ML20214R340

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Documents Final Status of Items Identified in Author Ltr (OBEN-46-86) as Requiring Addl Evaluation &/Or Util Action Before Items Considered Closed.Final Status of Confirmatory Items & Summary of Sys Review & Test Program Encl
ML20214R340
Person / Time
Site: Davis Besse Cleveland Electric icon.png
Issue date: 03/30/1987
From: Obenchain C
EG&G IDAHO, INC., IDAHO NATIONAL ENGINEERING & ENVIRONMENTAL LABORATORY
To: De Agazio A
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
OBEN-24-87, NUDOCS 8706080088
Download: ML20214R340 (14)


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/NEA Idaho National Engineering laboratory March 30, 1987 Mr. Albert W. DeAgazio Project Manager, PWR Directorate #6 Division of PWR Licensing B Bethesda, MD 20014 TRANSMITTAL OF FINAL STATUS OF DAVIS-BESSE CONFIRMATORY ITEMS LISTED IN SECTION V 0F INEL REPORT, TECHNICAL EVALUATION OF DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION SYSTEM REVIEW AND TEST PROGRAM (SRTP) EGG-NTA-7104 -

Oben-24-87 Ref: (1) NRC Form 189 Revision 5 for Selected Operating Plant Licensee Issues Program (FIN 06022) Project 3, November 12, 1986 (2) Technical Evaluation of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station System Review and Test Program EGG-NTA-7104 (3) C. F. Obenchain ltr to C. McCracken, Oben-46-86, Transmittal of Updated Status of Davis-Besse Confirmatory Items Listed in Section V of INEL Report, Technical Evaluation of Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station System Review and Test Program (SRTP)

EGG-NTA-7104

Dear Mr. DeAgazio:

In accordance with Ref (1), INEL issued a Technical Evaluation Report (TER) Ref. (2) on the Davis-8 esse SRTP in January 1986. This TER documented 10 confirmatory items requiring review. Reference (3) provided an updated status of the confirmatory items listed in Ref. (2).

The purpose of this letter is to document the final status of the items identified in Ref. (3) as requiring additional evaluation and/or utility action before they should be considered confirmed and closed. A summary of review and evaluation of the Davis-Besse SRTP and the subsequent witnessing of selected system tests is also provided.

870600008s DR 87o33o ADOCK 05000346 PDR EGnG,a . ,ne. P.O. Box 1M Idaho Falls, ID 83415

t Mr. A. W. DeAgazio March 30, 1987 Oben-24-87 Page 2 This transmittal completes the Davis-8 esse Assistance Task (Project 3) of the referenced NRC Form 189.

If you have any questions on this transmittal or if we can be of further assistance at this time, please contact either Louis Valenti at 208-526-9934 or-(FTS) 583-9934; or Stan Bruske at 208-526-9345 or (FTS) 583-9345.

Very truly yours, t h YP C. F. Obenchain, Manager NRR and I&E Support .

SB:ggo

Enclosure:

(1) Final Status of Confirmatory Items (2) Summary of Davis-Besse SRTP cc: iMit Carrington',7.NRC-TAM 89 G. L. Jones, DOE-ID C. Vandenburgh, NRC-Region III J. O. Zane, EG&G Idaho (w/o Enclosure) f T

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Enclosure 1 March 30, 1987 {

Oben-24-87 Page 1 of 2 )

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FINAL STATUS OF CONFIRMATORY ITEMS l

j Reference 2 identified four confirmatory items requiring additional evaluation and/or utility action before they were considered confirmed and j

closed. These items were numbered 5, 7, 9 and 10 in Reference 2.

These items in original form are addressed as follows with an account I

, of their final status accompanying each item:

1 5. The Make-up and Purification System and system functions-identified in the IPRC approved SRTP dated December 3, 1985 did not specifically address the function of Letdown Isolation on a 4

Hi Temperature signal to mitigate a letdown line pipe break. The j utility committed to revise the Davis-Besse Updated Safety '

Analysis Report (USAR) to clarify what systems and system functions are assumed to mitigate a letdown line pipe break-discussed in USAR Section 15.4. This action remains to be  ;

confirmed. l l

i Final Status: This item remains not confirmed and closed by this j review until inclusion to the USAR. The cognizant NRC Inspector has reviewed and closed this item.

