ML20077F315

Forwards Govt Accountability Project (Gap) Rept of Gap Investigation Into Region V/Nrr Effort on Former Bechtel Employee Allegations Re Welding Practices

ML20077F315
Person / Time
Site:	San Onofre, Midland, 05000000
Issue date:	06/22/1983
From:	Garde B GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT
To:	Novak T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML20077F298	List: ML20077F315
References
NUDOCS 8308010331
Download: ML20077F315 (1)

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l GOV'ERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT '

fnstitute for Policy Studies 1901 Que Street. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20009 (202)234-9382 June 22, 1983 MEMORANDUM TO: Thomas M. Novak, Assistant Director for Licensing Division of Licensing FR: Billie Pirner Garde, Director. l Citizens Clinic for Accountable Government Government Accountability Project

Subject:

Information Item - Notification of Welding-Related Allegations at San Onofre 2/3 and Midland 1/2

1. On' November 30, 1982 your office notified the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board for the Midland Plant, Unit 1 and 2 that the concerns and allegations raised by Mr. E. Earl Kent, a former Bechtel Senior Quality Control Engineer, did not represent a safety concern since "none of the allegations have been substantiated."

2. Attached to this memorandum is a Government Accountability Project report to the Commissioners that details the results of our own five-month probe into the Region V/NRR effort that determined the position presented by your office in the memo referred to above.

'3. We believe that it is appropriate for us to request that you also notify the ASLB Board about the information contained in our report.

4. Finally, we wish to point out that our client,'Mr. Kent, and Region III officials are only now in the process of discussing.the allegations that Mr. Kent made about the Midland Nuclear Power Plant.

5. Please notify this office if you are not going to

docket the Midland Service List with the report.

Sincerely, A

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8308010331 830722' Billie'Pirner Garde, Director j ,

P S ADEK 05000 , , Citizens Clinic'-

"' GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILIT( PROJECT Instituth for Policy Studies 1901 Que Street. N.W. Woshington. D.C. 20009 (202)234 9002 g

June 20, 1983 Ibnorable Chairman Nunzio Palladino Honorable Victor Gilinsky Honorable John Ahearne

• c Honorable Jaxes Asseltine Honorable Thomas Roberts United States Nuclear Regulatory Ccmnission Washington, D. C. 20555

Dear Contnissioners:

On behalf of Mr. E. Earl Kent, who the Goverrrent Accountability Project (GAP) represents as counsel, we request that the Commission review this analysis of the serious mishandling of the imC inspection / investigation into allegations raised by our cldent of both specific and generic welding flaws at Bechtel constructed nuclear pcwer plants, particularly the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Stations (SONGS Units le 2, and 3). '

Further., we request that there be:

(1) a legitimate inspection and technical analysis of Mr. Kent's welding defect concerns, and (2) an investigation into the outrageous handling of Mr. Kent's allegations by another government agency inspector general or independent NRC investigators answer.ir.g directly to the Ccmnissioners; or (3) a request frcm the Ccanissioners for a G.O investigation into Regicn V's handling of this inspection and the deliberate or inadvertent violation of NFC inspection procedures and policies throughout the Region.

I. B.G GROUND ,

The Goversnent Acco0ntability Project is a project of the Institute fcr Policy Studies, Washingtcn, D. C. The purpose of GAP's Citizens and Legal clinics are to broaden the understanding of the vital role of tha public l employee, corporate enployee, and private citzen in preventing waste, cxar-  !

ruption, or health and safety concerns. GAP also offers legal and strategic j I l l

- o -- ,3 .a _ amm a A* -  ;

Q ed ' [l#W f

counsel to whistlebloyers, providcsa unique legal education for law student

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interns and public policy sttrients, brings reaningful and significant reform

• to the gove'rnment workplace, and exposes goverment actions that are repres-

• si've, tasteful or illegal, or that pose a threat to the health and safety of the American public.

Presently, GAP provides a program of multi-level assistance for ,

government enployees, corporate cmployees, and private citizens who report illegal, wasteful or improper actions. GAP also regularly monitors govern- <

' mental refonns, offers expertise to Executive Branch offices and agencies,

• l *. and state and local governmental bodies, and responds to requests by Congress

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and state legislatures for analysis of legislation to make government more L accountable to the public.

In March 1982, GAP's Citizen Clinic became actively involved with the Midland Nuclear Pcwer Plant. The Lone Tree Council had requested GAP to pursue allegations from workers of major problems at the Midland plant.

After our preliminary investigation, we ccmpiled six affidavits which we filed with the NRC on June 29, 1982. One of these affidavits was frtm Mr. E. Earl Kent, (Attachnent 1) .

Mr. Kent's allegations included concerns about tse other nuclear power plants that he had worked on -- San Onofre in California and Palsades, also in Mich igan. In keeping with our policy of full disclosure, we included references f.o Mr. Kent's other allegations in his affidavit. .

After several nonths of no action, Mr. Kent made a personal trip to the NRC Region III headquarters to check on the status of the NBC '

itvestigation into his allegations. Mr. Kent was so disturbed by the re-cepticn he received that he called the GAP office frcm the first pay phone after he left the Begion office. I detailed his concerns, as well as our own, in a letter to the Regional Administrator Mr. James G. Keppler on Septenber 6,1982. (Attachment 2) .

Mr. Kent also attenpted to independently pursue his concerns about the San Onofre facilities upon his return to California. He contacted the utility, Southern California Edison, and also made direct contact with the site Quality Control office in early and mid-Septstber.

', Finally, after alnost two years of wrking within the industry and regulatory systen, ca. nene agreed to talk to a reporter frcm the Ios Angeles Times. The reporter had learned of Mr. Kent's allegations from the Alliance for Survival, a public interest organization in Southern California.

On Octcber 13,14, and 15 there were numerous news stories about Mr. Kent's allegations at the three facilities. (Attachnent 3).

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The day following the stories Mr. Kent was contacted by the

. Region V inspectors who had previously ignored, or remained ignorant, i

of his allegations. '1hese NBC contacts came after Mr. Kent had again offered his assistance and information on serious welding flaws. ,

Mr. Kent agreed to meet with the Region V inspectors and drove to moet with them on Octcber 15, 1982. In a lengthy discussion with Mr.

Kent it was decided that a prerequisite for any detailed contact with the * ,

NFC would be either a witness, a personal tape-recording, or the agreernent <

, by the NRC insWon team to adhere to the advice of Mr. Kent's counsel

. and provide copies of the unaltered tapes and a transcri'pt of the same

, " , . ' imrediately following the meeting. Further, it was agreed that Mr. Kent

, should not sign a statement until it had been reviewed by counsel.

Two days later two NBC inspectors a@ eared at Mr. Kent's home and insisted that he sign a five page statement that they had prepared frcza their notes of the October 15 meeting. Mr. Kent. reviewed the statement, made changes, however, he wisely delayed signing the statement prior to review by counsel. (Attachnent 4).

• After our review of the statements, as well as receiving much nore detailed information frczn Mr. Kent, we informed the NRC - both Region III and Region V -- that Mr. Kent would be supplying an e.xpanded affidavit of his allegations. He, and his counsel, also made it quito clear to them that this afficfavit would be ' forthcoming after the tapes were reca:[ved and

• reviewed.

The tapes and the transcripts were alnost impossible to ci>tain. -

Mr. Kent, after giving up cn the NRC's voluntary ccIrpliance,' had to file a Freedom of Informaticri request. (Attachment 5) . The NRC FOIA office contacted me on Noveiber 30 to apologize for the delay in the delivery of the tapes. They were not aware of the fact that they had been premised to

• Mr. Kent as part of the legal agreenent between Regica V investigators and himself prior to the original interview. ,

The Office of Investigations (OI) indicated that there had been a misunderstanding between OI and the IE Regional office about the "ridht of Mr. Kent to have the tape." In fact, it had been the basic groundrules of Mr. Kent agreeing to talk to the NRC without counsel present.

