IR 05000285/1997003

Insp Rept 50-285/97-03 on 970209-0322.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maint & Engineering

ML20137M518
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Calhoun
Issue date:	04/04/1997
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20137M488	List: IR 05000285/1997003 ML20137M486
References
50-285-97-03, 50-285-97-3, NUDOCS 9704080110
Download: ML20137M518 (18)

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ENCLOSURE i,e U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

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Docket No: 50 285

. License No: . DPR-40

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. Report No: 50 285/97-03 Licensee: Omaha Public Power District Fort Calhoun Station FC-2-4 Ad P.O. Box 399, Hwy. 75 - North of Fort Calhoun Fort Calhoun, Nebraska

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Facility: _ Fort Calhoun Station Location: ' Blair, Nebraska i

) Dates: February 9 through March 22,1997 ,

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Inspectors: W. Walker, Senior Resident inspector V. Gaddy, Resident inspector

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Approved: W. D. Johnson, Chief, Project Branch B Attachment: Supplemental information f

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I 9704080'110 970404 PDR ADOCK 05000295 G PDR l

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  !

Fort Calhoun Station

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NRC inspection Report 50-285/97-03 i i

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r This routine announced inspection included aspects of licensee operations, engineering-

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maintenancef and plant support. The report covers a'6-week period of resident inspectio j

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Ooerations  !

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1 * .The inspectors noted that the shift supervisor and radiation protection technician j

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l' conducted excellent briefings prior to initiation of repair 'on a leaking instrument tee connection. Also, the chemistry technician who initially identified the leak provided - ,

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an excellent example of' attention to detailin that the leaking fitting was properly identified and the amount of leakage quantified without requiring additional-  !

containment entries prior to repair (Section 01.2). '

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Maintenance  !

• Three instances in which maintenance personnel failed to properly follow l j configuration control procedures were identified. This issue is unresolved pending l further NRC review (Sections M1.2 and M2.1).

• A weakness was identified in that maintenance planning did not know how much water needed to be drained from the shutdown cooling cross connect pipin Additionally, the planners did not identify that the piping could not be completely drained without some disassembly. This resulted in individuals receiving unnecessary radiation dose (Section M1.3),

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! * System engineering determined that the boric acid storage tank totalizer bypass

' valve most likely failed due to being overstressed. This issue will be further

, reviewed as an inspection followup item (Section M2.2).

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• A weakness in maintenance planning when verifying the lower oil reservoir level on

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a reactor coolant pump resulted in a maintenance technician and a health physics technician being exposed to unnecessary radiation dose (Section M4.1).

l 4 * A noncited violation was identified due to inadequate maintenance planning when a containment spray pump was unnecessarily declared inoperable and the spare parts necessary to perform the maintenance were not available (Section M4.2),

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Enaineerina

• Engineering provided a thorough evaluation of the missing valve pieces in the boric acid system (Section E1.1).

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2-Plant Succort

• Radiation protectis.n and chemistry personnel provided very good support during the search to locate missing valve parts in the boric acid storage tank (Section R1.1).

• The inspectors identified two examples of weaknesses in the licensee's as low as reasonably achievable program (Section R1.2).

• A tour of the emergency operations facility showed the facility was well organized and in a state of readiness (Section P2).

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Report Details Summary of Plant Status The Fort Calhoun Station began this inspection period operating at essentially 100 percent power and operated at that level throughout the inspection period, l. Operations 01 . Conduct of Operations 01.1 General Comments (71707)

Using inspection Procedure 71707, the inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations. In general, the conduct of operations was professional and safety conscious; specific events and noteworthy observations are detailed in the sections below. In particular, the inspectors observed excellent performance by the operating crews during the repair of an instrument tee connection inside containmen .2 Repair of Leakina Instrument Line Fittina Insoection Scope (71707)

On February 28,1997, the inspectors observed control room briefings and operator activities associated with the repair of a leaking fitting on a pressurizer instrument line inside containmen ,

I l Observations and Findinas

During a planned containment entry to sample the safety injection tanks for boron concentration, a chemistry technician observed a leak, approximately two drops per j second, from a 3/8 inch swagelok plug attached to the 3/8-inch test union tee, l upstream of Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter D/PT-10 l l

