ML20245F342

Insp Repts 50-413/89-12 & 50-414/89-12 on 890425-28.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Observation & Evaluation of Annual Radiological Emergency Response Exercise

ML20245F342
Person / Time
Site:	Catawba
Issue date:	05/23/1989
From:	Cunningham A, Rankin W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20245F330	List: ML20245F327 ML20245F342
References
50-413-89-12, 50-414-89-12, 50-414-89-14, NUDOCS 8906280107
Download: ML20245F342 (11)

See also: IR 05000413/1989012

Text

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• *s - u UNITED STATES ,

• *

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[/ptfo - '

, REGION 11

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g j 101 MARlETTA STREET,N.W. j

• e ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323

A...../ m24m .

Report Nos.: 50-413/89-12 and 50-414/89-14

Licensee: Duke Power Company

422 South Church Street

Charlotte, NC 28242

Docket Nos.: 50-413 and 50-414 License Nos.: NPF-35 and NPF-52

Facility Name: Catawba 1 and 2

Inspection Condu Ad: Fil 25-28,1989

Inspector: ..

<[_,

A. L. Cunningham '/

B~Je?-/f[

Date Signed

Accompanying Personnel: B. R. Bonser

C. R. Van Niel

. M. Will

Approved by (cuvdM 05-2989

W. H. Rankin, Chief Date Signed

Emergency Preparedness Section

Emergency Preparedness and Radiological

Protection Branch

Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards

SUMMARY

Scope

This routine, announced inspection involved observation and evaluation of the

annual radiological ercergency response exercise. The limited participation ,

exercise commenced at 7:15 a.m. on April 27, 1989. Federal, State and county I

participation was limited to receipt and acknowledgement of emergency

notifications throughout the exercise. The exercise was terminated at

4:00 p.m. on the above refsrenced date. The medical and fire drills were

performed on April 25 and 26,1989, respectively. Offsite local support and

resources were limited to performance of the med:: cal caergency and fire drills. ,

The status ci outstanding emergency preparedness open items was reviewed.  !

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Results ]

Nc- violations or devictiors were identifien. The exercise was fully l

successful, and the licensee demonstrated the capability to effectively assess, .

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control, and mitigate the postulated casualty presented in the exercise j

scenario. Additionally, onsite and offsite protective action recommendations l

were promptly made and determined to be consistent with the Emergency Plan, l

8906280107 890524

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!, respective procedures, and prevailing radiological conditions. Exercise

l- ' objectives were fully implemented. .One concern was identified and tracked as

. an inspector followup item, namely: provision of specific guidance for review,

approval, and implementation of nonprocedural emergency actions during plant

emergencies (Paragraph 8.b)

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REPORT DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

• T. Crawford, Integrated Scheduling Superintendent

• S. Deskevick, Design Engineer

• J. Forbes, Technical Services Superintendent

• M. Garrick, Safety Engineer

• R. Glover, Compliance Manager

• R. Harris, System Emergency Planner

• J. Hill, Shift Supervisor

• E. Kuhr, Corporate Emergency Planner (CNS)

• D. Lee, Health Physicist ,

• W. McCollough, Mechanical Maintenance Manager

• W. McRee, Corporate Emergency Planner

• G. Mitchell, Nuclear Production Specialist

• T. Owen, Station Manager

• D. Simpson, Station Emergency Planner

NRC Resident Inspector

• W. Orders

• Attended exit interview

2. Exercise Scenario (82302)

The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to assure that

provisions were made to test the integrated capability and a major portion  !

of the basic elements defined in the licensee's Emergency Plan and

organization pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), Paragraph IV.F of Appendix E

to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II N of j

Hl! REG-0654. 1

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The scenario was reviewed in advance of the exercise and discussed in i

detati with licensee representatives on several occasions. While no major 1

scenaric problems were identified, several inconsistencies became apparent I

during the exercise. The inconsistencies, however, failed to detract from l

the overall performance of the licensee's emergency organization.