Meanwhile, uegion V officials concluded their inspectierV investigatica into Kent's allegations. Withoat even the courtesy of notifying Mr. Kent or_ his counsel, Region V released their inspection reput at a much publicized press ccnference.

I The tapes of the meeting and transcripts of the meeting are' referred to in this letter as the " transcripts" e.

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The sane day, Bechtel and Southern California Edison (SCE) also -

issued a press release discrediting Mr. Kent's allegations, and warning

,, other potential whistleblowers frcm exposing informaticn. The Bechtel

, release sends a clear trossage: -

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It would seem inescapable 'that another prcduct of the Kent affair should be increased public skepticisn: skepticism about the integrity and motives of so-called whistleblowers and skepticism about the anti- .

nuclear groups that use both whistleblowers and the media.

Not until -several days after the public press conference did GAP receive the Novenber 30 inspection report or the transcript of the seven-

, * . .' hour meeting. Mr. Kent has since supplied us with in-depth information

• and appropriate technical data from the professional codes that describe

. and detail his concerns. Independent welding engineers and other experts have reviewcd Mr. Kent's alle'gations frcm the technical application of his nore theoretical concerns.

- On Decenber 14 and 15, and on March ~24,1983, GAP filed, on behalf of Mr. Yent, five Freedom of Information (EDIA) requests for documentation which could shed substantial light on both'the allegations thanselves and how the NFC came to its own swift conclusion.

The EDIA requests were for the folbwing bodies of information:

---FOIA r'equest 82-614: for the Office of Inspector and Auditor (OIA) investigation into the release of a draft inspection report to a licensae in February 1982. (Received) .

EDIA request 82-617: into a DeceRLer 30, 1980 inspection / investigation by Pegion III ancVor Region IV's vendor inspecticn team into Systans Control Corporation and Magnetics, Inc. (Referred to Department of Justice for

. prosecution.)

• EDIA request 82-61G: for all background informaticn into two 1980 Region III inspections at Midland. (Received).

FOIA request 82-618: for all background informaticn connected with --

the November 30,1982 "Special NRC Inspection at San Onofre." (Appealed)

, --EDIA request 83-1s4: for all cbcuments developed in the processing -

of EDIA 618 (Received) .

The information obtained as a result of the EDIA request, the list of documents withheld, and the FOIA office's specific answers to questions <

have shed significant light on how the NRC's massive inspection effort managed '

to totally discredit Mr. Kent personally and professionally, as well as fail to resolve Mr. Kent's allegations.

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- Information obtained further leads'us to the conclusion that Region V itself (1) fails to mbet even minunum standards.of inspection and investi- ~

' gation adequacy; (2) had seriously disregarded the laws and policies

- of the Freedcm of Informaticn Act, (EDIA) 5 USC 552, the Destruction of -

Doctznents Act, and the legislative intent of both; (3) has violated Comnission policies personnel. regarding prior comunication about inspection findings to utility  !

- The later finding potientially.affects the adequacy of NRC ,

inspections and investigations at all nuclear power plants in Region V during the past 22 nonths. i

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U RECUEST FOR AN INVESTIGATION BY THE GOVERNMENT Mt.NTING OFFICE INIO

'IEE NRC REGICN V KDTP INSPECTION The Kent inspection effort is evidence of regulation and enforcement

.. at its worst. GAP urges the Ocmnission to put the credibility of the agency at-large above ccmnitment to an internal investigatico section that has fostered a deep distrust among both agency employees ~ and the public.

We urge the serious consideration of the Comnission to voluntarily request ,

1 an independent investigation of the inspection / investigation policies in Region V by either the TO or another government agency Inspector General.1 A review of the mishandling of the Kent inspection / investigation will indicate the-necessity for irediate reinspection effcet. - -

NRC Report numbers 50-206/82-31, 50-361-82-31, dated Novenber 30, 1982, and 362/82-27 dated October 5,1982, docunent the results of inspections conducted in September 1982 and frcm October 15 through Novenber 15, 1982 at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Stations (fiONGS) .

Docunents discovered through a through Freedcm of Infonnation Seardi, Public Documents Room (PDR) search, and extensive interviews with Mr. Kent and other Bechtel employees provide further details pertaining to Mr. Kent's-allegations as well as the failure of the Regional office to conduct a minimally adequate inspection into his charges.

A. The NBC inspection recort (" Kent report") provicies inadecuate dccumentation. Our concerns aaout the Kent investigation can be civided into two categories. First, the allegations of generic welding problems within the Bechtel ntelear construction programs. Mr. Kent's allegations, although briefly cutlinsd in the affidavit that ,Mr. Kent submitted throu3h GAP to the NHC in June 198 2 regarding the Midland plant, are conplicated and technical. In lay terms, we are finding that Bechtel welding codes, in sczne instances, do not meet the standards as set by the various professicmal associations. As you know, conpliance with the professional codes is a-baseline requirernent of nuclear construction regulation.

Jother governnent agencies have used this method to ' perform investigations into their effort wre internal required.affairs when public credibility' and a fair investigation See W hibit 6, Washington Post account of the Dep= L .t of Housing and Urban Developnent (HUD) into the Insp=ch General of the Department of Agriculture,

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, The second category, although separate frcm the actual hardware issues, is the question of the IGC's technical review of the issues raised by Mr. Kent.' For example, although Region V requested assistance

, frcm the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) to evaluate the technical

,- ddails of Mr. K'ent's allegations, it appears that, in fact, no independent review was done. Under the Freedcm of Information Act we requeste' d and received the conmunications, notes, neroranda, etc., that surrounded the issues raised by Mr. Kent. Review of these documents'found a circular -

trail of verification thit'sinply relied on the industry - both Bechtel and Southern California Edison - to interpret and explain Mr. Kent's '

. allegations away. We have found no evidence of independent analysis or review by the NBC.

The Kent Report, issued by Region V on Novenber 30, 1982, ccmes to the conclusion that "no items of Non-coupliance were identified." (Report, at 1) . This ccnclusion is allegedly based on 218 inspection leurs by three regional inspectors and investigators "of allegations concerning design inadequacies and deficiencies in inclementation of welding codes and standards" (Kent Report, at 1) . .

Upon review of the do cientaticn compiled by the agency as proof of its position, GAP discovered that regional inspectors / investigators only documented - through tape recorded interviews - three of the 47 witnesses that were allegedly interviewed in their inspection effort.1 These interviews were of Mr. E. Earl Kent, Mr., Donald Martin, and Mr. W:ndy Lahr. Of these three interviews, only the tape of Mr. Kent was transcribed at the request of his counsel, and cbtainM caly after an unacceptable delay (see pp 3 of this letter) . Intervim *" T.=de up approximately 11 hours1.273148e-4 days <br />0.00306 hours <br />1.818783e-5 weeks <br />4.1855e-6 months <br /> of interviews conducted by three inspectors / investigators. Of the interviews with the remaining 44 witnesses, no interview notes were kept, or such notes were ,

destroyed, or the interviews were rever conducted.

'In the case of 14 of the witnesses, no interview notes were kept, and

' the interviews were probably never conducted. Through the final response to our request through MIA 618, we were told that:

"...the interviews mentioned in the report were ccnducted while the inspectors were in the plant, and that no separate written statements other than the three that have already been provided to

, you were prepared."

