IR 05000321/1997300
| ML20137T758 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 04/04/1997 |
| From: | Payne D, Peebles T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20137T695 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-321-97-30, 50-321-97-300, 50-366-97-30, 50-366-97-300, NUDOCS 9704160164 | |
| Download: ML20137T758 (67) | |
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je4 UNITED STATES -
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' NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION -
- O~ REGloN ll I j #. o 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2900
! 5 j ATLANTA, GEORGIA 303234100
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ,
REGION ll >
Docket Nos.: 50-321, 50-366 l
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r Report Nos.: 50-321/97-300, 50-366/97-300 .
Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company ;
Facility: Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2 I I
Location: 11030 Hatch Parkway Road -
Baxley, GA i
Dates: March 14 through March 20,1997
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Examiners: l ~ r /7m
<D[Cherrelii Payne, Chief Lice e Examiner Jonathan H. Bartley, Liedhse Examiner James H. Moorman, Ill, License Examiner l l
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Approved by: Thomas A. Peebles, Chief, l Operator Licensing and Human Performance Branch Division of Reactor Safety
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9704160164 970404 PDR
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2 NRC Examination Report Nos. 50-321/97-300, 50-366/97-300 During the period March 14-20, 1997, NRC examiners conducted an announced operator licensing initial examination in accordance with the guidance of Examiner Standards, NUREG-1021, Revision 7, Supplement 1, and as modified by the pilot program guidance of NRC Generic Letter 95-06, " Changes in the Operator Licensing Program". This examination implemented the operator licensing requirements of 10 CFR 555.41, $55.43, and $55.4 Operations
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Control room activities were observed during the examination validation week and examination administration week. The operators were found to be attentive and professional in their duties (Section 01.1).
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The examiners identified a positive finding in the prompt response of the licensee's Fix-It-Now (FIN) Program to a problem identified in the Reactor Building during the conduct of examinations (Section 01.2).
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Three Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) candidates received written examinations and operating tests. The licensee administered the written examination on March 14, and the NRC administered the operating tests March 18-19,1997 (Section 05.1).
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The examiners identified a positive finding with the licensee's incorporation of graphs, j charts and tables into the body of the written examination (Section 05.2).
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All of the candidates passed the examination. Two candidates were graded as a marginal pass on the written examination and all candidates were graded as a marginal pass on the administrative topics portion of the operating test (Section 05.3).
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Candidate Pass / Fail SRO RO Total Percent Pass 3 0 3 100 %
Fail 0 0 0 0%
Enclosure 1
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The examiners identified a generic performance weakness in the area of evaluating !
plant and equipment conditions for placing the Mode Switch to Run (Section 05.3).
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The examiners identified the use of a stand-in Shift Technical Advisor (STA) during I l the simulator scenarios as an impairment to clear and accurate candidate evaluation ;
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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Report Details Summary of Plant Status
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During the period of the examinations the Unit 1 was at 100 percent power and Unit 2 was shutdown for refuelin l. Operations !
. l 01 Conduct of Operations 01.1 Control Room Observation )
During validation and administration of the examination, the examiners observed the conduct of operations by currently licensed operators in the control room. The Reactor ;
Operators (ROs) were attentive to the evolutions in progress. The Senior Reactor Operators (SROs) limited personnel access for official business only, which contributed
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to a quiet, professional atmospher .2 Fix-h-Now (FIN) Proaram During conduct of the plant walkthrough portion of the operating test, one candidate ;
identified that the airlock between the Unit 1 and 2 Reactor Buildings was not i functioning properly (a door interlock prevents two doors from being open i simultaneously). The candidate telephoned the problem to pler' operators and then continued with his examination task. About 15 minutes later, ' :a examiner and candidate passed by the airlock again and noted that members of the FIN team had already responded to and corrected the problem. The examiners considered the licensee's prompt response to the above problem as a positive finding regarding the FIN progra Operator Training and Qualifications .
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O5.1 General Comments i
NRC examiners conducted regular, announced operator licensing initial examinations during the period March 14-20, 1997. NRC examiners administered examinations developed by two members of the Hatch training staff, under the requirements of an NRC security agreement, in accordance with the guidelines of the Examiner Standards (ES), NUREG-1021, Revision 7 Supplement 1 as modified by the pilot program guidance of NRC Generic Letter 95-06, " Changes in the Operator Licensing Program".
Three SRO instant license applicants received written examinations and operating test .2 Pre-Examination Activities Tnis examination represented the licensee's first attempt at developing written examinations and operating tests for the operator licensing process. In general, the examiners found that the as-submitted examination was good. The majority of Enclosure 1
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, 2 comments on the draft written exam concerned format and style changes. Of the 100 questions developed, the examiners found five to have either 1) incorrect information in the stem to support the intended correct answer or 2) had more than one correct answer. Additionally, tan other questions were found to be either 1) too easy or 2) the fourth distractor was not plausible enough to be considered a possible correct answer ,
i by the candidates. Given the general high quality of all the written questions, the
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examiners attributed the above weaknesses as part of the learning curve for
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developing NRC-style examinations. Also, the examiners positively noted that the i licensee's incorporation of graphs, charts, and tables into the body of their respective
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questions enhanced the quality of the test.
. The examiners considered the operating tests to be adequate. Originally, two Job
, Performance Measure (JPM) sets were developed by the licensee's exam team in
- anticipation of a larger number of candidates taking the tests. Each set met the
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guide!ines of the ES, but were not found to be particularly challenging. When the number of candidates dropped to three, an enhanced JPM set was developed from the
? two as-submitted JPM sets. Similarly, five simulator scenarios were developed
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originally but only three were actually validated and used (with one other backup
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scencrio) during the examination. These scenarios met the guidelines of the ES, but did not possess the flexibility of additional equipment and instrument malfunctions to
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cover contingencies for unanticipated candidate actions. These malfunctions were added to the scenarios and validated during the on-site exam review week March 3-4, 1997. Also, the examiners found that most of the equipment and instrument malfunctions were sequenced in the scenario after the major transient occurre Consequently, it would have been difficult for the examiners to provide a fair evaluation of the candidates' skills and abilities for these manipulations and responses. For future examination development, the licensee should ensure the ES minimum equipment and instrument malfunctions are planned to occur prior to the major transient. Other malfunctions may also be implemented after the major transient to enhance or direct the course of the scenario to the desired end poin .3 Examination Results and Related Findinas. Observations. and Conclusions All three SRO candidates passed the examination; however, two candidates were graded as a marginal pass on the written examination and all candidates were graded as a marginal pass on the administrative topics portion of the operating examinatio Detailed candidate performance comments have been transmitted under separate cover for management review and to allow appropriate candidate remediatio !
During NRC review of the written examination, question #13 was modified to test the candidates' knowledge of electrical bus 2R24-S012 loads vice bus 2R24-S011 loads l as originally submitted. While conducting a post-examination analysis for generic l training or knowledge deficiencies, the licensee exam developers identified that the i above change had been made to the master examination and answer key but had not been changed on the candidates' version of the test. The candidates were thus tested i on question #13 as it was originally submitted to the NRC. This question was valid either way it was written and therefore did not need to be deleted from the tes However, the master examination and answer key had to be corrected to reflect ihe as-given question and associated correct answer. This correction was recommended i Enclosure 1
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by the licensee and concurred with by the NRC Chief Examiner. The examiners noted that this question did not impact the pass / fait decision on any of the candidate All three candidates were given administrative JPM 25025, " Shift the Mode Switch From Startup/ Hot Standby to Run" to perform on the simulator. Each was given the initial condition of a plant startup in progress with the operators at Step 7.4.1 of 34GO-OPS-001-2S, " Plant Startup" and an opportunity to familiarize themselves with plant conditions on the simulator (i.e., walkdown the control panels). As part of the
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simulator setup, one Plant Service Water (PSW) pump and one Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pump were danger tagged out of service. Since these pumps were pieces of Technical Specification (TS) equipment, the candidates were expected to recognize this fact and apply the applicable Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) in their determination of whether the Mode Switch could be placed in Run. Technical Specifications allow a mode change with one PSW pump out of service; however. TS do not allow a mode change with one RHR pump out of service. All candidates properly followed the startup procedure but none of the candidates properly performed
this task by determining that the Mode Switch should no.t be placed in Run (due to the RHR pump being out of service). The examiners noted that the procedural steps for placing the Mode Switch to Run (steps 7.4.1 through 7.4.12) did not specifically address the need for compliance with TS requirements as a condition for that actio This area was considered a generic candidate performance weaknes Based on the candidates' simulator training program, a qualified instructor was permitted to stand-in as the Shift Technical Advisor (STA) during the simulator evaluations. Despite pre-exam coaching by the Chief Examiner, the substitute STA inappropriately assisted the candidates on several occasions which biased and complicated the evaluation process. Consequently, future use of an STA during NRC exams will not be permitted without prior approval by the Region 11 Operator Licensing Branch Chief. This approval should be obtained prior to commencing candidate simulator training in order to avoid confusion and negative trainin V. Manaaement Meetinas X1. Exit Meeting Summary At the conclusion of the site visit, the examiners met with representatives of the plant staff listed on the following page to discuss the results of the examinations. The licensee's management representatives dissented with NRC's intention to prohibit use of a stand-in STA during future NRC examinatin simulator scenarios. They indicated that the logical sequence of operator licensing training would be disrupted and that possible negative training could occur. Hatch management representatives indicated that other options would be explored that addressed the NRC's concerns and would communicate these to Region ll operator licensing management before initiating sirnulator training for licensing additional operator The Chief Examiner stated that the licensee's proposals would be reviewed when submitted and evaluated objectively to determined if the concerns discussed in this report were adequately addresse Enclosure 1
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The examiners asked the licensee whether any materials examined should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identifie PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee
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J. A. Betsill, Assistant General Manager Plant Operations S. M. Crosby, Operations Training Supervisor T. L. Elton, PRB Support Coordinator i D. R. Madison, Operation., ivianager C. T. Moore, Assistant General Manager Plant Support R. S. Grantham, Acting Training and Emergency Preparedness Manager ,
P. H. Wells, General Manager !
NRC B. L. Holbrook, Senior Res, ,nt inspector E. F. Christnot, Resident inspector ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened None Closed NONE Discussed NONE LIST OF ACRONYMS USED CFR Code of Federal Regulations ES Examiner Standards (NUREG-1021)
FIN Fix-It-Now JPM Job Performance Measure LCO Limiting Condition for Operation NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission PSW Plant Service Water RHR Residual Heat Removal RO Reactor Operator SRO Senior Reactor Operator STA Shift Technical Advisor TS Technical Specifications Enclosure 1
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SIMULATION FACILITY REPORT Facility Licensee: E. l. Hatch Nuclear Plant
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Facility Docket Nos.: 50-321 and 50-366 i Operating Tests Administered on: March 18 & 19,1997 This form is to be used only to report observations. These observations do not constitute audit or inspection findings and are not, without further verification and review, indicative of
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noncompliance with 10 CFR 55.45(b). These observations do not affect NRC certification or l approval of the simulation faci!ity other than to provide information that may be used in future evaluations. No licensee action is required in response to these observations.
l While conducting the imulator portion of the operating tests, the following items were -
j observed (if none, so state):
ITEM DESCRIPTION
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Enclosure 2
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WRITTEN EXAMINATION (S) AND ANSWER KEY (S) (SRO/RO)
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EXAAf TITLE:
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Initial License Candidate NRC Exam EXAAf NUAIBER: 1 CLASS TITLE: SRO Initial License (Instant)
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CLASS NUAfBER: SR 95-01 AUTHOR: Beck STUDENTNAA1E: AfASTER AND KEY
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EXAAf DATE: 3114/97 '
START: Ab STOP: U
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EXAAiSCORE: Jb PTS O' '
'io POINT VALUE: 100 points
- APPROVED: l 4lL DATE: 3ll)17 GRADED: IIIA DA TE: d i'A
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- REVIEWED: tllA DA TE: ^'/A All work done on this examination is my own. I have neither given nor received aid !
during this examinatio j CANDIDATE: il DA TE 'Jb'
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Policies and Guidelinesfor Taking NRC Written Examinations i Cheating on the examination will result in a denial of your application and could result in more f severe penaltie :
, After you comp!cte the examination, sign the statement on the cover sheet indicating that the :
work is your own and you have not received or given any assistance in completing the examinatio .
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l To pass the examination, you must achieve a grade of 80 percent or greate . The point value for each question is 1.0 poin !
' There is a time limit of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> for completing the examinatio l Use only black ink or dark pencil to ensure legible copies.
