ML18025B418

NRC Integrated Inspection Report and Emergency Preparedness Annual Inspection Report 05000254/2017004; 05000265/2017004; 05000254/2017501 and 05000265/2017501

ML18025B418
Person / Time
Site:	Quad Cities
Issue date:	01/25/2018
From:	Karla Stoedter NRC/RGN-III/DRP/B1
To:	Bryan Hanson Exelon Generation Co, Exelon Nuclear
References
IR 2017004, IR 2017501
Download: ML18025B418 (47)

See also: IR 05000254/2017004

Text

first initial,

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

2443 WARRENVILLE RD. SUITE 210

LISLE, IL 60532-4352

January 25, 2018

Mr. Bryan C. Hanson

Senior VP, Exelon Generation Company, LLC

President and CNO, Exelon Nuclear

4300 Winfield Road

Warrenville, IL 60555

SUBJECT: QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2NRC

INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

ANNUAL INSPECTION REPORT 05000254/2017004; 05000265/2017004;

05000254/2017501 AND 05000265/2017501

Dear Mr. Hanson:

On December 31, 2017, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an

integrated inspection at your Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2. On

January 3, 2018, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. H. Dodd

and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed

report. The NRC also completed its annual inspection of the Emergency Preparedness

Program, which began on January 1, 2017, and the issuance of this letter closes Inspection

Report 05000254/2017501; 05000265/2017501.

Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC inspectors did not identify any findings or

violations of more than minor significance.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection

and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document

Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Request for

Withholding.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Karla Stoedter, Chief

Branch 1

Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos. 50-254; 50-265

License Nos. DPR-29; DPR-30

Enclosure:

IR 05000254/2017004; 05000265/2017004;

05000254/2017501; 05000265/2017501

cc: Distribution via LISTSERV

Letter to Bryan C. Hanson from Karla Stoedter dated January 25, 2018

SUBJECT: QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2NRC

INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

ANNUAL INSPECTION REPORT 05000254/2017004; 05000265/2017004;

05000254/2017501 AND 05000265/2017501

DISTRIBUTION:

Jeremy Bowen

RidsNrrDorlLpl3

RidsNrrPMQuadCities Resource

RidsNrrDirsIrib Resource

Steven West

Darrell Roberts

Richard Skokowski

Allan Barker

Carole Ariano

Linda Linn

DRPIII

DRSIII

ROPreports.Resource@nrc.gov

ADAMS Accession Number: ML18025B418

OFFICE RIII

NAME KStoedter:bw

DATE 1/25/2018

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Docket Nos: 50-254; 50-265

License Nos: DPR-29; DPR-30

Report No: 05000254/2017004; 05000265/2017004

05000254/2017501; 05000265/2017501

Licensee: Exelon Generation Company, LLC

Facility: Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2

Location: Cordova, IL

Dates: October 1 through December 31, 2017

Inspectors: R. Murray, Senior Resident Inspector

K. Carrington, Resident Inspector

J. Beavers, Health Physicist

B. Bergeon, Operations Engineer

J. Cassidy, Senior Health Physicist

N. Fields, Health Physicist

M. Garza, Emergency Preparedness Inspector

V. Meghani, Reactor Inspector

K. Walton, Senior Operations Engineer

Approved by: K. Stoedter, Chief

Branch 1

Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUMMARY .................................................................................................................................... 2

REPORT DETAILS ....................................................................................................................... 3

Summary of Plant Status ........................................................................................................... 3

1. REACTOR SAFETY ........................................................................................... 3

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01) ..................................................... 3

1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04) ................................................................ 4

1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05) ........................................................................... 5

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11) ............................. 6

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12) ..................................................... 11

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13) 11

1R15 Operability Determinations and Functional Assessments (71111.15) ....... 12

1R18 Plant Modifications (71111.18) .................................................................. 13

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19) ...................................................... 14

1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22) ................................................................ 15

1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes (71114.04) ........ 16

1EP6 Drill Evaluation (71114.06) ........................................................................ 17

2. RADIATION SAFETY ....................................................................................... 17

2RS2 Occupational As-Low-As-Reasonably-Achievable Planning and Controls

(71124.02) ................................................................................................. 17

2RS5 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation (71124.05) ..................................... 19

2RS7 Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (71124.07) .................... 21

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES ........................................................................................ 22

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151) ............................................... 22

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152) .................................... 24

4OA3 Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion (71153) ....... 26

4OA5 Other Activities .......................................................................................... 28

4OA6 Management Meetings .............................................................................. 29

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION ............................................................................................... 2

Key Points of Contact ................................................................................................................ 2

List of Items Opened, Closed, and Discussed........................................................................... 2

List of Documents Reviewed ..................................................................................................... 3

List of Acronyms Used ............................................................................................................ 14

SUMMARY

Inspection Report 05000254/2017004, 05000265/2017004; 10/01/2017 - 12/31/2017;

05000254/2017501, 05000265/2017501; 01/01/2017-12/31/2017; Quad Cities Nuclear Power

Station, Units 1 and 2; Routine Integrated Inspection Report.

This report covers a 3-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced

baseline inspections by regional inspectors. The significance of inspection findings is indicated

by their color (i.e., greater than Green, or Green, White, Yellow, Red) and determined using

Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, "Significance Determination Process," dated

April 29, 2015. Cross-cutting aspects are determined using IMC 0310, "Aspects within the

Cross-Cutting Areas," dated December 4, 2014. All violations of NRC requirements are

dispositioned in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy, dated November 1, 2016. The

NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is

described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 6.

A. NRC-Identified and Self-Revealed Findings

No findings were identified during this inspection.

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REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

Unit 1

The unit operated at or near full power from October 1 to October 30, 2017. On

October 30, 2017, operators reduced power to 68.5 percent core thermal power in response to

an unanticipated automatic closure of main turbine control valve number 1. Following repairs to

a loose electro-hydraulic control (EHC) system servo cable connection, the unit was returned to

full power on October 31, 2017. On November 16, 2017, operators reduced power to

68 percent core thermal power to respond to unanticipated alarms and impending closure of

main turbine control valve number 1. Following repairs, which included lock-wire installation on

all EHC system servo cable connections to turbine control valves, the unit was returned to full

power on November 17, 2017, and remained at or near full power through the end of the

inspection period. Operating at or near full power includes planned power reductions for

turbine testing, control rod pattern adjustments, and other short-term power changes as

requested by the transmission system operator.

Unit 2

The unit operated at or near full power for the entire inspection period with the exception of

planned power reductions for turbine testing, control rod pattern adjustments and other

short-term power changes as requested by the transmission system operator.

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity,

Emergency Preparedness

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01)

Readiness for Impending Adverse WeatherFish Intrusion in the Intake Bay and the

Crib House

a. Inspection Scope

During the week of December 18, 2017, the inspectors observed the licensees activities

associated with readiness and corrective actions in response to an unusual amount of

Gizzard Shad, which had infiltrated the stations intake bay, and affected the Unit 2

traveling water screens in the crib house and also had a noticeable effect on the Unit 2

main condenser differential pressure. The inspectors observed pre-job, pre-shift, and

control room briefings to determine whether the briefings met licensee standards. The

inspectors reviewed licensee procedures for responding to traveling screen high

differential pressure alarms and procedures for directing reversal of flow to the main

condenser. The inspectors also discussed potential compensatory measures with

control room personnel. Finally, the inspectors periodically reviewed licensee activities

and data collection as specified by licensee procedures to determine whether the fish

intrusion and associated effects were being adequately monitored. The inspectors also

reviewed corrective action program (CAP) items to verify that the licensee was

identifying adverse weather/environmental issues at an appropriate threshold and

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entering them into their CAP in accordance with station corrective action procedures.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This activity constituted one readiness for impending adverse weather condition sample

as defined in Inspection Procedure (IP) 71111.01-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04)

Quarterly Partial System Walkdowns

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed partial system walkdowns of the following risk-significant

systems:

• Unit 1 reactor core isolation cooling system following planned maintenance;

• Unit 1 and Unit 1/2 emergency diesel generator (EDG) systems during Unit 2

EDG planned maintenance; and

• Unit 2 high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system during safe shutdown

makeup pump (SSMP) system planned maintenance.

The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk significance relative to the

Reactor Safety cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors attempted

to identify any discrepancies that could impact the function of the system and, therefore,

potentially increase risk. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures,

system diagrams, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Technical

Specification (TS) requirements, outstanding work orders (WOs), condition reports, and

the impact of ongoing work activities on redundant trains of equipment in order to identify

conditions that could have rendered the systems incapable of performing their intended

functions. The inspectors also walked down accessible portions of the systems to verify

system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and operable.

The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed

operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no obvious deficiencies.

The inspectors also verified that the licensee had properly identified and resolved

equipment alignment problems that could cause initiating events or impact the capability

of mitigating systems or barriers and entered them into the CAP with the appropriate

significance characterization. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this

report.

These activities constituted three partial system walkdown samples as defined in

IP 71111.04-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

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1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05)

Routine Resident Inspector Tours (71111.05Q)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted fire protection walkdowns which were focused on availability,

accessibility, and the condition of firefighting equipment in the following risk-significant

plant areas:

• Fire Zone (FZ) 5.0, Unit 2 Turbine Building, Elevation 595-0, Safe Shutdown

Pump Room;

• FZ 11.1.4, Unit 2 Reactor Building, Elevation 544-0, HPCI Pump Room;

• FZ 1.1.1.1, Unit 1 Turbine Building, Elevation 5950, Diesel Generator Room;

and

• FZ 1.1.2.1, Unit 1 Reactor Building, Elevation 5540, Top of Torus Area.

The inspectors reviewed areas to assess if the licensee had implemented a fire

protection program that adequately controlled combustibles and ignition sources within

the plant, effectively maintained fire detection and suppression capability, maintained

passive fire protection features in good material condition, and implemented adequate

compensatory measures for out-of-service, degraded or inoperable fire protection

equipment, systems, or features in accordance with the licensees fire plan.

The inspectors selected fire areas based on their overall contribution to internal fire risk

as documented in the plants Individual Plant Examination of External Events with later

additional insights, their potential to impact equipment which could initiate or mitigate a

plant transient, or their impact on the plants ability to respond to a security event.