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7. The Control Rod Drive System and system functions identified in the IPRC approved SRTP dated December 2, 1985 did not specifically address the Reactor Runback to 15% power. Runbacks i

are addressed in the Integrated Control System and system.

functions identified in the IPRC approved SRTP dated November 14, 1985. However the ICS function does not address the runback function as a safety. function. The Main Steam System and system functions identified in the IPRC approved SRTP dated December 3, 1985 did not specifically address the function of the turbine bypass. The utility committed to revise the USAR to update the discussion provided in Section 15.2 on the turbine .;

trip analysis to indicate that the anticipatory reactor trip i system provides the mitigating functions and delete the  !

discussion concerning reactor runback and turbine bypass as-mitigating functions. This action remains to be confirmed.

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i Enclosure 1 l

March 30, 1987

. Oben-24-87 j Page 2 of 2 l Final Status: This item remains not confirmed and closed by this I

review until inclusion to the USAR. The cognizant NRC Inspector has reviewed and closed this item.

9. Since the SRTP is continuing to develop as the various phases of program activity are initiated, performed, and reviewed, such things as the appropriate SRTP reliance on integrated plant tests to which Toledo Edison has committed, remains to be confirmed.

Final Status: This item, based on the extent of this review is confirmed and closed.

10. The review of selected test outlines to ensure that they ,

encompass all system functions required for safe plant operation I and that the systems are tested under anticipated operating conditions still requires evaluation. In addition, the witnessing and evaluating of selected systems tests to determine their adequacy remains an open item due to the lack of approved testing procedures and the lack of testing to date.

Final Status: This item, based on the extent of this review, is l confirmed and closed. I i

FINAL STATUS CONCLUSION I Items 5 and 7 remain not confirmed and closed by this review until inclusion in the USAR. Items 9 and 10 are confirmed and closed based on the extent of this review. The cognizant NRC Reactor Inspector has reviewed and closed items 5 and 7.

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4 Enclosure 2 March 30, 1987 Oben-24-87 Page 1 of 10

SUMMARY

OF DAVIS-8 ESSE SRTP The process of reviewing the Davis-Besse SRTP included:

o Reviewing procedures both in initial development and after final approval.

o Witnessing performance of tests. This included accompanying the Test Leader on walkdowns of the system to be tested, attending test briefings and observing all or most of the test. On occasions we were only able to witness portions of certain tests due to other tests being conducted concurrently, o Observing troubleshooting, repair and/or modification to systems to correct deficiencies noted during testing, or premodification to systems to perform testing.

i o Evaluating test results.

4 Based on our review, it is concluded that the SRTP has in general 4

accomplished its intended purpose. The SRTP management and testing personnel exhibited a dedicated effort to satisfactorily complete all testing on systems listed in the SRTP. Utility personnel were very responsive to all issues and concerns addressed during our review. All conflicting items and/or open issues that were found during our review have been addressed by the SRTP Group. These conflicting items and issues were reviewed and closed by the cognizant NRC Reactor Inspector.

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I Enclosure 2 l March 30, 1987 Oben-24-87 '

Page 2 of 10 t

A total of 15 site visits were made to Davis-Besse beginning in December 1985 and ending in February 1987. On-site attendance was provided for approximately 50% of the time between December 1985 and February 1987.

Additional time was spent at the home office reviewing and evaluating test procedures, test deficiencies and test results. An average of one site i

visit was made each month, with an average length of stay being two weeks. '

, A list of all site visits and their dates is shown in Table 1.

Even though the. testing that was witnessed as part of our review process was satisfactorily completed, some significant deficiencies were noted. These were also reviewed and closed by the cognizant NRC Reactor

Inspector.

l The following is a description along with comments of some of the significant deficiencies noted during the review:

1. 13.8 kV System TP 850.12 Integrated Electrical ~ Test, 13.8 kV BUS B Lockout--On February 10, 1986,- during testing per step 6.2.9.3 a nail was found in place of a roll pin in the control. power handle for Breaker H8BF4.

