ML19347D206

From kanterella
Revision as of 04:59, 18 February 2020 by StriderTol (talk | contribs) (StriderTol Bot change)
(diff) ← Older revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Requests Explanation of Sentence on Blade Failure in Aslab 810223 Memorandum & Order
ML19347D206
Person / Time
Site: North Anna  Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 03/05/1981
From: Pollard R
UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS
To: Buck J, Quarles L, Rosenthal A
NRC ATOMIC SAFETY & LICENSING APPEAL PANEL (ASLAP)
Shared Package
ML19347D201 List:
References
ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8103110457
Download: ML19347D206 (2)


Text

-.

,. /

O  !

. r , . . .

1 U111011 Of Comcensso Scismrisrs eu March 5, 1981 '

8/ 4 DOCKETED Alan S. Rosenthal, Chairman ~

US#U __

Dr. John H. Buck 6- MAR 91981 > -3 Dr. Lawrence R. Quarles Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board {sg CfP.s ei the Se:rebry C p;eg.:: a Ser.ics U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission E=--5 7 Washington, D.C. 20555 y M g 07 Gentlemen:

Regarding your February 23, 1981 Memorandum and Order in the matter of North Anna Units 1 and 2, Docket Nos. 50-338 OL and 50-339 OL, I would appreciate an explanation of one sentence in the last paragraph.

The sentence reads:

"As we observed, it may be possible to resolve the [ turbine missile] issue on the strength of a demonstration that the protective turbine covering would contain turbine missiles generated by a crack-induced blade failure (with the consequence that the risk of such a missile striking a safety structure or component is acceptably low)."

I have been observing the glacial pace of the turbine missile issue .in this proceeding since May 31, 1977 when I made a limited appearance before the licensing board and addressed this issue, among others. I would appreciate an l answer to the following questions:

1. How can the turbine missile issue possibly be resolved by considering only a crack-induced
blade failure?

l l

The practice of holding "an informal discussion" effectively precludes public scrutiny of another part of the licensing process.

g 1384 Massachusetts Avenue Camoricge. Massachusetts 02238 Telechone (617) 547-5552 1725 i Street. N W. Suite 601 Washington, D.C. 20006 Telepnone 202) 296 5600

l l

2. What is claimed to be the objective, technical i

basis for excluding disk failure, whether caused by crackin.g or destructive overspeed, from consid-eration?

3. If low probability of occurrence is claimed to i' be an acceptable resolution of the turbine missile issue, explain how that satisfies GDC-4 which requires, in part, that structures, systems and components important to safety "shall be appro-priately protected against dynamic effects, including the effects of missiles...that may result from equipment failures...."

If the answer asserts that a low probability of the effects occurring is an acceptable substitute for protection against the effects that may occur, please explain whether the same " logic" could be used to argue successfully that the remaining requirements of GDC-4, such as environmental qualification, can be similarly ignored.

I look forward to a prompt reply.

Since ly, f '

gf f j a Robert D. Pollard Nuclear Safety Engineer 4