Using the documents listed in the Attachment to this report, the inspectors verified that

fire hoses and extinguishers were in their designated locations and available for

immediate use; that fire detectors and sprinklers were unobstructed; that transient

material loading was within the analyzed limits; and fire doors, dampers, and penetration

seals appeared to be in satisfactory condition. The inspectors also verified that minor

issues identified during the inspection were entered into the licensees CAP.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

These activities constituted four quarterly fire protection inspection samples as defined in

IP 71111.05-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

Annual Fire Protection Drill Observation (71111.05A)

a. Inspection Scope

On September 26 and October 4, 2017, the inspectors observed two fire brigade

activations for a report of smoke in cabling for the Unit 1 motor control center (MCC)

18/19-5 and a report of smoke coming from the Unit 2 condensate pit man-lift,

respectively. Based on these observations, the inspectors evaluated the readiness of

the plant fire brigade to fight fires. The inspectors verified that the licensee staff

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identified deficiencies openly, discussed them in a self-critical manner at the drill debrief,

and took appropriate corrective actions. Specific attributes evaluated were:

• proper wearing of turnout gear and self-contained breathing apparatus;

• proper use and layout of fire hoses;

• employment of appropriate firefighting techniques;

• sufficient firefighting equipment brought to the scene;

• effectiveness of fire brigade leader communications, command, and control;

• search for victims and propagation of the fire into other plant areas;

• smoke removal operations;

• utilization of pre-planned strategies;

• adherence to the pre-planned drill scenario; and

• drill objectives.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

These activities constituted one annual fire protection inspection sample as defined in

IP 71111.05-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11)

Resident Inspector Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Requalification (71111.11Q)

a. Inspection Scope

On November 7, 2017, the inspectors observed two crews of licensed operators in the

plants simulator during licensed operator requalification training. The inspectors verified

that operator performance was adequate, evaluators were identifying and documenting

crew performance problems, and that training was being conducted in accordance with

licensee procedures. The inspectors evaluated the following areas:

• licensed operator performance;

• crews clarity and formality of communications;

• ability to take timely actions in the conservative direction;

• prioritization, interpretation, and verification of annunciator alarms;

• correct use and implementation of abnormal and emergency procedures;

• control board manipulations;

• oversight and direction from supervisors; and

• ability to identify and implement appropriate TS actions.

The crews performance in these areas was compared to pre-established operator action

expectations and successful critical task completion requirements. Documents reviewed

are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This inspection constituted one quarterly licensed operator requalification (LOR)

program simulator sample as defined in IP 71111.11-05.

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b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Resident Inspector Quarterly Observation during Periods of Heightened Activity or Risk

(71111.11Q)

a. Inspection Scope

On October 31, 2017, the inspectors observed operators raise power from approximately

75 percent to full (100 percent) core thermal power on Unit 1 following an emergent load

reduction due to a spurious closure of turbine control valve number 1.

On December 11, 2017, the inspectors observed operators perform a pre-job brief and

secure the Unit 2 B stator cooling water pump to support an emergent pump

replacement.

During the week of December 17, 2017, the inspectors observed operators in the control

room, on several occasions, during the fish intrusion event that is discussed in

Section 1R01, which included multiple main condenser flow reversals.

These were activities that required heightened awareness or were related to increased

risk. The inspectors evaluated the following areas:

• licensed operator performance;

• crews clarity and formality of communications;

• ability to take timely actions in the conservative direction;

• prioritization, interpretation, and verification of annunciator alarms;

• correct use and implementation of procedures;

• control board and equipment manipulations;

• oversight and direction from supervisors; and

• ability to identify and implement appropriate TS actions.

The performance in these areas was compared to pre-established operator action

expectations, procedural compliance, and task completion requirements. Documents

reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This inspection constituted one quarterly licensed operator heightened activity/risk

sample as defined in IP 71111.11-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.3 Annual Operating Test Results (71111.11A)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the overall pass/fail results of the Annual Operating Test

and the Biennial Written Examination administered by the licensee from

October 9, 2017, through November 17, 2017, required by Title 10 of the Code of

Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 55.59(a). The results were compared to the thresholds

7

established in IMC 0609, Appendix I, Licensed Operator Requalification Significance

Determination Process (SDP), to assess the overall adequacy of the licensees

Licensed Operator Requalification Training (LORT) Program to meet the requirements of

10 CFR 55.59. (02.02)

This inspection constituted one annual licensed operator requalification examination

results sample as defined in IP 71111.11-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.4 Biennial Review (71111.11B)

a. Inspection Scope

The following inspection activities were conducted during the weeks of October 9 and

October 16, 2017, to assess: (1) the effectiveness and adequacy of the facility

licensees implementation and maintenance of its systems approach to training (SAT)

based LORT Program put into effect to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 55.59;

(2) conformance with the requirements of 10 CFR 55.46 for use of a plant referenced

simulator to conduct operator licensing examinations and for satisfying experience

requirements; and (3) conformance with the operator license conditions specified in

10 CFR 55.53. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

• Licensee Requalification Examinations (10 CFR 55.59(c); SAT Element 4 as

Defined in 10 CFR 55.4): The inspectors reviewed the licensees program for

development and administration of the LORT biennial written examination and

annual operating tests to assess the licensees ability to develop and administer

examinations that are acceptable for meeting the requirements of

10 CFR 55.59(a).

- The inspectors conducted a detailed review of one biennial requalification

written examination versions to assess content, level of difficulty, and quality

of the written examination materials. (02.03)

- The inspectors conducted a detailed review of ten job performance measures

and four simulator scenarios to assess content, level of difficulty, and quality

of the operating test materials. (02.04)

- The inspectors observed the administration of the annual operating test

to assess the licensees effectiveness in conducting the examination(s),

including the conduct of pre-examination briefings, evaluations of individual

operator and crew performance, and post-examination analysis. The

inspectors evaluated the performance of one crew in parallel with the facility

evaluators during two dynamic simulator scenarios, and evaluated various

licensed crew members concurrently with facility evaluators during the

administration of several job performance measures. (02.05)

- The inspectors assessed the adequacy and effectiveness of the remedial

training conducted since the last requalification examinations and the

training planned for the current examination cycle to ensure that they

addressed weaknesses in licensed operator or crew performance identified

during training and plant operations. The inspectors reviewed remedial

training procedures and individual remedial training plans. (02.07)

8

• Conformance with Examination Security Requirements (10 CFR 55.49):

The inspectors conducted an assessment of the licensees processes related

to examination physical security and integrity (e.g., predictability and bias) to

verify compliance with 10 CFR 55.49, Integrity of Examinations and Tests.

The inspectors observed the implementation of physical security controls

(e.g., access restrictions and simulator I/O controls) and integrity measures

(e.g., security agreements, sampling criteria, bank use, and test item repetition)

throughout the inspection period. (02.06)

• Conformance with Operator License Conditions (10 CFR 55.53): The inspectors

reviewed the facility licensee's program for maintaining active operator licenses

and to assess compliance with 10 CFR 55.53(e) and (f). The inspectors

reviewed the procedural guidance and the process for tracking on-shift hours

for licensed operators, and which control room positions were granted

watch-standing credit for maintaining active operator licenses. Additionally,

medical records for seven licensed operators were reviewed for compliance with

10 CFR 55.53(I). (02.08)

• Conformance with Simulator Requirements Specified in 10 CFR 55.46:

The inspectors assessed the adequacy of the licensees simulation facility

(simulator) for use in operator licensing examinations and for satisfying

experience requirements. The inspectors reviewed a sample of simulator

performance test records (e.g., transient tests, malfunction tests, scenario based

tests, post-event tests, steady state tests, and core performance tests), simulator

discrepancies, and the process for ensuring continued assurance of simulator

fidelity in accordance with 10 CFR 55.46. The inspectors reviewed and

evaluated the discrepancy corrective action process to ensure that simulator

fidelity was being maintained. Open simulator discrepancies were reviewed for

importance relative to the impact on 10 CFR 55.45 and 55.59 operator actions as

well as on nuclear and thermal hydraulic operating characteristics. (02.09)

• Problem Identification and Resolution (10 CFR 55.59(c); SAT Element 5 as

Defined in 10 CFR 55.4): The inspectors assessed the licensees ability to

identify, evaluate, and resolve problems associated with licensed operator

performance (a measure of the effectiveness of its LORT Program and their

ability to implement appropriate corrective actions to maintain its LORT Program

up to date). The inspectors reviewed documents related to licensed operator

performance issues (e.g., licensee condition/problem identification reports

including documentation of plant events and review of industry operating

experience from previous 2 years). The inspectors also sampled the licensees

quality assurance oversight activities, including licensee training department

self-assessment reports. (02.10)

This inspection constituted one Biennial LOR Program inspection sample as defined in

IP 71111.11-05.

b. Findings

Introduction: While performing an assessment of the licensees processes related

to examination physical security and integrity (e.g. predictability and bias) to verify

compliance with 10 CFR 55.49, Integrity of Examinations and Tests, the inspectors

9

identified that Quad Cities 2015 LOR written examinations were duplicated from the

2013 LOR examinations, that 2017 LOR written examinations were duplicated from the

2015 LOR examinations, and that four individuals were administered the same written

examinations from the previous exam cycle.

Description: The inspectors identified that, with few exceptions, the licensee had

duplicated or reused questions from the 2015 written exam when they created the

2017 written exam. The licensee created six LOR written exam versions (i.e., A-F), one

for each crew. For the 2017 biennial exam, the licensee essentially swapped exam

versions from 2015 that were given to each crew (i.e., the 2015 Version A was given to

crew B in 2017 and Version B was given to crew A, etc.). The inspectors noted that

no crew received the same exam version in 2017 as they did in 2015. However, due to

crew personnel adjustments/realignments, the inspectors requested the licensee to

investigate if, and how many, operators were going to receive the same exam in 2017 as

in 2015. The licensee identified that one reactor operator had already taken the same

exam in 2017 that they were given in 2015. In addition, the licensee also identified that

two additional licensed operators were scheduled to take the same exam they had taken

in 2015, but they had not yet been given the exam due to the exam schedule. After

discussing the issue and concern with the inspectors, the licensee decided to administer

those two individuals different exam versions to which they had not been previously

exposed. In addition, the inspectors inquired how long the particular set of exam

versions had been reused and swapped among the crews (i.e., before 2015). The

licensee reviewed biennial written exams in 2013 and 2011 and determined the exam

content was different and stated, there was no predictable pattern in exam versions.

After reviewing all of the 2013 exam versions, the inspectors identified that three

versions were a mixture of questions between reused and new questions. For example,

2013 Version A was a mixture of questions of 2015 exam Versions C and D and two

unique questions. The 2013 Version B was a mixture of 2015 Version C and D and

seven unique questions. The 2013 Version F was a mixture of 2015 D and F and five

unique questions. The three remaining versions from 2013 were replicated in 2015, but

given to different crews. The inspectors requested the licensee determine the number of

personnel that took the same exam in 2015 as in 2013, and the licensee identified three

individuals who were given the same exam in 2013 and 2015 (two senior reactor

operators and one reactor operator).

The inspectors are considering this issue to be an unresolved item (URI) concerning

whether the repeated use of a biennial written examination for sequential requalification

programs (consecutive 24 month periods), and the resulting predictability induced to the

examination process, constitutes a violation of 10 CFR 55.49, Integrity of Examinations

and Tests. The inspectors have requested the licensee provide the written

examinations in question to the inspectors for further review. The inspectors will review

individual questions of the written examinations in order to determine if there were

sufficient differences between the examinations to characterize the examinations as

either different or similar. The results of the review will be used to determine if a

violation of 10 CFR 55.49 requirements exists. (URI 05000254/2017004-01;

05000265/2017004-01: Repeat Use of Written Exams during Licensed Operator

Requalification Examinations)

10

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12)

Routine Quarterly Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated degraded performance issues involving the following

risk-significant systems:

• Units 1 and 2 standby liquid control systems, and

• SSMP system.

