functional realignment.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area of inspection.
8.
Exit Interview
An exit interview was conducted with licensee representatives (identified
in paragraph 1).
During this interview, the SRI reviewed the scope and
findings of the inspection.
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