IR 05000445/1988058

Safety Insp Repts 50-445/88-58 & 50-446/88-54 on 880803-0908.Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Actions on Previous Insp Findings,Followup on Deviations/Violations & General Plant Tours

ML20207J521
Person / Time
Site:	Comanche Peak
Issue date:	09/21/1988
From:	Livermore H, Runyan M NRC OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS
To:
Shared Package
ML20207J514	List: IR 05000445/1988058 ML20207J510 ML20207J515
References
50-445-88-58, 50-446-88-54, NUDOCS 8809280019
Download: ML20207J521 (16)

Text

_ _ _ _ _ _

.

, i APPENDIX D U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

!'

OTFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS NRC Inspection Report: 50-445/88-58 Permits: CPPR-126 50-446/89-54 CPPR-127 Dockets: 50-445 Category: A2 50-446 Construction P1rmit Expiration Dates:

Unit la Extension request submitte Unit 2: Extension request  :

submitte Applicant: TU Electric Skyway Tower .

!

400 North Olive Street Lock Box 81 Dallas, Texas 75201

'

Facility Name Comancho Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES),

Units 1 t. 2 i Inspection Att Comancho Peak Site, Glen Rose, Texas Inspection Conducted: August 3 through September 8, 1988 l

!

l Inspector: 1 hu M. F. Runydn, Resident Inspector, 9-21*88 Date '

Civil Structural (paragraphs 2, 4, 5, and 7)

i

!

Consultants W. Richins, Parameter (paragraphs 2, 3, 5, 6, and 7)  !

I r

Reviewod by: T CU2Aff(MLJ 'l 1.l~ SS H. H. Livermore, Lead Senior Inspector Date i

,

% % .

O L

O

• i

'

s I

I Inspection Summary:

Inspection Conducted: August 3 through September 8, 1908 (Report 50-445/88-58: 50-446/88-54)

Areas Inspected: Unannounced, resident safety inspection of i applicant's actions on previous inspection findings, follow-up on .

I deviations / violations, 10 CFR Part 50.55(o) deficiencies identified '

by the applicant, Post Construction Hardware Validation Program (PCRVP), Comanche Peak Responso Team (CPRT) issuo-specific action .

plans (ISAP), and general plant tour i Results: Within the areas inspected, a ve:Pness was identified l concerning administrative errors in the ht..vilaneous steel PCHVP  :

category (paragraph 5), a strength was 14 ".. tied in the applicant's efforts to correct prcblems- T the steam generator upper lateral supports (pa;agraph 6), one violation was identified for improper scoping of a PCHVP inspection (paragraph 5), an .

unresolved item was identified for mistakes in documentation of a I PCHVP inLpoetion (paragraph 5), an open item was identified for the '

disposition of a nonconformanco report (paragraph 5), and an er'n item was identified to track correctivo actions following the i applicant's discovery of welded Hilti bolts (paragraph 7).

.

t

'

l l  ;

i r

i

<

I

, 1 l i

!

!

i

,

I I

i

, _ . - . _ _ . - - - --- .--_---.-,

. . . . - . . . - - - - . - - . - - - - . _ _ - . , , - - , . . - .

.

. -- . , _ , - -

E .

.

'

.

1 DETAILS

, Persons Contacted M. R. Clem,-CAP Structural, Stone-and Webster Engineer Corporation (SWEC)

• W. G. Counsil, Executive Vice President, TU Electric N. D. Hammett- Engineering Assurance, Brown & Root (B&R)

• T. L. Heatherly. Licensing Compliance Engineer, TU Electric C. R. Hoote"., Civil Engineering Manager, TU Electric

• 0. W. Lowe, Director of Engineering, TU Electric

• J. W. Muffett, Manager of Civil Engineering, TU Electric D. Nace, Vice President, Engineering and Construction,

,

• TU Electric

• D. M. Reynerson, Director of Construction, TU Electric

,

• C. E. Scott, Vice President, Nuclear Operations, TU Electric l M. R. Steelman, CPRT, TU Electric E. O. Tomlinson, CAP Structural, SWEC F. W. Van Dyne, Engineering Assurance, Southern Technical Services The NRC inspecters also interviewed other applicant employees .