The inspectors reviewed events such as where ineffective equipment maintenance had

resulted in valid or invalid automatic actuations of engineered safeguards systems and

independently verified the licensee's actions to address system performance or condition

problems in terms of the following:

• implementing appropriate work practices;

• identifying and addressing common cause failures;

• scoping of systems in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(b) of the maintenance rule;

• characterizing system reliability issues for performance;

• charging unavailability for performance;

• trending key parameters for condition monitoring;

• ensuring 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) or (a)(2) classification or re-classification; and

• verifying appropriate performance criteria for structures, systems, and

components/functions classified as (a)(2), or appropriate and adequate goals and

corrective actions for systems classified as (a)(1).

The inspectors assessed performance issues with respect to the reliability, availability,

and condition monitoring of the system. In addition, the inspectors verified maintenance

effectiveness issues were entered into the CAP with the appropriate significance

characterization. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This inspection constituted two quarterly maintenance effectiveness samples defined in

IP 71111.12-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13)

Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's evaluation and management of plant risk for the

maintenance and emergent work activities affecting risk-significant and safety-related

equipment listed below to verify that the appropriate risk assessments were performed

prior to removing equipment for work:

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• Work Week 17-40-04: Unit 1/2 EDG system extended limiting condition for

operation due to emergent work activities and planned Unit 2 core spray system

maintenance;

• Work Week 17-42-06: Unit 2 EDG system planned maintenance, planned

secondary containment breaches resulting in both units online risk change to

yellow, and Unit 2 125 Vdc battery charger load test;

• Work Week 17-46-10: Unit 1 B low pressure coolant injection and residual

heat removal system planned maintenance resulting in online risk change to

yellow, 345 kV line planned maintenance, Units 1 and 2 reactor buildings

planned maintenance, and planned secondary containment breaches resulting in

both units online risk change to yellow; and

• Work Week 17-51-02: Unit 1 1A 125 Vdc battery charger system emergent

maintenance, and Unit 2 fish intrusion in intake bay.

These activities were selected based on their potential risk significance relative to the

Reactor Safety cornerstones. As applicable for each activity, the inspectors verified that

risk assessments were performed as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and were accurate

and complete. When emergent work was performed, the inspectors verified that the

plant risk was promptly reassessed and managed. The inspectors reviewed the scope

of maintenance work, discussed the results of the assessment with the licensee's

probabilistic risk analyst or shift technical advisor, and verified plant conditions were

consistent with the risk assessment. The inspectors also reviewed TS requirements and

walked down portions of redundant safety systems, when applicable, to verify risk

analysis assumptions were valid and applicable requirements were met. Documents

reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This inspection constituted four maintenance risk assessments and emergent work

control samples as defined in IP 71111.13-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R15 Operability Determinations and Functional Assessments (71111.15)

Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following issues:

• Issue Report (IR) 4059847: 1-7503 [Unit 1 standby gas treatment system

(SBGT) Reactor Building Inlet Valve] Failed to Close During QCOS 7500-08;

• IR 4062552: B Train CREV [control room emergency ventilation] Superheat

Value High;

• IR 4062754: 1A Core Spray Motor Bearing Oil Issue;

• IR 4066290: 1A SBLC Pump Accumulator Schraeder Valve is Stuck Open;

• IR 4072162: Unit 1 HPCI Did Not Trip During QCOS 2300-05;

• IR 4077502 and IR 4081377: MCC 18/19-5 Overvoltage Relay Target Lit (partial

sample); and

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• IR 4078677: EO ID [Equipment Operator Identified], Local Control Switch Would

Not Start the SSMP and IR 4078579: SSMP Reserve Feed MCR [Main Control

Room] Switch Will Not Close.

The inspectors selected these potential operability issues based on the risk significance

of the associated components and systems. The inspectors evaluated the technical

adequacy of the evaluations to ensure that TS operability was properly justified and the

subject component or system remained available such that no unrecognized increase in

risk occurred. The inspectors compared the operability and design criteria in the

appropriate sections of the TS and UFSAR to the licensees evaluations to determine

whether the components or systems were operable. Where compensatory measures

were required to maintain operability, the inspectors determined whether the measures

in place would function as intended and were properly controlled. The inspectors

determined, where appropriate, compliance with bounding limitations associated with the

evaluations. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sampling of corrective action

documents to verify that the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies

associated with operability evaluations. Documents reviewed are listed in the

Attachment to this report.

The inspectors documented one partial operability sample related to MCC 18/19-5

over-voltage relay. The inspection of this sample continued into the next inspection

period.

This operability inspection constituted six samples as defined in IP 71111.15-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R18 Plant Modifications (71111.18)

Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following modifications:

• Engineering Change 619131: U-1 HPCI Signal Converter Output Failed Alarm

Bypass, Revision 0; and

• Engineering Change 20370: Motor Control Center 18/19-5 Protective Relay

Modification.

The inspectors reviewed the configuration changes and associated 10 CFR 50.59 safety

evaluation screening against the design basis, the UFSAR, and the TS, as applicable, to

verify that the modification did not affect the operability or availability of the affected

systems. The inspectors, as applicable, observed ongoing and completed work

activities to ensure that the modifications were installed as directed and consistent with

the design control documents; the modifications operated as expected; post-modification

testing adequately demonstrated continued system operability, availability, and reliability;

and that operation of the modifications did not impact the operability of any interfacing

systems. As applicable, the inspectors verified that relevant procedure, design, and

licensing documents were properly updated. Lastly, the inspectors discussed the plant

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modification with operations, engineering, and training personnel to ensure that the

individuals were aware of how the operation with the plant modification in place could

impact overall plant performance. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to

this report.

This inspection constituted one temporary modification sample and one permanent plant

modification sample as defined in IP 71111.18-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19)

Post-Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following post-maintenance activities to verify that

procedures and test activities were adequate to ensure system operability and functional

capability:

• B CREV operability test following planned maintenance;

• Unit 1/2 EDG system testing and calibration following governor booster pump

and relay replacements and other 2-year planned maintenance;

• A SBGT auto start test, following relay replacement;

• Unit 1 station blackout diesel generator system post-maintenance testing

following 2-year planned maintenance activities;

• Unit 1 HPCI pump operability test, following solenoid valve SV 1-2301-8

replacement;

• Unit 2 Division I turbine first stage low pressure above setpoint calibration and

functional test, following pressure switch 2-0504-A replacement;

• SSMP system operability test following planned maintenance; and

• Unit 2 station blackout diesel generator system post-maintenance testing

following 2-year planned maintenance.

These activities were selected based upon the structure, system, or component's ability

to impact risk. The inspectors evaluated these activities for the following (as applicable):

the effect of testing on the plant had been adequately addressed; testing was adequate

for the maintenance performed; acceptance criteria were clear and demonstrated

operational readiness; test instrumentation was appropriate; tests were performed as

written in accordance with properly reviewed and approved procedures; equipment was

returned to its operational status following testing (temporary modifications or jumpers

required for test performance were properly removed after test completion); and test

documentation was properly evaluated. The inspectors evaluated the activities against

TSs, the UFSAR, 10 CFR Part 50 requirements, licensee procedures, and various

NRC generic communications to ensure that the test results adequately ensured that the

equipment met the licensing basis and design requirements. In addition, the inspectors

reviewed corrective action documents associated with post-maintenance tests to

determine whether the licensee was identifying problems and entering them in the CAP

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and that the problems were being corrected commensurate with their importance to

safety. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This inspection constituted eight post-maintenance testing samples as defined in

IP 71111.19-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)

Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the test results for the following activities to determine whether

risk-significant systems and equipment were capable of performing their intended safety

function and to verify testing was conducted in accordance with applicable procedural

and TS requirements:

• QCOS 7000-08: U2 SBGT Initiation Logic Test (Routine);

• QCOS 1400-07: Core Spray Pump Comprehensive/Performance Test

(In-Service Test); and

• Surveillance Frequency Control Program Surveillance Test Interval Number

QDC-17-002: 125/250 Vdc Battery Service Testing (Routine).

The inspectors observed in-plant activities and reviewed procedures and associated

records to determine the following:

• did preconditioning occur;

• the effects of the testing were adequately addressed by control room personnel

or engineers prior to the commencement of the testing;

• acceptance criteria were clearly stated, demonstrated operational readiness, and

were consistent with the system design basis;

• plant equipment calibration was correct, accurate, and properly documented;

• as-left setpoints were within required ranges; and the calibration frequency was

in accordance with TSs, the USAR, procedures, and applicable commitments;

• measuring and test equipment calibration was current;

• test equipment was used within the required range and accuracy; applicable

prerequisites described in the test procedures were satisfied;

• test frequencies met TS requirements to demonstrate operability and reliability;

tests were performed in accordance with the test procedures and other

applicable procedures; jumpers and lifted leads were controlled and restored

where used;

• test data and results were accurate, complete, within limits, and valid;

• test equipment was removed after testing;

• where applicable for inservice testing activities, testing was performed in

accordance with the applicable version of Section XI, American Society of

Mechanical Engineers code, and reference values were consistent with the

system design basis;

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• where applicable, test results not meeting acceptance criteria were addressed

with an adequate operability evaluation or the system or component was

declared inoperable;

• where applicable for safety-related instrument control surveillance tests,

reference setting data were accurately incorporated in the test procedure;

• where applicable, actual conditions encountering high resistance electrical

contacts were such that the intended safety function could still be accomplished;

• prior procedure changes had not provided an opportunity to identify problems

encountered during the performance of the surveillance or calibration test;

• equipment was returned to a position or status required to support the

performance of its safety functions; and

• all problems identified during the testing were appropriately documented and

dispositioned in the CAP.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This inspection constituted two routine surveillance testing samples and one in-service

test sample as defined in IP 71111.22, Sections-02 and-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes (71114.04)

a. Inspection Scope

The regional inspectors performed an in-office review of the latest revisions to the

Emergency Plan, Emergency Action Levels (EALs), and EAL Bases document to

determine if these changes decreased the effectiveness of the Emergency Plan.

The inspectors also performed a review of the licensees 10 CFR 50.54(q) change

process, and Emergency Plan change documentation to ensure proper implementation

for maintaining Emergency Plan integrity.

The NRC review was not documented in a safety evaluation report, and did not

constitute approval of licensee-generated changes; therefore, this revision is subject to

future inspection. The specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in

the Attachment to this report.

This EAL and Emergency Plan Change inspection constituted one sample as defined

in IP 71114.04-06.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

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1EP6 Drill Evaluation (71114.06)

Emergency Preparedness Drill Observation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the conduct of a routine licensee emergency drill on

November 8, 2017, to identify any weaknesses and deficiencies in classification,

notification, and protective action recommendation development activities. The

inspectors observed emergency response operations in the Operations Support Center

and Technical Support Center to determine whether the event classification,

notifications, and protective action recommendations were performed in accordance with

procedures. The inspectors also attended the licensee drill critique to compare any

inspector-observed weaknesses with those identified by the licensee staff in order to

evaluate the critique and to verify whether the licensee staff was properly identifying

weaknesses and entering them into the CAP. As part of the inspection, the inspectors

reviewed the drill package and other documents listed in the Attachment to this report.

