IR 05000285/1997001

Insp Rept 50-285/97-01 on 970414-0506.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Competency of Seven Senior Reactor Operator License Applicants for Issuance of Senior Reactor Operator Licenses

ML20141J777
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Calhoun
Issue date:	05/21/1997
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20141J775	List: IR 05000285/1997001 ML20141J771
References
50-285-97-01, 50-285-97-1, NUDOCS 9705280218
Download: ML20141J777 (12)

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ENCLOSURE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

Docket No.: 50-285 l

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License No.: DPR-40 Report No.: 50-285/97-01 l

Licensee: Omaha Public Power District l l

Facility: Fort Calhoun Station l Location: Fort Calhoun Station FC-2-4 Ad P.O. Box 399, Hwy 75 - North of Fort Calhoun Fort Calhoun, Nebraska Dates: April 14 through May 6,1997 Inspectors: R. Lantz, Chief Examiner, Operations Branch D. Pereira, Examiner, Engineering Branch Approved By: J. L. Pellet, Chief, Operations Branch ,

Division of Reactor Safety 1 l

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ATTACHMENTS:

Attachment 1: Supplemental Information Attachment 2: Simulation Facility Report Attachment 3: Final Written Examination and Answer Key 9705280218 970521 PDR ADOCK 05000285 Q PDR

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. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY l

Fort Calhoun Station NRC Inspection Report 50-285/97-01 NRC examiners evaluated the competency of seven senior reactor operator license applicants for issuance of senior reactor operator licenses at the Fort Calhoun Station facility. The licensee developed the initial license examinations using the pilot process program guidance contained in Generic Letter 95-06 and NUREG-1021, " Operating Licensing Examiners Standards," Revision 7, Supplement 1. NRC examiners reviewed, ,

approved, and administered the examinations. The initial written examination was i administered on April 14,1997, by facility proctors in accordance with instructions l provided by the chief examiner. The examiners administered the operating tests on ;

April 15-17,1997. All of the applicants displayed the requisite knowledge and skills to j satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 55 and were issued the appropriate license l Operations l

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• No generic knowledge or training weaknesses were identified as a result of !

evaluation of the graded written examinations (Section 04.1). l l

• Minor performance weaknesses and training deficiencies were identified for licensee j and applicant consideration and corrective action as appropriate (Section 04.2).

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• The licensee submitted an acceptable examination outline (Section 05.1.1).

• The licensee submit ted examination package was of good quality and adequate for administration with the exception of the job performance measure questions. The licensee staff was responsive in correcting the noted deficiencies, as well as incorporating enhancements in other sections of the examination that the chief examiner identified during the review process (Section 05.1.2).

• The simulator supported the examinations well, with a minor limitation (Section 05.2).

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Report Details i i

Summarv of Plant Status i

j The plant operated at 100 percent power for the duration of this inspection.

l 1. Operations

01 Conduct of Operations Inspection Scope l The examiners observed the on-shift operators during routine operations of the i

facility, coincident with the in-plant main control room section of the operating test walkthrough '

i j Observations and Findinas ,

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J The examiners observed communications in the control room with maintenance and

) other plant technicians. The communication was clear and effective, and formal 4 use of three-legged communication was adhered to during operationally significant I communications. Access to the control room was monitored and regulated by the operators, and the noise level was maintained low. The operators were attentive to  ;

the control boards. Observations in the main control room were consistent with  !

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j observations of license applicants during the dynamic simulator section of the

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operating test.

Conclusions i

i The control room operators exhibited professional demeanor and good i communication practices.

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04 Operator Knowledge and Performance i

! 04.1 Initial Written Examination

) Insoection Scope

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On April 14,1997, the facility licensee proctored the administration of the written F examination to seven applicants for initial upgrado senior reactor operator licenses.

The licensee graded the written examinations and evaluated the results for question i validity and generic weaknesses. The chief examiner and other NRC staff reviewed

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4 Observations and Findinas l l

The minimum passing score was 80 percent. The scores ranged from 83 to 94 percent, with an average score of 86.5 percent. Four or more of the applicants !

missed the following questions: 11, 21, 28, 36, 47, 58, 70 and 86. The licensee performed a post administration evaluation and deleted question 11 from the grading, based on no correct answer given to the question. The chief examiner concurred with this determination. No broad training or knowledge weaknesses were identified. Reasons for missing these questions appeared to be related to question difficulty and isolated training weaknesses. The licensee initiated appropriate actions to upgrade candidate specific knowledge and correct specific training weaknesse l

l Conclusions  !