'

dering this inspection perio '

l * Denotes personnel present at the September 8, 1988, ex mnetin . Applicant Actlpn on Previous Inspection Findings 192701)

j- (Closed) Open Item (445/8514-0-14): This item addressed a potential deviation regarding voids identifjed in i concrete placement CPC-105-5865-01 The voids were identified by CPRT during an inspection of Verification Package I-S-CONC-51 witnessed by the NRC inspector. The condition VAs documented on CPRT !.4viation Report (DR; I-S-CONC-51-DR1 and incorporated into nonconformance

! report (NCR) C85-101591SX, This NCR was subsequently

dispositioned "rowork" in accordance with Frocedure CCP-12 and required QC to verify the repair.

- The NRC inspector reviewed the documentation associated

' with the repair of the voids and the completed repair and

'

verified that the repairs were properly mad This item

is close (closed) Open Item (445/8514-0-30)

This item addressed #

potential deviations regarding connection location, ,

connect l.on size, and bolt hole edge distance for structural steel member MRB-0565-DCA-MK- This member

,

is parc of a platform structure located in the Unit 1 Reactor Buildin These conditions were identified by CPRT during an inspection of Verification

,

' ,

t

-. . .- - - - - - - -. - .. - . - - . - _ - -. .. - - . - -

l' .

3 ..

y

Package I-S-STEL-120 witnessed by the NRC inspector; documented on CPRT DRs I-S-STEL-120-DR2, I-S-STEL-120-DR3, and I-S-STEL-120-DR5; and incorporated into NCR M86-103158X. This NCR was subsequently dispositionad "use-as-is" based on Design Change Authorization (DCA) 5567, Revision 2 and calculation 16345-CS(S)-017, Revision 0. Calculation 16345-CS(S)-017 identifies that allowable stress levels are not exceeded due to the nonconforming conditions addressed by NCR M86-103158X. The NRC inspector reviewed i the above documentation and supporting calculation, and concurred with the disposition of NCR M86-103158X. This item is close c. (closed) open Item (445/8516-0-44): This item addressed pctential deviations regarding an extra bolt hole identified by inspection that was not shown on design drawings and material under the head of a 1/2-inch bolt for structural steel member MK-12. This member is a sump

- Lcreen in the Unit 1 Reactor Building. These conditions wera identified by CPRT during an inspection of Verification Package I-S-STEL-007 witnessed by the NRC inspector, documented on CPRT DRs I-S-STEL-007-DR1 and I-S-STEL-007-DR2, and incorporated into NCR M85-101774S This NCR was subsequently dispositioned "use-as-is" based on vieddco Metals shop drawing CP-0459-450-D12 (which identifies the extra hole discussed above) and DCA 25414

'

with supporting calculation 163^5-CS(S)-06 Calculation 16345-CS(S)-062 identifies that the bolts were used as fastenerc and were not designed for structural load The NRC inspector reviewed the above documentation and supporting calculation, and concurred with the disposition of NCR M85-101774SX. This item is close , (closed) Open Item (445/8622-0-11): This item addressed '

potential deviations regarding support configuration and an undersized wold for a battery charger support in the Unit 1 Auxiliary Building. These conditions were identified by CPRT during an inspection of Verification Package I-S-EQSP-002 witnessed by the NRC inspector, '

documented on CPRT DRs I-S-EQSP-002-DR1 and I-S-EQSP-002-DR2, and incorporated into NCR M86-101534X.

