IR 05000244/2017002
| ML17215A899 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 08/02/2017 |
| From: | Anthony Dimitriadis Reactor Projects Branch 1 |
| To: | Bryan Hanson Exelon Generation Co, Exelon Nuclear |
| References | |
| IR 2017002 | |
| Download: ML17215A899 (39) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I 2100 RENAISSANCE BLVD.
KING OF PRUSSIA, PA 19406-2713 August 2, 2017 Mr. Bryan Senior Vice President , Exelon Generation Company, LLC President and Chief Nuclear Officer, Exelon Nuclear 4300 Winfield Road Warrenville, IL 60555 SUBJECT: R.E. GINNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, LLC - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000244/201 7002
Dear Mr. Hanson:
On June 30, 201 7 , the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, LLC (Ginna). On July 12, 2017, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. Paul Swift , Plant General Manager , and other members of the Ginna staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report. The NRC inspectors did not identify any finding or violation of more than minor significance.
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding."
Sincerely,
/RA/ Anthony Dimitriadis, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No.
50-244 License No.
Enclosure:
Inspection Report
05000244/201 7002 w/Attachment: Supplementary Information
REGION I Docket No.
50-244 License No.
DPR-18 Report No.
05000244/20 1 7002 Licensee: Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Exelon) Facility: R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, LLC (Ginna) Location: Ontario, New York
Dates: April 1, 201 7 , through June 3 0 , 20 1 7 Inspectors:
N. Perry, Senior Resident Inspector J. Schussler, Resident Inspector H. Anagnostopoulos, Senior Health Physicist C. Hobbs, Reactor Inspector K. Kolaczyk, Senior Resident Inspector, Nine Mile Point J. Lilliendahl, Senior Emergency Response Coordinator M. Modes, Senior Reactor Inspector A. Rosebrook, Senior Project Engineer
Approved by:
Anthony Dimitriadis, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects
2
SUMMARY
Inspection Report 05000244/20 1 7 00 2; 0 4/01/201 7 - 06/3 0/201 7; Ginna; Routine Integrated Inspection Report.
Th is report covered a 3
-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced baseline inspections performed by regional inspectors. No findings were identified during this inspection. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC's) program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUR EG-1649, "Reacto r Oversight Process," Revision 6
.
Cornerstone: Initiating Events/Mitigating Systems/Barrier Integrity
No NRC-identified or self-revealing findings were identified during this inspection.
4
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
===Ginna began the inspection period operating at 100 percent power. On April 2 3, 2017 , operators commenced a shutdown for a planned refueling and maintenance outage (G1R40). The station entered Mode 6 (refueling) on April 27, 2017. Following the completion of refueling and maintenance activities, operators commenced a reactor start
-up on May 13, 2017. Operators returned the unit to 100 percent power on May 19
, 2017. The unit remained at or near 100 percent power for the remainder of the inspection period
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
1R01 Adverse Weather Protecti
on (71111.01
- 2 sample s)
.1 Readiness for Seasonal Extreme Weather Conditions
a. Inspection Scope
On June 1 , 2017, the inspectors reviewed Exelon's readiness for the onset of seasonal high temperatures. The review focused on the intermediate building clean side steam header area, relay room, 'A' and 'B' battery rooms, electrical power substation 13A, and the emergency diesel generators (EDGs). The inspectors reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), technical specifications (TSs), control room logs, and the CAP to determine what temperatures or other seasonal weather could challenge these systems, and to ensure Exelon personnel had adequately prepared for these challenges. The inspectors reviewed station procedures, including Exelon's seasonal weather preparation procedure and applicable operating procedures. The inspectors performed walkdowns of the selected systems to ensure station personnel identified issues that could challenge the operability of the systems during hot weather conditions.
Documents reviewed for each section in this report are listed in the Attachments.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Summer Readiness of Offsite and Alternating Current (AC) Power Systems
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed plant features and procedures for the operation and continued availability of the offsite and alternate AC power systems to evaluate readiness of the systems prior to seasonal high grid loading. The inspectors reviewed Exelon's procedures affecting these areas and the communications protocols between the transmission system operator and Exelon. This review focused on changes to the established program and material condition of the offsite and alternate AC power equipment. The inspectors assessed whether Exelon established and implemented appropriate procedures and protocols to monitor and maintain availability and reliability of both the offsite AC power system and the onsite alternate AC power system. The inspectors evaluated the material condition of the associated equipment by interviewing electricians, reviewing action requests (ARs) and open work orders (WOs), and walking down portions of the offsite and AC power systems
, including the station 13A switchyard.
b. Findings
No findings were identified
.
1R04 Equipment Alignment
.1 Partial System Walkdown
s (71111.04 Q - 4 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the systems below. The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk
-significance relative to the reactor safety cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures, system diagrams, the UFSAR , TSs, WOs, ARs, and the impact of ongoing work activities on redundant trains of equipment in order to identify conditions that could have impacted the system's performance of its intended safety functions. The inspectors also performed field walkdowns of accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and were operable. The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no deficiencies. The inspectors also reviewed whether Exelon staff had properly identified equipment issues and entered them into the CAP for resolution with the appropriate significance characterization.
Reactor h ead lift (O-15.2) on April 27
- 28, 2017 'A' safety injection (SI) system (O-30.1) on May 16, 2017 Turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater (TDAFW) system on June 6, 2017
'D' standby auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system on June 29, 2017
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Full System Walkdown
(711 11.04S - 1 sample)
a. Inspection Scope
On May 12, 2017, the inspectors performed a complete system walkdown of accessible portions of the component cooling water (CCW) system to verify the existing equipment line-up was correct. The inspectors reviewed operating procedures, surveillance tests (STs), drawings, equipment line
-up check-off lists, and the UFSAR to verify the system was aligned to perform its required safety functions. The inspectors also reviewed electrical power availability, component lubrication and equipment cooling, hanger and support functionality, and operability of support systems. The inspectors performed field walkdowns of accessible portions of the systems to verify as
-built system configuration matched plant documentation, and that system components and support equipment remained operable. The inspectors confirmed that systems and components were aligned correctly, free from interference from temporary services or isolation boundaries, environmentally qualified, and protected from external threats. The inspectors also examined the material condition of the components for degradation and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no deficiencies. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of related ARs and WOs to ensure Exelon appropriately evaluated and resolved any deficiencies.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection
.1 Resident Inspector Quarterly Walkdowns (71111.05Q
- 5 sample s)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted tours of the areas listed below to assess the material condition and operational status of fire protection features. The inspectors verified that Exelon controlled combustible materials and ignition sources in accordance with administrative procedures. The inspectors verified that fire protection and suppression equipment was available for use as specified in the area pre
-fire plan, and passive fire barriers were maintained in good material condition. The inspectors also verified that station personnel implemented compensatory measures for out of service (OOS), degraded, or inoperable fire protection equipment, as applicable, in accordance with procedure s.
'B' EDG room , Fire Zone EDG1B
, on April 21, 2017 Containment basement, Fire Zone RC
-1, on May 9, 2017 Containment intermediate floor, Fire Zone RC
-2 , on May 9, 2017 Containment operating floor, Fire Zone RC
-3, on May 11, 2017 Air handling room, Fire Zone AHR, on June 30, 2017
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R0 6 Flood Protection Measures (71111.06 - 1 sample) Internal Flooding Review
a. Inspection Scope
On May 25, 2017, the inspectors reviewed the UFSAR, the site flooding analysis, and plant procedures to identify potential internal flooding susceptibilities for the site. The inspectors review focused on the auxiliary building. T he inspectors verified the adequacy of internal tanks, flood barrier controls, equipment seals located below the flood line, floor and water penetration seals, watertight door seals, common drain lines and sumps, sump pumps, level alarms, control circuits, and temporary or removable flood barriers. The inspectors assessed the adequacy of operation actions that Exelon had identified as necessary to cope with flooding in this area and also reviewed the CAP to determine if Exelon was identifying and correcting problems associated with both flood mitigation features and site procedures for responding to flooding.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R08 Inservice Inspection
- 1 sample)
a. Inspection Scope
On May 1-5 and 8-12, 2017, the inspectors conducted an inspection and review of the inservice inspection (ISI) program activities in order to assess the effectiveness of Exelon's program for monitoring degradation of the reactor coolant system (RCS) boundary and risk
-significant piping system boundaries at Ginna.
