ML100400041
| ML100400041 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | River Bend  |
| Issue date: | 02/09/2010 |
| From: | Vincent Gaddy NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-C |
| To: | Mike Perito Entergy Operations |
| References | |
| IR-09-005 | |
| Download: ML100400041 (50) | |
See also: IR 05000458/2009005
Text
February 9, 2010
Michael Perito
Vice President, Operations
Entergy Operations, Inc.
River Bend Station
5485 US Highway 61N
St. Francisville, LA 70775
Subject: RIVER BEND STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION
REPORT 05000458/2009005
Dear Mr. Perito:
On December 31, 2009, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an
inspection at your River Bend Station. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the
inspection findings, which were discussed on January 7, 2010, with Mr. E. Olson, General
Manager, Plant Operations, and other members of your staff.
The inspections examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and
compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed
personnel.
This report documents one NRC-identified and one self-revealing finding of very low safety
significance (Green). These findings were determined to involve violations of NRC
requirements. Additionally, one licensee-identified violation, which was determined to be of very
low safety significance, is listed in this report. However, because of the very low safety
significance and because they are entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is
treating these findings as a noncited violations, consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC
Enforcement Policy. If you contest the violations or the significance of the noncited violations,
you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis
for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk,
Washington, D.C. 20555-0001, with copies to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Region IV, 612 E. Lamar Blvd, Suite 400, Arlington, Texas,
76011-4125; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, D.C. 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the River Bend Station
facility. In addition, if you disagree with the characterization of any finding in this report, you
should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for
your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region IV, and the NRC Resident Inspector
at River Bend Station. The information you provide will be considered in accordance with
Inspection Manual Chapter 0305.
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
R E GI ON I V
612 EAST LAMAR BLVD, SUITE 400
ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-4125
Entergy Operations, Inc.
- 2 -
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, and its
enclosure, will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document
Room or from the Publicly Available Records component of NRCs document system (ADAMS).
ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the
Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Vincent G. Gaddy, Chief
Project Branch C
Division of Reactor Projects
Docket: 50-458
License: NPF-47
Enclosure:
NRC Inspection Report 05000458/2009005
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
cc w/Enclosure:
Senior Vice President
Entergy Nuclear Operations
P. O. Box 31995
Jackson, MS 39286-1995
Senior Vice President and COO
Entergy Operations, Inc.
P. O. Box 31995
Jackson, MS 39286-1995
Vice President, Oversight
Entergy Operations, Inc.
P. O. Box 31995
Jackson, MS 39286-1995
Senior Manager, Nuclear Safety & Licensing
Entergy Nuclear Operations
P. O. Box 31995
Jackson, MS 39286-1995
Entergy Operations, Inc.
- 3 -
Manager, Licensing
Entergy Operations, Inc.
River Bend Station
5485 US Highway 61N
St. Francisville, LA 70775
Attorney General
State of Louisiana
P. O. Box 94005
Baton Rouge, LA 70804-9005
Ms. H. Anne Plettinger
3456 Villa Rose Drive
Baton Rouge, LA 70806
President of West Feliciana
Police Jury
P. O. Box 1921
St. Francisville, LA 70775
Mr. Brian Almon
Public Utility Commission
William B. Travis Building
P. O. Box 13326
Austin, TX 78701-3326
Mr. Jim Calloway
Public Utility
Commission of Texas
1701 N. Congress Avenue
Austin, TX 78711-3326
Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality
Radiological Emergency Planning and
Response Division
P. O. Box 4312
Baton Rouge, LA 70821-4312
Associate General Counsel
Entergy Nuclear Operations
P. O. Box 31995
Jackson, MS 39286-1995
Entergy Operations, Inc.
- 4 -
Chief, Technological Hazards
Branch
FEMA Region VI
800 N. Loop 288
Denton, TX 76201-3698
Entergy Operations, Inc.
- 5 -
Electronic distribution by RIV:
Regional Administrator (Elmo.Collins@nrc.gov)
Deputy Regional Administrator (Chuck.Casto@nrc.gov)
DRP Director (Dwight.Chamberlain@nrc.gov)
DRP Deputy Director (Anton.Vegel@nrc.gov)
DRS Director (Roy.Caniano@nrc.gov)
DRS Deputy Director (Troy.Pruett@nrc.gov)
Senior Resident Inspector (Grant.Larkin@nrc.gov)
Resident Inspector (Charles.Norton@nrc.gov)
Branch Chief, DRP/C (Vincent.Gaddy@nrc.gov)
RBS Administrative Assistant (Lisa.Day@nrc.gov)
Senior Project Engineer, DRP/C (Bob.Hagar@nrc.gov)
Public Affairs Officer (Victor.Dricks@nrc.gov)
Public Affairs Officer (Lara.Useling@nrc.gov)
Branch Chief, DRS/TSB (Michael.Hay@nrc.gov)
RITS Coordinator (Marisa.Herrera@nrc.gov)
Regional Counsel (Karla.Fuller@nrc.gov)
Congressional Affairs Officer (Jenny.Weil@nrc.gov)
OEMail Resource
ROPreports
OEDO RIV Coordinator (Leigh.Trocine@nrc.gov)
File located: R:\\_REACTOR\\_RB\\2009\\RB 2009005-RP-GFL.doc
SUNSI Rev Compl.
- Yes No
- Yes No
Reviewer Initials
VGG
Publicly Avail
- Yes No
Sensitive
Yes : No
Sens. Type Initials
VGG
RI:DRP/C
SRI:DRP/C
C:DRS/EB1
C:DRS/EB2
C:DRS/OB
CHNorton
GFLarkin
RLKellar
NFOKeefe
RELantz
/T-VGG for/
/T-VGG for/
/RA/TRFarnholtz for /RA/
/RA/SGarchow for
02/5/10
02/5/10
1/26/10
1/26/10
1/26/10
C:DRS/PSB1
C:DRS/PSB2
C:DRP/C
MPShannon
GEWerner
VGGaddy
/RA/PJElkman for
/RA/JFDrake
/RA/
1/28/10
1/27/10
02/8/10
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
T=Telephone E=E-mail F=Fax
- 1 -
Enclosure
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Docket:
05000458
License:
Report:
Licensee:
Entergy Operations, Inc.
Facility:
River Bend Station
Location:
5485 U.S. Highway 61N
St. Francisville, LA
Dates:
October 1 through December 31, 2009
Inspectors:
G. Larkin, Senior Resident Inspector
C. Norton, Resident Inspector
S. Makor, Reactor Inspector, Engineering Branch 1
G. Vasquez, Senior Health Physicist, Plant Support Branch 2
D. Stearns, Health Physicist, Plant Support Branch 2
Approved By:
Vincent G. Gaddy, Chief, Project Branch C
Division of Reactor Projects
- 2 -
Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000458/2009005; 10/01/2009 - 12/31/2009; River Bend Station; Integrated Resident and
Regional Report; Surveillance Testing; Radioactive Material Processing and Transportation;
Identification and Resolution of Problems
The report covered a 3-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced
baseline inspections by regional based inspectors. Two Green noncited violations were
identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, or
Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process. Findings
for which the significance determination process does not apply may be Green or be assigned a
severity level after NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe
operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor
Oversight Process, Revision 4, dated December 2006.
A.
NRC-Identified Findings and Self-Revealing Findings
Cornerstone: Initiating Events
Green. A self-revealing noncited violation of 10CFR50 Appendix B, Criterion V,
Instructions, Procedures and Drawings, was identified for the failure to follow
the procedure for making a permanent plant modification and provide adequate
procedures for installation and use of the main steam line plugs following a main
steam line plug design change. This failure resulted in draining approximately
5,000 gallons of water from the upper reactor cavity pool to the drywell and a
manual actuation of low pressure coolant injection to restore cavity pool water
level. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as
Condition Report CR-RBS-2009-4681.
The finding was more than minor in accordance with Inspection Manual
Chapter 0612, Appendix B, Issues Screening, because the finding affected the
initiating events cornerstone attribute of configuration control and the cornerstone
objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and
challenge critical safety functions during shutdown operations. The inspectors
evaluated the finding in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609,
Appendix G, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process. The
inspectors reviewed Section II.B.(1) of Checklist 7 and determined that the
finding required a Phase 2 analysis because the finding involved procedures that
affected steam line plug seal configuration and resulted in inventory loss from the
upper reactor cavity pool. The senior reactor analyst determined that, because
of the special circumstances of this event, the use of a qualitative assessment
using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix M, was more appropriate than
the risk tools provided in Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix G. This is
because the draindown event was self-limiting, such that the inventory excursion
could not have drained reactor cavity level below the level of the main steam
lines, and that even with the failure of operators to take actions, the core would
have remained covered with no challenges to the shutdown cooling system.