Following discovery of the leak, operations personnel, in coordination with instrument I and control personnel and radiation protection personnel, began making preparations f to repair the leak. A decision was made to attempt to stop the leak by replacing the ;

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plug on the test tee connection. The operators performed Leak Rate Surveillance Test OP-ST-RC-3001, but were unable to detect any noticeable difference in the leak rate from the previous 8-hour leak rat The inspectors noted that the shift supervisor conducted two separate briefings, one with the control room operators prior to the initiation of repairs and one with the instrumentation and control technician who actually performed the repair. Both briefings were thorough, with clarifying questions encouraged and additional information provided as neede I l

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The inspectors also attended the as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) radiation dose _ briefing that informed the instrumentation and control technician and health physics technician of the radiological conditions inside containment. This briefing was informative and provided the workers with complete information regarding radiological conditions inside containment in the area where the repair would be performe During the repair activity, the inspectors observed that the reactor operators logged into the appropriate Technical Specification limiting condition for operation, and good three way communications were observed in the control room. Repeat backs were noted between the reactor operators and the instrumentation and control technician performing the repair inside containment, Conclusions

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The inspectors concluded that the shift supervisor and radiation protection technician buth conducted excellent briefings prior to initiating repair of the instrument tee ,

connection. These briefings were thorough and encouraged questions to ensure that l all possible contingencies related to the repair or plant configuration during the repair j

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were addressed. The inspectors also determined that the chemistry technician who initially identified the leak provided an excellent example of attention to detail in that the leaking fitting was properly identified and the amount of leakage quantified without requiring additional containment entries prior to repai Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment O2.1 Enaineered Safetv Feature System Walkdown (71707)

The inspectors used Inspection Procedure 71707 to walkdown accessible portions of the main steam system. The system was walked down using the following procedures: )

• Procedure OI-MS-1 A, Main Steam System Operation, Revision 4

• Standing Order S0-0-44, Administrative Controls for the Locking of Components, Revision 52 The inspectors noted that the material condition of the equipment was good. All supports and seismic restraints were properly anchored and in good condition. Also,

. all accessible valves were verified to be in the correct position, as required by the ;

procedure )

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02.2 Verification of Dancer Taaouts  ;

, Insoection Scone (71707) l l

The inspectors verified the danger tagouts established to perform maintenance on 'i Raw Water Pump AC-10D and High Pressure Safety injection Pump SI-2A were i

constructed to ensure the equipment was properly isolate : Observations and Findinas ,

The inspectors reviewed the tagouts that had been established to remove the raw water pump and the high pressure safety injection ' pump from service. The inspectors verified that the tagouts had been properly prepared and authorized. The

. inspectors also verified the tagged components were in their required positions, the ,

appropriate tags were in place, and all the Technical Specification requirements were l met for the inoperable equipmen !

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i The inspectors concluded that the licensee had adequately prepared and tagged out !

the proper components to remove the raw water pump and high pressure safety injection pump from servic ,

11. Maintenance l

l M1 Conduct of Maintenance

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M1.1 General Comments j I Insoection Scoce (62707)

i The inspectors observed all or portions of the following activities:  ;

• Characterization of the control element drive mechanism thermocouples .

• Search for missing parts in Boric Acid Storage Tanks CH-11 A and CH-118 l

• Replacement of jacket water thermocouple for Diesel Generator 2 j

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• Seal welding connection adjacent to the fuel oil transfer pump suction strainer of Diesel Generator 2

• Main generator voltage control system troubleshooting  ;

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t i Observations and Findinas  ;

The work observed by the inspectors was performed in a thorough and professional manner. All work observed was performed with the work package present and in i active use. Maintenance craft were knowledgeable of the work being performe The inspectors verified that the test equipment used by maintenance personnel was !

calibrated. System engineering presence was also noted during some of the above ,

maintenance activitie !

