IR 05000219/2014004

NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000219-14-004 (July 1, 2014 - September 30, 2014)

ML14317A041
Person / Time
Site:	Oyster Creek
Issue date:	11/13/2014
From:	Kennedy S R NRC/RGN-I/DRP/PB6
To:	Pacilio M J Exelon Nuclear
kennedy, sr
References
IR 2014004
Download: ML14317A041 (41)

Text

November 13, 2014

Mr. Michael Chief Nuclear Officer and Senior Vice President Exelon Nuclear 4300 Winfield Road Warrenville, IL 60555

SUBJECT: OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000219/2014004

Dear Mr. Pacilio:

On September 30, 2014, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on October 22, 2014, with Mr. G. Stathes, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff. The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. This report documents one violation of NRC requirements, which was of very low safety significance (Green). However, because of the very low safety significance, and because it was entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating this finding as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy. If you contest the non-cited violation in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station. In addition, if you disagree with the cross-cutting aspect assigned to this finding, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region I, and the NRC Resident Inspector at Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station. In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,/RA/ Silas R. Kennedy, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50-219 License No. DPR-16

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000219/2014004

w/Attachment:

Supplementary Information cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ

ML14317A041 SUNSI Review Non-Sensitive Sensitive Publicly Available Non-Publicly Available OFFICE RI/DRP RI/DRP NAME JKulp/ CAB per telecom CBickett/ CAB SKennedy/ SRK DATE 11/ 10 /14 11/10 /14 11/12 /14 1 Enclosure U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I Docket No. 50-219 License No. DPR-16 Report No. 05000219/2014004 Licensee: Exelon Nuclear (Exelon) Facility: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Location: Forked River, New Jersey Dates: July 1, 2014 through September 30, 2014 Inspectors: J. Kulp, Senior Resident Inspector A. Patel, Resident Inspector P. Kaufman, Senior Reactor Inspector S. Pindale, Senior Reactor Inspector S. Barr, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector E. Burket, Emergency Preparedness Inspector B. Dionne, Health Physicist A. Dugandzic, Project Engineer Approved By: Silas R. Kennedy, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects 2 Enclosure

SUMMARY

IR 05000219/2014004; 07/01/2014 09/30/2014; Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station (Oyster Creek); Maintaining Emergency Preparedness. This report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced inspections performed by regional inspectors. Inspectors identified one finding of very low safety significance (Green), which was a non-cited violation (NCV). The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (i.e. greater than Green, or Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter June 19, 2012. Cross--in accooverseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

Green.

The inspectors identified an NCV of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.54(q)(2), 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10), and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.4, for failing to maintain the effectiveness of the Oyster Creek emergency plan as a result of failing to provide the station evacuation time estimate (ETE) to the responsible offsite response organizations (OROs) by the required date. Exelon entered this issue into its corrective action program as issue reports 1525923 and 1578649. Additionally, Exelon re-submitted a new revision of the Oyster Creek ETE to the NRC on April 4, 2014, and the The performance deficiency is more than minor because it is associated with the Emergency Preparedness cornerstone attribute of procedure quality and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring that the licensee is capable of implementing adequate measures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency. The ETE is an input into the development of protective action strategies prior to an accident and to the protective action recommendation decision making process during an accident. Inadequate ETEs have the potential to reduce the effectiveness of public protective actions implemented by the OROs. The finding is determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it is a failure to comply with a non-risk significant portion of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10). The cause of the finding is related to a cross-cutting aspect of Human Performance, Documentation, because Exelon did not appropriately create and maintain complete, accurate, and up-to-date documentation [H.7]. (Section 1EP5)

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status Oyster Creek began the inspection period at 100 percent power. On July 7, 2014, operators commenced a reactor shutdown and entered a forced outage (1F34) to conduct an inspection of the installed electromagnetic relief valve solenoids. On July 10, 2014, operators commenced a reactor startup following completion of the electromagnetic relief valve solenoid inspections. On July 11, 2014, operators manually scrammed the reactor due to a loss of condenser vacuum and entered a forced outage (1F35) to conduct repairs. Following completion of repairs, operators commenced a reactor startup on July 14, 2014, and achieved full power on July 16, 2014. On July 16, 2014, operators performed a downpower to 75 percent power to conduct a rod for flow swap and returned to full power later the same day. On August 5, 2014, operators performed a downpower to 70 percent power to conduct a control rod pattern adjustment and returned to full power on August 6, 2014. On August 22, 2014, operators performed a downpower to 70 percent power to conduct a control rod pattern adjustment and returned to full power on August 23, 2014. On September 3, 2014, operators performed a downpower to 90 percent power to conduct core spray system surveillances and returned to full power on September 4, 2014. On September 9, 2014, operators performed a downpower to 90 percent power to conduct core spray system surveillances and returned to full power on September 10, 2014. Operators commenced a plant shutdown on September 14, 2014, took the generator offline, and entered the 1R25 refueling outage on September 15, 2014. Oyster Creek remained shutdown and in 1R25 through the remainder of the inspection period.

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity 1R04 Equipment Alignment

.1 Partial System Walkdowns

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following systems: Emergency diesel generator No. 1 while emergency diesel generator No. 2 out of service on July 28, 2014 Emergency diesel generator No. 2 while emergency diesel generator No. 1 out of service on August 4, 2014 Emergency diesel generator No. 1 while emergency diesel generator No. 2 out of service on August 25, 2014 Core spray system II while shutdown cooling system inservice for refueling outage (1R25) on September 17, 2014 The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk-significance relative to the reactor safety cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures, system diagrams, the updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR), technical specifications, work orders, condition reports, and the impact of ongoing work activities on redundant trains of equipment in order to identify conditions that could have impacted system performance of their intended safety functions. The inspectors also performed field walkdowns of accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and were operable. The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no deficiencies. The inspectors also reviewed whether Exelon staff had properly identified equipment issues and entered them into the corrective action program for resolution with the appropriate significance characterization. Documents reviewed for each section of this inspection report are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Full System Walkdown

a. Inspection Scope

On September 23 and 24, 2014, the inspectors performed a complete system walkdown of accessible portions of the emergency service water system to verify the existing equipment lineup was correct. The inspectors reviewed operating procedures, surveillance tests, drawings, equipment line-up check-off lists, and the UFSAR to verify the system was aligned to perform its required safety functions. The inspectors also reviewed electrical power availability, component lubrication and equipment cooling, hangar and support functionality, and operability of support systems. The inspectors performed field walkdowns of accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and operable. The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no deficiencies. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of related condition reports and work orders to ensure Exelon appropriately evaluated and resolved any deficiencies.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection Resident Inspector Quarterly Walkdowns

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted tours of the areas listed below to assess the material condition and operational status of fire protection features. The inspectors verified that Exelon controlled combustible materials and ignition sources in accordance with administrative procedures. The inspectors verified that fire protection and suppression equipment was available for use as specified in the area pre-fire plan, and passive fire barriers were maintained in good material condition. The inspectors also verified that station personnel implemented compensatory measures for out of service, degraded, or inoperable fire protection equipment, as applicable, in accordance with procedures.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R06 Flood Protection Measures

Annual Review of Cables Located in Underground Bunkers/Manholes

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted an inspection of underground bunkers/manholes subject to flooding that contain cables whose failure could disable risk-significant equipment. The inspectors performed visual observations of risk-significant areas with assistance from a camera, including the SBO3 (MH-743-3) and SBO4 (MH-743-4), containing 13.8kV cables from the combustion turbine, and to verify that the cables were not submerged in water, that cables and/or splices appeared intact, and to observe the condition of cable support structures. An additional manhole sample included was the start-up transformer A&B (MH-724-1), containing 34.5kV cables from the start-up transformers. The inspectors also ensured that drainage was provided and functioning properly in areas where dewatering devices were not installed. The inspectors also verified that Exelon took action to keep the cables dry and assess cable degradation in accordance with

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R07 Heat Sink Performance (711111.07A

1 sample)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the containment spray system I heat exchangers to determine their readiness and availability to perform their safety function. The inspectors reviewed Letter 89-13. The inspectors reviewed the results of previous inspections of the containment spray system 1 heat exchangers. The inspectors discussed the results of the most recent inspection with engineering staff including the as-found and as-left conditions. The inspectors verified that Exelon initiated appropriate corrective actions for identified deficiencies. The inspectors also verified that the number of tubes plugged within the heat exchanger did not exceed the maximum number allowed.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Performance in the Main Control Room

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed licensed operator performance during a plant startup from a forced outage (1F35) on July 14, 2014. The inspectors also observed licensed operator performance response during an unplanned low instrument air pressure condition on August 6, 2014. The inspectors observed infrequently performed test or evolution briefings that were performed and met the requirements of Exelon procedure HU-AA--room operator performance to verify that procedure use, crew communications, and coordination of activities between work groups similarly met established expectations and standards.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the samples listed below to assess the effectiveness of maintenance activities on structure, system, or component performance and reliability. The inspectors reviewed system health reports, corrective action program documents, maintenance work orders, and maintenance rule basis documents to ensure that Exelon was identifying and properly evaluating performance problems within the scope of the maintenance rule. For each sample selected, the inspectors verified that the structure, system or component was properly scoped into the maintenance rule in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65 and verified that the (a)(2) performance criteria established by Exelon staff was reasonable. As applicable, for a structure, system, or component classified as (a)(1), the inspectors assessed the adequacy of goals and corrective actions to return the structure, system or component to (a)(2). Additionally, the inspectors ensured that Exelon staff was identifying and addressing common cause failures that occurred within and across maintenance rule system boundaries.

