IR 05000285/1998014
| ML20237E478 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
| Issue date: | 08/28/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20237E477 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-285-98-14, NUDOCS 9808310300 | |
| Download: ML20237E478 (17) | |
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ENCLOSURE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Docket No.: 50-285 License No.: DPR-4 Report No.: 50-285/98-14 Licensee: Omaha Public Power District Facility: Fort Calhoun Station Location: Fort Calhoun Station FC-2-4 Adm., P.O. Box 399, Hwy. 75 - North of Fort Calhoun Fort Calhoun, Nebraska Dates: July 5 through August 15,1998 Inspectors: W. Walker, Senior Resident inspector V. Gaddy, Resident inspector R. Azua, Project Engineer Approved By: W. D. Johnson, Chief, Project Branch B ATTACHMENT: Supplemental Information i
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9808310300 980828 PDR ?
G ADOCK 05000285 i PDR - ~
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I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Fort Calhoun Station NRC inspection Report 50-285/98-14 Operations
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Operations personnel demonstrated excellent command and control of activities by challenging personnel who wanted to enter the control room to ensure only official business was conducted and consistently using three-way communications to acknowledge alarms and perform equipment manipulations (Section 01.1).
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The licensee failed to maintain an automatic containment isolation valve operable during refueling activities as required by Technical Specification 2.8. The cause of this noncited violation (50-285/9814-01) was a decision by the outage control center shift supervisor to release Steam Generator RC-2A blowdown isolation valve for maintenance without ensuring containment closure was established. This nonrepetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section Vil.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (Section 08.4).
. The licensee failed to maintain containment isolation during refueling activities as required by Technical Specification 2.8. The cause of this noncited violation (50-285/9814-02) was a failure of the outage control center shift supervisor to recognize that valves that fail open which are being used to maintain containment closure need to be manually overridden into the closed position. This nonrepetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (Section O8.5).
. The licensea failed to maintain a cooldown rate of 10 degrees per hour or less as required by Technical Specification 2.1.2. The cause of this noncited violation (50-285/9814-03) was a lack of depth in review during the evaluation which decreased the margin for the cooldown rate, resulting in a decrease in operating margin for plant operations. This nonrepetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (Section 08.7).
Maintenance
= During the replacement of fire protection piping, maintenance personnel sat on the auxiliary feedwater piping to replace the fire protection piping. A subsequent analysis performed by engineering personnel determined that the additional weight did not have an adverse effect on the auxiliary feedwater piping (Section M1.3).
- Maintenance personnel failed to follow maintenance work control procedures and ensure that valve blocks were properly removed after completion of maintenance activities. The individual who performed the independent verification for removal of the valve blocks was not qualified to perform that task. This nonrepetitive,
! licensee identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation l consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (Section M1.4).
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The inspectors questioned the working hours of two of six maintenance personnel t
whose records were reviewed. During discussions with maintenance management, questions regarding both of the maintenance personnel were resolved. The licensee -
, indicated that a more thorough review of maintenance staff working hours would be l
pedormed (Section M6.1).
Enaineerina
The scope of the assessment performed to evaluate the susceptibility of the Fort Calhoun Station to the failure of the fire protection system and subsequent flooding in the emergency core cooling system room was good. The assessment concluded that
[ the Fort Calhoun Station had reasonable assurance it was not susceptible to water I hammer similar to that experienced at the Washington Nuclear Plant (Section E1.1).