The scenario develcped for this exercise was & tailed, and fully exercised  !

the onsite emergency organization. The scenario provided sufficient  !

information to the States, counties, local governments and Federal 1

agencies consistent with the scope of their participation in the exercise. 1

The licensee demonstrated a significant commitment to training and

personnel through use of controllers, evaluators, and specialists

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participating in the exercise. The controllers provided adequate guidance

throughout the exercise. Neither prompting nor undue interaction between

controllers and playe.3 was observed.

The scenarios develcped for the medical emergency and fire drills were

reviewed in detail,. and determined to be adequate. Both drills fully

integrated the required . response activities of licensee and offsite

. support groups including effective management of combined resources, where

applicable. The scope and objectives of the subject drills were met.

, No violations or deviations were identified.

3. Assignment of Responsibility (82301)

This area was observed to assure that primary responsibilities for

emergency response by the licensee were specifically established, and that

adequate stcff was available to respond to an emergency pursuant to

10 CFR 50.47(b)(1), Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and

specific guidance promulgated in Section II.A of NUREG-0654.

The inspector observed that specific emergency assignments were made for

the licensee's emergency response organization, and that adequate staff

was available to respond to the simulated emergency. The initial response

organization was augmented by designated licensee representatives;

however, because of the scenario scope and conditions, long-term or

continuous staffing of the emergency response organization was not

required. Discussions with licensee representatives and a detailed review

of the site Radiological Emergency Plan (REP) indicated that a sufficient

number of trained technical persanel were available for continuous

staffing of the emergency organization, if needed.

The inspector also observed activation, staffing, and operation of the

emergency organization in the Technical Support Center (TSC) and

Operations Support Center (OSC). Required staffing and specific

assignment of responsibility at these facilities were consistent with the

Radiological Emergency Plan and respective iraplementing procedures., The

Crisis Management Center (CMC) and Emergency News Center (ENC) were not

activated during this exercise.

No violations or deviations were identified.  ;

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4. Onsite Emergency Organization (82301)

The licensee's onsite emergency organization was observed to assure that i

the following requirements were implemented pursuant to

10 CFR 50.47(b)(2),. Paragraph IV. A of Appendix E to 10 CFP,50, and

specific guidance promulgated in Section II.B of NUREG-0654:

(1) unambiguous definition of responsibilities for emergency response;

(2) provision of adequate staffing to assure initial facility accident

response in key functional areas at all times; and (3) specification of

onsite and offsite support organizational interactions.

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The inspector observed that the initial onsite emergency organization was

adequately defined, and that staff was available to fill key functional

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positions within the organization. Augmentation of the initial emergency

response organization was accomplished through mobilization of off-shitt

and available on-shift personnel. The on-duty Shift Supervisor assumed j

the duties of Emergency Coordinator promptly upon commencement of the  ;

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simulated emergency, and directed the response until formally relieved by

the Station Manager following declaration of the Alert emergency i

classification. Required interactions between the licensee's emergency

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response organization, State, and local support agencies were adequate and

consistent with the scope and objectives of the exercise.

No violations or deviations were identified.

5. Emergency Classification System (82301)

this area was observed to assure that a standard emergency classification j

and action level scheme was in use by the nuclear facility licensee '

pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), Paragraph IV.C of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, i

specific guidance promulgated in Section 11.0 of NUREG-0654; and guidance

developed in NRC Information Notice B3-28.

An Emergency Action Level (EAL) matrix was promptly used to identify and

properly classify the initiating emergency event and escalate it to more

severe emergency classifications as the simulated accident sequence

progressed. Licensee actions in this area were timely and effective.

Observations confirmed that the emergency classification system _ was

properly used and was consistent with the Emergency Plan and implementing

procedures. The sytem was observed to be adequate for classification of

the simulated accident events. The emergency procedures provided for

initial and continuing mitigating actions during the simulated casualty.

No violations or deviations were identified.

