ML19347D206
| ML19347D206 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | North Anna  |
| Issue date: | 03/05/1981 |
| From: | Pollard R UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS |
| To: | Buck J, Quarles L, Rosenthal A NRC ATOMIC SAFETY & LICENSING APPEAL PANEL (ASLAP) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19347D201 | List: |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8103110457 | |
| Download: ML19347D206 (2) | |
Text
-.
/
O 1
U111011 Of r
Comcensso Scismrisrs eu March 5, 1981 8/
DOCKETED 4
Alan S. Rosenthal, Chairman US#U
~
Dr. John H. Buck 6-MAR 91981 > -3 Dr. Lawrence R. Quarles
{
CfP.s ei the Se:rebry C Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board sg p;eg.:: a Ser.ics U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission E=--5 7
Washington, D.C.
20555 M
y g
07 Gentlemen:
Regarding your February 23, 1981 Memorandum and Order in the matter of North Anna Units 1 and 2, Docket Nos. 50-338 OL and 50-339 OL, I would appreciate an explanation of one sentence in the last paragraph.
The sentence reads:
"As we observed, it may be possible to resolve the [ turbine missile] issue on the strength of a demonstration that the protective turbine covering would contain turbine missiles generated by a crack-induced blade failure (with the consequence that the risk of such a missile striking a safety structure or component is acceptably low)."
I have been observing the glacial pace of the turbine missile issue.in this proceeding since May 31, 1977 when I made a limited appearance before the licensing board and addressed this issue, among others.
I would appreciate an l
answer to the following questions:
1.
How can the turbine missile issue possibly be resolved by considering only a crack-induced blade failure?
l l
The practice of holding "an informal discussion" effectively precludes public scrutiny of another part of the licensing process.
g 1384 Massachusetts Avenue Camoricge. Massachusetts 02238 Telechone (617) 547-5552 1725 i Street. N W.
Suite 601 Washington, D.C. 20006 Telepnone 202) 296 5600
2.
What is claimed to be the objective, technical basis for excluding disk failure, whether caused i
by crackin.g or destructive overspeed, from consid-eration?
3.
If low probability of occurrence is claimed to i
be an acceptable resolution of the turbine missile issue, explain how that satisfies GDC-4 which requires, in part, that structures, systems and components important to safety "shall be appro-priately protected against dynamic effects, including the effects of missiles...that may result from equipment failures...."
If the answer asserts that a low probability of the effects occurring is an acceptable substitute for protection against the effects that may occur, please explain whether the same " logic" could be used to argue successfully that the remaining requirements of GDC-4, such as environmental qualification, can be similarly ignored.
I look forward to a prompt reply.
Since ly, gf f j f
a Robert D. Pollard Nuclear Safety Engineer 4