Non-destructive Examination and Welding Activities (Section 02.01)
The inspectors reviewed the nondestructive evaluation (NDE) of American Society for Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel (B&PV) Code,Section III, Class 1 Welds Reactor Pressure Vessel Support Pads N1A and N2B by record review. The inspectors evaluated the examination against the requirements of ASME B&PV Code,Section XI. The inspectors reviewed the ND E of ASME B&PV Code,Section III, Class 1 Upper Head
-to-Upper Shell Circumferential Weld C1 and Upper Shell Vertical Weld (Longitudinal) V
-1. The inspectors compared the NDE against the applicable Exelon procedure ER
-AA-335-049, "Ultrasonic Examination in Accordance with ASME Section V, Article 4
."
For each evaluation, the inspectors verified that NDE activities were performed in accordance with the 2004 edition, without addenda, of the ASME B&PV Code requirements. When required by the code, the inspectors verified the nondestructive test met the requirements contained in ASME B&PV Code,Section XI, Mandatory Appendix VIII, Article VIII
-2000 , and the examination personnel were qualified in accordance with ASME Code,Section XI, Mandatory Appendix VII. No relevant indications were evaluated for acceptance or repair by Exelon staff. However , the inspectors verified that indications and defects, if present, would have been dispositioned in accordance with the ASME Code and verified that relevant indications would have been compared to previous examinations to determine if any changes had occurred. The inspectors verified risk
-significant welds in the ISI program were chosen, by Exelon staff, based on Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) TR-11 2657 , "Revised Risk-Informed ISI Evaluation Procedure," Revision B
-A (ADAMs No. ML013470102) with Code Case N 1, or Code Case N
1. Welding on Pressure Boundary Systems
No pressure boundary risk significant welding activity was undertaken during this outage. Vessel Upper Head Penetration Inspection Activities (Section 02.02) The inspectors reviewed the examination procedure ER
-AP-335-001, "Bare Metal Visual Examination for Nickel Alloy Steels
," and reviewed the post
-examination records. The inspectors reviewed Exelon's criteria for confirming visual examination quality and instructions for resolving interference or masking issues to confirm they were consistent with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(D).
The inspectors reviewed the records concerning the extent of inspection for each penetration nozzle
, including documents which resolved interference or masking issues to confirm that the extent of examination met 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(D). The inspectors reviewed the records for vessel penetrations 1, 6, and 10:
To confirm the coverage had been achieved and that limitations in coverage were properly recorded To verify that the activities were performed in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(D)
And to verify that indications and defects, if detected, were dispositioned in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(D)
The inspectors reviewed the examination records, and associated evaluations, and determined no penetrations were accepted for continued service with relevant indications. The inspectors verified that Exelon's acceptance standard for continued service was in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(D).
Boric Acid Corrosion Control Inspection Activities (Section 02.03) The inspectors reviewed the following evaluations performed for boric acid found on RCS components valve 892B, valve 721, and valve 431A. The inspectors reviewed Exelon procedure ER
-AP-331-1002, "Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program Identification, Screening and Evaluation," to determine if Exelon staff properly applied applicable corrosion rates to the affected components and properly assessed the effects of corrosion induced wastage on structural or pressure boundary integrity.
The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions for resolving boric acid leaks described in ARs 04003217, 04003249, and
===04003192. The inspectors confirmed that these corrective actions were consistent with requirements of the ASME B&PV Code and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI.
Steam Generator Tube Inspection Activities (Section 02.04) Pressure Testing The inspectors did not review the in-situ screening criteria, used by Exelon staff, because no in-situ pressure testing was performed during this outage.
Degradation Management The inspectors compared the number of tubes affected by loose part s and support wear, and limiting flaw sizes, with that predicted by the operational assessment, Technical Evaluation 0192
-AST-101038 , "R.E. Ginna Unit 1, End of Cycle 39, Steam Generator Degradation Assessment
," dated April 18, 2017, to evaluate Exelon staff's relative accuracy in predicting degradation. The inspectors reviewed the results of the current examinations to determine how well Exelon staff were able to predict future tube performance by comparing the current results with the values predicted in the previous outage operational assessment.
The inspectors then evaluated the scope of eddy current testing to determine if areas of potential degradation were inspected, noting if areas known to represent eddy current challenges were included. Lastly
, the inspectors compared the steam generator tube eddy current examination scope and expansion criteria with TS requirements to determine if Exelon was in compliance with these requirements.
Exelon staff did not identify a new degradation mechanism during this inspection sequence. The inspectors reviewed the level of tube degradation attributable to secondary side structures, such as foreign object abrasion. The inspectors reviewed secondary side examinations and compared the actions taken with the guidance contained in the Steam Generator Management Program:
Steam Generator Integrity Assessment Guidelines, Part 10 (ML100480242). The inspectors reviewed Exelon staff's corrective action taken in response to any observed degradation.
Tube Repairs
The inspectors confirmed that Exelon has depth sizing techniques that provide reasonable estimates of the depth of degradation such that the typical TS repair limit of 40 percent through
-wall can be implemented without a loss of tube integrity for the period of time between inspections.
Eddy Current Technique Qualification The inspectors reviewed Exelon's vendor EPRI Pressurized Water Reactor Steam Generator Examination Guidelines Appendices H and I, "Examination Technique Specification Sheets
," ETSS1_EOC39_B0B_R0, ETSS2_EOC39_R0, ETSS3_EOC39_1C_R0, ETSS4_EOC39_2X16XP_R0, and ETSS5_EOC39_RESP_ROTO to determine if the eddy current test probes and equipment are qualified for detection or sizing of the expected types of tube degradation.
In particular, the inspectors focused the review on the site specific factors potentially affecting the qualification of one or more techniques (e.g., equipment, data quality/noise issues, and degradation mode). The inspectors reviewed the equipment and probes used for the examinations. The inspectors verified the appropriate eddy current probe (e.g., bobbin, pancake, or multi
-coil type) was used to detect the type of flaw that might be expected. The inspectors verified the equipment was calibrated in accordance with the eddy current procedure and the ASME Code. The inspectors observed the resolution of buff indications on tubes R63C45, R66C38, and the resolution of a distorted support signal on R91C51.
Secondary Side Degradation
The inspectors reviewed Exelon's corrective actions for loose parts or foreign material, in the secondary side of the steam generators.
The inspectors verified that Exelon planned repairs or had perform ed an engineering evaluation of affected steam generator tubes. The inspectors observed the inspection of the secondary side of the steam generator s and the process to remove foreign objects. For foreign objects that were inaccessible, and not removed, the inspectors determined that Exelon staff performed an evaluation that considered the potential effects of object migration and tube fretting damage.
Identification and Resolution of Problems (Section 02.05) The inspectors verified that Exelon staff were identifying ISI and steam generator problems at an appropriate threshold and had enter ed them in the CAP. The inspectors selected a sample of problems associated with ISI and steam generator inspection s documented by Exelon staff and verified the appropriateness of the corrective actions. The inspectors used the guidance in NRC Inspection Procedure (IP) 71152, "Identification and Resolution of Problems," to evaluate the corrective actions. The inspectors also verified Exelon personnel were assessing the applicability of operating experience to the plant.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program
and Licensed Operator Performance (71111.11 Q - 2 samples)
.1 Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Requalification Testing and Training
a. Inspection Scope
On June 20, 2017 , the inspectors observed licensed operator simulator training
, which included a containment recirculation fan high vibration condition, a pressurizer pressure transmitter failing high, a non
-regenerative heat exchanger tube leak, a loss of one offsite power circuit, a feedwater regulating valve controller failure, a main turbine high vibration condition, a failure of the motor
-driven AFW pumps with the TDAF W pump OOS, and a failure of one stop valve and both main steam isolation valves to close. The inspectors evaluated operator performance during the simulated event and verified completion of risk
-significant operator actions, including the use of abnormal and emergency operating procedures. The inspectors assessed the clarity and effectiveness of communications, implementation of actions in response to alarms and degrading plant conditions, and the oversight and direction provided by the unit supervisor. The inspectors verified the accuracy and timeliness of the emergency classification s made by the shift manager and the TS action statements entered by the unit supervisor. Additionally, the inspectors assessed the ability of the crew and training staff to identify and document crew performance problems.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Performance in the Main Control Room
a. Inspection Scope
On May 13 and 14, 2017 , the inspectors observed and reviewed reactor start-up and main generator grid synchronization in the main control room.