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l Maintenance activities were generally completed thoroughly and professionally by -[

knowledgeable maintenance craft personne l M1.2 Surveillance Activities  ! Inspection Scope (61726) ,

The inspectors observed portions of the following activities:

• OP-ST-FP-0001D, Fire Protection System inspections and Test, Revision 0

• OP-ST-AFW-3006, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump FW-10, Steam isolation Valve I and Check Valve Tests, Revision 9

• IC-CP-01 -1039, Calibration of Auxiliary Feedwater Pump FW-10 Speed Control Loop 1039, Revision 1

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• SE-PFT-CCW-0001, Quarterly Performance Test Procedure for AC-1D Heat i Exchanger, Revision 8

. Observations and Findinas

4 The inspectors noted that the surveillance procedure was present and in use during

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During performance of Surveillance Test SE-ST AFW-3006, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump FW 10, the licensee was unable to meet the acceptance criteria in Step 7.49, which required a differential pressure between 130 psid and 150 psid The differential pressure being measured was between main steam pressure and

, feedwater discharge pressure to determine that the differential pressure controller 3

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was functioning to ensure at least 200 gpm of water was available to the steam '

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generator for heat removal during a transient conditio The first performance of the test was unsuccessful in that a differential pressure of 100 psid was measured versus the required differential pressure of 130 to 150 psi !

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5-A Technical Specification limiting condition for operation was then entered, allowing 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> for restoring the pump to operability or a reactor shutdown would be required. The licensee determined that the speed control loop needed adjustment in i that the controller did not appear to be controlling linearl ;

During performance of Preventive Maintenance Order 9701856 on the inverse derivative control relay portion of the controller, maintenance technicians identified that a needle spring from a needle valve was missing. The inspectors reviewed the last maintenance performed on the inverse derivative control relay under Preventive Maintenance Order 9602443. This work was performed on October 23,1996. The f ailure to replace the needle valve spring during the preventive maintenance activity is being treated as an unresolved item related to configuration control in that the preventive maintenance order required the spring to be removed, cleaned, and replaced (50-285/97003-01),  ;

The system engineer completed an evaluation of the acceptability of the relay without the spring on a PED-OP-19, " Evaluation of Potentially Reportable Conditions," and determined that the missing spring did not contribute to the f ailed i surveillance, was not reportable, and did not affect the capability of the system to !

carry out its design function. Following preventive maintenance to disassemble and l clean the controller, the spring was replaced, and Surveillance Test SE-ST-AFW-3006 I was successfully performed and the turbino driven auxiliary feedwater pump was declared operabla Conclusions Maintenance technicians determined that a needle valve spring was missing from the inverse derivative control relay. This appeared to be another example of weak configuration control in that the control relay had been disassembled, cleaned, and reassembled during the last refueling outag )

M1.3 Inadeauate Maintenance Plannina Resultina in Unnlanned Radiation Exposure

,-  ! Inspection Scope (62707)

The inspectors followed upord weakness in maintenance planning that resulted in licensee personnel being exposed to more radiation dose than planne Observations and Findinas On February 24,1997, maintenance personnel entered Room 15A (shutdown cooling heat exchanger valve room) to replace the inlet gasket for the outlet cross-connect relief valve for Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger AC-4A and AC-4B (SI-310).

Operations established the tagout to support the gasket replacement on February 2 l I

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Upon entry into Room 15A, maintenance personnel attempted to drain the piping so l that the valve could be replaced. Maintenance personnel then realized that the piping l could not be thoroughly drained to allow the gasket to be replaced and exited the 1 area. Establishing the tagout and attempts to drain the piping resulted in l i approximately 115 mrem of dose to maintenance end operations personne .

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The inspectors performed a review to determine whir the piping could not be draine i

' The inspectors were informed that, due to the configuration of the system and since l 1 the relief valve was not located at the system's high point, it could not be thoroughly  ;

drained to allow the gasket to be replaced. The maintenance planner and the crew j

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leader did not walk down the piping prior to job planning or performance due to  ;

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ALARA radiation concerns raised by Radiation Protection personnel, in fact, the only j

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way to drain the piping was to unbolt the flange and drain water to the floor drain, t

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The flange was unbolted to allow draining of the piping. However, while draining to j the floor drain, the floor drain clogged and the flange was rebolted. Maintenance i

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personnel had remained inside Room 15A while draining the piping during the entire evolution.

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During discussions with maintenance planning personnel, they indicated that they did i not know how much water needed to be drained from the piping. Failing to know I how much water needed to be drained or what needed to be performea to drain the  !

piping contributed to personnel receiving more radiation dose than planned. The  !