'

This NCR was subsequently dispositioned "use-as-is" based on the justification contained in the NCR. The

,

juctification states that (1) the change in the support configuration (a channel is 1/4-inch off the center line s of the baseplate) does not result in a significant stress beyond allowable limits and (2) the undersized weld

(undersized for a length of 1 3/4-inches) is not a nonconforming condition as the installed weld is 2 inches

,

longer than the design require The NRC inspector l

l

. --- . --. - . - . -- - - - -

-

. ,

g .%

.

.

,

reviewea~the above documentation and concurred with the disposition of NCR M86-101534 This item is close (Open) Unresolved Item (445/8842-U-01): This item addressed the effectiveness of Field Verification Method-(FVM) CPE-SWEC-FVM-CS-075 to identify concrete attachment spacing violations per specification 2323-SS-30. Inspection activity regarding this item is documented in paragraph 5 of this report. This item remains ope . Follow-up on Violations / Deviations (92702) (Closed) Deviation (445/8702-D-03; 446/8702-D-03'/: This item addressed discrepancies identified by the NRC in the population items list (PIL) for the CPRT VII.c population of concrete placement. The discrepancies indicated that the PIL was not entirely complete and accurate and did

not include all safety-related concrete pours. The initial CPRT review of the PIL was inadequat The committed corrective actions involved a review of approximately 10 percent of the total population of

,

concrete pour Pours listed on drawings were i crcss-checked by CPRT against a computer list generated by TU Electric from concrete pour cards. This computer

,

list was used as the population source for the concrete placement population. The CPRT review identified 28

,

discrepancies in addition to the 19 discrepancies previously identified by the NRC inspecto The impact

'

of these discrepancies on the validity of the PIL is as

-

follows:

. Twenty-three discrepancies were drafting errors on

'

isometric drawings, but had correct pour card These discrepancies had no impact on the sampling l

process.

i . Fifteen discrepancies involved minor pours for curbs l or pads and are not structurally significant. They were constructed using the same work process as other concreto pours and were apparently poured with adjacent pours. Similar pours have been sampled for each type of pour where discrepancies were noted.

l l . Two discrepancies involved major pours apparently L placed with adjacent pour The pour cards appear to be in error by not listing these pours

-

separately. Similar pours have been sampled and thus the sampling used is representative of the population.

l

l

.

.'

..

. Seven discrepancies involved pour cards located in the records vault, but not listed on the PI It appears that these pours were inadvertently not included on the computer list. These errors represent less than one percent error, are random,

.and are not restricted to any time period, building, or type of pou *

In addition to the above review, CPRT compared a manual log of civil inspection reports with the information contained in the computer list. One discrepancy was identified for concrete blocks that do not have a structural functio CPRT concluded that the computer list is a representative source list for the concrete placement population. The discrepancies identified have no effect on the sampling process based on the low error rate, random nature of the errors, and the fact that pours similar to those missing from the PIL were sample CPRT issued document 1921/ MISC 19, "Guideline for Determining that each Population Items List is Complete, Accurate and Consistent." Letter QA/QC-RT-8211 dated July 24, 1987, requires the population engineers to review each PIL using the above guideline. The guideline defines the methodology used for reviewing each PIL for completeness and accurac The NRC inspector reviewed the documents supporting the <

above CPRT activities and conclusions, and concurred with the corrective action taken to resolve this issue and to avoid further deviations. This item is closed.

! Action on 10 CFR Part 50.55(e) Deficiencies Identified by the Applicant (92700)

, (Closed) SDAR-CP-79-08, "Installation of Drilled-In Expansion Anchors": By letter TXX-88311 dated March 29,

'

1988, the applicant stated that the corrective actions previously proposed for this SDAR had been superseded by

'

the corrective action plan for SDAR-CP-86-04, which is presented in letter TXX-88185, dated February 5, 198 ,

'

SDAR-CP-79-08 involved the initial installation spacing requirements for drilled-in expansion anchors and other

>

cmbedded anchors. Corrective actions for this matter

,

have been incorporated into the PCHVP. The NRC inspector verified that all issues resulting from SDAR-CP-79-08 have been included in SDAR-CP-86-04. Consequently,