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Enclosure
Therefore, the event in the worst case would have been transparent to the core.
Also, the displaced inventory posed no threat to any of the plant's mitigating
systems. The inspectors concluded that the finding was of very low safety
significance (Green). There is no crosscutting aspect associated with this
violation because the finding does not reflect current licensee performance
(Section 1R22).
Cornerstone: Public Radiation Safety
Green. The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 71.5 and
49 CFR Part 172.604(a) for a failure to ensure that the shift manager, whose
phone number was listed as the required 24-hour emergency phone number on
shipping documents, was knowledgeable about the radioactive waste shipment
that left site on December 16, 2009, and had immediate access to a person who
had specific information on the shipment. Specifically, the shift manager was
listed as the required 24-hour contact; however, the shift managers (on multiple
shifts) were not provided with documentation or information about the shipments
that left the site on December 16, 2009. Although the shift manager would have
eventually contacted a knowledgeable person, this delay would not have resulted
in immediate access to the person with information related to the shipment. The
licensee immediately provided the shift manager a copy of the shipping
documentation, briefed the shift manager, and entered this issue into their
corrective action program as Condition Report CR-RBS-2009-06419.
This performance deficiency was more than minor because it adversely affected
the public radiation safety cornerstone to ensure adequate protection of public
health and safety from exposure to radioactive materials released into the public
domain in that the failure to have shipment information immediately available
could restrict the actions of fire department and/or rescue personnel responding
to an accident. When processed through the Public Radiation Safety
Determination Process, the finding was determined to be of very low safety
significance because the finding: (1) was associated with radioactive material
control, (2) involved the licensees program for radioactive material
transportation, (3) did not cause radiation limits to be exceeded, (4) did not
involve a breach of package during transit, (5) did not involve a certificate of
compliance finding, (6) did not involve a low level burial ground nonconformance,
and (7) did not involve a failure to make notifications. The inspectors determined
the finding had a crosscutting aspect in area of resources, associated with
documentation, because the licensees procedures did not provide guidance on
informing the control room about shipments and thus, the procedures were not
complete, accurate nor up-to-date H.2(c) (Section 2PS2).
- 4 -
Enclosure
B.
Licensee-Identified Violations
A violation of very low safety significance, which was identified by the licensee, has been
reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have
been entered into the licensees corrective action program. This violation and corrective
action tracking numbers (condition report numbers) are listed in Section 4OA7.
- 5 -
Enclosure
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
River Bend Station began the inspection period in a refueling outage. On October 18, 2009, the
plant began a start up and reached 100 percent power on October 23, 2009. On November 7,
2009, the plant reduced reactor power to 69 percent to make a control rod sequence exchange
and repair a leak in the bypass electro-hydraulic control system. The plant returned to 100
percent power on November 8, 2009. On December 12, 2009, the plant reduced reactor power
to 69 percent for control rod sequence exchange and to repair a steam leak on FWS-MOV 22A.
The station returned to 100 percent power on December 13, 2009, and remained at or near full
rated thermal power for the remainder of the inspection period.
1.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, and
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01)
.1
Readiness for Impending Adverse Weather Conditions
a.
Inspection Scope
Since thunderstorms and high winds were forecast in the vicinity of the facility during
landfall of Hurricane Ida on November 10, 2009, the inspectors reviewed the plant
personnels overall preparations/protection for the expected weather conditions. On
November 9, 2009, the inspectors walked down the Fancy Point switchyard, 13.8 KV
and 4.16 KV transformers, instrument air compressors, and the ultimate heat sink
systems because their safety-related or important to safety functions could be affected,
as a result of high winds or tornado-generated missiles or the loss of offsite power. The
inspectors evaluated the plant staffs preparations against the sites procedures and
determined that the staffs actions were adequate. During the inspection, the inspectors
focused on plant-specific design features and the licensees procedures used to respond
to specified adverse weather conditions. The inspectors also toured the plant grounds to
look for any loose debris that could become missiles during a tornado. The inspectors
evaluated operator staffing and accessibility of controls and indications for those
systems required to control the plant. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the Updated
Safety Analysis Report and performance requirements for the systems selected for
inspection, and verified that operator actions were appropriate as specified by plant-
specific procedures. The inspectors also reviewed a sample of corrective action
program items to verify that the licensee identified adverse weather issues at an
appropriate threshold and dispositioned them through the corrective action program in
accordance with station corrective action procedures. Specific documents reviewed
during this inspection are listed in the attachment.
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Enclosure
These activities constitute completion of one readiness for impending adverse weather
condition sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.01-05.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2
Readiness to Cope with External Flooding
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated the design, material condition, and procedures for coping with
the design basis probable maximum flood. The evaluation included a review to check
for deviations from the descriptions provided in the Updated Safety Analysis Report for
features intended to mitigate the potential for flooding from external factors. As part of
this evaluation, the inspectors checked for obstructions that could prevent draining,
checked that selected roofs did not contain obvious loose items that could clog drains in
the event of heavy precipitation, and determined that barriers required to mitigate the
flood were in place and operable. Additionally, the inspectors performed an inspection of
the protected area to identify any modification to the site that would inhibit site drainage
during a probable maximum precipitation event or allow water ingress past a barrier.
The inspectors also reviewed the abnormal operating procedure for mitigating the design
basis flood to ensure it could be implemented as written. Specific documents reviewed
during this inspection are listed in the attachment.
These activities constitute completion of one external flooding sample as defined in
Inspection Procedure 71111.01-05.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignments (71111.04)
Partial Walkdown
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed partial system walkdowns of the following risk-significant
systems:
Division II emergency diesel generator
Division II control building chill water system
Reactor core isolation cooling
The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk significance relative to the
reactor safety cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors attempted
to identify any discrepancies that could affect the function of the system, and, therefore,
- 7 -
Enclosure
potentially increase risk. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures,
system diagrams, Updated Safety Analysis Report, technical specification requirements,
administrative technical specifications, outstanding work orders, condition reports, and
the impact of ongoing work activities on redundant trains of equipment in order to identify
conditions that could have rendered the systems incapable of performing their intended
functions. The inspectors also inspected accessible portions of the systems to verify
system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and operable. The
inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed operating
parameters of equipment to verify that there were no obvious deficiencies. The
inspectors also verified that the licensee had properly identified and resolved equipment
alignment problems that could cause initiating events or impact the capability of
mitigating systems or barriers and entered them into the corrective action program with
the appropriate significance characterization. Specific documents reviewed during this
inspection are listed in the attachment.
These activities constitute completion of three partial system walkdown samples as
defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.04-05.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05)
Quarterly Fire Inspection Tours
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted fire protection walkdowns that were focused on availability,
accessibility, and the condition of firefighting equipment in the following risk-significant
plant areas:
October 21, 2009, auxiliary building 70-foot level, 95-foot level, 114-foot level,
141-foot level, and 171-foot level
October 21, 2009, reactor building 95-fool level, 114-foot level, 141-foot level,
and 162-foot level
November 2, 2009, fuel building all levels and tunnel B
November 3, 2009, control building all levels
December 7, 2009, control building cable chases
December 7, 2009, Division 1 and Division II emergency diesel generator
components
- 8 -
Enclosure
December 9, 2009, tunnel F
The inspectors reviewed areas to assess if licensee personnel had implemented a fire
protection program that adequately controlled combustibles and ignition sources within
the plant; effectively maintained fire detection and suppression capability; maintained
passive fire protection features in good material condition; and had implemented
adequate compensatory measures for out of service, degraded, or inoperable fire
protection equipment, systems, or features, in accordance with the licensees fire plan.
The inspectors selected fire areas based on their overall contribution to internal fire risk
as documented in the plants Individual Plant Examination of External Events with later
additional insights, their potential to affect equipment that could initiate or mitigate a plant
transient, or their impact on the plants ability to respond to a security event. Using the
documents listed in the attachment, the inspectors verified that fire hoses and
extinguishers were in their designated locations and available for immediate use; that
fire detectors and sprinklers were unobstructed; that transient material loading was
within the analyzed limits; and fire doors, dampers, and penetration seals appeared to
be in satisfactory condition. The inspectors also verified that minor issues identified
during the inspection were entered into the licensees corrective action program.
Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.
These activities constitute completion of seven quarterly fire-protection inspection
samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.05-05.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R07 Heat Sink Performance (71111.07) - Annual Sample
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed licensee programs, verified performance against industry
standards, and reviewed critical operating parameters and maintenance records for the
standby service water cooling tower. The inspectors verified that performance tests
were satisfactorily conducted for heat exchangers/heat sinks and reviewed for problems
or errors; the licensee utilized the periodic maintenance method outlined in EPRI
Report NP 7552, Heat Exchanger Performance Monitoring Guidelines; the licensee
properly utilized biofouling controls; the licensees heat exchanger inspections
adequately assessed the state of cleanliness of their tubes; and the heat exchanger was
correctly categorized under 10 CFR 50.65, Requirements for Monitoring the
Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants. Specific documents reviewed
during this inspection are listed in the attachment.