The inspectors observed pre-shift briefings and reactivity control briefings to verify that the briefings met the criteria specified in procedure s HU-AA-1211, "Pre-Job Briefings
." Additionally, the inspectors observed the start-up activities to verify that procedure use, crew communications, and coordination of activities between work groups similarly met established expectations and standards.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
- 2 sample s)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspector reviewed the samples listed below to assess the effectiveness of maintenance activities on structure, system, and component (SSC) performance and reliability. The inspectors reviewed system health reports, CAP documents, maintenance WOs, and maintenance rule (MR) basis documents to ensure that Exelon was identifying and properly evaluating performance problems within the scope of the MR. For each sample selected, the inspectors verified that the SSC was properly scoped into the MR in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65 and verified that the (a)(2) performance criteria established by Exelon staff were reasonable. As applicable, for SSCs classified as (a)(1), the inspectors assessed the adequacy of goals and corrective actions to return these SSCs to (a)(2).
Additionally, the inspectors ensured that Exelon staff was identifying and addressing common cause failures that occurred within and across MR system boundaries.
Boric acid system on June 14, 2017 Shroud fan s on June 26, 2017
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
- 6 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed station evaluation and management of plant risk for the maintenance and risk activities listed below to verify that Exelon performed the appropriate risk assessments prior to removing equipment from service. The inspectors selected these activities based on potential risk significance relative to the reactor safety cornerstones. As applicable
, the inspectors evaluated each activity to determine if Exelon personnel performed risk assessments as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and if the assessments were accurate and complete. When Exelon performed emergent work, the inspectors verified that operations personnel promptly assessed and managed plant risk. The inspectors reviewed the scope of maintenance work and discussed the results of the assessment with the station's probabilistic risk analyst to verify plant conditions were consistent with the risk assessment. The inspectors also reviewed the TS requirements and inspected portions of redundant safety systems, when applicable, to verify risk analysis assumptions were valid and applicable requirements were met.
Planned maintenance on the 'B' EDG on April 5, 2017 Planned maintenance on both the 'A' motor driven AFW pump and a reactor make-up valve on April 18, 2017 Outage Protection Phase 1
& 2 on April 27, 2017 Spent fuel pool cooling on May 1, 2017 Reduced reactor vessel level inventory, May 8, 2017
'B' S I functional testing on May 10, 2017
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
- 4 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed operability determinations for the degraded or non-conforming conditions listed below based on the risk significance of the associated components and systems. The inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of the operability determinations to assess whether TS operability was properly justified and the subject component or system remained available such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred. The inspectors compared the operability and design criteria in the appropriate sections of the TSs and UFSAR to Exelon's evaluations to determine whether the components or systems were operable. Where compensatory measures were required to maintain operability
, the inspectors assessed whether the measures in place would function as intended and were properly controlled by Exelon.
'A' shroud fan OOS on April 13, 2017 Nuclear Instrument, Power Range Detector N
-43 voltage drift high on June 2, 2017 Intermediate building high area temperatures on June 12, 2017
'B' main feedwater pump motor elevated vibrations on June 19, 2017
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R18 Plant Modifications
(71111.1 8 - 2 sample s)
.1 Permanent Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated the modifications listed below to verify that the design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of the affected systems were not degraded by the modification. In addition, the inspectors reviewed modification documents associated with the design change, including piping configuration and flow path, pipe stress analysis, support design analysis, code applicability, and work planning instructions.
Engineering Change Package (ECP)000071, "Install Redundant Relief Valve on SI Accumulators
," for the 'B' SI accumulator ECP-13-000522, "Nuclear Instrumentation System Source / Intermediate Range Drawer Replacement
," for source range detector N
-32
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing
- 7 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the post
-maintenance tests for the maintenance activities listed below to verify that procedures and test activities adequately tested the safety functions that may have been affected by the maintenance activity, that the acceptance criteria in the procedure were consistent with the information in the applicable licensing basis and/or design basis documents, that the test results were properly reviewed and accepted , and that problems were appropriate ly documented. The inspectors also performed a walk-down of the affected job site, observed the pre
-job brief and post
-job critique where possible. Additionally, the inspectors confirmed that work site cleanliness was maintained, witnessed the test or reviewed test data to verify quality control hold points were performed and checked, and ensured that results adequately demonstrated restoration of the affected safety functions.
'B' EDG planned maintenance on April 5, 2017 TDAFW lube o il planned maintenance on May 12, 2017 Equipment hatch, personal access inner door seal planned maintenance and fitting replacement and on May 18, 2017
, local leak rate test (LLRT) Technical support center diesel generator planned maintenance on June 9, 2017
'A' control room emergency air treatment system planned maintenance on June 13, 2017 'A' EDG and service water flow indicator, planned maintenance and repairs to the flow transmitter on June 14, 2017 TDAFW planned maintenance on June 20, 2017
b. Findings
No findings were identified
.
1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities
- 1 sample)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the station's work schedule and outage risk plan for the maintenance and refueling outage (G1R40) conducted April 24 through May 14, 2017. The inspectors reviewed Exelon's development and implementation of outage plans and schedules to verify that risk, industry experience, previous site
-specific problems, and defense-in-depth were considered. During the outage, the inspectors observed portions of the shutdown and cooldown processes and monitored controls associated with th e following outage activities:
Configuration management, including maintenance of defense
-in-depth, commensurate with the outage plan for the key safety functions and compliance with the applicable TSs when taking equipment OOS Implementation of clearance activities and confirmation that tags were properly hung and that equipment was appropriately configured to safely support the associated work or testing Installation and configuration of reactor coolant pressure, level, and temperature instruments to provide accurate indication and instrument error accounting Status and configuration of electrical systems and switchyard activities to ensure that TSs were met Monitoring of decay heat removal operations Impact of outage work on the ability of the operators to operate the spent fuel pool cooling system Reactor water inventory controls, including flow paths, configurations, alternative means for inventory additions, and controls to prevent inventory loss Activities that could affect reactivity Maintenance of containment as required by TSs Refueling activities, including fuel handling and fuel receipt inspections Fatigue management Tracking of startup prerequisites, walkdown of the containment building to verify that debris had not been left which could block the emergency core cooling system suction strainers, and startup and ascension to full power operation Identification and resolution of problems related to G1R40 activities
b. Findings
No findings were identified
1R22 Surveillance Testing
(71111.22 - 5 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed performance of STs and/or reviewed test data of selected risk-significant SSCs to assess whether test results satisfied TSs, the UFSAR, and Exelon procedure requirements. The inspectors verified that test acceptance criteria were clear, tests demonstrated operational readiness and were consistent with design documentation, test instrumentation had current calibrations and the range and accuracy for the application, tests were performed as written, and applicable test prerequisites were satisfied. Upon test completion, the inspectors considered whether the test results supported that equipment was capable of performing the required safety functions. The inspectors reviewed the following STs: CH-PRI-SAMP-ROOM, Sampling in the Nuclear Sample Room on June 2, 2017 STP-O-R-10.3, Preparation For and Performance of Main Steam Safety Valve (MSSV) Test Using Setpoint Verification Device on April 21, 2017 STP-O-R-2.1-TR-B, SI Functional Test on May 10, 2017 STP-O-23.3 , LLRT of Makeup Water to PRT PEN 121A on May 3, 2017 (LLRT) STP-O-23.42, LLRT of Containment Air Isolation Pen 313 on May 11, 2017 (LLRT)
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
1EP6 Drill Evaluation (71114.06
- 2 sample s)
.1 Emergency Preparedness Drill Observations
a. Inspection Scope
On June 27, 2017, the inspectors evaluated the conduct of a routine Exelon emergency drill to identify any potential weaknesses and deficiencies in the classification, notification, and protective action recommendation development activities. The inspectors observed emergency response operations in the simulator and emergency operations facility to determine whether the event classification, notifications, and protective action recommendations were performed in accordance with procedures. The inspectors also attended the station drill critique to compare inspector observations with those identified by Exelon staff in order to evaluate Exelon's critique and to determine whether Exelon was properly identifying weaknesses and entering them into the CAP
.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Training Observations
a. Inspection Scope
On June 2 0, 2017 , the inspectors observed a simulator training evolution for Exelon licensed operators which required Emergency Plan implementation by an operations crew. Exelon planned for this evolution to be evaluated and included in performance indicator data regarding drill and exercise performance. The inspectors observed event classification and notification activities performed by the crew. The inspectors also attended the post
-evolution critique for the scenario. The focus of the inspectors' activities was to note any weaknesses and deficiencies in the crew's performance and ensure that Exelon evaluators noted the same issues and entered them in the CAP.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
RADIATION SAFETY
Cornerstone:
Occupational and Public Radiation Safety
2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed Exelon's performance in assessing and controlling radiological hazards in the workplace. The inspectors used the requirements contained in 10 CFR Part 20, "Standards F or Protection Against Radiation," TSs, Regulatory Guide (RG) 8.38, "Control of Access to High and Very High Radiation Areas of Nuclear Plants
," and the procedures required by TSs as criteria for determining compliance.