Finding of the nail was properly documented. A surveillance report was issued by Quality Control with instructions given to j

perform an inspection of all 13.8/4160 Breakers. This inspection i found no discrepancies. A review of all maintenance performed on Breaker HBBF4 through the last 5 years, turned up two possible cases where the nail could have been introduced.

i Comment: Recommend more frequent inspection of breakers with second and third party verification of breaker conditions when any l inspection, maintenance, or internal activity on the breaker

] is performed.

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l Enclosure 2 i March 30, 1987 l

Oben-24-87 I Page 3 of 10 I

2. Nitrogen Supply System TP 850.86 Nitrogen System /RCS Valve Leakage Test--This test was performed early in the SRTP program l and indicated numerous deviations from administrative requirements.
a. Eight signatures / initials were not accounted for,
b. There was no test briefing documented in the test chronolog.
c. . Steps were not signed off by Test Leader at the time of performance. l l
d. Test deficiencies were not written at the time the )

deficiency occurred.

e. There was an inordinate amount of time between the end of the test on March 3, 1986 and the receipt of the Evaluation of Leak Testing dated June 23, 1986. This evaluation was performed by the outside independent technical group assisting in the Leak Testing.

Items a through d were addressed by the SRTP Group. Item e was addressed through discussion with the SRTP manager. Disposition i of addressed items is satisfactory.

1 Comment: The performance of this test early in the SRTP program alerted this group to improve their testing and reviewing methods.

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Enclosure 2 March 30, 1987 Oben-24-87 Page 4 of 10 Whenever an outside, independent, technical group is involved in testing, a firm control and responsibility should be established over that group to ensure a timaly response is made to any concerns or requests by the test group.

3. Aux-Bldg HVAC TP 851.00 AUX-BLOG NON-RAD HVAC (Low Voltage Switchgear Room)
a. Methodology of measurements was inadequate
b. Evaluation of Test Results was inadequate.
c. Methodology and evaluation were addressed and satisfactorily dispositioned by the SRTP Group.

Comment: Careful review of proper test methodology should be -

performed prior to approval and initiation of test.

Evaluation of test results should be performed by those properly qualified to perform such evaluations, with an independent review following the evaluation.

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4. Main Steam System TP 851.55 MSIV Stroke Time--Testing performed  ;

between December 15, 1986 and December 21, 1986, MSIV 101 exhibited a closing response time of 5.7 seconds.

This closing response time did not satisfy two of four different sections of Davis-Besse Technical Specifications, where' l

operability and closure time requirements for the MSIV's.are identified (Section 3.6.3.1--Containment Isolation Yalves, I Section 3/4.7.1.5--Main Steam Line Isolation Valves).

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l Enclosure 2 l March 30, 1987 Oben-24-87  :

! Page 5 of 10 l The station has addressed this in a Safety Evaluation (Reference 3) and concluded all MSIV closure times discussed will satisfy all existing Safety Analysis assumptions.

The station has committed to installing an Air Assist System Test and to test this system and observe any response or change in  !

MSIV closure time. Testing is to be performed immediately after i high power reactor trip test.

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Comment: We did not witness this Air Assist System Test.

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5. Integrated Control System TP 850.21 ICS Restart Tuning at Power Test--The Reactor tripped at 15%.

Inadequate communication between test personnel and reactor operators allowed for the removal of an ICS component for troubleshooting, thus contributing to the Reactor Trip (Reference 1).

1 Comment: Thorough communications should have been maintained at j all times. There was a test briefing given by the_ Test

Leader to the reactor operators. The SRTP Group required that a more thorough briefing be administered along with a discussion of any concerns the reactor operators may have on any of the ICS testing. Also a j thorough and constant communication is to be maintained throughout the test. This has been addressed and noted as being performed in subsequent test briefings.