'Ihe draft of this letter cbtained through mIA 154 (Exhibit 7) explains much more graphically the reality of the casualness with which the NRC inspectors " gathered evidence" to disprove Mr. Kent's allegations:

"the interviews mentioned in the resort wre conducted while the -

inspectors were walking through the plant..." (enphasis added) Exhibit 8. '

LThe Kent Peport, Individuals- Contacted, Page 1, Paragraph 1, lists 33 Bechtel, Southarn California Edison, University Mechanical Engineers and Constructors, as contacted. NRC letter m rch 21, 1983 frcm J.M. Felton to Billie Garde in

, response to M IA 82-618 identifies 14 other individuals, previously defined in

'.,, - the Kent Report as "other individuals" as six pipefitters, one pipe fittar

,f supervisor, two welders, six Bechtel quality control weldang inspecAru.s.

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, , In fact, the question of written intervices of the Kent inspection remains a. key issue in our request for an independent investigation into the handling of this inspection effort. Clearly the infonration cbtained frcm all of the sources cxxld have shed considerable light on the adequacy of the inspection. Yet, if the intervieas were conducted, there is no record of the statenents at all. If the Region V inspectors had not docu-rented any of their intervices, the argument that regional policy prevented retention of interview notes would possibly have some credibility; however, ,

the interviews conducted of Kent, Lahr, and Martin all produced tapes, notes, and an interview infocration log. The lack of substantial evidence leads <

us to believe there is no validity to the Regional inspectors claim that Kent's allegations were "not substantiated."

The public simply cannot be expected to accept the Kent report as an adequate inspection effort. Nor, should the Co.missicn itself tolerate an inspection effort that does not meet its own inspe:: tion standards.

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Inspection and EnforcsTent Manual, Chapter 1000 '" Inspection Reports" states as its Policy (1005-02)

The basic policy is to provide a written record of inspections.

The primary purposes of the written record are to: (1) provide a basis for enforcement action and convey the results of the inspection to the licensee or vendor, and (2) provide 'information for management of the inspection program within the Office of Inspection and Enforce: rent. Secondary purposes are to provide information to other NRC offices and to the general public.

That staterunt is further clarified in a March 8,1983 letter to The Honorable Edward J. Markey, Chainran of the Subconmittee on Oversight and Investigations of .e Comrittee of Interior and Insular Affairs frcm NRC Chainran Nunzio Palladino.

In respcnse to the question: "Does the Comnission require written sunmaries of meetings related to an investigation, but not with persons who are the subject of that investigation?" the Cornissioner replied:

"NRC policy requires written su:meries of reetings with repre-sentatives of organizations or individuals under investigation.

With respect' to contacts with persons who are the suject of an investigation or who may have information relevant to the investi-gatica (intervicaees), it is Nic policy to docunent interviews which relate to NRC investigations."A 5

1NRC policies that differentiate between inspect. ions hnd investigations do not appear to be substantially different in the documentaticn requirements.

According to the Office of Inspection and Enforcement Director, Mr. Richard DeYoung, as explained at a public meeting (March 9, 1983 re: Regionalization)

I&E inspectors keep " detailed notes of their interviews which can be used

- for enforcerent considerations."

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.To illustrate the abuse of undocumented interviews in the Kent

. report the following exanple is included:

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In the inspection into Mr. Kent's concerns about the abuse of scribe marks cn piping for socket weld fit up reasure. ents (Kent Report at 6), the l -

following explanation stands as the . sole docunentation of their inspection effort: -

The inspector interviewed several pipefitters to determine if pipe / tubing cutters were eme used by them or others on their -

crews to nake socket weld scribe rrarks. The pipefitters stated ,

' that none of them had ever used pipe cutter or tubing cutters, nor had they ever seen one used cn site, at make the scribe marks used in socket weld fitup measurements. All of the fitters interviewed stated that they had received specific inst. ructions, at the beginning or tneir enploynent onsite, that prohibited the use of pipe / tubing cutters for making the socket weld fitup scribe marks. All pipe .

fitters interviet.ui. had worked at San Onofre since the 1974-1977 tire period. Therefore, the inspector mnchv% that such use of pipe / tubing cutters was not an establishea practice anong the crafts.

Not only are there no interviews,' notes, logs, sumraries, or any other verification of what the above referenced pipefitters said, there is also no idea of how many pipe fitters there are at San Onofre, and how many pipefitters could have used pipe cutters. The inspector's conclusion does not stand up to the nest genorcus extension of inspection criteria. Unfortunately, the inspectors continued their undocunented ronp through unidentified personnel piecing together a completely unsubstantiated conclusion. Had the inspectors kept interview logs and sumraries, it would be possible to make an .

intelligent overview of the adequacy of the inspection interviews. However, as the undocumented dialogue indicates, the inspectors relied solely on the word of urployees who were not under oath, did not have to prcduce documentation, did not have to sign a statcment, did not have to even attach their name (with or without a request for confidentiality) and are completely unaccountable for their statenents. Certainly nuclear whistleblcwers such as Mr. Kent would never be allcwed the type of looseness used in this report to discredit serious concerns. .

Even nere incredible is the flippant use of the term " interview" in the Kent report to establish the alleged "unsubstantiation" of Mr. Kent's charges:

"To det:r-i.: t'.c practices and criteria used by inspectors in the inspection process of socket welded' fittings, the inspector interviewo:i Welding Quality Control Engineers (WQCE) and their Supervisors. 'Ihese interviews established that the NQCEs did not e

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' utilize pit gages in all cases to verify ccr:pliance with

• " the 5% of rcminal wall criteria. These intervieas also established that if the WJCEs observed cases where the scribe 1.ine looked excessively deep, a pit gage was used to determine the depth of the mark and establish conformance with the 5% of nominal wall criteria.

The WCCEs and crafts personnel were "knculedgeable" of acceptance criteria and limits in the cond2ctof their particular activities." -

(Kent Report, at 6) .

s Other examples of the use of undocurented interviews clearly demonstrate that the NFC inspectors relied on the unsubstantiated information gained from other SCE/Bechtel ecployees to di'scredit Mr. Kent's charges:

" Discussions with c3gnizant Bechtel Quality Control inspectors indicated that are strikes on the weldment are routinely re: roved

'as a matter of course because such welds dicantinuities inhibit veld examination." (Report, at 19) .

and "Bechtel personne'l state that M&OS maintains several different editions of the procedures and specifications and that it is the I responsibility of the appropriate site discipline project engineer to order that cdition which is to be used at each puticular site."

(Report at 30).

The inclusion of unsubstantiated or undocumented interviews is an unacceptable inspection or investigation methodology in any case. When the subject of the investigaticn is the safety of a nuclear poser plant, the shoddy inspection practices utilized in this report are inexcusable.

C. The search through the docum2nts provided under the various FrWm of Information Requests as well as a thorough search of public docunents available in the Public Docurents Foon indicate that Region V officials purposely or inadvertently violated the FOIA, 5 USC8552.

(1) On December 14 we filed a Freedcm of Information' request for all dccuments" prepared by U.S. Government sployees in connection with a Nuclear Regulatory Ccnmission Inspection and Enforcement report dated Novenber 30, 1982 and entitled "Special Inspection of San Onofre #1, 2, and 3 fin particular Mr. Kent r. quests all earlier full or partiil drafts and/or proposed supplements to the report, as well as all records related to any deletions, frcm its final versiat."

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On January 13, 1983, CAP received its first response to mIA 82-618.

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The agency, in describing their answer as a partial response, provided

, 19 documents - .many of which were already public information. On February 15, 1983 we received a further response. This provided 25 cbcunents. It also gave us the first indication that there was a serious problem in the ability of the agency to provide the draft reports which we had requested in our initial response. The letter state:h "In your letter and in a telephone conversation with Carol Reed

. you requested inforration on drafts and final inspection report.

Ms. Reed has contacted Region V and has been informed that no

'.* drafts of the repart exist. The report was typed on a word processing

, machine and when the drafts were corrected and the new versions proofed, the old versions were destroyed."