'

SDAR-CP-79-08 is closed. SDAR-CP-86-04 remains ope l

,~-,----,-------------,--.,m ._. 7 , -,,m--------,-----,r,,-.,--.,,~.(- - - - - - - -

., - - , - - - . . - . . - - - - - - - -

, -

'

,

..

b. (Closed) SDAR-CP-84-31, "Control Room Separation Wall":

By letter CPPA-41,568 dated October 30, 1984, the applicant informed the NRC of a reportable issue involving the unacceptable seismic design of an architectural wall. The wall was located on the mezzanine flour above the control room at elevation 840 fee It was determined that unacceptable interactions could occur during an earthquake. The subject wall was removed and replaced with a seismic Category II wal This complete redesign was supported by a revised seismic analysis. The NRC inspector compared the new wall to the design drawings and associated travelers and noted that the new wall appeared to comply with the intended design and had the physical appearance of a strong, carthquake-resistant structure. This SDAR is close c. (Closed) SDAR-CP-85-18, "Embedded Angles": By letter TXX-88301, dated March 10, 1988, the applicant stated that the corrective actions previously proposed for this SDAR had been superseded by the corrective action plan for SDAR-CP-86-04, which is presented in letter TXX-88185, dated February 5, 1988. SDAR-CP-85-18 involved the failure of installation procedures to specify minimum spacing requirements between concrete anchors and embedded angle Corrective actions for this matter have been incorporated into the PCHVP. The NRC inspector verified that all issues resulting from SDAR-CP-85-18 have been incorporated in SDAR-CP-86-0 Consequently, SDAR-CP-85-18 is close d. (Closed) SDAR-CP-86-08, "Super Hilti 3olt Installations":

By letter TXX-88204, dated February 5, 1988, the applicant informed the NRC that the substitution of six improperly marked Hilti bolts for Super Hilti bolte was not a reportable issue. An installation had been identified in which regular Hilti bolts had been stamped with a star, the marking reserved for Super Hilti bolts (which were specified in the design of the pipe support in question). The applicant analyzed this support and concluded that the as-built configuration was structurally adequate despite the use of the weaker bolt On the broader issue, the applicant determined that a programmatic deficiency may have existed in the control of star-stamped Super Hilti bolts prior to March 1982 (the bolts in question were installed prior to this time). To determine the scope of the problem, the applicant performed ultrasonic tests on star-stamped (presumably Super Hilti) bolts installed both prior to and after March 1982. This survey revealed no discrepancies in the post-March 1982 population (198 bolts), whereas two deficiencies were identified in the pre-March 1982 population (about 1000 bolts). The two additional deficiencies were associated with cable tray

. . ,

.

.

..

hangers and were determined to be structurally adequate as installed. The applicant determined that t't.e three identified cases of bolt substitution were isolated, did not result in inadequate structures, and occurred prior to March 1982 when the control of star stamps was strengthened. The NRC inspector reviewed CAR-058, Revision 2, CAR-074, Revision 0, and the SDAR file and concluded that the applicant had properly dispositioned this cas This SDAR is close ' Closed) SDAR-CP-86-17; "Minimum Concrete Coverage": By letter TXX-6180 dated December 23, 1986, the applicant informed the NRC that a discrepancy involving minimum concrete coverage was not a reportable issue. The FSAR, Section 9.5.1.5.2, references the Uniform Building Code (UBC) for the minimum concrete cover required to provide a three-hour fire barrie UBC chapter 43, Table 43-A, specifies a minimum cover of one-inch for this purpos The plant's fire-related slabs and walls were designed to ACI 318-71. Section 7.14.1 of this code requires a 3/4-inch concrete cover. The applicant resolved the discrepancy through written and oral communication with UBC engineers who stated that a 3/4-inch cover (as specified by ACI 318-71) was adequate to provide a three-hour fire barrier. UBC also stated that Table 43-A of chapter 43 provides general requirements only and that table 43-9-J of the same chapter specifies a 3/4-inch concrete cover for slabs in a restrained conditio Although no specific UBC requirements exist for walls, UDC stated that walla have at least the same fire endurance as slab The NRC inspector reviewed the SDAR file including the UBC communication and other references, discussed the i issue with the applicant, and concurred with the i applicant's position. This SDAR is closed.