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Plant Support
Radiation protection personnel continued to reduce contaminated areas within the L radiologically controlled area (Section R2.1)
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Report Details Summarv of Plant Status The plant operated at essentially 100 percent power during this inspection perio I. Operations
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01 . Conduct of Operations 0 General Comments (71707)
Using Inspection Procedure 71707, the inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations. In general, the conduct of operations was professional and safety conscious, Operations personnel demonstrated excellent command and control
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of activities by challenging personnel who wanted to ' enter the control room to ensure only official business was conducted and consistently using three-way communications to acknowledge alarms and perform equipment manipulation .O2 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment 0 Review of Eauioment' Taaouts (71707)
The inspectors reviewed the following tagouts and the performance of independent verification:
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Serial Number 98-1242 Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump
.. Serial Number 98-1253 Motor-Driven Fire Pump The inspectors found that all tags were on the proper components and that components 4 were in the required tagged position. Plant material condition and housekeeping were observed to be goo :
08 Miscellaneous Operations issues 08.1 (Closed) Violation EA 96-204 (01013): failure to take action to compensate for failed safety-related equipment. Specifically, on March 18,1996, operations personnel failed to implement the requirements of Standing Order SO-G-100, " Operability Disposition
' When Calibrating or Testing Safety Related Equipment," by taking no actions when the reactor protection system pressurizer pressure trip units and the pressurizer power-operated relief valves were configured such that without manual operator action the equipment would have been unable to perform its intended design function. This violation occurred because the operating crew did not recognize that taking the power-operated relief valve control switches to close disabled the low temperature overpressure protection function and required entry into Technical Specification Inadequate supervisory oversight by the shift supervisor contributed to the violatio . _ _ _ _ - . ____- _________ -
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' As corrective action, Standing Order SO-G-100 was revised to identify that, in addition to calibrating and testing safety-related equipment, it also applied to operability
~ disposition when operating safety-related equipment. Operations personnel were
. provided refresher training on low temperature overpressure protection / power-operated
~ relief valve control circuitry and the requirements of the Technical Specification Cautions were added to Operating instruction OI RC-4A, " Pressurizer Cooldown,"
stating that taking the power-operated relief valve control switches to close disabled the -
, low temperature overpressure protection function and required a Technical Specification entry. Operations management met with shift supervisors to discuss maintaining the big
. picture and ensuring command and control. The inspectors concluded that these actions were appropriate to prevent recurrenc !
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08.2 (Closed) Violation EA 96-204 (01023): inadequate shift tumovers and a failure to log
- abnormal plant conditions. This violation occurred due to an inadequate shift turnover from a day shift to the afternoon shift. The inadequate logkeeping occurred due to lack of thoroughness, attention to detail, and a questioning attitude. Corrective actions and
- additional formality improvements in shift turnovers were implemented as follows
fL = A plant status tumover sheet is now distributed to all oncoming operators. The turnover sheet provides plant status, Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation, and other important information that facilitates a good, thorough !
tumove '
.. Requirements were established for shift supervisors and licensed senior operators to walkdown front and back control boards and annunciator . The availability cf annunciator response procedures was increased.
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,. Additional training on the importance of a questioning attitude and good attention I
to detailis provided.
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= lssuance of a memorandum to operations personnel that discussed the requirements for logkeepin '
These actions were appropriate to prevent recurrence.
l l- 08.3 (Closed) Violation EA 96-204 (01033): inadequate pressurizer cooldown procedure, i.
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Specifically, Operating Instruction OI-RC-4A, " Pressurizer Cooldown," did not provide adequate guidance to prevent the disabling of the low temperature overpressure L
protection function of the pressurizer power-operated relief valves without taking
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appropriate compensatory measure, nor did the procedure provide guidance to ensure system restoration to an operable status following the completion of pressurizer-cooldow As corrective action, Operating instruction OI-RC-4A, " Pressurizer Cooldown," was revised to clearly state how to open and close the power-operated relief valve Cautions were added stating that taking the power-operated relief valve control switches i
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to close disabled the low temperature overpressure protection function and required a Technical Specification entry. Operators were provided refresher training on low temperature overpressure protection / power-operated relief valve control circuitry and requirements of the Technical Specifications. Operations management met with shift supervisors to discuss maintaining the big picture and ensuring proper command and control. The inspectors concluded that these actions were appropriate to prevent !
recurrenc .4 (Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-285/96-10: loss of containment integrity during fuel movement. On October 18,1996, the licensee identified that containment integrity was breached for approximately 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> when maintenance activities were performed on automatic containment Isolation Valves HCV-1388A (Steam Generator RC-2A Blowdown Isolation Valve) and HCV-1041 A (Steam Generator RC-2A Main Steam Isolation Valve) at the same time. Valve HCV-1041 A was located outside containment and Valve HCV-1388A was located inside containment. This resulted in a flow path for containment atmosphere via the secondary side of Steam Generator RC-2A into the auxiliary building. Following discovery of the loss of containment integrity, the core off-load was halted and was not allowed to resume until containment closure was established by completing the maintenance on Valve HCV-1388A and performing Operating instruction O1-C0-4," Containment Closure," to verify containment closure conditions were met. Technical Specification required that all automatic containment isolation valves be operable during refueling activitie The licensee identified that the primary cause of the event was a decision by the outage control center shift supervisor to release Valve HCV-1388A for maintenance without establishing a control over the completion of Operating Instruction OI-CO- The licensee performed the following corrective actions:
. Established a single point of contact (shutdown safety advisor) to develop a closure boundary for all penetrations. This closure plan was to be developed prior to Mode . Upon review of the closure plan, selected valves would be danger-tagged closed at the control switch. The shutdown safety advisor would not allow maintenance or other evolutions that could reposition the valve, if work was required on a boundary valve, the shutdown safety advisor would release the tags and either establish a new boundary or determine that closure requirements were not needed and release the equipmen . Operating Instruction Ol-CO-4 would be maintained by the shutdown safety L advisor, and containment closure must be validated within one hour prior to use.
