IR 05000261/2007004
| ML073020339 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Robinson  |
| Issue date: | 10/29/2007 |
| From: | Randy Musser NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB4 |
| To: | Walt T Carolina Power & Light Co |
| References | |
| IR-07-004 | |
| Download: ML073020339 (25) | |
Text
ber 29, 2007
SUBJECT:
H.B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000261/2007004
Dear Mr. Walt:
On September 30, 2007, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your H.B. Robinson reactor facility. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection findings, which were discussed on October 4, 2007, with Mr. Eric McCartney and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
On the basis of the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Randall A. Musser, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No.: 50-261 License No.: DPR-23
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000261/2007004 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
_________________________
OFFICE RII:DRP RII:DRP RII:DRP RII:DRS RII:DRP SIGNATURE RAM RCH2 by fax RCH2 by fax for HJG1 GRW NAME RMusser RHagar EMorris HGepford GWilson DATE 10/29/2007 10/26/2007 10/26/2007 10/16/2007 10/25/2007 10/ /2007 10/ /2007 E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
CP&L 2
REGION II==
Docket No: 50-261 License No: DPR-23 Report No: 005000261/2007004 Facility: H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit 2 Location: 3581 West Entrance Road Hartsville, SC 29550 Dates: July 1, 2007 through September 30, 2007 Inspectors: R. Hagar, Senior Resident Inspector E. Morris, Resident Inspector H. Gepford, Senior Health Physicist (Section 2OS3)
Approved by: R. Musser, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000261/2007-004, 07/1/2007-09/30/2007; H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit 2;
Routine Integrated Report.
The report covered a three month period of inspection by resident inspectors and an announced inspection by a regional senior health physics inspector. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 4, dated December 2006.
NRC-Identified and Self Revealing Findings
None B. Licensee Identified Findings None
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status On July 1, power in the unit was reduced to 50 percent following failure of a heater drain pump during a thunderstorm. The unit was returned to full power on July 4, and operated at full power for the remainder of the inspection period.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection
a. Inspection Scope
When extreme hot weather was predicted for the site August 6 through August 11, the inspectors reviewed actions taken by the licensee in accordance with Procedure PLP-118, Hot Weather Operations, prior to the onset of that weather, to ensure that the adverse weather conditions would neither initiate a plant event nor prevent any system, structure, or component from performing its design function. The inspectors reviewed the operator actions described in PLP-118 to verify that the desired results could be achieved.
Prior to the onset of hurricane season, the inspectors reviewed the actions described in Procedure OMM-021, Operation During Adverse Weather, to ensure that potential hurricane conditions would neither initiate a plant event nor prevent any system, structure, or component from performing its design function.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment
a. Inspection Scope
Partial System Walkdowns:
The inspectors performed the following three partial system walkdowns, while the indicated structures, systems, and/or components (SSCs) were out-of-service for maintenance and testing:
System Walked Down SSC Out of Service Date Inspected A & B Safety Injection Pump C Safety Injection Pump August 20 Trains B Containment Spray Pump A Containment Spray Pump August 28 B Auxiliary Feedwater Train Steam Driven Auxiliary September 5 Feedwater Pump To evaluate the operability of the selected trains or systems under these conditions, the inspectors compared observed positions of valves, switches, and electrical power breakers to the procedures and drawings listed in the Attachment.
Complete System Walkdown:
The inspectors conducted a detailed review of the alignment and condition of coolant charging pump train A to verify that the existing alignment of the system was consistent with the correct alignment. To determine the correct system alignment, the inspectors reviewed the procedures, drawings, and the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) section listed in the Attachment. The inspectors also walked down the system.
During the walkdown, the inspectors reviewed the following:
- Valves were correctly positioned and did not exhibit leakage that would impact the functions of any given valve
- Electrical power was available as required
- Major system components were correctly labeled, lubricated, cooled and ventilated
- Hangers and supports were correctly installed and functional
- Essential support systems were operational
- Ancillary equipment or debris did not interfere with system performance
- Tagging clearances were appropriate
- Valves were locked as required by the locked valve program The inspectors reviewed the documents listed in the Attachment to verify that the ability of the system to perform its functions could not be affected by outstanding design issues, temporary modifications, operator workarounds, adverse conditions, and other system-related issues tracked by the engineering department.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection
a. Inspection Scope
For the six areas identified below, the inspectors reviewed the control of transient combustible material and ignition sources, fire detection and suppression capabilities, fire barriers, and any related compensatory measures to verify that those items were consistent with UFSAR Section 9.5.1, Fire Protection System, and UFSAR Appendix 9.5.A, Fire Hazards
Analysis.