I Post Co1struction Hardware Validation Program (PCHVP) Structural and Miscellaneous Steel (CPE-SWEC-FVM-EE/MS/IC/CS-086 and CPE-SWEC-FVM-EE/ME/IC/CS-090) (48053)

The structural and miscellaneous stool PCHVP category l

includes items such as loaded embedmonts, platforms, watertight doors, monorails, support angles, stairs, and handrail Among the applicant inspected attributes are bearing of the base member; item size and orientation; bolting configuration and location; base metal defects; bolting engagement; washer installation; and weld size, length, and location. The NRC inspector reviewed the following completed structural and miscellaneous stool PCHVP packages during this report period

!

l

{ - - - - .

-

.

.

..

'

(1-4)CS-090-AB-831-226-507, CS-090-AB-831-226-S08, CS-090-AB-831-226-SO9, CS-090-AB-831-226-S11, embedded strip plates, Auxiliary Building. The NRC inspector noted that the only attribute inspected for these items was base metal damage. This was later confirmed to be consistent with the Controlling Procedure NQI 3.09-M-005, "Field verification of Structural and Miscellaneous Steel,"

Revision 5, which requires only an inspection of base metal for loaded embedmont The QC inspectors determined that base metal was satisfactory (no damage) for packages CS-090-AB-831-226-509 and CS-050-AB-831-226-S1 For packages CS-090-AB-831-226-S07 and CS-090-AB-831-226-S08, bas; metal was determined to be unsatisfactory due to the presence of holes and mechanical abrasion. The NRC inspector looked at the hardware and concurred with the base metal inspection for each of the four package The NRC identified two apparent discrepancies regarding the inspection of the above PCHVP packages. Paragraph 6.2.1.8 of Procedure NQI 3.09-M-005 states, in part, "The item attached to the embed plate shall be identified in the remarks section of the applicable IR if available."

contrary to the above, the NRC inspector identified that a support for cable tray T24KADK22 was attached to the embed plates associated with PCHVP packages i CS-090-AB-831-226-S07 and CS-090-AB-831-226-50 In I

addition, pipe support FPX-2047-700-A55C was found attached to the embed plate associated with PCHVP package CS-090-AB-831-226-S1 Inspection Report 1-0224754 for PCHVP package CS-090-AB-831-226-SO9 identifies the location of the embed plate as 7 foot 11 inches south of 8 The actual location is 13 feet 10 inches south of 8A as measured by the NRC inspector and shown on the

"Structural and Miscellaneous Steel PCHVP Component List" attached to this package. The NRC inspector verified that the locations were corrnetly identified for PCHVP packages CS-090-AB-931-226-S07, !

CS-090-AB-831-226-508, and CS-090-AB-831-226-511.

i-The discrepancies described above regarding the unidentified attachments to embed plates and the incorrectly noted location of the embed plate associated with PCHVP package CS-090-AB-831-226-S09 will be tracked as Unresolved Iteni (445/8858-U-01).

i l

.

'

r

..

