ML100400041

IR 05000458-09-005, on 10/01/2009-12/31/2009; River Bend Station; Integrated Resident and Regional Report; Surveillance Testing; Radioactive Material Processing and Transportation; Identification and Resolution of Problems

ML100400041
Person / Time
Site:	River Bend
Issue date:	02/09/2010
From:	Vincent Gaddy NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-C
To:	Mike Perito Entergy Operations
References
IR-09-005
Download: ML100400041 (50)

See also: IR 05000458/2009005

Text

UNITED STATES

NUC LE AR RE G UL AT O RY C O M M I S S I O N

R E GI ON I V

612 EAST LAMAR BLVD , SU I TE 400

AR LI N GTON , TEXAS 76011-4125

February 9, 2010

Michael Perito

Vice President, Operations

Entergy Operations, Inc.

River Bend Station

5485 US Highway 61N

St. Francisville, LA 70775

Subject: RIVER BEND STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION

REPORT 05000458/2009005

Dear Mr. Perito:

On December 31, 2009, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an

inspection at your River Bend Station. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the

inspection findings, which were discussed on January 7, 2010, with Mr. E. Olson, General

Manager, Plant Operations, and other members of your staff.

The inspections examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and

compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed

personnel.

This report documents one NRC-identified and one self-revealing finding of very low safety

significance (Green). These findings were determined to involve violations of NRC

requirements. Additionally, one licensee-identified violation, which was determined to be of very

low safety significance, is listed in this report. However, because of the very low safety

significance and because they are entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is

treating these findings as a noncited violations, consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC

Enforcement Policy. If you contest the violations or the significance of the noncited violations,

you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis

for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk,

Washington, D.C. 20555-0001, with copies to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, Region IV, 612 E. Lamar Blvd, Suite 400, Arlington, Texas,

76011-4125; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

Washington, D.C. 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the River Bend Station

facility. In addition, if you disagree with the characterization of any finding in this report, you

should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for

your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region IV, and the NRC Resident Inspector

at River Bend Station. The information you provide will be considered in accordance with

Inspection Manual Chapter 0305.

Entergy Operations, Inc. -2-

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, and its

enclosure, will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document

Room or from the Publicly Available Records component of NRCs document system (ADAMS).

ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the

Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Vincent G. Gaddy, Chief

Project Branch C

Division of Reactor Projects

Docket: 50-458

License: NPF-47

Enclosure:

NRC Inspection Report 05000458/2009005

w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

cc w/Enclosure:

Senior Vice President

Entergy Nuclear Operations

P. O. Box 31995

Jackson, MS 39286-1995

Senior Vice President and COO

Entergy Operations, Inc.

P. O. Box 31995

Jackson, MS 39286-1995

Vice President, Oversight

Entergy Operations, Inc.

P. O. Box 31995

Jackson, MS 39286-1995

Senior Manager, Nuclear Safety & Licensing

Entergy Nuclear Operations

P. O. Box 31995

Jackson, MS 39286-1995

Entergy Operations, Inc. -3-

Manager, Licensing

Entergy Operations, Inc.

River Bend Station

5485 US Highway 61N

St. Francisville, LA 70775

Attorney General

State of Louisiana

P. O. Box 94005

Baton Rouge, LA 70804-9005

Ms. H. Anne Plettinger

3456 Villa Rose Drive

Baton Rouge, LA 70806

President of West Feliciana

Police Jury

P. O. Box 1921

St. Francisville, LA 70775

Mr. Brian Almon

Public Utility Commission

William B. Travis Building

P. O. Box 13326

Austin, TX 78701-3326

Mr. Jim Calloway

Public Utility

Commission of Texas

1701 N. Congress Avenue

Austin, TX 78711-3326

Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality

Radiological Emergency Planning and

Response Division

P. O. Box 4312

Baton Rouge, LA 70821-4312

Associate General Counsel

Entergy Nuclear Operations

P. O. Box 31995

Jackson, MS 39286-1995

Entergy Operations, Inc. -4-

Chief, Technological Hazards

Branch

FEMA Region VI

800 N. Loop 288

Denton, TX 76201-3698

Entergy Operations, Inc. -5-

Electronic distribution by RIV:

Regional Administrator (Elmo.Collins@nrc.gov)

Deputy Regional Administrator (Chuck.Casto@nrc.gov)

DRP Director (Dwight.Chamberlain@nrc.gov)

DRP Deputy Director (Anton.Vegel@nrc.gov)

DRS Director (Roy.Caniano@nrc.gov)

DRS Deputy Director (Troy.Pruett@nrc.gov)

Senior Resident Inspector (Grant.Larkin@nrc.gov)

Resident Inspector (Charles.Norton@nrc.gov)

Branch Chief, DRP/C (Vincent.Gaddy@nrc.gov)

RBS Administrative Assistant (Lisa.Day@nrc.gov)

Senior Project Engineer, DRP/C (Bob.Hagar@nrc.gov)

Public Affairs Officer (Victor.Dricks@nrc.gov)

Public Affairs Officer (Lara.Useling@nrc.gov)

Branch Chief, DRS/TSB (Michael.Hay@nrc.gov)

RITS Coordinator (Marisa.Herrera@nrc.gov)

Regional Counsel (Karla.Fuller@nrc.gov)

Congressional Affairs Officer (Jenny.Weil@nrc.gov)

OEMail Resource

ROPreports

DRS STA (Dale.Powers@nrc.gov)

OEDO RIV Coordinator (Leigh.Trocine@nrc.gov)

File located: R:\_REACTOR\_RB\2009\RB 2009005-RP-GFL.doc ML 100400041

SUNSI Rev Compl. : Yes No ADAMS  : Yes No Reviewer Initials VGG

Publicly Avail  : Yes No Sensitive Yes : No Sens. Type Initials VGG

RI:DRP/C SRI:DRP/C C:DRS/EB1 C:DRS/EB2 C:DRS/OB

CHNorton GFLarkin RLKellar NFOKeefe RELantz

/T-VGG for/ /T-VGG for/ /RA/TRFarnholtz for /RA/ /RA/SGarchow for

02/5/10 02/5/10 1/26/10 1/26/10 1/26/10

C:DRS/PSB1 C:DRS/PSB2 C:DRP/C

MPShannon GEWerner VGGaddy

/RA/PJElkman for /RA/JFDrake /RA/

1/28/10 1/27/10 02/8/10

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY T=Telephone E=E-mail F=Fax

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

Docket: 05000458

License: NPF-47

Report: 05000458/2009005

Licensee: Entergy Operations, Inc.

Facility: River Bend Station

Location: 5485 U.S. Highway 61N

St. Francisville, LA

Dates: October 1 through December 31, 2009

Inspectors: G. Larkin, Senior Resident Inspector

C. Norton, Resident Inspector

S. Makor, Reactor Inspector, Engineering Branch 1

G. Vasquez, Senior Health Physicist, Plant Support Branch 2

D. Stearns, Health Physicist, Plant Support Branch 2

Approved By: Vincent G. Gaddy, Chief, Project Branch C

Division of Reactor Projects

-1- Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000458/2009005; 10/01/2009 - 12/31/2009; River Bend Station; Integrated Resident and

Regional Report; Surveillance Testing; Radioactive Material Processing and Transportation;

Identification and Resolution of Problems

The report covered a 3-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced

baseline inspections by regional based inspectors. Two Green noncited violations were

identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, or

Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process. Findings

for which the significance determination process does not apply may be Green or be assigned a

severity level after NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe

operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor

Oversight Process, Revision 4, dated December 2006.

A. NRC-Identified Findings and Self-Revealing Findings

Cornerstone: Initiating Events

• Green. A self-revealing noncited violation of 10CFR50 Appendix B, Criterion V,

Instructions, Procedures and Drawings, was identified for the failure to follow

the procedure for making a permanent plant modification and provide adequate

procedures for installation and use of the main steam line plugs following a main

steam line plug design change. This failure resulted in draining approximately

5,000 gallons of water from the upper reactor cavity pool to the drywell and a

manual actuation of low pressure coolant injection to restore cavity pool water

level. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as

Condition Report CR-RBS-2009-4681.

The finding was more than minor in accordance with Inspection Manual

Chapter 0612, Appendix B, Issues Screening, because the finding affected the

initiating events cornerstone attribute of configuration control and the cornerstone

objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and

challenge critical safety functions during shutdown operations. The inspectors

evaluated the finding in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609,

Appendix G, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process. The

inspectors reviewed Section II.B.(1) of Checklist 7 and determined that the

finding required a Phase 2 analysis because the finding involved procedures that

affected steam line plug seal configuration and resulted in inventory loss from the

upper reactor cavity pool. The senior reactor analyst determined that, because

of the special circumstances of this event, the use of a qualitative assessment

using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix M, was more appropriate than

the risk tools provided in Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix G. This is

because the draindown event was self-limiting, such that the inventory excursion

could not have drained reactor cavity level below the level of the main steam

lines, and that even with the failure of operators to take actions, the core would

have remained covered with no challenges to the shutdown cooling system.

-2- Enclosure

Therefore, the event in the worst case would have been transparent to the core.