Forked River combustion turbine No. 2 on August 14, 2014 Electromatic relief valves on September 22, 2014

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed station evaluation and management of plant risk for the maintenance and emergent work activities listed below to verify that Exelon performed the appropriate risk assessments prior to removing equipment for work. The inspectors selected these activities based on potential risk significance relative to the reactor safety cornerstones. As applicable for each activity, the inspectors verified that Exelon personnel performed risk assessments as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and that the assessments were accurate and complete. When Exelon performed emergent work, the inspectors verified that operations personnel promptly assessed and managed plant risk. The inspectors reviewed the scope of maintenance work and discussed the results of the assessment wthe risk assessment. The inspectors also reviewed the technical specification requirements and inspected portions of redundant safety systems, when applicable, to verify risk analysis assumptions were valid and applicable requirements were met.

Emergency diesel generator No. 2 out of service on July 28, 2014 Emergency diesel generator No. 1 and containment spray system I out of service on August 4, 2014 Emergency diesel generator No. 2 out of service on August 25, 2014 Core spray system I out of service on September 4, 2014 Refueling outage yellow shutdown risk due to decay heat removal on September 16, 2014

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed operability determinations for the following degraded or non-conforming conditions: Electromatic relief valve solenoids degraded condition on September 17, 2014 Emergency diesel generator No. 1 due to common cause evaluation for the emergency diesel generator No. 2 cooling fan shaft failure on July 28, 2014 Emergency diesel generator No. 2 governor with low oil level on August 4, 2014 Emergency diesel generator No. 2 following engine overspeed trip on August 25, 2014 Emergency diesel generator No. 2 following water found in lube oil system on August 28, 2014 The inspectors selected these issues based on the risk significance of the associated components and systems. The inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of the operability determinations to assess whether technical specification operability was properly justified and the subject component or system remained available such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred. The inspectors compared the operability and design criteria in the appropriate sections of the technical specifications and UFSAR to Where compensatory measures were required to maintain operability, the inspectors determined whether the measures in place would function as intended and were properly controlled by Exelon. The inspectors determined, where appropriate, compliance with bounding limitations associated with the evaluations.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R18 Plant Modifications

Permanent Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated a modification to the change the material of electromatic relief valve solenoid internal components. The inspectors verified that the design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of the affected systems were not degraded by the modification. In addition, the inspectors reviewed modification documents associated with the material change, including replacement of electromatic relief valve solenoid actuator internal components. The inspectors also reviewed revisions to the purchase orders to ensure the materials were changed.

The inspectors also evaluated a modification of the design of the electromatic relief valve solenoid actuators. The inspectors verified that the design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of the affected systems were not degraded by the modification. In addition, the inspectors reviewed modification documents associated with the design change, including replacement of electromatic relief valve solenoid actuators and relocation of vibration susceptible internal components of the actuators. The inspectors also reviewed revisions to the maintenance refurbishment procedure and interviewed engineering and maintenance personnel to ensure the procedure could be reasonably performed.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the post-maintenance tests for the maintenance activities listed below to verify that procedures and test activities ensured system operability and functional capability. The inspectors reviewed the test procedure to verify that the procedure adequately tested the safety functions that may have been affected by the maintenance activity, that the acceptance criteria in the procedure was consistent with the information in the applicable licensing basis and/or design basis documents, and that the procedure had been properly reviewed and approved. The inspectors also witnessed the test or reviewed test data to verify that the test results adequately demonstrated restoration of the affected safety functions.

Electromatic relief valves following electromatic relief valve solenoid refurbishment on July 10, 2014 Emergency diesel generator No. 2 following cooling fan shaft replacement on July 30, 2014 Emergency diesel generator No. 1 following cooling fan shaft inspections on August 4, 2014 Emergency diesel generator following crankcase pressure detector replacement on August 28, 2014 V-31-5, reactor head cooling inlet valve, replacement on September 23, 2014 Electromatic relief valves replacement following electromatic relief valve solenoid actuator internal components design change on September 30, 2014

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities

a. Inspection Scope

s work schedule and outage risk plan for the Oyster Creek forced outage 1F34, on July 7, 2014. On July 10, 2014, Oyster Creek commenced startup and subsequently manually scrammed the reactor on July 11, 2014, due to low vacuum conditions in the condenser. Oyster Creek forced outage 1F35 on July 11, 2014, following a manual scram in response to a low condenser vacuum condition. On July 14, 2014, Oyster Creek commenced startup and returned to full power on July 16, 2014.

Oyster Creek maintenance and refueling outage (1R25), which started on September 15, 2014, and ongoing at the end of the inspection period. The completion of this sample will be documented in the 4th quarter integrated inspection report.

schedules to verify that risk, industry experience, previous site-specific problems, and defense-in-depth were considered. During the outage, the inspectors observed portions of the shutdown and cooldown processes and monitored controls associated with the following outage activities: Configuration management, including maintenance of defense-in-depth, commensurate with the outage plan for the key safety functions and compliance with the applicable technical specifications when taking equipment out of service Implementation of clearance activities and confirmation that tags were properly hung and that equipment was appropriately configured to safely support the associated work or testing Status and configuration of electrical systems and switchyard activities to ensure that technical specifications were met Monitoring of decay heat removal operations Impact of outage work on the ability of the operators to operate the spent fuel pool cooling system Reactor water inventory controls, including flow paths, configurations, alternative means for inventory additions, and controls to prevent inventory loss Activities that could affect reactivity Maintenance of secondary containment as required by technical specifications Refueling activities, including fuel handling and fuel receipt inspections Identification and resolution of problems related to refueling outage activities

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed performance of surveillance tests and/or reviewed test data of selected risk-significant structures, systems, and components to assess whether test results satisfied technical specifications, the UFSAR, and Exelon procedure requirements. The inspectors verified that test acceptance criteria were clear, tests demonstrated operational readiness and were consistent with design documentation, test instrumentation had current calibrations and the range and accuracy for the application, tests were performed as written, and applicable test prerequisites were satisfied. Upon test completion, the inspectors considered whether the test results supported that equipment was capable of performing the required safety functions. The inspectors reviewed the following surveillance tests: Unidentified reactor coolant system (RCS) leak rate verification on August 1, 2014 Core spray system I valve operability and in-service test on September 9, 2014 Core spray system I pump operability and in-service test on September 10, 2014 V-31-5, reactor head cooling inlet valve, local leak rate test on September 20, 2014

b. Findings

No findings were identified. Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

1EP2 Alert and Notification System Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

An onsite review was conducted to assess the maintenance and testing of the alert and notification system (ANS). During this inspection, the inspectors conducted a review of the ANS testing and maintenance programs. The inspectors reviewed the associated ANS procedures and the Federal Emergency Management Agency approved ANS Design Report to ensure compliance with design report commitments for system maintenance and testing. The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71114, Attachment 2. 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5) and the related requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, were used as reference criteria.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1EP3 Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation System

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted a review of the Oyster Creek Emergency Response Organization (ERO) augmentation staffing requirements and the process for notifying and augmenting the ERO. The review was performed to verify the readiness of key their emergency response facilities (ERF) in a timely manner. The inspectors reviewed the Oyster Creek Emergency Plan for ERF activation and ERO staffing requirements, the ERO duty roster, applicable station procedures, augmentation test reports, the most recent drive-in drill reports, and corrective action reports related to this inspection area. The inspectors also reviewed a sample of ERO responder training records to verify training and qualifications were up to date. The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71114, Attachment 3. 10 CFR 50.47(b)