Through continuing comerrations with mIA offi and Region V personnel involved with the inspection, it became increasingly clear that none of the substantiating dccuments would be produced voluntarily under our EIA request.

That fear was confirmed by the final agency' response received March 21, 1983.

That letter stated:

"In a telephone conversation on March 10, 1983 with Carol Ann Read, you again inquired about the existence of drafts of the report and also inquired about documentation for the interviews which were conducted in addition to the Kent, Lahr and Martin interviews. You specifically mentioned the reference to."several" interviews in the report.

"Mr. Bchby Faulkenberry, Deputy Regional Administration, Region V, was contacted by telephcne on March 10, 1983, and he has informed

. me that previcus drafts of the report were destroyed at the time succeeding drafts were prepared. He also informed me that the

, interviews nuntioned in the report were conducted while the inspectors were in the plant, and that no separate written statements other than the three that have already been provided to you were prepared. He further stated in reference to the wrd "several" that the ' inspectors recall they talked to six pipe fitters, one pipe fitter supervisor,

. two welders, and cix Bechtel quality control welding inspectors.

, The inspermrs rotes, which are not agency records and which are not

.. required t.s bc cLaincd by agency practice or procedures, were destroyed by the inspectors at the time the report was finalized."

l . 'Ihe position was cicrified in a conference call on March 23, 1983 between )

l Washington M IA officials, Region V officials and myself. At that time I l .

requested.a clarification of the inccnsistent position taken on the existence of drafts of the Kent report and interview sumaries or notes of the other l witnesses. Region V acknowledged that there, in fact, had been interview notes e

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and suanuries prepared of scxne of the individuals contacted, h- t that those notes had been destroyed. They also indicated that thers had been

.. 'at least two final drafts of the report which were not destromi ungil after the public issuance of the final report cn Dececber .'ih 3982. '

-J After an even nore thorough review of the materials provided to us '

. under IVIA, we have determined that other documents responsive te cur .

request nust still exist in Region V files. We have filed an appeal of the agency's IDIA decision on 618 today. Exhibit 9.

. (2) The destruction of agency docununts relative to insoection efforts.

, The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Inspection and Enforcement fkinual states in Section 1005-20 " Disclosure to the Public," the following in Paragraph 201:

"Except for certain safeguard inspections, all final inspection reports will be routinely disclosed to the public. Although draft inspection reports will not be disclosed cn a routine basis, they will be available to members of the public upon reauest." (enphasis added) .

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Clearly the agency's cwn policies do not make provisions for destruction of draft reports because the Regional Offi has the convenient use of a word processor. ,

, If this were an isolated incident, perhaps the Governnent Accountability Project staff would not be as concerned about this obvious violation of agency

• policy. However, Mr. Falkenberry specifically indicated on at least two occasions that the destruction of draft reports and interview notes was

" regional policy."

(3) Release of draft reports.

Curiously, the other major item of concern about the inspection and investigatica policies of Region V also concern draft reports. But in the roccnd case the violation of agency policy centers around draft reports being given to licensees' prior to the issuance of enforcenent acticn. This led,

.in at least one case, to the downgrading of enforcement action as a result of prior agency notification.

3 Gd has a confidential witness who reviewed the report in draft form prior to issuance of- the final agency report. Although our witness is not willing to go public at this, time, he/she will agree to talk to government investigators L, who are looking into this if they are not NRC internal investigators.

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, (4) The indoection and investigation practices of Region V must be

, reviewcd and brought under control by the Co mission. It is highly suspect that the sane inspectors and investigators who find it appropriate -

to share enforce: rent informtion with the targets of their investigations'do not even bother ' retaining inspection infonmtion about allegations of i serious defects'and construction flaws. In this instanoe, Mr. Kenh became the target of inspection / investigation rather than a source of information.

Region V has turned the NRCs inspection and enforcement policies into a charade. .

D. _ Inadequate Site Tour on mny occasions Mr. Kent volunteered to point out on both the SIGS and i.he Midland site areas where the welding problems were most extensive.

One instance of thin was during the October 15, 1982 interview. At the time, Mr. Kent was told that nuclear witnesses are not permitted crt construction sites for the pttrpose of identifying problems. Finally on October 25, 1982, at the request of the NRC, Mr. Kent was pennitted to t: Air -

the site to indicate the exact locations regarding the welding inadequacies.

d The tour was virtually meritless. Mr. Kent was accompanied by an NBC inspector, a regional NTO cuprvisor, and NRC investigator and several staff members of SCE and Bechtel. He was permitted to tour only a preselected area. Furthenrere, Mr. Kent was denied the use of any inspection tools

including a ladder, fillet weld gages, notes, measuring equipment, pen, pencil, etc. .

If the NBC had watM cn illustrative site tour by Mr. Kent to identify specific exanples of pr:' '.==, then they would have prcuided him with the necessary doctreents, agay.ent, and time. On the contrary, they provided -

him with a walk through tour which amounted to a public relationa sham.

Even at that, Mr. Kent identified prcblems to both industry and',NRC inspectors. These included:

transition slopes frcm the body of nuclear valves (and other equipment) to the connecting pipac w e e tco steep an incline. The actual slope was about a 45 degree angle, whereas the ASME code maximum at the time the

' contracts were signed, was less than 20 degrees maxinun.

-- le al so p_,1w.. -

. %t wNY JOINTS STIII EXISP AS PARTIALLY NELDED, UNDOUBTEDLY M 'r-GH:NDS OF PLACES. NNY OF THESE JOINTS DID NOT HAVE THE RECUIRED END RErCRNS ON THE NELDS. SCOE WERE ETEN FOUND ON CRITICAL COCTLING ETLR PIPE SUPPORrS. ,

W G

e 994 ,

ae p- a g e ,

, E. Evidence of Malice and Deliberate Undermining of 10 C.F.R. Part 19 by OI Investigator Ouen Shackleton (Fogion V) and Janus Foster 1 Region III) '

(1) 10 C.F.R. Part 19 states:

The NFC is amending its regulations in regard to.' job -

protection for employees who provide information to the Ccumission. These amendments emphasize to enployers -- that ,

is, licensees, permittees, appl,icants, and their contractors and subcontractors - that terminati7n or other acts of job discrimination against employees who engage'in activities

• ! *. furthering the purposes of the Atcmic Energy Act and the

Energy Reorganization Act is prohibited.

On September 7,1982, Mr. Kent talked to Bechtel officials. On Septenber 13, 1982, SCE and Bechtel notified the NBC about the allegations and the NRC resolutions. On October 6,1982, Regicn V was contacted by Mr. John O' Dell

. of the Los Angeles Times regarding Mr. Kent's allegations. On October 13, 1982, Mr. Owen Shackleton contacted Mr. James Fo, ster, Region III OI. The hand-written notes of that teleccm (Exhibit 10) are particularly enlightening and shed light on the eventual outoame of the Region V investigation, and potentially the Region III investig . tion. A review of'these notes are particularly disquieting. Sane commnts, listed belcw, prove to be the basis for Mr. Shackleton's entire line of questioning with Mr. Kent at his .

October .15,1982 interview.

(2) Caments by Foster, as written by Shackleton (Attachment B-4' to EDIA 618):

a. " Spent a great deal of time investigating Kent's allegations."

• This is simply not true. The only time Mr., Foster spent on Mr. Kent's allegations was during a March 1982 conference call and when Mr. Kent came on his own initiative to the Region III office in Adgust 1982 and spent approximately

. tw hours with Foster. Foster asked no questions regarding specific details or concerns about Midland, beyond the affidavit provided to the NBC.