These activities constitute completion of one heat sink inspection sample as defined in
Inspection Procedure 71111.07-05.
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Enclosure
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R08 In-service Inspection Activities (71111.08)
Completion of Sections .1 and .2, below, constitutes completion of one sample as
defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.08-05.
.1
Inspection Activities Other Than Steam Generator Tube Inspection, Pressurized Water
Reactor Vessel Upper Head Penetration Inspections, and Boric Acid Corrosion Control
(71111.08-02.01)
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed two types of nondestructive examination activities. None of the
observed or reviewed nondestructive examinations identified any relevant indications,
and cognizant licensee personnel stated that no relevant indications were accepted by
the licensee for continued service.
The inspectors directly observed the following nondestructive examinations:
SYSTEM
WELD IDENTIFICATION
EXAMINATION TYPE
System (MSS)
MSS-700A-FWB12, 2
Penetrant Testing
System (MSS)
MSI-027C-FW003, Pipe-to-Tee, 2 Penetrant Testing
The inspectors reviewed records for the following nondestructive examinations:
SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION
EXAMINATION TYPE
Residual Heat
Removal System
(RHS)
RHS-067A-FW001, Pipe-Valve
1E 12 MOVF042A
Ultrasonic Testing
During the review and observation of each examination, the inspectors verified that
activities were performed in accordance with the ASME Code requirements and
applicable procedures. The inspectors compared indications from previous
examinations and verified that licensee personnel dispositioned the indications in
accordance with the ASME Code and approved procedures. The inspectors also
verified the qualifications of all nondestructive examination technicians performing the
inspections were current.
The inspectors verified, by review, that the welding procedure specifications and the
welders had been properly qualified in accordance with ASME Code,Section IX
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Enclosure
requirements. The inspectors also verified, through observation and record review, that
essential variables for the welding process were identified, recorded in the procedure
qualification record, and formed the bases for qualification of the welding procedure
specifications. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the
attachment.
These actions constitute completion of the requirements for Section 02.01.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2
Identification and Resolution of Problems (71111.08-02.05)
a.
Inspection scope
The inspectors reviewed eight condition reports which dealt with inservice inspection
activities and found the corrective actions were appropriate. The specific condition
reports reviewed are listed in the documents reviewed section. From this review the
inspectors concluded that the licensee has an appropriate threshold for entering issues
into the corrective action program and has procedures that direct a root cause evaluation
when necessary. The licensee also has an effective program for applying industry
operating experience. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in
the attachment.
These actions constitute completion of the requirements of Section 02.05.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12)
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated degraded performance issues involving the following risk
significant systems:
The inspectors reviewed events such as where ineffective equipment maintenance has
resulted in valid or invalid automatic actuations of engineered safeguards systems and
independently verified the licensee's actions to address system performance or condition
problems in terms of the following:
Implementing appropriate work practices
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Enclosure
Identifying and addressing common cause failures
Scoping of systems in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(b)
Characterizing system reliability issues for performance
Charging unavailability for performance
Trending key parameters for condition monitoring
Ensuring proper classification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) or -(a)(2)
Verifying appropriate performance criteria for structures, systems, and
components classified as having an adequate demonstration of performance
through preventive maintenance, as described in 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2), or as
requiring the establishment of appropriate and adequate goals and corrective
actions for systems classified as not having adequate performance, as described
The inspectors assessed performance issues with respect to the reliability, availability,
and condition monitoring of the system. In addition, the inspectors verified maintenance
effectiveness issues were entered into the corrective action program with the appropriate
significance characterization. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are
listed in the attachment.
These activities constitute completion of two quarterly maintenance effectiveness
samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.12-05.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13)
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed licensee personnel's evaluation and management of plant risk
for the maintenance and emergent work activities affecting risk-significant and
safety-related equipment listed below to verify that the appropriate risk assessments
were performed prior to removing equipment for work:
Fancy Point emergent breaker replacement and planned maintenance to repair
line 746, October 19-22, 2009
Station blackout diesel and Fancy Point planned maintenance with control
building chillers C and D out of service, October 29, 2009
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Enclosure
Normal service water pump 7C emergent repairs with Fancy Point planned
maintenance, November 10, 2009
Loss of Division I safety bus operability due to inadequate impact review for fuse
removal, November 30, 2009
Division I emergency diesel generator outage due to planned maintenance,
December 5, 2009
The inspectors selected these activities based on potential risk significance relative to
the reactor safety cornerstones. As applicable for each activity, the inspectors verified
that licensee personnel performed risk assessments as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4)
and that the assessments were accurate and complete. When licensee personnel
performed emergent work, the inspectors verified that the licensee personnel promptly
assessed and managed plant risk. The inspectors reviewed the scope of maintenance
work, discussed the results of the assessment with the licensee's probabilistic risk
analyst or shift technical advisor, and verified plant conditions were consistent with the
risk assessment. The inspectors also reviewed the technical specification requirements
and inspected portions of redundant safety systems, when applicable, to verify risk
analysis assumptions were valid and applicable requirements were met. Specific
documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.
These activities constitute completion of five maintenance risk assessments and
emergent work control inspection samples as defined in Inspection
Procedure 71111.13-05.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15)
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the following issues:
CR-RBS-2009-04141, cable and flex conduit in contact with uninsulated pipe,
reviewed on October 20, 2009
CR-RBS-2009-05652, high pressure core spray operability following high
pressure spray test return isolation valve failure to close, reviewed on
October 27, 2009
CR-RBS-2009-05882, FPW-P1B diesel fire pump muffler failure, reviewed on
November 17, 2009
- 13 -
Enclosure
CR-RBS-2009-05928, ground fault and failed sudden pressure relay failure on
STX-XS2B, reviewed on November 17, 2009
The inspectors selected these potential operability issues based on the risk significance
of the associated components and systems. The inspectors evaluated the technical
adequacy of the evaluations to ensure that technical specification operability was
properly justified and the subject component or system remained available such that no
unrecognized increase in risk occurred. The inspectors compared the operability and
design criteria in the appropriate sections of the technical specifications and Updated
Safety Analysis Report to the licensee personnels evaluations to determine whether the
components or systems were operable. Where compensatory measures were required
to maintain operability, the inspectors determined whether the measures in place would
function as intended and were properly controlled. The inspectors determined, where
appropriate, compliance with bounding limitations associated with the evaluations.
Additionally, the inspectors also reviewed a sampling of corrective action documents to
verify that the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with
operability evaluations. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in
the attachment.
These activities constitute completion of four operability evaluations inspection samples
as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.15-04
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R18 Plant Modifications (71111.18)
.1
a.
Inspection Scope
To verify that the safety functions of important safety systems were not degraded, the
inspectors reviewed the following temporary modifications:
TMOD 6321, Adjust Reactor Water Cleanup Differential Flow Indication to
Indicate Positive Differential Flow and Comply with Technical Specification 3.3.6.1, Revision 0
TMOD 17814, Removal of RTX-XR1E Load Tap Changer Internal Mechanism,
Revision 0
EC 15860, Disable Alarm and Trip Functions for Sudden Pressure Relays for
RTX-XSR1F and RTX-XSR1D, Revision 0
The inspectors reviewed the temporary modifications and the associated
safety-evaluation screening against the system design bases documentation, including
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Enclosure
the Updated Safety Analysis Report and the technical specifications, and verified that the
modification did not adversely affect the system operability/availability. The inspectors
also verified that the installation and restoration were consistent with the modification
documents and that configuration control was adequate. Additionally, the inspectors
verified that the temporary modification was identified on control room drawings,
appropriate tags were placed on the affected equipment, and licensee personnel
evaluated the combined effects on mitigating systems and the integrity of radiological
barriers.
These activities constitute completion of three samples for temporary plant modifications
as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.18-05.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2
Permanent Modifications
The inspectors reviewed key parameters associated with energy needs, materials,
replacement components, equipment protection from hazards, operations, structural,
process medium properties, licensing basis, and failure modes for the permanent
modifications listed below.
Engineering Change EC-2911, Perform Following Modifications for the EL 118
Drywell Steel, Revision 0
Engineering Change EC-18153, Replace Old Station Blackout Diesel, BYS-EG1,
with new Generac Diesel Generator, Revision 0
The inspectors verified that modification preparation, staging, and implementation did not
impair emergency/abnormal operating procedure actions, key safety functions, or
operator response to loss of key safety functions; postmodification testing will maintain
the plant in a safe configuration during testing by verifying that unintended system
interactions will not occur; systems, structures, and components performance
characteristics still meet the design basis; the modification design assumptions were
appropriate; the modification test acceptance criteria will be met; and licensee personnel
identified and implemented appropriate corrective actions associated with permanent
plant modifications. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the
attachment.