Also, the displaced inventory posed no threat to any of the plant's mitigating

systems. The inspectors concluded that the finding was of very low safety

significance (Green). There is no crosscutting aspect associated with this

violation because the finding does not reflect current licensee performance

(Section 1R22).

Cornerstone: Public Radiation Safety

• Green. The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 71.5 and

49 CFR Part 172.604(a) for a failure to ensure that the shift manager, whose

phone number was listed as the required 24-hour emergency phone number on

shipping documents, was knowledgeable about the radioactive waste shipment

that left site on December 16, 2009, and had immediate access to a person who

had specific information on the shipment. Specifically, the shift manager was

listed as the required 24-hour contact; however, the shift managers (on multiple

shifts) were not provided with documentation or information about the shipments

that left the site on December 16, 2009. Although the shift manager would have

eventually contacted a knowledgeable person, this delay would not have resulted

in immediate access to the person with information related to the shipment. The

licensee immediately provided the shift manager a copy of the shipping

documentation, briefed the shift manager, and entered this issue into their

corrective action program as Condition Report CR-RBS-2009-06419.

This performance deficiency was more than minor because it adversely affected

the public radiation safety cornerstone to ensure adequate protection of public

health and safety from exposure to radioactive materials released into the public

domain in that the failure to have shipment information immediately available

could restrict the actions of fire department and/or rescue personnel responding

to an accident. When processed through the Public Radiation Safety

Determination Process, the finding was determined to be of very low safety

significance because the finding: (1) was associated with radioactive material

control, (2) involved the licensees program for radioactive material

transportation, (3) did not cause radiation limits to be exceeded, (4) did not

involve a breach of package during transit, (5) did not involve a certificate of

compliance finding, (6) did not involve a low level burial ground nonconformance,

and (7) did not involve a failure to make notifications. The inspectors determined

the finding had a crosscutting aspect in area of resources, associated with

documentation, because the licensees procedures did not provide guidance on

informing the control room about shipments and thus, the procedures were not

complete, accurate nor up-to-date H.2(c) (Section 2PS2).

-3- Enclosure

B. Licensee-Identified Violations

A violation of very low safety significance, which was identified by the licensee, has been

reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have

been entered into the licensees corrective action program. This violation and corrective

action tracking numbers (condition report numbers) are listed in Section 4OA7.

-4- Enclosure

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

River Bend Station began the inspection period in a refueling outage. On October 18, 2009, the

plant began a start up and reached 100 percent power on October 23, 2009. On November 7,

2009, the plant reduced reactor power to 69 percent to make a control rod sequence exchange

and repair a leak in the bypass electro-hydraulic control system. The plant returned to 100

percent power on November 8, 2009. On December 12, 2009, the plant reduced reactor power

to 69 percent for control rod sequence exchange and to repair a steam leak on FWS-MOV 22A.

The station returned to 100 percent power on December 13, 2009, and remained at or near full

rated thermal power for the remainder of the inspection period.

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, and

Emergency Preparedness

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01)

.1 Readiness for Impending Adverse Weather Conditions

a. Inspection Scope

Since thunderstorms and high winds were forecast in the vicinity of the facility during

landfall of Hurricane Ida on November 10, 2009, the inspectors reviewed the plant

personnels overall preparations/protection for the expected weather conditions. On

November 9, 2009, the inspectors walked down the Fancy Point switchyard, 13.8 KV

and 4.16 KV transformers, instrument air compressors, and the ultimate heat sink

systems because their safety-related or important to safety functions could be affected,

as a result of high winds or tornado-generated missiles or the loss of offsite power. The

inspectors evaluated the plant staffs preparations against the sites procedures and

determined that the staffs actions were adequate. During the inspection, the inspectors

focused on plant-specific design features and the licensees procedures used to respond

to specified adverse weather conditions. The inspectors also toured the plant grounds to

look for any loose debris that could become missiles during a tornado. The inspectors

evaluated operator staffing and accessibility of controls and indications for those

systems required to control the plant. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the Updated

Safety Analysis Report and performance requirements for the systems selected for

inspection, and verified that operator actions were appropriate as specified by plant-

specific procedures. The inspectors also reviewed a sample of corrective action

program items to verify that the licensee identified adverse weather issues at an

appropriate threshold and dispositioned them through the corrective action program in

accordance with station corrective action procedures. Specific documents reviewed

during this inspection are listed in the attachment.

-5- Enclosure

These activities constitute completion of one readiness for impending adverse weather

condition sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.01-05.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Readiness to Cope with External Flooding

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the design, material condition, and procedures for coping with

the design basis probable maximum flood. The evaluation included a review to check

for deviations from the descriptions provided in the Updated Safety Analysis Report for

features intended to mitigate the potential for flooding from external factors. As part of

this evaluation, the inspectors checked for obstructions that could prevent draining,

checked that selected roofs did not contain obvious loose items that could clog drains in

the event of heavy precipitation, and determined that barriers required to mitigate the

flood were in place and operable. Additionally, the inspectors performed an inspection of

the protected area to identify any modification to the site that would inhibit site drainage

during a probable maximum precipitation event or allow water ingress past a barrier.

The inspectors also reviewed the abnormal operating procedure for mitigating the design

basis flood to ensure it could be implemented as written. Specific documents reviewed

during this inspection are listed in the attachment.

These activities constitute completion of one external flooding sample as defined in

Inspection Procedure 71111.01-05.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignments (71111.04)

Partial Walkdown

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed partial system walkdowns of the following risk-significant

systems:

• Division II emergency diesel generator

• Division II control building chill water system

• Reactor core isolation cooling

The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk significance relative to the

reactor safety cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors attempted

to identify any discrepancies that could affect the function of the system, and, therefore,

-6- Enclosure

potentially increase risk. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures,

system diagrams, Updated Safety Analysis Report, technical specification requirements,

administrative technical specifications, outstanding work orders, condition reports, and

the impact of ongoing work activities on redundant trains of equipment in order to identify

conditions that could have rendered the systems incapable of performing their intended

functions. The inspectors also inspected accessible portions of the systems to verify

system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and operable. The

inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed operating

parameters of equipment to verify that there were no obvious deficiencies. The

inspectors also verified that the licensee had properly identified and resolved equipment

alignment problems that could cause initiating events or impact the capability of

mitigating systems or barriers and entered them into the corrective action program with

the appropriate significance characterization. Specific documents reviewed during this

inspection are listed in the attachment.

These activities constitute completion of three partial system walkdown samples as

defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.04-05.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05)

Quarterly Fire Inspection Tours

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted fire protection walkdowns that were focused on availability,

accessibility, and the condition of firefighting equipment in the following risk-significant

plant areas:

• October 21, 2009, auxiliary building 70-foot level, 95-foot level, 114-foot level,

141-foot level, and 171-foot level

• October 21, 2009, reactor building 95-fool level, 114-foot level, 141-foot level,

and 162-foot level

• November 2, 2009, fuel building all levels and tunnel B

• November 3, 2009, control building all levels

• December 7, 2009, control building cable chases

• December 7, 2009, Division 1 and Division II emergency diesel generator

components

-7- Enclosure

• December 9, 2009, tunnel F

The inspectors reviewed areas to assess if licensee personnel had implemented a fire

protection program that adequately controlled combustibles and ignition sources within

the plant; effectively maintained fire detection and suppression capability; maintained

passive fire protection features in good material condition; and had implemented

adequate compensatory measures for out of service, degraded, or inoperable fire

protection equipment, systems, or features, in accordance with the licensees fire plan.

The inspectors selected fire areas based on their overall contribution to internal fire risk

as documented in the plants Individual Plant Examination of External Events with later

additional insights, their potential to affect equipment that could initiate or mitigate a plant

transient, or their impact on the plants ability to respond to a security event. Using the

documents listed in the attachment, the inspectors verified that fire hoses and

extinguishers were in their designated locations and available for immediate use; that

fire detectors and sprinklers were unobstructed; that transient material loading was

within the analyzed limits; and fire doors, dampers, and penetration seals appeared to

be in satisfactory condition. The inspectors also verified that minor issues identified

during the inspection were entered into the licensees corrective action program.

Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.

These activities constitute completion of seven quarterly fire-protection inspection

samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.05-05.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R07 Heat Sink Performance (71111.07) - Annual Sample

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed licensee programs, verified performance against industry

standards, and reviewed critical operating parameters and maintenance records for the

standby service water cooling tower. The inspectors verified that performance tests

were satisfactorily conducted for heat exchangers/heat sinks and reviewed for problems

or errors; the licensee utilized the periodic maintenance method outlined in EPRI

Report NP 7552, Heat Exchanger Performance Monitoring Guidelines; the licensee

properly utilized biofouling controls; the licensees heat exchanger inspections

adequately assessed the state of cleanliness of their tubes; and the heat exchanger was

correctly categorized under 10 CFR 50.65, Requirements for Monitoring the

Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants. Specific documents reviewed

during this inspection are listed in the attachment.

These activities constitute completion of one heat sink inspection sample as defined in

Inspection Procedure 71111.07-05.

-8- Enclosure

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R08 In-service Inspection Activities (71111.08)

Completion of Sections .1 and .2, below, constitutes completion of one sample as

defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.08-05.

