IR 05000346/2001016
| ML020710594 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 03/08/2002 |
| From: | Christine Lipa NRC/RGN-III/DRP/RPB4 |
| To: | Bergendahl H FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co |
| References | |
| IR-01-016 | |
| Download: ML020710594 (23) | |
Text
rch 8, 2002
SUBJECT:
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-346/01-16
Dear Mr. Bergendahl:
On February 15, 2002, the NRC completed an inspection at your Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings, which were discussed on February 12, 2002, with Mr. Randy Fast and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection, one issue of very low safety significance (Green) was identified. However, because of the very low safety significance and because this problem was entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating this issue as a Non-Cited Violation, in accordance with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. If you deny this Non-Cited Violation, you should provide a response with the basis for your denial, within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and to the NRC Resident Inspector at the Davis-Besse facility.
Immediately following the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the NRC issued an advisory recommending that nuclear power plant licensees go to the highest level of security, and all promptly did so. With continued uncertainty about the possibility of additional terrorist activities, the Nations nuclear power plants remain at the highest level of security and the NRC continues to monitor the situation. This advisory was followed by additional advisories and although the specific actions are not releasable to the public, they generally include increased patrols, augmented security forces and capabilities, additional security posts, heightened coordination with law enforcement and military authorities, and more limited access of personnel and vehicles to the sites. The NRC has conducted various audits of your response to these advisories and your ability to respond to terrorist attacks with the capabilities of the current design basis threat. From these audits, the NRC has concluded that your security program is adequate at this time.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely, Original signed by Christine A. Lipa Christine A. Lipa, Chief Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50-346 License No. NPF-3
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 50-346/01-016
REGION III==
Docket No: 50-346 License No: NPF-3 Report No: 50-346/01-16(DRP)
Licensee: FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company Facility: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Location: 5501 North State Route 2 Oak Harbor, OH 43449-9760 Dates: January 1, 2002, through February 15, 2002 Inspectors: S. Thomas, Senior Resident Inspector D. Simpkins, Resident Inspector M. Bielby, Senior Operations Engineer T. Ploski, Sr. Emergency Preparedness Analyst J. House, Sr. Radiation Specialist Approved by: Christine A. Lipa, Chief Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS IR 05000346-01-16, on 01/01-02/15/2002, FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company, Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station. Public Radiation Safety.
This report covers a 6-week routine inspection conducted by resident inspectors and regional specialists. The inspection identified one Green finding and an associated Non-Cited Violation.
The significance of most findings is indicated by the color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using IMC0609 Significance Determination Process (SDP). The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described at its Reactor Oversight Process website at http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/index.html.
A. Inspection Findings Cornerstone: Public Radiation Safety Green. A finding and associated Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR 71.5(a) and the Department of Transportation regulations contained in 49 CFR 172.504 was identified for the failure to placard vehicles used to transport radioactive materials (Section 2PS2.1).
This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the shipment was exclusive use, dose rates were minimal, the shipment was marked properly, and the shipping papers were correct.
B. Licensee Identified Findings No findings of significance were identified.
Report Details Summary of Plant Status The plant operated at 100 percent power throughout most of the inspection period. Exceptions were for brief power reductions to about 93 percent for turbine testing, to 90 percent at the request of the system dispatcher, and to 15 percent on January 4, 2002, to remove the generator for repairs of a hydrogen cooler leak. Subsequent repairs were completed and the plant returned to 100 percent on January 7, 2002. On February 15, 2002, the plant began a planned down-power in preparation for starting a planned refueling outage the following day.