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l Ensure that your name is printed in the blank provided on the examination cover sheet and the l answer shee !
! Mark your answers on the answer sheet provided and do not leave any question blan . If the intent of the question is unclear, ask questions of the ' sminer onl i 1 Restroom trips are permitted, but only one applicant at a time will be allowed to leave. Avoid all contact with anyone outside the examination room to eliminate even the appearance or possibility ;
of cheatin ~
1 When you complete the examination, assemble a package including the examination questions, j examination aids, and answer sheets and give it to the examiner or proctor. Remember to sign the statement on the examination cover shee .
1 After you have turned in you examination, leave the examination area as defined by the f examiner.
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, Unit Two is operating at 100% RTP with the "A" EHC Pressure Regulator in service, when the i
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- 4 Turbine Control Valve goes closed. SELECT the expected plant responi::
i the reactor scrams due to a turbine trip signal from the TCV closure ; the turbine bypass valves open to control pressure the EHC pressure regulator shifts to "B" controlling l the reactor scrams on high reactor pressur ;
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ANS: b I a is incorrect because you only get a half sciam l c is incorrect because the bypass valves control pressure !
d is incorrect because the bypass valve open to control pressure !
NEW l KA# 241000 A2.04 l OBJ# 019.003.a.04 l REF LT-LP-01901 l COGNITIVELVL 2 l I Unit One is performing a normal shutdown per 34GO-OPS-013-IS. The followmg parameters !
and values were recorded at the times listed:
l 0600 0700 ?
Reactor Pressure 485 psig 265 psig '
Recirc Loop A/B temp 435 F 407 F ,
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Rx Vessel metal temp 463 F 437 F Bottom Head drain temp 402 F 338 F CALCULATE the RPV cooldown rate:
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ANS: b (convert press to psia, use steam tables to find temp,467 F - 411 F = 56 F in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />)
a incorrect because it uses recirc loop temps c incorrect because it didn't convert to press to psi i d incorrect because it uses bottom head drain tem ,
- NEW: modifiedfrom a question on the Brunswick 1995 exa l KA# 241000 A1.22 l OBl# 014.017.a.01 l REF LR-LP-20318 l COGNITIVE LVL 3 l l
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l The 2A Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) is in TEST and the operator has just closed the
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diesel output breaker to parallel the EDG to the bus, when he notices the following:
EDG Frequency 60 Hz ,
EDG Kilowatts 5Kw '
EDG Kilovars 4500 Kvar Attempting to lower the Kvars on the EDG, the operator takes the SPEED ADJUST switch to lower. SELECT the EDG response to this action: Frequency will decrease rapidly.
l Kilovars will decrease rapidly, i
- The EDG will slip a pole.
i The EDG will trip on reverse power.
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a incorrect because frequency will be locked into the grid's frequency when in parallel b .ncorrect because the speed adjust does not adjust reactive load (volt adjust does) :
. incorrect because a low generator field strength is what causes a pole to sli NEW l KA# 264000 A4.01 l ONJ# 02.8.023.a.02 lREF LT-LP-02801 l COGNITIVE LVL 3l Unit Two is at 100% RTP with the following conditions:
l Both Reactor Recire Pumps are in Master-Manual Control A fuse for the power supply to the Master Controller fails '
l The Master Controller de-energize SELECT the Reactor Recirculation System response: the controller will lock in its previous signal and maintain pump speed constant.
- both recire pumps will run back to approximately 45% speed.
L both recirc pumps will run back to approximately 20% spee speed will remain constant because both scoop tubes lock u ;
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a incorrect because this happens on a loss of signal from controller (not power loss)
c incorrect because of clamped lower limit of 45% on master controlle d incorrect because the speed control signal was not los NEW
l KA# 202002 K3.05 l OBJ# 004.001.a.02 lREF LR-LP-00401 l COGNITIVE LVL 3l
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4 HPCI has just received a valid initiation signal and the operator notices the following indications
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on the HPCI system (assume the PF light is OFF and the controller is in A UTOMA TIC):
i PUMP SUCTION PUMP DISCit TURD INLET TURB EXil i PRESS PRESS PRESS PRESS
] 2E41 R606 2E41-R601 2E41-R602 2E41-R603
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t TURB SPEED RJRBINE CONTROLLER !
j 2E41-R610 2E41-R612 I L_l@4 J l* '
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Based on the previous indications, HPCI is: injecting into the RPV with all parameters normal injecting into the RPV; however, turbine speed should be increased NOTinjecting into the RPV because the controller is failed NOTinjecting into the RPV and may be pumping out a broken lin ANS: d a incorrect because speed and discharge pressure are lower than normal b incorrect because discharge pressure is lower than reactor pressure c incorrect because the controller is maintain set flowrat NE H'
l KA# 206000 A3.01 l OBJ# 005.005.a.10 lREF LR-LP-00501 l COGNITIVE LVL 3l
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' On Unit One, a Group 1 isolation signal and an automatic reactor scram occuned. The RCIC system automatically started and is restoring RPV level. When an operator verifies RCIC performance, the following indications are noted:
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1E51-F045, Turbine Steam Supply Valve, CLOSED 1E51-F013, RCICInjection Valve, CLOSED RCIC turbine speed is 100 rpm and decreasing rapidly RCIC discharge pressure is ZERO .
RCIC Turbine Inlet pressure is 900 psi Suppression poollevelis 152" SELECT the most likely cause of these indications: An isolation signal was received, A turbine trip signal was receive A high reactor water level signal was receive A trip occurred due to suction swapping to the toru ANS: c a incorrect because the F045 doesn't close on an isolation signa b incorrect because a trip signal closes the trip & throttle valv d the suction swap is sequenced so the suction is not los NEW l KA# 217000 K4.02 l OBJ# 039.013.a.01 lREF LT-LP-03901 l COGNITIVE LVL 3l Unit Two is operating at 80% RTP with the "A" EHC Pressure Regulator in service. If the pressure input signal to the "A" pressure regulator failed UPSCALE, the following would occur:
- The "B" EHC pressure regulator light will be lit and reactor pressure will be 4 to 10 psig higher than befor The "B" EHC pressure regulator light will be lit and reactor pressure will be 4 to 10 psig lower than before.
t The main turbine bypass valves (BPVs) will open and the turbine control valves (TCVs)
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will close with reactor pressure remaining approximately the sam The main turbine BPVs and TCVs will open and actual reactor pressure will decrease until a Group 1 isolation signal is received.
l aNS: d a incorrect because it only swaps to "B"ifit fails downscale b incorrect because it only swaps to "B" if it fails downscale c incorrect because the TCVs will also open on sensed high pressur MODIFIEDfrom the LRQ Rank.
i l KA# 241000 K6.07 l OBJ# 019.010.a.01 lREF LT-LP-01901 l COGNITIVE LVL 2l I
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' The Unit Two "A" Core Spray system has started with the following plant conditions: i
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Drywell pressure 22 psig Reactor pre.ssure 395 psig ;
Based on these conditions : E21-F005A should be closed and system flow should be zero gp ; E21-F005A should be open and system flow should be zero gpm E21-F005A should be open and system flow should be approximate 1.y 500 gpm i and increasing, E21-F005A should be open and system flow should be 4250 gp {
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a incorrect because the F005A opens at ~449 psig ;
c incorrect because CS shutoff head is ~ 385 psig ,
d incorrect because CS shutoff head is - 385 psig ;
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NEW l KA# 209001 A2.08 l OBJ# 008.002.a.05 lREF LT-LP-00801 l COGNITIVE LVL 3l Unit Two is shutdown with the following conditions: l Drywell Pressure 3.1 psig All RHR pumps are RUNNING i The 2A 125 VDC Bus (2R25-S001) has deenergized after the RHR pump starte ,s If the operator placed the 2A RHR pump switch to stop, the pump would:
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' Remain running and must be tripped locall Trip and restart once the switch is release Trip and can be restarted with the control switc Trip and must be restarted using the Start / Reset pushbutto ANS: d a incorrect because the breaker receives trip signal from the B logic h incorrect because the breaker anti-pumping logic keeps it tripped c incorrect for pumps A and C but is correct for pumps B and NEW IKA# 203000 K1.07 l OBJ# 006.007.a.02 l REF LT-LP-00701 l COGNITIVE LVL 3 l
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. ' 1 A LOSP has occurred on Unit Two with the following conditions:
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All 4160 V emergency buses are de-energized No EDGs are currently running HPCI and RCIC are isolated RPV level has been steady at -145" for the past 5 minute Drywell pressure is 4.2 psi Inhibit switches are in norma The ADS System : l l has initiated and 7 ADS valves should be open l will initiate in approximately 7 minutes when the 13 minute timer times ou ] will initiate immediately when AC power is restored and a low pressure ECCS pump is i started will initiate 2 minutes after AC power is restored and a low pressure ECCS pump is ;
started ANS: c a incorrect because no low pressure ECCS pumps are running b incorrect because the high drywell pressure signal bypasses the 13 minute timer d incorrect because the 2 minute timer has expired NEW: however, similar ADS logic cuestions are in the exam ban l KA# 218000 K5.01 l OBJ# 038.004.a.02 REF LT-LP-03801 l COGNITIVE LVL 3 l 1 Unit One is operating at 100% RTP, when a spurious half scram occurs in the "A" RPS trip system with the following indications:
Illuminated Annunciators REACTOR AUTO SCRAM SYSTEM A TRIP ROD DRIFT Selected rod 22-27 has a Red drift light illuminated Its associated RPIS indication is blank The Blue scram light is illuminated No other control rods have been affecte ,
i l l The status of control rod 22-27 is caused by: a blown scram fuse in the "A" logic to rod 22-27 l a blown scram fuse in the "B" logic to rod 22-27 a failed scram relay (deenergized) in the "A" RPS logic l a failed scram relay (deenergized)in the "B" RPS logic.
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ANS: b a incorrect because you need to deenergize the "B" side to cause the rod to scram )
c incorrect because you need to deenergize the "B" side to cause the rod to scram i d incorrect because more that one rod would be affected if this occurre )
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NEW l t KA# 212000 K1.06 l OBl# 010.016.a.02 l REF LT-LP-01001 l COGNITIVE LVL 3 l )
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. 1 Unit Two is operating at 100% RTP , when the "A" RPS MG Set trips. The following conditions l
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result:
The reactor scrams l
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Inboard MSIVs are closed and outboard MSIVs are open Inboard PCIVs are closed and outboard PCIVs are open RWCU inboard isolation is closed and outboard is open i
"A, C, E" APRMs all are indicating downscal Based on the above conditions, the plant responded:
- as expected for a loss of RPS bus "A" unexpectedly, the outboard valves should have closed instead of the inboard valves unexpectedly, the RWCU inboard isolation should have remained open unexpectedly, the inboard MSIVs should have remained ope ANS: d a incorrect, no scram should occur (MSIVs remain open)
b incorrect inboard gp 2&4 valves isolate c incorrect, RWCU inboard isolation does close on loss of RPS "A". ,
NEW l KA# 212000 A2.01 l ORJ# 010.002.a.01 l REF LT-LP-01001 l COGNITIVE LVL 3 l 1 An ATWS condition exists on Unit Two, 2R24-S01 i e'- nergized, and Standby Liquid Control (SLC) is required. Under these conditions, the operator may start the- !
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l "A" SLC pump and fire both squib valves
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, "B" SLC pump and fire both squib valves "A" SLC pump and fire only one squib valve "B" SLC pump and fire only one squib valve.
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ANS: f'd. ," 5lnb? ;
a incorrect, no power to "B" pump or one squib '
b incorrect, no power to one squib d. incorrect, no power to "B" pump NEW: similar to a Brunswick 1995 exam questio I KA# 211000 K2.01 l OBJ# 011.002.a.02 l REF LT-LP-01101 l COGNITIVE LVL 2 l Nr Lf
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.k 0.n AlLxh aughJr, e V Ls bawh~ coas Ml =N* ,
pr .
. N'u a a ~ ~ % ' w d h " "
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,
a u " a n s h n w r' b % u '~ ~-
li )a sau.. ' 0 .ea:s (
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, 1 Chemistry has just sampled the Unit Two SLC storage tank and the following conditions were I
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reported to the Shift Superviso Volume Concentration Temperature 1800 10 % 50 F
!
Based on these conditions the SLC system is: Operable; however, only boron concentration should be increased s Operable; however, boron concentration and temperature should be increased Inoperable and only boron concentration should be increased Inoperable and boron concentration and temperature should be increase (164iSal. t 3%) 4.120*F)
13 120.- . - -
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i? . ] li 12 llegias A
. , , v: ; g, i 6M - { Pernussible Regmn of Continuous Operniisa .
s .
