IR 05000285/1997008

Insp Rept 50-285/97-08 on 970512-16.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Records & Repts,Testing & Maint,Barriers & Dection Aids,Assessment Aids,Alarm Stations,Communications, Security Sys Power Supply & Security

ML20140D079
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Calhoun
Issue date:	06/05/1997
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20140D050	List: IR 05000285/1997008 ML20140D046 ML20140D061
References
50-285-97-08, 50-285-97-8, NUDOCS 9706100226
Download: ML20140D079 (18)

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ENCLOSURE 2 l

u.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  ;

REGION IV -  ;

l Docket No.: 50-285 l License No.: DPR-40

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Report No.: 50-285/97-08 )

Licensee: Omaha Public Power District Facility: Fort Calhoun Station Location: Fort Calhoun Station FC-2-4 Ad P.O. Box 399, Hwy. 75 - North of Fort Calhoun Fort Calhoun, Nebraska Dates: May 12-16,1997

' Inspector: D. Schaefer, Security Specialist, Plant Support Branch ,

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Approved By: Blaine Murray, Chief, Plant Support Branch Division of Reactor Safety ATTACHMENT: Supplemental Information I

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY a

Fort Calhoun Station NRC Inspection Report 50 285/97-08 This was an announced inspection of the licensee's physical security program. The areas  ;

inspected included records and reports, testing and maintenance, vital area barriers and detection aids, assessment aids, alarm stations, communications, security system power ,

supply, security program plans and procedures, compensatory measures, access control of personnel packages and vehicles, personnel training and qualification, management  !

support, and security program audi f

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Plant Sucoort

• A very good records and reports program was in place. The security staff was )

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correctly reporting security events (Section S1.1).

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• An excellerit testing and maintenance program was in place. Timely repair of security equipment resulted in a low number of compensatory posting hours for security officers (Section G2.1).

• Effective vital area barriers and detection system were in place that would provide adequate delay and detection to individuals attempting unauthorized entr Additionally, the vital area barriers and detection system effectively limited access to only authorized personnel (Section S2.2).

• Assessment aids provided excellent assessment of the perimeter detection zone !

Instrumentation and control technicians provided excellent service support and routinely repaired problems in a timely manner (Section S2.3).

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• The alarm stations were redundant and well protected. The operators were alert  !

and well trained. A non-cited violation was identified involving the manning of the

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central alarm station (Section S2.4).

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• An excellent security radio communication system was maintained. An adequate number of portable radios were available for members of the security organization ,

(Section S2.5). ,

• The sec.urity backup power supply system performed extremely well(Section S2.6).

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• Changes to security programs and plans were reported within the required time frame (Section S3.1).

• The compensatory measures program was effectively implemented. Security )

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personnel were well trained on the program requirements (Section S4.1).

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• A very good prsgram for searching personnel packages and vehicles was j maintained (Section S4.2). 1 I

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• An excellent security training program had been implemented and was determined ;

to be a strength in the overall security program. Medical examinations for security i officers were thorough and well documented (Section S5.1 f

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• Senior management support for the security organization was good. The security j l

program was implemented by a well trained and highly qualified staff. The mvale ;

of the security officers was very good (Section S6.1). j

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• Security program audits and surveillance reports were excellent. A violation was l identified involving nonsubmittal of a legible fingerprint card to the FB l

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i Report Details  !

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S1 ' Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities j

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S Records and Reports (81700-02.01)  :

i Inspection Scope ,

The inspector reviewed safeguards event logs and security incident reports to )

determine compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 73.21(b) and (c), l 10 CFR 26.73, and the physical security pla 'i i Observations and Findinas j

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The inspector reviewed the security event logs from January 1996 through March 1997. The records were available for review and maintained for the time required j by regulations. . The inspector determined that the licensee conformed to the l

regulatory requirements regarding the reporting of security events. The logs and

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incident reports were organized in numerical sequence and easy to audit. The licensee's records included trending and analysis of problems with security force errors, lost / unattended badges, unsecured doors, access control, microwaves, closed-circuit television, computer, search equipment, and security doors. Trending j was very good, l

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A very good records and reports program was in place. The security staff was {

correctly reporting security event S2 . Status of Security Facilities and Equipment j

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S2.1 Testina and f,!aintenance (81700-02.07)

