ML18139A405
| ML18139A405 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry, North Anna  |
| Issue date: | 02/18/1980 |
| From: | Allen J NORTH ANNA ENVIRONMENTAL COALITION |
| To: | Bradford P NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18139A401 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8007070079 | |
| Download: ML18139A405 (8) | |
Text
'NoRTH*ANNA fNv1RoNMENrA coAunoN Charlottesville, Virginia February 18, 1980
- Mailing Address:
,u OWeu Dl-lve JlaDtaTillOs Al.ab~ 36801 (205) 836-0678 Commissioner Peter Bradford U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conmdssion Washington, D. C.
20555 Re:
Defective demineralizer design Related corrosion and cracking in Steam Generators & turbine discs In the Matter of Virginia Electric and Power Company North Anna Power Station, Units land 2 Docket Nos. 50-338 and 50-339 OL Surry Nuclear Power Station, Units land 2 Docket Nos, 50-280 and 50-281
Dear Commissioner Bradford:
NAEC commends the decision of the Commission to require an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) on the experimental replacement of steam generators at the Surry Power Station.
After so many months had passed since Mr. Denton's 2-1-79 denial to NAEC of both a public hearing and an EIS, we had virtually abandoned hope.
We would like to think that our letters of 3-4-79, 5-5-79, and 8-14-79 were of some use to you in your deliberations, and are grateful for your decision to review.
Our letter*today would again ask your prudent action in the light of recent disturbing developments:
--Westinghouse(~) admission of turbine disc cracking Discovered at both Surry reactors P~tential at both North Anna reactors, already under Appeal Board review for turbine missile problems
--Defective Powde.x demineralizer design, leading to
--Five (5) resin §Pills at North Anna #1, the largest of
- 200-300 pounds occurring on February 27, 1979 (the same date "liquid discharge from Unit #2 VCT entered an unrestricted area in #2 *** Iodine 131 was 310 times value specified in 10 CFR Part.20 *** 11 );
others occurring 7-19-79, 9-10-79, 9-12-79, and 9-15-79
--Secondary chemistry problems from the foregoing spills leading to corrosion and cracking in steam generator.
support plates and tubes as well as in turbine disc keyways leading to possible disc bursts
Surry Conditions at North Anna Chemotherapy Defective
.Demineralizer Design
. Redesign at Surry #2 Secondary*
Chemistry Affects Turbines Surry Turbine Missile Risks e NAEC would call the attention of the Co~ssion to the striking inter-relatedness~-and the irony--of the fore-going problems.
VEPCO*s severe problems with Westinghouse steam gen-erators at Surry were to be avoided at North Anna by the presence of fresh water, by the absence of chloride, and by the use of the Powdex demineralizer or polisher. Yet according to VEPC0 1s 12-10-79 report, the spills of the resins into the steam generators at North Anna actu@lb created Surry-like corrosion conditions and the beginning of similar corrosion and cracking in 35% of the tubes.*
One NRC engineer likens the corrosion to a "malignant tumor," all of whose cells must be removed if North Anna's steam generators are to regain health. Nevertheless, the NRC has permitted the installation of a steam generator inspection port to be put off until 1981, after the second re-fueling at North Anna #1.
According to NRC Atlanta, the damaging resin spills at North Anna were caused by a semi-automatic system IWlll-function with Powdex valve insufficiencies requiring re-'
design. Thus North Anna #1 is currently operating without demineralization
- Ironically, such a Powdex demineralizer has just been installed in Surry #2, down for over a year for steam generator replacement (a difficulty some NRC engineers thought demi.neral-izers might have prevented). It must now follow that the same redesign is reauired at Surry ft-to prevent a restart and subseguent resin spill which could be.gin Surcy's $lJ.3 million steam generator repair troubles anew.
As noted earlier, resin spill effects upon the sec-ondary chemistry can cause corrosion and cracking not only in the steam generators, but also in the turbines. Since the turbine building at North Anna is s~ttling abno~1 the risk to turbine integrity is enhanced; periodic shim-ming has already been necessary.
At 'both Surry uni_tt, the turbines are known to be cracked, with NRC staff listing Surry Unit #1 in Category AA and Surry Unit #2 in Category A.
Although unlike North Anna.,
the Surry units are not now under review by an Appeal Board concerned with turbine missile risk., that risk would seem to be even greater under current Surry conditions and thus de-serves the direct attention of the Conmi.ssion.
In the light of the complexity and number of unsolved problems at North Anna and Surry (including condenser neglect described in detail 5-5-79, a leak problem at North Anna now),
the Coalition hereby asks the Commissioners to take the follow-ing actions in the first instance since NRC staff approval of VEPCO*s continued operation with malfunctioning steam generators is a matter of record:
- 1. Shut down North Anna #1 for turbine inspection, installation of steam generator inspection~,
aild installation of redesigned valves in.la!! !!29.=
funetioning Powdex demineralizer, proscribing restart pending adequate spill~proof test results.