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Failing to comply with the requirements of Technical Specification 2.8 is a violatio This nonrepetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (50-285/9814-01).
08.5 (Closed) LER 50-285/96-11: loss of containment closure due to a maintenance activity during refueling. On October 30,1996, the licensee identified that containment closure was breached while fuel was being moved. Maintenance activities were being conducted on Auxiliary Feedwater Pump FW-10 Inlet Steam Valve YCV-1045, de-energizing the valve and causing Main Steam Line A Auxiliary Feedwater Pump FW-10 Supply Valve YCV-1045A to open. This resulted in a flow path for containment atmosphere via a removed secondary side manway on Steam Generator RC-2A into the auxiliary building. Containment closure was lost for approximately 30 minutes and two fuel bundles were moved during that tim The licensee identified the primary cause of the event as a failure to maintain valves for containment closure in the desired position per Operating Instruction OI-CO-4,
" Containment Closure." Specifically, valves that fail open were relied upon to maintain a containment boundar The potential radiological consequences of this event were analyzed by the licensee and determined to not pose a nuclear safety significant condition because of the limited size of the leakage pathwa The licensee determined that both this LER and LER 98-010 resulted from the release of a maintenance work package by the outage control center without ensuring that containment closure requirements were monitored. Due to the close proximity between these two events, the inspectors determined that the licensee's corrective actions for the first event were not developed enough to preclude the second even ,
The licensee performed the following corrective actions:
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Operating Instruction OI-CO-4 was revised to require valves that fail open and are used to maintain containment closure be manually overridden into the closed position; and
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Station procedures, including outage-related administrative procedures were reviewed and revised as necessary to ensure adequate controls existed to allow containment closure to be established and maintained during fuel movement and after activities requiring containment closur Failing to comply with the requirements of Technical Specification 2.8 is a violation.
- This nonrepetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a l noncited violation consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy L
(50-205/9814-02).
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e-5-08.6 (Closed) Violation 50-285/9612-01: failure to place fuel assemblies near operable source range neutron monitors as required by plant procedures. The inspector verified the corrective actions described in the licensee's response letter, dated January 9,1997, to be reasonable and complete. No similar problems were identified.
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08.7 (Closed) LER 50-285/9G14-00: failure to comply with Technical Specification Requirement 2.1.2. The licensee identified this event when discussing plant cooldown actions during a shift turnover briefing. Technical Specification 2.1.2 precludes a cooldown greater than 10'F per hour when reactor coolant system temperature is less than 135'F. On November 17,1996, the licensee jogged the reactor coolant pumps during plant startup to sweep the steam generator tubes of entrapped gases. This caused the reactor coolant temperature to decrease from 130*F to 111 *F in 3 minute The root cause of this event was a lack of depth in review during evaluation of Technical Specification Amendment 161 and a failure to recognize or adequately evaluate the effects of a decrease in operating margin on plant operations. The licensee corrective actions included revising both the plant startup procedure and operating instruction for starting reactor coolant pumps to provide additional guidance to prevent excessive reactor coolant system cooldown and evaluating the feasibility of providing additional operational margin in the cooldown limits. The described corrective actions were found to be appropriate for addressing this issue. The failure by the licensee to restrict reactor coolant system temperature decrease to 10*F per hour as required by Technical Specifications is a violation of NRC requirements. This nonrepetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (50-285/9814-03).