This emergency preparedness drill inspection constituted one sample as defined in

IP 71114.06-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

2. RADIATION SAFETY

Cornerstones: Public Radiation Safety, Occupational Radiation Safety

2RS2 Occupational As-Low-As-Reasonably-Achievable Planning and Controls (71124.02)

Radiological Work Planning (02.02)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors compared the results achieved with the intended dose established in the

As-Low-As-Reasonably-Achievable (ALARA) planning. The inspectors compared the

person-hour estimates provided by work groups to the radiation protection group with the

actual work activity time results, and evaluated the accuracy of these time estimates.

The inspectors evaluated the reasons for any inconsistencies between intended and

actual work activity doses.

The inspectors evaluated whether post-job reviews were conducted to identify lessons

learned and entered into the licensees CAP.

These inspection activities supplemented those documented in NRC Integrated

Inspection Report 05000254/2016002; 05000265/2016002 and constituted one complete

sample as defined in IP 71124.02-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

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Verification of Dose Estimates and Exposure Tracking Systems (02.03)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors assessed whether the assumptions and basis for the current annual

collective exposure estimate were reasonably accurate. The inspectors assessed

source term reduction effectiveness and reviewed applicable procedures for estimating

exposures from specific work activities.

The inspectors reviewed the assumptions and bases in ALARA work planning

documents for selected activities and verified that the licensee has established

measures to track, trend, and if necessary to reduce, occupational doses for ongoing

work activities.

The inspectors determined whether a dose threshold criteria was established to prompt

additional reviews and/or additional ALARA planning and controls and evaluated the

licensees method of adjusting exposure estimates, or re-planning work, when

unexpected changes in scope or emergent work were encountered. The inspectors

determined if adjustments to exposure estimates were based on sound radiation

protection and ALARA principles or if they are just adjusted to account for failures to

control the work. The inspectors evaluated whether there was sufficient station

management review and approval of adjustments to exposure estimates and that the

reasons for the adjustments were justifiable.

The inspectors reviewed selected occasions with inconsistent or incongruent results

from the licensees intended radiological outcomes to determine whether the cause was

attributed to a failure to adequately plan work activities, or failure to provide sufficient

management oversight of in-plant work activities, or failure to conduct the work activity

without significant rework, or failure to implement radiological controls as planned.

These inspection activities constituted one complete sample as defined in

IP 71124.02-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

Implementation of As-Low-As-Reasonably-Achievable and Radiological Work Controls

(02.04)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors compared the radiological results achieved with the intended radiological

outcomes and verified that the licensee captured lessons learned for use in the next

outage.

These inspection activities supplemented those documented in NRC Integrated

Inspection Report 05000254/2016002; 05000265/2016002 and 05000254/2017001;

05000265/2017001 constituted one complete sample as defined in IP 71124.02-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

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Problem Identification and Resolution (02.06)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed self-assessments and/or audits performed of the ALARA

program and determined if these reviews identified problems or areas for improvement.

The inspectors assessed whether problems associated with ALARA planning and

controls were being identified by the licensee at an appropriate threshold and properly

addressed for resolution.

These inspection activities constituted one complete sample as defined in

IP 71124.02-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

2RS5 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation (71124.05)

Walkdowns and Observations (02.02)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors assessed select portable survey instruments that were available for use

for current calibration and source check stickers, and instrument material condition and

operability.

The inspectors observed licensee staff demonstrate performance checks of various

types of portable survey instruments. The inspectors assessed whether high-range

instruments responded to radiation on all appropriate scales.

The inspectors walked down area radiation monitors and continuous air monitors to

determine whether they were appropriately positioned relative to the radiation sources or

areas they were intended to monitor. The inspectors compared monitor response with

actual area conditions for selected monitors.

The inspectors assessed the functional checks for select personnel contamination

monitors, portal monitors, and small article monitors to verify they were performed in

accordance with the manufacturers recommendations and licensee procedures.

These inspection activities constituted one complete sample as defined in

IP 71124.05-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

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Calibration and Testing Program (02.03)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors assessed laboratory analytical instruments used for radiological analyses

to determine whether daily performance checks and calibration data indicated that the

frequency of the calibrations was adequate and there were no indications of degraded

instrument performance. The inspectors assessed whether appropriate corrective

actions were implemented in response to indications of degraded instrument

performance.

The inspectors reviewed the methods and sources used to perform whole body count

functional checks before daily use and assessed whether check sources were

appropriate and aligned with the plants isotopic mix. The inspectors reviewed whole

body count calibration records since the last inspection and evaluated whether

calibration sources were representative of the plant source term and that appropriate

calibration phantoms were used. The inspectors looked for anomalous results or other

indications of instrument performance problems.

Inspectors reviewed select containment high-range monitor calibration and assessed

whether an electronic calibration was completed for all range decades, with at least one

decade at or below 10 rem/hour calibrated using an appropriate radiation source, and

calibration acceptance criteria was reasonable.

The inspectors reviewed select monitors used to survey personnel and equipment for

unrestricted release to assess whether the alarm setpoints were reasonable under the

circumstances to ensure that licensed material was not released from the site. The

inspectors reviewed the calibration documentation for each instrument selected and

discussed the calibration methods with the licensee to determine consistency with the

manufacturers recommendations.

The inspectors reviewed calibration documentation for select portable survey

instruments, area radiation monitors, and air samplers. The inspectors reviewed

detector measurement geometry and calibration methods for portable survey

instruments and area radiation monitors calibrated onsite and observed the licensee

demonstrate use of the instrument calibrator. The inspectors assessed whether

appropriate corrective actions were taken for instruments that failed performance checks

or were found significantly out of calibration, and that the licensee had evaluated the

possible consequences of instrument use since the last successful calibration or

performance check.

The inspectors reviewed the current output values for instrument calibrators. The

inspectors assessed whether the licensee periodically measured calibrator output over

the range of the instruments used with measuring devices that have been calibrated by a

facility using National Institute of Standards and Technology traceable sources and

corrective factors for these measuring devices were properly applied in its output

verification.

The inspectors reviewed the licensees Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations,

Part 61, Licensing Requirements for Land Disposal of Radioactive Waste, source term

to assess whether calibration sources used were representative of the types and

energies of radiation encountered in the plant.

20

These inspection activities constituted one complete sample as defined in

IP 71124.05-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

Problem Identification and Resolution (02.04)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated whether problems associated with radiation monitoring

instrumentation were being identified by the licensee at an appropriate threshold and

were properly addressed for resolution. The inspectors assessed the appropriateness of

the corrective actions for a selected sample of problems documented by the licensee

that involve radiation monitoring instrumentation.

These inspection activities constituted one complete sample as defined in

IP 71124.05-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

2RS7 Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (71124.07)

Groundwater Protection Initiative Implementation (02.03)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed leak and spill events and Title 10 of the Code of Federal

Regulations, Part 50.75(g) records and assessed whether the source of the leak or spill

was identified and appropriately mitigated.

These inspection activities supplemented those documented in NRC Integrated

Inspection Report 05000254/2017003; 05000265/2017003 and constituted one complete

sample as defined in IP 71124.07-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified

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4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, Emergency

Preparedness, Public Radiation Safety, Occupational Radiation Safety, and

Security

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)

.1 Reactor Coolant System Specific Activity

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the reactor coolant system specific

activity performance indicator (PI) for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1

and 2, for the period from the third quarter 2016 through the third quarter 2017. The

inspectors used PI definitions and guidance contained in the Nuclear Energy

Institute (NEI) Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator

Guideline, Revision 7, dated August 2013, to determine the accuracy of the PI data

reported during those periods. The inspectors reviewed the licensees reactor coolant

system chemistry samples, TS requirements, IRs, event reports, and NRC integrated

inspection reports to validate the accuracy of the submittals. The inspectors also

reviewed the licensees IR database to determine if any problems had been identified

with the PI data collected or transmitted for this indicator. In addition to record reviews,

the inspectors observed a chemistry technician obtain and analyze a reactor coolant

system sample. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This inspection constituted two reactor coolant system specific activity samples as

defined in IP 71151-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

Mitigating Systems Performance IndexHigh Pressure Injection Systems

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the mitigating systems performance

index (MSPI)high pressure injection systems PI for Quad Cities Nuclear Power

Station, Units 1 and 2, for the period from the fourth quarter 2016 through the third

quarter 2017. To determine the accuracy of the PI data reported during those periods,

PI definitions and guidance contained in the NEI Document 99-02, Regulatory

Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, dated August 31, 2013, were

used. The inspectors reviewed the licensees operator narrative logs, IRs, MSPI

derivation reports, event reports and NRC integrated inspection reports for the period of

October 1, 2016, through September 30, 2017, to validate the accuracy of the

submittals. The inspectors reviewed the MSPI component risk coefficient to determine if

it had changed by more than 25 percent in value since the previous inspection, and if so,

that the change was in accordance with applicable NEI guidance. The inspectors also

reviewed the licensees IR database to determine if any problems had been identified

with the PI data collected or transmitted for this indicator, and none were identified.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

22

This inspection constituted two MSPI high pressure injection system samples as defined

in IP 71151-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

Mitigating Systems Performance IndexHeat Removal Systems

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the MSPIheat removal systems PI for

Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2, for the period from the fourth quarter

2016 through the third quarter 2017. To determine the accuracy of the PI data reported

during those periods, PI definitions and guidance contained in the NEI Document 99-02,

Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, dated

August 31, 2013, were used. The inspectors reviewed the licensees operator narrative

logs, IRs, event reports, MSPI derivation reports, and NRC integrated inspection reports

for the period of October 1, 2016, through September 30, 2017, to validate the accuracy

of the submittals. The inspectors reviewed the MSPI component risk coefficient to

determine if it had changed by more than 25 percent in value since the previous

inspection, and if so, that the change was in accordance with applicable NEI guidance.

The inspectors also reviewed the licensees IR database to determine if any problems

had been identified with the PI data collected or transmitted for this indicator, and none

were identified. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This inspection constituted two MSPI heat removal systems samples as defined in

IP 71151-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

Mitigating Systems Performance IndexResidual Heat Removal System

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the MSPIResidual Heat Removal

System PI for Units 1 and 2 for the period from the fourth quarter 2016 through the third

quarter 2017. To determine the accuracy of the PI data reported during those periods,

PI definitions and guidance contained in the NEI Document 99-02, Regulatory

Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, dated August 31, 2013, were

used. The inspectors reviewed the licensees operator narrative logs, IRs, MSPI

derivation reports, event reports and NRC integrated inspection reports for the period of

October 1, 2016, through September 30, 2017, to validate the accuracy of the

submittals. The inspectors reviewed the MSPI component risk coefficient to determine if

it had changed by more than 25 percent in value since the previous inspection, and if so,

that the change was in accordance with applicable NEI guidance. The inspectors also

reviewed the licensees IR database to determine if any problems had been identified

with the PI data collected or transmitted for this indicator, and none were identified.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

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This inspection constituted two MSPI residual heat removal systems samples as defined

in IP 71151-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

Mitigating Systems Performance IndexCooling Water Systems

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the MSPIcooling water systems PI

Units 1 and 2 for the period from the fourth quarter 2016 through the third quarter 2017.