.1 Inspection Activities Other Than Steam Generator Tube Inspection, Pressurized Water

Reactor Vessel Upper Head Penetration Inspections, and Boric Acid Corrosion Control

(71111.08-02.01)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed two types of nondestructive examination activities. None of the

observed or reviewed nondestructive examinations identified any relevant indications,

and cognizant licensee personnel stated that no relevant indications were accepted by

the licensee for continued service.

The inspectors directly observed the following nondestructive examinations:

SYSTEM WELD IDENTIFICATION EXAMINATION TYPE

Main Steam MSS-700A-FWB12, 2 Penetrant Testing

System (MSS)

Main Steam MSI-027C-FW003, Pipe-to-Tee, 2 Penetrant Testing

System (MSS)

The inspectors reviewed records for the following nondestructive examinations:

SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION EXAMINATION TYPE

Residual Heat RHS-067A-FW001, Pipe-Valve Ultrasonic Testing

Removal System 1E 12 MOVF042A

(RHS)

During the review and observation of each examination, the inspectors verified that

activities were performed in accordance with the ASME Code requirements and

applicable procedures. The inspectors compared indications from previous

examinations and verified that licensee personnel dispositioned the indications in

accordance with the ASME Code and approved procedures. The inspectors also

verified the qualifications of all nondestructive examination technicians performing the

inspections were current.

The inspectors verified, by review, that the welding procedure specifications and the

welders had been properly qualified in accordance with ASME Code,Section IX

-9- Enclosure

requirements. The inspectors also verified, through observation and record review, that

essential variables for the welding process were identified, recorded in the procedure

qualification record, and formed the bases for qualification of the welding procedure

specifications. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the

attachment.

These actions constitute completion of the requirements for Section 02.01.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71111.08-02.05)

a. Inspection scope

The inspectors reviewed eight condition reports which dealt with inservice inspection

activities and found the corrective actions were appropriate. The specific condition

reports reviewed are listed in the documents reviewed section. From this review the

inspectors concluded that the licensee has an appropriate threshold for entering issues

into the corrective action program and has procedures that direct a root cause evaluation

when necessary. The licensee also has an effective program for applying industry

operating experience. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in

the attachment.

These actions constitute completion of the requirements of Section 02.05.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated degraded performance issues involving the following risk

significant systems:

• Standby liquid control

• Reactor water cleanup

The inspectors reviewed events such as where ineffective equipment maintenance has

resulted in valid or invalid automatic actuations of engineered safeguards systems and

independently verified the licensee's actions to address system performance or condition

problems in terms of the following:

• Implementing appropriate work practices

- 10 - Enclosure

• Identifying and addressing common cause failures

• Scoping of systems in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(b)

• Characterizing system reliability issues for performance

• Charging unavailability for performance

• Trending key parameters for condition monitoring

• Ensuring proper classification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) or -(a)(2)

• Verifying appropriate performance criteria for structures, systems, and

components classified as having an adequate demonstration of performance

through preventive maintenance, as described in 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2), or as

requiring the establishment of appropriate and adequate goals and corrective

actions for systems classified as not having adequate performance, as described

in 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1)

The inspectors assessed performance issues with respect to the reliability, availability,

and condition monitoring of the system. In addition, the inspectors verified maintenance

effectiveness issues were entered into the corrective action program with the appropriate

significance characterization. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are

listed in the attachment.

These activities constitute completion of two quarterly maintenance effectiveness

samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.12-05.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed licensee personnel's evaluation and management of plant risk

for the maintenance and emergent work activities affecting risk-significant and

safety-related equipment listed below to verify that the appropriate risk assessments

were performed prior to removing equipment for work:

• Fancy Point emergent breaker replacement and planned maintenance to repair

line 746, October 19-22, 2009

• Station blackout diesel and Fancy Point planned maintenance with control

building chillers C and D out of service, October 29, 2009

- 11 - Enclosure

• Normal service water pump 7C emergent repairs with Fancy Point planned

maintenance, November 10, 2009

• Loss of Division I safety bus operability due to inadequate impact review for fuse

removal, November 30, 2009

• Division I emergency diesel generator outage due to planned maintenance,

December 5, 2009

The inspectors selected these activities based on potential risk significance relative to

the reactor safety cornerstones. As applicable for each activity, the inspectors verified

that licensee personnel performed risk assessments as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4)

and that the assessments were accurate and complete. When licensee personnel

performed emergent work, the inspectors verified that the licensee personnel promptly

assessed and managed plant risk. The inspectors reviewed the scope of maintenance

work, discussed the results of the assessment with the licensee's probabilistic risk

analyst or shift technical advisor, and verified plant conditions were consistent with the

risk assessment. The inspectors also reviewed the technical specification requirements

and inspected portions of redundant safety systems, when applicable, to verify risk

analysis assumptions were valid and applicable requirements were met. Specific

documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.

These activities constitute completion of five maintenance risk assessments and

emergent work control inspection samples as defined in Inspection

Procedure 71111.13-05.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following issues:

• CR-RBS-2009-04141, cable and flex conduit in contact with uninsulated pipe,

reviewed on October 20, 2009

• CR-RBS-2009-05652, high pressure core spray operability following high

pressure spray test return isolation valve failure to close, reviewed on

October 27, 2009

• CR-RBS-2009-05882, FPW-P1B diesel fire pump muffler failure, reviewed on

November 17, 2009

- 12 - Enclosure

• CR-RBS-2009-05928, ground fault and failed sudden pressure relay failure on

STX-XS2B, reviewed on November 17, 2009

The inspectors selected these potential operability issues based on the risk significance

of the associated components and systems. The inspectors evaluated the technical

adequacy of the evaluations to ensure that technical specification operability was

properly justified and the subject component or system remained available such that no

unrecognized increase in risk occurred. The inspectors compared the operability and

design criteria in the appropriate sections of the technical specifications and Updated

Safety Analysis Report to the licensee personnels evaluations to determine whether the

components or systems were operable. Where compensatory measures were required

to maintain operability, the inspectors determined whether the measures in place would

function as intended and were properly controlled. The inspectors determined, where

appropriate, compliance with bounding limitations associated with the evaluations.

Additionally, the inspectors also reviewed a sampling of corrective action documents to

verify that the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with

operability evaluations. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in

the attachment.

These activities constitute completion of four operability evaluations inspection samples

as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.15-04

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R18 Plant Modifications (71111.18)

.1 Temporary Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

To verify that the safety functions of important safety systems were not degraded, the

inspectors reviewed the following temporary modifications:

• TMOD 6321, Adjust Reactor Water Cleanup Differential Flow Indication to

Indicate Positive Differential Flow and Comply with Technical Specification 3.3.6.1, Revision 0

• TMOD 17814, Removal of RTX-XR1E Load Tap Changer Internal Mechanism,

Revision 0

• EC 15860, Disable Alarm and Trip Functions for Sudden Pressure Relays for

RTX-XSR1F and RTX-XSR1D, Revision 0

The inspectors reviewed the temporary modifications and the associated

safety-evaluation screening against the system design bases documentation, including

- 13 - Enclosure

the Updated Safety Analysis Report and the technical specifications, and verified that the

modification did not adversely affect the system operability/availability. The inspectors

also verified that the installation and restoration were consistent with the modification

documents and that configuration control was adequate. Additionally, the inspectors

verified that the temporary modification was identified on control room drawings,

appropriate tags were placed on the affected equipment, and licensee personnel

evaluated the combined effects on mitigating systems and the integrity of radiological

barriers.

These activities constitute completion of three samples for temporary plant modifications

as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.18-05.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Permanent Modifications

The inspectors reviewed key parameters associated with energy needs, materials,

replacement components, equipment protection from hazards, operations, structural,

process medium properties, licensing basis, and failure modes for the permanent

modifications listed below.

• Engineering Change EC-2911, Perform Following Modifications for the EL 118

Drywell Steel, Revision 0

• Engineering Change EC-18153, Replace Old Station Blackout Diesel, BYS-EG1,

with new Generac Diesel Generator, Revision 0

The inspectors verified that modification preparation, staging, and implementation did not

impair emergency/abnormal operating procedure actions, key safety functions, or

operator response to loss of key safety functions; postmodification testing will maintain

the plant in a safe configuration during testing by verifying that unintended system

interactions will not occur; systems, structures, and components performance

characteristics still meet the design basis; the modification design assumptions were

appropriate; the modification test acceptance criteria will be met; and licensee personnel

identified and implemented appropriate corrective actions associated with permanent

plant modifications. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the

attachment.