(2) and related requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, were used as reference criteria.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes

a. Inspection Scope

Staff from the Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response (NSIR) performed an in-office review of the latest revision to the ETE Analysis for Oyster Creek located under ADAMS accession number ML14101A164, as listed in the Attachment. The staff performed a review using the guidance provided in NUREG/CR-be complete in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E.IV.3. The NRC review was only intended to verify consistent application of the ETE guidance contained in NUREG/CR-7002; and therefore remains subject to future NRC inspection in its entirety.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1EP5 Maintaining Emergency Preparedness

a. Inspection Scope

efforts to maintain the Oyster Creek emergency preparedness (EP) program. The inspectors reviewed: memorandums of agreement with offsite agencies; the 10 CFR 50.54(q) equipment important to EP; records of ETE population evaluation; and provisions for, and implementation of, primary, backup, and alternate ERF maintenance. The inspectors also verifregulations regarding: emergency action levels for hostile action events; protective actions for on-site personnel during events; emergency declaration timeliness; ERO augmentation and alternate facility capability; ETE updates; on-shift ERO staffing analysis; and ANS back-up means. Additionally, NRC EP rulemaking, which became effective on December 23, 2011, added a new regulation which required licensees to develop an ETE analysis and submit it to the NRC by December 23, 2012. This inspection included a follow-up of issues identified by the NSIR staff during its review of the Exelon submittal of the ETEs for the ten sites that it operated at the time. The NSIR staff related those issues to Exelon, which provided responses through 2013 and into 2014. During this inspection period, regional EP inspectors reviewed applicable Exelon documents, conducted discussions with Exelon personnel, and provided assessment of the Exelon response. The inspectors fthrough their identification and correction of EP weaknesses, and by reviewing a sample of drill reports, actual event reports, self-assessments, and 10 CFR 50.54(t) reviews. Also, the inspectors reviewed a sample of EP-related condition reports initiated at Oyster Creek from October 2012 through September 2014. The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71114.05. 10 CFR 50.47(b) and the related requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, were used as reference criteria.

b. Findings

Introduction:

The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50.54(q)(2) for failing to maintain the effectiveness of the Oyster Creek emergency plan. Specifically, Exelon failed to provide the station ETE to responsible OROs and failed to update its site-specific protective action strategies as outlined in the requirements listed in 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10), and Section IV, Paragraph 4, of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50.

Description:

On November 23, 2011, the NRC issued final new and amended EP regulations (76 Federal Register 72560) that required all licensees to update the ETE on a periodic basis. This rulemaking became effective on December 23, 2011. The rulemaking also added a new regulation, 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.4, which required licensees to develop an ETE analysis using the most recent decennial census data and submit it to the NRC within 365 days of December 23, 2011.

Concurrently, with the issuance of the rulemaking, the NRC published a new report -7002. The Statements of Consideration for the rulemaking (76 Federal Register 72580) identified that the NRC staff would review the submitted ETEs for completeness using that document. The Statements also provided that the guidance of NUREG/CR-2002 was an acceptable template to meet the requirements and licensees should use the guidance or an appropriate alternative. By individual letters dated December 12, 2012, Exelon submitted the ETEs for the sites for which it held the operating licenses, including Oyster Creek. By letter dated January 23, 2013, Exelon submitted the NUREG/CR-7002 checklists for the ETEs that identified where a particular criterion was addressed in the ETEs, facilitating the NRC review. As provided in the Statements of Consideration, the NRC staff performed a completeness review using the checklists and found the ETEs (including the ETEs for Oyster Creek) to be incomplete due to common and site-specific deficiencies. The staff discussed its concerns regarding the completeness of the ETEs, in a teleconference with Exelon conducted on June 10, 2013. On September 5, 2013, Exelon resubmitted the ETEs and the associated checklists for its sites. The NRC staff performed another completeness review and again found the ETEs to be incomplete. Examples of information missing from the submittal included: peak and average attendance were not stated (NUREG/CR-7002 Criteria Item 2.1.2.a); the ETE used a value based on campsite and hotel capacity, vice an average value (2.1.2.b); basis for speed and capacity reduction factors due to weather was not provided (3.4.b); snow removal was not addressed (3.4.c); no bus routes or plans were included in the ETE analysis (4.1.2.a); and no discussion on the means of evacuating ambulatory and non-ambulatory residents was included (4.1.2.b). The staff communicated the various ETE issues to Exelon through several telephone conference calls. Upon identification, Exelon entered this issue into its corrective action program as issue reports 1525923 and 1578649. that ETE is documented in Section 1EP4 of this report.

Analysis:

The inspectors determined that the failure to submit a complete updated ETE for Oyster Creek by December 23, 2012, is a performance deficiency because Exelon failed to meet a regulatory requirement that was reasonably within its ability to foresee and correct, and should have been prevented, for both the December 12, 2012, and September 5, 2013, submittals.

Using IMC performance deficiency is associated with the Emergency Preparedness cornerstone attribute of procedure quality and is more than minor because it adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring that the licensee is capable of implementing adequate measures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency. The ETE is an input into the development of protective action strategies prior to an accident and to the protective action recommendation decision making process during an accident. Inadequate ETEs had the potential to reduce the effectiveness of public protective actions implemented by the OROs.

The inspectors utilized IMC 0609, Appendix nce of the performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was associated with planning standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10). EP SDP Table 5.10-were not provided to emergency preparedness implementing procedures (EPIPs) are not consistent with the nce deficiency site OROs nor was it used to inform the site EPIPs as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10), and Section IV, Paragraph 4 of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Therefore, in accordance with EP SDP Table 5.10-1, this was determined to be a finding of very low safety significance (Green).

The cause of the finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Documentation, because Exelon personnel did not create and maintain complete, accurate and, up-to-date documentation. Specifically, the EP organization did not develop the Oyster Creek ETE as required by the new regulation introduced by the

Enforcement:

10 CFR 50.54(q)(2) statmaintain in effective emergency plans which meet the standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b) and CFR 50.47(b)(10), states, in part, that licensees shall develop an evacuation time estimate and update it on a periodic basis. 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix E, Section IV.4, states that within 365 days of December 23, 2011, nuclear power reactor licensees shall develop an ETE analysis and submit it under § 50.4.

Contrary to the above, the ETEs submitted by Exelon on December 12, 2012, and on September 5, 2013, for Oyster Creek were found to be inadequate. Upon identification, Exelon implemented immediate corrective actions by entering this issue into its corrective action program as issue reports 1525923 and 1578649, and revising the ETE to satisfy NRC requirements. Because this finding is of very low safety significance treated as an NCV consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy. (NCV 05000219/2014004-01: Inadequate Evacuation Time Estimate Submittals)

RADIATION SAFETY

Cornerstone:

Occupational Radiation Safety

2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

a. Inspection Scope

During the period of August 11-14, 2014, and September 22-26, 2014, the inspectors reviewed Exelon performance in assessing the radiological hazards and exposure control in the workplace. The inspectors used the requirements in 10 CFR Part 20 and guidance required by technical specifications as criteria for determining compliance.

Inspection Planning

The inspectors reviewed 2013 and 2014 performance indicators for the occupational exposure cornerstone for Oyster Creek. The inspectors reviewed the results of radiological protection (RP) program audits. The inspectors reviewed any reports of operational occurrences related to occupational radiation safety since the last inspection. Radiological Hazard Assessment The inspectors reviewed changes to plant operations since the last inspection that represent a significant new radiological hazard for onsite workers or members of the public. The inspectors evaluated whether Exelon assessed the potential impact and has implemented appropriate controls. The inspectors reviewed the following documents: Radiological surveys associated with the following radiation work permits (RWPs): o RWP OC 14-01700 Torus Vacuum Breaker Surveillance; o RWP 14-00406, 1R25 Refueling Floor Activities; o RWP 14-00508, 1R25 Drywell Scaffolding; o RWP 14-00511, 1R25 Drywell Control Rod Drive (CRD) Exchange Activities and Support; o RWP 14-00519, 1R25 Drywell In-service Inspection (ISI), Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking (IGSCC), Flow-Accelerated Corrosion (FAC) Inspection. Drywell air sample locations and the use of continuous air monitors Loose contamination monitoring Radiological surveys from the Torus and Spent Fuel Pool heat exchangers Instructions to Workers The inspectors selected five radioactive material containers and assessed whether the containers were labeled and controlled in accordance with 10 CFR Part 20 requirements. The inspectors reviewed RWPs used to access high radiation areas (HRA) and evaluated if the specified work control instructions and control barriers were consistent with technical specification requirements for HRA. Contamination and Radioactive Material Control The inspectors observed five locations where Exelon monitors potentially contaminated material leaving the radiological control area and inspected the methods used for control, survey, and release of these materials from these areas. The inspectors observed the performance of personnel surveying and releasing material for unrestricted use and evaluated whether the work was performed in accordance with plant procedures. The inspectors assessed whether the radiation monitoring instrumentation used for equipment release and personnel contamination surveys had appropriate sensitivity for the type(s) of radiation present. The inspectors evaluated whether any recent transactions involving nationally tracked sources were reported in accordance with10 CFR Part 20 requirements.