Inspection Planning
The inspectors reviewed the performance indicators (PIs) for the occupational exposure cornerstone, radiation protection program audits, and reports of operational occurrences in occupational radiation safety since the last inspection.
Radiological Hazard Assessment
=
The inspectors conducted independent radiation measurements during walk
-downs of the facility and reviewed the radiological survey program, air sampling and analysis, continuous air monitor use, recent plant radiation surveys for radiological work activities, and any changes to plant operations since the last inspection to verify survey adequacy of any new radiological hazards for onsite workers or members of the public.
Instructions to Workers (1 sample)===
The inspectors reviewed high radiation area (HRA) work permit controls and use, observed containers of radioactive materials and assessed whether the containers were labeled and controlled in accordance with requirements.
===The inspectors reviewed several occurrences where a worker's electronic personal dosimeter alarmed. The inspectors reviewed Exelon's evaluation of the incidents, documentation in the CAP, and whether compensatory dose evaluations were conducted when appropriate. The inspectors verified follow
-up investigations of actual radiological conditions for unexpected radiological hazards were performed.
Contamination and Radioactive Material Control (1 sample)===
The inspectors observed the
===monitoring of potentially contaminated material leaving the radiological controlled area and inspected the methods and radiation monitoring instrumentation used for control, survey, and release of that material. The inspectors selected several sealed sources from inventory records and assessed whether the sources were accounted for and were tested for loose surface contamination. The inspectors evaluated whether any recent transactions involving nationally tracked sources were reported in accordance with requirements.
Radiological Hazards Control and Work Coverage (1 sample)===
The inspectors evaluated in
===-plant radiological conditions and performed independent radiation measurements during facility walk
-downs and observation of radiological work activities. The inspectors assessed whether posted surveys; radiation work permits (RWPs); worker radiological briefings and radiation protection job coverage; the use of continuous air monitoring, air sampling and engineering controls; and dosimetry monitoring were consistent with the present conditions. The inspectors examined the control of highly activated or contaminated materials stored within the spent fuel pool and the posting and physical controls for selected HRAs, locked high radiation areas (LHRAs) and very high radiation areas (VHRAs) to verify conformance with the occupational PI.
Risk-Significant HRA and VHRA Controls (1 sample)===
The inspectors reviewed the procedures and controls for HRAs, VHRAs, and radiological transient areas in the plant.
Radiation Worker Performance and Radiation Protection Technician Proficiency (1 sample)
The inspectors evaluated radiation worker performance with respect to radiation protection work requirements. The inspectors evaluated radiation protection technicians in performance of radiation surveys and in providing radiological job coverage.
Problem Identification and Resolution (1 sample)
The inspectors evaluated whether problems associated with radiation monitoring and exposure control (including operating experience) were identified at an appropriate threshold and properly addressed in the CAP.
===b. Findings No findings were identified.
2RS2 Occupational A
s Low As Is Reasonably Achievable Planning and Controls (71124.02 - 2 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors assessed Exelon's performance with respect to maintaining occupational individual and collective radiation exposures as low as is reasonably achievable (ALARA). The inspectors used the requirements contained in 10 CFR Part 20, RGs 8.8 , "Information Relevant to Ensuring that Occupational Radiation Exposures at Nuclear Power Stations Will Be ALARA ," and 8.10, "Operating Philosophy for Maintaining Occupational Radiation Exposures ALARA ," TSs, and procedures required by TSs as criteria for determining compliance.
Implementation of ALARA and Radiological Work Controls (1 sample)===
The inspectors reviewed the current plant radiological source term and historical trend, plans for plant source term reduction, and contingency plans for changes in the
===source term as the result of changes in plant fuel performance or changes in plant primary chemistry.
The inspectors observed radiological work activities and evaluated the in
-plant use of shielding and other engineering work controls based on the radiological controls and ALARA plans for those activities.
Radiation Worker Performance (1 sample)===
===The inspectors observed radiation worker and radiation protection technician performance during radiological work to evaluate worker ALARA performance according to specified work controls and procedures. Workers were interviewed to assess their knowledge and awareness of planned and/or implemented radiological and ALARA work controls.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
Cornerstone: Public Radiation Safety (PS)
2RS6 Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment
(71124.06 - 6 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the treatment, monitoring, and control of radioactive gaseous and liquid effluents. The inspectors used the requirements in 10 CFR Part 20, 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix I, "Numerical Guides for Design Objectives and Limiting Conditions for Operation To Meet the Criterion "ALARA" for Radioactive Material in Light
-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Reactor Effluents," TS, Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM), applicable industry standards, and procedures required by TSs as criteria for determining compliance.
Inspection Planning
The inspectors conducted in
-office reviews of the Ginna 2015 and 2016 Annual Radioactive Effluent and Environmental Reports, radioactive effluent program documents, UFSAR, ODCM, and applicable event reports.
Walkdowns and Observations (1 sample)===
The inspectors walked down the gaseous and liquid radioactive effluent monitoring and
===filtered ventilation systems to assess the material condition and verify proper alignment according to plant design. The inspectors also observed potential unmonitored release points and reviewed radiation monitoring system surveillance records and the routine processing and discharge of gaseous and liquid radioactive wastes.
Calibration and Testing Program (1 sample)===
The inspectors reviewed gaseous and liquid effluent monitor instrument calibration, functional test results, and alarm set
===-points based on National Institute of Standards and Technology calibration traceability and ODCM specifications.
Sampling and Analyses (1 sample)===
The inspectors reviewed radioactive effluent sampling activities, representative sampling requirements, compensatory measures taken during effluent discharges with inoperable effluent radiation monitoring instrumentation, the use of compensatory radioactive effluent sampling, and the results of the inter
===-laboratory and intra
-laboratory comparison program including scaling of hard
-to-detect isotopes.
Instrumentation and Equipment (1 sample)===
The inspectors reviewed the methodology used to determine the radioactive effluent stack and vent flow rates to verify that the flow rates were consistent with TS/ODCM and UFSAR values. The inspectors reviewed radioactive effluent discharge system surveillance test results based on TS acceptance criteria. The inspectors verified that
===high-range effluent monitors used in emergency operating procedures were calibrated and operable and have post
-accident effluent sampling capability.
Dose Calculations (1 sample)===
The inspectors reviewed changes in reported dose values from the previous annual radioactive effluent release reports, several liquid and gaseous radioactive waste discharge permits, the scaling method for hard
===-to-detect radionuclides, ODCM changes, land use census changes, public dose calculations (monthly, quarterly, annual), and records of abnormal gaseous or liquid radioactive releases.
