ML20197A782

Application for Amend to License NPF-35,extending Time Permitted for Certain 18 Month Tech Spec Surveillance Requirements to First Refueling Outage.Fee Paid

ML20197A782
Person / Time
Site:	Catawba
Issue date:	05/05/1986
From:	Tucker H DUKE POWER CO.
To:	Harold Denton, Youngblood B Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML20197A787	List: ML20197A782 ML20197A807
References
NUDOCS 8605120385
Download: ML20197A782 (8)

Text

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e DUKE POWER GOMI%NY P.O. IM)X W1888 CHAMLOTTE. N.G. 2H242 MALttTUCKEN TRt_Ernove ver e reemasung manean peamervoo=

(704) 373-4&ls May 5, 1986 4

Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Coannission Washington, D.C. 20555 ATTENTION: Mr. B.J. Youngblood, Project-Director

PWR Project Directorate No. 4 Re

Catawba Nuclear Station, Unit 1

Docket No. 50-413 Technical Specification Amendment for

Extension of Surveillance Time Requirements

Dear Mr. Denton:

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j This letter contains proposed amendments to the Technical Specifications for Facility Operating License No. NPF-35 for Catawba Unit 1. The attachment contains the proposed changes and a discussion of the justification and safety analysis. The analysis is included pursuant to 10 CFR 50.91 and it has been concluded that the proposed amendments do not involve significant hazards considerations.

This request involves one amendment request to Catawba's Technical

, Specifications. Accordingly, pursuant to 10 CFR 170.21 a check for $150.00 is enclosed.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.91 (b) (1) the appropriate South Carolina State Official is being provided a copy of this amendment request.

Very truly yours, l

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Hal B. Tucker 4

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, Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director b May 5, 1986 l

Page Two xc: Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Mr. P.H. Skinner NRC Resident Inspector Catawba Nuclear Station Mr. Heyward Shealy, Chief Bureau of Radiological Health S.C. Dept. of Health & Environmental Control 2600 Bull Street Columbia, South Caolina 29201 INPO Records Center Suite 1500 1100 circle 75 Parkway Atlanta, Georgia 30339 American Nuclear Insurers c/o Dottie Sherman, ANI Library The Exchange, Suite 245 270 Farmington Avenue Farmington, CT 06032 M&M Nuclear Consultants 1221 Avenue of the Americas New York, New York 10020 J

Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director May 5. 1986

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Page Four HAL B. TUCKER, being duly sworn, states that he is Vice President of Duke Power Company; that he is authorized on the part of said Company to sign i and file with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission this revision to the Catawba Nuclear Station Technical Specifications, Appendix A to License No.

NPF-35; and that all statements and matters set forth therein are true and

correct to the best of his knowledge.

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Hal B. Tucker, Vice President s

i Subscribed and sworn to before me this 5 th day of May,1986.

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DISCUSSION OF AMENDMENT REQUEST It is requested that the time allowed to perform certain 18 month surveillance Raquirements he eurendad to the first refueling cutage for Catawba Unit 1. Unit 1 is currently scheduled to enter the first refueling outage in late August. The surveillances identified below can only be conducted while the unit is shutdown and will all come due before this time. Therefore, an extension for the time to conduct these surveillances is necessary.

Since the unit is not scheduled to be shutdown until late August, it is requested that these surveillance intervals be extended until September 28, 1986, with the exception of the Diesel Generator inspection. Due to the fact that one D/G must be operable in Modes 5 and 6, only one diesel may be taken out of service to perform surveillances. Surveillance 4.8.1.1.2g.1 involves the teardown of the diesel and normally takes up to 30 days to perform. Therefore, in order to be able to do both diesels, this surveillance interval must be extended until prior to entering Mode 4 following the first refueling. With the exception of the D/G surveillance, the most limiting extension would be on the order of 3 months.

SURVEILLANCE DUE DATE

1. Table 4.3-7, Items 11 and 12 7/24/86 Channel Calibration

2. Table 4.3-7, Item 18 8/25/86 Channel Calibration

3. 4.3.3.9c. Loose Part Detection 8/14/86 Channel Calibration

4. 4.3.4.2c. Turbine Overspeed Protection 8/19/86 Channel Calibration

5. 4.4.6.lb. Leakage Detection 8/9/86

6. 4.6.1.2d. 8/19/86 - 8/22/86 Type C Test

7. 4.7.13.6 SSF Level Transmitter 7/2/86 Channel Calibration

8. 4.8.1.1.2g.1) Diesel Generator (D/G) 7/3/86 (D/G 1A)

Manufacturer's Inspection 8/15/86 (D/G 1B)

9. 4.S.4a. Overcurrent Protective Devices 8/2/86 Functional Tests

ANALYSIS OF SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION 10 CFR 50.92 (c) states that s proposed amendment... involves no significant hazards considerattons. if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not:

(1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety."

The change to Technical Specification Table 4.3-7 regarding the Channel Calibration for the PORV Position Indicators and the PORV Block Valve Position Indicators does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. These indicators are highly reliable and no problems have been experienced with them. Additionally, Surveillances 4.4.4.lb. and 4.4.4.2 ensure continued operability of the associated valves. This change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. No design change is involved and the method and manner of plant operation is unchanged. This change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The extension to the surveillance interval is small (approximately two months) and other required surveillances ensure that the associated valves will be operable.

The plant design bases, safety limits, limiting safety system settings and limiting conditions for operation remain unchanged.

The change to Technical Specification Table 4.3-7 regarding the Containment Area-High Range Radiation Monitor (EMF-53) Channel Calibration does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. EMF-53 is a reliable radiation monitor intended to detect high levels of radiation which might be released during an accident. Monthly channel checks as required by the Technical Specifications will continue to be performed to ensure continued operability. This change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. No design change is involved and the method and manner of plant operations is unchanged. This change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The surveillance interval extension would only be on the order of one month. Also, the plant design basis, safety limits, limiting safety system settings and limiting conditions for operation will remain unchanged.