Intoection Scope j The inspector reviewed the testing and maintenance program to determine

. compliance with the requirements of the security pla Observations and Findinas The inspector determined through interviews with security officers and supervisors l and a review of records that repairs to security equipment were completed in a timely manner. The timely response to repair detection sids, access control equipment, and vital area door locks resulted in a low number of compensatory

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-4- l The inspector determined through interviews and a review of records that proper l tests were conducted on the following: security computer, closed-circuit television I cameras, on and off site communications, metal and explosive detectors, x-ray {

machines, perimeter microwave zones, protected and vital area barriers and portals, l and the security dedicated power supply system. The testing and maintenance i program was a program strength, f l Conclusions  !

f An excellent testing and maintenance prograrn was conducted and documente Timely repair of security equipment resulted in a low number of compensatory posting S2.2 Vital Area Barriers and Detection Aids (81700-02.05) Inspection Scone The inspector observed the licensee's vital area barriers and detection aids to determine compliance with the requirements of the physical security pla Observations and Findinas The inspector determined through observation that the vital areas were appropriately locked and alarmed and that the vital area barriers were adequate to ensure delay of a potential adversary, and to ensure that unescorted access was limited to authorized personnel. The alarm system consisted of balanced magnetic switches at the entry points to the vital areas. The alarms annunciated in continuously manned alarm stations. The vital area door locking mechanisms and alarms were properly tested. Emergency exits from vital areas were locked and alarme Conclusions Effective vital area barriers and detection system wes in place that would provide delay and detection to individuals attempting unauthorized entry. Additionally, the vital area barriers and detection system effectively limited access to only authorized personne S2.3 Assessment Aids (81700-02.06) Lnroection n Scope The inspector reviewed the assessment aids to determine compliance with the physical security plan. The areas inspected included the closed-circuit television rnonitors located in the alarm station w we B+ed.--=i+

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b.- Observations and Findinas- t i

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The inspector observed the assessment aids during the hours of daylight from .

May 13-14,1997, and determined that the licensee had an excellent assessment  :

aids system. The fixed and pan-tilt zoom closed-circuit television cameras were f

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placed to ensure effective coverage. Camera resolution was excellen !

l Additionally, the inspector determined through interviews and a review of records i that instrumentation and controls technicians provided excellent service suppor l Operational problems with assessment equipment were corrected in a timely {

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I ' Conclusions

. Assessment aids provided excellent assessment of the perimeter detection zones - l and were determined to be a strength in the overall security progra :

Instrumentation and controls technicians provided excellent service support and i routinely repaired problems with closed-circuit television cameras in a timel l manne l i

S2.4 Alarm Stations (81700-02_,_061 0 i l Inspection Scope l

The alarm stations were inspected to determine compliance with the requirements - l

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of the security plan. The areas inspecte'd included the requirements and capabilities of the alarm station l

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The inspector confirmed the redundancy and diversity of the alarm stations. Action  !

by one alarm station operator could not reduce the effectiveness of the security  !

systems without the knowledge of the other alarm station operators. The central alarm station and secondary alarm station were bullet resistant. The inspector i Equestioned the station operators and determined that they we'e r highly trained and - l knowledgeable of their duties. A noncited violation concerning alarm station  ;

staffing was identifie !

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• Staffina of the Central Alarm Station j s

Licensee Security incident Report L96137, de.ted July 23,1996, and the  !

licensee's security everit log, Event 96-137 identified a situation in which the ' {

i central alann station ope.rator abandoned his alarm station post for j

approximatel.y two minute .

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6-License Condition 2.C of the licensee's facility operating license requires, in I part, that the licensee maintain in effect and fully implement all provisions of the commission-approved physical security plan, including amendments and changes made pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR 50.54(p).

Section 8.4.1 of the licensee's physical security plan states, in part, "The CAS (Central Alarm Station) is manned 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day by a Nuclear Office Page 3-6 (Definitions), item 22, defines Nuclear Security Officer, in part, as

"any individual trained, equipped and qualified to perform a specific Security task."