These activities constitute completion of two samples for permanent plant modifications

as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.18-05.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

- 14 - Enclosure

1R19 Postmaintenance Testing (71111.19)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following postmaintenance activities to verify that

procedures and test activities were adequate to ensure system operability and functional

capability:

• WO 209226, Removal of Load Tap Changer Internal Mechanism on

RTX-XSR1E, reviewed on October 13, 2009

• WO 199598, Disable Alarm and Trip Functions for Sudden Pressure Relays for

RTX-XSR1F and RTX-XSR1D, reviewed on October 20, 2009

• WO 133778, EGS-EG1A has 20 dpm Lube Oil Leak on the Inlet to the Engine,

reviewed on December 11, 2009

• WO 146473, EGS-EG1A Modify Turbocharger Piping per EC 6184, reviewed on

December 14, 2009

• WO 170258, EGS-EG1A #6 Fuel Injector Pump has Fuel Leak, reviewed on

December 11, 2009

• WO 205860, EGS-EG1A Inspect Engine, reviewed on December 14, 2009

• WO 206158, Inspect Sub Cover Pedestals for Cracks, reviewed on

December 11, 2009

• WO 208433, EGS-EG1A Perform Postmaintenance Inspection/Run, reviewed

on December 14, 2009

• WO 213965, EGS-EG1A Jacket Water Leak at Intercooler Bypass Orifice,

reviewed on December 11, 2009

• WO 217748, EGS-EG1A Intercooler has Nine Broken Bolts, reviewed on

December 14, 2009

• WO 217749, EGS-EG1A Jacket Water Leak on Exhaust Shroud, reviewed on

December 11, 2009

The inspectors selected these activities based upon the structure, system, or

component's ability to affect risk. The inspectors evaluated these activities for the

following (as applicable):

• The effect of testing on the plant had been adequately addressed; testing was

adequate for the maintenance performed

- 15 - Enclosure

• Acceptance criteria were clear and demonstrated operational readiness; test

instrumentation was appropriate

The inspectors evaluated the activities against the technical specifications, the Updated

Safety Analysis Report, 10 CFR Part 50 requirements, licensee procedures, and various

NRC generic communications to ensure that the test results adequately ensured that the

equipment met the licensing basis and design requirements. In addition, the inspectors

reviewed corrective action documents associated with postmaintenance tests to

determine whether the licensee was identifying problems and entering them in the

corrective action program and that the problems were being corrected commensurate

with their importance to safety. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are

listed in the attachment.

These activities constitute completion of 11 postmaintenance testing inspection samples

as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.19-05.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities (71111.20)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the outage safety plan and contingency plans for the River

Bend Station RF-15 refueling outage, conducted Fall 2009, to confirm that licensee

personnel had appropriately considered risk, industry experience, and previous

site-specific problems in developing and implementing a plan that assured maintenance

of defense in depth. During the refueling outage, the inspectors observed portions of the

shutdown and cooldown processes and monitored licensee controls over the outage

activities listed below.

• Configuration management, including maintenance of defense in depth, is

commensurate with the outage safety plan for key safety functions and

compliance with the applicable technical specifications when taking equipment

out of service.

• Clearance activities, including confirmation that tags were properly hung and

equipment appropriately configured to safely support the work or testing.

• Installation and configuration of reactor coolant pressure, level, and temperature

instruments to provide accurate indication, accounting for instrument error.

• Status and configuration of electrical systems to ensure that technical

specifications and outage safety-plan requirements were met, and controls over

switchyard activities.

- 16 - Enclosure

• Monitoring of decay heat removal processes, systems, and components.

• Verification that outage work was not impacting the ability of the operators to

operate the spent fuel pool cooling system.

• Reactor water inventory controls, including flow paths, configurations, and

alternative means for inventory addition, and controls to prevent inventory loss.

• Controls over activities that could affect reactivity.

• Maintenance of containment as required by the technical specifications.

• Refueling activities.

• Startup and ascension to full power operation, tracking of startup prerequisites,

walkdown of the drywell (primary containment) to verify that debris had not been

left which could block emergency core cooling system suction strainers, and

reactor physics testing.

• Licensee identification and resolution of problems related to refueling outage

activities.

Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.

These activities constitute completion of one refueling outage and other outage

inspection sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.20-05.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the Updated Safety Analysis Report, procedure requirements,

and technical specifications to ensure that the surveillance activities listed below

demonstrated that the systems, structures, and/or components tested were capable of

performing their intended safety functions. The inspectors either witnessed or reviewed

test data to verify that the significant surveillance test attributes were adequate to

address the following:

• Preconditioning

• Evaluation of testing impact on the plant

• Acceptance criteria

- 17 - Enclosure

• Test equipment

• Procedures

• Jumper/lifted lead controls

• Test data

• Testing frequency and method demonstrated technical specification operability

• Test equipment removal

• Restoration of plant systems

• Updating of performance indicator data

• Engineering evaluations, root causes, and bases for returning tested systems,

structures, and components not meeting the test acceptance criteria were correct

• Annunciators and alarms setpoints

The inspectors also verified that licensee personnel identified and implemented any

needed corrective actions associated with the surveillance testing.

• STP-309-0601, Division I ECCS Test, performed on September 29, 2009

• STP-000-6303, Miscellaneous Containment and Drywell Isolation Valves

Quarterly Operability Test, Revision 11, performed on November 17, 2009

• STP-052-0102, Partially Withdrawn Control Rod Insertion Operability Test,

performed on December 12, 2009

• STP-203-6305, HPCS Quarterly Pump and Valve Operability Test, performed

on December 21, 2009

• STP-203-4503, ECCS/DIV 3 - HPCS System Flow Rate - Low Channel,

performed on December 21, 2009

• STP-309-0203, Division III Diesel Generator Operability Test, performed on

December 23, 2009

• STP-251-3100, Diesel Fire Pump Weekly Battery Surveillance, performed on

December 29, 2009

- 18 - Enclosure

• SOP-0054, Contingency Equipment Operations, (Station Blackout Diesel

Generator Monthly Operability Run), performed on December 30, 2009

Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.

These activities constitute completion of eight surveillance testing inspection samples as

defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.22-05.

b. Findings

Introduction. A Green self-revealing violation of 10CFR50 Appendix B, Criterion V,

Instructions, Procedures and Drawings, was identified for the failure to follow the

procedure for making a permanent plant modification and provide adequate procedures

for installation and use of the main steam line plugs following a main steam line plug

design change. This failure resulted in draining approximately 5,000 gallons of water

from the upper reactor cavity pool to the drywell and a manual actuation of low pressure

coolant injection to restore cavity pool water level.

Description. Entergy uses main steam line plugs during outages to allow work on main

steam line components while the reactor is flooded and refueling activities are in

progress. Each main steam line plug has a primary mechanical o-ring seal and a

secondary inflatable seal, such that either seal is leak tight with the failure of the other

seal. On September 29, 2009, operators performed Surveillance Test Procedure

STP-309-0601, Division 1 ECCS Test, for a loss of offsite power concurrent with a loss

of coolant accident which isolated service air to the containment and the main steam line

plugs secondary seals. During the test, approximately 5,000 gallons of water drained

from the upper reactor cavity pool to the drywell. This event occurred because reactor

cavity pool water leaked past the improperly seated main steam line A plug primary seal,

the deflated secondary seal, and main steam line C safety relief valve flanges which

were disassembled for maintenance. Operators stopped the reactor cavity pool

draindown event by restoring service air to the main steam line secondary seals and

starting a low pressure coolant injection pump to restore upper reactor cavity pool water

level.

In 2001, when a redesigned main line plug was selected for use, Entergy evaluated the

design using an engineering reply rather and an engineering evaluation per company

Procedure DC-115, ER Response Development. An engineering reply is used to

clarify approved design documents or standard engineering practices and make simple

comparisons between items. It is not used to change plant documents, design, or

configuration. Since the plugs were not evaluated in accordance with Procedure

DC-115, there was no review of the Updated Safety Analysis Report, procedures, or

drawings for plant impact caused by using a different plug design. Specifically, General

Maintenance Procedure GMP-102, Reactor Vessel Disassembly, should have provided

sufficient primary seal seating instructions and plug installation acceptance criteria.

Surveillance Test Procedure STP-309-0601 should have changed to restore service air

to the main steam line plugs secondary seal, as required by the new plug design,

instead of restoring instrument air to the secondary seals, as required by the previous

- 19 - Enclosure

plug design. Either change should have prevented the loss of reactor cavity pool water

inventory to the drywell.

Analysis. This performance deficiency was the failure to follow the requirements of

company Procedure DC-115 and update Procedure GMP-102 and Procedure

STP-309-0601 to ensure the main steam line plugs primary seals were properly inserted

and to ensure service air was maintained to the secondary seals. The inspectors

determined the finding was more than minor in accordance with Inspection Manual

Chapter 0612, Appendix B, Issues Screening, because the finding affected the

initiating events cornerstone attribute of configuration control and the cornerstone

objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge

critical safety functions during shutdown operations. The inspectors evaluated the

finding in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix G, Shutdown

Operations Significance Determination Process. The inspectors reviewed

Section II.B.(1) of Checklist 7 and determined that the finding required a Phase 2

analysis because the finding involved procedures that affected steam line plug seal

configuration and resulted in inventory loss from the upper reactor cavity pool. The

senior reactor analyst determined that, because of the special circumstances of this

event, the use of a qualitative assessment using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609,

Appendix M, was more appropriate than the risk tools provided in Inspection Manual

Chapter 0609, Appendix G. This is because the draindown event was self-limiting, such

that the inventory excursion could not have drained reactor cavity level below the level of

the main steam lines, and that even with the failure of operators to take actions, the core

would have remained covered with no challenges to the shutdown cooling system.

Therefore, the event in the worst case would have been transparent to the core. Also,

the displaced inventory posed no threat to any of the plant's mitigating systems. The

inspectors concluded that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green). There

is no crosscutting aspect associated with this violation because the finding does not

reflect current licensee performance.