l All seven applicants passed the written examination. No broad knowledge or training weaknesses were identified as a result of evaluation of the grcded examination O4.2 Initial Operatina Test Insoection Scope l

i The examination team administered the various portions of the operating )

examination to the seven applicants on April 15-17,1997. Each applicant participated in three or four dynamic simulator scenarios, and was in the senior reactor operator position for one of those scenarios. One applicant was in the senior reactor operator position for two scenarios. Each applicant also received a walkthrough test which consisted of five system tasks with two related questions for each system, and an administrative test which consisted of five tasks in four administrative area Observations and Findinas

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Overall, all of the applicants performed well in all sections of the operating tes In the dynamic simulator scenarios, the examiners noted good oversight and effective communications that were routinely formal and three legged. The applicants displayed good knowledge of Technical Specification and facility abnormal and emergency procedures. While acting as the control board operators, the applicants displayed good knowledge of component controls and board awareness, with one minor generic weakness which involved recognition of a partially stuck control ro .

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. Scenario 3 was administered to six of the applicants in two dynamic simulator sessions. The scenario involved a steam line break in containment that resulted in a reactor trip with the failure of two control rods to fully insert during the trip. One rod was stuck fully withdrawn, and the other was stuck after partially insertin Both crews immediately recognized that one rod was stuck fully withdrawn, however, one crew never recognized the partially inserted rod, and the second crew recognized it late in the scenario. The crews had two independent indications on the main control boards of the partially inserted rod, and one indication on the plant computer that could have been used to recognize the partially inserted rod. The first indication was the lack of a rod bottom light on the full core display, the second was a mid-position indication on the control rod synchroscope position indication meter. Both of these indications were present for the duration of the scenario. The third indication was available, but was not selected by the operators for display on the plant computer. However, simulator modeling limitations also presented two conflicting indications that challenged the opentors' ability to quickly diagnose the partially inserted rod. The first was the lack of a white light for the rod on the full core display, which would have indicated the rod was greater than 4 inches withdrawn. The second was the secondary rod position indicating system, j that indicated the rod was fully inserte The chief examiner discussed the simulator fidelity in modeling this event, and )

concluded that the simulator was not capable of properly modeling a partially '

l inserted rod following a reactor trip. The malfunction was initially proposed by the chief examiner due to recent industry events, and the licensee simulator operator for

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the examinations was able to produce the simulated indications. The modeling -

discrepancies were not identified prior to administratio Overall, the applicants performed well on the walkthrough and administrative sections of the examination. However, a few minor generic performance weaknesses were observed, which licensee staff stated would be reviewed for remedial training and future incorporation in license training. Examples of training l weaknesses were:

• Three of the applicants could not recall which containment spray header j isolation valve and pump combination would result from a containment spray

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actuation, based on the associated system interloc l l

• Some applicants were unsure of the existence of a reactor coolant pump lif t oil pump oil pressure interlock.

* Two applicants chose an emergency action level of site area emergency based on Emergency Action Level 7.2, major fuel damage and radiation

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l rnonitor readings of greater than 1000 times normal. The expected classification was an alert based on Emergency Action Level 7.1, fuel

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applicants did not meet the verification criteria description of major fuel l - . .. - ..

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i 6-damage. Major fuel damage is defined by example in the Basis Document for EPIP-OSC-1 as "large object damages fuel or water loss below fuel level to an irradiated fuel assembly not contained in an enclosed reactor vessel." ;

The applicants were given that a fuel pin had broken in half while being l removed from a bundle for repairs. After discussion with the facility, the !

examiner determined that the applicants had conservatively determined that a site area emergency was warran'ed, based on their discretion and lack of more definitive guidance from the procedures with respect to the definition I of " major fuel damage."