The inspector reviewed the licensee's incident report which identified that on July 23,1996, the central alarm station operator had requested a relief break; however, due to a temporary shortage of on-duty security officers (caused by bad weather and inoperable security equipment) a relief break officer was not available. At approximately 1259 hours0.0146 days <br />0.35 hours <br />0.00208 weeks <br />4.790495e-4 months <br />, July 22,1996, the assigned contral alarm station operator left the central alarm stat' ion to use the nearby bathroom; he returned approximately two minutes later. The

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licensee stated that during this time, an officer, trained and qualified to perform alarm station duties, was not available in the central alarm statio The inspector verified through interviews that the licensee's corrective and

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disciplinary actions were appropriate. Since July 22,1996, this type of l &,ent has not recurre The licensee's failure to maintain a trained and qualified nuclear security officer in the central alarm station for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> on July 22,1996, is a violation cf Section 8.4.1 of the physical security plan. The violation was licensee identified, nonrepetitive, and corrected within a reasonable period of time. Accordingly, the violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (50-285/MO8-01), Conclusions The alarm stations were redundant and well protected. The operators were alert and well trained. A noncited violation was identified involving the manning of the central alarm statio S2.5 Communications (81700-02.ON Inspection Scope The communication capabilities were inspected to determine compliance with the requirements of the physical security plan. The areas inspected included the operability of radio and telephone systems and the capability to effectively communicate with the local law enforcement agencies through both of the system i

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I-7-I Observations and Findinas The inspector confirmed that the licensee had radio and telephone systems capable of meeting all communication requirements of the security organization. The licensee maintained an adequate number of portable radios for use by members of the security organization. The licensee also had a maintenance program to insure that the batteries for the portable radios did not maintain a " memory" but remained at maximum operating power. Conclusions An excellent security radio communication system was maintained. An adequate l number of portable radios was available for members of the security organization.

S2.6 Security System Power Sunniv (71750-02.05) Insocction Scone

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The security system power supply was inspected to determine compliance with the j requirements of the physical security pla > Observations and Findinas The inspector obcerved a licensee initiated test of the security dedicated backup power supply system. Upon simulating a loss of off site power, the battery system immediately took over supplying the security systems with power until the security ,

diesel generator automatically started and assumed the load. The diesel startup !

was almost instantaneous. The test required the system to remain on the diesel for l approximately one hour. This test of the system was conducted every week as a l part of the preventive maintenance and testing program. The system performed as required under the alternate power source. There was an automatic indication to l the alarm station operators that there was a transfer to the backup power syste There were no spurious alarm Conclusions i A test of the security backup power supply system indicated that the system performed extremely wel S3 Security and Safeguards Procedures and Documentation S3.1 Security Proarem Plans and Procedures (81700-02.03) Inspection Scope The physical security plan and the implementing procedures were inspected to determine compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(p) and the physical security pla .

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4 Observations and Findinas i The inspector reviewed plan change submissions in order to determine if the i changes .were submitted within the required time frame and that any changes i . submitted did not reduce the effectiveness of the plan. The inspector reviewed implementing procedures for adequacy, ensured that the licensee maintained an

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effective management system for the development and administration of D procedures, and that changes to the procedures did not reduce the effectiveness of the licensee's security program.

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Changes to security programs and plans were reported within the required time  :

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i I S4 Security and Safeguards Staff Knowledge and Performance

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' S4.1 Compensatory Measu es (81700-02.07)

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L areas inspected included deployment of compensatory measures and the l effectiveness of those measure '

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' Observations and Findinas  ;

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The inspector confirmed through a review of Security Procedure SCP-04, l

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" Compensatory Measures," that the licensee deployed compensatory measures in a

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manner consistent with the requirements in the security plan. The inspector i determined through interviews that the security personnel available for assignment to compensatory security posts were properly trained for those dutie ,

> Conclusions I The compensatory measures prograrn was effectively implemented. The security -

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procedure for compensatory measures met the requirements in the security plan.

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Security personnel were well trained on the program requirements.