1. REACTOR SAFETY Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, and Emergency Preparedness 1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04Q)
.1 Decay Heat Removal Pump #2 a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a walkdown of the #2 decay heat removal pump to verify that the redundant train was in the correct lineup while the #1 decay heat removal pump was inoperable during decay heat removal pump quarterly testing. The inspectors used the checklist and drawing to determine the correct lineup. The inspectors also reviewed outstanding work orders (WO) and condition reports (CR) associated with the #2 train to verify that these documents did not reveal issues that could affect train function. The inspectors used the information in the applicable sections of the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) and Technical Specifications (TS) to determine the functional requirements of the system. During the walkdown, the inspectors also observed the material condition of the equipment to verify that there were no significant conditions not already in the licensees work control system.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) #1 a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a walkdown of the #1 EDG to verify that the redundant train was in the correct lineup while the #2 EDG was inoperable due to periodic surveillance testing. The inspectors used the system checklist and drawing to determine the correct lineup. The inspectors also reviewed outstanding WOs and CRs associated with the
- 2 EDG to verify that these documents did not reveal issues that could affect train function. During the walkdown, the inspectors also observed the material condition of
the equipment to verify that there were no significant conditions not already in the licensees work control system.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05Q)
.1 Quarterly Fire Area Walkdowns a. Inspection Scope The inspectors conducted fire protection walkdowns that were focused on availability, accessibility, and the condition of fire fighting equipment, the control of transient combustibles, and the condition and operating status of installed fire barriers. The inspectors selected fire areas for inspection based on their overall contribution to internal fire risk, their potential to impact equipment which could initiate a plant transient, or their impact on the plants ability to respond to an event. Using the documents listed at the end of this report, the inspectors verified that fire hoses and extinguishers were in their designated locations and available for immediate use, that fire detectors and sprinklers were unobstructed, that transient material loading was within the analyzed limits, and that fire doors, dampers, and penetration seals appeared to be in satisfactory condition.
The following areas were inspected:
! Fire Area for the Emergency Core Cooling System Room #1;
! Fire Area for the Emergency Core Cooling System Room #2;
! Fire Area for the Emergency Core Cooling System Heat Exchanger Room; and
! Fire Area for the Turbine Deck.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Temporary Instruction 2515/146, Hydrogen Storage Locations Inspection a. Inspection Scope The inspectors met the requirements of Temporary Instruction 2515/146, Hydrogen Storage Locations. The inspectors confirmed distances between hydrogen storage and ventilation intakes were greater than 50 feet or were in accordance with licensees commitments. Also the inspectors confirmed that distances between hydrogen storage and risk significant tanks and systems, structures, and components (SSCs) were greater than 50 feet or were in accordance with licensees commitments.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification (71111.11B)
.1 Operating Test Results a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed an in-office review of the pass/fail results of individual operating tests and simulator operating tests (required to be given per 10 CFR 55.59(a)(2)) administered by the licensee during calendar year 2001.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Rule (MR) Implementation (71111.12Q)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed systems to verify that the licensee properly implemented the MR for systems, structures, and components (SSCs) with performance problems. This evaluation included the following aspects:
! whether the SSC was scoped in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65;
! whether the performance problem constituted a MR functional failure;
! the proper safety significance classification;
! the proper 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) or (a)(2) classification for the SSC; and
! the appropriateness of the performance criteria for SSCs classified as (a)(2) or the appropriateness of goals and corrective actions for SSCs classified as (a)(1).
The above aspects were evaluated by using the MR scoping and report documents listed at the end of this report. For each SSC reviewed, the inspectors also reviewed significant WOs and CRs to verify that failures were properly identified, classified, and corrected and that unavailable time had been properly calculated. In addition, the inspectors reviewed CRs to verify that minor deficiencies identified during these inspections were entered in the licensees corrective action system.
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of the MR requirements for the following SSCs:
! service water system;
! snubbers; and
! condensate system.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Evaluation (71111.13)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the licensees management of plant risk during emergent maintenance activities or activities during a time when more than one significant system or train was unavailable. The activities were chosen based on their potential impact on increasing the probability of an initiating event or impacting the operation of safety significant equipment. The inspection was conducted to verify that evaluation, planning, control, and performance of the work were done in a manner to reduce the risk and minimize the duration where practical, and that contingency plans were in place where appropriate. The licensees daily configuration risk assessments, observations of shift turnover meetings, observations of daily plant status meetings, and the documents listed at the end of this report were used by the inspectors to verify that the equipment configurations had been properly listed, that protected equipment had been identified and was being controlled where appropriate, and that significant aspects of plant risk were being communicated to the necessary personnel.