These activities constitute completion of two samples for permanent plant modifications
as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.18-05.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
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Enclosure
1R19 Postmaintenance Testing (71111.19)
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the following postmaintenance activities to verify that
procedures and test activities were adequate to ensure system operability and functional
capability:
WO 209226, Removal of Load Tap Changer Internal Mechanism on
RTX-XSR1E, reviewed on October 13, 2009
WO 199598, Disable Alarm and Trip Functions for Sudden Pressure Relays for
RTX-XSR1F and RTX-XSR1D, reviewed on October 20, 2009
WO 133778, EGS-EG1A has 20 dpm Lube Oil Leak on the Inlet to the Engine,
reviewed on December 11, 2009
WO 146473, EGS-EG1A Modify Turbocharger Piping per EC 6184, reviewed on
December 14, 2009
WO 170258, EGS-EG1A #6 Fuel Injector Pump has Fuel Leak, reviewed on
December 11, 2009
WO 205860, EGS-EG1A Inspect Engine, reviewed on December 14, 2009
WO 206158, Inspect Sub Cover Pedestals for Cracks, reviewed on
December 11, 2009
WO 208433, EGS-EG1A Perform Postmaintenance Inspection/Run, reviewed
on December 14, 2009
WO 213965, EGS-EG1A Jacket Water Leak at Intercooler Bypass Orifice,
reviewed on December 11, 2009
WO 217748, EGS-EG1A Intercooler has Nine Broken Bolts, reviewed on
December 14, 2009
WO 217749, EGS-EG1A Jacket Water Leak on Exhaust Shroud, reviewed on
December 11, 2009
The inspectors selected these activities based upon the structure, system, or
component's ability to affect risk. The inspectors evaluated these activities for the
following (as applicable):
The effect of testing on the plant had been adequately addressed; testing was
adequate for the maintenance performed
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Enclosure
Acceptance criteria were clear and demonstrated operational readiness; test
instrumentation was appropriate
The inspectors evaluated the activities against the technical specifications, the Updated
Safety Analysis Report, 10 CFR Part 50 requirements, licensee procedures, and various
NRC generic communications to ensure that the test results adequately ensured that the
equipment met the licensing basis and design requirements. In addition, the inspectors
reviewed corrective action documents associated with postmaintenance tests to
determine whether the licensee was identifying problems and entering them in the
corrective action program and that the problems were being corrected commensurate
with their importance to safety. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are
listed in the attachment.
These activities constitute completion of 11 postmaintenance testing inspection samples
as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.19-05.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities (71111.20)
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the outage safety plan and contingency plans for the River
Bend Station RF-15 refueling outage, conducted Fall 2009, to confirm that licensee
personnel had appropriately considered risk, industry experience, and previous
site-specific problems in developing and implementing a plan that assured maintenance
of defense in depth. During the refueling outage, the inspectors observed portions of the
shutdown and cooldown processes and monitored licensee controls over the outage
activities listed below.
Configuration management, including maintenance of defense in depth, is
commensurate with the outage safety plan for key safety functions and
compliance with the applicable technical specifications when taking equipment
out of service.
Clearance activities, including confirmation that tags were properly hung and
equipment appropriately configured to safely support the work or testing.
Installation and configuration of reactor coolant pressure, level, and temperature
instruments to provide accurate indication, accounting for instrument error.
Status and configuration of electrical systems to ensure that technical
specifications and outage safety-plan requirements were met, and controls over
switchyard activities.
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Enclosure
Monitoring of decay heat removal processes, systems, and components.
Verification that outage work was not impacting the ability of the operators to
operate the spent fuel pool cooling system.
Reactor water inventory controls, including flow paths, configurations, and
alternative means for inventory addition, and controls to prevent inventory loss.
Controls over activities that could affect reactivity.
Maintenance of containment as required by the technical specifications.
Refueling activities.
Startup and ascension to full power operation, tracking of startup prerequisites,
walkdown of the drywell (primary containment) to verify that debris had not been
left which could block emergency core cooling system suction strainers, and
reactor physics testing.
Licensee identification and resolution of problems related to refueling outage
activities.
Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.
These activities constitute completion of one refueling outage and other outage
inspection sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.20-05.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the Updated Safety Analysis Report, procedure requirements,
and technical specifications to ensure that the surveillance activities listed below
demonstrated that the systems, structures, and/or components tested were capable of
performing their intended safety functions. The inspectors either witnessed or reviewed
test data to verify that the significant surveillance test attributes were adequate to
address the following:
Preconditioning
Evaluation of testing impact on the plant
Acceptance criteria
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Enclosure
Test equipment
Procedures
Jumper/lifted lead controls
Test data
Testing frequency and method demonstrated technical specification operability
Test equipment removal
Restoration of plant systems
Updating of performance indicator data
Engineering evaluations, root causes, and bases for returning tested systems,
structures, and components not meeting the test acceptance criteria were correct
Annunciators and alarms setpoints
The inspectors also verified that licensee personnel identified and implemented any
needed corrective actions associated with the surveillance testing.
STP-309-0601, Division I ECCS Test, performed on September 29, 2009
STP-000-6303, Miscellaneous Containment and Drywell Isolation Valves
Quarterly Operability Test, Revision 11, performed on November 17, 2009
STP-052-0102, Partially Withdrawn Control Rod Insertion Operability Test,
performed on December 12, 2009
STP-203-6305, HPCS Quarterly Pump and Valve Operability Test, performed
on December 21, 2009
STP-203-4503, ECCS/DIV 3 - HPCS System Flow Rate - Low Channel,
performed on December 21, 2009
STP-309-0203, Division III Diesel Generator Operability Test, performed on
December 23, 2009
STP-251-3100, Diesel Fire Pump Weekly Battery Surveillance, performed on
December 29, 2009
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Enclosure
SOP-0054, Contingency Equipment Operations, (Station Blackout Diesel
Generator Monthly Operability Run), performed on December 30, 2009
Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.
These activities constitute completion of eight surveillance testing inspection samples as
defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.22-05.
b.
Findings
Introduction. A Green self-revealing violation of 10CFR50 Appendix B, Criterion V,
Instructions, Procedures and Drawings, was identified for the failure to follow the
procedure for making a permanent plant modification and provide adequate procedures
for installation and use of the main steam line plugs following a main steam line plug
design change. This failure resulted in draining approximately 5,000 gallons of water
from the upper reactor cavity pool to the drywell and a manual actuation of low pressure
coolant injection to restore cavity pool water level.
Description. Entergy uses main steam line plugs during outages to allow work on main
steam line components while the reactor is flooded and refueling activities are in
progress. Each main steam line plug has a primary mechanical o-ring seal and a
secondary inflatable seal, such that either seal is leak tight with the failure of the other
seal. On September 29, 2009, operators performed Surveillance Test Procedure
STP-309-0601, Division 1 ECCS Test, for a loss of offsite power concurrent with a loss
of coolant accident which isolated service air to the containment and the main steam line
plugs secondary seals. During the test, approximately 5,000 gallons of water drained
from the upper reactor cavity pool to the drywell. This event occurred because reactor
cavity pool water leaked past the improperly seated main steam line A plug primary seal,
the deflated secondary seal, and main steam line C safety relief valve flanges which
were disassembled for maintenance. Operators stopped the reactor cavity pool
draindown event by restoring service air to the main steam line secondary seals and
starting a low pressure coolant injection pump to restore upper reactor cavity pool water
level.
In 2001, when a redesigned main line plug was selected for use, Entergy evaluated the
design using an engineering reply rather and an engineering evaluation per company
Procedure DC-115, ER Response Development. An engineering reply is used to
clarify approved design documents or standard engineering practices and make simple
comparisons between items. It is not used to change plant documents, design, or
configuration. Since the plugs were not evaluated in accordance with Procedure
DC-115, there was no review of the Updated Safety Analysis Report, procedures, or
drawings for plant impact caused by using a different plug design. Specifically, General
Maintenance Procedure GMP-102, Reactor Vessel Disassembly, should have provided
sufficient primary seal seating instructions and plug installation acceptance criteria.
Surveillance Test Procedure STP-309-0601 should have changed to restore service air
to the main steam line plugs secondary seal, as required by the new plug design,
instead of restoring instrument air to the secondary seals, as required by the previous
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Enclosure
plug design. Either change should have prevented the loss of reactor cavity pool water
inventory to the drywell.