- 2. Continue licensing moratorium on North Anna. 112, requiring the same inspection and repairs as those for North Anna #1.
(NAEC would also request that the licensing moratorium be continued for Sequoyah since this reactor alsohas a Westinghouse turbineo)
- 3. Keep Surry #l closed,pending its steam. generator replacement,as unsafe to operate with its multiple related problems:
plugged steam generator tubes in excess of 25%, cracked turbine, and questionable seismic resistance.
- 4. Maintain Surry #2 shutdown pending repair of cracked turbines, redesign and repair of Powdex demineralizer, installation of seismic reinforcements, and stringent testing of new steam generator and condenser tubing.
The Coalition further asks the Commissioners to investigate the following related matters:
- a. Why did VEPCO make no 2/79 report of the significant and damaging 200-300 pound resin spill in the North Anna. steam generator of 2-27-79?
- b.
Why did the NRC require no report?
- c.
Why did the North Anna plant continue in operation after the spill as opposed to closing for clean-up of the resins from the steam generators?
..... '... d.
Why did the NRC on-site inspector not know of the spill until months after it had taken place?
- e. Was the NRC informed before the four (4) succeeding spills? If so, what action was taken?
- f. Was the major resin spill of 2-27-79 related to the volume control tank discha:11) and Iodine-131 at 310 times specified value reported on 2-27-79 or to the "uncontrolled release to the storm drain" of 2-28-79?
(See April and May OUSR1s of 1979)
- g. What are the implications of the three September 1979 spills on the l0th 9 12th, and 15th, foll~wed by the radiation release accident of September 25?
- h. Have resin-spill effect warnings been sent to other licensees with Powdex demineralizers and Westinghouse steam generators?
- i. Was NRC's first notice of}! turbine disc cracking and missile problems the anonymous letter of November 5, 1979 suggesting a "flagrant Westinghouse violation"?
The Coalition believes that Commission investigation of the foregoing has safety significance beyond Virginia reactors. Thank you for your professional consideration.
Sincerely, c::: ~;-ca.eIL.
President, NAEC P. s. In terms of reportability., NAEC is puzzled as to why the 3-28-19 reactor scram at Browns Ferry /fl was not a reportable event since it. was "due to false high pressure and low water level signals generated when concrete that was dislodged during a floor drilling operation struck a local panel."
Today we are concerned with the implications of disgruntled employees at Browns Ferry cntti.ng the cords and removing the mouthpieces of "between 65 and 70 inplant telephones" this past weekend.
What does this event say of worker responsibility or worker comprehension of the safety necessity of inplant comnunication? Will there be an NRC investigation?
~
e e
- NORTH ANNA ENVIRONMENTAL COALITION Charlotteeville, Virginia February 18, 1980 Mailing ~dreee:
,u O..u J>Z'lft JlllnllTille, Alu-315801
(.208) 536-0678 Conmissioner Peter Bradford U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conmission Washington, D. C.
20555 Re:
Defective demineralizer design Related corrosion and cracking in Steam Generators & turbine discs In the Matter of Virginia Electric and Power Company North Anna Power Station, Units land 2 Docket Nos. 50-338 and 50-339 OL Surry Nuclear Power Station, Units land 2 Docket Nos, 50-280 and 50-281
Dear Commissioner Bradford:
NAEC conmends the decision of the CoDllli.ssion to require an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) on the experimental replacement of steam generators at the Surry Power Station.
After so many months had passed since Mr. Denton 1s 2-1-79 denial to NAEC of both a public hearing and an EIS, we had virtually abandoned hope.
We would like to think that our letters of 3-4-79, 5-5-79, and 8-14-79 were of some use to you in your deliberations, and are grateful for your decision to review.
Our letter*today would again ask your prudent action in the light of recent disturbing developnents:
--Westinghouse(!!) admission of turbine disc cracking Discovered at both Surry reactors Potential at both North Anna reactors, already under Appeal Board review for turbine missile problems
--Defective Powdex d~eralizer design, leading to
--Five (5) ~
spills at North Anna 1/1, the largest of 200-300 pounds occurring on February 271 1979 (the same date "liquid discharge from Unit #2 VCT entered an unrestricted area in #2 *** Iodine 131 was 310 times value specified in 10 CFR Part 20 *** ");
others occurring 7-19-79, 9-10-79, 9-12-79, and 9-15-79
~Secondary chemistry problem, from the foregoing* spills leading to corrosion and cracking in steam generator support plates and tubes as well as in turbine disc keyways leading to possible disc bursts
I Surry Conditions at North Anna.
Chemotherapy Defective Demineralizer Design Redesign at Surry #2 Secondary*
Chemistry Affects Turbines Surry Turbine Missile Risks i.----------. ------**--* *--- --, - -*.. *-* -*-
e NAEC would call the attention of the Comnission to the striking inter-relatedness~and the irony--of the fore-going problems.