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Enclosure 2 March 30 1987 Oben-24-87 Page 6 of 10

6. The Main feedwater, Auxiliary Feedwater and Motor Driven feed Pump systems were covered extensively in our review. Aside from the normal review process, witnessing of major repair work was performed on Main Feed Pump Turbines 1 and 2. This included witnessing of final alignment checks on No. 1 MFP after its repair of bearing failure on January 1, 1987, witnessing of No. 2 MFP front standard bearing inspection, and No. 1 MFP repair on Stub Shaft and Governor Drive Shaft. Below is a list of Test Procedures performed on the Main feed Pumps, Auxiliary feed Pumps, and the Motor Driven Feed Pump. This list represents a majority of the test procedures performed on the Main Feedwater, Aux Feedwater and Motor Driven feed Pump systems. This does not include the periodic test procedures which were conducted on a more frequent interval as opposed to the test procedu'res which were performed only once.

1 TP850.43 Auxiliary Feedwater Valve Logic Verification TP850.45 AFPT Admission Valve Test on Aux. Steam TP850.48 AFPT Admission Valve and Governor Cold Testing TP850.49 Aux. Feedwater System Refueling Test TP850.50 AFPT Overspeed Trip Test and AFPT Governor Low and High Speed Stop Verification.

l TP850.52 AFP System Monthly Test l

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O Enclosure 2 March 30, 1987 Oben-24-87 Page 7 of 10 TP850.53 AFP Train 1-1 Instr. Functional and Calibration Test TP850.60 Main feed Pump Turbine Drain System Test TP850.61 Main Feed Pump and Turbine Control Oil Test TP850.77 MDFP Motor Run-In i

TP850.79 Steam Generator Remote Shutdown Instrumentation- l Calibration TP850.80 AFW Pressure and Valve Test .

l TP850.96 AFW Pump Room Ventilation Test i

l TP850.99 AFW-MS Supply Line Vibration Test  !

l TP851.06 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Train 1-2 Instrumentation Functional and Calibration Test TP851.07 MDFP Monthly Test TP851.32 Feedwater Control Valve Response to Loss of Instrument i

Air l TP851.52 MFPT Casing Drain Capacity Test TP851.54 MFPT Circuitry Test.

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Enclosure 2 March 30, 1987 Oben-24-87 Page 8 of 10 CONCLUSION The successful completion of testing up to this point by Davis-Besse's SRTP group has demonstrated that systems important to safe plant operation are capable of functioning as intended.

1 The review of Davis-Besse's testing over the last 15 months identified a very responsive approach by the SRTP group to all issues and concerns raised. ~This approach enabled the group to become more proficient in their testing and reviewing methods.

As of February 13, 1987 when the last site visit was completed, all testing, with the exceptions noted under confirmatory items, had been satisfactorily completed. The confirmatory items 5 and 7 have been discussed with and considered closed by the cognizant NRC Reactor Inspector

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(Reference 4). I 1

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Enclosure 2 March 30, 1987 Oben-24-87 Page 9 of 10 TA8LE 1. DAVIS-BESSE SITE VISITS BY INEL PERSONNEL

1. December 2 to December 13, 1985
2. December 16 to December 27, 1985
3. January 19 to January 24, 1986
4. January 27 to January 31, 1986
5. February 3 to February 14, 1986
6. February 24 to March 7, 1986 l
7. March 17 to March 31, 1986
8. May 5 to May 23, 1986 ,

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9. June 16 to July 2, 1986
10. July 21 to August 17, 1986 l
11. September 22 to October 3, 1986
12. October 20 to October 30, 1986
13. November 11 to November 26, 1986
14. December 8 to December 24, 1986
15. January 18 to February 13, 1987 l

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Enclosure 2 1 March 30, 1987 Oben-24-87 Page 10 of 10 REFERENCES

1. Davis-Besse Unit LER 87-001, Jan. 21, 1987, Reactor Trip Due to Feedwater Isolation and Subsequent Overcooling.
2. C. F. Obenchain 1tr to C. McCracken, Oben-46-86, Transmittal of Updated Status of Davis-Besse Confirmatory Items Listed in Section V of INEL Report, Technical Evaluation of Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station System Review and Test Program (SRTP) EGG-NTA-7104.
3. J. Williams, Jr. itr to J. G. Keppler dated December 22, 1986 Serial j No. 1-698.
4. L. Valenti, personal communication to C. Vandenburgh on March 18, 1987.

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