-
m . p. v - rymem yw I' + -
100 - - - - - - - - -
_
Ad% s u, da .L.- .
T i 90 - - = - - - -
Permissible Region of Cantinuous Operation h e- ,
m, g , q ,p g . . g . y g -
a so _
'e
'
- "'
i
{g _ ,
l i p - z ; 9 , /
'
-
70 - -
j'
3,.
"
E
-
~
\t ,Illll
\ llIll (2605 gal,6 9%) ' q l l
8 i 83 (3 71%,40*F)
'
6 --------
((6 9%.40*F)
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-
l (3400 gal. 5%) 30 '
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1000 200 400 600 suo 000 200 400 600 2 00 3000 3200 1400 3600 3800 Concentrat'
Gross Wlume of Soluten in Tank (gal) (Weight Percent Sodiurs Pematenste in Solution)
Sodium Penaborate Solution Volume Sodium Pensborate Solution Tersperature Versus Concentration Requirements Versus Concentration Requirements I
,
ANS: d 1 a,b incorrect, concentration low, system INOP c incorrect, concentration low This question is modified from a question in the LRQ ban ,
NEW l l KA# 211000 Gen 2.2.23 l OBJ# 300.006.a.25 l REF LR-LP-01101 l COGNITIVE LPL 3 l I
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1 A Unit I startup is in progress per 34GO-OPS-001-1S with IRMs and SRMs inserted. The reactor is at the point of adding heat and the IRMs are all on range 8. SELECT the appropriate plant response if the "A" and "B" SRM high voltage power supply failed low: j i a full reactor scram occurs a control rod block occurs ; no automatic actions occur a half reactor scram occur ANS: c a incorrect because shorting links are removed during startup I b incorrect, SRMs are bypassed when IRMs are on range 8 or above d incorrect, same reason as "a". ;
NE1Y l KA# 215004 K3.01 l OBJ# 012.003.a.10 l REF LT-LP-01201 l COGNITIVE LVL 2 l )
i 1 Unit Two is in the process of a reactor startup with all IRMs indicating 30 on range 5 j (Red scale 0-40). If the range switch for the IRM channel A is changed from position 5 to l position 4, the expected IRM response would be to: j initiate a RPS trip signal resulting in a half scram but not a rod block initiate a control rod block signal resulting in a rod block but not a scram ) initiate both a RPS half scram and control rod block trip signal change the IRM recorder indication; but, no automatic actions would occu ANS: c a incorrect; this occurs, but so does a rod block b incorrect; this occurs, but so does an RPS trip d incorrect; this occurs, but so do some auto actions
.
NE1V: similar to a previously seen questio I l
l KA# 215003 K5.03 l OBJ# 012.003.c.10 l REF LT-LP-01202 l COGNITIVE LFL 3 l
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1 Unit One is operating at approximately 12% rated power with the reactor mode switch in Start and Ilot Standby position. The following indicates the present status of LPRM inputs and
- indicated power
APRM A APRM N APRM C APRM D APRM E APRM F D Levelinputs 4 3 2 4 3 4 ,
CLsrelinputs 3 2 4 4 3 3 '
B lxvelinputs 4 3 3 4 4 2 1 A 12Velinputs 3 2 4 3 4 5 Power Indicated 12 % 11 % 14 % 11 % 14 % 10 %
SELECT the appropriate plant response to this APRM configuration: no automatic actions, the "B" APRM is administratively INO a control rod block and a half reactor scram in channel "A" will occu a control rod block and a half reactor scram in channel "B" will occu . a control rod block and a full reactor scram will occu ANS: d ;
a incorrect, a full scram will occur, "B" has an INOP trip b incorrect, a full scram occurs from "B" and "C" c incorrect, a full scram occurs from "B" and "C".
Modifiedfrom the LRQ exam ban l KA# 215005 A1.02 l OBJ# 012.003.d.01 l REF LT-LP-01203 l COGNITIVE LVL 3 l ,
1 Unit Two is operating at 45% reactor power, when the "A" Recirculation Flow Unit fails, indicating zero Dow in its respective Recirculation loop. SELECT the appropriate plant response to this event:
i The auctioneering circuit allows the "C" flow unit to provide input, A reactor scram signal is generated from the flow biased circuitry, A control rod block is generated from the flow biased circuitr A control rod block is generated by the Dow comparator circuitr ANS: d a incorrect, the auctioneering circuit allows the low signal to pass b incorrect, the flow biased setpoint is now 59% (.58W+59%)
c incorrect, the flow biased rod block is now 47%
Modifiedfrom LRQ bank questio l KA# 215005 A3.05 l OBJ# 012.003.f.01 l REF LT-LP-01203 l COGNITIVE LVL 3 l l l
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. 1 Unit Two was operating at 100% RTP with the "A" Drywell Cooling fans in run and the "B"
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drywell cooling fans in standby when a LOSP and a Reactor Scram occurred. Plant conditions l are presently as follows: ;
EDG 2A is providing power to 4160V bus 2E l EDG 2C is providing power to 4160V bus 2G !
EDG 1B is supplying power to Unit 1 and 4160V 2F is de-energized .l Reactor pressure : 900 psig i RPV level: -20 inches ,
Drywell pressure: 1.2 psig l
Drywell temperature: 165 F l The status of the drywell coolir g fans is: both the "A" and "B" I'rywell cooling fans are runnin l l the "A" Drywell cooling fans are running, "B" fans are still in standby the "B" Drywell cooling fans are running, "A" fans have no power all drywell cooling fans are tripped; but, can be overridden to allow starting.
ANS a b incorrect,"B" fans start on high d/w temp > 135 F
- c incorrect,"A"is powered from 4160V 2E (600 C) ,
l d incorrect, no auto trip signal has occurre )
NEW \
{ KA# 223001 K2.10 l OBJ# 013.034.a.03 l REF LT-LP-01304 l COGNITIVE LVL 3 l 2 Unit One is operating at 100% RTP with spent fuel being moved in the spent fuel poo Suddenly, Unit One refueling floor exhaust ventilation radiation reaches 22 mr/hr on all radiation l monitors. The appropriate ventilation response to this event is: Unit 1 SGT remains in standby and all secondary containment ventilation systems remain in their normal configuratio Unit 1 SGT starts, Unit 1 Reactor Building ventilation isolates, and Unit 1 & 2 Refuel Floor ventilation isolates, onl < Unit 1 SGT starts, Unit 1 & 2 Reactor Building ventilation isolates, and Unit 1 & 2 Refuel Floor ventilation isolates, onl Unit 1 & 2 SGT start, Unit 1 & 2 Reactor Building ventilation isolates, and Unit 1 & 2 Refuel Floor ventilation isolate ANS: d a incorrect, isolation setpoint is 20 mr/hr b incorrect, due to recent logic change both unit's SGT start and ventilation isolates j c incorrect, due to recent logic change both unit's SGT start and ventilation isolates NEW i l KA# 290001 K6.01 l OBJ# 037.011.a.10 l REF LT-LP-01303 l COGNITIVE LVL 3 l l
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2 Unit Two was operating at 35% RTP when all MSIVs closed and the reactor scrammed. The following occurred after the scram:
I RCIC and IIPCI are runnmg ;
RPV level is -5" and increasing at 10"/ mi Reactor pressure peaked at 1095 psig and is currently 855 psig and decreasing at l
20 psig/ mi Regarding SRVs and LLS: No SRVs lifted; RCIC and HPCI are controlling reactor pressur Four SRVs lifted; RCIC and HPCI are controlling reactor pressur Four SRVs lifted; RCIC, HPCI, and one LLS valve are controlling reactor pressur Eight SRVs lifted; RCIC, HPCI, and two LLS valves are controlling reactor pressur ANS: a b,c,d incorrect,4 SRVs lift at 1120 psig,therefore, no SRVs lifted to actuate LL NElV l KA# 239002 K4.01 l OBJ# 014.003.a.01 l REF LT-LP-01401 l COGNITIVE LVL 3 l 2 Unit One (1) is operating at 100% RTP with the 1 A EDG in TEST and paralleled to the IE 4160VAC bus. While testing the EDG, the main turbine trips. SELECT the electrical plant response to this even The EDG comes out of TEST and all 4160 VAC station service buses transfer to altemate supply, The EDG comes out of TEST and all 4160 VAC station service buses de-energiz The EDG remains paralleled to 4160 VAC IE and all 4160VAC station service buses de-energiz The EDG remains paralleled to 4160 VAC 1E and all 4160 VAC station service buses transfer to altemat ANS: d a incorrect, EDG comes out of test on a LOCA or LOSP signal b incorrect, EDG comes out of test on a LOCA or LOSP signal, buses transfer c incorrect, buses auto transfer (can't manually transfer when in test)
NElY l KA# 262001 A3.02 l OBl# 200.017.a.03 l REF LT-LP-02702 l COGNITIVE LVL 2 l l
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2 Unit Two was operating at 100% RTP when the normal breaker to 4160 VAC bus 2G tripped and the alternate breaker tied in re-energizing the bus. Regarding the status of Vital AC immediately after the transient, the system: has an amber status light and is energized from the Vital AC batterie has an amber status light and is energized from its alternate suppl has a white status light and is energized from its normal suppl has a white status light and is energized from the Vital AC batterie ANS: a b vital ac goes to the batteries first, then to alt on low battery volt c normal supply breaker trips on low volts on swap, white light out, amber o d white light out, amber light o NEW l KA# 262001 A3.03 l OBJ# 027.033.b.03 l REF LT-LP-02703 l COGNITIVE LVL 2 l 2 Unit Two is operating at 100% power with the RWLC system in three element control and the
"B" level detector (C32-R606B) selected. The diaphragm in the transmitter that feeds C32-R606B ruptures, equalizing pressure across the transmitter. SELECT the appropriate plant response to this event: the reactor scrams on a main turbine trip signal due to an invalid high reactor water level signal the reactor scrams on a main turbinu trip signal due to a valid high reactor water level signa the reactor scrams on a low reactor water level due to both RFPTs trippin the reactor scrams on low reactor water level due to both RFPTs running bac l ANS: d !
a incorrect, the indicator fails high; but, you need more than one for the turbine trip b incorrect, actual level will decrease c incorrect, the indicator fails high: but, you need more than one for the turbine tri NEW: however, similar questions are in the exam ban l KA# 259002 K6.05 l OBJ# 002.020.a.06 l REF LT-LP-00202 l COGNITIVE LVL 2 l l
_ _ _ _ _ . _ _ - ._ _ _.__.__ ___ _ _ _ -.- ___ ___ . _ _
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2 Unit Two is at approximately 10% RTP during a reactor startup. The operator withdraws control f
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rod 50-19 to position 48. The following indications are noted:
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Annunciators Illuminated: ROD OVERTRAVEL ROD DRIFT Rod 50-19 Four-Rod display is blan *
SELECT the required operator action: Fully insert rod 50-19 and disarm the HCU electricall Immediately insert a manual reactor scram, Insert the rod no more than three notches to attempt recoupling i Verify rod position, then enter substitute rod position data on RW ANS: c a incorrect, this action is for an inop control rod
b incorrect, this action is for a drifting out control rod d incorrect, this action is for a failed reed switch NEW l KA# 201003 A2.02 l OBl# 200.09 l REF LT-SG-50201 l COGNITIVE LVL 3 l ;
2 Unit One was operating at 100% RTP when the following conditions occurred:
IB CRD pump was initially in service ;
- A spurious reactor scram occurred l 1B EDG is supplying power to the 4160 VAC 1F bus l The main turbine tripped and the 4160 VAC station service busesfall to transfer R W L
- -20" and increasing Drywell Press: 0.7 psig and slowly increasin ,
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Based on the above conditions, SELECT the status of the CRD system. .The CRD system tripped: and can be restarted by taking the control switch to off and back to star and can be restarted once the LOCA reset pushbutton is depressed l on low suction pressure and can be restarted once condensate is restored ; on undervoltage and 1 A CRD pump must be started in order to restore CRD back to l normal.