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gasket replacement task was deferred pending an evaluation of the most appropriate method to drain the pip , _Qanclusions

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A planning weakness resulted in licensee personnel being exposed to more radiation i l dose than planne M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment  :

M2.1 Soent Fuel Pool Pomo Confiauration Differences Inspection Scoce (62707)

The inspectors identified and followed up on a configuration difference between the [

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spent fuel pool cooling pump : Observations and Findinas

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On February 25,1997, while touring Room 5 (spent fuel pool cooling room) the inspectors noted a difference in the configuration of Spent ?uel Pool Cooling Pumps AC-5A and AC-58. Specifically, Pump AC-5B had a glass reinforced nylon +

deflector installed on the outboard bearing and Pump AC-5A did not have this type  !

deflector installed. Pump AC-5A had a black rubber deflector installed. The l

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inspectors inquired about the difference in pump configuration. On February 27, -

system engineering personnel initiated Condition Report 199700206 to document the difference in the configuration of the pump l

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In response to the inspectors questions, system engineer personnel investigated and determined that the mechanical seal of Pump AC-5B was replaced on August 16, .

1996. The work was authorized using Engineering Change Notice 95-403 and Maintenance Work Document 954356. The reason for the engineering change notice i was because, during the replacement of the mechanical seal, the pump was upgraded to a newer model. System engineering personnel and the inspectors reviewed the engineering change notice and noted that the vendor documentation specified that a deflector be used with the old model pump. However, the upgraded l

pump did not require a deflector. In f act, the vendor documentation which was included as part of the engineering change notice, specified that no deflector was required with the upgraded pum The inspectors reviewed the detailed work instructions of the maintenance work document and noted that the instructions did not provide direction to install the ,

deflector. Although the deflector was not directed to be installed by the maintenance work document or the approved engineering change notice, ,

maintenance personnel installed the deflecto In response to the inspectors' observations on the spent fuel pooling pumps, system !

engineering personnel performed additional walkdowns and noted configuration l differences in the shafts of Demineralized Water Surge Tank Transfer i Pumps DW-40A and DW-40B. Specifically, system engineering personnel noted that, although the pumps were identical, DW-40A had a glass reinforced nylon deflector installed and Pump DW-40B had a rubber deflector installed. Configuration l differences between the spent fuel pool and demineralized water pumps will remain unresolved pending further NRC review (50-285/97003-02). Conclusions The inspectors identified that Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Pump AC-5B had a glass reinforced nylon deflector installed. Neither the vendor documentation, engineering change notice, nor maintenance work document specified that this component be installed. System engineering personnel identified a similar difference between the demineralized water surge tank transfer pump l M2.2 Search for Missina Pieces of Valve CH-462 Insoection Scoce (37551 and 62707) ,

l The inspectors observed the licensee's effort to locate and retrieve pieces missing from the boric acid totalizer bypass valve of Boric Acid Tank CH-11 !

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On March 6,1997, the inspectors observed the licensee locate and retrieve valve (

parts from Boric Acid Storage Tank CH 11B. On February 27,1997, the licensee  ;

initiated Condition Repert 199700207 to document that, during the disassembly of .

. Tank CH-462 (Boric' Acid Tank CH 11B totalizer bypass valve), the lower wedge and [

wedge spring were noted to be missing. The licensee suspected that the missing  !

t valve pieces had most likely traveled to the bottom of Boric Acid Tank CH-11 The inspectors observed the system engineer and a mechanic retrieve four pieces of [

.the valve from the tank. The wedge spring and three pieces of the lower wedge i were retrieved. When the lower wedge pieces were reconstructed, the licensee  !

noted that not all pieces had been retrieved. The valve was a Anchor Darling 2-inch l socket stainless steel double gate valve with a 12 inch handwhee I f

The licensee contacted the vendor to obtain additional infumation as to why the i valve failed. The vendor stated that the lower wedge of the valve could failif excess {

torque was applied to the handwheel while tightening the valve. The vendor manual [

indicated that the total force applied to the rim of the handwheel should not exceed i

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100 pounds. The vendor manual also stated that valve wrenches should not be used to provide extra leverage to close the valve in fact, the vendor manual indicated.the ;

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valve should seat tightly with less than 60 pounds of force on the handwheel and if tha valve did not seat properly it should be disassembled and inspecte [

The inspectors asked if operators had been provided guidance on the vendor torque ,

i- requirement and if operators had been provided guidance to prevent the use of valve -)

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wrenches on the valves. Licensing personnel stated that no guidance had been

provide System engineering personnel believed the valve was most likely damaged by operators while closing the valve. The pieces retrieved from the tank were examined l by the licensee's metallurgical expert. This individual concluded that the valve was most likely damaged due to excess torque.