• One applicant did not understand facility expectations for the review of a temporary change to a surveillance procedure as the licensed senior reactor ;

operator signing for interim approval. This applicant approved a temporary change which would have violated Technical Specifications. The applicant ;

believed that he could approve the change after verifying that a no change of intent determination form had been completed by a qualified 10 CFR 50.59 ;

reviewer, rather than performing an independent assessment. The applicant )

also noted that he was not a qualified 10 CFR 50.59 reviewer and, therefore, j did not question the original determination. The licensee staff stated that ;

this was a misunderstanding of current facility expectations for the senior !

reactor operator level review. The examiner determined that facility l expectations for the senior reactor operator review were not explicit in the I governing procedure nor in licensed operator training. The licensee staff generated a condition report to review the temporary procedure change process and evaluate the level of review expected by the senior reactor operator, and then stated those expectations would be clarified with the operators through trainirag and other communicatio * While simulating valve manipulations in the radiological control area, two of the applicants would have violated the restrictions of their radiation work permit had they actually manipulated the valves. During performance of the waste gas task inside the radiological control area, the applicants were required to simulate closing a radiological waste sample isolation valve WD-1080. Since this valve is approximately seven feet above the floor, it would require notification of the radiation protection technician prior to operation, as noted in the radiation work permit. The applicants recognized the need to close the valve, and two immediately simuhted closing the valve. These applicants did not simulate calling the radiation protection tech as required by the radiation work permit. The licensee staff stated that there was no exception to the 6-foot notification requiremen c. Conclusions Overall, applicants performed well on the operating test. Minor generic performance or knowledge weaknesses were noted in containment spray interlocks, reactor coolant pump lift oil pressure interlock, definition of major fuel damage, and

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radiation work permit restrictions for operations in the overhead. The licensee acknowledged the noted weaknesses and stated that training would review the weaknesses and take appropriate corrective actio Operator Training and Qualification

05.1 Initial Licensina Examination Development The facility licensee developed the initiallicensing examination in accordance with guidance provided in Generic Letter 95-06, " Changes in the Operator Licensing Program" and NUREG 1021, " Licensed Operator Examiner Standards," Revision 7, Supplement .1.1 Examination Outline Insoection Scooe The Tacility licensee submitted the initial examination outline on February 18,199 The chief examiner reviewed the submittal against the requirements of NUREG-1021 and NUREG/BR-0122, " Examiner's Handbook for Developing Operator ,

Licensing Written Examinations," Revision I Observations and Findinas The staff determined that the initial examination outline satisfied all requirements and the chief examiner advised the licensee to proceed with examination development. The licensee authors of the outlino had communicated informally with the chief examiner concerning the contents of the outline on several occasions prior to the formal submitta Conclusions The licensee submitted an high quality examination outline on February 18,199 .1.2 Examination Packaae Inspection Scooe The facility licensee submitted the completed examination package on March 12, 1997. The chief examiner reviewed the submittal against the requirements of NUREG-1021, * Licensed Operator Examiner Standards" Revision 7, Supplement 1, and NUREG/BR-0122, " Examiner's Handbook for Developing Operator Licensing Written Examinations," Revision )

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-8- Observations and Findinas The draft written examination contained 100 questions. The draft examination was considered technically valid, to discriminate at the proper level, and responsive to the knowledge and abilities sample plan submitted by the licensee on February 12, 1997. The chief examiner provided enhancement suggestions for approximately 30 percent of the examination. The suggestions generally related to clarity of wording in the stem, use of inadvertent cues, plausibility of distractors, or level of knowledge required. After extensive discussion of the chief examiner's suggestions, the licensee modified the questions as appropriate. The chief examiner concurred with the resolution of his suggestions and the final product. The licensee performed a post-examination analysis and recommended that one question be deleted based on no correct answer to the question. The chief examiner concurred with the analysi The licensee submitted five dynamic scenarios, including one backup scenario which was not used during the examination. The chief examiner reviewed the scenarios onsite and made enhancement recommendations to the scenarios. For Scenario 3, the chief examiner requested inclusion of a two stuck control rod event, i

in which one rod stuck fully withdrawn and the other stuck approximately 30 percent withdrawn. The simulator operator noted that this malfunction was not normally performed, but that it could be modeled adequately. This was determined to be incorrect after administratio To support the systems walkthrough portion of the operating test, the facility licensee provided job performance measures developed to evaluate selected -!

operator tasks that contained well written task elements, performance standards, i and comprehensive evaluator cues. Five job performance measure tasks with two j followup questions each were submitted. The as submitted job performance '

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measures were adequate, with definitive critical tasks appropriately identified for ;

each job performance measur l The chief examiner modified two of the tasks to enhance the validity of the job performance measures. The first job performance measure as submitted was a

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reactor coolant pump start, with high running motor current, which required an i

immediate manual reactor coolant pump trip. The examiner noted that this was the l only alternate path reactor coolant pump start job performance measure in the facility job performance measure bank, which greatly increased the likelihood of an applicant expecting to see that failure. The chief examiner modified the job performance measure to be a normal reactor coolant pump start, with a spurious high vibration alarm that required local verification, but did not require a reactor

{ coolant pump trip. The examiner also modified a normal containment spray pump i start to have high motor current amps, which then required a manual containment

spray pump trip.