Analysis. This performance deficiency was the failure to follow the requirements of
company Procedure DC-115 and update Procedure GMP-102 and Procedure
STP-309-0601 to ensure the main steam line plugs primary seals were properly inserted
and to ensure service air was maintained to the secondary seals. The inspectors
determined the finding was more than minor in accordance with Inspection Manual
Chapter 0612, Appendix B, Issues Screening, because the finding affected the
initiating events cornerstone attribute of configuration control and the cornerstone
objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge
critical safety functions during shutdown operations. The inspectors evaluated the
finding in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix G, Shutdown
Operations Significance Determination Process. The inspectors reviewed
Section II.B.(1) of Checklist 7 and determined that the finding required a Phase 2
analysis because the finding involved procedures that affected steam line plug seal
configuration and resulted in inventory loss from the upper reactor cavity pool. The
senior reactor analyst determined that, because of the special circumstances of this
event, the use of a qualitative assessment using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609,
Appendix M, was more appropriate than the risk tools provided in Inspection Manual
Chapter 0609, Appendix G. This is because the draindown event was self-limiting, such
that the inventory excursion could not have drained reactor cavity level below the level of
the main steam lines, and that even with the failure of operators to take actions, the core
would have remained covered with no challenges to the shutdown cooling system.
Therefore, the event in the worst case would have been transparent to the core. Also,
the displaced inventory posed no threat to any of the plant's mitigating systems. The
inspectors concluded that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green). There
is no crosscutting aspect associated with this violation because the finding does not
reflect current licensee performance.
Enforcement. Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures
and Drawings, states in part that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by
documented instructions, procedures, or drawings of a type appropriate to the
circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions,
procedures, or drawings. Instructions, procedures, or drawings shall include appropriate
quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities
have been satisfactorily accomplished. Specifically, In 2001, Entergy company
Procedure DC-115, ER Response Development, paragraph 5.3.1, states that an
Engineering Reply cannot be used to change plant documents, design, or configuration;
cannot authorize the implementation of plant activities; and cannot be used as a source
of design input. Contrary to the above, Entergy evaluated the redesigned main steam
line plug using an engineering reply. The engineering reply failed to provide the
necessary procedure steps to ensure that the main steam line plugs primary and
secondary seals functioned properly to prevent a loss of reactor cavity pool inventory
during emergency core cooling logic testing. Because this violation is of very low safety
significance and it has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as
Condition Report CR-RBS-2009-4681, this violation is being treated as a noncited
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Enclosure
violation, consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000458/2009005-01 "Main Steam Line Plug Seal Failure Results in Loss of Reactor
Cavity Inventory.
2.
RADIATION SAFETY
Cornerstone: Occupational and Public Radiation Safety
2OS2 ALARA Planning and Controls (71121.02)
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors assessed licensee personnels performance with respect to maintaining
individual and collective radiation exposures as low as is reasonably achievable. The
inspectors used the requirements in 10 CFR Part 20 and the licensees procedures
required by technical specifications as criteria for determining compliance. The
inspectors interviewed licensee personnel and reviewed the following:
Current 3-year rolling average collective exposure
Five work activities from previous work history data which resulted in the highest
personnel collective exposures
Site-specific ALARA procedures
Five work activities of highest exposure significance completed during the last
outage
ALARA work activity evaluations, exposure estimates, and exposure mitigation
requirements
Intended versus actual work activity doses and the reasons for any
inconsistencies
Interfaces between operations, radiation protection, maintenance, maintenance
planning, scheduling and engineering groups
Person-hour estimates provided by maintenance planning and other groups to
the radiation protection group with the actual work activity time requirements
Postjob (work activity) reviews
Method for adjusting exposure estimates, or re-planning work, when unexpected
changes in scope or emergent work were encountered
Exposure tracking system
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Enclosure
Use of engineering controls to achieve dose reductions and dose reduction
benefits afforded by shielding
Records detailing the historical trends and current status of tracked plant source
terms and contingency plans for expected changes in the source term due to
changes in plant fuel performance issues or changes in plant primary chemistry
Source-term control strategy or justifications for not pursuing such exposure
reduction initiatives
Specific sources identified by the licensee for exposure reduction actions,
priorities established for these actions, and results achieved since the last
refueling cycle
Self-assessments, audits, and special reports related to the ALARA program
since the last inspection
Resolution through the corrective action process of problems identified through
postjob reviews and postoutage ALARA report critiques
Corrective action documents related to the ALARA program and follow-up
activities, such as initial problem identification, characterization, and tracking
Effectiveness of self-assessment activities with respect to identifying and
addressing repetitive deficiencies or significant individual deficiencies
Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.
These activities constitute completion of 11 of the required 15 samples and 8 of the
optional samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71121.02-05.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
2PS2 Radioactive Material Processing and Transportation (71122.02)
a.
Inspection Scope
This area was inspected to verify that the licensee=s radioactive material processing and
transportation program complies with the requirements of 10 CFR Parts 20, 61, and 71
and Department of Transportation regulations contained in 49 CFR Parts 171-180. The
team interviewed licensee personnel and reviewed:
The radioactive waste system description, recent radiological effluent release
reports, and the scope of the licensee=s audit program;
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Enclosure
Liquid and solid radioactive waste processing systems configurations, the status
and control of any radioactive waste process equipment that is not operational or
is abandoned in place, changes made to the radioactive waste processing
systems since the last inspection, and current processes for transferring
radioactive waste resin and sludge discharges;
Radio-chemical sample analysis results for radioactive waste streams and use of
scaling factors and calculations to account for difficult-to-measure radionuclides;
Shipment packaging, surveying, labeling, marking, placarding, vehicle checking,
driver instructing, and disposal manifesting;
Shipping records for non-excepted package shipments;
Self-assessments and corrective action reports performed since the last
inspection.
Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.
Either because the conditions did not exist or an event had not occurred, no
opportunities were available to review the following item:
Licensee event reports and special reports.
These activities constitute completion of six of the required six samples, as defined in
Inspection Procedure 71122.02-04.
b.
Findings
Introduction. The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 71.5 and
49 CFR Part 172.604(a) for a failure to ensure that the shift manager, whose phone
number was listed as the required 24-hour emergency phone number on shipping
documents, was knowledgeable about the shipment that left the site on December 16,
2009, or had immediate access to a person who had knowledge of the shipment.
Specifically, although the shift manager was listed as the required 24-hour contact, the
shift managers (on multiple shifts) were not provided with documentation or information
about the shipments that left the site on December 16, 2009. Although the shift manager
would have eventually contacted the correct person, he would have made multiple
telephone calls before finding the knowledgeable person. This delay would not have
resulted in immediate access to a knowledgeable person.
Description. On December 16, 2009, the licensee loaded a liner containing spent resins
into a high integrity container, prepared it for exclusive use shipment by contract carrier,
and once the shipping papers were approved, a licensee designated shipper briefed the
truck driver, and the shipment departed the site. As required by 49 CFR Part 172.604(a),
the licensee listed the 24-hour emergency telephone number on the shipment paper for
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Enclosure
the shift manager office. The designated shipper (whose office is located outside of the
protected area) then faxed a copy of the shipping paperwork to the control room. This
was intended to notify the shift manager of the shipment and provided the designated
shippers name. However, the licensee informed the inspectors that the fax machine was
apparently broken at the time, and the fax was not received. The designated shipper did
not call the shift manager to ensure receipt of the fax.
On December 17, 2009, the inspectors interviewed the shift manager and found that he
had no knowledge of the shipment. The shift manager stated that hypothetically, if he
received a telephone call about an emergency involving the shipment, he first would call
the shift radiation protection technician. If the shift technician did not have the
information about the shipment (shift radiation protection technicians are not normally
provided with a copy of the shipping paper), the shift manager stated he would have
called the duty radiation protection supervisor next. If the supervisor didnt have the
information (the radiation protection supervisors are not normally provided with a copy of
the shipping paper work), he would have started calling others starting with the radiation
protection manager.
The inspectors determined that this process did not satisfy the requirement that the
24-hour emergency contact (shift manager) be either knowledgeable of the hazardous
material being shipped or have comprehensive emergency response and incident
mitigation information for that material, or have immediate access to a person who
possessed information. Although the shift manager was listed as the 24-hour contact,
the shift managers were not provided the documentation or information related to the
shipment that left the site on December 16, 2009. Eventually, the shift manager would
have contacted the correct person but this was not considered to meet the requirement
for immediate access to the person who possessed information and knowledge about
the shipment.
In response, the licensee immediately provided the shift manager a copy of the shipping
documents and briefed him about the shipment, and began reviewing the issue through
a human performance evaluation review. Licensee representatives stated that its
procedures were silent on how to notify the shift manager about a shipment. The
licensee began instituting a new process that requires the shipping papers be hand
delivered to the shift manager and that the shift manager be briefed about the shipment.