The change to Technical Specification 4.3.3.9c. - Loose Parts Detection System, does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The required daily Channel Check, monthly Analog Channel Operational Test and the capability of overlap testing of the circuits will ensure continued operability of this system. This change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. The design and operation of the plant will be unchanged by this surveillance extension. This change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The surveillance interval extension would be approximately 1 1/2 months. Also, the plant design basis, safety limits,

ANALYSIS OF SIGNIFICANT HAZARDR CON 9TDFRATION (Con t inued )

approximately 1 1/2 months. Also, the plant design basis, safety limits, limiting safety system setpoints and limiting conditions for operation will remain unchanged.

The change to Technical Specification 4.3.4.2c. - Turbine Overspeed Protection, does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. Weekly cycling of the high pressure turbine stop valves, low pressure turbine intermediate stop valves and low pressure turbine intercept valves and monthly cycling of the high pressure turbine control valves will ensure continued operation of this system. This change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. The design and operation of the plant will be unchanged by this surveillance interval extension. This change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The surveillance interval extension would be slightly less than 1 1/2 months. Also, the plant design basis, safety limits, limiting safety system setpoints and limiting conditions for operation will remain unchanged.

The change to Technical Specification 4.4.6.lb. concerning the Channel Calibration of the Containment Floor and Equipment Sump Level and Flow Monitoring Subsystem, does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. Continued operability of the Containment Atmosphere Gaseous and Particulate Monitoring System and the Containment Ventilation Unit Condensate Drain Tank Level Monitoring Subsystem will assure adequate capability to monitor Reactor Coolant System Leakage. This change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. The design and operation of the plant will be unchanged by this surveillance interval extension. This change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The surveillance interval extension would be less than 2 months. Also, the plant design basis, safety limits, limiting safety system setpoints and limiting conditions for operation will remain unchanged.

The change to Technical Specification 4.6.1.2d. concerning the Type C leak rate testing of the containment penetrations identified in the attached Table 3.6-la does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The penetrations are required to be Type C leak tested every 24 months. The last leak rate tests for these penetrations provided very good results. It is not expected that these penetrations would degrade significantly over the period of time between the first and the second Type C leak test. This change does not create the possibility of a new or dif ferent kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. Th* design and operation of the plant will be unchanged by this surveillance interval extension.

This change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of snfety.

The surveillance interval extension will be on the order of 1 1/2 months.

Also, the plant design basis, safety limits, limiting safety system setpoints and limiting conditions for operation will remain unchanged.

This extension request also requires a one-time exemption from the requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix J. This exemption request will be detailed in a subsequent transmittal.

ANALYSIS OF SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION (Continued)

The change to Technical Specification 4.7.13.6 would only apply to the Channel Calibration of Steam Generator level transmitter ICFLT5632. This instrument provides indication at the Standby Shutdown Facility of Steam Generator "C" wide range level. This is a non-safety related instrument which provides Control Room indication but has no actuation capability.

There are three other Steam Generator level transmitters (one per Steam Generator) which will be calibrated as required. The continued operability of the other three transmitters along with the required monthly Channel Check of all four instruments will provide adequate assurance that there will be no increase in the probability or consequences of a previously evaluated accident. This change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. The design and operation of the plant will be unchanged by this surveillance interval extension. This change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The surveillance interval extension will be slightly less than 3 months. Also, the plant design basis, safety limits, limiting safety systems setpoints, and limiting conditions for operation will remain unchanged.

The change to Technical Specification 4.8.1.1.2g.1) concerning subjecting each diesel to an inspection in accordance with procedures prepared in conjunction with its manufacturer's recommendations does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. Extensive inspections were performed on each diesel prior to Unit 1 Startup (see SSER 4). All other required surveillances will continue to be performed (with the exception of those related to the ESF actuation surveillance interval extension previously granted). The performance of the other required surveillances will provide assurance of continued Diesel Generator operability. This change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. The design and operation of the plant will remain unchanged by this surveillance interval extension. This change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The surveillance interval extension for the Diesel Generator inspection needs to be allowed to extend until prior to entering HOT SHUTDOWN following the refueling.

This is due to the fact that one diesel is required to be operable in Modes 5 and 6 and therefore, the diesel inspections cannot be conducted concurrently. These inspections will not be completed on both diesels prior to September 28, 1986 and thus, the surveillance interval extension needs to be extended until the unit is ready to enter Mode 4 following the outage. During this time period, one diesel will remain operable and the appropriate surveillances will be conducted to assure its operability.

Therefore, there will be no significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Also, the plant design bases, safety limits, limiting safety system setpoints and limiting conditions for operation will remain unchanged.

The change to Technical Specification 4.8.4a. concerning the functional testing of a 10% sample of the circuit breakers and fuses listed in Table 3.8-1A does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously identified. The breakers and fuses have proven to be highly reliable with no failures or actuations recorded to date. This change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. The design and operation of the plant will remain unchanged. This change does not involve

ANALYSIS OF SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION (Continued) a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The surveillance interval extension for the Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices would be somewhat less than 2 months. Also, the plant design basis, safety limits, limiting safety system setpoints and limiting conditions for operation will remain unchanged.

Therefore, it can be concluded that postponement of the indicated surveillances by no more than three months will not result in an unacceptable risk to plant operation or the health and safety of the public. The conduct of the other required surveillances coupled with the short duration of the exemption request plus the demonstrated reliability of the systems and components to function properly ensure that their performance will not degrade.