Radiological Hazards Control and Work Coverage The inspectors evaluated ambient radiological conditions and performed independent radiation measurements during walk-downs of the facility. The inspectors assessed whether the conditions were consistent with applicable posted surveys, RWPs, and associated worker briefings. The inspectors examined Exelon physical and programmatic controls for highly activated and contaminated materials stored within the spent fuel. The inspectors assessed whether appropriate controls were in place to preclude inadvertent removal of these materials from the pool.

The inspectors examined the posting and physical controls for selected HRAs and Locked High Radiation Areas (LHRAs) to verify conformance with the occupational performance indicator. The inspector evaluated the radiological controls, exposure monitoring, and radiation protection job coverage for the RWPs listed above.

Risk-Significant HRAs and LHRAs Controls The inspectors discussed with the Radiation Protection Manager the controls and procedures for high-risk HRAs and LHRAs. The inspectors discussed with first-line health physics supervisors the controls in place for areas that have the potential to become LHRAs during certain plant operations. The inspectors assessed whether plant operations required communication beforehand with the health physics group, so as to allow timely actions to post, control, and monitor the radiation hazards.

Radiation Worker Performance The inspectors observed the performance of radiation workers with respect to stated RP work requirements. The inspectors assessed whether workers were aware of the radiological conditions in their workplace and the RWP controls/limits in place, and whether their behavior reflected the level of radiological hazards present. The inspector reviewed radiological problem reports since the last inspection that attributed the cause of the event to human performance errors.

RP Technician Proficiency The inspectors observed the performance of the RP technicians with respect to controlling radiation work. The inspectors evaluated whether technicians were aware of the radiological conditions in their workplace and the RWP controls/limits, and whether their behavior was consistent with their training and qualifications with respect to the radiological hazards and work activities.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

2RS2 Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls

The inspectors assessed performance with respect to maintaining occupational individual and collective radiation exposures as low as is reasonably achievable (ALARA). The inspectors used the requirements in 10 CFR Part 20, RG 8.8, RG 8.10, technical specifications, and Exelon procedures required by technical specifications as criteria for determining compliance.

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed information regarding Oyster Creek collective dose history, current exposure trends, ongoing and planned activities in order to assess current rolling average collective exposure. The inspectors compared the site-specific trends in collective exposures against the industry average values and those values from similar vintage reactors. In addition, the inspectors reviewed any changes in the radioactive source term by reviewing the trend in average contact dose rate with recirculation piping. The inspectors reviewed site-specific procedures associated with maintaining occupational exposures ALARA, which included a review of processes used to estimate and track exposures from specific work activities. The inspectors reviewed the ALARA work activity evaluations, exposure estimates, and exposure reduction requirements. The inspectors assessed whether Exelon planning identified appropriate dose reduction techniques; considered alternate dose reduction features; and estimated reasonable dose goals. The inspectors determined whether Exelon work planning considered the use of remote technologies as a means to reduce dose and the use of dose reduction insights from industry operating experience and plant-specific lessons learned. The inspectors assessed the integration of ALARA requirements into work procedure and RWP documents. The inspectors reviewed the assumptions and basis for the current annual collective dose estimate for accuracy. The inspectors reviewed applicable procedures to determine the methodology for estimating exposures from specific work activities and for method of adjusting exposure estimates, or re-planning work, when unexpected changes in scope or emergent work were encountered.

The inspectors used Exelon records to determine the historical trends and current status of plant source term known to contribute to elevated facility collective dose. The inspectors assessed whether Exelon had made allowances or developed contingency plans for expected changes in the source term as the result of changes in plant fuel performance issues or changes in plant primary chemistry. The inspectors observed radiation worker and RP technician performance during work activities being performed in radiation areas, airborne radioactivity areas, and HRAs. The inspectors evaluated whether workers demonstrated the ALARA philosophy in practice and whether there were any procedure or RWP compliance issues.

ALARA Work Planning The inspectors reviewed ALARA planning estimates and results achieved for the following RWPs: RWP 14-00406,

==1R25 Refueling Floor Activities; RWP 14-00508, 1R25 Drywell Scaffolding; RWP 14-00511, 1R25 Drywell CRD Exchange Activities and Support; RWP 14-00519, 1R25 Drywell ISI, IGSSC, FAC Inspection. Source Term Reduction and Control The inspectors reviewed records of source term trends and current status of plant source term reduction plans and contingency plans for changes in source term.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

2RS3 In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation

==

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors verified in-plant airborne concentrations are being controlled consistent with ALARA principles and the use of respiratory protection devices-

Inspection Planning

The inspectors reviewed the following: UFSAR to identify areas with ventilation systems or airborne monitoring instrumentation The respiratory protection program Procedures for maintenance, inspection, use of respiratory protection equipment, and air quality maintenance Engineering Controls The inspectors reviewed the following: Procedures for use of installed plant ventilation systems Observed two temporary ventilation system setups Observed two installed ventilation systems including the alarm setpoints Threshold criteria for evaluating levels of airborne beta-emitting and alpha-emitting radionuclides Use of Respiratory Protection Devices The inspectors reviewed the following: Two work activities where respiratory protection devices were used The use of respirator protection factors Respiratory protection devices were certified for use Two individual respirator use qualifications

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors verified that occupational dose is appropriately monitored, assessed, and reported. The inspectors used the requirements in 10 CFR Part 20, RG 8.13, RG 8.36, RG 8.40, technical specifications, and procedures required by technical specifications as criteria for determining compliance.

Inspection Planning

The inspectors reviewed the following: RP program audit National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program dosimetry report procedures associated with dosimetry operations and dose assessments External Dosimetry The inspectors reviewed the following: Onsite storage of dosimeters Use of electronic personal dosimeters Eight dosimetry occurrence reports or corrective action program documents Routine Bioassay (In Vivo) The inspectors reviewed the following: Procedures used to assess internal dose The whole body count measurement process Portal radiation monitor use as a passive monitoring system Inclusion of hard-to-detect radionuclides in internal dose assessments, if applicable Internal Dose Assessment Airborne Monitoring The inspectors reviewed the dose assessment procedures based on airborne monitoring. Declared Pregnant Workers radiation exposure to the embryo/fetus, the regulatory aspects of declaring a pregnancy, and the specific process to be used for (voluntarily) declaring a pregnancy. Exelon had no declarations of pregnancy or internal dose assessments for declared pregnant workers during this inspection period. Shallow Dose Equivalent Exelon had no documented dose assessments for shallow dose equivalent during this inspection period.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification

.1 Safety System Functional Failures (IE05) (1 sample)

a. Inspection Scope

performance indicator for Oyster Creek for the period of April 1, 2013 through March 31, 2014. To determine the accuracy of the performance indicator data reported during those periods, inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Document 99--and 10 CFoperability assessments, maintenance rule records, maintenance work orders, condition reports, event reports and NRC integrated inspection reports to validate the accuracy of the submittals.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Unplanned Power Changes (IE03) (1 sample)

a. Inspection Scope

performance indicator for the period April 1, 2013 through March 31, 2014. To determine the accuracy of the performance indicator data reported during those periods, the inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in NEI Document 99-02, reviewed control room logs, NRC integrated inspection reports, and plant process computer data, and compared that information to the data reported by Exelon to validate the accuracy of the submittal.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

===.3 RCS Specific Activity and RCS Leak Rate (2 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

r the RCS specific activity and RCS leak rate performance indicators for the period of April 1, 2013 through June 30, 2014. To determine the accuracy of the performance indicator data reported during those periods, the inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in NEI Document 99-02, also reviewed RCS sample analysis logs and control room logs of daily measurements for RCS leakage, and compared that information to the data reported by the performance indicator. Additionally, the inspectors observed surveillance activities that determined the RCS identified leakage rate.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

=

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed data for the following three EP Performance Indicators:

(1) drill and exercise performance;

(2) ERO drill participation; and

(3) ANS reliability. The last NRC EP inspection at Oyster Creek was conducted in the fourth calendar quarter of 2013. Therefore, the inspectors reviewed supporting documentation from EP drills and equipment tests from the fourth calendar quarter of 2013 through the second calendar quarter of 2014 to verify the accuracy of the reported performance indicator data. The review of the performance indicators was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71151. The acceptance criteria documented in NEI 99-Assessment Performance Indicator Guidelinecriteria.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution

Routine Review of Problem Identification and Resolution Activities

a. Inspection Scope

As required by Iinspectors routinely reviewed issues during baseline inspection activities and plant status reviews to verify that Exelon entered issues into the corrective action program at an appropriate threshold, gave adequate attention to timely corrective actions, and identified and addressed adverse trends. In order to assist with the identification of repetitive equipment failures and specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the corrective action program and periodically attended condition report screening meetings.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA3 Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion

Plant Events

a. Inspection Scope

For the plant event listed below, the inspectors reviewed and/or observed plant parameters, reviewed personnel performance, and evaluated performance of mitigating systems. The inspectors communicated the plant event to appropriate regional activities. As applicable, the inspectors verified that Exelon made appropriate emergency classification assessments and properly reported the event in accordance -up actions related to the events to assure that Exelon implemented appropriate corrective actions commensurate with their safety significance.