The inspectors walked down accessible portions of each area and reviewed results from related surveillance tests to verify that conditions in these areas were consistent with descriptions of the areas in the UFSAR. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
The following areas were inspected:
Fire Zone Description cable spread room control room service water pump area 25A/25B turbine building ground floor 25D dedicated shutdown diesel generator station battery room The inspectors reviewed the following corrective-action documents associated with this area to verify that the licensee identified and implemented appropriate corrective actions:
- Action Request (AR) 136122, Fire barrier penetration seal CP-6310.00-FB
- AR 240873240873 Installation of portable fire extinguisher near main transformers to meet National Fire Protection Association requirements.
- Work Order (WO) 1079248, Air Duct Smoke Detector 17B3 did not alarm during OST-611-10
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R06 Flood Protection Measures
a. Inspection Scope
Internal Flooding The inspectors noted that the safety injection pumps and the containment spray pumps are susceptible to flooding from postulated pipe breaks in the safety injection pump room. The inspectors therefore walked down that room to verify that the area configuration, features, and equipment functions were consistent with the descriptions and assumptions used in Calculation RNP-F/PSA-0009, Assessment of Internally Initiated Flooding Events and in the supporting basis documents listed in the
. The inspectors reviewed the operator actions credited in the analysis to verify that the desired results could be achieved using the plant procedures listed in the
.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification
a. Inspection Scope
On August 28, the inspectors observed licensed-operator performance during requalification simulator training for operating crew 1, to verify that operator performance was consistent with expected operator performance, as described in Dynamic Simulator Scenario Examination DSS-019. This training tested the operators ability to operate components from the control room, direct auxiliary operator actions, and determine the appropriate emergency action level classifications while responding to a nuclear power range instrument failure, a main turbine steam stop valve closure, a steam break, and a loss of the Startup Transformer. The inspectors focused on clarity and formality of communication, the use of procedures, alarm response, control board manipulations, group dynamics, and supervisory oversight. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
The inspectors observed the post-exercise critique to verify that the licensee identified deficiencies and discrepancies that occurred during the simulator training.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the three degraded SSC/function performance problems or conditions listed below to verify the appropriate handling of these performance problems or conditions in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, and 10 CFR 50.65, Maintenance Rule. Documents reviewed are listed in the
.
The problems/conditions and their corresponding ARs were:
Performance Problem/Condition AR Unanticipated entry into Technical Specification action statement due to 209184 degraded belt on control room ventilation fan HVA-1B Engine-driven fire pump out of service due to low coolant temperature 216756 The A motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump failed to start after 233313 receiving a low-low steam generator level signal following the automatic reactor trip on May 15, 2007.
During the reviews, the inspectors focused on the following:
- Appropriate work practices
- Identifying and addressing common cause failures
- Scoping in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(b)
- Characterizing reliability issues (performance)
- Charging unavailability (performance)
- Trending key parameters (condition monitoring)
- 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) or (a)(2) classification and reclassification
- Appropriateness of performance criteria for SSCs/functions classified (a)(2) and/or appropriateness and adequacy of goals and corrective actions for SSCs/functions classified (a)(1)
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation
a. Inspection Scope
For the four time periods listed below, the inspectors reviewed risk assessments and related activities to verify that the licensee performed adequate risk assessments and implemented appropriate risk-management actions when required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4). For emergent work, the inspectors also verified that any increase in risk was promptly assessed, and that appropriate risk-management actions were promptly implemented. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. Those periods included the following:
- June 30 - July 6, including power ascension to full power following replacement of a heater drain pump motor.
- July 14 - July 19, including maintenance on the dedicated-shutdown diesel generator and dedicated-shutdown electrical bus.