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S Access Contr_98 of Personnel and Vehicles (81700-02.05)

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I Inspection Scope

' The access control program for personnel packages and vehicles was inspected to

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i b. ' Observations and Findinas I The inspector determined through observations at the primary access point, alternate access point, and the vehicle sallyport, that the licensee properly controlled personnel access to the protected area. The protected area access  :

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control equipmerit was inspected and found to be functional and well maintaine .The inspector observed the x-ray machine search of hand-carried packages at the primary access point. The operators were efficient and well traine l r

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A very good program for searching personnel packages and vehicles was; j maintaine :

S5' Security and Safeguards Staff Training and Qualification S5.1. Personnel Trainina and Qualification (81700-02.08) i Inspection Scope  ;

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The inspector reviewed the licensee's security training and qualification program to i

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determine adequacy and compliance with the requirements of the training and l

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qualification' plan and the contingency pla ;

l' Observations and Findinas

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The security organization conducted alt required training in accordance with its l approved security, training, and contingency plans. The inspector confirmed, by a - ,

. review of the composite security training records, that the required training was conducted every 12 month ;

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The inspector observed security officers during the performance of their duties. All l security officers displayed excellent conduct, and knowledge of the procedural i L_

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The inspector reviewed copies of medical examination records for nine security . l officers.. The medical records were complete and indicated that the required annual l

! medical examinations were thorough and conducted in a timely manner. The results of the medical examinations were properly documented. The inspector interviewed  ;

security officers and confirmed that the medical examinations were thc, roug .

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i- An excellent security training program had been implemented and was determined l

to be a' strength in the overall security program. Medical examinations for security officers were thorough and well documente I t

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S6 Security Organization and Administration 1

S6.1 Manaaement Suncort (81700-02.01)

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The effectiveness and adequacy of management support was inspected to i determine the degree of management support for the physical security program, Observations and Findinas The inspector determined by discussions with security force personnel that the security program received good support from senicr management. The inspector i

determined that the security program was implemented by a well trained and highl ,

qualified security staff. All members of the seciuity organization had a clear  ;

i' ' understanding of their duties and responsibilities.

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Senior management support for the security organization was good. The security program was implemented by a well trained and highly qualified staff.

S7 Quality Assurance in Security and Safeguards Activities S7.1 Security Proaram Audit (81700-02.01) Inspection Scope The audits of the security program were inspected to determine compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(p) and the physical security plan, Observation and Findinas The inspector confirmed that security program audits had been conducted at least every 12 months as required. The inspector reviewed six quality assurance audits  ;

and evaluation reports. The inspetor interviewed audit personnel and confirmed  !

that they were independent of plant security management and plant security  ;

management supervision. Additionally, the inspector reviewed 138 security l surveillance reports completed from January 1,1996, to April 30,1997. The i inspector determined that the audits and surveillance reports were a program strengt l In August 23,1996, a licensee surveillance report identified, in part, that a fingerprint card for a female employee, submitted on March 5,1990, had been categorized by the FBI as an " illegible print" and was returned to the license ;

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.! b l-11- t 10 CFR 73.57(d)(1), in part, requires licensees to submit one legible fingerprint card  ;

to the FBI for each individual requiring unescorted plant acces i

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in response to this surveillance report, the Supervisor, Access Authorization and the l Manager, Security Services stated that this illegible fingerprint card was the "Best l obtainable," and noted that in 1990 the FBI had completed, with negative results, a -l name check on this employe j

During this inspection, the inspector reviewed the employee's badging file and .

confirmed that on March 3,1990, the licensee had submitted only one (illegible) l

!. fingerprint card for this employee. Even though this individual had been J continuously employed at the plant, and a second fingerprinting could have been s accomplished, the licensee had not again fingerprinted this employe l

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The licensee stated that its current fingerprint program conforms to the guidance l

contained in NRC letter to Nuclear Energy Institute, dated October 24,1994. The

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attachment to this letter was titled: Comments on NEl Draft " Access Authorization (AA) Program issues and Responses," dated March 23,1994 to NEl. Response 2 in j this attachment stated, in part, as follows:  ;

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"The fingerprint rule reovires that a "leaible" print be submitted . . . In ')

cases where lyY.2 sets of completed, leaible prints are submitted and l returned as unclassifiable, a best effort can be satisfied with a name

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check from the FBI."

l During the exit meeting on May 1_6,'1997, the Manager, Security Services acknowledged the violation and stated that as corrective measures, this employee was refingerprinted on May 14,199 .The inspector verified that proper corrective actions had oeen completed by the licensee. . The licensee's failure to submit a legible fingerprint card for an employee requiring unescorted plant access,is a violation of 10 CFR 73.57(d)(1)