Enforcement. Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures

and Drawings, states in part that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by

documented instructions, procedures, or drawings of a type appropriate to the

circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions,

procedures, or drawings. Instructions, procedures, or drawings shall include appropriate

quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities

have been satisfactorily accomplished. Specifically, In 2001, Entergy company

Procedure DC-115, ER Response Development, paragraph 5.3.1, states that an

Engineering Reply cannot be used to change plant documents, design, or configuration;

cannot authorize the implementation of plant activities; and cannot be used as a source

of design input. Contrary to the above, Entergy evaluated the redesigned main steam

line plug using an engineering reply. The engineering reply failed to provide the

necessary procedure steps to ensure that the main steam line plugs primary and

secondary seals functioned properly to prevent a loss of reactor cavity pool inventory

during emergency core cooling logic testing. Because this violation is of very low safety

significance and it has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as

Condition Report CR-RBS-2009-4681, this violation is being treated as a noncited

- 20 - Enclosure

violation, consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000458/2009005-01 "Main Steam Line Plug Seal Failure Results in Loss of Reactor

Cavity Inventory.

2. RADIATION SAFETY

Cornerstone: Occupational and Public Radiation Safety

2OS2 ALARA Planning and Controls (71121.02)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors assessed licensee personnels performance with respect to maintaining

individual and collective radiation exposures as low as is reasonably achievable. The

inspectors used the requirements in 10 CFR Part 20 and the licensees procedures

required by technical specifications as criteria for determining compliance. The

inspectors interviewed licensee personnel and reviewed the following:

• Current 3-year rolling average collective exposure

• Five work activities from previous work history data which resulted in the highest

personnel collective exposures

• Site-specific ALARA procedures

• Five work activities of highest exposure significance completed during the last

outage

• ALARA work activity evaluations, exposure estimates, and exposure mitigation

requirements

• Intended versus actual work activity doses and the reasons for any

inconsistencies

• Interfaces between operations, radiation protection, maintenance, maintenance

planning, scheduling and engineering groups

• Person-hour estimates provided by maintenance planning and other groups to

the radiation protection group with the actual work activity time requirements

• Postjob (work activity) reviews

• Method for adjusting exposure estimates, or re-planning work, when unexpected

changes in scope or emergent work were encountered

• Exposure tracking system

- 21 - Enclosure

• Use of engineering controls to achieve dose reductions and dose reduction

benefits afforded by shielding

• Records detailing the historical trends and current status of tracked plant source

terms and contingency plans for expected changes in the source term due to

changes in plant fuel performance issues or changes in plant primary chemistry

• Source-term control strategy or justifications for not pursuing such exposure

reduction initiatives

• Specific sources identified by the licensee for exposure reduction actions,

priorities established for these actions, and results achieved since the last

refueling cycle

• Self-assessments, audits, and special reports related to the ALARA program

since the last inspection

• Resolution through the corrective action process of problems identified through

postjob reviews and postoutage ALARA report critiques

• Corrective action documents related to the ALARA program and follow-up

activities, such as initial problem identification, characterization, and tracking

• Effectiveness of self-assessment activities with respect to identifying and

addressing repetitive deficiencies or significant individual deficiencies

Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.

These activities constitute completion of 11 of the required 15 samples and 8 of the

optional samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71121.02-05.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

2PS2 Radioactive Material Processing and Transportation (71122.02)

a. Inspection Scope

This area was inspected to verify that the licensee=s radioactive material processing and

transportation program complies with the requirements of 10 CFR Parts 20, 61, and 71

and Department of Transportation regulations contained in 49 CFR Parts 171-180. The

team interviewed licensee personnel and reviewed:

• The radioactive waste system description, recent radiological effluent release

reports, and the scope of the licensee=s audit program;

- 22 - Enclosure

• Liquid and solid radioactive waste processing systems configurations, the status

and control of any radioactive waste process equipment that is not operational or

is abandoned in place, changes made to the radioactive waste processing

systems since the last inspection, and current processes for transferring

radioactive waste resin and sludge discharges;

• Radio-chemical sample analysis results for radioactive waste streams and use of

scaling factors and calculations to account for difficult-to-measure radionuclides;

• Shipment packaging, surveying, labeling, marking, placarding, vehicle checking,

driver instructing, and disposal manifesting;

• Shipping records for non-excepted package shipments;

• Self-assessments and corrective action reports performed since the last

inspection.

Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.

Either because the conditions did not exist or an event had not occurred, no

opportunities were available to review the following item:

• Licensee event reports and special reports.

These activities constitute completion of six of the required six samples, as defined in

Inspection Procedure 71122.02-04.

b. Findings

Introduction. The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 71.5 and

49 CFR Part 172.604(a) for a failure to ensure that the shift manager, whose phone

number was listed as the required 24-hour emergency phone number on shipping

documents, was knowledgeable about the shipment that left the site on December 16,

2009, or had immediate access to a person who had knowledge of the shipment.

Specifically, although the shift manager was listed as the required 24-hour contact, the

shift managers (on multiple shifts) were not provided with documentation or information

about the shipments that left the site on December 16, 2009. Although the shift manager

would have eventually contacted the correct person, he would have made multiple

telephone calls before finding the knowledgeable person. This delay would not have

resulted in immediate access to a knowledgeable person.

Description. On December 16, 2009, the licensee loaded a liner containing spent resins

into a high integrity container, prepared it for exclusive use shipment by contract carrier,

and once the shipping papers were approved, a licensee designated shipper briefed the

truck driver, and the shipment departed the site. As required by 49 CFR Part 172.604(a),

the licensee listed the 24-hour emergency telephone number on the shipment paper for

- 23 - Enclosure

the shift manager office. The designated shipper (whose office is located outside of the

protected area) then faxed a copy of the shipping paperwork to the control room. This

was intended to notify the shift manager of the shipment and provided the designated

shippers name. However, the licensee informed the inspectors that the fax machine was

apparently broken at the time, and the fax was not received. The designated shipper did

not call the shift manager to ensure receipt of the fax.

On December 17, 2009, the inspectors interviewed the shift manager and found that he

had no knowledge of the shipment. The shift manager stated that hypothetically, if he

received a telephone call about an emergency involving the shipment, he first would call

the shift radiation protection technician. If the shift technician did not have the

information about the shipment (shift radiation protection technicians are not normally

provided with a copy of the shipping paper), the shift manager stated he would have

called the duty radiation protection supervisor next. If the supervisor didnt have the

information (the radiation protection supervisors are not normally provided with a copy of

the shipping paper work), he would have started calling others starting with the radiation

protection manager.

The inspectors determined that this process did not satisfy the requirement that the

24-hour emergency contact (shift manager) be either knowledgeable of the hazardous

material being shipped or have comprehensive emergency response and incident

mitigation information for that material, or have immediate access to a person who

possessed information. Although the shift manager was listed as the 24-hour contact,

the shift managers were not provided the documentation or information related to the

shipment that left the site on December 16, 2009. Eventually, the shift manager would

have contacted the correct person but this was not considered to meet the requirement

for immediate access to the person who possessed information and knowledge about

the shipment.

In response, the licensee immediately provided the shift manager a copy of the shipping

documents and briefed him about the shipment, and began reviewing the issue through

a human performance evaluation review. Licensee representatives stated that its

procedures were silent on how to notify the shift manager about a shipment. The

licensee began instituting a new process that requires the shipping papers be hand

delivered to the shift manager and that the shift manager be briefed about the shipment.

Analysis. The inspectors determined the failure to ensure that the shift manager was

knowledgeable about the shipment or had immediate access to a person who had

knowledge was a performance deficiency because it was the result of the licensees

failure to meet a requirement and the cause was reasonably within the licensees ability

to foresee and correct and should have been prevented. The inspectors determined this

performance deficiency was more than minor because it adversely affected the public

radiation safety cornerstone to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety

from exposure to radioactive materials released into the public domain in that the failure

to have shipment information immediately available could restrict the actions of fire

department and/or rescue personnel responding to an accident. When processed

through the Public Radiation Safety Determination Process, the finding was determined

to be of very low safety significance because the finding: (1) was associated with

- 24 - Enclosure

radioactive material control, (2) involved the licensees program for radioactive material

transportation, (3) did not cause radiation limits to be exceeded, (4) did not involve a

breach of package during transit, (5) did not involve a certificate of compliance finding,

(6) did not involve a low level burial ground nonconformance, and (7) did not involve a

failure to make notifications. The inspectors determined the finding had a crosscutting

aspect in area of resources, associated with documentation, because the licensees

procedures did not provide any guidance on informing the control room about shipments

and thus, the procedures were not complete, accurate nor up-to-date H.2(c).

Enforcement. Title 10 CFR Part 71.5 which requires, in part, that each licensee who

delivers licensed material to a carrier for transport shall comply with the applicable

requirements of the DOT regulations in 49 CFR Parts 171 through 180 appropriate to the

mode of transport. Title 49 CFR Part 172.604(a)(2) requires, in part, that a person who

offers a hazardous material for transportation must provide a 24-hour emergency

response telephone number for use in the event of an emergency involving the

hazardous material. The telephone number must be the number of a person who is

either knowledgeable of the hazardous material being shipped or has comprehensive

emergency response and incident mitigation information for that material, or who has

immediate access to a person who possesses such knowledge and information.