, ANS: a l d,b,c incorrect, the pump has power and no LOCA signal exists NEW l KA# 20!001 K2.01 l OBJ# 200.045.a.01 l REF LR-LP-00101 l COGNITIVE LVL 3 l
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t 15 l
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27.- An ATWS has occurred on Unit Two and reactor power is approximately 19% RTP. The
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operator attempts to insert contiol rod 22-27 with the EMERGENCY-IN switch and the rod fails
to move. The operator then notes the following conditions:
Drive Water D/P: 240 psig I
Rx Mode Switch: Refuel ,
CRD Flow: > 100 gpm CRD Flow Control Valves: Closed CRD pump: 2A and 2B Running RWM: Normal
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Control Rod 22-27 will not move because: the RWM is enforcing an insert bloc drive water D/P is insufficient to move the control rod the CRD flow control valves are closed shutting off CRD flow to the HCU there is excessive CRD flow to the HCU accumulators ANS: a d incorrect, D/P is slightly lower than normal; but, the control rod will still move c incorrect, the closed flow control valve will pass 5 gpm (enough to move the iod)
b incorrect, doesn't matter because D/P is adequate NEW l KA# 201002 K1.05 - l OBJ# 001.010.a.12 l REF LT-LP-05401 l COGNITIVE LVL 3 l 2 A reactor startup is in progress on Unit One with power at approximately 12% RTP. An operator moves a control rod in the currently latched group to position 14. The control rod's withdraw limit is position 12 (the control rod did not double notch). Regarding the Rod Worth Minimizer (RWM): the RWM is functioning properly and should enforce a withdraw block on all control rods and an insert block on all control rods except the one mispositione the RWM is functioning properly and should display the mispositioned rod without enforcing any blocks due to being in the transition zon the RWM is malfunctioning and startup may continue once the RWM is bypassed and a second verifier is assigned to any rod movement l '
the RWM is malfunctioning and the reactor must be scrammed due to having a control rod mispositioned below the LPS ANS: c a incorrect, the RWM should not let the error be made b incorrect, the transition zone is from 20% to 30%
d incorrect, a reactor scram is required on a drifting control rod below LPSP NEW l KA# 201006 K5.10 l OBJ# 001.010.d.02 l REF LT-LP-05403 l COGNITIVE LVL 2 l
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. ' 2 Using the Main Generator Capabilities Curve, SELECT the set of conditions that fall within the
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allowable limits of the curve:
Afachine Gas Pressure Afain Generator AfW . Afain Generatoe AfVARs psig 700 MW +300 MVARs psig 400 MW +40 MVARs psig 850 MW -350 MVARs psig 500 MW 0 MVARs
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l :::::t:i l
____..___ w i ii T
++4i0 Paig- jji;ji;j j .i i iriiirr w !I}!m!!iM;, i -
r i
- O45 psi ! ?g i-
- ,
____
!i'!i hg l !
O
____ f _
%
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hl ;i
__ ;
g .-.
% . _ _-
--- 15 psig
'ti
'!! K__ - 'N t1 I~, -
__ _
- A _ __-+t Q iiiii hQil_ _h__kt4' '
$Q l
__
- ;
- :: ::::; ---~
A .a
_____
..+4 -___; . ____q ::::::: g j_ _ . .__ .g_
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p
- 3 psig - ! * ~T ~~~~~h
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[--h l O + 200 .
s h!! $
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I l '22 2=
f:
b~ I- ____ :::
> T .Ii:
.__d
< 0 -., ! :"il 0 100 , i i i 200---+- 400 : < i 600 --Z-bi 800-- t- 1000-1 ' T Megawatts- 4 [ !l
' ~
~j-- ---
I! lj !
$ l N I '
l I 9 b555b5b 4,* :: r- p::_
l J 53
i
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i
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! i
'!& ft i i
- ' +-
- _ - - - -
!
u -200 , ,
j .1, i i;i,j g j_ _ _
_,j
- ;;'
- :t .4
'-
_t ;/. ;4 ._.a .
1 .
A r
- t _:J: ,_
. __
!
4+ , : ::: / j+ :
-
p$ .,4 ::
_
r +
_
d.. ; 4. l-400 - -
-%c .
. .
-
"T ,?t ,.
i i 1 -
! !!!;. !!
!iT l & :
- ii
+ L--4
p~-iY N lM: i
f+%:N .
44 __-_d
- 600
- - !
!!T !
'
'f! !!! "4+ !
ANS: b a,c,d incorrect (plot curve). Note: interpolation is not allowed on graph, e.g. if machine gas pressure is between 45 and 60 psig then the operator will drop down to the 45 psig
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line.
Afodifiedfrom the LRG Bank.
) l KA# 245000 Gen 2.1.25 l OBJ# Ol7.032.a.02 l REF LR-LP-10002 l COGNITIVE LFL 3 l
.r a 46m-9 a.; oon--4=,. nkeua-m1.m.- d n -4 - A6-M+-=^ - +A-*
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. 3 ' While touring the plant during an outage, an operator notices that a local Area Radiation Monitor
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(ARM) meter on the 130' elevation in the Reactor Building indicates zero . This ARM is: indicating low due to low gamma and neutron radiation levels I indicating low due to low neutron radiation levels, only { indicating low due to low gamma radiation levels, only ; indicating low and appears to be inoperabl ,
i ANS: d a,b,c incorrect, a thorium bug on the inside wall of the detector ensures that it will l always indicate at least 20% Of the first decad l NEW '
l KA# 272000 A1.01 l OBl# 200.030.a.11 l REF LT-LP-10007 l COGNITIVE LVL 2 l l
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3 During a low RPV level condition, Increasing CRD Flow During An Emergency has been directed per 34SO-Cll-005-2S. A caution in the procedure reminds the operator to maintain CRD pump discharge pressure greater than 1180 psi Observing this caution will prevent pump: trip due to low suction pressure l operation under runout conditions ; trip due to overcurrent protection ! discharge pressure being less than reactor pressur l
ANS: b l a,b,c incorrect, although all these things could occur, they are not the reason for this ,
particular cautio {
NEW similar to a question on the Brunswick 1995 exa .
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l KA# 201001 K4.12 l OBJ# 001.032.a.02 l REF LT-LP-00101 l COGNIT!VE LVL 2 l
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i l i 3 Unit Two is in Mode 3 and the 2A RHR pump has just been placed in shutdown coolin ,
]
- Suddenly, drywell pressure increases to 2.5 psig and stabilizes. SELECT the response of the 2A '
- RHR loop to this event:
i l
! E11-F015A isolates and the 2A RHR pump runs on minimum flow
- E11-F015A isolates and the 2A RHR pump rims with no flowpath 4 Ell-F008 and 2E11-F009 isolate and the 2A RHR pump trips
, E11-F008 ,2E11-F009, and 2E11-F015A isolate and the 2A RHR pump trips.
ANS: b
- a incorrect, min flow is tagged out in SDC l
- c incorrect, F008&9 isolate on high Rx press.
]"
d incorrect, F008&9 isolate on high Rx pres NEW t ,
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l KA# 205000 A3.01 l OBJ# 006.008.a.04 l REF LT-LP-00701 l COGNITIVE LVL 2 l
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I 3 Unit Two was operating at 100% RTP when the following occurs:
)
The Main Turbine trips and the reactor scrams
! The generator PCB's are CLOSED
, Position indication is OUT for DC powered RCIC valves
2El1-F015A light indication is OUT.
,
j The likely cause of this event is a loss of: /250 VDC Switchgear "A",2R22-S016 /250 VDC Switchgear "B",2R22-S017 VDC Cabinet "B",2R25-S002 VDC Cabinet "C",2R25-S00 ANS: a b incorrect, the bus powers different equipment c incorrect, cabinet is powered from "B" switchgear l
~c ' incorrect, similar conditions except the turbine doesn't trip i Modifiedfrom LRQ Bank Questio l KA# 263000 K3.03 l OBJ# 200.018.a.01 l REF LT-LP-02704 l COGNITIVE LVL 3 l
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3 Unit One is in Mode 5 with the reactor mode switch in REFUEL and all control rods inserte The refueling bridge operator grappled a fuel bundle, raised the grapple, and commenced movin; l
the bundle to the core. As the refueling bridge staned moving towards the core, it:
l
, continued until it was over the core and initiated a control rod bloc stopped before it got to the core with no other protective actions continued until it was over the core with no protective actions stopped before it got to the core and initiated a control rod block ANS: a
d incorrect, bridge movement is not stopped because all rods are in b incorrect, the answeris incomplete c incorrect, bridge movement is not stopped because all rods are in NEW l KA# 234000 K4.02 l OBJ# 045.018.a.01 l REF LT-LP-04502 l COGNITIVE LVL 3 l 3 A LOSP has occurred on Unit One and Unit Two resulting in all 4160 VAC buses being de-energized on each unit. A fuel pool low level alarm is actuated on Unit 2 and it is reported by maintenance personnel that significant amounts of water is flowing out of the expansion gap between Unit 1 ana Unit 2 Reactor Buildings. Based on these indications the crew should:
, align N2 from drywell pneumatics to the transfer canal seals and fill the fuel pool with condensate transfer wate align N 2from drywell pneumatics to the transfer canal seals and fill the fuel pool with fire wate align N 2from nitrogen storage bottles to the transfer canal seals and fill the fuel pool with condensate transfe align N 2from nitrogen storage bottles to the transfer canal seals and fill the fuel pool with fire wate ANS: d a incorrect, no power to cond xfer pumps, no drywell pneumatic backup b incorrect, no drywell pneumatic backup c incorrect, no power to cond xfer pumps NEW l KA# 233000 K3.02 l OBJ# 045.032.a.04 l REF LT-LP-04501 l COGNITIFE LFL 3 l
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3 Unit One is operating at 100 % RTP (840 MWe) when the 8* stage feedwater heater low level I '
alarm actuates. Initial feedwater temperature was 440 F. The following conditions are noted i after the alarm comes on:
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Reactor Power 102 %
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GMWe 825 MWe l Feedwater Temp 419 F The most probable cause of these indications is:
1 extraction steam to the heater isolated i the high level dump valve has failed open a heater tube has ruptured l the heater bypass valve is open i
ANS: b a incorrect, would cause GMWe to increase c incorrect, level should be controlled by the level control system d incorrect, GMWe would not change i NEW i
l KA# 239001 A1.10 l OBJ# 200.050.c.02 l REF LT-LP-01501 l COGNITIVE LYL 3 l 3 Unit Two is at 90% RTP. Condensate Pumps 2B and 2C are running and pump 2A is in standby, with its control switch in AUT A loss of 4160 VAC bus 2C occurs. How will the condensate system respond? Condensate pump 2B trips. Condensate pump 2A auto starts immediately when condensate booster pump suction pressure reaches 38 psig, Condensate pump 2B trips. Condensate pump 2A auto starts ten (10) seconds after condensate booster pump suction pressure reaches 38 psi Condensate pump 2C trips. Condensate pump 2A auto starts immediately when condensate booster pump suction pressure reaches 38 psi Ceadensate pump 2C trips. Condensate pump 2A auto starts ten (10) seconds after condensate booster pump suction pressure reaches 38 psi *
ANS: d l' incorrect, due to ten second time delay c incorrect, the 2B pump still has power / ten sec. time delay
<
a incorrect, the 2B pump still has power NEW l KA# 256000 A3.02 l OBJ# 026.003.a.04 l NEF LT-LP-00201 l COGNITIVE LYL 2 l
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3 Unit Two is in the process of a reactor startup following a scram. Reactor pos.er is at 32% RTP.
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The operator selects a control rod and moves it one out notch when a rod block occurs. The
] following indications were noted when the rod block occurred: (Assume the RWM is not in
sequence control)
! RWM: indicated select error !
!
RBM: indicated 116% l
. APRM: indicated 41%
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- Core Flow
- indicated 30%
The most probable cause of the control rod block is: 5 RBM upscale block RWM withdraw block l APRM flow biased rod block I APRM fixed rod bloc ANS: a >
b incorrect, RWM above LPAP c incorrect, power below setpt (.58W+47%) !
,
d incorrect, power above setpt; however, bypassed when the mode switch is in RUN l
NEW ,
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l KA# 215002 K1.03 l OBJ# 012.003.e.01 l REF LT-LP-01203 l COGNITIVE LVL 3 l 3 During a startup on Unit Two with the mechanical vacuum pump in service and the Offgas mode switch in BYPASS, a simultaneous downscale failure of BOTH Posttreatment Radiation Monitors occurs. A few minutes later the crew notices that main condenser vacuum is slowly decreasing. The cause of this loss of vacuum is: The mechanical vacuum pump tripped and isolated The steam packing exhausters tripped and isolated The main stack isolation valve is closed (F037) The charcoal bed bypass valve closes (F043).