6. Notification Methods and Procedures (82301)

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This erec was cbserved to ensure that procedures were established by the

Mcensee for rotificatior of State and local response organizations, and

emarcency personrel, and tt'at the content of initial and followup messages )

was disseminated te these organizations. This area was further observed  !

to ensure that means to provide early notification to the populace within 1

plume exposure pathway were established pursuant to

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10 CFR 50.47(b)(5), Paragraph IV.D of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and

specific guidance promt.lgated in Sectico II.E of NUREG-0654.  ;

An intpector observed that notification methods and prceedures were

establ'ished and available for use in providing infont,ation regereing the

simulated emergency ccnditions to Federal, State crd local response

organizations, and to alert the licensee's augmented emergency response i

organizations, if required. Inspection also disclosed that the licensee l

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consistently implemen+ed prompt notification of the State and counties i

within the 15-minute time regime following declaration of each emergency

classification during the exercise. Periodic updating of the State I

regarding plant status via telephone and hard copy was also consistently i

implemented. i

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No violations or deviations were identified. )

7. Emergency Communications (82301)

This area was observed to ensure that provisions existed for prompt

communications among principal response organizations and emergency

personnel pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6), Paragraph IV.E of Appendix E to

10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Sett nn II.F of i

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NUREG-0654. j

The inspector observed communications within and between the licensee's l

emergency response facilities (Control Room, TSC, and OSC,), the licensee

and offsite response organizations, and the offsite environmental

monitoring teams and the TSC. The inspector also observed information

flow among the various groups within the licensee's emergency

organization. Emergency communications and communication systems were

significantly effective, and consistent with emergency response ]

requi rements. A dedicated intercom / plant PA system linking the TSC with 2

the Control Room and OSC was available for routine facility briefings by

the Emergency Coordinator, and other interfacility communications as .

required.

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No violations or deviations were identified. j

8. Emergency Facilities and Equipment (82301) j

This area was observed to assure that adequate emergency facilities and

equipment to support an emergency response were provided and maintained

pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8), Paragraph IV.E of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, ,

and specific guidance promulgated in Section 1.H of NUREG-0654. i

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The inspector observed activation, staffing, and operation of the 1

emergency response facilities, and observed the use of eouipment therein.  ;

Emergency response facilities used by the licensee during the exercise j

included the Control Room, TSC, and OSC. The CMC was not activated during j

this exercise.

3. Control Room - Unit 1 Control Room was provided for the enrcise

Shift Supervisor and his staff. Required communications equipment,

Control Room procedures and dooments were readily available, The i

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inspector ebserved that, following review and analysis cf the

sequence of accident events, Control Room operations personnel i

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promptly initiated required responses to the simulated casualty.

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Emergency procedures were readily available, routinely followed, and

factored into accident assessment and mitigation exercises.

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Control Room personnel involvement was essentially limited to those

personnel assigned routine and special operational duties. Effective

management of personnel gaining access to the Control Room precluded

overcrowding, and maintained an ambient noise level required for

orderly conduct of operations under emergency conditions.

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The Shift Supervisor and the Control Room Operators were cognizant of

their duties, responsibilities, and authorities. These personnel

demonstrated an understanding of the emergency classification system

and the proficient use of specific procedures to determine and '

declare the proper emergency classification. The staff also

demonstrated the capability to consistently and effectively assess

the initial conditions and implement required mitigating actions in a i

timely manner. It was noted that a detailed log of Control Room

activities was maintained by the Shift Supervisor throughout the

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exercise. The Shift Supervisor demonstrated effective management and

control of the facility and staff during the exercise.

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b. The Operations Support Center (OSC) was relocated and effectively

designed to separate the team staging and facility operations areas.

Configuration of the facility significantly reduced the ambient noise

level necessary to the conduct of required operations. The OSC was . -

promptly staffed following activation of the Emergency Plan by the . .g

Emergency Coordinator and declaration of the Alert. An inspector .

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observed that reentry teams were promptly assembled, briefed, and ' .'

dispatched. A health physics technician accompanied each team. The

OSC Supervisor appeared to be cognizant of his duties and

responsibilities. During operation of the facility, radiological

habitability was routinely monitored and documented.

The OSC Supervisor established and maintained effective management

and control of the facility. The facility staff was frequently

uptted regarding plant status. The supervisor also assured that

investigation and repair teams were thoroughly briefed regLrding

their tasks prior to deployment to the accident areas. During the

exercise, inspection disclosed a concern identified by the inspector

and licensee representatives regarding implementation of unapproved

nonprocedural emergency actions. In response to loss of a second

residual heat removal (RHR) pump (consistent with the simulated

casualty), OSC management proposed restoration of the reactor water

storage tank (RWST) inventory via modification of an existing valve

alignment to provide transfer of water from the spent fuel pool to

the referenced tank. Although concurrence was later given, the

action was initiated without prior concurrence of the Emergency

Coordinator and cognizant TSC staff. This item was thori ughly

discussed with licensee representatives prior to and during the exit

{ interview. This concern will be tracked as an inspector follow-up

item (IFI).