The inspectors reviewed the following maintenance activities:
! auxiliary feedwater greyboot connectors;
! electro-hydraulic control filter replacement;
! loss of control room forebay level indication due to maintenance; and
! turbine bypass valve modifications.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R14 Performance in Non-Routine Evolutions (71111.14)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors observed operations personnel to verify personnel performance was conducted in a safe and conservative manner during the following activities:
! power reduction to take the main generator off-line to repair a leak in the hydrogen cooling system;
! loss of vacuum transient due to broken gage glass on feedwater heater; and
! main steam safety valve testing and reactor downpower in preparations for the refueling outage.
The inspectors reviewed TS, operations procedures, and facility administrative procedures to determine the acceptance criteria for the inspection activities.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors selected CRs related to potential operability issues for risk significant components and systems. These CRs were evaluated to determine whether the operability of the components and systems was justified. The inspectors compared the operability and design criteria in the appropriate sections of the TS and USAR to the licensees evaluations presented in the CRs listed below to verify that the components or systems were operable. Where compensatory measures were necessary to maintain operability, the inspectors verified by review of the documents listed at the end of the report that the measures were in place, would work as intended, and were properly controlled.
The conditions evaluated were:
! snubber inoperability and retesting; and
! valve DH14B stroke times exceeding expected durations.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R17 Permanent Plant Modifications (71111.17)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed design descriptions and drawings to determine the scope of the design changes to the station air compressor #2. The inspectors reviewed the associated safety evaluations to verify consideration of USAR, TS, and 10 CFR 50.59 requirements. Other inspection attributes included incorporation of design criteria such as channel redundancy, separation, and single failure analysis. The inspectors also reviewed the associated post-modification testing results to verify acceptable system performance and compliance with test acceptance criteria.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed post-maintenance testing activities associated with maintenance on important mitigating and support systems to ensure that the testing
adequately verified system operability and functional capability with consideration of the actual maintenance performed. The inspectors used the appropriate sections of TS and the USAR, as well as the documents listed at the end of this report, to evaluate the scope of the maintenance and verify that the post-maintenance testing performed adequately demonstrated that the maintenance was successful and that operability was restored. In addition, the inspectors reviewed CRs to verify that minor deficiencies identified during these inspections were entered into the licensees corrective action system.
Testing subsequent to the following activities was observed and evaluated:
! EDG #2 barring and idle start;
! condensate pump #1 re-installation after refurbishment; and
! main steam safety valve retesting after lift setpoint adjustments.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors witnessed selected surveillance testing and/or reviewed test data to verify that the equipment tested using the surveillance procedures (SPs) met TS, the USAR, and licensee procedural requirements, and also demonstrated that the equipment was capable of performing its intended safety functions. The activities were selected based on their importance in verifying mitigating systems capability. The inspectors used the documents listed at the end of this report to verify that the testing met the TS frequency requirements; that the tests were conducted in accordance with the procedures, including establishing the proper plant conditions and prerequisites; that the test acceptance criteria were met; and that the results of the tests were properly reviewed and recorded.
The following tests were observed and evaluated:
! motor driven feedwater pump and valve quarterly test;
! decay heat removal pump #1 quarterly test; and
! auxiliary feedwater train #1 check valve test.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes (71114.04)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed Revision 22 and Revision 21 of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Emergency Plan to determine whether changes identified in Revision 22 reduced the effectiveness of the licensees emergency planning, pending onsite inspection of the implementation of these changes.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
2. RADIATION SAFETY Cornerstone: Public Radiation Safety 2PS2 Radioactive Material Processing and Transportation (71122.02)
.1 Shipping Records a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed documentation for two shipments of contaminated spent fuel racks, shipped as exclusive use, surface contaminated objects (SCO), to verify compliance with NRC and Department of Transportation (DOT) requirements (i.e., 10 CFR Parts 20 and 71 and 49 CFR Parts 172 and 173).
b. Findings On January 22, 2001, the licensee generated Condition Report 02-00214, Lack of Placarding of Radioactive SCO Shipments, to document a problem with two exclusive use shipments of contaminated fuel racks that had been transported to a vendor for processing. The licensee was notified by the vendor that both shipments arrived without placards. A review of shipping documents indicated that all other regulatory requirements, including vehicle surveys and markings, were complied with. The licensee determined that the shipment arrived at the vendor without further incident.