Analysis. The inspectors determined the failure to ensure that the shift manager was
knowledgeable about the shipment or had immediate access to a person who had
knowledge was a performance deficiency because it was the result of the licensees
failure to meet a requirement and the cause was reasonably within the licensees ability
to foresee and correct and should have been prevented. The inspectors determined this
performance deficiency was more than minor because it adversely affected the public
radiation safety cornerstone to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety
from exposure to radioactive materials released into the public domain in that the failure
to have shipment information immediately available could restrict the actions of fire
department and/or rescue personnel responding to an accident. When processed
through the Public Radiation Safety Determination Process, the finding was determined
to be of very low safety significance because the finding: (1) was associated with
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Enclosure
radioactive material control, (2) involved the licensees program for radioactive material
transportation, (3) did not cause radiation limits to be exceeded, (4) did not involve a
breach of package during transit, (5) did not involve a certificate of compliance finding,
(6) did not involve a low level burial ground nonconformance, and (7) did not involve a
failure to make notifications. The inspectors determined the finding had a crosscutting
aspect in area of resources, associated with documentation, because the licensees
procedures did not provide any guidance on informing the control room about shipments
and thus, the procedures were not complete, accurate nor up-to-date H.2(c).
Enforcement. Title 10 CFR Part 71.5 which requires, in part, that each licensee who
delivers licensed material to a carrier for transport shall comply with the applicable
requirements of the DOT regulations in 49 CFR Parts 171 through 180 appropriate to the
mode of transport. Title 49 CFR Part 172.604(a)(2) requires, in part, that a person who
offers a hazardous material for transportation must provide a 24-hour emergency
response telephone number for use in the event of an emergency involving the
hazardous material. The telephone number must be the number of a person who is
either knowledgeable of the hazardous material being shipped or has comprehensive
emergency response and incident mitigation information for that material, or who has
immediate access to a person who possesses such knowledge and information.
Contrary to the requirement, on December 16 through 17, 2009, River Bend Station
offered hazardous material for transportation in which the position/individual listed for the
24-hour emergency number neither had knowledge of the hazardous material being
shipped nor had comprehensive emergency response and incident mitigation
information for that material, nor had immediate access to a person who did possess
such knowledge. The shift manager was listed as the 24-hour contact; however, the
shift manager was not provided with the information about the shipment. Consequently,
he would not have immediately known whom to contact for detailed information
concerning the radioactive material shipment. Because the finding is of very low safety
significance and has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as
Condition Report CR-RBS-2009-06419, this violation is being treated as a noncited
violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy:
NCV 05000458/2009005-02, Failure to Ensure the Emergency Contact had Knowledge
About a Shipment.
4.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)
.1
Data Submission Issue
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a review of the performance indicator data submitted by the
licensee for the third quarter 2009 performance indicators for any obvious
inconsistencies prior to its public release in accordance with Inspection Manual
Chapter 0608, Performance Indicator Program.
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Enclosure
This review was performed as part of the inspectors normal plant status activities and,
as such, did not constitute a separate inspection sample.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2
Reactor Coolant System Specific Activity (BI01)
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the reactor coolant system specific
activity performance indicator for the period from the second quarter 2008 through the
third quarter 2009. To determine the accuracy of the performance indicator data
reported during those periods, the inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in
NEI Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline,
Revision 5. The inspectors reviewed the licensees reactor coolant system chemistry
samples, technical specification requirements, issue reports, event reports, and NRC
integrated inspection reports for the period of April 2008 through September 2009 to
validate the accuracy of the submittals. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees
issue report database to determine if any problems had been identified with the
performance indicator data collected or transmitted for this indicator and none were
identified. In addition to record reviews, the inspectors observed a chemistry technician
obtain and analyze a reactor coolant system sample. Specific documents reviewed are
described in the attachment to this report.
These activities constitute completion of one reactor coolant system specific activity
sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151-05.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.3
Reactor Coolant System Leakage (BI02)
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the reactor coolant system leakage
performance indicator for the period from the second quarter 2008 through the third
quarter 2009. To determine the accuracy of the performance indicator data reported
during those periods, the inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in NEI
Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 5.
The inspectors reviewed the licensees operator logs, reactor coolant system leakage
tracking data, issue reports, event reports, and NRC integrated inspection reports for the
period of April 2008 through September 2009 to validate the accuracy of the submittals.
The inspectors also reviewed the licensees issue report database to determine if any
problems had been identified with the performance indicator data collected or
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Enclosure
transmitted for this indicator and none were identified. Specific documents reviewed are
described in the attachment to this report.
These activities constitute completion of one reactor coolant system leakage sample as
defined in Inspection Procedure 71151-05.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152)
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, Emergency
Preparedness, Public Radiation Safety, Occupational Radiation Safety, and Physical
Protection
.1
Routine Review of Identification and Resolution of Problems
a.
Inspection Scope
As part of the various baseline inspection procedures discussed in previous sections of
this report, the inspectors routinely reviewed issues during baseline inspection activities
and plant status reviews to verify that they were being entered into the licensees
corrective action program at an appropriate threshold, that adequate attention was being
given to timely corrective actions, and that adverse trends were identified and
addressed. The inspectors reviewed attributes that included the complete and accurate
identification of the problem; the timely correction, commensurate with the safety
significance; the evaluation and disposition of performance issues, generic implications,
common causes, contributing factors, root causes, extent of condition reviews, and
previous occurrences reviews; and the classification, prioritization, focus, and timeliness
of corrective actions. Minor issues entered into the licensees corrective action program
because of the inspectors observations are included in the attached list of documents
reviewed.
These routine reviews for the identification and resolution of problems did not constitute
any additional inspection samples. Instead, by procedure, they were considered an
integral part of the inspections performed during the quarter and documented in
Section 1 of this report.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
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Enclosure
.2
Daily Corrective Action Program Reviews
a.
Inspection Scope
In order to assist with the identification of repetitive equipment failures and specific
human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of
items entered into the licensees corrective action program. The inspectors
accomplished this through review of the stations daily corrective action documents.
The inspectors performed these daily reviews as part of their daily plant status
monitoring activities and, as such, did not constitute any separate inspection samples.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.3
Semi-Annual Trend Review
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a review of the licensees corrective action program and
associated documents to identify trends that could indicate the existence of a more
significant safety issue. The inspectors focused their review on repetitive equipment
issues, but also considered the results of daily corrective action item screening
discussed in Section 4OA2.2, above, licensee trending efforts, and licensee human
performance results. The inspectors nominally considered the 6-month period of
April 2009 through September 2009 although some examples expanded beyond those
dates where the scope of the trend warranted.
The inspectors also included issues documented outside the normal corrective action
program in major equipment problem lists, repetitive and/or rework maintenance lists,
departmental problem/challenges lists, system health reports, quality assurance
audit/surveillance reports, self-assessment reports, and Maintenance Rule assessments.
The inspectors compared and contrasted their results with the results contained in the
licensees corrective action program trending reports. Corrective actions associated with
a sample of the issues identified in the licensees trending reports were reviewed for
adequacy.
These activities constitute completion of one single semi-annual trend inspection sample
as defined in Inspection Procedure 71152-05.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
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Enclosure
.4
Selected Issue Follow-up Inspection
a.
Inspection Scope
During a review of items entered in the licensees corrective action program, the
inspectors recognized a corrective action item documenting operator attempt to shift the
reactor recirculation pumps from fast speed to slow during a plant shutdown for a
refueling outage.
These activities constitute completion of one in-depth problem identification and
resolution sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71152-05.
c.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.5
In-depth Review of Operator Workarounds
a.
Inspection Scope
An operator workaround is defined as a degraded or nonconforming condition that
complicates the operation of plant equipment and is compensated for by operator
action. During the week of November 2, 2009, the inspectors reviewed the cumulative
effect of the existing operator workarounds and contingency plans. The inspectors
concentrated on the effect the workarounds have on: (1) the reliability, availability, and
potential for misoperation of any mitigating system; (2) whether they could increase the
frequency of an initiating event; and (3) their effect on the operation of multiple mitigating
systems. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the cumulative effects the operator
workarounds have on the ability of the operators to respond in a correct and timely
manner to plant transients and accidents.