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IFI 50-413. 414/89-12-01: Provide specific. guidance- for review,

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approval, and' implementation of nonprocedural emergency actions

during plant emergencies.-

No violations or deviations were identified.

A c. Technical . Support Center (TSC) - The TSC was activated-and promptly

staffed following notification by the Emergency Coordinator of the

simulated emergency conditions and the declaration of an Alert.

The facility staff appeared to be cognizant of. their emergency

duties, authorities, and responsibilities. Required operation of the

tacility proceeded in an orderly manner. The TSC was provided with

adequate equipment for support of the assigned staff and continued

mitigation.ot the postulated casualty.

During operation'of the TSC, radiological habitability was routinely

monitored and documented, and personnel dosimetry was distributed as

required. Status boards and related visual aids.were strategically

located to facilitate viewing by the TSC staff. Status boards were

maintained by communicators assigned to the facility. Inspection

also disclosed the following additional findinos, namely:

(1) engineering, maintenance, and other technical support functions

were readily implemented and factored into problem-solving exercises;

(2) assumption of du'.ies by the Emergency Coordinator.was definite

and firm: (3) transfer of certain emergency-responsibilities from the-

Control Room to the TSC. was firmly declared and announced to the TSC

staff; (4) simultaneous briefings of the.TSC.and.0SC' staffs by the

Emergency Coordinator's use of the dedicated intercom. system were

frequent, and consistent with changes in' plant status and related

emergencyconditions;(5) accountability,includingidentificationof

missing personnel, was readily implemented. within the ' required time

regime and was consistent with the scope and objectives 'of the

scenario; and-(6) TSC controllers were effective in identifying minor

scenario problems, and interacted with players without prompting.

The TSC dose assessment group demonstrated proficiency in manual and

computerized assessment methodologies. Contact between the

-assessment group and offsite monitoring teams (OMTs)- were routinely

maintained. OMTs were frequently cppraised of changing plant

conditions and casualty status. Offsite dose assessment and dose

projections were consistent with the offsite radiological data

provided, and were performed in a timely manner. Results provided by

the TSC dose assessment group were incorporated into offsite followup

notification messages. The dose assessment staff demonstrated a

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significant commitment to training throughout the exercise.

Additionally, facility access and contamination control were

consistently maintained throughout the exercise.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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9., 'AccidentAssessment(82301)

-This area .was observed to ~ assure that adequate methods, systems, and '

-equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential ~ offsite

consequences of a radiological emergency condition were in use as required

by 10 CFR' 50.47(b)(9), Paragraph IV.B .of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and

specific' guidance ~ promulgated-in Section 11.I of NUREG-0654.-

The. accident assessment program. included an engineering' assessment of

plant status, and an assessment. of radiological hazards - to onsite and

offsite personnel directly resulting from the casualty. During the

exercise, accident' assessment teams functioned effectively in analyzing

plant status and providing ~ recommendations to the Emergency . Coordinator-

regarding the following: (1) mitigating actions required to~ reduce damage

to plant .' systems and equipment; (2) prevention and/or control of

radioactive releases; and (3) prompt termination of emergency conditions.

. Radiological assessment activities involved several groups. An inplant-

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group was effective in projecting the radiological impact within the plant

based' upon inplant monitoring and onsite measurements. Offsite'

radiological monitoring teams were dispatched to ' determine the level of

radioactivity in .those areas within the influence of the radioactive

plume. Radiological effluent data provided by inplant and offsite ' teams

were received in the TSC where dose calculations were computed and

factored into the ' exercise. All resultant data were consistent with

projected scenario parameters. . Offsite monitoring teams were neither

. observed nor evaluated by NRC during this exercise; however, inspectors

observed that the TSC Field Team Coordinator frequently briefed and

updated the offsite monitoring teams on periodic meteorological changes,

plant releases data, and plant casualty status. Communications between

the subject entities were effective throughout the exercise.