- August 18 - August 24, including maintenance on train-A coolant charging pump and electrical grid reliability alerts due to high ambient temperatures.
- September 1 - September 7, including maintenance on the steam-driven auxiliary feedwater pump train and in the switchyard
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R15 Operability Evaluations
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the operability determinations associated with the following two action requests:
- AR 246999246999 small pieces of concrete debris found in the service water section of the B component cooling water heat exchanger
- AR 241022241022 increases in component cooling water system losses The inspectors assessed the accuracy of these evaluations, the use and control of any necessary compensatory measures, and compliance with the Technical Specifications (TS). The inspectors verified that the operability determinations were made as specified by procedure OPS-NGGC-1305, Operability Determinations. The inspectors compared the justifications provided in the determinations to the requirements from the TS, the UFSAR, and associated design-basis documents to verify that operability was properly justified and the associated components remained available, such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R19 Post Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
For the five post-maintenance tests listed below, the inspectors witnessed the test and/or reviewed the test data to verify that test results adequately demonstrated restoration of the affected safety functions described in the UFSAR and TS. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
The following tests were witnessed/reviewed:
Related Test Procedure Title Maintenance Activity Date Inspected OST-302-1 Service Water Service Water Pump B July 12 Pumps A & B packing box to head Inservice Test bolt replacement OST-910 Dedicated Shutdown Preventative July 25 Diesel Generator maintenance on various Dedicated Shutdown Diesel Generator components OST-101-2 [Chemical & Volume Preventive August 7 Control System] maintenance on Component Test Coolant Charging Charging Pump B Pump B WO 1112195-2* B [Service Water] Service Water Pump B August 28 Pump Breaker breaker amptector Amptector replacement Replacement OST-908-1 Comprehensive Flow Replacement of the C September 19 Test for the Component Cooling Component Cooling Water Motor Water Pumps
- For this post-maintenance test, test instructions were included in a work order rather than in a procedure.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
For the four surveillance tests listed below, the inspectors witnessed testing and/or reviewed the test data to verify that the systems, structures, and components involved in these tests satisfied the requirements described in the TS, the UFSAR, and applicable licensee procedures, and that the tests demonstrated that the SSCs were capable of performing their intended safety functions. Documents reviewed are listed in the
.
Test Procedure Title Date Inspected OST-409-1 Emergency Diesel Generator A Fast July 5 Speed Start OST-201-1* Motor Driven Auxiliary Feed Water July 10 System Component Test - Train A OST-927-2 Reverse Flow Test For Check Valve August 23 SW-911 OST-202 Steam Driven Auxiliary Feedwater September 5 System Component Test
- This procedure included inservice testing requirements.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1EP6 Drill Evaluation
a. Inspection Scope
On August 6, the inspectors observed an emergency preparedness drill to verify licensee self-assessment of classification, notification, and protective action recommendation development in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix E. The inspectors also attended the post-drill critique to verify that the licensee properly identified failures in classification, notification and protective action recommendation development activities. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
RADIATION SAFETY
2OS3 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation and Protective Equipment
a. Inspection Scope
Portable Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation During the week of July 9, 2007, the inspectors evaluated completion and adequacy of radiation survey instrument calibrations performed by Progress Energys central calibration facility located at the Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant. Availability of portable instruments for use by H. B.
Robinson was evaluated through discussion with licensee personnel regarding inventory, logistics, and transfer/receipt of instruments. Calibration data for portable instruments staged or recently used for coverage of field tasks were reviewed. Records associated with the annual certifications of the gamma irradiator and neutron source used for performing calibrations and routine response checks were reviewed in detail.
In addition, the inspectors observed the relocated calibration facility for gamma and neutron instrument calibrations and discussed its adequacy for performing instrument calibrations with cognizant licensee personnel. Three corrective action program (CAP)documents and a self-assessment associated with the instrument calibration activities were reviewed and discussed with responsible licensee representatives.