To determine the accuracy of the PI data reported during those periods, PI definitions

and guidance contained in the NEI Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment

Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, dated August 31, 2013, were used. The

inspectors reviewed the licensees operator narrative logs, IRs, MSPI derivation reports,

event reports and NRC integrated inspection reports for the period of October 1, 2016,

through September 30, 2017, to validate the accuracy of the submittals. The inspectors

reviewed the MSPI component risk coefficient to determine if it had changed by more

than 25 percent in value since the previous inspection, and if so, that the change was in

accordance with applicable NEI guidance. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees

IR database to determine if any problems had been identified with the PI data collected

or transmitted for this indicator, and none were identified. Documents reviewed are

listed in the Attachment to this report.

This inspection constituted two MSPI cooling water systems samples as defined in

IP 71151-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152)

Routine Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program

a. Inspection Scope

As discussed in previous sections of this report, the inspectors routinely reviewed issues

during baseline inspection activities and plant status reviews to verify they were being

entered into the licensees CAP at an appropriate threshold, adequate attention was

being given to timely corrective actions, and adverse trends were identified and

addressed. Some minor issues were entered into the licensees corrective action

program as a result of the inspectors observations; however, they are not discussed in

this report.

These routine reviews for the identification and resolution of problems did not constitute

any additional inspection samples. Instead, by procedure they were considered an

integral part of the inspections performed during the quarter.

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b. Findings

No findings were identified.

Semi-Annual Trend Review

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a review of the licensees CAP and associated documents to

identify trends that could indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue. The

inspectors review was focused on repetitive equipment issues, but also considered the

results of daily inspector CAP item screening discussed in Section 4OA2.1 above,

licensee trending efforts, and licensee human performance results. The inspectors

review nominally considered the 6-month period of June 1, 2017, through November 30,

2017, although some examples expanded beyond those dates where the scope of the

trend warranted.

The review also included issues documented outside the CAP in major equipment

problem lists, repetitive and/or rework maintenance lists, departmental

problem/challenges lists, system health reports, quality assurance audit/surveillance

reports, self-assessment reports, and Maintenance Rule assessments. The inspectors

compared and contrasted their results with the results contained in the licensees

CAP trending reports. Corrective actions associated with a sample of the issues

identified in the licensees trending reports were reviewed for adequacy.

This review constituted one semi-annual trend review inspection sample as defined in

IP 71152.

b. Observations and Assessments

The inspectors reviewed the licensees internal trend review which spanned the range of

four quarters for emerging cross-cutting themes. The cross-cutting areas identified by

the licensee as having been impacted over the last four quarters were work

management, training, avoiding complacency, and conservative bias. The inspectors

reviewed the licensees assessment which did not identify any trends/themes in the

areas impacted. The inspectors verified the licensee continuously monitored

cross-cutting areas for the presence of recurring themes. The inspectors review did not

identify any recurring themes with equipment issues or in other areas such as work

management, human performance, or problem identification and resolution that were

indicative of a more significant safety issue. The inspectors also performed a more

focused review of the licensees corrective action database and resolution and

identification of issues associated with safety-related relays. The inspectors reviewed

the database to identify if any previous relay failures could be attributed to gaps in the

licensees preventative maintenance strategies and work practices. No trends/themes

were identified.

c. Findings

No findings were identified.

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4OA3 Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion (71153)

(Closed) Licensee Event Report 05000265/2017-001-00: High Pressure Coolant

Injection Minimum Flow Valve Failed to Open

On May 15, 2017, operations personnel performed surveillance procedure QCOS 2300-

05, HPCI Pump Operability Test. While securing from the test, operators tripped the

HPCI turbine, and the HPCI minimum flow bypass valve failed to open on low flow.

Operators attempted to manually open the minimum flow bypass valve. However, when

they released the control switch, the valve returned to the closed position. Since the

acceptance criteria in the surveillance procedure requires proper operation of the

minimum flow valve, the licensee declared the HPCI system inoperable due to the

apparent failure of the minimum flow valve to operate properly. The licensee

documented the issue in IR 4011130, During HPCI S/D MO 2-2301-14 did not Auto

Open. The licensees investigation identified that the HPCI pump discharge flow

indicating switch had an intermittent failure that was caused by a manufacturing defect.

The defect caused the minimum flow valve to receive a sporadic continuous closed

signal. The licensee replaced the flow indicating switch (FIS), retested the system, and

declared HPCI operable. An engineering evaluation by the licensee discussed that the

minimum flow bypass valve is designed for pump protection when other discharge line

valves are closed (i.e. during testing). Therefore, in the event of a loss of coolant

accident, HPCI would have still been able to perform its design safety-related function

because the HPCI discharge valves to the reactor would open and no pump damage

would be expected to occur. Based on the inspectors discussions with the licensee, the

licensee determined that their procedure direction, to declare HPCI inoperable, may

have been overly restrictive and initiated a procedure change to clarify the function of the

minimum flow valve. The inspectors reviewed the licensees evaluation and did not

identified a performance deficiency.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report. This licensee event

report (LER) is closed.

This event follow-up review constituted one sample as defined in IP 71153-05.

Retraction of Event Notification No. 52955: High Pressure Coolant Injection System

Inoperable

The original event occurred on September 8, 2017, when the Unit 2 HPCI minimum flow

valve, MO 2-2301-14, flow indicating switch, FIS 2-2354, failed to meet the TS

allowable value during calibration testing using procedure QCIS 2300-10, HPCI Pump

Discharge Flow Switch Calibration and Functional Test, Revision 8, and HPCI was

subsequently declared inoperable. The licensee reported the event as a condition that

could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function in accordance with

10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). Since the HPCI system is a single train system, the loss of

HPCI would prevent the high pressure injection safety function that HPCI provides. The

flow indicating switch, FIS 2-2354, was successfully recalibrated and HPCI was returned

to Operable status approximately 10 minutes after it was found out of tolerance.

After reviewing the details of this event under IR 4050176, the licensee determined that

the surveillance procedure contained an overly restrictive statement that directed

operators to immediately declare the HPCI system inoperable when FIS 2-2354 fails.

This statement was in conflict with TS 3.3.5.1, Condition E, which allows 7 days to

26

restore the HPCI FIS (instrument channel only) to an operable status prior to entry into

TS 3.3.5.1, Condition H, which requires declaring HPCI inoperable immediately.

Therefore, during the period of the FIS inoperability10 minutesthe HPCI system was

not required to be declared inoperable in accordance with TS. Licensee corrective

actions included a revision to the procedure which would direct entry into the appropriate

instrumentation TS.

The inspectors reviewed the licensees basis for the event retraction and verified that

HPCI was not required to be declared inoperable at the time of the event. The

inspectors noted that while the FIS failed the calibration, it would have still functioned

and opened the minimum flow valve. However, it would have opened at a lower flow

rate than required by the TS. The inspectors also noted that this FIS calibration

surveillance failure differed from the event described in LER 05000265/2017-001 due to

the failure mechanism of the FIS. The event described in that LER prevented the

minimum flow valve from operating automatically or manually, and the minimum flow

valve was declared inoperable during that event, again due to procedural guidance in

another surveillance procedure that was later determined to be overly restrictive. No

performance deficiencies were identified.

This event follow-up review constituted one sample as defined in IP 71153-05.

(Closed) Licensee Event Report 05000254/2017-003-00: Control Room Emergency

Ventilation Air Conditioning Piping Refrigerant Leak Due to High Cycle Fatigue

On September 21, 2017, the licensee identified a refrigerant leak at an expansion joint

located on the discharge piping of the CREV air conditioning (AC) system compressor.

The licensee declared the refrigeration condensing unit inoperable and entered TS 3.7.5,

Condition A, which required restoration of the CREV AC system within 30 days. The

licensee was required to report the condition under 10 CFR 50.72/73 (a)(2)(v)(D)

because the CREV AC system is a single train safety system required to mitigate the

consequences of an accident. The licensee determined that the piping failure was

caused by high cycle fatigue at the expansion joint, which had been in service for

approximately 20 years. As a result, the licensee replaced the compressor discharge

pipe fitting (expansion joint).

The licensee had experienced three compressor failures over the 20-year timespan,

which were suspected to be the main causes of the increased vibrations on the piping.

Due to previous compressor modifications following the prior failures, the licensee

expected the replaced fitting will continue to function beyond the life of the plant. The

inspectors reviewed the licensees evaluation and corrective actions. No performance

deficiencies were identified.

This event follow-up review constituted one sample as defined in IP 71153-05.

27

4OA5 Other Activities

Review of Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Storage Pad Design (60856,

Appendix A)

a. Inspection Scope

The licensee currently has an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) pad

with a capacity to store 60 casks and plans to expand the ISFSI capacity by installation

of a new pad to accommodate an additional 114 casks. Title 10 of the Code of Federal

Regulations (10 CFR) 72.212(b)(5)(ii) requires that licensees perform written evaluations,

before use, which establish that cask storage pads and areas have been designed to

adequately support the static and dynamic loads of the stored casks, considering potential

amplification of earthquakes through soil-structure interaction, and soil liquefaction

potential or other soil instability due to vibratory ground motion.

The inspectors evaluated the licensees soil and ISFSI pad engineering design

evaluations for the new pad to verify the licensees compliance with the cask Certificate of

Compliance (CoC), 10 CFR Part 72 requirements, and industry standards.

The licensee was utilizing the Holtec HI-STORM 100S, Version B (218) dry cask storage

system. The new reinforced concrete pad was 35 inches thick and capable of

supporting 114 HI-STORM casks in a 6-by-19 array. The pad was 89 feet wide and

307.5 feet long. The licensee designed and constructed the ISFSI pad as an

important-to-safety (category C) structure.

The inspectors reviewed the licensees soil investigation reports and calculations

documenting the engineering properties and design soil profile of the ISFSI site based

on new geotechnical investigations of the ISFSI areas combined with the data in the plant

UFSAR. The inspectors reviewed documents to verify that the pad design duly addressed

geological and hydrological considerations using the information from the earlier and the

new soil investigations as applicable. The inspectors reviewed the licensees liquefaction

analysis to verify seismic input and safety factors were consistent with Regulatory

Guidance 1.198, Procedures and Criteria for Assessing Seismic Soil Liquefaction at

Nuclear Power Plant Sites.

The inspectors reviewed documents for the generation of new seismic acceleration time

histories from the seismic ground motion spectra for the reactor site to be used as inputs for

the ISFSI analyses. The inspectors reviewed the soil structure interaction analysis

methodology and calculations to verify adequacy of the soil/pad/cask analytical model. The

inspectors reviewed the ISFSI pad structural design to verify the methodology, load factors

and acceptance criteria, as well as considerations of settlements, static/dynamic and

sequential/partial loadings.

The inspectors reviewed the licensees cask haul path evaluations to verify that

maximum expected loads were considered in the design of the new haul path. The

inspectors interviewed licensee personnel and performed walkdowns of the haul path

and the ISFSI areas to verify that licensee had reviewed the haul path for the

right-of-way requirements and potential interferences from nearby structures and

overhead lines and that any impact on buried utilities was also addressed, as applicable.