08.8 (Closed) LER 50-285/9615-00: failure to place fuel assemblies near operable source range neutron monitors as required by plant procedures. This issue was addressed during the review and closure of Violation 50-285/9612-01. No further actions were require II. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 General Comments Insoection Scope The inspectors observed all or portions of the following maintenance activities:
. Oil Change and Lube Coupling FW-4B l . Various Maintenance Activities on FP-1B
. Fire Protection System Piping Replacement t
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. 4160 Volt Motor inspection
. Replacement of Diesel Generator Jacket Water immersion Heater ' Observations and Findinas
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The inspectors found the work performed under these activities to be professional and
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thorough. All work observed was performed with the work package present and in active use. Maintenance technicians were experienced and knowledgeable of their assigned tasks. The inspectors frequently observed supervisors and system engineers monitoring job progress, and quality control personnel were present when required by procedur Conclusions The maintenance activities observed were conducted in a controlled and professional '
manne I M1.2 Surveillance Tests ,
i l . insoection Sqqgg The inspectors observed all or portions of the following surveillance activities:
. OP-ST-DG-0002, " Diesel Generator 2 Check," Revision 24;
. . MM-ST-FP-0001, " Inspection of Diesel Fire Pump Engine," Revision 8, and
. CH-SMP-RE-0015," Condenser Off Gas / Gas Sampling," Revision 4.
" Observations and Findinos Surveillance activities were generally completed thoroughly and professionall Conclusions
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The surveillance activities observed by the inspectors were completed in a controlled manner and in accordance with procedures.
! M1.3' Fire Protection System Pioina Replacement
. Inspection Scoce (62707) >
The inspectors observed maintenance personnel sitting on top of the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump suction piping.
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1 b. , Observations and Findinas
. On July 28,1998, the inspectors observed maintenance personnel replace two spans of fire protection system piping in Room 19 (Air Compressor Room). While observing the ;
pipe replacement near the auxiliary feedwater pumps, the inspectors noted that two maintenance personnel were sitting on top of 6-inch suction piping to the steam-driven !
auxiliary feedwater pump to facilitate the fire protection piping replacemen .
The inspectors asked the fire protection system engineer if an analysis had been ;
performed prior to replacing the pipe that authorized maintenance personnel to sit on i the auxiliary feedwater piping. The system engineer stated that an analysis had not l been performed. The structural engineer was contacted and an analysis was performed. The analysis concluded that the additional temporary load on the auxiliary j
' feedwater piping was acceptable in that the pipe was adequate to support these load l Conclusions j During the replacement of fire protection piping, maintenance personnel sat on the -
auxiliary feedwater piping to replace the fire protection piping. A subsequent analysis performed by engineering personnel determined that the additional weight did not have an adverse effect on the auxiliary feedwater pipin M1.4 Eailure to Remove Blockina Devices From the Seal Cooler of the Hiah Pressure Safety iniection Pumo Inspection Scoce )
The inspectors followed up.to determine why blocking devices were not removed from i component cooling water valves associated with the High Pressure Safety injection i Pump SI-2A bearing coole l
1 Observations and Findinas On July 7,1998, operations personnel tagged out High Pressure Safety injection ,
Pump SI-2A using Danger Tag 98-1208. The purpose of the tagout was to clean and l
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. flush the component cooling water side of the pump's seal coolers. Following the maintenance activity, control room operators attempted to cycle Valve HCV-2810A
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.(Component Cooling Water inlet to Bearing Cooler) for postmaintenance testing. The
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' v.alve would not cycle. Operations personnel inspected the valve and noted that the l ' valve block was still in place even though the tagout indicated that the block had been l,
removed.iThe block was also still in place on Valve HCV-2810B (component cooling l water outlet to bearing cooler). j L {
i During followup the inspectors determined that Preventive Maintenance Order 9802916 directed maintenance personnel to install the blocks on the valves to prevent the valves from opening if a loss of instrument air occurred. Both the preventive maintenance i
' order and the danger tag sheet had been signed and independently verified, indicating ;
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that the blocks had been removed from the valves. Maintenance personnel had signed that the blocks were removed and a radiation protection technician had signed that he independently verified the blocks were remove The inspectors asked maintenance management to explain the discrepanc Maintenance management determined that, during the removal of the blocks, the maintenance craft person had to explain to the radiation protection technician how the blocks were physically installed and removed. Following the explanation, the craft person forgot to remove the blocks. The craft person thought he had removed the .
blocks after demonstrating to the radiation protection technician how the blocks were to !
be removed. A radiation protection supervisor stated that the individual who performed the independent verification was not qualified to perform independent verification and that radiation protection personnel are not expected to independently verify work .