This issue, if not corrected, would become a more significant concern and could impact the licensees radioactive waste shipping program and the licensees ability to make radioactive waste shipments. This issue involves the licensees Radioactive Material Transportation Program and is contrary to the DOT regulations. The NRC requires licensees to follow DOT regulations contained in 49 CFR when shipping licensed material on public highways. Therefore this issue represents a finding which the inspectors evaluated using the NRC Significance Determination Process (SDP) for the public radiation safety cornerstone. The finding did not involve radiation limits being exceeded, did not involve a package breach during transit, did not involve a certificate of
compliance finding, did not involve access to a low level burial ground, and did not involve failure to make notifications or provide emergency information. Consequently, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green).
10 CFR 71.5(a) requires that a licensee who transports licensed material outside of the site of usage, as specified in the NRC license, or where transport is on public highways, or who delivers licensed material to a carrier for transport, comply with the applicable requirements of the regulations appropriate to the mode of transport of the Department of Transportation in 49 CFR Parts 170 through 189.
49 CFR 172.504 prescribes requirements for placarding vehicles used to transport hazardous materials. Specifically, Table 1 requires that the transport vehicle be placarded on each side and each end with a RADIOACTIVE placard when transporting: (1) packages bearing a RADIOACTIVE YELLOW-III label; and (2) exclusive-use shipments of low specific activity (LSA) radioactive materials and surface contaminated objects (SCO) transported in accordance with 49 CFR 173.427(b)(3) or (c), (see footnote in Table 1, 49 CFR 173.504(e)).
Contrary to the above, on January 21, 2002, the licensee transported SCO consisting of contaminated fuel racks as exclusive use shipments in accordance with 49 CFR 173.427(b)(3), outside the site of usage as specified on the NRC license, and on a public highway and the transport vehicle was not placarded with RADIOACTIVE placards. However, because of the very low safety significance of this issue, and because the licensee entered this problem into the corrective action program (CR 02-00214) and took immediate steps to prevent this from recurring, the NRC is treating this issue as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV 50-346/01-16-01).
2PS3 Radiological Environmental Monitoring and Radioactive Material Control Programs (71122.03)
.1 Review of Environmental Monitoring Reports and Data a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the licensees Annual Radiological Environmental Monitoring Report for the years 1999 and 2000. Sampling location commitments, monitoring and measurement frequencies, land use census, the vendor laboratorys Interlaboratory Comparison Program, and data analysis were assessed. Anomalous results including data, missed samples, and inoperable or lost equipment were evaluated. The review of the Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP) was conducted to verify that the REMP was implemented as required by the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) and associated TSs, and that changes, if any, did not affect the licensees ability to monitor the impacts of radioactive effluent releases on the environment. The most recent quality assessment of the licensees REMP vendor laboratory for environmental sample analyses was reviewed to verify that the vendor laboratory performance was consistent with licensee and NRC requirements.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Walkdowns Of Radiological Environmental Monitoring Stations and Meteorological Tower a. Inspection Scope The inspectors conducted a walkdown of the 10 environmental air sampling stations and selected dosimeters to verify that their locations were consistent with their descriptions in the ODCM, and to evaluate the equipment material condition. The meteorological monitoring site was observed to validate that sensors were adequately positioned and operable. The inspectors reviewed semi-annual meteorological instrument calibration documents for the onsite meteorological monitoring program, including data recovery rates, routine calibration and maintenance activities to verify that the meteorological instrumentation was operable, calibrated, and maintained in accordance with licensee procedures. The inspectors also verified that readouts of wind speed, wind direction, and atmospheric stability measurements were available in the Control Room and that the readout instrumentation was operable.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.3 Review of REMP Sample Collection and Analysis a. Inspection Scope The inspectors accompanied a licensee REMP technician to observe the collection and preparation of environmental samples including surface and ground water, air filters (particulate) and charcoal cartridges (iodine) to verify that representative samples were being collected in accordance with procedures and the ODCM. The inspectors observed the technician perform air sampler field check maintenance to verify that the air samplers were functioning in accordance with procedures. Selected air sampler calibration and maintenance records for 2001 were reviewed to verify that the equipment was being maintained as required. The environmental sample collection program was compared with the ODCM to verify that samples were representative of the licensees release pathways. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed results of the vendor laboratorys Interlaboratory Comparison Program to verify that the vendor was capable of making adequate radio-chemical measurements.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.4 Unrestricted Release of Material From the Radiologically Controlled Area a. Inspection Scope The inspectors evaluated the licensees controls, procedure, and practices for the unrestricted release of material from radiologically controlled areas and verified that:
(1) radiation monitoring instrumentation used to perform surveys for unrestricted release of materials was appropriate; (2) instrument sensitivities were consistent with NRC guidance contained in Inspection and Enforcement (IE) Circular 81-07 and Health Physics Positions in NUREG/CR-5569 for both surface contaminated and volumetrically contaminated materials; (3) criteria for survey and release conformed to NRC requirements; (4) licensee procedures were technically sound and provided clear guidance for survey methodologies; and (5) radiation protection staff adequately implemented station procedures.