Prior to that, the caly Region III inspection into Kent's allegations was conducted in March 1982 by Mr. Kevin Ward. Three of the four issues raised before Kent left the Midland site were dismissed at the time, but are under a second review by Region III. Further, a large nutber of Kent's Midland allegations dealt with the untrained and uncertified welders, and with the refusal of Bechtel0C inspectors to identify the prcblems and issue corrective .

action (NCRS). Both of these problems were stated recently in Mr. J. G. Keppler's Ictter of Notification notifying Consumers Power Cbmpany of a $120,000 fine against the utility as a result of a " quality assurance inplementation breakdown."

" People consider him strange."

~

(b) e

'4 t

• * = .. .. .

This statement, possibly libelous, again inplies that Kent is simply a

^'

troublemaker, regardless ,of the nerits of his allegations.

c. Mr. Fent Is Supposed Ib Be a Welding Engineer.

This ctatement is neither relevantnoraccurate. Mr. Kent holds a Diplcma in Structural Engineering, lus had forty years of practical experience in engineering and welding. (See stnmary of Mr. Kent's experience.) He was a member of the American Society for Quality Control until his dismissal fran c

• Bechtel. Pagardless, Mr. Kent is required by both federal 1.aw and industrial policy to report all violations of construction regulaticns.' 'It is both crude and inappropriate for the NRC to attack his personal qualifications, as the

.  ; means to discredit his allegations. '

d. Industry slander included in NRC investigative file.

The CAP investigation revealed evidence that the NRC actively sought cr incorporated unsubstantiated information regarding Mr. Kent. La a telephone memorandum from 0.Shackleton, Tom Bishop advised that Burns and Roe Engineers stated that:

" Kent was fired at Litton Industries because his performance was atrocious and he had high absenteeism. When fired Kent made a seventeen-page telegram to President Nixon alleging '

thdt ships were so full of faults they would make a bunch of Navy widows." (Exhibit 11.)

CAP's independent investigaticn into the Burns and Roe allegations reveal-that their attack on Mr. Kent was itself doubtful. Burns and Fm are heavily

' involved with many Bechtel construction projects, including San onofre.

Suffice it to say that it is' obvious that the ccnments suppled by Mr. Foster to Mr. Shackleton poisoned the Region V investigation from the beginning. A revicw of Shackleton's questions is evidence that he first " destroyed" Mr. Kent, using 50 pages techniques of the Transcript.) and gossip.gidbits frcm Foster. (See in particular the first

e. The Kent inspection was Curtailed and Prejudiced at the Onset by SCE and Bechtel Influence.

A review of the internal correspondence regarding the NBC's inspecticn of Kent's allegcatioim gives dailling insight into the mindset with which the NRC began the Kent investigation / inspection effort.

Examples are listed below:

'- Meeting notes, 10/14/82, frca a Region V meeting, state the following (Attachent 12): -

e 1

The 257 rp transcript of the NRC-Kent meeting is available 3D the PDR under FOIA request #618 b

. -15'- ,

-(l) Intervies Yant for all his concerns.

(2) Need full investigative sup; ort.

(3) Technical positions in Region AII ard V have to be the same. '

. (Engelken)

(4) Have mR reaffirm their hosition on the ASME Code (enphasis added).

(5) Call Fitzgerald/Mard and discuss the matter with him. (Exhibit 32)

Peport #82-27, Oct. 5,1982, was.,the initial (pre-publicity) NRC review of Southern California Edison's questions to resolve Kent's allegations.

Tne report states:

"The inspector reviesed the licensee's actions to resolve these allegations by discussions with licensee personnel and examination of doc'.rnentation.

The licensee appeared to have taken ccurprehensive investigation action and adequately addressed all issues. The licensee's investigation did not substantiate any allegatica."

Unfortunately,' it is this cursory review of the licensee's self-examination that provides the basis for the hT's position.

In a*Noventer 17, 1982, Memo for Thcmas M.' Novak from William F. Johaston,

Subject:

Allegations by Earl Kent concerning adequacy of weldaants at San Onofm Units 1, 2 and 3," the following statement confirms the lack of indegndant analysis of Mr. Kent's technical concerns.

' "'Ihe review has included: (1) interviewing the people who acconpanies Mr. Kent on a walk-through tour of the plants . . .,

(2) repeating the tour and inspecting those welds which he pointed out were of concern to him, (3) review of the documents provicied by, the applicant denenstrating ccupliance with tre applicable ccxies.

We conclude that there is no merit in the allegations made by Mr. Kent, and reccumend that no further action be taken. The Pechtal' Peaer Corporation (BIC) provided doctmentation to refute

__,_ the allecations by Mr. Kent. This doctrnentation was gathered and i assccbled without BPC having the specific allegations by Mr. Kent i

as expressed in his statements. The documentation was thorough,

'and refuted all of the allegations."

- Yne.recent " Request for Technical Assistance," Octcher 29,1982, frca Jesse L. Crews, Director, Division of Resident, Reactor Projects and Engineering Programs The Inspectionto Mr.priorities Darrell Eisenhut, of the hT.Director of the Division of Licensing, states (Exhibit 13) i-I

Obviously Kent's inspection had a prcdetermin.ed tireframe!

"It is our intention to have a satisfactory resolution on all o,f, the allegations by Mr. Kent prior to lio2nse issuance for San Onofre Unit 3, tentatively'estiruted by Region V as Noveaber 15, 1982. Your assistan in this tine frame would be ,

appreciated."

III. The specific technical concerns raised by Mr. Kent have not been adequately -

l investigated or they have b mn obfuscated by NRC rhetoric which ignores key issues that Mr. Kent is laising about welding at nucler power plants.

The following technical items are recorded in the order that they are inclMM in the " KENT rescrt" issued Novenber 30th by Fagion V. After each allegation a review of the inspection's effort is provided. This section of the analysis has been developed by engineers frcm several disciplines, as well as reviewed with representatives of the professional organizations involved 'with Mr. Kent's code viol'ation concerns.

Mr. Miguel A. Pulido, a nechanical engineer, served as technical coordinator of the evaluation of the data provided: )

Allegation: ,

j 8.a. " Pip,e fitters samtimes use pipe cutters to rake scribe rarks for socket weld fit-up measuremnts. These scribe narks caused grooves in both stainless and carbon steel pipes about 1 inch back frcm the weld area. I am ccn rned that these grooves might cause stress raisers. These conditions exist cn socket welded fittings at ran&xa ,

in Units 1 and 2, and possibly a few in Unit 1."

i Contrary to the NRC conclusions, there is at least on case wh% substan tlates this allegation in the NRC's own report.

"One instance was identified, to the inspector, where a pipe cutter had been used to scripe a pipe."

This is a perfect example of what the allegation refers to. In this particular case, a Ncnconforrance Feport (NCR)No. P-3330 was generated. The pipe in questica here was part of the Auxiliary Feedwater System at Unit 3, has b m n repaired.

Poor investightiEpra~ctices are denonstrated in the additicnal response to this allegation. The investigator cnly measured the depth of scribe marks on "several of the fittings " (Pg. 8, fourth paragraph, last sentence).

SONGS has thousands of such welds and nore than several should have been inspected for notch depths. Numerous ccmplaints have been rade by our organization about the NBC's lack of using statistical sampling rethods to determine the number' of items required to take an accurate sanple, and the techniques used to judge the

[- results.of that sarple.

A large portion of the response to the allegaticn rwis with the 5% criterion limit. Bechtel Engineers performed calculations to show that stress raisers caused l by notches having this 5% depth would be within code design margins. 'Ihis entire approach does not siiress the allegation. The allegation did not conterd that a -

51 notch depth would violate the code. The allegation stated::

"I am concerned that these grooves might cause stress raisers."

I

, There is no question that they cause stress raisers.

What the NRC' investigator should have done is to inspect a

~

reasonable sample of socket welded fittings and examine all of those fittings tc determine the depth of the marks (grooves or notches) .