Loss of vacuum scram during startup from a forced outage (1F34) on July 11, 2014

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA5 Other Activities

Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) Report Review

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the final report for the INPO plant assessment of Oyster Creek conducted in February 2014. The inspectors reviewed these reports to ensure that any issues identified were consistent with NRC perspectives of Exelon performance and to determine if INPO identified any significant safety issues that required further NRC follow-up.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

On October 22, 2014, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. G. Stathes, Site Vice President, and other members of the Oyster Creek staff. The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained by the inspectors or documented in this report.

ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Exelon Personnel

G. Stathes, Site Vice-President

J. Dostal, Plant Manager

M. Ford, Director, Operations

G. Malone, Director, Engineering

D. Chernesky, Acting Director, Maintenance

C. Symonds, Director, Training

D. DiCello, Director, Work Management

M. Chanda, Oyster Creek Emergency Preparedness Manager

M. McKenna, Manager, Regulatory Assurance

T. Farenga, Radiation Protection Manager

J. Renda, Manager, Environmental/Chemistry

T. Keenan, Manager, Site Security

P. Bloss, Senior Manager, Plant Engineering

H. Ray, Senior Manager, Design Engineering

E. Swain, Shift Operations Superintendent

D. Moore, Regulatory Assurance Specialist

K. Paez, Regulatory Assurance Specialist

K. Aleshire, Exelon Corporate Emergency Preparedness Manager

V. Cwietniewicz, Mid-Atlantic Corporate Emergency Preparedness Manager

M. Jesse, Regulatory Assurance Manager

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, DISCUSSED, AND UPDATED

Opened/Closed

05000219/2014004-01 NCV Inadequate Evacuation Time Estimate Submittals (Section 1EP5)

Attachment

Section 1R04: Equipment Alignment

Procedures

ABN-18, Service Water Failure Response, Revision 7 310, Containment Spray System Operation, Revision 109 341, Emergency Diesel Generation Operation, Revision 101

ER-AA-2008, Mitigating Systems Performance Index (MSPI) Monitoring and Margin Evaluation,

Revision 4

LS-AA-2200, Mitigating System Performance Index Data Acquisition & Reporting, Revision 5

Condition Reports

1614019

1511787

1645010

1645135

1649757

1663342

Work Orders

R2233196

R2234500

Drawings

GE 148F740, Sheet 1, Containment Spray System Flow Diagram, Revision 43 3E-241-A1-001, Sheet 1, Containment Spray System, Revision 7 3E-532-A1-001, Sheet 1, Emergency Service Water System ISI Boundary Drawing, Revision 29

BR-2005, Sheet 4, Flow Diagram of Emergency Service Water System, Revision 76

Miscellaneous

Emergency Service Water System Health Report (7/21/2014-9/30/2014)

Section 1R05: Fire Protection

Procedures

OP-OC-201-008, Oyster Creek Pre-Fire Plans, Revision 17 101.2, Oyster Creek Site Fire Protection Program, Revision 70

OP-OC-201-008-1003,

OP-OC-201-008- OP-OC-201-008-

Section 1R06: Flood Protection Measures

Procedures

ER-AA-300-150, Cable Condition Monitoring Program, Revision 0

MA-OC-773-001, Testing/ Condition Monitoring of Inaccessible medium voltage cables not subject to 10CFR50.49 Environmental Qualification, Revision 1

Condition Reports

1503497

1674025

1680027

1674684

1614019

Work Orders

R2217149

R2220905

R2217149

R2212922

R2220905

R2233196

Attachment

Section 1R07: Heat Sink Performance

Procedures

ER-AA-340,

GL 89-13 Program Implementing Procedure, Revision 7

ER-OC-340-1001, Oyster Creek Generic Letter 89-13 Program Basis Document, Revision 3

ER-AA-340-1001,

GL 89-13 Program Implementation Instructional Guide, Revision 8

ER-AA-340-1002, SW Heat Exchanger and Component Inspection Guide, Revision 5 607.4.004, Containment Spray and Emergency Service Water Pump System 1 Operability and

Comprehensive/Pre-service/Post-Maintenance In-service Test, Revision 87 607.4.016, Containment Spray and Emergency Service Water System 1 Pump Operability and

Quarterly In-service Test, Revision 38

Condition Reports

1681138

Calculations

C-1302-241-E120-078, Containment Spray Heat Exchanger Performance Evaluation, Revision

0

C-1302-241-E610, Calculation of Torus Pool Temperature for NPSH and to Determine Containment Spray System Design Basis Requirements, Revision 4 EXOC005-CALC-002, System Acceptance Criteria for Containment Spray and ESW Flow

Rates, Revision 0

Drawings

BR 2005, Sheet 4, Emergency Service Water System, Revision 86

GE 148F740, Containment Spray System, Revision 44

Miscellaneous

Electric Power Research Institute, EPRI

NP-7552, Heat Exchanger Performance Monitoring Guidelines, Final Report, December 1991 NRC Information Notice 90-26, Inadequate Flow of Essential Service Water to Room Coolers and Heat Exchangers for Engineered Safety-Feature Systems, April 24. 1990 System Design Basis Document

OC-241, Containment Spray System, Revision 5 Containment Spray System 1 Heat Exchanger Cleanliness Test, dated January 23, 2014

EPRI-NP-7552, Heat Exchanger Performance Monitoring Guidelines, dated December 1991 System Health Report Containment Spray System, 3rd Quarter 2014 Containment Spray System 1 Heat Exchanger Average Cleanliness Factor Trending Data October 19, 2011 and January 23, 2014

C-1302-241-E120-078, Containment Spray Heat Exchanger Performance Evaluation,

Revision 1

TDR-1063, Evaluation of Heat Transfer Capability of Safety-Related Heat Exchangers,

Revision 0 A0703677, Containment Spray System 1 HX Performance Test

Evaluation of Data Collected

During Heat Exchanger Test Performed in 2011, completed March 28, 2011

Section 1R11: Licensed Operator Requalification Program

Miscellaneous

202.1, Power Operation, Revision 143

HU-AA-1211, Pre-Job Briefings, Revision 9

Attachment

Section 1R12: Maintenance Effectiveness

Procedures

ER-AA-310, Implementation of the Maintenance Rule, Revision 9

ER-AA-310-1001, Maintenance Rule Scoping, Revision 4

ER-AA-310-1003, Maintenance Rule

Performance Criteria Selection, Revision 4

ER-AA-310-1005, Maintenance Rule

Dispositioning between (A1) and (A2), Revision 6 Oyster Creek Generating Station Procedure 117.3, Alternate AC System Reliability Monitoring,

Revision 5 System Heath Report Station Blackout and Support Systems, 2nd Quarter 2014 CT and Support System Monitoring Basis Form, January 31, 2014

Condition Reports

1439089

Section 1R13: Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Procedures

308, Emergency Core Cooling System Operation, Revision 94 310, Containment Spray System Operation, Revision 109 341, Emergency Diesel Generator Operation, Revision 108

WC-AA-101-1006, Online Risk Management and Assessment, Revision 1

WC-AA-101, On-Line Work Control Process, Revision 22

Section 1R15: Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Procedures

OP-AA-108-115, Operability Determinations, Revision 14

OP-AA-108-115-1002, Supplemental Consideration for On-Shift Immediate Operability Determinations, Revision 2

PI-AA-120, Issue Identification and Screening Process, Revision 1

PL-AA-12, Analysis of Failed Components, Revision 1

PL-AA-001-0002, Analysis of Failed Components, Revision 1

RAP-T4f, EDG 2 Disabled, Revision 1

Drawing

EM 8397907, Emergency Diesel Generator #2 Electrical Elementary Wiring Diagram Control Circuits, Revision 14