ANS: c a incorrect, trips and isolates from different monitors b incorrect, trips and isolates from different monitors d incorrect, this occurs when the mode switch is in aut NEW l KA# 271000 K6.02 l OBJ# 031.001.a.06 l REF LT-LP-03101 l COGNITIVE LVL 3 l
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4 A loss of air to the lube oil storage area deluge system causes it to actuate. Fire main pn a. re subsequently drops to 92 psig. SELECT the appropriate response of the fire system:
Jockey P imp Electric Pump Diesel A Pump Diese!B Pump ~ on off off off on on off off c, on on on off on on on on ANS: c a,b,d incorrect, starting setpoints JP 120psig. EP 110 psig, DA 100 psig, DB 90 psig NEW l KA# 286000 A 4.06 l OBJ# 036.020.b.01 l REF LT-LP-03601 l COGNITIVE LVL 1 l 4 A LOSP has occurred on Unit One. Upon verification of proper 1 A Emergency Diesel Generator operation, the operator notices the following:
Blue 4160 VAC bus pot lights extinguished White EDG pot lights illuminated EDG frequency 60 HZ EDG output breaker open LOSP lockout tripped .
Normal and alternate supply breakers open LOSP annunciator actuated, no other annunciators have activate The 1 A EDG is: Running; but, can not be tied to the bus because a fault exists on the bu Running; but can not power the bus due to the 86 lockout being trippe Running and not tied; but, can be tied by turning on the sync. switch and closing the EDG output breake Running and not tied; but can be auto tied by reducing EDG frequency to below 57.5 HZ and brought back to 60H7-.
ANS: d a incorrect, no indications of a bus fault exists b incorrect, EDG is not tied to the bus c incorrect, sync acceptor relay not satisfied for the breaker manual switch NEW l KA# 295003 A2.03 l OBJ# 028.025.a.01 l REF LR-LP-02801 l COGNITIVE LYL 3 l
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4 A transient has occurred with the following indications on both units:
!
{ Unit I Unit 2 SAT 1C & 1D deenergized SAT 2C & 2D deenergized i
. RWL: -110" RWL: -45" I DW press: 1.4 psig DW press: 2.7 psig
1 Regarding the IB Emergency Diesel Generator, it is: (Assume Unit 1 has control of the IB d
EDG) !
l
' Running and tied to 4160 VAC bus IF Running and tied to 4160 VAC bus 2F Running, but not tied to any 4160 VAC buses Not running and 4160 VAC bus IF is deenergize ANS: c l'
a,b incorrect, the logic doesn't know which unit to go to if you have a LOSP/LOCA signal on both units ;
d incorrect, the EDG should have started on low bus voltag NEW l KA# 295003AA2.04 l OBJ# 028.025.a.04 l REF LT-LP-02801 l COGNITIVE LVL 3 l 4 Unit Two was operating at 100% RTP when the reactor scrammed. The operator notices the following indications:
Reactor Pressure: 900 psig ,
'
SPDS has a red SCRAMindication The rod select power light is extinguished RWM: All Rods In: NO '
Shutdown: YES Rods Not FullIn: 040 -
The reactor is: in a cold shutdown rod configuration with forty control rods at position 0 in a cold shutdown rod configuration with forty control rods out further than 0 , only suberitical at the present reactor temperature with forty rods at position 02 only suberitical at the present reactor temperature with forty rods out further than 0 ;
ANS: a l b incorrect, the forty control rods are at position 02 or less c incorrect, cold shutdown configuration with 40 rods at 02 or less !
d inconect, cold shutdown config. and rods at 02 or les NEW l KA# 295015.AK1.01 l OBl# 001.013.b.02 l REF LT-LP-05403 l COGNITIVE LYL 3 l 24 j
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4 ' Unit One is operating at 100% RTP with the HPCI System in full flow test. The operator reports i the suppression pool temperature is 106 F. Based on this temperature, the Shift Supervisor !
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[ should direct the operator to:
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l Place either the "A" or "B" loop of RHR in suppression pool cooling.
i Place all available loops of RHR in the suppression pool cooling mode, onl l
! Place all available loops of RHR in suppression pool cooling and shutdown HPC :
j Place all available loops of RHR in suppression pool cooling and scram the reactor.
i *
- . ANS
- c
) a,b,c incorrect, >100 F and <110 F requires all RHR in cooling and all testing stoppe i i NEW I i
i j l KA# 295013 AK3.02 l OBl# LT-20201.011 l REF LT-LP-20201 l COGNITIVE LVL 2 l
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i 4 ,
! ;
- 4 During a reactor startup on Unit Two with reactor power at 7% RTP, an operator starts to !
s withdraw a control rod to its withdraw limit of 12. The following conditions are then noted: 1 i
'
Rod Drift Annunciator actuates !
- Rod Drift Lightilluminated !
] RPIS indication shows the rod moving towards position 48.
.. .
.- Based on the above conditions, the operator should:
,
- ;
l Immediately insert a manual reactor scram l
j Drive the control rod in using EMERGENCY I !
I Scram the control rod with the SCRAM TEST toggle switch I Enter the Fast Reactor Shutdown procedure,34GO-OPS-014-2S.
! l l ANS: a \
- b incorrect, the scram should insert the rod per procedure l l c- incorrect, only done if scram not reg'd
. d incorrect, done if power is above LPSP.
NEW
! l KA# 295014 AA1.04 l OBl# LT-20201.015 l REF LT-LP-20201 l COGNITIVE LYL 3 l l
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<
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} 25 i
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~ ~ 4 Unit One is operating at 23% RTP with the main turbine rolling at rated speed, but not tied to the grid. Suddenly, the reactor scrams and the operator notices the following:
i
'
The Main Turbine is tripped Main condenser vacuum is 20" Hg and decreasing Reactor water level is 0 inches and decreasing Reactor pressure peaked at 1005 psig and is now being controlled at 920 psig.
l The most probable cause of the reactor scram is: a low reactor water level signal i a main turbine trip signal I a high reactor pressure signal l
l a MSIV closure signal -
i
!
l ANS: a
! b incorrect, power is less than 30%
c incorrect, pressure <1080psig .
d incorrect, MSIVs close at 10" hg vacuum l NEW
l KA# 295006 AA2.06 l OBJ# 300.008.a.02 l REF LR-LP-01001 l COGNITIVELVL 3 l I
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(intentionally blank question # 47 on next page)
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4 Using the schematic below, the instrument leg off of instrument tap M . lB ruptures. SELECT the effect on indicated reactor water level and the expected plant iesponse. Indicated RWL will:
(Assume RWLC is selected to "B") Decrease on the affected instruments; however, no protective actions would occu Decrease on the affected instruments and a low level scram signal would occur causing a full reactor scra Increase on the affected instruments; however, no protective actions would occu Increase on the affected instruments and a main turbine and RFPT high level trip signal would occu ll . new v ,,, ca- w ca-. y ,
dh R60$ [g M'
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u peos
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C22-R655 Y ] 3 3 U LH ;
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@ @ gi gn sJh yi gi (.t w to.co , (.aso i. .ao, l
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92 93 90 yo sp 95 73 yo 90 93
- ,, x .,
- ;
Nos5 Neis (41rio.in (atr io.1r) Nois Nc36 l
EE ^ '
Jet Pump #15 Jet Pump #S T tower Tap lower Tap
! (ssto !
REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL INSTRUMENTATION ANS: b i l a incorrect, N080A & N080B generate a scram signal in both RPS channels i c incorrect, variable leg break i d incorrect, variable leg break
- NEw l KA# 295009 AK2.01 l OBJ# 200.002.a.014 l REF LT-LP-00201 l COGNITIVE LVL 3 l
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l a
27 l l
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4 Control room evacuation. has required Unit Two systems to be controlled from the Remote Shutdown Panel. The 2B CRD pump has been placed in service at the Remote Shutdown Pane The following conditions occur after 2B CRD is started:
l l Drywell pressure: 4.5 psig l Reactor Water Level: -65 inches DC control power is lost to the 2B CRD pump breake ,
SELECT the response of the 2B CRD pump: the pump trips on a high drywell pressure signal b, the pump trips on a low reactor water level signal , the pump continues to run due to loss of control power i the pump trips when control power is los ANS: d a incorrect, high d/w press. trip is disabled at the RSDP b incorrect, low level signal disabled ,
c incorrect, all pumps on the 2F 4160 VAC bus have a mech. loss of control power tri NEW
!
l KA# 295016 AK3.03 l'OBJ# 001.023.a.05 l REF LT-LP-05201 l COGNITIVE LVL 3 l l
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4 Unit One is operating at 100% RTP when a chemical intrusion occurs. The lab samples the reactor water and determines that some fuel elements have failed. Subsequent to the sample, the following alarms actuate: (Assume the alarms have been confirmed to be valid)
O/G ANNUAL RELEASE RATE LibilTEXCEEDED AfAINSTEAh!LINERADIATION HIGH AfAIN STEAbi LINE RADIA TION HIGH-HIGH/INOP i
!
l
! Based on these indications, the crew should: ;
i l manually scram the reactor and close all Group 1 isolation valve ,
l reduce reactor power with recirc to clear the alarms l commence a fast reactor shutdown per 34GO-OPS-014-2S
' j manually scram the reactor and commence an aggressive cooldown ;
ANS: a 1 b incorrect, reg'd action for the high alarm only I c incorrect, may be req'd for the last two alarms '
[ d incorrect, incomplete answer i NEW
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l KA# 295017 AK2.14 l OBl# 200.098.a.01 l REF LR-LP-01401 l COGNITIVE LVL 3 l
28 l
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5 The unit has just scrammed and the following conditions exist: l
MSIVs are closed due to a leak detection isolation signa ;
No SRVs will open due to electrical failure ,
RWL: -50" and increasing at 5"/ min with CRD pumps ;
DW pressure: 1.2 psig To control reactor pressure, the crew may:
, start IIPCIin the full flow test mode , start RCIC in full flow test mode ! re-open MSIVs and use turbine bypass valves use RWCU in the Recirculation mod ;
ANS: d l a incorrect, HPCI has an initiation signal b incorrect, RCIC test flowpath via HPCI test line is isolated due to HPCI initiation :
signal c incorrect, can't reopen MSIVs due to ler.k detection NEW l KA# -295007 AA1.03 l OBJ# 201.066.a.11 l REF LR LP-20308 l COGNITIVE LVL 3 l 5 The intent of the following EOP override is to:
'
IF drywell pressure is l THEN prevent injection above 1.85 psig l from CS and j LPCI pumps per l 31EO-EOP-114-2S l EXCEPT when required i e for adequate core
! coolin l force the crew to lower RPV level in an attempt to reduce reactor power ! allow the crew to initiate containment sprays during a LOSP , to prevent a power excursion due to cold water injection i to prevent uncontrolled injection as reactor pressure decrease ;
ANS: d ,
a,c incorrect, these reflect reason to terminate and prevent injection :
b incorrect, containment sprays would be prevented by this override if pumps reg'd for j ACC l NEW l KA# 295024 EA1.03 !
l OBl# 201.066.a.03 l REF LR-LP-20308 l COGNITIVE LVL 2 l
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5 Unit Two has scrammed with the following conditions: ;
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- Drywell Pressure
- 15 psig
] Suppression Chamber Press.: 13.9 psig ;
j Drywell Temperature: 225 F '
l Torus Water Level: 220 inches ;
- If Drywell Sprays were initiated under these conditions:
j the d; 1well may de-inert due to rapid pressure decrease
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- drywell design differential pressure may be exceeded j chugging may occur on the downcomer piping l j it would have no negative effect and drywell pressure would decreas !