The inspectors reviewed the quality control records for radiochemistry instrumentation used to identify and quantitate radioisotopes in materials for free release, in order to verify that the instrumentation was calibrated and maintained as required by site procedures. This review included instrument calibrations, control charts, and the environmental lower limit of detection capability.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.5 Identification and Resolution of Problems a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed condition reports, the results of the licensees REMP self-assessment, a Nuclear Quality Assurance Audit and Surveillance of the REMP to determine if problems were being identified and entered into the corrective action program for timely resolution. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees overall management of the REMP, including attention to details of the sampling program and the vendor laboratory, in order to evaluate the effectiveness of the REMP in collection and analysis of samples for the detection of offsite radiological contamination.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
4. OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the Performance Indicator (PI) data submitted by the licensee for completeness and accuracy for the Reactor Coolant System Leakage PI in the
Barrier Integrity cornerstone. The inspectors compared the data reported by the licensee to the definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 2. The inspectors reviewed the licensees computerized data sources and logs to gather information regarding reactor coolant system leakage, and compared to the data reported by the licensee.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
4OA6 Exit Meetings Exit Meeting The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Fast and other members of licensee management during the February 12, 2002 exit meeting. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. No proprietary information was identified.
Interim Exit Meetings Senior Official at Exit: Dave Imlay, Operation Training Manager Date: January 14, 2002 Proprietary (explain yes): No Subject: Results of Licensed Operator Requalification Testing for Calendar Year 2001 Change to Inspection Findings: No Senior Official at Exit: R. Fast, Plant Manager Date: January 24, 2002 Proprietary: No Subject: Radiological Environmental Monitoring and Radioactive Material Control Programs, and Radioactive Material Processing and Transportation Program Change to Inspection Findings: No
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT Licensee H. Bergendahl, Vice President - Nuclear R. Fast, Plant Manager W. Bentley, Superintendent, Operations S. Coakley, Outage Manager D. Eshelman, Director, Support Services R. Greenwood, Supervisor, Health Physics Services D. Geisen, Manager, Design Engineering D. Lockwood, Manager, Regulatory Affairs G. Melssen, Maintenance Rule Coordinator J. Messina, Director, Work Management D. Miller, Supervisor, Compliance S. Moffit, Director, Technical Services W. Mugge, Manager, Nuclear Training D. Nelson, Manager, Work Control R. Pell, Manager, Plant Operations R. Rishel, PRA Specialist J. Rogers, Manager, Plant Engineering P. Schultz, Manager, Radiation Protection G. Skeel, Manager, Nuclear Security H. Stevens, Manager, Quality Assessment M. Stevens, Manager, Maintenance G. Wolf, Licensing Engineer NRC G. Grant, Division Director C. Lipa, Branch Chief LIST OF ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED Opened 50-346/01-16-01 NCV Failure to placard radioactive SCO shipment (Section 2PS2.1)