Condition Reports

1673665

1678550

1680869

1688756

1688727

1686101

1686767

1575377

1686101

1686135

1695955

1696895

1696438

1671539

1099299

Maintenance Orders/Work Orders R2212089

C2032634 R2242349 A2340615 R2151853 R2190622 A2256917 R2240253

Attachment Miscellaneous Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Technical Specification 3.4.B, Automatic Depressurization System, Amendment 247 NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0326, Operability Determinations & Functionality Assessments for Conditions Adverse to Quality or Safety, dated January 31, 2014

OC 13-00474, Fan Hitting Shroud, Rot on Fan Blade, Revision 0

OC-2014-OE-004, EDG #2 Water Leak Operability Evaluation, Revision 0

Section 1R18: Plant Modifications

Procedures

CC-AA-102, Design Input and Configuration Change Impact Screening, Revision 27

Miscellaneous

TDR 1227, Review of EMRV Test Results from Testing Performed at Wyle Labs, 4/2/1998

OC 07-00451, 204-42075: EMRV Spring Bracket with Guide Material Change, Revision 0

EC 14-00371, EMRV Solenoid Design Upgrade, Revision 0

Section 1R19: Post-Maintenance Testing

Procedures

MA-AA-716-012, Post Maintenance Testing, Revision 19 602.3.005, ADS Actuation Circuit Test and Calibration, Revision 34 636.4.003, Diesel Generator 1 Load Test, Revision 100 636.4.013, Diesel Generator 2 Load Test, Revision 42 665.5.006, Local Leak Rate Tests, Revision 51

Work Orders

C2032913

Condition Reports

1673665

1678550

1680869

1688756

1688727

1686101

1686767

1575377

1686101

1686135

1695955

1696895

1696438

1671539

1099299 2382430

Section 1R20: Refueling and Other Outage Activities

Procedures

203, Plant Shutdown, Revision 76

MA-OC-763-421, Nuclear Generator Disassembly, Inspection and Reassembly, Revision 1 131, Oyster Creek Load Lift Management Procedure, Revision 7

MA-AA-796-024, Scaffold Installation, Inspection, and Removal, Revision 9

MA-MA-796-024-1001, Scaffolding Criteria for the Mid Atlantic Stations, Revision 8

ABN-49, Loss of USS 1B3, Revision 7

Work Orders

C2028773 A2085476 A2268377

Attachment Condition Reports

2384030

2384036

2384008

2384007

2384004

2383967

2383947

2383946

2383893

2383889

2383877

2383691

2383687

2381794

2381792

2382555

2382551

2382476

2382165

2381310

2381267

2381018

2381388

2381310

2380943

2380939

2380923

2380924

2380925

2380927

2380931

2380934

2345642

2345116

2345085

2264927

2383174

2383153

2383001

2383041

2384039

2384035

2381420

2381033

2381516

2382227

2382580

2381928

2384769

2385320

2385268

2384961

2384931

2384908

2384856

2384786

2384746

2384772

2387288

2387297

2387299

2387302

2387351

2387371

2387393

2387275

2387282

2388916

2388741

2388737

2388392

2388352

2388222

2388179

2388150

2387995

2386958

2386974

2387050

2387054

2387128

2387132

2387142

2387167

2387168

2387169

2387170

2387187

2387212

2387239

2387244

2387260

2387271

2387251

2386495

2385829

2385799

2385717

2385592

2385501

2385858

2385855

2385853

2385737

2385726

2385656

2385620

2385557

2385500

2385458

2385370

2384780

2384761

2384705

2384712

2384768

2384948

2385163

2385319

2385316

2385172

2384783

2385128

2384779

2385321

2385323

2386510

2386507

2386491

2386490

2386486

2386483

2386411

2386336

2386319

2386063

2385969

2385958

2385878

2386482

2386480

2386419

2386417

2386416

2386339

2386337

2386335

2386306

2386208

2386186

2386151

2385903

2383712

2383714

2383758

2383993

2381157

2382341

2382358

2383761

2383775

2383765

2383064

2383107

2383756

2382954

2381937

2381941

2381942

2381425

2381424

2363437

2382943

2383948

2345243

2380937

2381348

2381410

2382859

2383185

2382548

2383401

2383396

2383393

2382722

2383112

2387588

2387610

2387995

2385903

2380831

2380915

2383832

2383831

2383817

2383265

2383852

2383820

Miscellaneous

MRP Associates Inc. letter, MPR Independent Review of Oyster Creek Bridge Crane for 165 Ton Planned Engineered Lift of Turbine Rotor, dated September 27, 2014 Shutdown Safety Review, Main Generator Rotor Heavy Lift (1R25), Revision 1, dated September 27, 2014 Event Notice 50476 oling Pump Degradation Oyster Creek Generating Station 1R25 Refueling Outage Shutdown Safety Plan, Revision 2 1R25 Outage Risk Analysis Report, dated September 14, 2014

Section 1R22: Surveillance Testing

Procedures

610.4.003, Core Spray Valve Operability and In-Service Test, Revision 44 610.4.022, Core Spray System 2 Pump Operability and Quarterly In-Service Test, Revision 29 665.5.006, Local Leak Rate Tests, Revision 51

Attachment

Drawings

GE885D781, Core Spray System Flow Diagram, Sheet 1, Revision 71

Work Orders

R22422210 R2242220 R2212212

Condition Reports

2382430

Miscellaneous

Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Section 6.3.1.3, Core Spray System, Revision 18 Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Technical Specification 4.4, Emergency Cooling, Amendment 271

Section 1EP2: Alert and Notification System Evaluation

Procedures

EP-MA-121-1002, Exelon East Alert Notification System (ANS) Program, Revision 9

EP-MA-121-1003, Exelon East ANS Siren Monitoring, Troubleshooting, and Testing ASC ANS Systems, Revision 3

EP-MA-121-1004, Exelon East ANS Corrective Maintenance, Revision 5

EP-MA-121-1005, Exelon East ANS Preventative Maintenance Program, Revision 6

Condition Reports

1527756

1530874

1532881

1533033

1533716

1534317

1553190

1553234

1553424

1667470

Miscellaneous

EP-MA-121-1005, Attachment 2, ANS Preventive Maintenance Checklist for Sirens 11, 32, and 34, dated February 29, 21, and 25, 2013

Letter from FEMA Region II to NJ OEM, REP Unit, re Backup Alert and Notification System for Oyster Creek Generating Station Emergency Planning Zone, dated December 6, 2012 Letter from FEMA Region II to NJ State Police, Emergency Management Section, re: Oyster Creek Generating Station ANS Design Report, Revision 0, dated October 4, 2013 Oyster Creek Generating Station Public Alert and Notification System Design Report, dated May 10, 2013

Section 1EP3: Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation System

Procedures

EP-AA-1010, Radiological Emergency Plan Annex for Oyster Creek Station, Revision 8

EP-AA-1010, Addendum 1, Oyster Creek Station On-Shift Staffing Technical Basis, Revision 0

EP-AA-112-100-F-06, ERO Notification or Augmentation, Revision Q

EP-AA-121-1001, Automated Call-Out System Maintenance, Revision 7

OP-OC-100-101, Shift Coverage Guidelines, Revision 8

OP-OC-100-1001, Shift Coverage Log, Revision 16

TQ-AA-113, ERO Training and Qualification, Revision 23

Attachment Condition Reports

1429882

1491029

1648164

1657677

1665149

1665293

Drill Reports Unannounced Call-In Augmentation Drill Reports:

2013-04, 2013-06, 2013-08, 2014-01, 2014-05, and 2014-07

Miscellaneous

Oyster Creek Team Roster Report, dated September 23, 2014

Section 1EP4: Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes

Miscellaneous

Letter from J. Barstow (Exelon Generation Company, LLC) to:

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E

Evacuation Time Estimate Analysis Information for Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station and Three Mile Island Nuclear Station," dated April 4, 2014 [ML14101A164]

Section 1EP5: Maintenance of Emergency Preparedness

Procedures

EMG-3200.11, Secondary Containment Control, Revision 13

EP-AA-120-1001, 10

CFR 50.54(q) Change Evaluation, Revision 7

EP-AA-121, Emergency Response Facilities and Equipment Readiness, Revision 12

EP-AA-121-F-10, Oyster Creek Equipment Matrix, Revision 1

EP-MA-114-100, Mid-Atlantic State/Local Notifications, Revision 20

EP-MA-124-1001, Facilities Inventories and Equipment Tests, Revision 10

LS-AA-104-1002, 50.59 Applicability Review Form, Revision 5

PI-AA-120, Issue Identification and Screening Process, Revision 1 Oyster Creek Generating Station Procedure 420, Instrumentation Setpoints, Revision 14