} Condition Report 199700207 also identified 11 other similar valves that were potentially susceptible to being damaged by excessive torque and on March 7,1997, the operations department hung caution tags on those valves. The note on the caution tag stated "Do Not Use Wrench or Overtighten. Excessive Force May

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Damage Valve."

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- The inspectors also asked if vendor torquing requirements were generically applied to operator training and if the licensee had identified other valves in the plant with !

vendors restrictions on valve wrench usage. System engineering personnel stated I

that no specific torquing requirements were included in operational procedures and

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that valves with specific torquing requirements had not been identifie l l

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' The system engineering representative also stated that they were looking through the vendor manual for all valves in the plant to identify specific torquing and valve l wrench requirement On March 11,1997, a vendor was used to assist in locating the missing parts. The

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vendor searched from the bottom of the boric acid storage tank (CH-11B) to the suction of Boric Acid Transfer Pump CH-48. No missing pieces were located during the search. Since no parts were located, system engineering personnel initiated an i operability evaluation to determine if the chemical and volume control system could i still perform its safety function of injecting borated water into the reactor coolant .i system if the missing pieces were located in the suction or flow pat .

The operability evaluation was completed on March 13. Specific details of the operability evaluation are discussed in Section E On March 14, system engineering personnel finalized an action plan. The action plan indicated that similar valves in the boric acid system would be inspected for i damage and that a root cause analysis would be performe !

An inspection followup item was opened pending additional NRC review of the ,

outstanding items discussed above (50-285/97003-03). Conclusions The licensee concluded that the Boric Acid Storage Tank CH-11B totalizer bypass valve most likely failed due to being overstressed during closing of the valve. The licensee did not locate all parts from the missing valve. The vendor-recommended torque requirements for valves were not included during operator training. The licensee was reviewing the vendor manuals for all valves to identify specific torquing requirement M4- Maintenance Staff Knowledge and Performance M4.1 Additional Radiation Exposure Due to Failure to Verifv Plant Confiauration Inspection Scoce (71750 and 62707)

The inspectors identified a weakness in planning that resulted in individuals being exposed to unnecessary radiation dose while verifying the lower oil reservoir oillevel of Reactor Coolant Pump RC-3 Observations and Findinos On February 19,1997, the licensee made a containment entry to determine the cause of the dropping' oil level indicetion in the lower oil reservoir on Reactor Coolant Pump RC-38. The indication had dropped from approximately 86 percent since the

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- 10-beginning of the fuel cycle to 75 percent. The licensee determined that this decrease equated to approximately 1 gallon of oillos During the entry, a maintenance mechanic, accompanied by a radiation protection )

technician, attempted to verify the actual lower reservoir oil level using the I sightglass. The level could not be verified because the oil collection cover was installed over the sightglass. After realizing the oil level could not be verified, the individuals exited containment. The maintenance mechanic received a dose of 219 mrem and the radiation protection technician received 214 mre After discussions between system engineering and radiation protection personnel, a ,

second containment entry was made to remove the cover over the sightglass and  !

verify the lower reservoir oillevel. During this entry, the mechanic carried the proper tools required to remove the cover, successfully verified the oillevel, and replaced the cover. The actual oil level was approximately 1/8 inch below the full level mar Since the proper oillevel was confirmed, the licensee determined that the oillevel transmitter was functioning improperly. The licensee initiated Maintenance Work Request 9700550 to troubleshoot the transmitter. Total dose received during the two entries was 862 mrem. The mechanic received 546 mrem and the radiation protection technician received 316 mre The inspectors performed a review to determine why two containment entries were !

necessary to verify the oillevel. The inspectors learned that the vendor drawing for Reactor Coolant Pump RC-3B showed that the oil collection cover was installed over the sightglass. The oil collection cover on the remaining three reactor coolant pumps had been removed. The Pump RC-3B motor had been replaced, and the cover had not been evaluated for removal, as was the case for the other three reactor coolant pumps. System engineering personnel assumed that the oil collection cover for Reactor Coolant Pump RC-3B had also been removed. No one verified that the oil collection cover had been removed from Reactor Coolant Pump RC-3B prior to the containment entry, Conclusions The inspectors found actual plant configuration was not verified prior to making a containment entry to check the lower reactor coolant pump motor oil reservoir leve Not verifying the plant configuration prior to the first containment entry resulted in a second containment entry and also resulted in individuals being exposed to additional radiation dose. This additional dose could have been prevented if the actual plant configuration had been verifie l