OI DRYWELL SPRAY INmATION LIMIT
J 3-5 pig *
i 600 i i
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' S j w l WE l
. s 300
- b ,
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- 200 i i
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100 ijjii! i i i i i ; j i
! 0 10 20 30 40 DRYWELL PRESSURE (psig)
l 92:2'TMl~*.L"
< ANS: b
a incorrect, safe on DSIL curve c incorrect, you spray to prevent chugging j d incorrect, the drywell to torus vacuum breakers are covered a NEW i l KA# 295024 EK3.01 l OBl# 201.072.a.27 l REF LR-LP-20310 l COGNITIVE LFL 3 l l
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, ' 5 A LOCA has occurred on Unit One. The 1 A RHR pump is maintaining RPV level at -145" and
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steady. The 1 A RHRSW pump is available. No other low pressure pumps are available for injection. If Drywell pressure increased to 65psig, the crew should: Use the 1 A RHR pump to spray the Drywell even if RPV level drops below TAF Use the 1 A RHR pump to spray the Drywell only if RPV level stays above TAF Use the 1 A RHRSW pump to spray the drywell and the 1 A RilR pump to inject Use the 1 A RHR pump and 1 A RHRSW pump to restore RPV level to tho normal bau ANS: a b incorrect, > 54 psig spray d/w irrespective of adequate core cooling c incorrect, procedure does not allow spraying with RHRSW d incorrect, primary containment take priority over core at this pressur NEW l KA# 295024 EA2.01 l OBJ# 201.072.a.02 l REF LR-LP-20310 l COGNITIVE LFL 3 l 5 A small break LOCA occurred on Unit One and the following conditions were noted:
Torus pressure: 3.2 psig Torus level: 153 inches Drywell H2: 5%
Drywell 0 2: 4%
Based on the above conditions and the Primary Containment Control flowcharts, PC-1 & PC-2, which of the following actions isprohibited: Vent the suppression chamber within offsite release rate limits Initiate supression chamber sprays Override tie HPCI and RCIC suction transfer logic Vent the .ywell irrespective of offsite release rate limit ANS: d a incorrect, allowed because of high hydrogen and oxygen concentratio b incorrect, allowed because Torus pressure is > 1.85 psig c inconect, allowed because torus level is > 150" NEW l KA# 295010 AA1.05 l OBl# 201.072.a.13 l REF LR-LP-20310 l COGNITIVE LVL 3 l
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. 5 An ATWS has occurred on Unit Two and the main turbine is tripped. The Shift "upervisor :
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directs an operator to stabilize RPV pressure below 845 psig using the main turbine bypass i
valves. This action is done to:
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' cause reactor power oscillations to subside allow for condensate booster pump injection , minimize heat up of the primary containment , close a failed open SR i ANS: c a,b,c incorrect, <845 psig will ensure the lowest setpt LLS SRV will close in order to
{
minimize containment heatu ;
NEW l KA# 295037 EK1.01 l OBJ# 201.069.a.12 l REF LR-LP-20328 l COGNITIVE LVL 2 l !
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56. - A reactor scram has occurred on ' fWwo and the following conditions exist after the scram:
Reactor Power: 24% RTP RWL: -45" Torus Water Temp: 95 F -
Drywell pressure: 1.2 psig ,
MSIVs: Open ;
BPVs: Controlling RPV pressure !
Based on these conditions and CP-3, the operating crew should: terminate and prevent injection into the RPV from all systems except boron and CRD t terminate and prevent injection into the RPV from all systems except boron, CRD, and RCIC establish an RPV level band between +50 inches and -100 inches establish an RPV level band between +50 inches and -155 inche ;
c ANS: c :
a,b incorrect, have not met the conditions to terminate and prevent i d incorrect, this is the level band for MSIVs being close NEW -
l KA# 295037 EK3.03 l OBJ# 201.089.a.01 l REF LR-LP-20327 l COGNITIVE LVL 3 l {
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j . 5 Using the Boron Injection Initiation Temperature Curve (Graph 5), SELECT the conditions l , which would place the plant in the UNSAFE region of the curve:
i
- Reactor Power Torus Temperature
- % 145 F i % 140 F --
I % 109 F l %
~
105 F l
' ~
UNIT 2 i GRAPH'5 l
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L BORON INJECTION INITIATION TEMPERATURE )
i l 165 ,
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f 160 4 .
' *' -.,
-
i 1 w 150 145 m 4 140 g
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@"135 130 -
! Q *
- g] 125 , .
l u
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g 120 _
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m n :
115 ' '
l 110 ,'
,r------
- -------
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h-----4---h---------h---------
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! 105 L l l l l t 4 100 f 0 5 REACTOR POWER (%)
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NOIE. kw wee SPOS Emergercy DumM m okxa of rm M ANS: b '
a,c,d incorrect, plot graph ,
Modifiedfrom a LRQ Hank questio I KA# 295026 Gen 2.1.25 l OBJ# 201.071.a.10 l REF LR-LP-20328 l COGNITIVE LFL 3 l
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5 A dual seal failure on a Reactor Recirculation Pump has caused drywell pressure to rise above
- the reactor scram setpoint. The Recirculation Pump was tripped and isolated and drywell pressure has stabilize SELECT the action that should be performed to reduce drywell pressure
- Enter EOP PC-1 & PC-2; commence drywell ventin Enter EOP PC-1 & PC-2; operate all available drywell cooler , Enter 34AB-T23-002-1S; commence drywell venting ;
' Enter 34AB-T23-002-lS; operate all available drywell coolin ,
ANS: b a incorrect, venting prevented by isolation signal c,d incorrect, entry into the EOPs is req' NEW l KA# 295010 Gen 2. l OBJ# 201.093.a.01 l REF LR-LP-20310 l COGNITIVE LYL 2 l 5 A Loss of High Pressure Feedwater has occurred on Unit One and the Shift Supervisor has transitioned to CP-1, Alternate Level Control. At TAF, the crew emergency depressurizes the
RPV. Adequate core cooling is available when: at least one Core Spray pump commences injecting into the RPV all available low pressure pumps are injecting into the RPV ; all available low pressure pumps are injecting and RPV level is increasing all available low pressure pumps have restored RPV level above TA ANS: d a,b,c incorrect, the core is not submerge NEW l KA# 295031 EA2.04 l OBJ# 201.093.a.08 l REF LP-LP-20304 l COGNITIVE LVL 2 l
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- 6 A Loss of High Pressure Feed and large LOCA have occurred on Unit Two. The following 1
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indications currently exist:
R W L: -225" and steady Reactor Pressure: 53 psig and 7 ADS valves are OPEN RHR Status: 2A RHR pump is injecting at 11,500 gpm i CS status: 2A Core Spray tagged ou l 2B Core Spray indicates zero flow and its discharge i pressure is oscillating between 50 psig and 320 psi Torus Water Level: 142 inches Torus Water Temp: 165 F
.
Based on these conditions , the crew should:
I reduce 2A RHR flow to within the NPSH limit throttle closed 2E21-F005B to increase Core Spray discharge pressure align the suction of the 2B Core Spray pump to the CST maintain current status until RPV level is above TA GRAPH 12A RHR Pump NPSH l.imit m2 (Suppression Pool Water Level Below 146")
250 i
- #
UNSAFE
-
{ 240 f---
S 230 - 1 10 psig* l 2 I [
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I - -
220 -- '~~
-~l w 5 psi * l [- }-
210 - - --
+ --+- L-
- J---- - - '
! i i i :
-
i l 200 J --'-- t-- --+----
- .-- T - 7-- 7 - j--- - - ,
'
o 190 ---
- i :
!
--
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--
7----f_
j !
a Q
180 --- I
r--h-- S7d -+
i i i h-4- - -l' !
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--
M 170 d - I i
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b l I : i ,
l 1 l I ! I i ! ! i i
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160 y m - r T T-~T O 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000 10000 11000 12000 Flow (gpm)
g=myy-.. -
a see er o=5 =non a w e. opsacatu - re ANS: c a incorrect, NPSH limit is ignored when pumps are reg'd for AC b incorrect, suction strainer clogging has occurred, pump should be realigned d incorrect, 2B Core Spray needs to be addressed NE1Y l KA# 295031 EA1.01 l OBJ# 201.083.a.12 l REF LR-LP-20309 l COGNITIVE LFL 3 l l
_ _ _ __ _ _ . _ . . - _ . _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ . _ . . . . _ . . _ . .. . _____
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- . 6 The Unit One Primary Containment Control flowchart, PC-1, has the crew perform the following l
,
, action if suppression pool water level can not be maintained above 115 inches:
i Trip and prevent operation of
! HPCIirrespective of adequate i
- core cooling
.
This action is required to prevent: -
' unstable HPCI operation-i HPCI exhaust check valve chatter i i loss of backpressure on the exhaust line overpressurization of the primary containmen .
ANS: d a,b incorrect, these are the reasons for the low speed limit l c incorrect, backpressure is lost, the action prevents an uncovered HPCI exhaust from
!
overpressurizing the suppression chambe :
NEW
s l KA# 295030 Gen 2.4.18 l OBJ# 201.075.a.11 l REF LR-LP-20310 l COGNITIVE LFL 2 l
] 6 An ATWS has occurred on Unit Two . Injection was terminated and prevented for power / level
) ~ control and eventually re-established. The following conditions now exist:
4 RPV level band: -155 inches to -185 inches ;
i SLC tank level: 15 %
- Reactor Power
- 3% t i
Based on the above conditions, the crew may: ,
i
i commence a controlled cooldown of the reactor vessel restore and maintain RPV level in the normal band i exit the CP-3 Dowchart and control level per the RC flowchart j exit the RCA and CP-3 flowcharts to control level, power, and pressur !
<
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t~
ANS: b l j' a hicorrect, this would be correct if SLC tank level was 12% l 4 e incorrect, can not exit CP-3 until RCA is exited d incorrect, can not exit RCA until cold shutdown rod configuration is achieve I
- NEW
] l KA# 295037 EK1.04, l OBJ# 201.092.a.02 l REF LR-LP-20327 l COGNITIPE LVL 3 l i
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. ' 6 An unisolable steam leak in the turbine building on Unit Two has caused an offsite release rate of
,
5 mr/hr. Per the Radioactivity Release (RR) EOP, the crew should isolate ALL systems discharging into areas outside the primary and secondary containments, EXCEPT systems required to:
i
? assure adequate core cooling, shutdown the reactor, and suppress a fire
! shutdown the reactor, suppress a fire, and vent primary containment irrespective of offsite release rates j assure adequate core cooling, suppress a fire, and vent the primary containment i irrespective of offsite release rates
, assure adequate cooling, shutdown the reactor, and vent the suppression chamber
'
irrespective of offsite release rates.
l ANS: d
, a,b,c incorrect, fire suppression only applies to the SC flowchart NEW l KA# 295038 EK3.02 l OBl# 201.082.a.05 l REF LR-LP-20325 l COGNITIVE LVL 1 l 6 Unit One is operating at 75% RTP when the "B" SRV fails open. The fuses are pulled to the "B" SRV and the following conditions are noted:
SAFETY / BLOWDOWN VALVELEAKING is actuated SAFETY BLOWDOWN PRESSURE HIGH is green SPDS indication for the "B" SRV is green Suppression Pool Temperature is 111 F Based on these indications, the "B" SRV is: OPEN and the reactor should be manually scrammed OPEN and one loop of RHR should be placed in suppression pool cooling CLOSED and the reactor should be manually scrammed CLOSED and one loop of RHR should be placed in suppression pool coolin ANS: c a,b incorrect, the SRV indicates closed d incorrect, high torus temp requires a scra NEW j KA# 295026 EA2.01 ,
l OBj# 201.074.a.09 l REF LR-LP-20310 l COGNITIVE LVL 3 l
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. 6 Unit Two was operating at 100% RTP when the main turbine inadvertently tripped. The ,
following conditions were noted on 2H11-P603 two minutes after the scram:
,
j
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All 4 Scram Group A lights are illuminated All 4 Scram Group B lights are extinguished l Reactor pressure peaked at 1190 psig and is now 920 psig i RWM shows all control rods are insene !
The control rods insened due to: l Main Turbine trip > 30% scram signal l High reactor pressure scram signal ; Backup scram valves acmated and depressurized the scram air header ' ARI actuated and depressurized the scram air heade ANS: d a,b,c incorrect, indications show a half scram signal was received NEW l KA# 295025 EK2.04 l OBJ# 010.024.a.02 l REF LT-LP-00101 - l COGNITIVE LVL 3 l i
6 The Unit Two Fuel Handling SRO contacts the control room to report that the fuel bundle being ;
moved dropped approximately 3 ft into its storage location and visible bubbles were noted. The following control room alarms actuate: ,
REFUEL 2NG FLOOR VENTEXHAUSTRAD HIGH REFUEUNG FLOOR VENT EXHA UST RAD HI-HI t
'
REFUELING FLOOR AREA RADIATION HIGH ,
i Based on these indications, the immediate action for the operating crew should be: l l evacuate personnel from the refuel floor l dispatch health physics and operations personnel to investigate { evacuate personnel from the refuel floor and the reactor building 1
' obtain an activity sample of the fuel poo i l
ANS: a l l
l b incorrect, IIP provides assistance after evacuation occurs l c incorrect, required on a lowering fuel pool level l d incorrect, subsequent action l NEW l KA# 295023 AK1.01 l OBl# LT-20201.003 l REF LT-LP-20201 l COGNITIVEI,VL 3 I J
-. -_ _ _ . - _-
.
. 6 Unit Two is operating at 55% RTP when the 2A Reactor Recire Pump trips. The following
, conditions are noted after the pump trip:
Reactor Power: 45 %
Core Flow: 39 %
2B Recire pump speed: 10l%
APRMs: oscillating between 43% and 49% with the amplitude increasin Based on these conditions, the crew should: reduce 2B Recire. Pump speed less than 100%
' insert contrei rods to exit the region of potential instabilities continue monitoring APRM and LPRM power oscillations immediately manually scram the reacto Unit 2 0/o 110 ,, , u .