Closed 50-346/01-16-01 NCV Failure to placard radioactive SCO shipment (Section 2PS2.1)
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED CFR Code of Federal Regulations CR Condition Report DB Davis-Besse DBNPS Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station DOT Department of Transportation DRP Division of Reactor Projects DRS Division of Reactor Safety EDG Emergency Diesel Generator MR Maintenance Rule NCV Non-Cited Violation NPS Nuclear Power Station NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission OA Other Activities ODCM Offsite Dose Calculation Manual PI Performance Indicator REMP Radiological Effluent Monitoring Program SCO Surface Contaminated Object SDP Significance Determination Process SSC Systems, Structures, and Components TS Technical Specifications USAR Updated Safety Analysis Report WO Work Order
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED 1R04 Equipment Alignments SD-042 Decay Heat/Low Pressure Injection System Rev. 1 USAR Section Low Pressure Injection System Rev. 14 3.6.2.7.1.11 USAR Functional Drawing, Decay Heat/Low Pressure Rev. 7 Figure 6.3-2A Injection System P&ID M-033A Decay Heat Removal Train 1 Rev. 29 P&ID M-033B Decay Heat Removal Train 2 Rev. 39 OS-004 Decay Heat Removal/Low Pressure Injection System Rev. 32 DB-OP-6316 Diesel Generator Operating Procedure Rev. 02 1R05 Fire Protection NRC Reg. Fire Protection for Operating Nuclear Power Plants Guide 1.189 Pre-Fire Plan Fire Hazards Analysis Report Rev. 14 Dwg. A221F Fire Protection General Floor Plan El. 545'-0" & 555'- Rev. 6 0"
Dwg. A223F Fire Protection General Floor Plan El. 623'-0" Rev. 12 Dwg. A228F Fire Protection Sections A-A & B-B Rev. 2 Dwg. A229F Fire Protection Sections C-C & D-D Rev. 4 DSO-02- Telephone Call Documentation from Vern Patton, DB, January 22, 2002 00002 to D. Simpkins, USNRC, Subject: Questions Regarding H2 Storage Near BWST NFPA 50A Gaseous Hydrogen Systems, Chapter 3, Location of Gaseous Hydrogen Systems 1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification DB-OP-00000 Conduct of Operations Rev. 4 Drill Scenario Licensed Operator Training Schedule 1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation Davis-Besse System Health Report 1st - 4th Qtr 2000
Davis-Besse System Health Report 1st - 4th Qtr 2001 MRPM 06 Maintenance Rule Program Manual October 27, 2001 DB-PF-00003 Maintenance Rule Administrative Procedure June 8, 2000 Service Water System OS-20 Sh. 2 Service Water System Rev. 23 CR 01-0518 Service Water Pump Testing CR 01-0642 Collective Significance Review Of Post-Maintenance Testing Issues CR 01-1002 Unexpected Service Water Pump Motor Temperature Increase CR 01-1508 Equipment Lineups Affected Maintenance Risk Assessment CR 01-1724 Service Water Pump 3 Performance Test Data Problems CR 01-2165 Plant Equipment Lineup Did Not Match Risk Summary CR 01-2913 Unnecessary Accrual Of Unavailability CR 01-2928 Intake Structure Flooding Issue With Pumps Removed Snubbers CR 01-2251 Snubber Benchmarking CR 02-00273 Snubber A51, Failed As-Found Testing CR 02-00353 Snubber Inspection Failure CR 02-00346 Potential Generic Snubber Issue CR 02-00385 Snubber A-50, Hanger EBD-19-H76, Failed As-Found Bleed Rate CR 02-00294 Snubber A-121, Hanger HCB-3-H12, Failed As-Found Testing CR 02-00295 Snubber A-120, for Hanger HCB-3-H10 Failed As-Found Testing PCAQR Problem with Grinnel 5434-3 Snubber Test Machine 97-1504 DB-MM-05001 Bench Testing Snubbers Rev. 3