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-11-M4.2 Containment Sorav Pomo Removed from Service Due to inadeauate Plannina Inspection Scope (62707)

The inspectors followed up on inadequate maintenance planning that resulted in a containment spray pump being declared inoperable and unable to perform it's safety functio Q.bservations and Findinas On February 12,1997, operations personnel tagged out Containment Spray Pump SI-3B in preparation for scheduled replacement of the mechanical seal of the pump. Operations personnel completed the tag out at 4 While reviewing Maintenance Work Document 963063 and the parts that were needed to support the maintenance activity, maintenance personnel noted that two flexitallic cover-to case gaskets were not included with the other parts. Additional investigation by the licensee determined that the gaskets needed to complete work on the containment spray pump had not been ordered and were not on site. After this discovery, the licensee returned the containment spray pump to service at 12:42 p.m. Failing to have all the parts availabic to support work on the containment spray resulted in the containment spray being unnecessarily declared inoperable and unable to perform its safety function for almost 9 hnur Standing Order SO-M-101, " Maintenance Work Control," Revision 42, Step 4.5.8, required maintenance planning to identify and procure parts, services, materials, and special equipment required for a planned work activity. Failing to procure the gaskets needed to support planned work on the containment spray pump is a violation of Technical Specification 5.8.1. This licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section V11.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (285/97003-04).

To correct the violation, the licensee indicated that the maintenance procedure would be changed to specifically indicate that the gaskets were needed to support the work, in addition, maintenance planning personnel stated that more gaskets were being ordere Conclusions l

Inadequate maintenance planning and coordination resulted in Containment Spray Pump SI-3B being unnecessarily declared inoperable. The pump was tagged out by ,

operations, however, not all parts needed to complete the maintenance had been I ordered. The pump remained inoperable for almost 9 hour1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br /> I l

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Ill. Enaineerina E1' Conduct of Engineering i

E1.1 Boric' Acid iniection Flow Path Operability

, insoection Scope (37551)  ;

The inspectors reviewed the operability evaluation performed by system engineering personnel to justify that the' chemical and volume control system could perform the ,

function of injecting concentrated boric acid into the reactor coolant system under j emergency condition ;

l Observations and Findinos On March 13,1997, system engineering personnel completed an operability I

evaluation to determine that the pieces missing from Valve CH-462 (Boric Acid Tank CH-118 Totalizer Bypass Valve) would not prevent Boric Acid Transfer Pump CH-4B and the Boric Acid Storage Tank CH-118 from performing their design function of injecting borated water into the reactor coolant syste l i

in the operability evaluation, the evaluator referenced tests performed by valve >

vendor Anchor Darling. During the tests, severalidentical valves were overtorqued to determine how they would fail, in each case, the lower wedge of the valve broke into five pieces in specific locations. Since the failure mechanism for Valve CH 462 was the same, the licenses concluded that the lower wedge most likely broke into five pieces similar to that seen by the vendor. The evaluator also estimated that the remaining two pieces were small and weighed less than one ounc Since the operations department sometimes used Boric Acid Transfer Pump B to recirculate Boric Acid Storage Tank A, and Boric Acid Transfer Pump A to recirculate i

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Boric Acid Storage Tank B, the evaluator concluded that the missing pieces were most likely located in Boric Acid Storage Tank A or in the 3-inch or 4-inch piping nearby at a system low point or low flow point. The evaluator concluded that, des i

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to the piping configuration, piping fluid velocities, and the inertia, friction, and momentum of the missing pieces, it was quite unlikely that any of the missing pieces '

could migrate to the volume control tank or charging pump suction lines. If the pieces were to migrate downstream of the boric acid transfer pumps, the evaluator l stated the most likely component to be affected would be the charging pumps. The evaluator concluded that, since only one of three charging pumps was required to perform the design function of borated water injection, there was no credible ,

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postulated failure that could render the system inoperabl During a plant review committee discussion, the evaluator stated that, during recirculation, the possibility existed for a missing piece to become lodged inside a recirculation control valve and prevent the valve from seating. To address this, the !