,L Allegation: '

, 8.b. "Bechtel designers use fillet welds on connections of beams in pipe supports and tray hangers and do not weld'all around the joint to restrain forces in

, all directions. I' feel this is a code violation.

No prototype tests to my personal knowledge were conducted to verify the adequacy of welds. There-fore, the actual structural strength of the electrical tray hanger / tube steel welds used or the actual mate-rial at SONGS may not be truly known. This also ap-plies to the pipe supports. I also feel that the of ten partial joint strength (less than full joint integrity) and failure to weld all around the joint is a generic problem. Unfortunately, and in my opinion, the codes do not always demand full strength welding, whether all around or not."

This allegation concerns three separate issues: (1) fillet welds; (2) the failure to weld 100% around the joints; and (3) prototype testing. The NRC determined that these allegations were deemed to -

be " unsubstantiated." Yet, the NRC Regional report deals only with the failure to weld all around joints and dp,es not discuss either the fillet welds problem or prototype testing._+ The NRC report clearly refers to the NRR report as justification for Staff reso-lution of the allegations raised in paragraph 8. Yet, upon review, the MRR report deals only with the fillet weld and not with the failure to weld 100% around the' joints. Neither the NRC report nor the URR review cites any , professional codes which contradict' Mr. Kent's 1/ In fact, the rapert (p. 10) does substantiate Mr. Kent's allegation that no prv.u-ype testing was done. "The alleger's con-

• tention that no iuvLe y ew tasting was conducted...was substantiated."

The Staff, however, - adopts the judgment and explanation of the designer 2

without question. Yet, both the ASME and ANS professional codes we have reviewed clearly state .that prototype testing is a requirement, not an ' option of construction engineering. The Bechtel/SCE explanation does not even refer to ASME/AWS codes, the codes that Mr. Kent points out have been violated, but instead to the American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC) Manual. And even the sections of the AISC Manual -

referred to as justification do not address the prototype testing allegations specifically, but discuss failure modes not welding requirements.

_ _ _ . ., , _ .c. _

allegations that failure to weld 100% around the joints not only I violated the codes, but also the health and safety requirements impo, sed by the NRC. "

In essence, in its rush to clear itself of public embarrassment,

~

the NRC Region V and NRR Staff have taken a great leap.of, faith. They.

, 'have put the judgment concerning dangerous code violations with serious i

' implications for the safety of the public into the. veryf ands of those wh R have a direct interest in the vindication of their practices..

' Mt. Kent's allegation is simply that welding all around the '

joint would make the weld integrity greater. Bechtel engineers deter- ,

mine weld adequacy by look.ing at average stress distribution across <

, the joint instead of realistically considering peaks.

Thi's allegation takes exception to both code. and nimplementation of the welding requircments by Bechtel.

Allegation: \

)

3 8.c. "The ASME Code rYquires adequate root penetration ' ,

of fillet welds.' I recal1 that some of the vendor supplied welded hardware appeared to not have ade-1 quate root penetration. The one vendor I recall is "Zack," I.believe a supplier of HVAC equ pment. I remember one instance on a piece of Zack{ hardware

, where a fillet weld with inadequate welding was iden-tified during inspection on site. Jhislipstance das subsequently corrected by weld repafs after installa-tion in the plant. I do recommend that the NRC examine the beginning and end of fillet welds to assure' root penetration at these areas and verify tiiat all craters are fil'aed, and conduct destructive < testing '

' of selected suDports ' supplied by this ven' dor' to after-mine if other fillet 9 elds and groove welds, have, ade-quate root penetration or other codes violations."

In this instance the Region V ' report takes a particularly cophomoric approach to discredit Mr. Kent. Their response can be summarized as '

follows: a mock' exacerbated search of the SONGS vendor to find a '

"Zack Company." -

l S3mply reading the transcript of Mr. Kent's 7-hour interview reveals that"all three NRC/ Region V and OI inspectors should have been

'well awarp that Mr. Kent's Zack allegations were in reference to ques-tions they asked about the Midland plant. (Transcript, pp. 29-30).

Furthereone of the reasons Mr. Kent did not sign the 6-page statement prepared by Region V investigators was because they had grossly.. mis-stated his factual allegations. Mr. Kent has always been aware o'f s

.the serious problems of welding done by the Zack Company in Midltnd, Mic higan. To' misstate his clear knowledge is inexcusable.

y .

N k

Finally, although the Region V inspection would have the public  ;

believe 'that there were "no items of noncompliance or deviations identJfied" 19 relation to allegation 8c, nothing could be further

.,,' from the truth.

e ,

1 r c Qa,

_ 1- .

x# ,

.. '+

The Zack Company has caused innumerable problems in Region III.

At Midland all Zack welders were laid off on December 2, 1982, and again in'ngy 1993, because they were trained by a testing agency not on the Approved vendors List (AVL). The Zack problems at Midland Ted to a

+

$38,000 fine in 1981, and are now the subject of a major Region IV

, vendor inspection investigation, an Office of Investigations (OI) in-vestigation, and a Region III IE inspection.

s It in unclear how many of the 218 hours0.00252 days <br />0.0606 hours <br />3.604497e-4 weeks <br />8.2949e-5 months <br /> we're spent on looking

, for a Zack Company that didn't exist at SOMGS. Had the IE inspectors referred to the transcript in which the allegation was made,,they could- <

have sav,ed that time.

. Allegation:

8.d. "A steel, bracket would be placed, I was told, between a Unit l ' hydrogen line on trip for steam generator.

This was done because the hydrogen line had worn thin due to rubbing with another line. I believe maintenance people at the site, who were working during the period when damage due to the Unit 1 diesel generator fire was being corrected, would remember and be able to locate the design change and spacer. I don't recall the exact location of the hydrogen line. To the best of my recollection, there

, wasn't equipment within ten feet. I don't remember if*there was any nuclear safety-related equipment nearby, and about the potential for loss of human life and firc, should this line rupture. I recom-

..nend NRC cunduct an examination of this hydrogen line and make certain it has sufficient wall thickness to be safely operated. Mostly likely, I prevented a major fire in Unit 1 and probably save the lives of

. several (or more) working here'"

Although the NRC concluded that there was no substantiation .to this allegation, in fact, the report itself validates Mr. Kent's concerns. '

)

l (

In the course of the walkdown, the inspector f iidentified ebe following:

L I Ferr lir.: rupports were missing.

su l . One support was not connected to the overhead i H ancher ;cint and was hanging from the pipe.

The 'line was supported with baling wire at one

~

puint and with duct tape at another.

Mr. Kept's allegations clearly brought to the attention of both the utility and the NRC : serious problems which require d repair and resolutions. .

l

. i

.U.

o

(

_____ n -_ - _ _______. -

_ gf _

Allegation

. . 8.e. "I am of the opinion that weld end returns are not required on Bechtel drawings. This is in violation

, of RMS-Dl.1, Section 8, 1974 Edition, paragraphs

,, 8.8.6, 8.8.6.1, and 8.8.6.2. These conditions exist

. on details in many structu'ral applications. A two-page Bechtel Power Corporation table establishes that certain pipe supports and other items must con-form to. AWS Dl.1 requirements ."

Mr. Kent contends that the word "shall" (see p. 12, fourth line, NRC '

Finding) in this case means that there is no prerogative to be used here.

Inspectors are given codes, rules and standards to inspect by. In this case Mr. Kent had a two-page table. Attached is a copy of

~

that table (Exhibit 11 ), given to Mr. Kent by Mr. E. Puckett, Quality Control Engineer.

Thi's table clearly calls out certain codes and specifications. It does not allow for the substitution of Bechtel specifications. The inspector stated (at p. 14, 1. 9) that:

It, therefore, appears that Bechtel specifications correctly assign code jurisdictional boundaries and provide for appropriate inspection criteria within those jurisdictional boundaries.