28

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

On-site Fabrication of Components and Construction of an Independent Spent Fuel

Storage Installation (60853)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a walkdown of the new ISFSI pad construction site on

September 26 and 27, 2017, after the licensee had performed significant earthwork and

placed engineered fill for the pad, but before any concrete formwork or rebar for the pad

had been placed. The inspectors observed the licensees process for setting up and

performing a plate load test on the engineered fill for the ISFSI pad. The inspectors also

interviewed licensee and contractor personnel to evaluate their understanding of the

design and construction specifications for the ISFSI pad.

The inspectors evaluated the licensees construction activities for the new pad to verify the

licensees compliance with the cask CoC, 10 CFR Part 72 requirements, the cask Final

Safety Analysis Report, the ISFSI pad design specification, and applicable industry

standards.

As the licensee continues the construction process for this ISFSI pad expansion into

2018 to include both rebar and concrete placement, the inspectors will continue to utilize

IP 60853 to evaluate the licensees compliance. The results of this inspection will be

documented in a future inspection report.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA6 Management Meetings

Exit Meeting Summary

On January 3, 2018, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. H. Dodd and

other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented.

The inspectors confirmed that none of the potential report input discussed was

considered proprietary.

Interim Exit Meetings

Interim exits were conducted for:

• The results of the biennial LORT program inspection were presented to

Mr. H. Dodd, Plant Manager, and other licensee staff members on

October 20, 2017.

• The inspectors presented the characterization of a potential enforcement issue

(URI) identified during the biennial LORT inspection to Mr. E. Pannell, Training

Manager, and other licensee staff members via telephone conference on

January 2, 2018.

29

• The results of the ISFSI pad inspection were presented to Mr. C. Alguire and

other members of the licensee staff via telephone conference on

November 20, 2017.

• The results of the emergency preparedness program inspection were presented

to Mr. G. Buckley, Emergency Preparedness Manager, via telephone on

November 22, 2017.

• The results for the radiation safety program review inspection were presented

with Mr. H. Dodd, Plant Manager, on December 14, 2017.

The inspectors confirmed that none of the potential report inputs discussed were

considered proprietary. Proprietary material received during the inspections was

returned to the licensee.

ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

30

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee

H. Dodd, Plant General Manager

M. Anderson, Maintenance Director

J. Bries, Operations Director

T. Bell, Engineering Director

D. Collins, Radiation Protection Manager

J. Cox, Shift Operations Superintendent

R. Craddick, Organizational Effectiveness Manager

M. Humphrey, Regulatory Assurance

T. Petersen, Regulatory Assurance

J. Roos, System Engineering Electrical Manager

T. Wojcik, Engineering Manager

J. Woolridge, Chemistry Manager

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

L. Kozak, Acting Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 1

R. Murray, Senior Resident Inspector

K. Carrington, Resident Inspector

Illinois Emergency Management Agency (IEMA)

C. Mathews, IEMA

C. Settles, IEMA

Attachment

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened

05000254/2017004-01; URI Repeat Use of Written Exams during Licensed Operator

05000265/2017004-01 Requalification Examinations (Section 1R11)

Closed

05000265/2017001-00 LER High Pressure Coolant Injection Minimum Flow Valve

Failed to Open (Section 4OA3.1)05000254/2017003-00 LER Control Room Emergency Ventilation Air Conditioning

Piping Refrigerant Leak Due to High Cycle Fatigue

(Section 4OA3.3)

Discussed

None.

2

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

The following is a partial list of documents reviewed during the inspection. Inclusion on this list

does not imply that the NRC inspector reviewed the documents in their entirety, but rather that

selected sections or portions of the documents were evaluated as part of the overall inspection

effort. Inclusion of a document on this list does not imply NRC acceptance of the document or

any part of it, unless this is stated in the body of the inspection report.

Section Document Description or Title Revision or

Number Number Date

Section 1R01

1R01 QCAN 901(2)-7 Traveling Screens High DP Annunciator 5

C-15 Response

1R01 QCOP 4400-09 Circulating Water System Flow Reversal-TIC 30a/ TIC

3452 3452

1R01 QCOP 4400-02 Circulating Water System Startup and 37

Shutdown

1R01 IR 4084820 Fish Impingement Challenges Unit Availability 12/16/2017

1R01 IR 4084886 EO ID: 2C Traveling Screen Metal Guide 12/17/2017

Ripped out of Place

1R01 IR 4084887 One Panel of 2D Traveling Screen Found 12/17/2017

Partially Detached

Section 1R04

1R04 IR 4050467 EO ID: U1 RCIC Turbine Vacuum Pump Leak 09/10/2017

1R04 QOM 1-1300-02 Unit 1 RCIC Valve Checklist (RCIC Room) 10

1R04 QOM 1-1301-03 Unit 1 RCIC Valve Checklist (Not in RCIC 10

Room)

1R04 STN 17-073 RCIC Turbine Vacuum Pump

1R04 QCOP 6600-23 Unit 1 Diesel Generator Preparation for 3

Standby Operation

1R04 QCOP 6600-04 Diesel Generator 1/2 Preparation for Standby 23

Operation

1R04 QOM 2-2300-01 Unit 2 HPCI Valve Checklist 18

1R04 QOM 1-2300-02 HPCI System Fuse and Breaker Checklist 6

Section 1R05

1R05 QDC-4100-M- Combustible Loading Calculation for the Power 6D

0691 Block, SBO Building and Crib House

1R05 Fire Hazards Analysis Methodology and 22

Assumptions

1R05 Quad Cites Generating Station Pre-Fire Plan: October

Unit 2 TB 5950 Elev. Safe Shutdown Pump 2013

Room, Fire Zone 5.0

1R05 Quad Cites Generating Station Pre-Fire Plan: July 2009

Unit 2 RB 5440 Elev. HPCI Pump Room, Fire

Zone 11.1.4

Section 1R11

1R11 AT 3984542-04 SA: Pre-NRC 71111.11B 10/12/2017

1R11 IR 4083711 NRC Concern Related to LORT 12/13/2017

Comprehensive Written Exams

3

1R11 IR 4063652 NRC ID: Active License Tracking Log 10/16/2017

Discrepancies

1R11 TQ-AA-306 Simulator Management 8

1R11 TQ-AA-155-F04 Simulator Evaluation FormsIndividual, 10/19/2017

Crew F

1R11 TQ-AA-155-F05 Simulator Evaluation FormsCrew, Crew F 10/19/2017

1R11 TQ-AA-155-F04 Simulator Evaluation FormsIndividual, 10/19/2017

Crew F

1R11 NOSA-QDC-15- Quad Cities Functional Area Audit Report 09/23/2015

08

1R11 Q1C25 Simulator Core Model Test

1R11 Q1C25 Simulator Cert Testing

1R11 LORT 2017 Operating Exam #7 Scenario 20

Based Testing

1R11 LORT 2017 Operating Exam #3 Scenario 21

Based Testing

1R11 ILT NRC Scenario #2 Scenario Based Testing 0

1R11 Simulator ComparisonCV #4 Failure 04/15/2017

1R11 Simulator ComparisonU1 Feedwater Heater 05/30/2015

Excursion

1R11 Simulator ComparisonU1 Feedwater Heater 11/14/2015

Excursion

1R11 Simulator ComparisonU1 Manual SCRAM 04/02/2015

Due to D-Ring Header Steam Leak

1R11 IR 3949564 TrainingSimulator Critical Task List Review 12/05/2016

1R11 IR 2674201 Paragon Knowledge Gap Regarding Drywell

Inerted State

1R11 IR 2687088 Did Not Proactively Ensure REMA Dates Were

Valid-Updated for Downpower Extension

1R11 IR 2697050 Did Not Notify Key Personnel Outside the MCR

When HVAC Tripped on High Toxic Gas

1R11 IR 2716967 Supervisor Left RoleAcknowledged Control

Room Alarms Due to Perceived Time Pressure

1R11 IR 3956869 Missed Opportunity to Update Crew on Status

of FW Heater Transient Before Re-Latching of

MSDT LCVs

1R11 IR 4003770 Crew Didnt Recognize Load Drop Exceeded

20% in One Hour, Didnt Request RETS

Sample

1R11 IR 2503095 Update Needed to Time Sensitive Actions in

OP-QC-102-106

1R11 IR 4055629 TrainingSimulator Crash During OBE 09/25/2017

1R11 IR 4030214 Simulator Crashed During LORT Training 07/10/2017

Scenario

1R11 IR 2741979 QDC-EP-2016-NRC-Simulator Issue 11/16/2016

1R11 IR 2726915 Simulator MST Abort Caused Lost Simulator 10/11/2016

Training Time

1R11 IR 2568617 TrainingDelay in LORT NRC Exams Due to 10/07/2015

Simulator Malfunctions

4

1R11 IR 2618447 Training: Loss of Training Time Due to 01/28/2016

Simulator Malfunction

1R11 SWR 133381 Simulator Crashing When Reactor 10/05/2017

Depressurizes Less Than 20 psi

1R11 SWR 133333 Meter Scaling Items from SWR 132888 That 09/20/2017

Require a Software Change

1R11 SWR 133628 EC 619744Cyber Security Remediation: 10/12/2017

Isolate Recorders from Recorder Server

Network

1R11 Reactivation of License Logs (various) February

2016 - April

2017

1R11 Active License Tracking Logs 1 Quarter

st

2016, 3rd

Quarter

2016, 2nd

Quarter

2017

1R11 2017 Crew F RO Written LORT Annual

Requalification Exam

1R11 2017 Crew F SRO Written LORT Annual

Requalification Exam

1R11 Quad Cities Operation Static Exam Bank, Static 5

Exam: STATIC23

1R11 JPM LP-003-II-A Locally Start of U1/2 DG with Failure of the 1/2 1

EDGCWP

1R11 JPM LP-040-I Bypassing RCIC Steam Line Isolation Signal 11

1R11 JPM LS-001-II-A Startup the RHRSW System with Reduced 13

Pump Capacity

1R11 JPM LS-038-I Perform the Unit 1 Weekly Turbine Generator 3

Tests

1R11 JPM LS-083-I Bypass A Channel of the Reactor Mode 3

Switch to Shutdown Scram

1R11 JPM SRO-012-I Initiate a Fire Impairment Permit Requiring 4

Compensatory Actions

1R11 JPM LP-042-II Main Feedwater Regulator into Local Operation 3

1R11 JPM LP-043-I Local Emergency Start of the 1(2) SBO Diesel 13

Generator

1R11 JPM LS-002-I-A Shutdown the U 1/2 B SBGT with a Failure of 8

Damper to Close

1R11 JPM LS-005-II Transfer Auxiliary Power from Xfmr 11 to 22

Xfmr 12

1R11 JPM LS-044-I-A HPCI Startup with an Inadvertent Isolation 4

1R11 JPM SRO-003-I Review Faulted Jet Pump Operability 9

Surveillance

1R11 License Requalification Operating Exam #7, 23

dated 08/17

1R11 License Requalification Operating Exam #3, 24

dated 08/17

5

1R11 License Requalification Operating Exam #10, 19

dated 08/17

1R11 License Requalification Operating Exam #20, 18

dated 08/17

Section 1R12

1R12 ENGAGE PM Template for SSMP System

1R12 Maintenance Rule Basis DocumentSS2900

(Safe Shutdown Make-Up Pump)