Problem Identification and Resolution (1 sample)===
The inspectors evaluated whether problems associated with the radioactive effluent monitoring and control program were identified at an appropriate threshold and properly
===addressed in Exelon's CAP.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA1 P e r f ormance Indicator Verification
(7115 1 - 3 samples)
.1 Safety System Functional Failure
(1 sample)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors sampled Exelon's submittals for the safety system functional failures (MS05) PI for the period of April 1, 2016 through March 31, 2017. To determine the accuracy of the PI data reported during those periods, inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Document 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment PI Guideline," Revision 7, and NUREG
-1022, "Event Reporting Guidelines 10 CFR 50.72 and 10 CFR 50.73."
The inspectors reviewed Exelon's operator narrative logs, operability assessments, MR records, maintenance WOs , ARs, event reports
, and NRC integrated inspection reports to validate the accuracy of the submittals.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 R CS Specific Activity and
RCS Leak Rate (2 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed Exelon's submittal for the RCS specific activity (BI01) and RCS leak rate (BI02) PIs for the period April 1, 2016 through March 31, 2017. To determine the accuracy of the PI data reported during those periods, the inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in NEI Document 99
-02, "Regulatory Assessment PI Guideline," Revision 7. The inspectors also reviewed RCS sample analysis and control room logs of daily measurements of RCS leakage, and compared that information to the data reported by the PI. Additionally, the inspectors observed surveillance activities that determined the RCS identified leakage rate, and chemistry personnel taking and analyzing an RCS sample.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution
(71152 - 2 sample s)
.1 Routine Review of Problem Identification and Resolution Activities
a. Inspection Scope
As required by I P 71152, "Problem Identification and Resolution," the inspectors routinely reviewed issues during baseline inspection activities and plant status reviews to verify that Exelon entered issues into its CAP at an appropriate threshold, gave adequate attention to timely corrective actions, and identified and addressed adverse trends. In order to assist with the identification of repetitive equipment failures and specific human performance issues for follow
-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the CAP and periodically attended AR screening meetings. The inspectors also confirmed, on a sampling basis, that, as applicable, for identified defects and non
-conformances, Exelon performed an evaluation in accordance with 10 CFR Part 21, "Reporting of Defects and Noncompliance."
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Annual Sample:
Failures of Nuclear Instrumentation Drawers (1 sample)===
a. Inspection Scope
===The inspectors performed an in
-depth review of Exelon's evaluation and corrective actions to address performance problems with replacement of the Ginna nuclear instrumentation drawers. The inspectors reviewed condition reports that documented the identification, evaluation, and corrective actions taken to address the performance issues. In addition to the review of these documents, the inspectors interviewed the responsible system engineer to determine whether the scope of the corrective actions addressed all identified deficiencies. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed actions completed by Exelon staff to address erroneous indications, out of tolerance values, and component failures.
The inspectors assessed Exelon's evaluation, extent of condition review, completed and proposed corrective actions, and the prioritization and timeliness of actions to evaluate whether the actions taken by Exelon were appropriate. Inspectors evaluated whether the corrective actions which included potentiometer replacement, recalibration, rewiring, and resoldering addressed the identified issues. The inspectors also evaluated whether the nuclear instruments were being tested in accordance with TSs and approved procedures. The inspectors reviewed communications between Exelon and vendors which evaluated deficiencies and assessed the need for reporting in accordance with 10 CFR Part 21, "Reporting of Defects and Noncompliance.
" The inspectors reviewed the assessments of failures, including apparent cause evaluations, work group evaluations, and MR functional failure evaluations to determine if Exelon was using the available processes at the correct thresholds.
b. Findings and Observations
No findings were identified.
The inspectors determined that Exelon's evaluations and extent
-of-condition reviews were thorough and the causes were appropriately identified. The inspectors also determined that the corrective actions were reasonable and addressed the deficiencies and corrected the identified issues.
However, the inspectors' review did identify several examples of poor documentation for the bases of decisions. AR 2961059 identified loose cable connections. Based upon a conversation with the vendor, a procedure change request (PCR) was made to address the potential for future loose connections; but based upon an undocumented conversation with an instrumentation and controls supervisor, the final procedure change did not match the AR corrective action or the PCR. Secondly, AR 4002607 documented the inability of a source range power supply to be adjusted within the calibration
procedure acceptance range. The acceptance range for the power supply voltage was then expanded based upon an undocumented conversation with the vendor. Finally, AR 2673435 identified an instrument drawer in service with an inadequate solder joint. One assignment for this AR was to "evaluate the receipt inspection process and determine if any improvements can be made to better ensure workmanship criteria [are] met." The assignment was closed with a description of the receipt inspection process
, but without any evaluation of the process or determination if improvements were possible. These examples were determined to be of minor significance in accordance with IMC 0612 because, although not documented, the evaluations were appropriate.
.3 Semi-Annual Trend Review
(1 sample)===
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a semi
-annual review of site issues to identify trends that might indicate the existence of more significant safety concerns. As part of this review, the inspectors included repetitive or closely related issues documented by Exelon in trend reports, major equipment problem lists, operator work around and challenge lists, system health reports, MR assessments, and maintenance or CAP backlogs. The inspectors also reviewed Exelon's c ap database for the first and second quarters of 2017 to assess ARs written in various subject areas (equipment problems, human performance issues, etc.), as well as individual issues identified during the NRC's daily AR review (Section 4OA2.1). The inspectors reviewed Exelon's quarterly trend reports for the first and second quarters of 2017 to verify that Exelon personnel were appropriately evaluating and trending adverse conditions in accordance with applicable procedures.
b. Findings and Observations
No findings were identified.
The inspectors evaluated a sample of issues and events that occurred over the course of the first and second quarters of 2017 to determine whether issues were appropriately considered as emerging or adverse trends. The inspectors verified that these issues were addressed within the scope of the CAP or through department review.
The evaluation did not reveal any new trends that could indicate a more significant safety issue.
The inspectors determined that Exelon personnel were identifying trend issues at a low threshold, entered them into the CAP for resolution and had appropriately prioritized investigation reviews.
The inspectors noted minor adverse trends identified by Exelon staff in the areas of nuclear instrumentation, steam leaks, B5B portable diesel DC generator, intersystem relationships specific to 48 0V grounds coincident with nuclear instrument spikes, component greasing preventive maintenance, and clearance and tagging.
There were no adverse safety consequences as a result of these low
-level trend issues.
Based on the overall results of the semi
-annual trend review, the inspectors determined that Exelon had properly identified adverse trends at Ginna before they became more significant safety problems.
The inspectors independently evaluated the deficiencies noted above for significance in accordance with the guidance in IMC 0612, Appendix B, "Issue Screening," and Appendix E, "Examples of Minor Issues."
The inspectors determined these conditions were deficiencies of minor significance and, therefore, are not subject to enforcement action in accordance with the NRC's Enforcement Policy.
4OA3 Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion
(71153 - 1 sample) Plant Events
a. Inspection Scope
For the plant event listed below, the inspectors reviewed and/or observed plant parameters, reviewed personnel performance, and evaluated performance of mitigating systems. The inspectors communicated the plant event to appropriate regional personnel, and compared the event details with criteria contained in IMC 0309, "Reactive Inspection Decision Basis for Reactors," issued October 28, 2011, for consideration of potential reactive inspection activities. As applicable, the inspectors verified that Exelon made appropriate emergency classification assessments and properly reported the event in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73. The inspectors reviewed Exelon's follow-up actions related to the event to assure that Exelon implemented appropriate corrective actions commensurate with their safety significance.
Three MSSVs lift pressures greater than TS limits on April 23, 2017. Licensee Event Report (LER) 05000244/2017 00, "During Surveillance Testing, Lift Pressure Setpoints on Three MSSVs Found Outside TSs Limits Due to Stiction," was subsequently issued on June 16, 2017. This LER will be closed via a separate inspection activity in a future inspection report.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
On July 12, 20 1 7, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Paul Swift
, Plant General Manager
, and other members of the Ginna staff. The inspectors verified that no propriety information was retained by the inspectors or documented in this report.
ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTA RY INFORMATION Attachmen t SUPPLEMENTA RY INFORMATION KEY POINTS OF CONTACT Licensee Personnel W. Carsky, Site Vice President P. Swift, Plant General Manager D. Blankenship, Director, Site Operations T. Edwards, Manager, Site Chemistry D. Wilson, Director, Site Engineering K. Garnish, Senior Manager, Operations Support and Services K. Gould, Manager, Radiation Protection T. Harding, Manager, Site Regulatory Assurance F. Kelpacki, ISI Program Manager M. Shields, Steam Generator Program Manager J. Stanger, System Engineer S. Wihlen, Director, Site Maintenance
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, DISCUSSED, AND UPDATED Open 05000244/2017 00 LER During Surveillance Testing, Lift Pressure Setpoints on Three MSSVs Found Outside TSs Limits Due to Stiction LIST OF
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Section 1R01: Adverse Weather Protection
Procedures
O-23, Hot Weather Sea
sonal Readiness Walkdown, Revision 015
O-6.9, Operating Limits for Station 13A Transmission
WC-AA-107, Seasonal Readiness, Revision 17
A Rs 0 396 3 978 04012196 04021032 W Os C93452095 Miscellaneous
Preventive Maintenance PS010337, Monthly Thermography on Plant Yard Equipment Station 13
and Station 13A
Section 1R04: Equipment Alignment
Procedures
O-15.2, Valve Alignment for Reactor Head Lift, Core Component Movement, and Periodic Status
Checks, Revision
041 S-8A, CCW System Startup and Normal Operation Valve Alignment, Revision 05603
STP-O-30.1, S I System Valve and Breaker Position Verification, Revision 00105
STP-O-30.4, AFW System Valve and Breaker Position Verification, Revision 00402
STP-O-30.9, CCW Flow Path Verification, Revision 00003
STP-O-30.5, Standby AFW Pumps Valves and Breakers, Revision 00400
Drawings 33012-1231, Main Steam (Safety
-Related) Piping and Instrumentation Drawing (P&ID), Revision 0
33013-1237, AFW P&ID, Revision 73
33013-1238, Standby AFW, P&ID, Revision 41
33013-1245, Auxiliary Coolant CCW (AC) P&ID, Revision 35
33013-1246, Auxiliary Coolant CCW (AC) P&ID, Sheet 2, Revision 14
33013-1246, Auxiliary Coolant CCW (AC) Sheet 1, Revision 1
33013-1250, Station Service Cooling Water Safety
-Related (SW) P&ID, Revision 52
33013-1250, Station Service Cooling Water Safety
-Related (SW) P&ID, Sheet 2 of 3, Revision 52
Section 1R05: Fire Protection
Procedures
FPS-15, Fire Door Identification, Inspection and Maintenance, Revision 35
FRP-1.0, Containment Basement, Revision 008
FRP-2.0, Containment Intermediate Floor, Revision 009
FRP-3.0, Containment Operating Floo
r, Revision 009
FRP-25.0, Diesel Generator Room B and Vault, Revision 12
FRP-16.0, Air Handling Room, Revision 10
Drawings 21488-111, Fire Barrier General Arrangement Sheet, Diesel Generator Room 'B' Floor Plan
Penetration Locations Floor Elevation
- 253'6", Sheet 1, Revision 4
33013-2542, Fire Response Plan Containment Structure & Intermediate Building Plan
- Basement Floor
Elevation 235'8", Revision 5
33013-2544, Fire Response Plan Turbine Building Plan Basement Floor Elevation 253'6", Revision 15
33013-2545, Fire Response Plan Containment Structure & Intermediate Building Plan
- Intermediate Floor Elevation 253'3", Revision 9
33013-2551, Fire Response Plan Containment Structure & Intermediate Building Plan
- Operating Floor Elevation 278'4", Revision 8
33013-2559, Fire Response Plan, Control Building, Plan Views, Revision 14
A Rs 03993358 03998682 03999932 04000752 Miscellaneous
DA-ME-98-004 , Combustible Loading Analysis, Revision 15
Section 1R06: Flood Protection Measures
Procedures
EP-2-P-0169, Structural Assessment and Monitoring Program, Revision 01701
IP-CON-9, Plant Barrier Control Program Implementation, Revision 00301
UFSAR, Chapter 3, Design of Structures, Components, Equipment, and Systems, Section 3.4, Revision 26
A Rs 0 3999932 0 4000752 04016353 Section 1R08: In
-service Inspection
N DE Reports Component Summary 1003610, N1A Support Pad
, 5/5/2017 Component Summary 1003640, N2B Support Pad
, 5/5/2017 Control Rod Drive Mechanism Visual Examination Record 2017
-04-28 20_03_23_3746
Control Rod Drive Mechanism
Visual Examination Record 2017
-04-29 11_24_32_9190
Control Rod Drive Mechanism
Visual Examination Record 2017
-04-29 14_33_49_53
Liquid Penetrant Examination Report BOP
-PT-17-016, CV3519 3/4" Pipe Weld 2
Liquid Penetrant Examination Report BOP
-PT-17-028, CV 3519 3/4 Pipe to Bonnet Weld
N DE Report 17GV096
NDE Report 17GV095
UT Vessel Examination, Upper Head
-to-Upper Shell Circ. Weld, C-1 08GU075, 4/29/2017
UT Vessel Examination, Upper Head
-to-Upper Shell Circ. Weld, C
-1 17GU031, 5/8/2017
UT Vessel Examination, Upper Shell Vertical Weld (Longitudinal), V
-1, 17GU032, 5/8/2017
Visual Examination of Pipe Hanger, Support or Restraint (VT
-3) Report 17GV095, RPV Nozzle Support Pad N1A
Visual Examination of Pipe Hanger, Support or Restraint (VT
-3) Report 17GV096, RPV Nozzle Support Pad N2B
Procedures
ER-AA-335-016, VT-3 Visual Examination of Component Supports, Attachments, and Interiors of Reactor Vessels, Revision 10
ER-AA-335-049, Ultrasonic Examination in Accordance with ASME Section V, Article 4 , Revision 0
ER-AP-331-1001, Boric Acid Corrosion Control Inspection Locations, Implementation and Inspection Guidelines, Revision 9
ER-AP-331-1002, Boric Acid Corrosion Control
Program Identification, Screening and Evaluation , Revision 9
ER-AP-335-001, Bare Metal Visual Examination for Nickel Alloy Materials, Revision 5
Procedure ER
-AA-335-016, VT-3 Visual Examination of Component Supports, Attachments and Interiors of Reactor Vessels
, Revision 10
-WKI-101059, Revision 000
-IIT-10, "Alloy 600 Program Plan ," Revision 00300
Technical Evaluations
Technical Evaluation 0192
-AST-101038 ,
- R.E. Ginna Unit 1 End of Cycle 39, Steam Generator Degradation Assessmen
t, Revision 000
AR s 04003192 04003217 04003249 04003256 04003639 04005427 04005432 Section 1R11: Licensed Operator Requalification Program
Procedures
HU-AA-1211, Pre-Job Briefings, Revision 011
OP-AA-101-113-1006, 4.0 Crew Critique Guidelines, Revision 007
TG-GI-150-F31 (LORT), License Operator Requalification Training Program, Revision 003
Section 1R12: Maintenance Effectiveness
Procedures
AR-L-8, 480V Ground, Revision 86
ER-AA-310, Implementation of the
MR, Revision 009
ER-AA-310-1001, M R - Scoping, Revision 004
ER-AA-310-1002, M R Functions
- Safety Significance Classification, Revision 003
ER-A A-310-1003, M R - Performance Criteria Selection, Revision 005
ER-AA-310-1004, M R - Performance Monitoring, Revision 013
ER-AA-310-1005, M R - Dispositioning Between (A)(1) and (A)(2), Revision 007
A Rs 03970499 03997116 03998061 Miscellaneous
M R Expert Panel Meeting 17
-02 Section 1R13: Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Procedures
OP-A A-108-117, Protected Equipment Program, Revision 004
OP-AA-201-009, Control of Combustible Material, Revision 019
OPG-Protected-Equipment , Operations Protected Equipment Program, Revision 01
WC-AA-104, Integrated Risk Management, Revision 024