Further NRC inspection will determine whether these examples are isolate (5) CS-090-S61-773-54-S1, watertight door, Safeguard Building, Unit The NRC inspector reviewed the documents in the PCHVP package and inspecte?. the watertight doo The only attribute inspected by the PCHVP inspectors was base metal damage / defects. All other attributes were noted "N/A" (not applicable) on the inspection reports contained in the package. Applicant representatives at first postulated that the door was vender supplied and installed and thus, all other attributes were out of the scope of PCHVP and were justifiably eliminated from the inspectio The NRC inspector concurred that the base metal damage / defects attribute was satisfactory and requested additional information regarding the scope of the work performed by the vendo Applicant representatives subsequently supplied construction documents for the watertight doo The NRC inspector reviewed Construction Traveler CE-82-201-8903 dated May 10, 1982, which indicates that the door was installed by a site contractor, not by the vendor. The traveler specifies, in part, that: (1) the door assembly identification and location be verified, '2) stitch welding be used to attach the door frame to embeds, and (3) a seal weld j be installed between the door frame and the embeds on the hinge side of the door. Wolding inspection for the door was originally documented on Inspection Report MS-491 dated November 2, 1982. Design Change Authorization (DCA) 13695, Revision 2, requires the installation of additional welds at the mitered corners of the door frame and for the attachment of an additional angic to an embedded angle used to attach the door frame to the structural wall. The

above welds should be part of the scope of the PCHVP

, inspection of the door as the welds are either part of the door frame or provide structural attachment of the door frame to the building wall Cr}terion V of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50, as implemented by Section 5.0, Revision 0, of the TU Electric Quality Atsarance Manual dated

.

February 1, 1988, requires that activities affecting j quality shall be prescribed by and accomplished in accordance with documented instructions, procedures,

,

or drawing ~

. 'l

c s .

The PCHVP Inspection Report 1-0184414 contains attribute 3, "Verify item location and arientation" and attribute 13, "Verify weld size, length, and location." Both of these attributes were incorrectly marked "N/A" and the scope of the '

.

inspection was incorrectly identifie ' Paragraph 7.1 of Fiald Verification Method CPE-SWEC-FVM-EE/ME/IC/CS-090, Revision 5, states:

"Those commodities and associated attributes identified on Attachments 1-4 of this FVM shall be reinspected by. Quality control in accordance with the referenced specification criteria identified on Attachments 1-4 of this FVM."

Attachment 3 clearly specifies that welds be inspected for structural steel. The NRC inspector concluded that while the procedures for identifying the scope of the PCHVP inspection activity.were adequate, they were not correctly implemented for PCHVP Package CS-090-S61-773-54-Sl. The above discrepancies are identified as a violation (445/8858-V-02).

Drawing DCA-13695, sheet 3 of 4, supplied in the PCHVP package specified 3/8-inch Hilti Kwik-bolts to anchor an angle which was added to the existing embedded door frame to provide a watertight sea Although the angle was observed to be installed, the NRC inspector could not verify the presence of the specified Hilti bolts, and therefore questioned why the QC inspector had not made an out-of-scope observation of this condition. The applicant supplied additional documentation (NCRs M-84-00265 and M-82-01965) which established that post-nut series bolts were used in lieu of the specified '

Hilti Kwik bolts to anchor the angle. This nonconformance was dispositioned use-as-is based on '

the strength of the substituted bolts. Post-nut series bolts are flush with the bolted surface and may be unobservable once the surface is painte The NRC inspector reinspected the door and located several surface indentations indicative of post-nut series bolts. The NRC inspector, howcycr, was unable to verify the existence and location of all the post-nut series bolts identified in NCR 84-00265. This is an Open Item (445/8858-0-03).

(6) CS-090-RB1-808-003-S01, removable block wall supports, Reactor Building. The QC inspector documented the block wall supports to be ,

l

._ . - . .. _

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -

t,

.

g

i satisfactory with respect to size ar.d length, location and orientation, alterations and notching, bolt location, base metal defects, and weld configuration. The NRC inspector examined the wall supports and verified conformance with drawing 2323-8-0787, Revision 3; DC1.-015313, Revision 7; and DCA-014402, Revision 15. The NRC inspector concurred with the QC inspection repor Considering the limited number of items inspected by the NRC inspector, the above identified violation and open item (regarding embedded strip plates) are considered indicative of a weakness in the miscellaneous steel PCHVP construction work category. Further inspection will more full; define the scope of the problem area Concr,ete Attachments (CPE-SWEC-FVM-CS-075) (46053)