1R12 IR 1201017 SSMP Room Cooler Trend IR 04/11/2011

1R12 IR 1209711 MRule: Performance Criteria Exceeded (SSMP 04/29/2011

RM Cooler)

1R12 IR 1592607 SSMP HS 1-2940-4 Difficult to Place In PTL 12/04/2013

1R12 IR 2633959 SSMP MCC 30 Local Control Switch Failed 03/01/2016

1R12 IR 2728974 MRule Unavailability Missed for SSMP 10/17/2016

1R12 IR 3997936 PSUMCR SSMP FIC 0-2940-7 Is Not 04/13/2017

Controlling in Auto or Man

1R12 IR 4027615 WO to Remove Spare Contacts SSMP MCC 30 06/30/2017

C3

1R12 IR 4030993 WO Needed for SSMP FIC 2940-7 07/12/2017

1R12 IR 4040433 SSMP FIC Would Not Reach 400 GPM with 08/09/2017

Setpoint at 400 GPM

1R12 IR 4078579 SSMP Reserve Feed MCR Switch Will Not 11/28/2017

Close

1R12 IR 4078677 EO ID: Local Control Switch Would Not Start 11/28/2017

the SSMP

Section 1R13

1R13 Work Week Profile 17-40-04

1R13 Work Week Profile 17-42-06

1R13 Work Week Profile 17-46-10

1R13 Work Week Profile 17-51-02

1R13 2017.11.13.22.05. Protected System/Pathway Checklist 11/13/2017

49

1R13 ER-AA-600-1042 On-line Risk Management 11

1R13 QC-CRM-38 Overall On-line Risk Determination 0

1R13 WC-AA-101 On-line Work Control Process 27

Section 1R15

1R15 GEK-9597 Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Equipment December

ManualChapter 34, Heating, Ventilation, and 1973

Air Conditioning

1R15 IR 2730448 Lessons Learned From B CREVs LCO Week 10/20/2016

of 10-10-16

1R15 IR 4062552 B Train CREV Superheat Value High 10/13/2017

1R15 NES 709-3 Installation, Operation and Maintenance 3

Instructions for Refrigeration Condensing Units

Control Room HVAC Upgrade Nuclear Electric

Generating Facilities at Dresden and Quad

Cities

1R15 QDC-5700-H- Heat Gain Calculation for Train B Control Room 0

0805 HVAC System

6

1R15 GE Sil No. 657 Standby Liquid Control System Accumulator 09/07/2006

Bladder

1R15 IR 4066290 1A SBLC Pump Accumulator Schraeder Valve 10/24/2017

is Stuck Open

1R15 4E-1527, Sheet 3 Schematic Diagram High Pressure Coolant Q

Injection System Sensors and Auxiliary Relays

1R15 4E-1533 Schematic Diagram HPCI Turbine Motor Gear AP

Unit Speed Exchanger and Auxiliary Valves

1R15 M-46 Diagram of HPCI Turbine Lubricating and G

Hydraulic Oil System and Pump Seal Cooler

Piping

1R15 QCOS 2300-05 HPCI Pump Operability Test 79

1R15 IR 4078579 SSMP Reserve Feed MCR Switch Will Not 11/28/2017

Close

1R15 IR 4078677 EO ID: Local Control Switch Would Not Start 11/28/2017

the SSMP

1R15 QCOP 2900-01 Safe Shutdown Makeup Pump System 39

Preparation for Standby Operation

1R15 QCOS 2900-10 Safe Shutdown Makeup Pump Local Panel 5

Flow Test

Section 1R18

1R18 4E-1828 Wiring Diagram HPCI System Signal N

1R18 EC 619131 U-1 HPCI Signal Converter Output Failed 04/18/2017

Alarm Bypass

1R18 IR 3992828 Local Current Meter 1-2386-8206 Erratic 04/01/2017

1R18 IR 3997418 Unexpected 901-3 H-9 Alarm 04/12/2017

1R18 QCAN 901(2)-3 HPCI Controller Signal Converter Output Failed 3

1R18 WO 4625756 Unexpected 901-3 H-9 Alarm 04/28/2017

Section 1R19

1R19 EC 24448 Replace the 1/2 Standby Diesel

Generator Seismic Qualification Utility Group

(SQUQ) Relays and the Associated DC Control

Power Transfer Switch

1R19 IR 4057911 Incorrect Step in QCIPM 6600-03 10/01/2017

1R19 IR 4057926 1/2 EDG Governor Booster Pump Needs to Be 10/01/2017

Replaced

1R19 IR 4067226 1/2 EDG LCO Extent of Condition Issues 10/26/2017

1R19 QCEPM 0400-10 Emergency Diesel Speed Sensing Circuit 26

Testing and Calibration

1R19 QCMMS 6600-03 Emergency Diesel Generator Periodic 33

Preventive Maintenance Inspection

1R19 WO 1656769-03 IM Replace U-0 EDG Speed Switch 0-6601-ES 09/29/2016

1R19 WO 1914200 (LR) Diesel Generator Periodic Insp 10/02/2017

1R19 WO 1914200-02 (LR) Diesel Generator Periodic Insp 10/02/2017

1R19 Drawing R107D- Equipment Arrangement, Control Room

1321710-F, Refrigeration Condensing Unit

Sheet 2

1R19 WO 4694130 Control Room Emergency Filtration Sys Test 10/12/2017

(IST)

1R19 WO 4697777 B CR HVAC Bundled PMT Review 10/13/2017

7

1R19 WO 4709406 Unit 1 HPCI Did Not Trip During QCOS 2300- 11/09/2017

05

1R19 QCOS 2300-05 HPCI Pump Operability Test 79

1R19 WO 1924709 SBO DG Jacket Water Booster Pump Recirc 11/03/2017

Valve Pressure Control Test

1R19 WO 1945526 SBO Overspeed Trip Test 11/03/2017

1R19 WO 4671151 SBO DG Load Test 11/03/2017

1R19 WO 4671154 SBO DG Jacket Water Booster Pump Test 11/03/2017

1R19 WO 4671158 SBO DG Starting Air Compressor B 11/03/2017

1R19 WO 4712561 PS 2-0504-A Did Not Function as Expected 11/16/2017

1R19 QCIS 0500-06 Unit 2 Division I Turbine First Stage Low 7

Pressure Above Setpoint Calibration and

Functional Test

1R19 QCOS 2900-01 Safe Shutdown Makeup Pump Flow Rate Test 38

1R19 WO 4717433-01 SSMP Reserve Feed MCR Switch Will Not 11/29/2017

Close

1R19 WO 4717766-01 Local Control Switch Would Not Start the 11/29/2017

SSMP

1R19 QCOP 2900-01 Safe Shutdown Makeup Pump System 39

Preparation for Standby Operation

1R19 QCOS 2900-10 Safe Shutdown Makeup Pump Local Panel 5

Flow Test

1R19 QCOS 7500-04 Unit 1 Standby Gas Treatment Initiation and 36

Reactor Building Ventilation Isolation Test

Section 1R22

1R22 IR 4059849 Discrepancies to QCOS 7500-08 10/05/2017

1R22 QCOS 1400-07 Core Spray Pump 15

Comprehensive/Performance Test

1R22 QCEMS 0230-11 Modified Performance Test of Unit 1(2) 125 10

VDC Normal or Alternate Battery

1R22 IEEE/ANSI 450- Recommended Practice for 03/09/1987

1987 Maintenance,Testing, and Replacement of

Large Lead Batteries for Generating Stations

and Substations

Section 1EP4

1EP4 EP-AA-1000 Exelon Nuclear Standardized Radiological 29

Emergency Plan

1EP4 EP-AA-1006 Quad Cities Emergency Plan Annex 37 and 38

1EP4 EP-AA-1006, Emergency Actions Levels for Quad Cities 2 and 3

Addendum 3

1EP4 EP-QC-1000 Quad Cities Power Station Radiological 0

Emergency Plan

1EP4 Evaluation 16-106 50.54(q) Evaluation and Effectiveness Review 09/19/2016

1EP4 Evaluation 17-27 50.54(q) Evaluation and Effectiveness Review 03/20/2017

Section 1EP6

1EP6 Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS) 11/08/2017

Form for Quad Cities 4th Qtr PI Drill

1EP6 Quad Cities Generating Station 2017 4th Qtr PI 11/08/2017

Drill

8

1EP6 EP-AA-111-F-06 Quad Cities PAR Flowchart G

Section 2RS2

2RS2 IR 3995639-04 Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls 10/31/2017