These activities constitute completion of one in-depth review of operator workarounds
sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71152-05.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA3 Event Follow-up (71153)
.1
(Closed) Licensee Event Report 05000458/2009-003-00: Low Pressure Coolant
Injection Actuation Following Loss of Water from Upper Reactor Cavity Pool
On September 20, 2009, plant operators were reducing reactor power to begin a
refueling outage. At 37 percent reactor power, the operators attempted to shift both
reactor recirculation pumps from fast to slow speed. Reactor recirculation pump A
shifted to slow speed, but tripped off approximately nine seconds later. Reactor
recirculation pump B tripped off directly from high speed. The operators reactivity
- 30 -
Enclosure
manipulation plan relied on forced circulation for plant shutdown. Without a plan for
reactor shut down in the natural circulation mode, the operators inserted an unplanned
controlled manual reactor scram. Thermal-hydraulic conditions remained within
operational limits during the event. The licensee entered the event into their corrective
action program as Condition Report CR-RBS-2009-04175. The inspectors discussed
the event with licensee management, engineering, operations, and maintenance
personnel to understand the conditions leading to the loss of both reactor recirculation
pumps and subsequent operator actions. This licensee event report is closed.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2
(Closed) Licensee Event Report 05000458/2009-002-00: Unplanned Manual Reactor Scram Following Trip of Both Reactor Recirculation Pumps
The safety significance and the enforcement aspect of this violation are discussed in
section 4OA2. The licensee has entered the event into their corrective action program
as Condition Report CR-RBS-2009-04175. This licensee event report is closed.
4OA5 Other Activities
Quarterly Resident Inspector Observations of Security Personnel and Activities
a.
Inspection Scope
During the inspection period, the inspectors performed observations of security force
personnel and activities to ensure that the activities were consistent with River Bend
security procedures and regulatory requirements relating to nuclear plant security.
These observations took place during both normal and off-normal plant working hours.
These quarterly resident inspector observations of security force personnel and activities
did not constitute any additional inspection samples. Rather, they were considered an
integral part of the inspectors normal plant status review and inspection activities.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA6 Meetings
Exit Meeting Summary
On October 2, 2009, the inspector presented the in-service inspection activities inspection
results to Mr. J. Roberts, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged
the issues presented. The inspector asked the licensee whether any materials examined during
the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
- 31 -
Enclosure
On December 17, 2009, the inspectors presented the radiation safety inspection results to Mr.
M. Perito, Site Vice President, Operations, and other members of the licensee staff. The
licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any
materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary
information was identified.
On January 7, 2010, the inspectors presented the integrated baseline inspection results to
Mr. E. Olson, General Manager, Plant Operations, and other members of the licensee staff. The
licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any
materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary
information was identified.
4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations
The following violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by the
licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which meets the criteria of Section VI of
the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600, for being dispositioned as a noncited
violation.
Technical Specification 5.4.1.a requires implementation of applicable procedures
recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978.
Section 7(e) of the Appendix requires procedures for training in radiation
protection and personnel monitoring. Section 4.0[1] of Procedure EN-RP-100,
Radworker Expectations, Revision 0, requires, in part, that workers notify health
physics upon receipt of any electronic alarming dosimeter alarm that was not
prebriefed. Contrary to this, on January 17, 2008, a licensee worker failed to
notify radiation protection personnel upon receipt of an electronic alarming
dosimeter dose rate alarm that was not prebriefed in steam jet air ejector room B.
This finding had very low safety significance (Green) because: (1) it was not an
ALARA finding, (2) there was no overexposure, (3) there was no substantial
potential for an overexposure, and (4) the ability to assess dose was not
compromised. This item was entered into the licensees corrective action
program as Condition Report CR-RBS-2008-00506.
A-1
Attachment
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel
M. Briley, Corporate Engineering, Sr. Lead Technical Specialist
D. Burnett, Manager, Emergency Preparedness
G. Bush, Manager, Plant Maintenance
M. Chase, Manager, Training and Development
G. Chatterton, Engineering, Technical Specialist
J. Clark, Assistant Operations Manager - Shift
B. Cox, Manager, Operations
M. Feltner, Manager, Outage
C. Forpahl, Manager, Engineering Programs & Components
P. Gritton, Manager, Site Support
D. Heath, Supervisor, Radiation Protection
R. Heath, Superintendent, Chemistry
D. Herbert, Engineering, Technical Specialist
B. Houston, Manager, Radiation Protection
K. Huffstatler, Senior Licensing Specialist
A. James, Manager, Plant Security
L. Kitchen, Manager, Planning and Scheduling
R. Kowaleski, Manager, Corrective Actions & Assessments
G. Krause, Assistant Operations Manager - Support
D. Lorfing, Manager, Licensing
W. Mashburn, Manager, Design Engineering
R. McAdams, Manager, System Engineering
J. McElwain, Manager, Human Resources
L. Meyer, Senior Health Physics/Chemistry Specialist
E. Olson, General Manager, Plant Operations
M. Perito, Site Vice President, Operations
R. Persons, Superintendent, Training
J. Roberts, Director, Nuclear Safety Assurance
K. Rockwood, Supervisor, Radiation Protection
J. Schroeder, Assistant Operations Manager - Training
D. Wiles, Director, Engineering
R. Williams, Corporate Engineering, Sr. lead Technical Specialist
J. Wilson, Supervisor, Reactor Engineering
L. Woods, Manager (Acting), Quality Assurance
NRC Personnel
G. Larkin, Senior Resident Inspector
C. Norton, Resident Inspector
A-2
Attachment
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened and Closed 05000458/2009005-01
Main Steam Line Plug Seal Failure Results in Loss of Reactor
Cavity Inventory (Section 1R22)0500458/2009005-02
Failure to Ensure the Emergency Contact had Knowledge
About a Shipment (Section 2PS2)
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Section 1R01: Adverse Weather Protection
MISCELLANEOUS
NUMBER
TITLE
REVISION
Procedural and Submittal Guidance for the Individual
Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for
Severe Weather Vulnerabilities
0
Regulatory Effectiveness of the Station Blackout
Rule
0
Grid Reliability and the Impact on Plant Risk and the
Operability of Offsite Power
PROCEDURES
NUMBER
TITLE
REVISION
Severe Weather Operation
21
Degraded Grid
0
10CFR50.59 Review Program
4
ENS-DC-199
Off-Site Power Supply Design Requirements
2
ENS-DC-201
ENS Transmission Grid Monitoring
2
Grid Monitor
1
A-3
Attachment
Section 1R04: Equipment Alignment
MISCELLANEOUS
PROCEDURES
NUMBER
TITLE
REVISION
SOP-0035
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System
35
SOP-0049
120 VDC System
27
SOP-0053
Standby Diesel Generator and Auxiliaries
307
SOP-0058
Control Building HVAC Systems
20
Section 1R05: Fire Protection
CONDITION REPORTS
CR-RBS-2009-06002 CR-RBS-2009-06003
MISCELLANEOUS
NUMBER
TITLE
REVISION
DRL-FP-00107
Control Building 116-foot C71 P002 RPS DIST PNL
4
Pre-Fire Plan/Strategy Book
TRM 3.7.9.6
Fire Related Assemblies
USAR Section 9A.2