Contrary to the requirement, on December 16 through 17, 2009, River Bend Station

offered hazardous material for transportation in which the position/individual listed for the

24-hour emergency number neither had knowledge of the hazardous material being

shipped nor had comprehensive emergency response and incident mitigation

information for that material, nor had immediate access to a person who did possess

such knowledge. The shift manager was listed as the 24-hour contact; however, the

shift manager was not provided with the information about the shipment. Consequently,

he would not have immediately known whom to contact for detailed information

concerning the radioactive material shipment. Because the finding is of very low safety

significance and has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as

Condition Report CR-RBS-2009-06419, this violation is being treated as a noncited

violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy:

NCV 05000458/2009005-02, Failure to Ensure the Emergency Contact had Knowledge

About a Shipment.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)

.1 Data Submission Issue

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a review of the performance indicator data submitted by the

licensee for the third quarter 2009 performance indicators for any obvious

inconsistencies prior to its public release in accordance with Inspection Manual

Chapter 0608, Performance Indicator Program.

- 25 - Enclosure

This review was performed as part of the inspectors normal plant status activities and,

as such, did not constitute a separate inspection sample.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Reactor Coolant System Specific Activity (BI01)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the reactor coolant system specific

activity performance indicator for the period from the second quarter 2008 through the

third quarter 2009. To determine the accuracy of the performance indicator data

reported during those periods, the inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in

NEI Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline,

Revision 5. The inspectors reviewed the licensees reactor coolant system chemistry

samples, technical specification requirements, issue reports, event reports, and NRC

integrated inspection reports for the period of April 2008 through September 2009 to

validate the accuracy of the submittals. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees

issue report database to determine if any problems had been identified with the

performance indicator data collected or transmitted for this indicator and none were

identified. In addition to record reviews, the inspectors observed a chemistry technician

obtain and analyze a reactor coolant system sample. Specific documents reviewed are

described in the attachment to this report.

These activities constitute completion of one reactor coolant system specific activity

sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151-05.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.3 Reactor Coolant System Leakage (BI02)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the reactor coolant system leakage

performance indicator for the period from the second quarter 2008 through the third

quarter 2009. To determine the accuracy of the performance indicator data reported

during those periods, the inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in NEI

Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 5.

The inspectors reviewed the licensees operator logs, reactor coolant system leakage

tracking data, issue reports, event reports, and NRC integrated inspection reports for the

period of April 2008 through September 2009 to validate the accuracy of the submittals.

The inspectors also reviewed the licensees issue report database to determine if any

problems had been identified with the performance indicator data collected or

- 26 - Enclosure

transmitted for this indicator and none were identified. Specific documents reviewed are

described in the attachment to this report.

These activities constitute completion of one reactor coolant system leakage sample as

defined in Inspection Procedure 71151-05.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152)

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, Emergency

Preparedness, Public Radiation Safety, Occupational Radiation Safety, and Physical

Protection

.1 Routine Review of Identification and Resolution of Problems

a. Inspection Scope

As part of the various baseline inspection procedures discussed in previous sections of

this report, the inspectors routinely reviewed issues during baseline inspection activities

and plant status reviews to verify that they were being entered into the licensees

corrective action program at an appropriate threshold, that adequate attention was being

given to timely corrective actions, and that adverse trends were identified and

addressed. The inspectors reviewed attributes that included the complete and accurate

identification of the problem; the timely correction, commensurate with the safety

significance; the evaluation and disposition of performance issues, generic implications,

common causes, contributing factors, root causes, extent of condition reviews, and

previous occurrences reviews; and the classification, prioritization, focus, and timeliness

of corrective actions. Minor issues entered into the licensees corrective action program

because of the inspectors observations are included in the attached list of documents

reviewed.

These routine reviews for the identification and resolution of problems did not constitute

any additional inspection samples. Instead, by procedure, they were considered an

integral part of the inspections performed during the quarter and documented in

Section 1 of this report.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

- 27 - Enclosure

.2 Daily Corrective Action Program Reviews

a. Inspection Scope

In order to assist with the identification of repetitive equipment failures and specific

human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of

items entered into the licensees corrective action program. The inspectors

accomplished this through review of the stations daily corrective action documents.

The inspectors performed these daily reviews as part of their daily plant status

monitoring activities and, as such, did not constitute any separate inspection samples.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.3 Semi-Annual Trend Review

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a review of the licensees corrective action program and

associated documents to identify trends that could indicate the existence of a more

significant safety issue. The inspectors focused their review on repetitive equipment

issues, but also considered the results of daily corrective action item screening

discussed in Section 4OA2.2, above, licensee trending efforts, and licensee human

performance results. The inspectors nominally considered the 6-month period of

April 2009 through September 2009 although some examples expanded beyond those

dates where the scope of the trend warranted.

The inspectors also included issues documented outside the normal corrective action

program in major equipment problem lists, repetitive and/or rework maintenance lists,

departmental problem/challenges lists, system health reports, quality assurance

audit/surveillance reports, self-assessment reports, and Maintenance Rule assessments.

The inspectors compared and contrasted their results with the results contained in the

licensees corrective action program trending reports. Corrective actions associated with

a sample of the issues identified in the licensees trending reports were reviewed for

adequacy.

These activities constitute completion of one single semi-annual trend inspection sample

as defined in Inspection Procedure 71152-05.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

- 28 - Enclosure

.4 Selected Issue Follow-up Inspection

a. Inspection Scope

During a review of items entered in the licensees corrective action program, the

inspectors recognized a corrective action item documenting operator attempt to shift the

reactor recirculation pumps from fast speed to slow during a plant shutdown for a

refueling outage.

These activities constitute completion of one in-depth problem identification and

resolution sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71152-05.

c. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.5 In-depth Review of Operator Workarounds

a. Inspection Scope

An operator workaround is defined as a degraded or nonconforming condition that

complicates the operation of plant equipment and is compensated for by operator

action. During the week of November 2, 2009, the inspectors reviewed the cumulative

effect of the existing operator workarounds and contingency plans. The inspectors

concentrated on the effect the workarounds have on: (1) the reliability, availability, and

potential for misoperation of any mitigating system; (2) whether they could increase the

frequency of an initiating event; and (3) their effect on the operation of multiple mitigating

systems. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the cumulative effects the operator

workarounds have on the ability of the operators to respond in a correct and timely

manner to plant transients and accidents.

These activities constitute completion of one in-depth review of operator workarounds

sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71152-05.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA3 Event Follow-up (71153)

.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Report 05000458/2009-003-00: Low Pressure Coolant

Injection Actuation Following Loss of Water from Upper Reactor Cavity Pool

On September 20, 2009, plant operators were reducing reactor power to begin a

refueling outage. At 37 percent reactor power, the operators attempted to shift both

reactor recirculation pumps from fast to slow speed. Reactor recirculation pump A

shifted to slow speed, but tripped off approximately nine seconds later. Reactor

recirculation pump B tripped off directly from high speed. The operators reactivity

- 29 - Enclosure

manipulation plan relied on forced circulation for plant shutdown. Without a plan for

reactor shut down in the natural circulation mode, the operators inserted an unplanned

controlled manual reactor scram. Thermal-hydraulic conditions remained within

operational limits during the event. The licensee entered the event into their corrective

action program as Condition Report CR-RBS-2009-04175. The inspectors discussed

the event with licensee management, engineering, operations, and maintenance

personnel to understand the conditions leading to the loss of both reactor recirculation

pumps and subsequent operator actions. This licensee event report is closed.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 (Closed) Licensee Event Report 05000458/2009-002-00: Unplanned Manual Reactor Scram Following Trip of Both Reactor Recirculation Pumps

The safety significance and the enforcement aspect of this violation are discussed in

section 4OA2. The licensee has entered the event into their corrective action program

as Condition Report CR-RBS-2009-04175. This licensee event report is closed.

4OA5 Other Activities

Quarterly Resident Inspector Observations of Security Personnel and Activities

a. Inspection Scope

During the inspection period, the inspectors performed observations of security force

personnel and activities to ensure that the activities were consistent with River Bend

security procedures and regulatory requirements relating to nuclear plant security.

These observations took place during both normal and off-normal plant working hours.

These quarterly resident inspector observations of security force personnel and activities

did not constitute any additional inspection samples. Rather, they were considered an

integral part of the inspectors normal plant status review and inspection activities.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA6 Meetings

Exit Meeting Summary

On October 2, 2009, the inspector presented the in-service inspection activities inspection

results to Mr. J. Roberts, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged

the issues presented. The inspector asked the licensee whether any materials examined during

the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

- 30 - Enclosure

On December 17, 2009, the inspectors presented the radiation safety inspection results to Mr.

M. Perito, Site Vice President, Operations, and other members of the licensee staff. The

licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any

materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary

information was identified.

On January 7, 2010, the inspectors presented the integrated baseline inspection results to

Mr. E. Olson, General Manager, Plant Operations, and other members of the licensee staff. The

licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any

materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary

information was identified.

4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations

The following violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by the

licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which meets the criteria of Section VI of

the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600, for being dispositioned as a noncited

violation.

• Technical Specification 5.4.1.a requires implementation of applicable procedures

recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978.