(50-285/9708-02). Conclusions Security program audits and surveillance reports were excellent and determined to be a strength in the overall security program. A violation was identified involving a legible fingerprint card that had not been submitted to the FB S8- Miscellaneous Security and Safeguards issues (92904)

i S8.1 '(Closed) Inspection Followuo item 285/9607-02: Licensee Review of Deroaatory

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During a previous inspection, the inspectors reviewed background investigation files and were unable to determine if the licensee had previously considered all derogatory information in these files, prior to granting unescorted access

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l _ authorization. in sever'al instances, the licensee had documented its review ot

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derogatory information by placing a " check" or the reviewers initials adjacent to the ;

! derogatory information. In other files, no marks were placed adjacent to the l

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During this inspection, the inspector verified that the licensee was placing, as appropriate, a memorandum in each employee's background investigation file,

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summarizing its review of the employee's derogatory informatio l

S8.2 (Closed) Violation 285/9607-03: Incomplete Review of Deroaatorv information: and i

Licenseo Audit of Active Backaround Investiaation Files During a previous inspection, the inspectors determincd that the licensee had failed

[ to review and consider allinformation obtained during a background investigation.

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> ' The licensee made a favorable determination of trustworthiness and reliability and

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granted an employee final unescorted access to the protected and vital areas

- without determining if criminal history information, reported by the FBI, had been I willfully omitted by the individual from his personnel security questionnaire. The licensee's adjudication of the employee's criminal history information was incomplete. In view of opposing written information, the licensee accepted without -

' challenge, the individual's omission and denial of a criminal conviction. During the exit meeting on August 23,1996, the licensee committed to audit the security

background investigation files for allindividuals currently granted unescorted access 1 authorization.

in its February 14,1997, response to the violation, the licensee stated that the violation resulted from actions that occurred in 1993, and that during the conduct I of the background investigation, the employee may have been responsible for

< altering information on a court document that he had provided to the licensee. The licensee acknowledged that it had not independently verified the court record that s the employee had provide i j

in its response, the licensee also stated that its audit of active badging records, to I ensure that criminal history results had been properly reviewed and adjudicated, had been completed on October 21,1990. As a result of this audit, the licensee )

identified issues that were favorably resolve l Additionally, in the'above response, the licensee stated that an additional audit of

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i active files containing derogatory information was completed on January 17,199 ]i This additional audit was conducted to ensure that the background investigation files, provided in support of challenges to FBI criminal history reports, had not been j altered. The licensee stated that as a result of this audit, no additional files wt re found to have been improperly adjudicated. The licensee also stated that Secttrity Administrative Procedure SAP-30 was revised to prevent recurrence of this even l l

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During this inspection, the inspector reviewed the licensee's audit reports dated f October 21,1996, and January 17,.1997. As a result of these audits, the licensee  !

determined that all other criminal history results had been properly reviewed and {

adjudicated, _and that no other files contained documents provided in support of  ;

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challenges to FBI criminal history reports, which might have been altered.

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The inspector also verified through interviews, that the licensee's corrective actions ,

- for the violation included (access authorization) staff briefings to emphasize the

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importance of independent checks of information supplied by employees, ar a the need for a thorough review upon completion of a background investigatio Additionally, the inspector reviewed Security Administrative Procedure SAP-30,

" Background Investigations," dated January 24,1997, and verified that

- paragraph'2.2.2(D) had been changed. As changed, this paragraph requires that whenever an individual applies directly to the referenced agency to correct a  !

(court of law enforcement) record, that prior to granting unescorted access, the licensee will independently _ verify the accuracy of this informatio !

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V. Manaaement Meetinos X1 Exit Meeting Summary

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The inspector presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on May 16,1997. The licensee acknowledged

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the findings presented. The security services manager commented on the violation, as discussed in Section S7.1 abov !

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ATTACHMENT

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SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED l

' Licensee . '!

R. Andrews, Manager, Nuclear Services Division G. Bishop, Assistant Plant Manager D. Dryden, Station Licensing Engineer-J.' Gasper, Manager, Nuclear Projects l

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D. Gross, Supervisor, Security Training i

' W. Hansher, Supervisor, Station Licensing T. Herman, Lead Auditor (Security),' Ouality Assurance - l B. Kindred, Supervisor, Security Operations i D. Keiber, Supervisor, Security Support Services l

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j M. Roberts, Supervisor, Access Authorization Programs

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H. Sefick', Manager, Security Services J. Tills, Manager, Nuclear Licensing 3 W. Woerner, Specialist, Security Systems  ;

i NRC i

W. Walker, Senior Resident inspector INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED

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i IP 71750 Plant Support Activities  ;

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IP 81700 Physical Security Program for Power Reactors Follow-up - Plant Support -  !