The NRC inspector met with the applicant to discuss actions taken to resolve NRC concerns regarding Field Verification Method CPE-SWEC-FVM-CS-075 (EVM-075) as documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-445/88-42; 50-446/88-38 and Unresolved Item 445/8842-U-01. The concrete attachments on 50 plant surfaces (including walls, slabs, beams, and columns) have been mappe Instances where the spacing of concrete attachments violates Specirication 2323-SS-30 have been determined and confirmed by field measurement. The applicant is currently comparing the actual load on each bolt or attachment influenced by a spacing violation with the resulting reduced capacity of the attachment to determine whether the hardware is acceptable as installe The NRC inspector reviewed one package in an interim stage and

,

observed that the overall process of determining spacing violations appeared adequat A spot check of individual calculations yielded no errors. Further inspection will continue when fully completed packages are availabl . Applicant's Actions on CPRT Issue-Specific Action Plans (ISAP)

(48055)

The following CPRT ISAP V.b activities were inspected during this report period:

Determine Potential _ Generic Applicability Through Sample

' Reinspection of Two Separate Populations (NRC Reference 05.b.04.00), Inspection of Richmond Inserts on ASME l Pipe Supports (NRC Reference 05.b.04.01), and Inspection of Blind Hole Bolted Connections (NRC Reference 05.b.04.02)

To determine the potential generic applicability of the thread engagement problem addressed by ISAP V.b, two populations of

!

l

. . .-

I

'

.

.

13  :

i blind structural connections were sampled and inspected by the applicant for thread engagement adequacy: Richmond inserts and drill and tap blind connection The NRC inspecter reviewed the Richmond insert inspection program as part of ISAP VII.c (see NRC Inspection Report 50-445/88-21; 50-446/88-181 An unclassified trend was identified for Fichmond inserts with inadequate thread engagement. Corrective action is now part of the PCHV ,

The population of bolted connections with a drilled and tapped blind hole was selected for inspection by CPRT based on a review of holted connections where thread engagement is an important design attribut CPRT sampled this population using the plan developed in Appendix D of the CPRT Program Pla The thread engagement for each sample was inspected against the criterion of a minimum thread engagement equal to the bolt diamete No deviations from this criterion were found by the CPRT inspector The NRC inspector reviewed the following CPRT and applicant documents related to ISAP V.b blind hole bolted connections:

STIR-CPRT-S-001, "Threaded Fastener Evaluation" CPRT File V.b.3-005, "Review of Project's Activity to Identify other Bolted Connections" CPRT Files V.b.3-008, "Resolutica of Third Party Questions Related to the Sampting Investigation of the Thread Engagement of Drilled and Tapped Connections" I Southwest Research, Inc., QA Surveillance Reports:

CPSES-OB-86-1 i

CPSES-OB-87-1 CPSES-OB-87-2 CPSES-OB-87-3 CPSES-OB-87-4 CPSES-OB-87-5 CPSES-OB-87-6 Based on the above review and discussion with applicant representatives, the NRC inspector concluded that the CPRT program for the inspection of blind hole bolted connections was adequate and the conclusion that no deviations were found was justtfie No violations or deviations were identified. This activity is complete and no further NRC inspection is planned for these reference item _ . - - .-. _ .

.

.'

..

'

Identify Root Cause and Generic Implications (NRC Reference 05.b.05.00)

The NRC inspector reviewed the identified root causes and generic implications related to the steam generator upper lateral support installation problem addressed by ISAP "

The root causes and generic implications are discussed in detail in the CPRT Results Report for ISAP V.b, Revision The NRC inspector verified that the conclusions reached by CPRT were justified and that all issues were addressed. The NRC inspector's conclusion was based on: (1) pre /lous inspection of ISAp V.b activities, (2) inspection of ISAP ;

activities summarized in this report, and (3) review of CPRT i documentation related to this ISA ,

No violations or deviations were identified. This activity is l complete and no further NRC inspection is planned for this I reference ite >

This completes the NRC review of ISAP V.b. The NRC inspector consiocred the applicant's efforts to correct problems with the steam generator upper lateral supports and other related issues to be oxemplary, and identified this as an overall strength within the ISAF program.