Section 7(e) of the Appendix requires procedures for training in radiation

protection and personnel monitoring. Section 4.0[1] of Procedure EN-RP-100,

Radworker Expectations, Revision 0, requires, in part, that workers notify health

physics upon receipt of any electronic alarming dosimeter alarm that was not

prebriefed. Contrary to this, on January 17, 2008, a licensee worker failed to

notify radiation protection personnel upon receipt of an electronic alarming

dosimeter dose rate alarm that was not prebriefed in steam jet air ejector room B.

This finding had very low safety significance (Green) because: (1) it was not an

ALARA finding, (2) there was no overexposure, (3) there was no substantial

potential for an overexposure, and (4) the ability to assess dose was not

compromised. This item was entered into the licensees corrective action

program as Condition Report CR-RBS-2008-00506.

- 31 - Enclosure

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

M. Briley, Corporate Engineering, Sr. Lead Technical Specialist

D. Burnett, Manager, Emergency Preparedness

G. Bush, Manager, Plant Maintenance

M. Chase, Manager, Training and Development

G. Chatterton, Engineering, Technical Specialist

J. Clark, Assistant Operations Manager - Shift

B. Cox, Manager, Operations

M. Feltner, Manager, Outage

C. Forpahl, Manager, Engineering Programs & Components

P. Gritton, Manager, Site Support

D. Heath, Supervisor, Radiation Protection

R. Heath, Superintendent, Chemistry

D. Herbert, Engineering, Technical Specialist

B. Houston, Manager, Radiation Protection

K. Huffstatler, Senior Licensing Specialist

A. James, Manager, Plant Security

L. Kitchen, Manager, Planning and Scheduling

R. Kowaleski, Manager, Corrective Actions & Assessments

G. Krause, Assistant Operations Manager - Support

D. Lorfing, Manager, Licensing

W. Mashburn, Manager, Design Engineering

R. McAdams, Manager, System Engineering

J. McElwain, Manager, Human Resources

L. Meyer, Senior Health Physics/Chemistry Specialist

E. Olson, General Manager, Plant Operations

M. Perito, Site Vice President, Operations

R. Persons, Superintendent, Training

J. Roberts, Director, Nuclear Safety Assurance

K. Rockwood, Supervisor, Radiation Protection

J. Schroeder, Assistant Operations Manager - Training

D. Wiles, Director, Engineering

R. Williams, Corporate Engineering, Sr. lead Technical Specialist

J. Wilson, Supervisor, Reactor Engineering

L. Woods, Manager (Acting), Quality Assurance

NRC Personnel

G. Larkin, Senior Resident Inspector

C. Norton, Resident Inspector

A-1 Attachment

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened and Closed

Main Steam Line Plug Seal Failure Results in Loss of Reactor

05000458/2009005-01 NCV

Cavity Inventory (Section 1R22)

Failure to Ensure the Emergency Contact had Knowledge

0500458/2009005-02 NCV

About a Shipment (Section 2PS2)

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Section 1R01: Adverse Weather Protection

MISCELLANEOUS

NUMBER TITLE REVISION

NUREG-1407 Procedural and Submittal Guidance for the Individual 0

Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for

Severe Weather Vulnerabilities

NUREG-1779 Regulatory Effectiveness of the Station Blackout 0

Rule

RIS-2004-05 Grid Reliability and the Impact on Plant Risk and the

Operability of Offsite Power

PROCEDURES

NUMBER TITLE REVISION

AOP-0029 Severe Weather Operation 21

AOP-0064 Degraded Grid 0

EN-LI-101 10CFR50.59 Review Program 4

ENS-DC-199 Off-Site Power Supply Design Requirements 2

ENS-DC-201 ENS Transmission Grid Monitoring 2

OSP-0063 Grid Monitor 1

A-2 Attachment

Section 1R04: Equipment Alignment

MISCELLANEOUS

Technical Specification 3.7.3

Technical Specification 3.8.1

PROCEDURES

NUMBER TITLE REVISION

SOP-0035 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System 35

SOP-0049 120 VDC System 27

SOP-0053 Standby Diesel Generator and Auxiliaries 307

SOP-0058 Control Building HVAC Systems 20

Section 1R05: Fire Protection

CONDITION REPORTS

CR-RBS-2009-06002 CR-RBS-2009-06003

MISCELLANEOUS

NUMBER TITLE REVISION

DRL-FP-00107 Control Building 116-foot C71 P002 RPS DIST PNL 4

Pre-Fire Plan/Strategy Book

TRM 3.7.9.6 Fire Related Assemblies

USAR Section 9A.2 Fire Hazards Analysis

USAR 9.4.7.2.1 15

PROCEDURES

NUMBER TITLE REVISION

AOP-0009 Loss of Normal Service Water 16

EN-DC-127 Control of Hot Work and Ignition Sources 7

EN-DC-128 Fire Protection Impact Reviews 4

A-3 Attachment

NUMBER TITLE REVISION

FPP-0100 Fire Protection System Impairment 10

FPP-0101 Fire Suppression System Inspection 10

SOP-0037 Fire Protection Water System Operating Procedure 27

(System 251)