IP 92904 i

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED CLOSED AND DISCUSSED  ;

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Items Opened l t

50-285/9707-02 VIO Failure to submit a legible fing'erprint card for employee  !

requiring unescorted plant acces ;

. l 50-285/9707-01 NCV Failure to. Maintain'a Trained and Qualified Operator in the  ;

Central Alarm Statio .,!

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m-2-Items Closed 60-285/9607-02 IFl Licensee Review of Derogatory Information 50 285/9607-03 VIO incomplete Review of Derogatory Information; and Licensee Audit of Active Background Investigation file /9707-01 NCV Failure to Maintain a Trained and Qualifice Operator in the Central Alarm Statio )

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED l

Security event logs from January 1,1996, through March 31,1997, and 30 (selected) i security incident report Fort Calhoun Station Plant Procedures:

SAP-30, Background Investigations, Revision 7 l SCP-04, Compensatory Measures, Revision 14 (partial) l SECOP-03A, CAS/SAS Operating Procedure, Revision 6 (partial)

Surveillance Reports completed from January 1,1996, to April 30,1997. These 138 reports included internal review by the Security Department in the following areas:

Badging Records: Access Lane / Equipment Operator, Alarm Station Operations, Cargo Search Area Operations, Entrance / Exit Window Officer, Security Tours, Sallyport Operations, Security System Testing, Corrective Lenses, Alternate Access Point, Safeguards Information Container Check, Key Control, Task Performance Appraisals, Training Records, Security Patrols, introduction of Test Weapon, Vehicle Escort, implementing Procedures, Visitor Forms, Employee Terminations, Forms Management, and Shift Activity Log Security Services Self Assessment Report, dated April 14,1997 with Addendum dated May 7,1997 A_udit/ Surveillance Reports:

Quality Assurance Audit Report 70, Fitness for Duty, dated February 16,1996 Quality Assurance Surveillance Report S1-96-1, Security Operations, dated April 30,1996 Emergent Quality Assurance Surveillance Report S-96-01, Range Activities, dated July 1, 1996 Quality Assurance Report 6, Site Security Plan and Contingency Plan, dated August 7, 1996

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Emergent Quality Assurance Surveillance Report S-96-2, Fitness for Duty, dated October 10,1996  :

Quality Assurance Audit Report 70, Fitness for Duty, dated February 11,1997 1996/1997 security department performance indicators

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Composite list of completed security training (classes) for nine security officers :

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Composite list of dates of medical examination i

Medical records for nine members of the security organization i

Composite list of security rnodification work orders from January 1,1996, through May 7, 1997 i

Central alarm station 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> alarm (computer) print out for May 6,1997 i

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Omaha Public Power District -3-E-Mail report to T. Boyce (THB)

E-Mail report to NRR Event Tracking System (IPAS)

E-Mail report to Document Control Desk (DOCDESK)

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bec to DCD (IE04)

bec distrib. by RIV:

Regional Administrator Resident inspector DRP Director Branch Chief (DRP/B)

Project Engineer (DRP/B)

Branch Chief, DRS/PSB

MIS System

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RIV Docket File Leah Tremper (OC/LFDCB, MS: TWFC 9E10)

Elaine Koup (NRR/DRPM/SGB, MS: 011-E22)

DRS/PSB Security Filo (Goines)

DRS Al 97-G-00l,lg

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DOCUMENT NAME: R: FC\FC708RP.DWS I; To receive copy of docurrent Indicate in box: "c" = copy withoutfenciosures/ .- coph "N" = No copy h enclosures

SS:PSB lE C:PSB D:DRP

AO g/ D:DRS 3/ i DWSchaefer * BMMurray * TPGwynn GS(r3tliM ATHoWi!U j 05/22/97 05/27/97 05/20/97 097997 06[e;/9?"

• Previously concurred OFFIC:AL RECORD COPP

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