performed by maintenance personnel. These expectations were reinforced to the ;
radiation protection technicia The inspectors reviewed the preventive maintenance order. Step 3 of the work plan instruction directed maintenance personnel to remove the blocks after the seal cooler '
flush was complete. The step had been signed off and independently verified as having been performed. Step 4.9.2 of Standing Order M-101," Maintenance Work Control," .
states that maintenance personnel are to pedorm assigned maintenance in accordance I with the maintenance work document. Failing to remove the blocks after the seal cooler flush is a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B: Criterion As corrective action, the licensee counseled maintenance personnel on the importance i
of performing maintenance in accordance with procedure. Maintenance management held a meeting with maintenance supervisors and crew leaders to express expectations for performing concurrent and independent verification.-
This nonrepetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (50-285/9814-04).
c. Conclusions Maintenance personnel failed to follow maintenance work control procedures and !
ensure that valve blocks were properly removed after completion of maintenance activities. The individual who performed the independent verification for removal of the valve blocks was not qualified to perform that task. This nonrepetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation l
consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
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-9 M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment M2.1 Review of Material Condition Durina Plant Tours Insoection Scoce (62707)
The inspectors performed routine plant tours to evaluaw plant material conditio Observations and Findinas The inspectors observed that material condition and housekeeping of accessible areas of the auxiliary building, the radwaste building, the intake structure, and most areas of the turbine building were goo The licensee operated the plant with a " black board" in the control room during most of tnis inspection period. Although a few annunciators on various equipment were bypassed, none were significan The inspectors reviewed the licensee's " System Report Cards for the Period January 1 Through June 30,1998." The inspectors discussed with the licensee two areas which were identified as needing additional attention, fire protection and sampling systems. The inspectors verified that the licensee has action plans in place to address the deficiencies in these two system Conclusions The inspectors concluded that material condition was good. The licensee operated the plant with a " black board" in the control room during most of the current inspection report period. The inspectors verified that the licensee has action plans in place to address deficiencies in several system ,
M6 Maintenance Organization and Administration
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M6.1 Review of Maintenance Staff Work Hours Insoection Scoce (62707)
The inspectors reviewed work hours of selected maintenance personnel to verify that they were consistent with regulatory requirements.
L Observations and Findinas i-On July 17,1998, the inspectors performed a review of work hours of maintenance personnel to verify that personnel complied with Technical Specification requirements during the recently completed refueling outage. The inspectors sampled work hours for six maintenance personnel covering the period of April 1-22,1998. During the sample, l
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-10-the inspectors questioned the working hours of two of the six maintenance personne During discussion with maintenance management, questions regarding both of the maintenance personnel were resolve Since questions were raised on two of the six records sampled, the maintenance manager indicated that an audit would be performed on the work hours of maintenance personnel during the outage. The audit was not scheduled to be completed until after the end of the inspection period. This will be an inspection followup item (50-285/9814-05). Conclusions The inspectors questioned the working hours of two of six maintenance personnel whose records were reviewed. During discussion with maintenance management, questions regarding both of the maintenance personnel were resolved. The licensee indicated that a more thorough review of maintenance staff working hours would be performe M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues M8.1 (Closed) Violation 50-285/9707-01: failure to complete a work request tag following initiation of a maintenance work request as required by plant procedures. The inspector verified the corrective actions described in the licensee's response letter, dated June 19, 1997, to be reasonable and complete. No similar problems were identifie M8.2 (Closed) Violation 50-285/9707-02: failure to follow procedures when blowing down raw water supply header flow transmitter sensing lines. The inspector verified the corrective actions described in the licensee's response letter, dated June 19,1997, to be reasonable and complete. No similar problems were identifie Ill. Enaineerin_g E1 Conduct of Engineering E Fire Protection System Water Hammer Assessment inspection Scope (37551)
In response to the fire protection water supply water hammer event and subsequent emergency core cooling system equipment flooding at the Washington Nuclear Plant on 1 June 17,1998, the licensee performed an assessment to determine if the Fort Calhoun I r Station was susceptible to a similar even l l
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-11-b. Observations and Findinas During a records review, the licensee determined there have been no recorded water hammer events in the fire protection system. Although water hammer was possible, to provide a more detailed assessment based on events at the Washington Nuclear Plant would require dynamic hydraulic modeling of the fire protection system. However, the licensee estimated that the margin against void formation was large and the susceptibility to water hammer due to standpipe voiding appeared to be nonexisten The licensee also concluded that, although the potential water hammer due to check valve slamming or pump starts /stop was not evaluated, a water hammer free history of operation indicated water hammer was not a concer With regard to potential internal flooding in the two emergency core cooling system rooms, the licensee concluded the following:
- Fire protection suppression piping was not present in either room so pipe rupture was not an issu . Each emergency core cooling room has a sump and two sump pumps. The sump pumps discharge to the spent regenerant tanks. Check valves are located down stream of the sump pumps to prevent backflow from the spent regenerant tanks to the sumps. These check valves were in the scope of the maintenance rule and have a 5-year preventive maintenance frequency. Preventive l maintenance was last performed in 199 )
- The emergency core cooling rooms have watertight pressure doors at the entry l to prevent externally generated flood ,
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in addition, the system engineer informed the inspectors that the floor drains in each room were equipped with check valves to prevent backflow through the floor drain ,
syste c. Conclusion The scope of the assessment performed to evaluate the susceptibility of the Fort ;
Calhoun Station to the failure of the fire protection system and subsequent flooding in l the emergency core cooling system room was good. The assessment concluded that the Fort Calhoun Station had reasonable assurance it was not susceptible to water hammer similar to that experienced at the Washington Nuclear Plant.
