ML20084E152

AO 50-244/74-14:on 740807,safety Injection Pump 1C Failed to Start Manually on Bus 16.Cause Not Determined.Westinghouse Specialist to Examine Breaker.Possible Replacement of Lockout & Tripper Bar Assembly Recommended

ML20084E152
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	08/15/1974
From:	Amish K ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:	James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20084E156	List: ML20084E152 ML20084E158
References
AO-50-244-74-14, NUDOCS 8304140361
Download: ML20084E152 (3)

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ROCHESTER CAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION e 89 EAST AVENUE, ROCHESTER, N.Y. IN49 stiTH w 4wisH ince=o=s scu c verc peu. cast anea cops tie 546 2700 uur. c .w m."

August 15, 1974 .

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Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director O t ""'P ,-

Directorate of Regulatory Operations 'h c ME~Cf Region I g U. S. Atomic Energy Commission 631 Park Avenue '

King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Subject:

Abnormal Occurrence 74-14: Failure of I-C Injection Pump to start manually from Bus 16 .

R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No.1 Docket No. 50-244

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

In accordance with Technical Specifications, Article 6.6.2a, the attached report of Abnormal Occurrence 74-14 is hereby attached.

Very truly yours,

.) /p; R Keith W. Amish Attachment j -a?Y pcsh 8304140361 740815 PDR ADDCK 05000211 s P""

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1. Repon No.: 50-244/74-14 2a. Report Date: August 15, 1974 2b. Occurrence Date: August 7,1974

3. Facility: R. E.' Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No.1

4. Identification of Occurrence:

This abnormal occurrence is defined by Technical Specifications Article

1. 9d: Failure of one or more components of an engineered safety feature or plant protection system that causes or threatens to cause the feature or system to be incapable of performing its intended function.

5. Conditions Prior to Occurrence:

At the time of the occurrence, the plant was at approximately 70% reactor power.

6. Descriotion of Occurrence: i 1

While ccnducting Periodic Test (PT 2.1), and following the satisfactory test of the 1A and 1B Safety Injection Pumps, the IC Safety Injection Pump which can be operated from either Bus 14 or Bus 16, failed to start manually on Bus 16 the first time it was tried. It had started properly T from Bus 14, but the first time it was tried from Bus 16, it failed to start.

The second try was successful and the surveillance of the 1C pump was completed. The 1C pump was again started from Bus 14 and then twice +

more from Bus IS.

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7. The 1C Safety Injection Pump can be operated from either Bus 14 or Bus 16.

During a safeguard opera' ting sequence, Bus 14 is the preferential Bus and i Bus 16 is considered the alternate Bus. A lockout scheme exists between the two supply breakers to insure that only one breaker can be closed at a time. When the system is functioning properly, the lockout relay will [

energize when a breaker closure is called for, providing that all inter-  :

locks are satisfied.

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The sequence for proper operation is as follows:  !

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a. The lockout relay's plunger will force the trip bar downward and properly latch the breaker's mechanicalclosing mechanism. .

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The movement of the trip bar closes a trip bar switch which then permits the breaker control relay to operate ('X" coll),

c. Operation of the control relay reflects a closed "X" contact in the circuit for the breaker closing coil. ,

d. The closing coil is then energized and the coil's armature will travel l

upward resulting in actuation of the breaker closing mechanism.

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During the investigation of the cause, the circuit breaker was operated five times in the test position with no failures. The test position eliminates the lockout interlock scheme. The lockout interlock scheme is part of the closing sequence when the circuit breaker is in the oper-ating position.

The breaker assembly was completely inspected by the station electri-clans. No abnormal condition was found.

8. Analysis of Occurrence:

There were no safety implications because the pump did start from Bus

. 14, and also both the 1A and IB Safety Injection pumps started satis-factorily. There were no consequences or potential consequences from the standpoint of public health and safety.

9. Corrective Action:

The Plant Operations Review Committee reviewed the occurrence and has i recommended the following:

a. The 1C Safety Injection Pump be started from Bus 16 on a weekly basis until the next scheduled monthly periodic test.

b. Westinghouse be contacted, to provide a specialist to examine this breaker.

! c. Investigate the possible replacement of the lockout and tripper bar assembly.

10. Failure Data:

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! a. The failure of the IC Safety Injection Pump to start from Bus 16 has l occurred previously on the following dates: June 11,1973 (Abnormal l Occurrence 73-3); June 12,1973 (Abnormal Occurrence 73-4);

l April 6,1974 (Abnormal Occurrence 74-4); and June 3,1974 when a faulty contact was found in the W-2 control switch. This last failure only affected the manual start and was intermittent, so it was not reported as an abnormal occurrence.

b. Equipment identification - Westinghouse DB-50 Air Circuit Breaker, 500 amp. rating. .

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