Drawings 33013-1265, Auxiliary Building CVCS P&ID, Sheet 2 of 2, Revision 27
33013-1266, Auxiliary Building Chemical Control System Boric Acid (CVCS) P&ID, Revision 35
A Rs 03975396 Miscellaneous
eSOMs Clearance
G1R40 Shutdown Safety Plan
Section 1R15: Operability
Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Procedures
CPI-AXIAL-N43, Calibration of Nuclear Instrumentation System Power Range N43 Axial Offset, Revision 039
O-6.13, Daily Surveillance Log, Revision 192
OP-AA-108-111, Adverse Condition Monitoring and Contingency Plan, Revision 10
WC-AA-104, Integrated Risk Management, Revision 24
A Rs 02703057 03997116 04017530 04018068 04020543 04020544 04021032 Miscellaneous
ECP-17-000268, Rev 000
Operability Evaluation, OPEVAL
-16-005, Revision 0
Risk Assessment
GIN-1-2017-0178, Revision 0
Risk Assessment GIN-1-2017-0180, Revision 0
Section 1R1
8: Plant Modifications
Procedures
ECP-13-000522, NIS Source / Intermediate Range Drawer Replacement, Revision 0000
ECP-17-000071, Revision 0000, 50.59 Review Coversheet Form, Revision 1
ECP-17-000071, Revision 0000, 50.59 Screening Form, Revision 0
ECP-17-000071, Revision 0000, Design Consideration Summary, Form 103
-DCS, Revision 0
ECP-17-000071, Revision 0000, Work Planning Instructions, Form 103
-C, Revision 1
ECP-17-000071, Revision 0000, Design Attribute Review (DAR), Form 102
-01, Revision 0
Drawings ECP-17-000071-CN-002, 33013
-1262 , 2-008, ECP P&ID Change Notice Final Turnover, Revision 0
W Os C92746759 C93600059 C93608553 Section 1R19: Post
-Maintenance Testing
Procedures
STP-E-12.5, Technical Support Center Diesel Test, Revision 00501
STP-O-12.1, Emergency Diesel Generator A, Revision 022
STP-O-16QT, AFW Turbine Pump
- Quarterly, Revision 01100
STP-O-16QT, AFW Turbine Pump
- Quarterly, Revision 012
STP-O-22.1, LLRT of Equipment Hatch Door Seal, Revisio
n 00202 T-35I, Functional Alignment of the Control Room Normal Air Handling Unit and CREATS Filtration
System, Revision 01802
A Rs 04011231 04019848 04022234
W Os C93622602 C93591032 C93279363 C93334189 C 93377032 C93334189 C93416253 Section 1R20: Refueling and Other Outage Activities
Procedures
A-3.1 Containment Storage and Closeout Inspection, Revision 05000
IP-OUT-2, Ginna Site
-Specific Outage Risk Management, Revision 02300
MA-AA-716-025, Scaffold Installation, Modification, and Removal Request
Process, Revision 12
O-1.1, Plant Heat
-Up from Cold Shutdown to Hot Shutdown, Revision 120
O-1.1B, Establishing Containment Integrity, Revision 06801
O-1.1D, Plant Requirement Check List for Heat
-Up Greater than 350 Degrees Fahrenheit , Revision 06400 O-1.2, Plant Startup
from Hot Shutdown to Full Load, Revision 207
O-2.1, Normal Shutdown to Hot Shutdown , Revision 142
O-2.2, Plant Shutdown from Hot Shutdown to Cold Conditions, Revision 158
O-2.3, Draining the RCS to Lowered Inventory <84" but >64", Revision 051
O-2.3.1, Draining and Operation at Reduced Inventory of the
RCS, Revision
088 O-2.3.1A, Containment
Closure Capability within Two Hours during RCS Reduced Inventory Operation, Revision 02602
O-15.2, Valve Alignment for Reactor Head Lift, Core Component Movement, and Periodic Status Checks, Revision
041 OP-AA-112-101, Shift Turnover and Relief, Revision
2 PT-34.1 Initial Criticality and Low Power Physics Testing with DRWM, Revision 35
RE-100, Preparation, Review, and Approval of Fuel Movement Sequence Sheets and Document
Closeout, Revision 017
STP-O-14, Circulating Water Pumps
- High Water Trip Logic, Revision 00000
SY-AA-102, Exelon Generation
Fitness for Duty Program, Revision 0
T-18C, Turbine Overspeed Trip Test, Revision 025
Drawings 33013-1247, Auxiliary Coolant Residual Heat Removal, Revision 47
A Rs 04000321 04000813 04000880 04001424 04001474 04002200 04004043 04004446 04005272 04006557 04006765 04006907 04007374 04007429 04007476 04007979 04008410 04008645 04009229 04009331 04009360 04009745 04009767 04009869 04009870 04009990 04010037 04010181 04010328 04010364 04010534 04010772 04011509 04011603 04011653 04011980 04012356 04021943 Miscellaneous
eSOMS Clearance
for V-712B Ginna Station Inservice Testing Program, Revisio
n 5
Section 1R22: Surveillance Testing
Procedures
CH-PRI-SAMP-ROOM, Sampling in the Nuclear Sample Room, Revision 01701
STP-O-R-10.3, Preparation for and Performance of MSSV Test Using Setpoint
Verification
Device , Revision 00500 STP-O-R-2.1-TR-B, S I Functional Test - Train B, Revision 001
STP-O-23.3, LLRT of Makeup Water to PRT Pen 121A, Revision
2 STP-O-23.42, LLRT of Air Isolation Pen 313, Revision 00101
Section 1EP6: Drill Evaluation
Procedure s TG-GI-150-F31 (LORT), License Operator Requalification Training Program, Revision 003
Section 2RS1: Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areas
Procedures
OP-AA-104-101, Communications
, Revision 3
RP-AA-203-1001, Personnel Exposure Investigations
, Revision 009
RP-AA-300, Radiological Survey Program
, Revision 015
RP-AA-300-1001, Discrete Radioactive Particle Controls
, Revision 005
RP-AA-300-1005, Removing Items from the
Spent Fuel P ool, Reactor Cavity, and Equipment Pit
, Revision 1
RP-AA-302, Determination of Alpha Levels and Monitoring, Revision 008
RP-AA-350, Personnel Contamination Monitoring, Decontamination and Reporting
, Revision 018
RP-AA-350-1001, Response to Guardhouse Portal Monitor Alarms
, Revision 002
RP-AA-460 , Controls for High and LHR Areas , Revision 29
RP-AA-460-001, Controls for VHR Areas , Revision 6
RP-AA-460-002, Additional High Radiation Exposure Control
, Revision 3
RP-AA-503, Unconditional Release Survey Method
, Revision 014
RP-AA-870-1001, Set-Up and Operation of Portable Air Filtration Equipment
, Revision 007
RP-AA-870-1002, Use of Vacuum Cleaners in Radiologically Controlled Areas
, Revision 008
SA-AA-114, Confined Space Entry
, Revision 19
Documents Airborne Radioactivity
Calculation
Sheet, Air Sample 32734
Airborne Radioactivity
Calculation
S heet , Air Sample 32760
Airborne Radioactivity
Calculation
Sheet, Air Sample 33719
Airborne Radioactivity
Calculation
Sheet, Air Sample 33879
Airborne Radioactivity
Calculation
Sheet, Air Sample 33880
ALARA Plan 2017
-1023 ALARA Plan 2017
-1027 ALARA Plan
2017-1036 ALARA Plan 2017
-1037 ALARA Plan 2017
-2021 Confined Space Permit 17-105 Inventory, Sealed Radioactive
Sources Log, Personnel Contamination
Events
Log, Whole Body Counts, 3/1/2017 to
Present Outage Weekly LHRA/HRA Posting, Barricade, and Barrier Verification, dated 5/2/17
RWP 17-00508, Revision 00
R WP 17-00614, Revision 00
R WP 17-00704, Revision 00
Radiological
Survey AB-2017-00026 Radiological
Survey AB-2017-00030 Radiological
Survey AB-2017-0006299999
Radiological
Survey CV-2017-00001, 00002, 00004, 00005, 00006, 00008, 00009, 00011, 00012, 00013, 00014
Radiological
Survey CV-2017-00017 Radiological
Survey EPRI
- SMRP dated 4/24/17 at 1245
Radiological
Survey EPRI
- SMRP dated 4/26/17 at 2330
Radiological
Survey RF-2017-00022 Radiological
Survey SG-2017-00003 to 00006
Report, Annual National Source Tracking System for 2017