. This, however, is not the issue. Mr. Kent was inspecting in accor-dance with the two-page table, and identified numerous missing end returns. Bechtel claims that it can confirm.to the code and simul-taneously drop end returns, as long as they satisfy the intent of the Bechtel further claims the intent of the AWS D.l.1 1974 8.9.6

~

code.

code is best expressed by the AISC Construction Manual, 7th Edition.

In any event, Mr. Kent was an inspector, inspecting in accordance with the two-page table that was provided. Under that criteria, he was right. Obviously, he is not the only Bechtel inspector. In investigating this issue it is not clear how many other inspectors .

the NRC questioned or if any of the others had that two-page table.

l A proper investigation would cover the important issues being raised' here about implementa_ tion of the codes.

l Allegation:

8.g. "Bechtel generated (I was told) a 92 page MCR on electrical tray hangers. 'I question whether the welds made on electrical supports prior to the NCR resolution were adequately or completely fixed."

. Some history is in order in addressing this allegation. Mr. Kent and Mr. Lahr found that the acceptance criteria for flare-bevel welds and the dir'ections, i.e., drawings, were not clear. There was such confusion that this extasive NCR -was developed. -

c This kJCR did result in a revision of Bechtel specifications (see p. 20)

, . . to clarify the matter. However, by that point in time there were hundreds of welds that were not filled, i.e., flush. Bechtel's calcu-

. lations (p.. 21, para. 3) to determine if~tEese incomplete, non-flush welds were theoretically acceptable. They concluded, and the NRC concurs, that the existi~ng conditions could be "dispositioned." (Note that 15 tube steel supports were reworked as a result of.this NCR,'

p. 21.)

Mr. Kent's allegation questions the adequacy of this disposition.

The NRC inspector examined 14 supports, and found 3 that were not filled to flush. He concluded that this was acceptable since it

, was covered by the NCR_ resolution (p. 22, para. 2). However,

. 1) If more supports are examined, it is likely that some are not covered by the NCR. -

2) In the entire " investigation" by the NRC there is no analysis performed independently of Bechtel on this point.

The adequacy of the NRC's effort on this part is both substantively weak, and empirically flawed.

Allegation:

'8.h. "Bechtel has not, in my opinion, complied with the requirements of AWS D.l.1 (1974) edition), paragraphs 5.12.1. 5 ( 2) , (b) and 8.15.1.3 regarding filling of open weld craters on tray hangers and other items to crossection of the weld."

The NRC simply restates the Bechtel position. (See p. 23 of the Bechtel Paper.) In essence, Bechtel's position paper admits that

, Mr. Kent's allegation is substantiated. Their justification for not substantiating it is that cases that don't meet the code,-,i.e.

"under filled," are analyzed based on conservative criteria.

Whether their analysis is conservative or not is not the issue.

Mr. Kent's concern is that the code is clearly being violated --

not that there is a degree of violation.

There is no analy=in of the subject here by the NRC. Again, the, NRC simply restates Bechtel's position.

Allegation:

8.i. "Bechtel has not, in my opinion, removed all arc strikes or blemishes from base metal on pipe sup-ports or structural steel as required by AWS Dl.1 paragraph 4.4."

In reality, the investigation performed by the NRC here really consisted of: "The inspector examined portions of several safety-

. related piping systems and did not observe any arc strikes." (At p.25.)

s em,

- . _ ..~ _ ._. -_ _. ._ __

+

And: -

. >- "The inspector could not find any arc strikes in the field which had not already been identified and dis-positioned by Bechtel."

There Ls no indication of how many pipe supports were examined, nor the methodology of the exami' nations. The remainder of the NRC response to this issue does not even address the allegation. .

Allegation: . <

8.j. "I' observed instances where run off plates had not been '

i used as required by AWS Dl.1 paragraph 4.6 on groove

, weld terminations. I cannot recall any specific locations,

..but I do recall observing this condition on beam and girder splices, as supplied by at least one vendor."

The " investigation" in this case consiste'd of:

"The inspector examined several exposed strutural steel beams and columns and did not identify any instances

of improper run-off plate use."

~

The remainder of the response. simply mentions where and.why 4

run-off platea should.be used. .

Q In the opinion of the professional engineer's working with GAP on this report, this is not an adequate ' inspection. effort. -

Allegation:

8.k. "I believe that a spacer plate is missing on the upper inside-door hinge of the Unit 2 containment personnel hatch because I observed a gap in the weld joint of about 1/4 inch. I brought this to the attention of my super-visor (name) who also shared that belief. I believe-that by bringing this condition to the attention of my super-visor I had properly performed by duty to identify this condition. I'did not compare the drawing requirements .

to the installed condition in making this determination-

"- of a missing spacer plate be'cause my supervisor had indicated to me that it was the 9endor's-problems to.

correct it and I had other work.ea do immediately."

Like'many of Mr. Kent's other allegations this item has been-l clearly subitantiated., Bechtel's own audit (Exhibit 15) identifies a " gap" in'the exact location that Mr. Kent ' identified the gap during his employmenc:at SONGL some two years ago.. Clearly the item was an important oversight then,.and' required both engineering ~ analysis and

[.

a revision in the design blueprints to justify not' requiring rework. .

t t

l_

l

.. I.

e *e- ,

• a =

With this allegation, as with numerous others, the NRC has decided to discredit and dismiss Mr. Kent's concerns instead of honestly reporting that Mr. Kent brought a matter to the attention of both the agency and the licensee that required technical resold--

tion. .

f Allegation:

8.1. "I believe that Bechtel has misinterpreted the require- -

'

• ments of the ASME Section III welding standards regarding <

socket weld engagement length without initiating a code case and cbtaining appropriate code relief. The ASME code requires a gap between the pipe end and the fitting of "approximately 1/16 inch." I believe that the code should provide a more definitive acceptance criteria than merely "approximately 1/16 inch."

Clarification of this allegation is not necessary. 1/16 inch is the minimum acceptable from separation. Yet a Bechtel memo which Mr. Kent has provided to his private attorney, Mr. Melvin Belli, allows this distance to become'any length, so lonn m thanine is not withdrawn from the socket.

Allegation: ,'

8.m. "Bechtel Specification WQ-2, sheet 20,. note 1, requires "shall not exceed 1/3 inch . . . " regarding maximum groove weld reinforcement at Midland, Michigan's Twin Nuclear Plant. This requirement should read "shall not exceed 1/8 inch . . . " as required by the ASME Section III code.

on groove weld reinforcement. This 1/3 inch height may be, also, mistakenly implemented at San Onofre."

Mr. Kent's allegation in this instance is proven on page 25, part 3 where Bechtel admits the 1/3 inch is a " typo".

If Bechtel is not going to weld in accordance with the code, the appropriate professional society should make a determination as to the acceptability. A " typo" that mistakenly denotes 1/8 of an inch for 1/3 of an inch is a good example of the type of error that cannot be tolerated in nuclear plant construction.

Allecation:

! 8.o. "The alleger indicated that Bechtel Power Corporation at the San Onofre-2/3 site allows: (1) low hydrogen weld

, rod to be in open air for eight hours prior to use; (2)

[ that Bechtel does not place low hydrogen electrodes in a l drying / holding oven'after removal from the hermetically sealed cans; and (3) that the Bechtel site procedures allow the issuance of weld rod upon removal from the hermetically

. sealed can."

Here Mr. Kent claims again that Bechtel is violating the code.

Through tests Bechtel~ claims 12 hoors are justified, and the NRC Concurs.

4 L

J. ; .

i .