Condition Reports

0238446

1433589

1438411

1488910

1497636

1548471

1551802

1557600

1636722

1639140

1696826

1635671

2384746

2385620

1649004

1665151

1665474

1695635

1696826

1635745

Audits & Self Assessments

NOSA-OYS-13-03, Emergency Preparedness Audit Report, dated April 30, 2013

NOSA-OYS-14-03, Emergency Preparedness Audit Report, dated April 23, 2014

Miscellaneous

KLD

TR-629, Oyster Creek Generating Station Development of Evacuation Time Estimates, dated March 20, 2014 Letter from D. M. Gullott (Exelon Generation Company, LLC) to:

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "10

CFR 50 Appendix E -

Evacuation Time Estimate Analysis for Three Mile Island Nuclear Station," dated

December 12, 2012 [ML123550293] Letter from D. M. Gullott (Exelon Generation Company, LLC) to:

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "10

CFR 50 Appendix E - Evacuation Time Estimate Analysis Checklists," dated January 23, 2013 [ML13024A209]

Attachment Letter from J. Barstow (Exelon Generation Company, LLC) to:

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "10

CFR 50, Appendix E -

Evacuation Time Estimate Analysis Supplemental Response for Braidwood Station, Byron Station, Clinton Power Station, Dresden Nuclear Power Station, LaSalle County Station, Limerick Generating Station, Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Quad Cities Nuclear Powe5, 2013 [ML13254A112] Letter from J. Barstow (Exelon Generation Company, LLC) to:

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "10

CFR 50, Appendix E

Evacuation Time Estimate Analysis Information for Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station and Three Mile Island Nuclear Station," dated April 4, 2014 [ML14101A164] Oyster Creek Emergency Plan Component Work Status Report, dated 9/24/14 Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station, 05/28/2014, Notice of Unusual Event Report, (2014-05), dated June 23, 2014

Surveillances 621.3.024, Stack RAGEMS Sample and Effluent Flow

Functional Test, performed January 10, 2014 and July 9, 2014

EP-MA-124-1001-F-04, Operations Support Center Inventory, dated February 3, 2014

EP-MA-124-1001-F-05, Field Team Inventory, dated October 31, 2012

EP-MA-124-1001-F-32, OCGS Hospital Inventory, dated February 26, 2013

Section 2RSO1:

Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

RP-AA-14, Radioactive Material Control Program Description, Revision

RP-AA-18, Radiological Posting and Labeling Program Description, Revision 1

RP-AA-19, High Radiation Area Program Description, Revision 2

RP-AA-203-1001, Personnel Exposure Investigations, Revision 6

RP-AA-300, Radiological Survey Program, Revision 9

RP-AA-300-1005, Removing Items from the Spent Fuel Pool, Reactor Cavity and Equipment Pit, Revision 0

RP-AA-302, Determination of Alpha Levels and Monitoring, Revision 5

RP-AA-350, Personnel Contamination Monitoring, Decontamination and Reporting, Revision 11

RP-AA-376, Radiological Postings, Labeling and Markings, Revision 8

RP-AA-376-1001, Radiological Postings, Labeling and Marking Standard, Revision 7

RP-AA-376-2001, Labeling Containers and Marking Material for Radiological Purposes, Revision 0

RP-AA-402-1002, Radiological Risk Management, Revision 4

RP-AA-460, Controls for High and Locked High Radiation Areas, Revision 25

RP-AA-460-002, Additional High Radiation Exposure Control, Revision 1

RP-AA-460-003, Access to HRAs/LHRAs and VHRA and Contaminated Areas, Revision 5

RP-AA-500, Radioactive Material (RAM) Control, Revision 15

RP-AA-500-1001, Requirements for Radioactive Material Stored Outdoors, Revision 3

RP-AA-500-1002, Incoming Survey Requirements for Non-Radioactive Tools and Equipment, Revision 1

RP-AA-503, Unconditional Release Survey Method, Revision 5

RP-AA-503-F-01, Unconditional Release Instructions Using SAM for Personnel Items used in the RCA but not in Contaminated Areas, Revision 0

RP-AA-800, Control, Inventory, and Leak Testing of Radioactive Sources, Revision 7

RP-AA-1015, Control of Drinking Water Stations in Radiological Controlled Areas, Revision 1

Attachment Audits, Self-Assessments, and Surveillances

Check In Self-Assessment

1459423, Nuclear Regulatory Commission Outage HP Inspection, dated June 19, 2013 Check In Self-Assessment

1459423, Nuclear Regulatory Commission Outage HP Inspection, dated July 30, 2014

NOS-OYS-13-06, Radiation Protection Audit, dated August 28, 2013

NOSCPA-OC-14-07, Oyster Creek Radiation Protection Performance Report, dated April 17, 2014

Condition Reports

1609182

1631206

1632468

1660734

1661413

1663763

2383020

2383255

2381738

1696800

Miscellaneous

Oyster Creek Final Safety Analysis Report OCGS Rad Survey

RBS-14-01859, RB Top of Torus, August 14, 2014 OCGS Rad Survey

RBS-14-01118, RB Top of Torus, May 13, 2014 OC

RWP 14-00406-1 Refueling Floor Activities, August 12, 2014 OC

RWP 14-00508, 1 R 25 Drywell Scaffolding, August 13, 2014 OC

RWP 14-00511, 1 R 25 DW CRD Exchange Activities and Support, June 20, 2014

OC

RWP 14-00519, 1 R 25 DW ISI, IGSSC, FAC Inspection Including Weld Crown Reduction, August 12, 2014 OC

RWP 14-00505, 1 R 25 DW Ops, Rad Pro, Service and Observations, June 20, 2014 OC Personnel Exposure Investigation 14-035, Electronic Dosimeter Alarm, September 22, 2014

OC Locked High Radiation Area Key List, September 23, 2014 OC Radiological Survey 14-02166

RB 119 West Refuel Floor Area, September 14, 2014 OC Radiological Survey 14-02391

RB 119 West Refuel Floor General Area, September 19, 2014 OC Radiological Survey 14-02454

DW 23 V-1-8 Main Steam Isolation Valve, September 21, 2014 OC Radiological Survey 14-02492

DW 23 V-1-8 Main Steam Isolation Valve, September 21, 2014

Section 2RSO2:

Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls

Procedures

RP-AA-16, ALARA Program Description, Revision 0

RP-AA-400-1005, ALARA Suggestion Program, Revision 0

RP-AA-400-1006, Outage Exposure Estimating and Tracking, Revision 3

RP-AA-400-1007, Elevated Dose Rate Response Planning, Revision 0

RP-AA-400-1008, Exposure Goal Recovery Plans, Revision 0

RP-AA-400-1009, Remote Monitoring System, Revision 0

RP-OC-402, Use of Temporary Shielding, Revision 0

CY-AB-120-1000, BWR Strategic Water Chemistry Plan, Revision 11

Condition Reports

1603581

1625662

1687571

1681930

1681942

2383889

Attachment Miscellaneous:

Oyster Creek Final Safety Analysis Report OC RO25 ALARA System Flush Plan, September 23, 2014 OC

RP-AA-401 Attachment 2 ALARA Plan 14-519 RO25 Drywell

ISI-IGSSC-FAC Inspections OC

RP-AA-401 Attachment 2 ALARA Plan 14-508 RO25 Drywell Scaffolding OC

RP-AA-401 Attachment 2 ALARA Plan 14-406 RO25 Rx Disassembly, Refuel, Inspection Reassembly OC

RP-AA-401 Attachment 2 ALARA Plan 14-511 RO2 CRD Exchange and CRD Support Work

RP-AA-401, Operational ALARA Planning and Control, Revision 15

RP-AA-402, Radiation Protection Dose Excellence Planning Process, Revision 3

RP-AA-400, ALARA Program, Revision 11

RP-AA-400-1004, Emergent Dose Control and Authorization, Revision 5 OC

RP-AA-401 Attachment 7 ALARA Work In Progress Review 1R25 Drywell

ISI-IGSSC-FAC

Inspections September 19, 2014 OC

RP-AA-401 Attachment 7 ALARA Work In Progress Review 1R25 Scaffolding, September 21, 2014 OC

RP-AA-401 Attachment 7 ALARA Work In Progress Review 1R25 CRD Exchange and CRD

Support, September 21, 2014 OC

RP-AA-401 Attachment 7 ALARA Work In Progress Review 1R25 Rx Disassembly, Refuel,

Inspection and Reassembly, September 19, 2014 OC Radiological Survey 14-025 76 Drywell BRAC Radiation Buildup Survey, September 23, 2014 OC Radiation Protection 01R24-2012 Refueling Outage Report, February 2013