Report, Electronic Dosimeter Alarms through 4/17/2017
Rx Cavity Sand Box Cover and Box Removal, WO# C93587039 Fall Protection Plan, dated 5/1/17 (at 1600)
for RWP 17
-00508 TEDE ALARA Evaluation for RWP 17
-00613 TEDE ALARA Evaluation for RWP 17
-00614 TEDE ALARA Evaluation for RWP 17
-00704 Work In-Progress Review for ALARA Plan 2017
-1036, 50 percent, dated 4/30/17 A Rs 03990430 03993234 03993397 03999434 04003076 04003972 04004229 04004296 04004299 04004341 04004379 04004447 04006063 04006425 Section 2RS2: Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls
See 2RS1 Section 2RS6: Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment
Procedures
AP-SG.1, Steam Generator Tube Leak
, Revision 017
CH-261, Collection and Analysis of Groundwater Samples, Revision 00800
CH-360, Primary to Secondary Leakage Sampling and Measurement
, Revision 00002
CH-RETS-RMS-INOP, Actions for RMS Monitor Alarm or Inoperability
, Revision 02200 CH-RETS-SAMP-CV-ALT, Alternate Sample Point for Containment Atmosphere Sampling and Analysis , Revision 00301
CY-AA-170-200, Radioactive Effluent Controls Program
, Revision 2
CY-AA-170-210, Potentially Contaminated System Controls Program
, Revision 0
CY-AA-170-1000, Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program and Meteorological
Program Implementation
, Revision 8
CY-AA-170-2000, Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report
, Revision 8
CY-AA-170-2300, Determination of Carbon
-14 in Gaseous Effluents
, Revision 0 CY-AA-170-3100, ODCM Revisions , Revision 6
EN-AA-407, Response to Inadvertent Releases of Licensed Materials to Groundwater, Surface Water, Soil or Engineered Structures, Revision 8
EN-AA-408, Radiological Groundwater Protection Program
, Revision 0
EN-AA-408-4000, Radiological Groundwater Protection Program Implementation
, Revision 8
EN-GI-408-4160, RGPP Reference Material for R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant
, Revision 1
T-6.11, Neutralizing and Release of Water from the High Conductivity Waste Tank (HCWT), Revision 060
Documents Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report and Annual Radiological Environmental Operating
Report, for CY2015, dated 5/12/2016
Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report and Annual Radiological Environmental Operating
Report, for CY2016, dated 5/10/2017
Apparent Cause Evaluation, CR
-2010-004000, Event Date 6/25/2010
Assessment, NEI Peer Assessment Report, NEI Groundwater Protection Initiative, dated
10/14/2016
Assessment, SAF
-20141205-00053, "Industrial Groundwater Protection Initiative
- Final Guidance Document", dated June 2014
Audit report, NOSA
-GIN-16-04 (AR2670950), dated 7/27/2016
Census, Land Use, CH
-ENV-LAND-USE, dated 9/23/2015
Census, Land Use, CH
-ENV-LAND-USE, dated 9/30/2016
Certificate, Sealed Radioactive
Source, S/N 340A
Certificate, Sealed Radioactive
Source, S/N 340B
Certificate, Sealed Radioactive
Source, S/N E1
-085 Certificate, Sealed Radioactive
Source, S/N E1
-086 Certificate, Sealed Radioactive
Source, S/N E3
-691 Certificate, Sealed Radioactive
Source, S/N P1
-058 Certificate, Sealed Radioactive
Source, S/N P1
-059 Certificate, Sealed Radioactive
Source, S/N P1
-060 Data, Groundwater
Radioanalytical
Results (spreadsheet), July 2014 to Present
Letter, NOVA
-16-07, from Nuclear Oversight Audit and Programs Director, dated 9/8/2016
ODCM Change Determination, Revision 31, Change Package 01 (two items)
ODCM, CY-GI-170-300, Revision 32
Permit, Gas Release, G
-2016010 REPTASK Number PS00978
Permit, Gas Release, G
-2017007 Permit, Liquid Release, L
-2017148 Results, Radiochemistry Cross
-Check Program, Eckert & Ziegler, 1Q2015 to 3Q2016
Technical Requirements Manual for the
- R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, Revision 65
UFSAR, Revision 26
ARs 01704748 02385054 02477439 02555033 02558553 02559559 02561707 02693034
03997299 04005762 04005787 04006305 04006425 04012204 04012212 04012219 04012225 04012229 04012238
04014069
WOs 92252135 92459752 92511716 92573845 92654880 92820264 92827253 92859218 92859229 92895989 92948816 92995308 93032026 93032049 93032238 93052720 93097971 93104844 93136725 93161773 93167543 93191108 93198271 93218282 93338779 93370504 93597102 Section 4OA1: Performance Indicator Verification
Procedures:
CH-PRI-SAMP-ROOM, Sampling in the Nuclear Sample Room, Revision 01701
S-12.4, RCS Leakage Surveillance Record Instructions, Revision 05801
Miscellaneous
NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment
PI Guideline, Revision 7
Section 4OA2: Problem Identification and Resolution
Procedures
PI-AA-101-1001, Performance Monitoring and Analysis Manual, Revision 0
PI-AA-125, CAP Procedure, Revision 5
PI-AA-127, Passport Action Tracking Ma
nagement Procedure, Revision 2.01 A Rs 2619403 2679728 2712787 2714016 2741140 2741633 3945953 3946031 3961532 3961532 3961537 3979370 3985966 3993336 3993905 4001753 4002544 4003084 4004281 4006439 4009866 4010929 4012162 4018068 4018975 4022165 04020814 4023224 4024703 W Os C92334791 C93054742 C93318209 C93473912 C93591097 C93621925 Miscellaneous
CPI- AXIAL-N41, Calibration of Nuclear Instrumentation System Power Range N41 Axial Offset, Revision 40
Section 4OA3: Follow
-Up of Events and
Notices of Enforcement Discretion
LER 2017-001, During Surveillance Testing, Lift Pressure Setpoints on three MSSVs found Outside T Ss Limits Due to Stiction, Revision 00
Section 4OA 7: Licensee-Identified Violations
Procedures
RE-100, Preparation, Review, and Approval of Fuel Movement Sequence Sheets and Document
Closeout, Revision 017
Technical Requirements Manual, TR
-3.9.1-Fuel Storage in Spent Fuel Pool, Revision 43
A Rs 04004043 04009990
LIST OF ACRONYMS
CFR Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations
AC alternating current
ALARA a s low as is reasonably
achievable AR action request
ASME American Society for Mechanical Engineers
B&PV boiler and
pressure vessel CAP corrective action program
CCW component cooling water
CF R Code of Federal Regulations
ECP engineering change package
EDG emergency diesel generator
EPRI Electric Power Research Institute
HRA high radiation area IMC Inspection Manual Chapter
IP inspection procedure
ISI inservice inspection
LER licensee event report
LHRA locked high radiation area LLRT local leak rate test
MR maintenance rule
MS S V main steam safety valve NCV non-cited violation
NDE nondestructive evaluation
NEI Nuclear Energy Institute
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ODCM offsite dose calculation manual
OOS out of service
PCR procedure change request
P&ID piping and instrumentation drawing PI performance indicator
RFO Refueling Outage
RG regulatory guide
RWP radiation work permit SDP significance determination process
SI safety injection
SSC structure, system, and component
ST surveillance tests
TDAFW turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater TS technical specification
UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report VHRA very high radiation area WO work order