Condensate System PCAQR Samples Confirmed the Presence of Resin in the 98-1334 Feedwater and Condensate Systems Davis-Besse Root Cause Analysis Report - 1998 Feedwater Resin Intrusion Event Davis-Besse Root Cause Analysis Report - 1998 Rev. 1 Feedwater Resin Intrusion Event CR 01-3433 Condensate Pump 1-3 Motor Lower Bearing High Temperature CR 01-1757 Foreign Material In Condensate CR 01-0612 Condensate Pump 1-1 Motor Degradation 1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Evaluation CR 01-3463 #1 CREVS Compressor Failed to Start After Low Suction Pressure Trip CR 02-00217 Forebay Level Indication Taken Out of Service Without Compensatory Action DB-SS-4164 EHC Hydraulic Power Unit Test Rev. 03 CR 02-00007 OE-13070 (Greyboot Connectors) Should be reviewed for impact on DB-ME-09500 DB-ME-09500 Installation and Termination of Electrical Cables Rev. 2 CR 02-00452 Evaluation of risk associated with TBV Mod work CR 02-00403 SP13A2 Modification suspended based upon risk to the station 1R14 Performance in Non-Routine Evolutions CR 01-1996 Hydrogen Leak at G209 CR 01-2842 Main Generator Hydrogen Leakage CR 01-3458 Main Generator Hydrogen Leakage is increasing CR 02-00184 Rising Condenser Pressure due to Broken Glass on LG408A DB-OP-02518 High Condenser Pressure Rev. 1 CR 02-00521 Source Range NI 1 failed to energize on shutdown
CR 02-00522 Turbine Bypass Valve SP13B3 failed to respond to ICS control Station CR 02-00523 Turbine Bypass Valve SP13A3 failed to approximately 20% during plant shutdown CR 02-00529 Main Steam Safety Valve test procedure acceptance criteria CR 02-00502 Main Steam Safety Valve As-found test results DB-OP-02504 Rapid Shutdown Rev. 3 DB-OP-06903 Plant Shutdown and Cooldown Rev. 5 DB-OP-06904 Shutdown Operations Rev. 4 DB-OP-02000 RPS, SFAS, SFRCS Trip or SG Tube Rupture Rev. 6 1R15 Operability Evaluations CR 02-00273 Snubber A51, Failed As-Found Testing CR 02-00353 Snubber Inspection Failure CR 02-00346 Potential Generic Snubber Issue CR 02-00385 Snubber A-50, Hanger EBD-19-H76, Failed As-Found Bleed Rate CR 02-00294 Snubber A-121, Hanger HCB-3-H12, Failed As-Found Testing CR 02-00295 Snubber A-120, for Hanger HCB-3-H10 Failed As-Found Testing WPG-2 Work Process Guideline - 2, Operations Equipment Issues CR 01-2138 DH14B Stroke Time Increase CR 02-00369 DH14B Stroke Time Greater than expected CR 02-00301 DH14B erroneous movement to 50% open 1R17 Permanent Plant Modifications CR 02-00233 Collective Significance for SAC #2 Modification CR 02-00161 SAC 2 Microprocessor controls SAC 2 operation but is not CAT B software CR 02-00172 SAC 2 restoration to service violated station procedures CR 02-00183 SAC 2 post modification testing may not be adequate
CR 02-00173 Operation of SAC 2 as a lag compressor per DB-OP-06251 will not work DB-OP-06251 Station and Instrument Air System Operating Rev. 2 Procedure CR 02-00094 Problems following installation of MOD 00-0044 on SAC 2 CR 02-00026 Inadequate FPR for SAC 2 modification CR 02-00196 SAC #2 Blowdown Valve cycling excessively 1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing DB-OP-06316 Diesel Generator Operating Procedure Rev. 2 CR 02-00320 Condensate Pump Thermocouples CR 02-00146 Condensate pump 1 work did not start as desired CR 02-00529 Main Steam Safety Valve test procedure acceptance criteria CR 02-00502 Main Steam Safety Valve As-found test results 1R22 Surveillance Testing DB-PF-3162 AF-68 Reverse flow test (IST) Rev. 2 DB-PF-3153 Auxiliary Feedwater Train 1 Check Valve Tests Rev. 2 DB-SS-3091 Motor Driven Feed Pump Quarterly Test Rev. 3 DB-SP-3136 Decay Heat Train 1 Pump and Valve Test Rev. 