No violations or deviations were identified.

10. Protective Measures (82301) t

This area was observed to determine whether guidelines for protective .

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actions, consistent with federal guidance, were developed and in place,

and whether protective actions for emergency workers, including evacuation

of nonessential personnel , were promptly implemented pursuant to

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10 CFR 50.47(b)(10), and specific guidance promulgated in NUREG-0654.

The protective measures decision-making process was observed by the

inspector. For each emergency classification defined, appropriate inplant

and offsite protective measures were reviewed and implemented where

required. Protective measures recommendations were consistent with the

accident conditions postulated during the exercise. Protective action

recommendations were also consistent with the facility Radiological

Emergency Plan and respective procedures.

No violations or deviations were identified.  ;

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11. Radiological Exposure Control (82301)

This area was observed to determine whether methods for controlling

radiological exposures during an emergency were established and

implemented for amergency workers, and whether these methods included

exposure guidelines consistent with Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

recommendations pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(11), and specific guidance

promulgated in Section II.K of NUREG-0654.

An inspector noted that radiological exposures were controlled throughout

.the exercise by issuing supplemental dosimeters to emergency workers, and

conducting periodic radiological surveys in the emergency response

facilities. Exposure guidelines were in place for various categories of

emergency actions taken. Adequate protective clothing and respiratory

protection were available for use as required.

Health Physics control of radiation exposure, contamination, and access to

radiation areas was determined to be adequate. The Health Physics

Supervisor was observed to thoroughly brief OSC survey, investigative, and

r0 pair teams prior to their deployment into radiation controlled areas.

Dosimetry was available and effectively used. High-rance fosimeters were

also available, if needed.

No violations or deviations were identified.

12. Public Education and Information (82301)

T..is area was observed to determined whether information concerning the

simulated emergency was made cvailable for dissemination to the public as

requiredby10CFR50.47(b)(7), Paragraphia.DofAppendixEto10CFR50,

and specific criteria promulgated in Section II.G of NUREG-0654.

Information was provided to the media and the public in advance of the

exercise; however, this area was not evaluated during the exercise.

13. Status of Previous Findings (92701)

a. (Closed) IFI 50-413,414/89-04-01: Formalize a procedure for Alert

and Notification System ( ANS) testing, maintenance, and followup

actions.

Inspection disclosed that a detailed procedure was established and

implemented to ensure that sirens and related components of the alert

and notification system were operable and maintained as required,

b. (Closed) IFI 50-413, 414/89-04-02: Conduct an augmentation drill to

verify and document Figure B-1 staffing requirements and arrival l

times.

Inspection disclosed that an off-hour augmentation drill was

conducted. Response of emergency organization personnel was ,

consistent with Table B-1 of the Emergency Plan with regard to 1

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required staffing and arrival time at the plant site and designated

j, , facilities f,ontrol Room. OSC, TSC)..

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-14. Critique-(82301)

The licensee's' critique. of the emergency exercise was. observed to

g determine whether deficiencies, weaknesses and required improvement items

oL identified during the . exercise were brought to - the. attention : of -

management, and documented for corrective action pursuant. to:

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10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), Paragraph IV.F of Appendix. E - to .10 CiR 50, and

specific guidance promulgated in Section II.N of NUREG-0654.

.The licensee conducted a players' ' critique in each emergency facility

immediately' after the exercise, f ollowed by a comprehensive Controller /

Evaluator critique. The' Licensee /NRC critique was conducted on

September 28, 1988, with these persons listed in Paragraph 1, above. The

. licensee's critique.was- detailed- and comprehensive and documented those-

~ items requiring review and corrective action. Following'the licensee's

critique, the NRC inspector described the areas evaluated and discussed in

detail the inspection results contained in this report. No. dissenting -

comments were received from tne licensee. The licensee did .not identify

as proprietary any. materials provided to or reviewed by the inspector.-

during this inspection.'

Item Number. Description and Reference

50-413,414/89-12-01 Provide specific guidance for: review,

approval, and implementation of

nonprocedural emergency actions .during

plant emergencies (Paragraph 8.b).

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