ML20205J852

Registers Strong Opposition to Reduction in Size of EPZ for for Facility.Util Request to Shrink Evacuation Planning Zone Is Retreat to pre-TMI Position That ESFs Alone Adequate

ML20205J852
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	09/25/1986
From:	Mceachern P AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED
To:	Kerr W Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
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ML20205J677	List: ML20205J673 ML20205J692 ML20205J718 ML20205J743 ML20205J760 ML20205J769 ML20205J781 ML20205J794 ML20205J820 ML20205J852 ML20205J894 ML20205K095 ML20205K127 ML20205K168 ML20205K183 ML20207A118 ML20207A145
References
FOIA-87-7 NUDOCS 8704010437
Download: ML20205J852 (1)

Text

'McEACHERN BEBUEX@6I September -25, 198 4

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• Dr. Williata Kerr Advisory Committee on E@d Reactor Safeguards Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1717 H Street NW Washington, DC 20555

Dear Dr. Kerr:

I am registering with your committee my strong opposition to f the reduction in size of the emergency planning zone for the Seabrook  ;

Nuclear Power Plant. Asyour committee discusses this issue, I would I ask that you instead consider expanding the evacuation zone. In j light of the 18 mile permanent evacuation following the Chernobyl 1 disaster in the Soviet Union, it is irresponsible and insensitive ]

to the health and safety needs of the people of New Hampshire to reduce the zone at Seabrook.

One of the main lessons of Three Mile Island made clear by the Kemeny Commission and the NRC's own inquiry group was that reliance on engineered safety features alone was not sufficient to assure ,

adequate protection of the public against the nuclear hazards of '

an accident.

The applicant's request to shrink the Evacuation Planning Zone is a blatant attempt to remove the opposition of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts from the planning process. It amounts to nothing i more than a retreat to the pre-Three Mile Island position that the )

engineered safety features alone are adequate. History shows us otherwise.

Sin rely, pun - P 7- 7

• ( 8704010437 870330 PDR Democratic Nominee for Governor FOIA SHOLLYB7-7 paa of New Hampshire CMd PM:jml Worth Plazo,Sete #7, Portsmouth, NH 03801 603/433 2288 a 1170 Elm Street,Monchester, NH 03101 603/644 2200

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t- 8, kg UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION N$  ;* wAsHWGTON, D. C. 206S5 k..... SEP 2 51986 s

MEMORANDUM FOR: Thomas M. Novak, Acting Director  !

Division of PWR Licensing-A  !

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation FRON: Themis P. Speis, Dirrector Division of Safety Review and Oversight Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

SUBJECT:

ADDITIONAL COWlENTS ON THE BNL REVIEW OF THE '

SEABROOK EMERGENCY PLANNING STUDY

REFERENCE:

T. SPEIS TO T. NOVAK, "8NL REVIEW OF SEABROOK EMERGENCY PLANNING STUDY," SEPTEMBER 15, 1986.

In response to your request of August 12, 1986, we reviewed the proposed tasks for the BNL evaluation of the Seabrook Emorgency Planning Study. Our comments were forwarded in Reference 1. -

Since that time we have had an opportunity to examine the Seabrook study results and to attend an August 27, 1986 briefing by the applicant and their 2

PRA consultants. We now have further suggestions on areas which should receive emphasis in the BNL review.

A key element of the Seabrook study is the finding that early containment failure with large-scale releases of fission products would occur in only 0.1% of all core melt sequences. This estimate is based primarily on analyses which show low probability of a failure to isolate containment in the event of a core melt

([/ failure), an exceptionally robust containment design and an unusually low pYobability of an interfacing systems LOCA (V sequence). These are all -

important results which should be carefully checked and verified by the NRC l i

contractor. It is particularly important to verify the low Y sequence 1

probability, since this result appears to be a consequence of improved l analysis techniques rather than enhanced design or operation of the plant. -

Seismi'cally initiated sequences leading to containment failure or bypass should also be carefully reviewed.

4 The estimated frequency of an early containment failure with large-scale release of fission products (3E-7 per reactor year) is very low compared with staff assessments of similar plants particularly when external events are included and phenomenological uncertainties are accounted for. This raises the question whether small effects, which are ordinarily neglected in PRAs, might become significant contributors to risk for Seabrook. Assuming that the NRC contractor review upholds the bases for the low estimates of early release probability, NRC should also obtain assurance that heretofore neglected issues

do not become dominant contributors to risk. The issues to be examined should include, but not necessarily be limited to, the following two areas:

hf Fan-?>7 1 d/39

e' g T. Novak 1. Off-Normal Operation In general, PRAs concentrate on accidents that would occur during power operation, because decay heat is much lower during non-power operation.

.However, from the viewpoint of early releases, there are some significant potential contributors from operation in modes 4, 5 and 6. Typically, technical specifications do not address the status of containment  ;

isolati s in mode 5, and require Isolation in mode 6 only during periods

of fuel handling. Consequently, it is possible to have a core melt accident with the containment wide open.

Even with the containment isolated, the potential exists for an -

interfacing systems LOCA during RHR operation with a water-solid PCS.

Inadvertent PCS pressurization due to charging pump operation or heatup by the reactor coolant pumps, combined with inadequate response of the LTOP features, could lead to a pipe rupture or pump seal LOCA outside of containment. The probability of such a core melt sequence is low, because additional failures of isolation valves and injection systems must be postulated. However, it remains to be shown that the frequency

, is less than 3E-7 per reactor yerr.

2. Exceptional Containment Failure Modes

' There are several potential modes of containment failure which are generally not examined in PRA analyses because they are judged to be less likely or less credible than the conventional failure modes. However, given the very low base case estimate of containment failure probability, the NRC should consider whether such phenomena represent a containment failure probability of 0.1% or greater. Two examples of such

{ phenomena are:

A. Local Hydrogen Detonations - although the Seabrook containment is <

sized and designed to withstand global hydrogen burns of any credible

~ magnitude, the potential always exists for hydrogen detonations in small compartments which would produce shock wave pressures capable i

of causing a local cuntainment breach. The potential for pockets of high hydrogen concentrations in areas such as the pressurizer relief tank enclosure should be addressed.

B. Direct Core Debris Attack On Containment Penetrations - A large fraction of postulated core melt accidents will lead to vessel meltthrough with the primary system at high pressure. This will -

probably result in a forcible ejection of core debris into regions of the containment beyond the reactor cavity. The presence of hot core ,

debris (molten or solid) in contact with metallic or elastomer '

penetrations holds the potential for structurally weakening components which are relied upon in the analysis of containment '

i failure pressure.

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.- T. Novak A particular potential problem is the containmc-nt sump, because of its low elevation in the containment building and the presence of large diameter recirculation lines which penetrate containment.

A final point relates to the role of uncertainties in probabilistic risk assessment. The methods of probabilistic risk assessment have improved greatly

~ ~ in the past decade, but substantial uncertainty remains .in the estimation of

~~~ core sklt' frequency, containment perfahnance and fission product behavior .

~ The BNL review should include an attempt to identify the major areas of uncertainty in risk and to evaluate potential improvements to the plant design and. operation which could significantly reduce those uncertainties.

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Themis P. Speis, Director Division of Safety Review and Oversight

, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation cc: H. Denton

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