4 DB-PF-3153 AFW Train 1 Check Valve Test Rev. 2 IEP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Emergency Plan Revision 22 Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Emergency Plan Revision 21 2PS2 Transportation TR02-0001 Uniform Low-Level Radioactive Waste Manifest January 21, 2002 Shipping Paper TR02-0002 Uniform Low-Level Radioactive Waste Manifest January 21, 2002 Shipping Paper 2002-0169 Radiological Survey Form: Container H-4 January 18, 2002 2002-0170 Radiological Survey Form: Container H-4 January 18, 2002
2002-0160 Radiological Survey Form: Rack 8 January 17, 2002 2002-0178 Radiological Survey Form: Container H-2 January 19, 2002 2002-0176 Radiological Survey Form: Container H-2 January 19, 2002 2002-0165 Radiological Survey Form: Rack 2 January 18, 2002 2PS3 Radiological Environmental Monitoring and Radioactive Material Control Programs DB-HP-01706 Release Of Material From Radiologically Restricted Rev. 5 Areas DB-CH- Radiochemistry Quality Control Program Rev. 3 00013 DB-HP-01113 Count Room Analysis System Operation Rev. 2 DB-HP-03005 Surveillance Test Procedure Rev. 4 DB-HP-10101 REMP Enhancement Sampling Rev. 4 DB-HP-00015 Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program Rev. 2 DB-HP-00013 Review and Evaluation of REMP Sample Analysis Rev. 2 Results DB-HP-03004 Surveillance Test Procedure Rev. 3 EN-DP-00103 Meteorological Monitoring Program Rev. 1 EN-DP-04000 Meteorological Monitoring System Channel Calibration Rev. 00 Data Sheets-Meteorological Primary System May 8, 2001 Data Sheets-Meteorological Backup System May 9, 2001 Data Sheets-Meteorological Primary System October 30, 2001 Data Sheets-Meteorological Backup System October 24, 2001 DB-HP-01452 Air Sampler Calibrations: Data Sheets ECP.0.11, Rev. 3 ECP.0.16, ECP.0.4, ECP.0.5, ECP.0.6, ECP.0.8 01-2674 Potentially Contaminated Oil Samples Removed From October 10, 2001 RRA Without Survey 01-1588 Area for Improvement in RP Sampling of Bulk Material June 14, 2001 Prior to Release 00-1293 Contaminated Scrubs Left at PPF May 4, 2000 00-0763 Contaminated Valve Found in PSF Maintenance Shop April 3, 2000 00-1045 Contaminated Mop Bucked Found in Clean Area April 17, 2000 01-1540 Portal Monitor Failed Daily Source Check June 15, 2001
01-2435 Vent Rig in I&C Hot Shop September 19, 2001 01-2436 Source Found in Lab Tech Detector Housing September 19, 2001 01-0636 ODCM Site Specific Dose Commitment Factor March 5, 2001 01-2864 Beach Station Power Outage October 25, 2001 01-3263 Errors in 2000 ARERR and Obsolete Dose December, 6, 2001 Assessment Software 01-3264 Radioactive Effluent Program Ownership December 6, 2001 01-2721 Required Met Tower Instrument Failure October 14, 2001 01-2812 Required Met Tower Instrument Failure October 22, 2001 02-00214 Lack of Placarding of Radioactive SCO Shipment January 22, 2002 SA-2000- Self Assessment Report: RP, Effluents, ODCM and January 25, 2001 0149 REMP AR-01- Nuclear Quality Assessment Audit Report January 17, 2002 RPPCP-01 SR-01- Surveillance Package March 9, 2001 CHEMC-01 17795 NUPIC Joint Audit of Environmental Inc. January 9, 2002 1999 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report April, 2000 2000 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report April 25, 2001 DP-60271 Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Rev. 14 Germanium Detector 3 Background Count January 20, 2002 4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification Davis-Besse System Health Report 1st - 4th Qtr 2000 Davis-Besse System Health Report 1st - 4th Qtr 2001 Unit Logs 22