2RS2 IR 3964145 Check-In Self-Assessment; Exposure Controls 02/28/2017

Inspection

2RS2 IR 2635387 Check-In Self-Assessment; Fleet ALARA 12/21/2016

Program

2RS2 IR 2589636 Check-In Self-Assessment; Exposure Controls 02/22/2016

Inspection, ALARA

2RS2 IR 2426117 Check-In Self-Assessment; Occupational 07/17/2015

ALARA Planning and Controls

2RS2 IR 3996125 CB&I Accumulated Dose Alarm 04/09/2017

2RS2 RP-AA-203- Personnel Exposure Investigation; EID 04/09/2017

1001, Hurley1491

Attachment 1

2RS2 IR 2686986 Potential Adverse Trend for Online Emergent 06/26/2016

Dose

2RS2 IR 3994959 Accumulated Dose Alarm Received in Unit 04/06/2017

MSIV Room

2RS2 IR 4006044 ALARA Post Job Review QC-01-17-00506 05/03/2017

2RS2 IR 4001030 RWP QC-01-17-00802 TB Main Cond 04/21/2017

Activities Exceed 25% Estimate

2RS2 IR 4000935 RWP QC-01-17-00517 Estimate >1 REM & 04/21/2017

Under Original Estimate

2RS2 IR 4000935 RWP QC-01-17-00518 Estimate >1 REM & 04/21/2017

Under Original Estimate

2RS2 IR 4000612 OLL: RWP QC-01-17-00403-01 OB MSIV 04/20/2017

Activities Exceeded Estimates

2RS2 RWP QC-01-17- DW Scaffolding Activities (Q1R24) Various

00506 Dates

2RS2 RWP QC-01-17- DW I/B MSIV Over Haul (Q1R24) Various

00541 Dates

2RS2 RWP QC-01-17- FF Rx Disassembly/Reassembly Activities Various

00901 (Q1R24) Dates

2RS2 RWP QC-02-16- DW Scaffolding Activities Various

00506 Dates

2RS2 RWP QC-02-16- DW Ventilation/Cooler System Activities Various

00507 (Q2R23) Dates

2RS2 Quad Cities Generating Station; Radiation N/A

Protection Q1R23 Refueling Outage Report

2RS2 Quad Cities Generating Station; Radiation N/A

Protection Q2R23 Refueling Outage Report

2RS2 Quad Cities Generating Station; Radiation 07/25/2017

Protection Q1R24 Refueling Outage Report

2RS2 RP-AA-400-1001 Establishing Collective Radiation Exposure 4

Annual Business Plan Goals

2RS2 RP-AA-401 Operational ALARA Planning and Controls 22

2RS2 CC-AA-401 Maintenance Specification: Installation and 10

Control of Temporary Shielding

9

2RS2 RP-QC-552 Source Term Reduction External 1

System/Component Flushing

2RS2 RP-AA-402 Radiation Protection Dose Excellence Planning 8

Process

2RS2 RP-AA-402, Abbreviated Exposure Reduction Plan 2017- 0

Attachment 1 2021

2RS2 RP-AA-400 ALARA Program 14

2RS2 RP-AA-230 Operation of the Canberra FASTSCAN Whole 3

Body Counter Using ABACOS Plus

2RS2 RP-AA-227 Operation of the Canberra ACCUSCAN Whole 0

Body Counter

2RS2 RP-AA-700 Controls for Radiation Protection 4

Instrumentation

2RS2 RP-AA-700-1401 Operation and Calibration of Eberline Model 4

PM-7 Personnel Contamination Monitor

2RS2 RPP-AA-700- Calibration Data Sheet PM-7 Portal Monitor; 11/30/2017

1401, Portal Monitor Instrument #PM15

Attachment 3

2RS2 RP-AA-700-1218 Calibration of HI-VOL Air Samplers 3

2RS2 RP-AA-700- Radeco H-809C, H-809V-I; H-809V-II 07/19/2017

1218, Calibration Data Sheet; Radeco Serial Number

Attachment 1 HV098

2RS2 RP-AA-1208 Operation of the Shepherd Model 89 Calibrator 3

2RS2 RP-AA-700- Irradiator Reference Data Sheet; Instrument 08/10/2017

1208, Model Number MGP Telepole WR and FH-40

Attachment 1 GL/FH 40 TG and Telepole II

2RS2 RP-AA-700- Irradiator Reference Data Sheet; ADM-300 07/14/2017

1208, Calibration Record; ADM-300 Serial Number

Attachment 1 10651

2RS2 RP-AA-1231 Operation and Calibration of the Model LAM-11 2

Large Articles Monitor

2RS2 RP-AA-700- LAM Calibration Data Sheet; LAM-11 Serial 03/10/2017

1231, Number LAM1

Attachment 2

2RS2 RP-QC-711-100 Calibration of the IPM 7/8 Whole Body Monitors 0

2RS2 RP-QC-700-100, IPM 7/8 Calibration Record; Monitor Serial 01/10/2017

Attachment 1 Number 365

2RS2 RP-AA-700- SAM-12 Calibration Data Sheet; SAM-12 03/17/2017

1239, Serial #12234

Attachment 2

2RS2 RP-AA-700-1235 Operation and Calibration of the PM-12 3

Gamma Portal Monitor

2RS2 RP-AA-700- PM-12 Calibration Data Sheet; PM-12 Serial 07/07/2017

1235, Number PM1224

Attachment 3

2RS2 Certificate of Calibration; Asset/Equipment 02/22/2017

1. 0012244; Model #RO20AA

2RS2 Certificate of Calibration; Asset/Equipment 01/23/2017

1. 076568; Model #FH-40G-L

10

2RS2 Certificate of Calibration; Asset/Equipment 02/23/2017

1. 076728; Model #ASP-1 w/HP-220

2RS2 Certificate of Calibration; Asset/Equipment 03/26/2017

1. 076927; Model #ASP-1

2RS2 Certificate of Calibration; Asset/Equipment 02/22/2017

1. 0011992; Model Ludlum 3

2RS2 Certificate of Calibration; Asset/Equipment 08/30/2017

1. 0017511; Model # REM 500

2RS2 Certificate of Calibration; Asset/Equipment 03/08/2017

1. 0798022 Model #AMP-100

2RS2 Certificate of Calibration; Asset/Equipment 02/23/2017

1. 0015972; Model # AMS-4/AMS4OPT14

2RS2 RP-AA-700, Out of Tolerance Report; 0015972 03/02/2017

Attachment 1

2RS2 Certificate of Calibration; Asset/Equipment 02/23/2017

1. 078022; Model #FHZ 612

2RS2 RP-AA-700, Out of Tolerance Report; 078022 03/02/2017

Attachment 1

2RS2 NCS-16-001 Implementation of Weekly Source Checks for 06/03/2016

RCA/PA Exit Monitors

2RS2 QDC-15-005 Unconditional Release Detection Thresholds 12/30/2015

and Dose Consequences

2RS2 QDC-17-002 2017 LAM Calibration Parameters 11/22/2017

2RS2 WO 1739632-01 Replace DW Rad Monitor (2-2149-B) 12/23/2015

2RS2 IR 2622489 Check In Self-Assessment; Radiation 10/25/2016

Protection Instrumentation

2RS2 IR 3992875 NRC Inspection (71124.05) Radiation 10/23/2017

Monitoring Instrumentation Self-Assessment

2RS2 IR 04061863 Instruments Not Labelled Appropriately 10/11/2017

2RS2 IR 02652614 CCP: Contradiction between Plan Drawings for 04/07/2016

ARM 35 & 36

2RS2 Quad Cities 10 CFR 61 Program Waste Stream 2017

Characterization and Scaling Factor Review

2RS2 50.75(g) Documented Contaminated Areas; N/A

K:RP/50.75.g

2RS2 LS-AA-2090 Monthly Data Elements for NRC Reactor 07/27/2016

Coolant System (RCS) Specific Activity and through

Supporting Data 09/28/2017

Section 4OA1

4OA1 Operator Logs from 10/01/2016 to 09/30/2017

4OA1 Units 1 and 2 HPCI and RCIC

Unavailability/Demands Data from 10/01/2016

to 09/30/2017

4OA1 MSPI Basis Document 6a

Section 4OA2

4OA2 IR 4054673 U2 CRD Water Analysis Follow Up to

IR 4053654

4OA2 IR 4062547 CREV AC Temperature Indication Abnormal 10/13/2017

4OA2 IR 4066450 U1 1A 125V DC Battery Charger Amperage 10/24/2017

Oscillations

11

4OA2 IR 4066516 Very Slow Leak from 1A RHR Motor Lower 10/24/2017

Reservoir Drain Plug

4OA2 IR 4068539 Part 21 Potential Issue with Speed Switch 10/30/2017

4OA2 IR 4068562 Flex Generator #3 Diesel Fuel High in Water/ 10/30/2017

Sediment Test

4OA2 IR 4068571 Flex Diesel Generator #2 Diesel Fuel is 10/30/2017

Degraded

4OA2 IR 4068869 U1 Control Valve #1 Suicided Closed 10/31/2017

4OA2 Exelon Nuclear: Quad Cities Station- R.1: October

Regulatory Inspection Findings & Performance 2017

Indicator Overview

4OA2 IR 4074136 Debris Found Under Coupling of 2-6657 11/13/2017

4OA2 IR 4057926 1/2 EDG Governor Booster Pump Needs to be 10/01/2017

Replaced

4OA2 IR 4067226 1/2 EDG LCO Extent of Condition Issues 10/26/2017

4OA2 IR 4068869 U1 Control Valve #1 Suicided Closed 10/31/2017

4OA2 IR 4084574 Review of Dresden IR 4061472 for Impact at 12/15/2017

Quad Cities

4OA2 IR 4081789 OOT, PS 1-1462-A, Trend Code B1 12/07/2017

4OA2 IR 4084402 M&TE Evaluation Requires U1 QCIS 1400-01 12/15/2017

to be Re-Performed

4OA2 IR 4086596 RB Floor Drain Line Plugged 12/21/2017

4OA2 IR 4086637 Received Unexpected Alarms 902-4 G-18 and 12/21/2017

C-18

4OA2 IR 4086651 Suspect RBEDT Pump Degradation 12/21/2017

Section 4OA3

4OA3 IR 4050176 OOT, FIS 2-2354, Trend Code B2 09/08/2017

4OA3 IR 5054681 Refrigerant Leak on B Train of CR HVAC 11/09/2017

Compressor Piping

4OA5 Letter from Terracon Consultants to Exelon 09/19/2017

Business Services Co. Re: Plate Load Test

Submittal

4OA5 QCNPS 10 CFR 72.212 Evaluation Report 12

4OA5 ASTM Standard Test Method for Nonrepetitive Static Reapproved

D1196/D1196M Plate Load Tests of Soils and Flexible 2016

Pavement Components, for Use in Evaluation

and Design of Airport and Highway Pavements

4OA5 CoC 72-1014 Certificate of Compliance for Spent Fuel Amendment

Storage Casks, Issued to Holtec International 8

4OA5 Drawing B-2166 ISFSI Expansion Pad, Sheets 1-6 New

4OA5 Drawing B-2183 ISFSI Expansion Area, Final Slope New

Configuration

4OA5 EC 405175 Dry Cask Storage Project, Installation of ISFSI 0

Pad 2

4OA5 HI-2002444 Holtec International HI-STORM 100 System 11.1

FSAR

4OA5 QDC-0000-S- Evaluation of Buried Utilities and Existing 3A

1339 Building Foundations Along the Haul Path for

the Dry Cask Storage Project

12

4OA5 QDC-0836-S- Seismic Soil Liquefaction Evaluation for ISFSI 0

2205 Pad Site

4OA5 QDC-0836-S- Time History Generation for Non-Linear Soil- 0

2206 Structure-Interaction Analysis for ISFSI Pad

Expansion

4OA5 QDC-0836-S- Geotechnical Slope Stability Analysis for ISFSI 0

2234 Pad Expansion Project

4OA5 QDC-0836-S- Geotechnical Analysis of Bearing Capacity, 0

2235 Subgrade Modulus Parameters for ISFSI Pad

Expansion

4OA5 QDC-0836-S- Strain-Dependent Soil Properties for ISFSI Pad 0

2238 Expansion

4OA5 QDC-0836-S- Non-Linear Soil-Structure-Interaction (SSI) 0

2239 Analysis for ISFSI Pad Expansion

4OA5 QDC-0836-S- ISFSI Pad Design for ISFSI Pad Expansion 0

2240

4OA5 RRTI-2144-011 Response to Request for Technical Information 0

Holtec International

4OA5 Specification Q- ISFSI Expansion: ISFSI Pad, Final Grading 1

2052 and Misc. Concrete Structures

13

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

AC Air Conditioning

ADAMS Agencywide Document Access Management System

ALARA As-Low-As-Reasonably-Achievable

CAP Corrective Action Program

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

CoC Certificate of Compliance

CREV Control Room Emergency Ventilation

EAL Emergency Actions Level

EDG Emergency Diesel Generator

EHC Electro-hydraulic Control

FIS Flow Indicating Switch

FZ Fire Zone

HPCI High Pressure Coolant Injection

IMC Inspection Manual Chapter

IP Inspection Procedure

IR Issue Report

ISFSI Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation

LER Licensee Event Report

LOR Licensed Operator Requalification

LORT Licensed Operator Requalification Training

MCC Motor Control Center

MSPI Mitigating System Performance Index

NEI Nuclear Energy Institute

NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

PI Performance Indicator

SAT Systems Approach to Training

SBGT Standby Gas Treatment

SDP Significance Determination Process

SSMP Safe Shutdown Makeup Pump

TS Technical Specification

UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report

URI Unresolved Item

WO Work Order 14