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-13-licensee was considering providing guidance to licensed operators to stroke the control valve af ter the syat'no had been run in the recirculation mode to ensure the control valve would sea Conclusions System engineering personnel performed an operability evaluation and concluded that the missing pieces from Valve CH-462 would not prevent the injection of concentrated boric acid into the reactor coolant system under emergency conditions and would provide a path for hot leg injection in post-loss of coolant accident long-term cooling. System engineering personnel also concluded that due to piping configuration and system flow rates it was unlikely that the missing pieces could migrate to the volume control tank or the suction of the charging pumps. The inspectors determined that the conclusions reached by system engineering personnel provided a reasonable basis for operabilit IV. Plant Suppgri R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls R1.1 Radiation Protection and Chemistrv Sucoort Durina Search for Missina Pieces from Valve CH-462 inspection Scope (71750)

The inspectors observed the support provided by radiation protection and chemistry personnel during the search for missing pieces of Valve CH-46 _ Observations and Findinas On March 6,1997, the inspectors observed the support provided by radiation protection personnel during the search for pieces missing from Valve CH-462 in Boric Acid Storage Tank CH-118. The inspectors observed radiation protection personnel perform surveys in the area prior to removal of the manwa In addition, once the manway was removed, chemistry perconnel obtained oxygen level samples needed for a confined space permi Radiation protection personnel also provided continuous coverage during the work observed by the inspector Conclusiong Radiation protection and chemistry personnel provided very good support during the search to locate missing parts in the boric acid storage tan . . . . . . _ . - . . .- . . - _ . . - -- -- . - . - , --

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R1.2 ALARA Radiation Proaram Weaknesses ,

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The inspectors identified two examples where maintenance planning weaknesses !

resulted in unnecessary radiation dose to workers (see Sections M1.3 and M4.1). 3 P2 Status of EP Facilities, Equipment, and Resources e

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P2.1 Emeraency Ooerations Facility Tour (71750)

On March 5,1997, the inspectors performed a tour of the licensee's emergency -

operations facility. The inspectors noted that the facility was well organized and in a .

state of readiness if needed in an emergency. The emergency planning manager i demonstrated the use of several pieces of equipment, including the emergency call j out notification system. In addition, the inspectors observed that the two emergency ,

response facility computers were operating and providing current plant operational

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VI. Manaaement Meetinas l j~  !

X1 Exit Meeting Summary .

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The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management l

at the conclusion of the inspection on March 25,1997. The licensee acknowledged l the findings presente '

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i The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the

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inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was

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ATTACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee R. Andrews, Division Manager, Nuclear Assessments G. Bishop, Assistant Plant Manager J. Chase, Manager, Fort Calhoun Station D. Dryden, Station Licensing Engineer H. Faulhaber, Manager, Maintenance S. Gambhir, Division Manager, Engineering & Operations Support J.' Herman, Manager, Outage Management R. Jaworski, Manager, Design Engineering, Nuclear B. Kindred, Supervisor, Nuclear Security Operations L. Kusek, Acting Manager, Quality Assurance / Quality Control

. E. Matzke, Station Licensing Engineer R. Phelps, Manager, Station Engineering R. Short, Manager, Operations J. Spijker, Corrective Action Group D. Spires, Manager, Chemistry -

J.-Tesarek, Supervisor, Simulator Services J. Tills, Manager, Nuclear Licensing D. Trausch, Manapr, Nuclear Safety Review Group NRC V. Gaddy, Resident inspector W. Walker, Senior Resident inspector INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED i

, IP 37551: Onsite Engineering .

IP 61726: Surveillance Observations IP 62703: Maintenance Observations IP 71707: Plant Operations IP 71750: Plant Support Activities

.lTEMS OPENED AND CLOSED Opened 50-285/97003-01 URI weak configuration control during maintenance on auxiliary feedwater control relay (Section M1.2)

50-285/97003-02 URI spent fuel pump and demineralized water transfer pump configuration differences (Section M2.1)

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C-2-50 285/97003-03 IFl missing valve pieces in the boric acid system (Section M2.2)

items Opened and Closed 50-285/97003-04 NCV containrnent spray pump removed from service due to inadequate planning (Section M4.2)

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