, t Yet, the code allows 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. In order to determine if what

' Bechtel has dene is acceptable, engineers advising GAP believe there would have to be a consultation with representatives from the governing code organizations. -

If what Bechtel has done in unacceptable, then virtually every

' weld on the site may be unacceptable.

Allegation: -

t 8.r. "The alleger, during the tour of the site on October 25, l 1982, identified instances in the Low Pressure and High Pressure Safety Injection Systems and the Component Cooling Water System where he believed the tapering requirements of the ASME B&PV Code had been violated in the welding of piping to certain valves. As examples of the concern ,

the alleger pointed out two Unit 3 pipe to valve attachment welds which had a section on the valve body that approached a 1:1 slope instead of the 3:1 slope that he believed should exist to conform to ASME Code requirements."

This is an important and relatively simple allegation to be ,

resolved. Mr. Kent claims one thing and the NRC addressed another.

(See pg. 166 of the Bechtel Position Paper.)

The diag' ram, which supports the NRC response, is simply not what Mr. Kent is concerned about. Instead, he is concerned that Bechtel has been using the wrong number, possibly across the country. This allegation is also substantiated, but disputed. (Exhibit 14 ) .

The technical concerns listed above represent an overview and technical analysis of Mr. Kent's allegations at San'Onofre. Our own review of the Bechtel and Southern California Edison justifica-tion discover that their efforts are largely defensive and avoid the key issues raised by Mr. Kent.

1 Unfortunately for the public, the NRC has chosen to regurgitate

the utility's self-examination. There'can be no confidence in an agency that refuses to conduct even the minimum.of independent analysis on serious technical concerns.

~

, Th'refore, we are requesting an independent technical analysis e'

of the.Assues raised by Mr. Kent, as well.as a second investigation effort on bchalf of the NRC by another agency.-

It is not enough for the NRC te accept Bechtel's justification.

of its own arrogant disregard for the professional codes that govern nuclear power plant construction. To illustrate the dangers of this, the following excerpts are incorporated from an independent design i-and construct {pn verification program .(IDCVP) at the Midland Nuclear Power Plant. _. ,

1/ - The Midland Nuclear Power Plant, -Units 1 and.2,f,has Bechtellas

~

the designer,-. engineer, and constructor.

N .. , ,  !

\

. i Tha.first monthly' report'of th2 IDCVP audit of the Auxiliary Foodwater System found several examples of Bechtel codes not ,

i meeting professional codes or contract sp,ecifications. For example, TERA confirmed item report C-028 which states that "The AFW system design may not meet a B&W interface . .

requirement that auxiliary.feedwater temperature be at ~

least 400 F. B&W's BOP criteria for AFW (Ref. 1) requires .

a 400 F minimum AFW temperature. Thi's criterion in -

consistent with the B&W document for reactor coolant system analysis (Ref. 2) whichiis used in analysis of reactor coolant system componen'ts. Bechtel calculation FM-4117-28 (Ref. 3) uses a 320 F temperature as a worst case winter temperature. The recommendation contained in the original was implemented, but no addition analyses were

, identified.

Item C-045 states:

"1. Manufactureri s recommended storage instructions require motor shaft rotation ever'y two weeks while' motor is in storage (Ref: Vendor Doc. No. 7220-M14-68) .

2. Bechtel procedure governing in-place' maintenance (F-10-247) requires rotation of motor shaft every 90 days,

• exceeding the maximum duration between shaft rotations, as recommended by the vendor, by a factor'of 6.

And finally item C-046 states thatt

.. _ l. Pt:::p manufacturer's reu.mu&d storage instructions require pump to be senrM under vacuum with VPI crystals (dessicant) to maintain relative humidity at less than 50%.

2. Bechtel Procedure for storage of pumps, Proc. #f-10-ll8, does not require vacuum nor humidity check #1 above

3. Further to concern, review of records indicates punp have been open, subject to flooding & other damage, & several NCR's remain open against the AFW ptznp turbinc.

s These have been included as Exhibit 16.

IV. Narbut Report In response to our FOIA request #614, we received an OIA investigation into alleged violations of NRC regulations by a R.egion V inspector, Paul Narbut, -in thei spring of 1982 concerning thei ~

release of a draft investigation / inspection report. Upon review of j the OIA report ("Narbut report") it is clear tha't front at least 1981 0

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to 1982 Region V had a policy about sharing draft inspection /investi-

,gation reports with licensees -- a policy that is in direct c'onf_lict with NRC regulations. Although the resolution of that problem came n in an April 1982 memorandum to all Region V personnel from Mr. -

Engleken ,following the Hayward Tyler Pump incident in Regio ~n IV, the fact remains that for almost two years Region V managemegt. had a policy that was indirectly violating federal regulations._1/

At a minimum'this raises serious questions about the,ju'agment .

and competence of the Regaional Administration. However, even more <

serious is the way that OIA administrators handled the very clear findings contained in the Narbut report. (Exhibit 17) The Narbut case involves a draft inspection report being released to a licensee, specifically a draft inspection report to the Washington Public Power Supply System in April 1982.

However, other cases discovered in the OIA investigation included a Region V release of a draft report to Southern California Edison concerning security problems at San Onofre (SONGS) in March, 19 82, which resulted in '-- apparently -- planned emadatil enforcement action being dropped. .

In a June 22, 1982 letter to Mr. James Cummings, Director of the Office of Inspector & Auditor, the investigator who directed the Narbut investigation registered his dissent about the internal edit by his superiors. (Exhibit 17)

"I am not cuestioning your authority in overruling me on this matter, nor do I feel that you were obliged to mention my views to the Commission. Howeve'r, I do believe that the memo improperly states that there'was unanimity in its recommendations . . . "

Details of the San Onofre Case In the course of investigating the Narbut case, OIA asked Rsgion V staff whether they knew of other cases'where draft reports had been released. The most detailed and significant example given by the NRC staff involved a March 8,1982 release concerning safeguards deficiencies at the San Onofre site in San Clemente, California. The release occurred with the knowledge and approval of the Regional Enforcment Director and the cognizant 1! . An October 21, 1981 Procedure for Initiating, Conducting and Reporting Enforcement Conferences " clearly directed Region V's personnel to provide licensees with a draft notice of violation in advance of any enforcement." (OIA Report, page 48.) This contradicts Section 04 of the IE Manual, Chapter 1025, dated April 17, 1981, that '

states: " Advance copies of inspection / investigation reports provided ,

to Headquarters in support of escalated enforcement action should not I be sent to licensee / vendors for review in accordance with this chapter until the documents initiating the enforcement action have been signed and issued."

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Division Director. 'Further more, it took plate at a time when escalated action was being actively considered. The particular fact is important because NRC rules, as stated in the IE manual,

- .-- apparently indicate that no reports --drafts or final--should be given to licensees until after the enforcement action has been

. fully determined.

• In this case, however, it appears that a planned escalated en-forcement action was cancelled partly because of the release of ~

the draft report. Because of. a prompt written response by Southern ,

California Edison to Region V's' concerns, no escalated enforce- l ment action was taken. The matter is complicated because of a March 9, 1982 change in NRC's enforcement policy establishing somewhat different criteria for what violations require civil penalities.

Nevertheless, prior to releasing the draf t report, prior to meeting with the licensee and prior to receiving the licensee's ,.

responses to NRC's concerns, Region V staff had planned to pro ~

pose a fine of $20,000.00.

Conclusion The resdits of the NARBUT investigation into Region V's in-spection policies, coupled with the handling of the KENT allegations, leave the Commission n~o choice but to take immediate strong action to restore public confidence in the NRC's Region V office. This can be done only by an independent investigation of both Mr, Kent's allegations and the NRC inspection of his chargea. We Icok forward to the direction of the Commission on this item in the near future. -

Sincerely, l_00

• n k Billie Pirner Garde '

Citizens Clinic Director BPG/mt i

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