VEPC0 1s severe p1.:;blems with Westinghouse steam gen-erators at Surry were to be avoided at North Anna by the presence of fresh water, by the absence of chloride, and by the use of the Powdex demineralizer or polisher. Yet according to VEPC0 1s 12-10-79 report, the spills of the resins into the steam generators at North Anna actually created Surry-like corrosion conditions and the beginning of similar corrosion and cracking in 35% of the tubes.
One NRC engineer likens the corrosion to a "malignant tumor," all of whose cells must be removed if North Aon@'s steam generators are to regain health. Nevertheless, the NRC has permitted the installation of a steam generator inspection port to be put off until 1981, after the second re-fueling at North Anna #1.
According to NRC Atlanta, the damaging resin spills at Nor~h Anna were caused by a semi-automatic system mal-function with Powdex valve insufficiencies requiring re-design.
Thus North Anna #l is currently operating without demineralization.
Ironically, such a Powdex demineralizer has just been installed in Surry #2, down for over a year for steam generator replacement (a difficulty some NRC engineers thought demineral-izers might have prevented). It must now follow that the same redesign is required at Surry /h, to prevent a restart and subsequent resin spill which could begin Surry's $133 million steam generator repair troubles anew.
As noted earlier, resin spill effects upon the sec-ondary chemistry can cause corrosion and cracking not only in the steam generators, but also in the turbines. Since the turbine building at North Anna is settling abnormally, the risk to turbine integrity is enhanc~d; periodic shim-ming has already been necessary.
At'both Surry units, the turbines are known to be cracked, with NRC staff listing Surry Unit #1 in Category AA and Surry Unit #2 in Category A.
Although unlike North Anna, the Surry units are not now under review by an Appeal Board concerned with turbine missile risk, that risk would seem to be even greater under current Surry conditions and thus de-serves the direct attention of the Conmission.
In the light of the complexity and number of unsolved problems at North Anna and Surry (including condenser neglect described in detail 5-5-79, a leak problem at North Anna now),
the Coalition hereby asks the CoDlllissioners to take the follow-ing actions in the first instance since NRC staff approval of VEPC0 1s continued operation with malfunctioning steam generators is a matter of record:
- 1. Shut down North Anna 1/1 for turbine inspection, installation of steam generator inspection.R2£1, and installation of redesigned valves in the J!2!!:
functioning Powdex demineralizer, proscribing restart pending adequate spill-proof test results.
- 2.
Continue licensing moratorium on North Anna #2, requiring the same inspection and repairs as those for North Anna #1.
(NAEC would also request that the licensing moratorium. be continued for Sequoyah since this rea~tor alsola.s a Westinghouse turbine.)
- 3.
Keep Surry Ill closed,pending its steam generator replacement,as unsafe to operate with its multiple related problems:
plugged steam generator tubes in excess of 25%, cracked turbine, and questionable~
seismic resistance.
- 4. Maintain Surry #2 shutdown pending repair of cracked turbines, redesign and repair of Powdex demineralizer, installation of seismic reinforcements, and stringent testing of new steam generator and condenser tubing.
The Coalition further asks the Connissioners to investigate the following related matters:
- a.
Why did VEPCO make no 2/79 report of the significant and damaging 200-300 pound resin spill in the North Anna steam generator of 2-27-79?
- b.
Why did the NRC require no report?
- c. Why did the North Anna plant continue in operation after the spill as opposed to closing for clean-up of the resins from the steam generators?
L t
V
.. d.
Why did the NRC on-site inspector not know of the spill until months after it had taken place?
- e. Was the NRC informed before the four (4) succeeding spills? If so, what action was taken?
- f. Was the major resin spill of 2-27-79 related to the volume control tank dischaqi9 and Iodine-131 at 310 times specified value reported on 2-27-79 or to the "uncontrolled release to the storm drain" of 2-28-79?
(See April and May OUSR's of 1979)
- g. What are the implications of the three September 1979 spills on the 10th, 12th, and 15th, followed by the radiation release accident of September 25?
- h. Have resin-spill effect warnings been sent to other licensees with Powdex demineralizers and Westinghouse steam generators?
- i. Was NRC's first notice of!! turbine disc cracking and missile problems the anonymous letter of November 5, 1979 suggesting a "flagrant Westinghouse violation"?
The Coalition believes that Coumission investigation of the foregoing has safety significance beyond Virginia reactors. Thank you for your professional consideration.
P. S.
In terms of reportability, NAEC is puzzled as to why the 3-28-'19 reactor scram at Browns Ferry #1 was not a reportable event since it was "due to false high pressure and low water level signals generated when concrete that was dislodged during a floor drilling operation struck a local panel."
Today we are concerned with the implications of disgruntled employees at Browns Ferry cutting the cords and removing the mouthpieces of "between 65 and 70 inplant telephones 11 this past weekend.
What does this event say of worker responsibility or worker comprehension of the safety necessity of inplant conmunication? Will there be an NRC investigation?
~ '
. -