,

7. Plant Tours (92700)

,

The NRC inspector made frequent tours of Unit 1, Unit 2, and i common areas of the facility to observe items such as i housekeeping, equipment protection, and in-process work [

activities.

'

The NRC inspector periodically observed Bisco QC closcout l

'

inspections of seismic wali gap For the most part, these

! inspections are confirming that the wall gaps are now free of k

l debris and spaced properly to avoid contact during an

earthquak Any remaining problem areas are being documented i on NCR. This effort, when finished, will complete the corrective actions for ISAP II.c, "Maintenance of Air Gap I

Between Concr9te Structures."

The NRC inspector monitored actions following the applicant's [

'

discovery of a void in a concrete wall at the 789 foot elevation in the Safeguards Building. The full extent of the [

,

void was determined to be approximately 5' 0" x 3 1/2" x 3/4" t j and apparently coincided with the keyway used during the ,

, grouting of a provicus blockout. All other concrete and grout i

! nearby was deter:.ined to be soun The applicant revised the .

structural calc'ilations and concluded that the void was  ;

l i insignificant. The NRC inspector observed the void after the  ;

i surrounding grout had been chipped and concurred with the  !

'

description of the void's geometry, the state of the l

!

t t

.,_ _ _ . . . _ _ _ , _ _ _ _ . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ , _ . , _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ . . . - . - _

-

r- ,

2+

surrourding concrtte, and the applicant's conclusions. NCR 88-13355, Revision 3 was issued and dispositioned "repair".

The void was regroute During implementation of DCA 49986R4, requiring the replaecment of 5/8" diameter Hilti bolts with 1" diameter Hilti bolts on a pipe support in Unit 1 containment, two of the existing six bolts attaching the baseplate to structural

'

concrete were found by the applicant to be welded to the baseplate. The welds had been covered by washers and nuts giving the bolts a normal external appearance. Although

,

exhibiting the required torque when tested, the bolts were attached only to the baseplate and, therefore, possessed no pull-out strength for tension loading and probably also a reduced shear-load capacit It is believed that the work crew which installed this support in 1983 was unable to torque the two bolts to the design value because the holes drilled in the concrete were too large. By welding the bolts to the braeplate, the appearance of a properly bolted and torqued connection was create l The applicant documented this incident on NCR 88-5620 and

informed the NRC. Since calculations showed the support to be adequate with only four of the six bolts, the applicant determined this issue to be not reportable under the i provisions of 10 CFR 50.55(e) or 10 CFR 21.

l The applicant issued Corrective Action Request (CAR)88-022 to determine whether this condition is widespread. The applicant

,

has committed to randomly inspect other similar supports

~

installed under the supervision of the foreman responsible for the subject case, beginning one year before and ending one year after the installation of the subject suppor Pending completion and review of CAR 88-022, this issue is identified as an open item (445/8858-o-04).

8. open Items

.

Open items are matters which have been discussed with the applicant, which will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or applicant or both. Open items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in paragraphs 5 and . Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations, or icviations. one unresolved item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in paragraph ._

I , j

. 'ii *

,

l

l

,

10. Exit Meeting (30703)

I An exit meeting was conducted September 8, 1988, with the l

'

applicant's representatives identified in paragraph 1 of this report. No written material was provided to the applicant by the inspectors during this reporting period. The applicant did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided ;

'

to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.

. During this m-sting, the NRC inspectors summarized the scope i and findings of the inspection.

,

,

J t

$

h a

! t

!

'

!

I i

!

]  !

i

$

t t

!