. 110
' ' '- - ' -
- lMMEDIATE Ex1T REGION
- **
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10 '
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0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 (Core Flow M!brTVhr) (30.8) 4 l+ (38.5) 4 (77.0)
+ (34.7)
% RATED CORE FLOW --m ANS: d a,,b c incorrect, these are options possibly if the power oscillations were not as sever Modifiedfrom a LRQ Bank questio l KA# 295001 Gen 2.1.25 l OBJ# LT-20201.016 l REF LT-LP-20201 l COGNITIVE LFL 3 l
__ _ . _ - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . __ _ . . _ ._ _ _ .__ .. _. ___ _ _ _
-
6 Unit Two is operating at 100% RTP with all three Condensate Pumps Running and the 2A and
, 2C Condensate Booster pumps mnning. Suddenly the 2C Condensate Pump trips and when
.
conditions stabilize, the crew notices the following conditions: (Assume no operator action) ,
!
COND PUMPS DISCil PRESS LOW annunciator is actuated l
Condensate Discharge Pressure indicator reads 120 psig )
The "A" SJAE is in service l
Main Condenser Vacuum is slowly decreasing l
l I
The Main Condenser Vacuum decrease is due to: i l
l closure of First Stage Steam Supply Valve,2N11-F008A l closure of Condenser Outer Suction Valve,2N22-F005A i closure of Condenser Inner Suction Valve,2N22-F004A i closure of Main Steam Supply to SJAE,2N11-F00 l ANS: a b incorrect, closes on low flow c incorrect, closes on low steam pressure ,
d incorrect, no auto closure function !
NEW 1
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l KA# 295002 AK2.06 l OBl# 025.004.a.01 l REF LT-LP-02501 l COGNITIVELVL 3 l
.
6 The Unit Two reactor has just received a spurious scram signal. During recovery actions the crew notices that reactor water level is 105 inches. Based on this indication the crew should :
immediately: l
! reduce reactor water level using RWCU close the MSIVs
' isolate HPCI and RCIC trip operating RFPT j i
ANS: b i a incorrect, this should be done after closing the MSIVs !
c,d incorrect, even though water in the HPCI/RCIC steam lines, there is no guidance !
l to isolate the system.
i NEW
!
l KA# 2950u8 AA1.03 l OBJ# LR 20301.006 l REF LR-LP-20301 l COGNITIVE LFL 3 l l
!
!
i
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l a
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70. During a startup on Unit Two, both CRD pumps trip. The following conditions exist: j Reactor Pressure: 700 psig i Charging Water Pressure: 0 psig j Two control rod accumulators have low pressure alarms SELECT the appropriate crew action:
l 1 Place the Reactor Mode Switch in Shutdown j If a CRD pump can not be restored in 20 minutes, then place the Reactor Mode Switch in j Shutdow I Attempt to start a CRD pump and monitor CRD temperatures locally on 2Cl1-R018 If any CRD temperature exceeds 400 F, then place the Reactor Mode Switch in Shutdow l ANS: a b,c incorrect, this would be true if reactor pressure was >900 psig l d incorrect, requires engineering evaluation NEW l KA# 295022 AA2.01 l OBl# LT-20201.013 l REF LT-LP-20201 l COGNITIVE LVL 3 l (intentionally left blank question # 71 on next page)
i l
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7 Unit Two is operating at 100% RTP when an plant air system break occurs. Upon investigation the crew notices the following indications:
Service Air Non-Essential Interruptible Non-Interrupt Press . Air Press EssentialAir EssentialAir Press Pres O psig 0 psig 50 psig 105 psig Based on these conditions, the break is most likely a(n): service air header rupture non-essential air pressure rupture interruptible essential air pressure rupture non-interruptible essential air pressure ruptur ""
- ToServue Air
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Service and Instrument Air Flowpath (Unit 2)
ANS: b a incorrect, pressure is low because the F017 isolated at 70 psig c incorrect, pressure is low because the F015 is cycling d incorrect, N backup 2 pressure NEW l KA# 295019 AK3.01 l OBJ# 200.025.a.04 l REF LT-LP-03501 l COGNITIVE LVL 3 l
_ _ _ .
l . 7 Unit Two is in Mode 3 with the 2A RHR pump in Shutdown Cooling. Suddenly,2E11-F008 l ,
inadvertantly closes and will not re-open. SELECT the appropriate crew response:
l throttle open the 2E11-F017A, RHR Outboard Injection Valve, to increase cooling place the 2C RHR pump in the Shutdown Cooling mode of operation place the 2B loop of RHR in the Shutdown Cooling mode of operation increase reactor water level greater than 53 inches to promote natural circulatio ANS: d a,b,c incorrect because the F008,F009 isolate and the pumps trip NE1Y l KA# 295021 AK1.04 l OBJ# LT-20201.014 l REF LT-LP-20201 l COGNITIVE LVL 3 l 7 The Unit One Primary Containment Control flowcahrt, PC-1, directs the following action be done if suppression chamber water level is above 150 inches:
Maintain suppression pool water level below 197.5 in per 34SO-Ell-010-IS or 34GO. OPS-087-I The significance of this step is to ensure suppussion pool water level stays below the: suppression pool spray header torus to reactor building vacuum breakers i suppression chamber vent pipe i torus to drywell vacuum breaker ANS: d a,b,c incorrect, these connections are not at 197.5 inches NE1Y l
l l
l KA# 295029 EA2.01 l OBl# 201.073.a.06 l REF LR-LP-20310 l COGNITIVE LVL 2 l
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- . . - - - . - . .- - - .- --- .. -- ..-. -
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. 7 Unit Two is operating at 100% RTP when the following occurs:
'
- TURB BLG PSW FLOW HIGH annunciator actuates l Division 1 PSW pressure is 45 psig i Division 2 PSW pressure is 45 psig All four PSW pumps are running )
y
- SELECT the appropriate crew response
1 reduce reactor power as necessary to maintain equipment temperatures within limits '
. reduce power to maintain equipment temperatures and close 2P41-F316A, B, C, and D i manually scram the reactor and close 2P41-F316A, B, C, and D i throttle closed 2P41-F316A and B until division pressures are > 80 psi I
'
ANS: c
.
a incorrect, scram required due to major break )
b incorrect,' scram required due to major break I
- c incorrect, would be allowed if reopening F316s and no break existe I t'
NEW <
l l KA# 295018 AK3.02 l OBJ# LT-20201.018 l REF LT-LP-20201 l COGNITIVE LVL 3 l 7 While placing the 2A RliRSW pump in service to suppon suppression pool cooling, the operator places the Interlock Override VLF 2 Ell-F068A switch to the override position and leaves it there. Subsequently, a leak in the drywell causes drywell pressure to increase to 5 psi l SELECT the adverse consequence,if any, to the RHRSW system: the discharge piping may rupture when restarting the 2A RliRSW pump RIiR heat exchanger relief valves will lift when restarting the 2A RiiRSW pump if a leak developed in the RliR heat exchanger, a release path to the fiume would exist the 2A RilRSW pump will trip and the 2E11-F068A will isolat ANS: c a incorrect, some water hammer by design but not excessive b incorrect, the interlock switch prevents lifting relief valves d incorrect, 2E11-F068A will not isolate NEW l KA# 295018 AKl.01 l OBJ# 034.002.a.12&l3 l REF LT-LP-03401 l COGNITIVE LYL 2 l
, , - - -.
.-. . -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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. ' 7 The Unit Two reactor has scrammed and the following conditions are noted:
'
Reactor Level: -5" and increasing Reactor pressure: 920 psig controlled with the bypass valves Drywell Temperature: 342*F All PSW pumps are tripped and cannot be restarted Based on drywell conditions, the crew should : emergency depressurize the RPV anticipate emergency depressurization and open the bypass valves start all available drywell cooling, overriding any automatic trips commence a controlled cooldown within the cooldown rate limi ANS: a b incorrect, this would be correct if < 340 c incorrect, no psw available to the drywell coolers d incorrect, not required immediately NEW l KA# 295028 EA2.01 l 081# 201.073.a.15 l REF LT-LP-20310 l COGNITIVE LVL 3 l 7 Secondary containment conditions are as follows on Unit Two:
No Reactor Building Sump alanns exist Reactor Building Pressure: +0.25 inches of water Main Steam Chase Temperature: 120 F Reactor Building Vent Exh Radiation: 2 mr/hr DETERMINE if entry into the Secondary Containment Control flowchart, SC, is required; NO entry is required at this time Entry is required due to Main Steam Chase High temperature Entry is required due to Rx Big Vent Exh High radiation Entry is required due to high differential pressure in the Reactor Buildin ANS: d c,b,c incorrect, see flowchart entry conditions NEW: similar to a question on the Brunswick 1995 exa l KA# 295035 Gen 2. l OBJ# 201.093.a.01 l REF LR-LP-20325 l COGNITIVELFL 3 l
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7 The Maximum Normal Operating Radiation 12 vel in the Secondary Containment is defined as the highest radiation level:
j
! expected to occur during normal plant operation with all equipment operating properly , at which safe shutdown equipment continue to operate properly l
, at which personnel access necessary for safe shutdown of the plant will be precluded at which releases from the reactor building will remain below the Alert limi ,
ANS: a
'
b,c incorrect, these are part of the definition for max SAFE levels d incorrect, Alert limit is considered on the RR chart NEW l KA# 295034 EA2.01 l OBJ# 201.077.a.0l l REF LR-LP-20306 l COGNITIVE LFL 1 l 7 If a primary system is discharging into the seconda:y containment, the Secondary Containment !
Control flowchart, SC, directs the following action:
BEFORE Ar# oreo rodlotion level reaches Maximum Safe Operating level (Table 6)
[
PERFORM CONCURRENTLY RC[Al Point A V
V The purpose of this step is to:
i initiate a reactor scram and reduce to decay heat levels the energy being discharged
' initiate a reactor scram and reduce the amount of radiation released to the environment commence a fast reactor shutdown before a maximum safe operating limit is exceeded fast shutdown the reactor and reduce reactor pressure in order to minimize the leak rat ANS: a b,c,d incorrect, see lesson plan NEW l KA# 295033. EK3.02 l OBJ# 201.079.a.]1 l REF LR-LP-20325 l COGNITIVE LFL 2 l
l i
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. . l l
.. 8 While verifying a valid PCIS Group 5 isolation signal, the Shift Technical Advisor notices that the 2G31-F004, RWCU Outboard Isolation Valve, has a Yellow color code on the SPDS
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Diagnostic screen. Based on this indication, the valve has:
I closed and the RWCU system is isolated i remained open and should be closed by the operating crew ! started closing and the STA should verify that it goes fully closed possibly lost power and valve position should be verified by other mean ,
ANS: d l a,b,c incorrect, yellow on a valve means that valve position data is not available, which !
usually occurs when power is lost to the valv i NEW j
!
l KA# 295020, AK2.04 l OBl# 056.002.c.03 l REF LT-LP-05601 l COGNITIVE LVL 2 l j l
- Unit Two is operating at 100% RTP when both stator cooling water pumps trip. The following conditions were noted:
t GENERATOR PROTECTION CIRCUIT ENERGIZED annunciator is actuated Initial Stator Amps: 20,000 amps l Stator Amps at 2 min.: 14,500 amps }
Final Stator Amps at 4 min: 7,500 amps .
. Main Turbine Generator is currently operatin *
Main Turbine Bypass Valves are controlling reactor pressur .
!
Based on these conditions, the operating crew should:
l maintain current conditions and attempt to restore a stator cooling water pump reduce reactor power with recire or control rods to close the main turbine bypass valves
' enter 34GO-OPS-014-2S and commence a fast reactor shbtdown manually scram the reactor and trip the main turbine due to failure to tri '
ANS: d a,b,c incorrect, the auto trip on the stator cooling runback circuitry has faile l NEW
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I l KA# 295005, AK2.04 l OBJ# 023.001.b.05 l REF LT-LP-02301 l COGNITIVE LVL 3 l l l
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k
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. 8 Unit Two is operating at 100% RTP when it is determined that the 2B 125/250 VDC STATION l , SERVICE BUS, 2R22-S017, is inoperable. SELECT the appropriate Technical Specification l action:
l Restore the bus to operable status within 7 days Restore the bus to operable status within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Restore the bus to operable status within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> Enter LCO 3.0.3 immediatel ANS: c a,b,d incorrect, see Tech Spec section 3. Tech Spec section required as referenc NEW l KA# 295004 Gen 2.2.22 l OBJ# 300.006.a.08 l REF LR-LP-02704 l COGNITIVE LPL 2 l 8 Unit Two is operating at 100% RTP, when the following annunciators actuate:
RBCCW SYS HEATEXCH OUTLET TEMP HIGH RBCCWSYS SURGE TANK LEVEL HIGH RBCCWRADIATIONAIARM (Alarms have been verified to be valid.)