Section 1R07: Heat Sink Performance

CONDITION REPORTS

CR-RBS-2008-02821 CR-RBS-2008-02878 CR-RBS-2009-04345 CR-RBS-2009-04830

MISCELLANEOUS

USAR 1.2.2.8.1

USAR 3.8.4.4.4

USAR 7.3.1.1.8

USAR 9.2.7

USAR Tables 9.2-5, 9.2-6, 9.2-7, 9.2-8, 9.2-10, 9.2-11, 9.2-13, 9.2-15, 9.2-16

PROCEDURES

NUMBER TITLE REVISION

SOP-0042 Standby Service Water 28

Section 1R08: Inservice Inspection Activities

CONDITION REPORTS

CR-RBS-2008-00430 CR-RBS-2008-00511 CR-RBS-2009-04463 CR-RBS-2009-04613

CR-RBS-2009-04683 CR-RBS-2009-04770 CR-RBS-2009-04773 CR-RBS-2009-04850

MISCELLANEOUS

NUMBER TITLE DATE

ELO-LO-2006-00094 Welding Program Assessment July 24, 2006

A-4 Attachment

PROCEDURES

NUMBER TITLE REVISION

CEP-NDE-0400 Ultrasonic Examination 3

Manual Ultrasonic Examination of Ferritic Piping

CEP-NDE-0404 4

Welds

Liquid Penetrant Examination (PT) for ASME

CEP-NDE-0641 5

Section XI

Magnetic Particle Examination (MT) for ASME

CEP-NDE-0731 3

Section XI

CEP-NDE-0903 VT-3 Examination 5

Section 1R12: Maintenance Effectiveness

CONDITION REPORTS

CR-RBS-2007-5298 CR-RBS-2008-3091 CR-RBS-2008-3303 CR-RBS-2008-3601

CR-RBS-2008-5073 CR-RBS-2008-5097 CR-RBS-2008-5129 CR-RBS-2008-5130

CR-RBS-2008-6244 CR-RBS-2008-6676 CR-RBS-2008-7029 CR-RBS-2008-7033

CR-RBS-2008-7039 CR-RBS-2008-7040 CR-RBS-2009-0424 CR-RBS-2009-0595

CR-RBS-2009-1485 CR-RBS-2009-5016 CR-RBS-2009-5048 CR-RBS-2009-5133

CR-RBS-2009-5170 CR-RBS-2009-5173 CR-RBS-2009-5314 CR-RBS-2009-5429

CR-RBS-2009-5474 CR-RBS-2009-6338 CR-RBS-2009-6348

PROCEDURES

NUMBER TITLE REVISION

EN-DC-205 Maintenance Rule Monitoring 2

EN-DC-206 Maintenance Rule (a)(1) Process 1

A-5 Attachment

Section 1R13: Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Controls

PROCEDURES

NUMBER TITLE REVISION

ADM-0096 Risk Management Program and Implementation 304

Risk Assessment

AOP-0029 Severe Weather Operation 24

AOP-0064 Degraded Grid 2

EN-MA-125 Troubleshooting and Control of Maintenance 5

Activities

EN-OP-103 Reactivity Management Program 3

EN-WM-101 On-Line Work Management Process 6

Section 1R15: Operability Evaluations

CONDITION REPORTS

CR-RBS-2002-01095 CR-RBS-2008-02504 CR-RBS-2009-04959 CR-RBS-2009-05882

CR-RBS-2009-05928

MISCELLANEOUS

NUMBER TITLE REVISION

IEEE Standard IEEE Guide for Protecting Power Transformers

C37.91-2008

PROCEDURES

NUMBER TITLE REVISION

STP-251-3205 Diesel Fire Pump Operational Test 14

Section 1R18: Plant Modifications

CONDITION REPORT

CR-RBS-2009-06517

A-6 Attachment

MISCELLANEOUS

NUMBER TITLE REVISION

ARP-SBO-Diesel 0 and 1

EC 18153 Replace Old Station Blackout Diesel, BYS-EG1, with

New Generac Diesel Generator

USAR 8.1.4

USAR 15.2.6.1.1.1

PROCEDURES

NUMBER TITLE REVISION

EN-DC-115 Engineering Change Process 8

EN-DC-136 Temporary Modifications 4

EN-LI-100 Process Applicability Determination 7

OSP-0007 Preparation, Review and Revision of Operations 19

Section Procedures

RBNP-001 Development and Control of RBS Procedures 29

SOP-0054 Contingency Equipment Operation 306

SOP-0054 Contingency Equipment Operation 307

WORK ORDERS

NUMBER TITLE

WO 00210006 Task 1, Install TMOD 6321 on RWCU A

WO 00210006 Task 3, Install TMOD 6321 on RWCU B

WO 00209226 Task 3, RTX-XSR1E, Remove Load Tap Changer and

Install TMOD 17184

WO 00199598 Task 3 & 4, RTX-XSR1F Transformer Trouble Alarm

Received in Main Control Room

A-7 Attachment

Section 1R19: Postmaintenance Testing

MISCELLANEOUS

NUMBER TITLE REVISION

EC 15860 Disable Alarm and Trip Functions for Sudden

Pressure Relays for RTX-XSR1F and RTX-XSR1D

USAR 8.1.4

USAR 15.2.6.1.1.1

WORK ORDERS

NUMBER TITLE REVISION

WO 00209226 Task 7, EMRTX-XSR1E Post Installation Testing for

TMOD 17814

Task 3 & 4, RTX-XSR1F Transformer Trouble Alarm

WO 00199598

Received in Main Control Room

Section 1R20: Refueling and Other Outage Activities

PROCEDURES

NUMBER TITLE REVISION

AOP-0001 Reactor Scram 24

GMP-0102 Reactor Vessel Disassembly 18

GMP-0103 Reactor Vessel Assembly 20

GOP-0001 Plant Startup 20

SOP-0031 Residual Heat Removal 306

Section 1R22: Surveillance Testing

CONDITION REPORTS

CR-RBS-1986-00018 CR-RBS-2009-04681 CR-RBS-2009-06460

A-8 Attachment

PROCEDURES

NUMBER TITLE REVISION

AOP-0027 Fuel Handling Mishaps 23

GMP-0108 Reactor Vessel Disassembly 31

SOP-0054 Contingency Equipment Operation 306

STP-309-0203 Division III Diesel Generator Operability Test 306

STP-309-0601 Division I ECCS Test 31

MISCELLANEOUS

NUMBER TITLE REVISION

ARP-SBO-Diesel 1

ASME OMb Code-2006 Code for Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear

Power Plants

Licensee Event Report November 23,

50-458/09-003-00 2009

Technical

Specifications 3.8.1,

3.8.2, and 3.8.3

WORK ORDERS

WO 52037115 WO 52228449

Section 2OS2: ALARA Planning and Controls

AUDITS, SELF-ASSESSMENTS, AND SURVEILLANCES

NUMBER TITLE DATE

Focused Assessment Report; Occupational Radiation

LO-RLO-2009-00005 March 06, 2009

Safety

Focused Assessment Report; Occupational Radiation

LO-RLO-2009-00057 August 07, 2009

Safety

Snapshot Assessment RP Outage Readiness May 26, 2009

Snapshot Assessment Dose Reduction Techniques August 31, 2009

A-9 Attachment

NUMBER TITLE DATE

Snapshot Assessment Control and Use of Contaminated Drip Bags May 12, 2009

September 30,

Snapshot Assessment Access to High Radiological Risk Activities

2009

CONDITION REPORTS

CR-RBS-2009-00309 CR-RBS-2009-01843 CR-RBS-2009-02325 CR-RBS-2009-02414

CR-RBS-2009-02854 CR-RBS-2009-03155 CR-RBS-2009-03918 CR-RBS-2009-04440

CR-RBS-2009-04779 CR-RBS-2009-04817 CR-RBS-2009-04948 CR-RBS-2009-05043

CR-RBS-2009-05064 CR-RBS-2009-05169 CR-RBS-2009-05749 CR-RBS-2009-05751

CR-RBS-2009-05844

MISCELLANEOUS

NUMBER TITLE REVISION

2009-2013 River Bend Station CRE Goals

PROCEDURES

NUMBER TITLE REVISION

EN-RP-100 Radworker Expectations 3

EN-RP-101 Access Control for Radiologically Controlled Areas 4

EN-RP-102 Radiological Control 2

EN-RP-105 Radiation Work Permits 7

EN-RP-109 Hot Spot Program 3

EN-RP-141 Job Coverage 4

RADIATION WORK PERMITS

NUMBER TITLE

2009-1006 General Radwaste Activities including shipping

<1000 mrem

2009-1214 General Radwaste Activities including shipping and

LHRA

A-10 Attachment

NUMBER TITLE

2009-1432 RF-15 Snubber Work

2009-1603 RF-15 Noble Chemistry Project Activities

2009-1800 RF-15 Refuel Activities

2009-1938 RF-15 Scaffold and Shielding

2009-1943 RF-15 Drywell

Section 2PS2: Radioactive Material Processing and Transportation

AUDITS, SELF-ASSESSMENTS, AND SURVEILLANCES

NUMBER TITLE DATE

QA-15-2007-RBS-1 & -2 Quality Assurance Audit of Radwaste and January 3, 2008

Radiation Protection Programs

QA-15-2007-RBS-1 Followup to Audits July 14-17, 2008

QS-2008-RBS-11 Followup of the 2008 Radwaste Surveillance December 15-17, 2008

CONDITION REPORTS

CR-HQN-2007-0541 CR-HQN-2007-0939 CR-HQN-2007-0939 CR-HQN-2007-0978

CR-HQN-2008-0013 CR-HQN-2008-0023 CR-HQN-2009-0400 CR-RBS-2007-3140

CR-RBS-2007-3661 CR-RBS-2007-3776 CR-RBS-2007-3793 CR-RBS-2007-4679

CR-RBS-2008-0452 CR-RBS-2008-3446

PROCEDURES

NUMBER TITLE REVISION

EN-RW-102 Radioactive Shipping Procedure 6

EN-RW-104 Scaling Factors 5

EN-RW-105 Process Control Program 1

RWS-0304 Radioactive Waste Handling and Control 15

RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL SHIPMENTS

2008-039 2009-040 2009-105 2009-106 2009-107

A-11 Attachment

10 CFR Part 61 Waste Stream Scaling Factors

NUMBER TITLE REVISION

Spent Pool Fuel Cleanup (SFC 2009) June 9, 2009

Westinghouse Chemical Decon March 1,

2008

Dry Active Waste August 7,

2008

Condensate and Liquid Waste System January 21,

2009

Section 4OA1: Performance Indicator Verification

PROCEDURES

NUMBER TITLE REVISION

EN-LI-102 Corrective Action Process 13

EN-LI-114 Performance Indicator Process 4

Section 4OA2: Identification and Resolution of Problems

CONDITION REPORTS

CR-RBS-2003-00670 CR-RBS-2008-02182 CR-RBS-2008-05650 CR-RBS-2009-04175

CR-RBS-2009-05933

LICENSEE EVENT REPORTS

NUMBER TITLE REVISION

LER 1995-012 Manual Scram Due to Recirculation Pump Transient 0

LER 2009-002 Unplanned Manual Reactor Scram Following Trip of 0

Both Reactor Recirculation Pumps

MISCELLANEOUS

NUMBER TITLE REVISION /

DATE

A-12 Attachment

NUMBER TITLE REVISION /

DATE

Caution Tags Greater than 90 day Index August 31,

2009

Caution tags Greater Than 90 day Index October 31,

2009

CEO 2009-00005 Nuclear Oversight Fleet Quarterly Report 0

Clearances Greater than 90 day Index August 31,

2009

Clearances Greater than 90 day index October 31,

2009

Control Room Annunciator Index August 31,

2009

Control Room Annunciator Index October 31,

2009

Control Room Deficiency Index August 31,

2009

Control Room Deficiency Index October 31,

2009

ER-RB-2002-0042 Evaluation of Recirculation Pump Downshift Logic 0

ODMI Index November

6, 2009

ODMI, FWS P1A/B/C Operation with High Seal

Leakage

ODMI, High Alterx Housing Vibration

ODMI, Turbine # 2 Valve Packing Leak

Operations Aggregate Index August, 31,

2009

Operations Aggregate Index October 31,

2009

Operator Burden Index August 31,

2009

Operator Burden Index October 31,

2009

Operator Work Around Index August 31,

2009

A-13 Attachment

NUMBER TITLE REVISION /

DATE

Operator Work Around Index October 31,

2009

Temporary Modification Log

PROCEDURES

NUMBER TITLE REVISION

AOP-0024 Thermal Hydraulic Stability Controls 22

GOP-0004 Single Loop Operation 20

Section 4OA3: Event Follow-Up

CONDITION REPORTS

CR-RBS-2003-00670 CR-RBS-2008-02182 CR-RBS-2008-05650 CR-RBS-2009-04175

CR-RBS-2009-05933

MISCELLANEOUS

NUMBER TITLE REVISION

ER-RB-2002-0042 Evaluation of Recirculation Pump Downshift Logic 0

LER 1995-012 Manual Scram Due to Recirculation Pump 0

Transient

LER 2009-002 Unplanned Manual Reactor Scram Following Trip of 0

Both Reactor Recirculation Pumps

PROCEDURES

NUMBER TITLE REVISION

AOP-0024 Thermal Hydraulic Stability Controls 22

GOP-0004 Single Loop Operation 20

A-14 Attachment