Operability, reliability, and calibration of selected radiation detection instruments were reviewed against 10 CFR Part 20; Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) section, Chapter 12; ANSI N323-1978, Radiation Protection Instrumentation Test and Calibration; and applicable licensee procedures. The ability to characterize, prioritize, and resolve the identified CAP issues were reviewed against CAP-0200, Corrective Action Program, Rev. 19 and associated guideline documents. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in Section 2OS3 of the report Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification
a. Inspection Scope
For the two performance indicators identified below, the inspectors verified the accuracy of the PI data that had been previously reported to the NRC by comparing those data to the actual data, as described below. The inspectors also compared the basis in reporting each data element to the PI definitions and guidance contained in NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline, Rev. 5. In addition, the inspectors interviewed licensee personnel associated with collecting, evaluating, and distributing these data. The PIs reviewed were:
- Heat Removal (Auxiliary Feedwater)
- Residual Heat Removal For the period from the second quarter of 2006 through the second quarter of 2007, the inspectors reviewed Licensee Event Reports (LERs), records of inoperable equipment, and Maintenance Rule records to verify that the licensee had accurately accounted for unavailability hours that the auxiliary feedwater and residual heat removal systems had experienced during the subject period. The inspectors also reviewed the number of hours those systems were required to be available and the basis for identifying unavailability hours.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems
.1 Routine Review of ARs
To aid in the identification of repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for followup, the inspectors performed frequent screenings of items entered into the CAP. The review was accomplished by reviewing daily AR reports.
.2 Annual Sample Review
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors selected AR 207175207175 Blocked Appendix R Pathway Trend for detailed review. The inspectors selected this AR because it relates generally to the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. The inspectors reviewed this report to verify:
- complete and accurate identification of the problem in a timely manner
- evaluation and disposition of performance issues
- evaluation and disposition of operability and reportability issues
- consideration of extent of condition, generic implications, common cause, and previous occurrences
- appropriate classification and prioritization of the problem
- identification of root and contributing causes of the problem
- identification of corrective actions which were appropriately focused to correct the problem
- completion of corrective actions in a timely manner The inspectors also reviewed this AR to verify compliance with the requirements of the CAP as delineated in Procedure CAP-NGGC-0200, Corrective Action Program, and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Observations and Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA3 Event Follow-up
.1 (Closed) LER 2007-001-00, Reactor Trip Due to a Loose Wire in the Main Transformer
Monitoring Circuitry . This Licensee Event Report (LER) reports the reactor trip that was discussed in section 4OA3.1 of inspection report 05000261/2007003. As described in that section, no findings of significance were identified through the inspectors review of the event. This LER also reports that the reactor trip was caused by a main turbine-generator trip which was in turn caused by a generator lockout signal. The generator lockout signal was caused by an electrical fault in the circuitry for a main transformer alarm panel. The electrical fault was determined to be a loose connection which allowed a wire associated with the neutral-bushing current transformer (CT) to become disconnected from the terminal. The root cause of the reactor trip was therefore the failure to crimp and verify the tightness of the lug connecting the CT to the transformer alarm panel. Because the subject failure involved maintenance activities on non-safety-related equipment, the inspectors consider it to not be a violation of regulatory requirements.
This LER further reports that following the reactor trip, the motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump failed to start automatically in response to low-low level in the steam generators. Section 1R12 of this report describes the inspectors review of the associated root-cause investigation report (AR 233313233313 and states that no findings of significance were identified. This LER presents no new information and is therefore closed.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
On October 4, 2007, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Eric McCartney and other members of his staff. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee personnel
- C. Baucom, Manager, Support Services - Nuclear
- S. Brown, Acting Outage and Scheduling Manager
- B. Clark, Training Manager
- W. Farmer, Engineering Manager
- J. Huegel, Maintenance Manager
- E. Kapopoulos, Plant General Manager
- J. Lucas, Nuclear Assurance Manager
- E. McCartney, Director of Site Operations
- J. Rhodes, Acting Radiation Protection Superintendent
- T. Tovar, Operations Manager
- T. Walt, Vice President
- S. Wheeler, Supervisor, Regulatory Support
NRC personnel
- R. Musser, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 4
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened
None
Closed
2007-001-00 LER Reactor Trip Due to a Loose Wire in the Main Transformer Monitoring Circuitry Opened &
Closed
None Previous Items
Closed
None
Discussed
None