Based on these conditions: Plant Service Water is leaking into the RBCCW system RBCCW is leaking into the Plant Service Water system l RWCU is leaking into RBCCW through the NRHX One RBCCW pump has tripped and the standby failed to star i ANS: c j a,b,d incorrect, these indications are received for a RWCU leak NEW l KA# 295018, AK1.01 l OBJ# 200.014.a.04 l REF LR-LP-00901 l COGNITIVE LPL 3 l l
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.- . - - . . . . - . - .... - . _ - . - -..-_- - -. . . - - . . - - . . - . - . - -
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. I 8 Preparations are presently being made to startup the Unit One reactor. The following conditions exist:
,.
Reactor Mode Switch: Shutdown Reactor Pressure: 125 psig
, - All reactor vessel head closure bolts are fully tensioned All rods are IN.
l
- The reactor is in
- l
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- Mode 2 Mode 3 l
- Mode 4 f
[ Mode 5
!
ANS: b \
a,c,d incorrect, see table 1.1-1 (pg 1.1-8)in Unit 1 Tech Spec !
NEW l
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[ KA# Genetic 2.1.22 l 081# 400.067.a.05 l REF LR-LP-30005 l COGNITIVE LVL 3 l }
i f
8 During a valve lineup, an operator needs to check a valve open. It is noted that the valve has a [
locking device on it. To check the valve position the operator should:
{
l unlock the valve, turn it in the closed direction no more than 1/4 turn, place it full !
open, and replace the locking device j l unlock the valve, turn it in the open direction, verify that the hand wheel moves less than j
~
1/4 turn, and replace the locking device leave the locking device installed, try to move the hand wheel to ensure locking device ;
integrity, and verify stem position !
l leave the locking device installed, verify stem position, and verify administratively that ;
the valve has not been repositione !
l l ANS: a i b incorrect, check it in the closed direction I c,d incorrect, the locking device needs to be remove to check actual valve positio j NEW I l
l KA# Generic 2.1.29 l OBl# 300.022.a.06 I l l REF LT-LP-30004 l COGNITIVE LVL 1 l
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- . 8 The Unit Two reactor is shutdown. An operator is directed to start the 2B Condensate Booster
, !
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Pum .
.
Which of the following classifies the level of use of this procedure?
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h Memory Use :
- Reference Use
., Continuous Use
! Information Use -
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'ANS: c
! a,b,d incorrect, see 10AC-MGR-019
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NEW :
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I KA# Generic 2.1.20 l OBl# LT-30004.001 l REF LT-LP-30004 l COGNITIVE LVL 1 l
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' 8 Unit Two is operating at 75% RTP with the 2C Condensate Pump tagged out for maintenanc Maintenance requests tagging out RCIC for preventive maintenance. This activity is: ;
(references provided) i t Low Risk and only requires Shift Supervisor approval i Medium Risk and requires Ops Manager approval ! Iligh Risk and requires Ops Manager approval t Very Ifigh Risk and requires a risk evaluation and Ops Manager approva !
ANS: d a,b,c incorrect, see 90AC-OAP-002-0S ;
NEW
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[EA# Generic 2. l OBJ# 300.011.b.02 l REF LT-LP-30004 l COGNITIVE LVL 3 l l
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8 . Unit Two is operating at 100% RTP. The operating crew is placing the 2B RIIR loop in service :
to support a IIPCI surveillance next shift (last day for IIPCI to be run) and the following .
I conditions are noted:
~
l Torus Water Temp: 85'F and stead The 2A loop of RIIR is not availabl The breaker to 2 Ell-F024B is tripped and will not rese l In order to piace the 2B loop of RIIR in torus cooling, the Shift Supervisor should: ,
t
. direct the operator to manually open 2 Ell-F024B l with the SOS concurrence direct manually opening 2E11-F024B > initiate a temporary change to the procedure to allow manually opening 2 Ell-F024B j initiate a permanent change to the procedure to allow manually opening 2E11-F024 l
!
ANS: c l a,b incorrect, can only authorize not following procedure in an emergency (
d incorrect, this is a temporary condition i NEW ;
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l KA# Generic 2.2.11 l OBJ# 300.002.a.02 l REF LT-LP-30004 l COGNITIVE LYL 3 l [
!
8 During an outage on Unit One, the 1 A Core Spray pump motor has been replaced. The (
maintenance department has asked to momentarily start the pump to check for proper rotation. In l
order to support this, the Shift Supervisor should: i ensure that the maintent ce department is using personalized danger tags I
' release the applicable subclearance that applies to the MWO being worked
- release all subclearances that require the 1 A Core Spray pump be tagged issue a temporary release after verifying all subclearance holders concu ANS
- d I
'
a incorrect, personalized danger tags are allowed but still need temp release if other subclearances are on the pum l b incorrect, can't release the subclearance until work is done t l_ ,
l c incorrect, can't release all subclearances until the work is done l NEW l l
I l KA# Generic 2.2.13 l OBJ# 300.016.a.01 l REF LT-LP-30004 l COGNITIVE LVL 2 l ;
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90. A pneumatic valve that is equipped with a manual operator (handwheel) will be used as an l
isolation point for a clearance. The valve is afait closed valv !
l SELECT the conditions that must be satisfied to use this valve as a clearance boundary once the l valve is closed: 1
, Only the handwheel is tagged i Only the air supply is isolated, depressurized, and tagged Both the air supply is isolated, depressurized, and tagged and the handwheel is tagged The air supply is isolated, depressurized, and tagged and a gagging device is installe ANS: c a,b,d incorrect, see 30AC-OPS-001-0S page 13 of 65 NEW: similar to a Brunswick 1995 exam questio l l KA# Generic 2.2.13 l OBJ# 300.016.a.01 l REF LT-LP-30004 l COGNITIVE LFL 1 l l
9I. Unit Two was operating at 100% RTP, when the Main Turbine tripped and the reactor
'
scrammed. Conditions after the scram are as follows:
Reactor Pressure peaked at 1275 psig and is now being controlled at 700 psig with EHC Pressure fe l-Reactor Power is 35% RT Control Rods are still withdrawn >
RPV Level Band is -100" to -155" and is being maintained in the ban Based on the above conditions: r a MCPR safety limit violation has occurred i a Reactor Water Level safety limit violation has occurred a Reactor Pressure safety limit violation has occurred
' no safety limits have been violate t ANS: ~ a b,c,d incorrect, RPV level > TAF, RPV pressure < 1325 psi !
NEW
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l KA# Generic 2.2.22 l OBJ# 300.003.a.01 l REF LT-LP-30005 l COGNITIVE LVL 3 l
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9 The Plant llatch initial administrative dose limit to the lens of the eye (LDE) is: rem / year rem / year rem / year rem / year ANS: c a,b,d incorrect, see 60AC-liPX-001 NEW l KA# Generic 2. l OBl# LT-30008.001 l REF LT-LP-30008 l COGNITIVE LVL 1 l 9 ealth Physics technicians have surveyed the main steam chase during an outage and obtained the following results:
Area Dose Rates one foot from the source: 83 mr/hr Airborne Concentration: .25 DAC
Smear Results: 750 dpm/100 cm Based on these results the area should be posted as a: Radiation Area l Iligh Radiation Area
! Airborne Radioactivity Area l Contaminated Area
!
!
l ANS: a l b incorrect, < 100 mr/hr t
c incorrect, < .3 DAC d incorrect, < 1000 dpm/100 cm2 NEW i
i l KA# Generic 2. l OBJ# LT-30008.002 l REF LT-LP-30008 l COGNITIVE LPL 3 l l
$3
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O 94, The Emergency Director decides that it is necessary to send someone into the Reactor Building
'
(with Health Physics) to isolate a leak before Core Spray and RHR pumps are flooded. (No releases are underway and RPV level is being maintained at 60 inches with the Condensate System)
SELECT the maximum allowable dose limit that the Emergency Director may authorize: SREM REM REM > 25 REM ANS: b a,c,d incorrect, see 73EP-EIP-017-0S pg 6 of 13 NEW l KA# Generic 2. l OBJ# LT-30008.002 l REF LT-LP-30008 l COGNITIVE LVL 1 l 9 An Alert Emergency has been declared and the OSC has been manned. A fire in the Service Building breakroom kitchen requires that the OSC be evacuated due to excessive smoke. When the evacuation is ordered, the OSC workers should go to the: East Wing of the Simulator Building Classroom 172 in the Simulator Building Simulator Building Cafeteria Technical Support Center conference roo ANS: c a incorrect, normal for EOF h incorrect, OSC supervision goes here d incorrect, TSC is not an alternate NEW l KA# Generic 2.4.42 l OBJ# 200.052.h.01 l REF EP-LP-30200 l COGNITIVE LVL 1 l l
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9 The lowest level emergency classification at which any releases are expected to be limited to
^
small fractions of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Protective Action Guideline (PAG) exposure levels is:
. NUE Alert Site brea Emergency General Emergency ANS: b a,c,d incorrect, see definitions in 73EP-EIP-001-0S NEW l KA# Generic 2.4.4 f l OBJ# 001.017.1(2) l REF EP-SS-20101 l COGNITIFE LFL 1 l 9 A General Emergency has been declared and all required facilities are manned. The Emergency .
Director is in the EOF having a conference with NRC representatives. The EOF Manager recognizes that the following actions are needed:
1 Exceeding 10CFR20 limits to rescue an injured worker 2 Potassium Iodine must be distributed due to radiation levels 3 Protective Action Recommendations need to made 4 The EOF needs to be evacuated due to high radiation levels SELECT the action (s) that the EOF Manager may authorize: , 3 , 4 ANS: d a,b,c incorrect, these are non-delegable emergency director dutie , NEW l KA# Generic 2.4.29 l OBJ# 200.107.a.05 l REF EP-LP-30300 l COGNITIVE LFL 3 l l
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. 9 Unit Two is operating at 100% RTP with the following conditions:
, I/PCI TURBINE EXII PRESS II/GII annunciator had been repeatedly actuating i and has been acknowledged for 2 shift HPCI is secured and has not been run in the past 2 shift HPCI turbine exhaust pressure indicates zero psi Based on these indications , the annunciator is a: problem annunciator and should be deactivated immediately problem annunciator and the Shift Supervisor should determine compensatory actions nuisance annunciator and should be deactivated immediately nuisance annunciator and the Shift Supervisor should determine compensatory action ANS: b a,c,d incorrect, it is a problem annunciator but shouldn't be considered for deactivation until after 2 day .
NEW l KA# Ger.eric 2.4.33 l OBJ# 300.030.a.01 l REF LR-LP-30004 l COGNITIVE LVL 3 l 9 The RC RPV Control EOP, RC/L Path, has the following caution:
CAUTION 2 Partial loss of RPV water level Indication during rapid depressurization This caution is reminding the operator that:
a, during a rapid RPV depressurization below 500 psig, most level instruments may F experience erratic behavior and should be monitored closely during a rapid RPV depressurization below 500 psig, EOP graph 1 may be exceeded and RPv flooding may be required during a rapid RPV depressurization below 500 psig, B21-R604A(B) and !
B21-R623 A(B) may be used if erratic behavior fails to occur . during a rapid RPV depressurization below 500 psig, B21-R604A(B) and l B21-R623A(B) cannot be used to determine RPV water leve ANS: d a,b,c incorrect, see caution 2 on the char NEW l KA# Generic 2.4.20 l OBJ# 201.065.a.09 l REF LR-LP-20305 l COGNITIVE LVL 2 l l
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o 100. Unit Two is operating at 100% RTP when the in-service CRD System flow control valve fails closed. SELECT the adverse consequerce from extended operation in this condition: Control Rod Drive Mechanism temperature will rise and system differential pressure may (N,g decrease Control Rods may drift into the core due to the abnormally high charging water header pressure The running CRD Pump will be operating under low flow conditions and may overheat and trip Recirculation Pump seal temperatures will rise due to low seal flow and may need to be trippe ANS: a b,c,d incorrect, see lesson plan NEW l KA# Generic 2. l OBJ# 200.045.a.01 l REF LR-LP-00101 l COGNITIVE LVL 2 l
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