Fire Hazards Analysis
USAR 9.4.7.2.1
15
PROCEDURES
NUMBER
TITLE
REVISION
Loss of Normal Service Water
16
Control of Hot Work and Ignition Sources
7
Fire Protection Impact Reviews
4
A-4
Attachment
NUMBER
TITLE
REVISION
Fire Protection System Impairment
10
Fire Suppression System Inspection
10
SOP-0037
Fire Protection Water System Operating Procedure
(System 251)
27
Section 1R07: Heat Sink Performance
CONDITION REPORTS
CR-RBS-2008-02821 CR-RBS-2008-02878
CR-RBS-2009-04830
MISCELLANEOUS
USAR 1.2.2.8.1
USAR 3.8.4.4.4
USAR 7.3.1.1.8
USAR 9.2.7
USAR Tables 9.2-5, 9.2-6, 9.2-7, 9.2-8, 9.2-10, 9.2-11, 9.2-13, 9.2-15, 9.2-16
PROCEDURES
NUMBER
TITLE
REVISION
SOP-0042
Standby Service Water
28
Section 1R08: Inservice Inspection Activities
CONDITION REPORTS
CR-RBS-2009-04463
CR-RBS-2009-04613
MISCELLANEOUS
NUMBER
TITLE
DATE
ELO-LO-2006-00094
Welding Program Assessment
July 24, 2006
A-5
Attachment
PROCEDURES
NUMBER
TITLE
REVISION
CEP-NDE-0400
Ultrasonic Examination
3
CEP-NDE-0404
Manual Ultrasonic Examination of Ferritic Piping
4
CEP-NDE-0641
Liquid Penetrant Examination (PT) for ASME
Section XI
5
CEP-NDE-0731
Magnetic Particle Examination (MT) for ASME
Section XI
3
CEP-NDE-0903
VT-3 Examination
5
Section 1R12: Maintenance Effectiveness
CONDITION REPORTS
PROCEDURES
NUMBER
TITLE
REVISION
Maintenance Rule Monitoring
2
Maintenance Rule (a)(1) Process
1
A-6
Attachment
Section 1R13: Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Controls
PROCEDURES
NUMBER
TITLE
REVISION
ADM-0096
Risk Management Program and Implementation
Risk Assessment
304
Severe Weather Operation
24
Degraded Grid
2
Troubleshooting and Control of Maintenance
Activities
5
Reactivity Management Program
3
On-Line Work Management Process
6
Section 1R15: Operability Evaluations
CONDITION REPORTS
MISCELLANEOUS
NUMBER
TITLE
REVISION
IEEE Standard
C37.91-2008
IEEE Guide for Protecting Power Transformers
PROCEDURES
NUMBER
TITLE
REVISION
STP-251-3205
Diesel Fire Pump Operational Test
14
Section 1R18: Plant Modifications
CONDITION REPORT
A-7
Attachment
MISCELLANEOUS
NUMBER
TITLE
REVISION
ARP-SBO-Diesel
0 and 1
Replace Old Station Blackout Diesel, BYS-EG1, with
New Generac Diesel Generator
USAR 8.1.4
USAR 15.2.6.1.1.1
PROCEDURES
NUMBER
TITLE
REVISION
Engineering Change Process
8
4
Process Applicability Determination
7
Preparation, Review and Revision of Operations
Section Procedures
19
RBNP-001
Development and Control of RBS Procedures
29
SOP-0054
Contingency Equipment Operation
306
SOP-0054
Contingency Equipment Operation
307
WORK ORDERS
NUMBER
TITLE
Task 1, Install TMOD 6321 on RWCU A
Task 3, Install TMOD 6321 on RWCU B
Task 3, RTX-XSR1E, Remove Load Tap Changer and
Install TMOD 17184
Task 3 & 4, RTX-XSR1F Transformer Trouble Alarm
Received in Main Control Room
A-8
Attachment
Section 1R19: Postmaintenance Testing
MISCELLANEOUS
NUMBER
TITLE
REVISION
Disable Alarm and Trip Functions for Sudden
Pressure Relays for RTX-XSR1F and RTX-XSR1D
USAR 8.1.4
USAR 15.2.6.1.1.1
WORK ORDERS
NUMBER
TITLE
REVISION
Task 7, EMRTX-XSR1E Post Installation Testing for
TMOD 17814
Task 3 & 4, RTX-XSR1F Transformer Trouble Alarm
Received in Main Control Room
Section 1R20: Refueling and Other Outage Activities
PROCEDURES
NUMBER
TITLE
REVISION
Reactor Scram
24
GMP-0102
Reactor Vessel Disassembly
18
GMP-0103
Reactor Vessel Assembly
20
GOP-0001
Plant Startup
20
SOP-0031
306
Section 1R22: Surveillance Testing
CONDITION REPORTS
CR-RBS-1986-00018 CR-RBS-2009-04681
A-9
Attachment
PROCEDURES
NUMBER
TITLE
REVISION
Fuel Handling Mishaps
23
GMP-0108
Reactor Vessel Disassembly
31
SOP-0054
Contingency Equipment Operation
306
STP-309-0203
Division III Diesel Generator Operability Test
306
STP-309-0601
Division I ECCS Test
31
MISCELLANEOUS
NUMBER
TITLE
REVISION
ARP-SBO-Diesel
1
ASME OMb Code-2006
Code for Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear
Power Plants
Licensee Event Report
50-458/09-003-00
November 23,
2009
Technical
Specifications 3.8.1,
3.8.2, and 3.8.3
WORK ORDERS
Section 2OS2: ALARA Planning and Controls
AUDITS, SELF-ASSESSMENTS, AND SURVEILLANCES
NUMBER
TITLE
DATE
LO-RLO-2009-00005
Focused Assessment Report; Occupational Radiation
Safety
March 06, 2009
LO-RLO-2009-00057
Focused Assessment Report; Occupational Radiation
Safety
August 07, 2009
Snapshot Assessment RP Outage Readiness
May 26, 2009
Snapshot Assessment Dose Reduction Techniques
August 31, 2009
A-10
Attachment
NUMBER
TITLE
DATE
Snapshot Assessment Control and Use of Contaminated Drip Bags
May 12, 2009
Snapshot Assessment Access to High Radiological Risk Activities
September 30,
2009
CONDITION REPORTS
CR-RBS-2009-03155
CR-RBS-2009-05169
CR-RBS-2009-03918
CR-RBS-2009-05749
CR-RBS-2009-04440
CR-RBS-2009-05751
MISCELLANEOUS
NUMBER
TITLE
REVISION
2009-2013
River Bend Station CRE Goals
PROCEDURES
NUMBER
TITLE
REVISION
Radworker Expectations
3
Access Control for Radiologically Controlled Areas
4
Radiological Control
2
Radiation Work Permits
7
Hot Spot Program
3
Job Coverage
4
RADIATION WORK PERMITS
NUMBER
TITLE
2009-1006
General Radwaste Activities including shipping
<1000 mrem
2009-1214
General Radwaste Activities including shipping and
A-11
Attachment
NUMBER
TITLE
2009-1432
RF-15 Snubber Work
2009-1603
RF-15 Noble Chemistry Project Activities
2009-1800
RF-15 Refuel Activities
2009-1938
RF-15 Scaffold and Shielding
2009-1943
RF-15 Drywell
Section 2PS2: Radioactive Material Processing and Transportation
AUDITS, SELF-ASSESSMENTS, AND SURVEILLANCES
NUMBER
TITLE
DATE
QA-15-2007-RBS-1 & -2
Quality Assurance Audit of Radwaste and
Radiation Protection Programs
January 3, 2008
QA-15-2007-RBS-1
Followup to Audits
July 14-17, 2008
QS-2008-RBS-11
Followup of the 2008 Radwaste Surveillance
December 15-17, 2008
CONDITION REPORTS
PROCEDURES
NUMBER
TITLE
REVISION
Radioactive Shipping Procedure
6
Scaling Factors
5
1
RWS-0304
Radioactive Waste Handling and Control
15
RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL SHIPMENTS
2008-039
2009-040
2009-105
2009-106
2009-107
A-12
Attachment
10 CFR Part 61 Waste Stream Scaling Factors
NUMBER
TITLE
REVISION
Spent Pool Fuel Cleanup (SFC 2009)
June 9, 2009
Westinghouse Chemical Decon
March 1,
2008
Dry Active Waste
August 7,
2008
Condensate and Liquid Waste System
January 21,
2009
Section 4OA1: Performance Indicator Verification
PROCEDURES
NUMBER
TITLE
REVISION
Corrective Action Process
13
Performance Indicator Process
4
Section 4OA2: Identification and Resolution of Problems
CONDITION REPORTS
CR-RBS-2009-04175
LICENSEE EVENT REPORTS
NUMBER
TITLE
REVISION
LER 1995-012
Manual Scram Due to Recirculation Pump Transient
0
LER 2009-002
Unplanned Manual Reactor Scram Following Trip of
Both Reactor Recirculation Pumps
0
MISCELLANEOUS
NUMBER
TITLE
REVISION /
DATE
A-13
Attachment
NUMBER
TITLE
REVISION /
DATE
Caution Tags Greater than 90 day Index
August 31,
2009
Caution tags Greater Than 90 day Index
October 31,
2009
CEO 2009-00005
Nuclear Oversight Fleet Quarterly Report
0
Clearances Greater than 90 day Index
August 31,
2009
Clearances Greater than 90 day index
October 31,
2009
Control Room Annunciator Index
August 31,
2009
Control Room Annunciator Index
October 31,
2009
Control Room Deficiency Index
August 31,
2009
Control Room Deficiency Index
October 31,
2009
ER-RB-2002-0042
Evaluation of Recirculation Pump Downshift Logic
0
ODMI Index
November
6, 2009
ODMI, FWS P1A/B/C Operation with High Seal
Leakage
ODMI, High Alterx Housing Vibration
ODMI, Turbine # 2 Valve Packing Leak
Operations Aggregate Index
August, 31,
2009
Operations Aggregate Index
October 31,
2009
Operator Burden Index
August 31,
2009
Operator Burden Index
October 31,
2009
Operator Work Around Index
August 31,
2009
A-14
Attachment
NUMBER
TITLE
REVISION /
DATE
Operator Work Around Index
October 31,
2009
PROCEDURES
NUMBER
TITLE
REVISION
Thermal Hydraulic Stability Controls
22
GOP-0004
Single Loop Operation
20
Section 4OA3: Event Follow-Up
CONDITION REPORTS
MISCELLANEOUS
NUMBER
TITLE
REVISION
ER-RB-2002-0042
Evaluation of Recirculation Pump Downshift Logic
0
LER 1995-012
Manual Scram Due to Recirculation Pump
0
LER 2009-002
Unplanned Manual Reactor Scram Following Trip of
Both Reactor Recirculation Pumps
0
PROCEDURES
NUMBER
TITLE
REVISION
Thermal Hydraulic Stability Controls
22
GOP-0004
Single Loop Operation
20