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-12-l IV. Plant SupppA R2 Status of Radiological Protection and Chemistry Facilities and Equipment
- R Radiologically Controlled Area Housekeeping Inspection and Scope (71750_)
The inspectors assessed housekeeping inside the radiologically controlled are . Observations and Findinas ,
During the inspection period, the inspectors made numerous housekeeping tours throughout the radiologically controlled area. In general, the inspectors noted that !
housekeeping was good. Especially notable was the continued reduction of l contaminated areas within the radiologically controlled area and the detailed turnover log Conclusions Radiation protection personnel continued to reduce contaminated areas within the rr Biologically controlled are V. Manaaement Meetinas X1 Exit Meeting Summaty l
The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the exit meeting on August 17,1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings presente The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
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i ATTACHMENT 1
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SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee i
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R. Clemens, Manager, Maintenance
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D. Dryden, Station Licensing S. Gambhir, Division Manager, Nuclear Operations Division J. Herman, Manager, Planning and Scheduling R. Ridennoure, Manager, Operations R. Short, Assistant Plant Manager
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J. Solymossy, Plant Manager - ,
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USEQ IP37551: Onsite Engineering ,
IP 61726: Surveillance Observations IP 62707: Maintenance Observations IP 71707: Plant Operations
- IP 71750: Plant Support Activities
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IP 92901: Followup'- Plan: Operations IP 92902: Followup - Maintenance ITEMS OPENED. CLOSED. AND DISCUSSED Opened 50-285/9814-05- IFl Review of Maintenance Personnel Work Hours (Section M6.1)
QgsjLd EA 96-204 (01013) V!O Failure to Take Action to Compensate for Failed Safety
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Related Equipment (Section 08.1)
EA 96-204 (01023) VIO Inadequate Shift Turnovers and a Failure to Log Abnormal Plant Conditions (Section 08.2)
. EA 96-204 (01033) VIO Inadequate Pressurizer Cooldown Procedure (Section 08.3)
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2-50-285/96-010 LER Loss of Containment Integrity During Fuel Movement (Section 08.4)
50-285/96-011 LER Loss of Containment Closure Due to a Maintenance Activity During Refueling (Section 08.5)
50-285/9612-01 VIO Failure to Place Fuel Assemblies Near Operable Source Range Neutron Monitors as Required by Plant Procedures (Section 08.6)
50 285/96-014 LER Failure to Comply With Technical Specification Requirement 2.1.2 (Section 08.7)
50-285/96-015 LER Failure to Place Fuel Assemblies Near Operable Source Cooldown Rate (Section 08.8)
50-285/9701-01 VIO Failure to Complete a Work Request Tag (Section M8.1)
50-285/9707-02 VIO Failure to Follow Procedures When Blowing Down Raw Water Supply Header Flow Transmitter Sensing Lines (Section M8.2)
Opened and Closed 50-285/9814-01 NCV Loss of Containment Integrity During Fuel Movement (Section O8.4)
50-285/9814-02 NCV Loss of Containment Closure Due to a Maintenance Activity During Refueling (Section 08.5)
50-285/9814-03 NCV Failure to Comply With Technical Specification Required Cooldown Rate (Section 08.7)
50-285/9814-04 NCV ~ Failure to Follow Maintenance Work Control Procedures (Section M1.4)
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