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. Nine of the ten proposed followup questions required replacement or modificatio Four of the questions were either directly cued in the associated task procedure or easily ant.wered by an associated reference, and the other five were not appropriate to test system operation knowledge. For example, one question asked what actions were required if the waste gas sample panel (A1110) were inoperable while transferring waste gas from the vent header to the gas decay tanks. The task was accomplished using Procedure OI-WDG-1, " Waste Gas Operating Instruction,"

Attachment 3, steps 1-7. Step 9 of the same procedure answers the question directly: "If A1110 is inoperable, then notify the following: .... " The applicant would have needed only to read the step of the procedure just used to obtain the correct answer. The question was replaced. Another question asked the Technical Specification basis for a differential temperature requirement while starting a reactor coolant pump. Technical Specification basis questions are outside the scope of the walkthrough portion of the operating test in accordance with NUREG-1021, Revision 7, Supplement 1, ES-301, D.1.k. The chief examiner required modification of the question to test knowledge of a starting interlock in the reactor coolant pump lift oil pumps. The licensee made appropriate replacements and modifications as required by the chief examine The licensee submitted five tasks with some associated questi'. ins to evaluate the administrative section of the walkthrough test. The tasks r,uomitted were acceptable, however, two were modified to enhance their validity. The first enhancement involved addition of a critical element in the ladiological control area entry task which tested a specific requirement of the radiclogical work permit. This resulted in a minor generic weakness, which is described in Section 04.2.b abov The second enhancement involved addition of completion of the emergency notification forms after making an emergency action level determination, Conclusions Overall, the written examination and operating test materials submitted were of high quality, discriminated at the appropriate license level, and were adequate for administration, with the exception of the job performance measure followup questions. Further, licensee staff were highly responsive to enhancement suggestions developed during the review process. One written examination question was deleted following examination grading and analysis. No other significant changes to examination materials were required as a result of administratio .2 Simulation Facility Performance Inspection Scope l The examiners observed simulator performance with regard to fidelity during the examination validation and administratio i

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4 f b. Observations and Findinas

Observed simulator performance problems did nc. affect examination administration.

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! One simulator modeling limitation was observed by the chief examiner durir.g I examination validation, and is listed in Attachment 2. This limitation had been i previausly identified by the licensee, and did not adversely affect examination

validity or administration.

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l .c. Conclusions

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{ The simulator supported the examinations well.

I V. Manaaement Meetinas

j X1 Exit Meeting Summary

i The examiners presented the inspection results to members of the licensee

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management at the conclusion of the inspection on April 18,19F' The licensee j acknowledged the findings presented.

j The licensee did not identify as proprietary any information or materials examined

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l l ATTACHMENT 1

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SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION l

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j PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

Licensee C. Brunnert, Manager - Quality Assurance

R. Conner, Manager - Training 1- . J. Chase, Plant Manager l D. Darrow, Operations Training i D. Dryden, Station Licensing l' G. Guliani, Supervisor, Operations Training i J. Koske, Operations Training i E. Matzke, Station Licensing d B. Shubert, Supervisor, Chemistry Services i J. Tills, Manager, Nuclear Licensing i

NRQ W. Walker, Senior Resident inspector P. Ambros, Brazilian Resident inspector J. Pellet, Chief, Operations Branch l

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ATTACHMENT 2 SIMULATION FACILITY REPORT Facility Licensee: Omaha Public Power District Facility Docket: 50-285 Operating Examinations Administered at: Fort Calhoun Station i l

l Operating Examinations Administered on: April 14-18,1997 These observations do not constitute audit or inspection findings and are not, without further verification and review, indicative of noncompliance with 10 CFR 55.45(b). These observations do not affe::t NRC certification or approval of the simulation facility, other than to provide information which may be used in future evaluations. No licensee action is ,

I required in response to these observation No simulator performance problems affected examination administratio l The following simulator deficiency was noted during examination validation and did not adversely impact the examination:

• The simulator was unable to properly model a partially stuck rod on a reactor trip.

l The full core mimic showed a red rod bottom light rather than a white rod not on

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bottom light, and the secondary rod position indicating system also indicated a rod on the bottom. The primary rod synchroscopes did indicate a rod partially withdrawn, and the plant computer also indicated a rod partially withdrawn.

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