Section 2RSO3:

In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation

Procedures:

RP-AA-013, Respiratory Protection Program Description, Revision 0

RP-AA-224, CEDE Dose Tracking Using Lapel Air Samplers, Revision 1

RP-AA-229, Fastscan ABACOS Plus Whole Body Counter Calibration, Revision 1

RP-AA-301, Radiological Air Sampling Program, Revision 8

RP-AA-302, Determination of Alpha Levels and Monitoring, Revision 7

RP-AA-440, Respiratory Protection Program, Revision 10

RP-AA-441, Evaluation and Selection of Respiratory Protection Usage, Revision 4

RP-AA-443, Quantitative Respirator Fit Testing, Revision 12

RP-AA-700-1301, Calibration, Source Check, Operation and Set-up of the Eberline Beta Air Monitor Model

AMS-4, Revision 1

RP-AA-825, Maintenance Care and Inspection of Respiratory Protective Equipment, Revision 6

RP-AA-825-1011, Inspection and use of Mururoa V4 and V4 F1 Air Supplied Suits, Revision 5

RP-AA-825-1014, Operation and Inspection of 3M VersafloTR-300 PAPR System, Revision 2

RP-AA-825-1020, Operation and Use of Supplied Air Respirators, Revision 0

RP-AA-825-1035, Issue and Control of Respirators, Revision 1

RP-AA-870-1002, Use of Vacuum Cleaners in Radiological Controlled Areas, Revision 3

RP-AA-870-1003, Testing Portable HEPA Filter Units, Revision 0

RP-AA-870-1001, Set-up and Operation of Portable Air Filtration Equipment, Revision 3

Audits, Self-Assessments, and Surveillances: Focused Area Self-assessment

AR 1611319, ALARA Dosimetry, 1R25 Pre NRC Inspection, July 30, 2014

Attachment Condition Reports:

2060042

Miscellaneous: Oyster Creek Final Safety Analysis Report

RP-AA-301, Attachment 2 Airborne Radioactivity Calculation Sheet, Sample # 14-1310, Turbine Building Condenser Bay, dated September 20, 2014

RP-AA-301, Attachment 2 Airborne Radioactivity Calculation Sheet, Sample # 14-1379, Turbine Building Condenser Bay: T-1-1 Moisture Separator, dated September 21, 2014

RP-AA-301, Attachment 2 Airborne Radioactivity Calculation Sheet, Sample # 14-1190, Turbine Building Heater Bay: 1-3 East Reheater Upper Manway, dated September 18, 2014

RP-AA-301, Attachment 2 Airborne Radioactivity Calculation Sheet, Sample # 14-ISI Prep on B Recirc Pump Line, dated September 26, 2014

RP-AA-301, Attachment 2 Airborne Radioactivity Calculation Sheet, Sample # 14-B Recirc Line Grinding, dated September 27, 2014

RP-AA-870-1001 Attachment 3 Sample HEPA Issue and Return Log, dated September 11, 2014

RP-AA-870-1002 Attachment 1 HEPA Vacuum Issue Log, dated September 22, 2014

RP-AA-825-1013 Attachment 2 3M Air Mate Inspection and issue Log, dated September 20, 2014

RP-AA-825-1011 Attachment 3 Muroa Air Fed Suit Inspection and Issue Log, dated September 21, 2014

RP-AA-825-1035 Attachment 1 Respirator Issue Log, dated September 21, 2014 Stan Hope Associates Certificate of Calibration 20142318-69477, TSI Portacount Leak Testing System Model 8020, Serial No.

80215961, dated July 17, 2014 Stan Hope Associates Certificate of Calibration 20142433-69873, TSI Portacount Leak Testing System Model 8020, Serial No. 15965, dated August 12, 2014

RP-AA-441 Attachment 2 TEDE ALARA Evaluation Screening Worksheet for

RO 25 Drywell MSIV Repair, dated March 10, 2014

RP-AA-441 Attachment 2 TEDE ALARA Evaluation Screening Worksheet for RO25 Cavity Decon and Coating, dated September 11, 2014

RP-AA-441 Attachment 2 TEDE ALARA Evaluation Screening Worksheet for E Recic Pump Seal Replacement, dated April 21, 2014

RP-AA-441 Attachment 2 TEDE ALARA Evaluation Screening Worksheet for E Recic Pump Seal Rebuild, dated May 6, 2014

RP-AA-441 Attachment 2 TEDE ALARA Evaluation Screening Worksheet for E Recic Pump Seal Replacement, dated May 6, 2014

Section 2RSO4:

Occupational Dose Assessment

Procedures:

RP-AA-203, Exposure Control and Authorization, Revision 3

RP-AA-203-1001, Personnel Exposure Investigations, Revision 6

RP-AA-208, Occupational Exposure Reporting, Revision 8

RP-AA-210, Dosimetry Issue, Usage and Control, Revision 23

RP-AA-210-1001, Dosimetry Logs and Forms, Revision 7

RP-AA-210-1003, REMs Access Control System Outage Guidance, Revision 0

RP-AA-211, Personnel Dosimetry Performance Verification, Revision 10

RP-AA-270, Prenatal Radiation Exposure, Revision 6

RP-AA-220, Bioassay Program, Revision 10

RP-AA-220-1001, Collection and Handling of In Vitro Bioassay, Revision 1

Attachment

RP-AA-221, Whole Body Count Data Review, Revision 1

RP-AA-222, Methods for Estimating Internal Exposure from In Vivo and In Vitro Bioassay Data, Revision 5

RP-AA-224, CEDE Tracking Using Lapel Air Samples, Revision 1

RP-AA-350, Personnel Contamination Monitoring, Decontamination and Reporting, Revision 11

RP-OC-230, Operation of the Canberra FastScan Whole Body Counter using

APEX-INVIVO, Revision 0

Audits, Self-Assessments, and Surveillances: Focused Area Self-assessment

AR 1611319, ALARA Dosimetry, 1R25 Pre NRC Inspection, dated July 30, 2014

Condition Reports

2383174

23831393

Miscellaneous: Oyster Creek Final Safety Analysis Report

RP-AA-203, Attachment 1 Dose Control Level Extension Form, P. Mahoney, dated September 9, 2014 Radiation Protection Calculation 14-010, Whole Body Count Calibration Report 2014, dated September 14, 2014

Section 4OA1: Performance Indicator Verification

Procedures

EP-AA-125-1001, EP Performance Indicator Guidance, Revision 7

EP-AA-125-1002, ERO Performance

Performance Indicators Guidance, Revision 9

ABN-1, Reactor Scram, Revision 11

Condition Reports

1576230

Miscellaneous

NUREG 1022, Reporting Requirements, Revision 3 Various Operator Logs from April 1, 2013 to March 31, 2014

NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7 ANS Reliability PI data, October 2013

June 2014 DEP PI data, October 2013

June 2014 ERO Drill Participation PI data, October 2013

June 2014

Section 4OA2: Problem Identification and Resolution

Procedures

PI-AA-125, Corrective Action Program Procedure, Revision 0

ABN-1, Reactor Scram, Revision 11 201, Plant Startup, Revision 93

Attachment

Section 4OA3: Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion

Procedures

PI-AA-125, Corrective Action Program Procedure, Revision 0

ABN-1, Reactor Scram, Revision 11 201, Plant Startup, Revision 93

Condition Reports

1568503

1680766

1681506

1680755

1681717

Work Orders

C2032482

Section 4OA5: Other Activities

Miscellaneous

Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station February 2014 Evaluation Final Report

LIST OF ACRONYMS

10 CFR Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations

ADAMS Agencywide Documents Access and Management System

ALARA As Low As Reasonably Achievable

ANS Alert and Notification System

CRD Control Rod Drive

EP Emergency Preparedness

EPIP Emergency Preparedness Implementing Procedure

ERF Emergency Response Facilities

ERO Emergency Response Organization

ETE Evacuation Time Estimate Exelon Exelon Nuclear

FAC Flow Accelerated Corrosion

ISI In-Service Inspection

HRA High Radiation Area

IGSSC Inter Granular Stress Corrosion Cracking

IMC Inspection Manual Chapter

INPO Institute of Nuclear Power Operations

LHRA Locked High Radiation Area

NCV Non-Cited Violation

NEI Nuclear Energy Institute

NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission

NSIR Nuclear Security and Incident Response, Office of

NUREG [[]]

NRC technical report designation (Nuclear Regulatory Commission)

ORO Offsite Response Organization

RCS Reactor Coolant System

RG Regulatory Guide

RP Radiological Protection

RWP Radiation Work Permit

SDP Significance Determination Process

UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report