ML20214J930

Forwards Changes Expected to Occur in Next Rev to Amend 18 of Fsar,Section 9.5 Re Fire Protection

ML20214J930
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	05/18/1987
From:	Carey J DUQUESNE LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
2NRC-7-131, TAC-62935, NUDOCS 8705280256
Download: ML20214J930 (17)

Text

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2NRC-7-13I (412)393 7546 Beaver Valley No. 2 Unit Project Organization Telecopy (412) 393-7889 S G

.Bof " May 18, 1987 shippingport, PA 15077 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

SUBJECT:

Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 2 Docket No. 50-412 FSAR Amendment 18 Changes - Section 9.5 Fire Protection Gentlemen:

Attached is a copy of changes which are currently expected to occur in the next revision to the Beaver Valley Unit 2 FSAR, Amendment No.18. The formal FSAR Amendaient will be the same or very similar to the attached copy.

If you should have any questions, please call Mr. R. W. Roth at (412) 643-5200, Extension 154.

DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY l

By J. Q/ Carey V Senior Vice President RWR/ijr NR/RWR/AMND/18 Attachments AR/NAR cc: Mr. P. Tam, Project Manager (w/a)

Mr. J. Beall, NRC Sr. Resident Inspector (w/a)

Mr. L. Prividy, NRC Resident Inspector (w/a)

Mr. William T. Russell, NRC Region I Administrator (w/a)

INP0 Records Center (w/o/a) 8705280256 870518 2 [

PDR ADCCK 0500 sj i

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission FSAR Amendment 18 Changes Page 2 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA )

) SS:

COUNTY OF BEAVER )

On this / - day of [4/p , /k[ , before me,- a Notary Public in and for said Commonwedith and County, personally appeared J.

J. Carey, who being duly sworn, deposed and said that (1) he is Senior Vice

, President of Duquesne Light, (2) he is duly authorized to execute and file the

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foregoing Submittal on behalf of said Company, and (3) the statements ' set forth in the Submittal are true and correct to the best of_ his knowledge.

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Notary Public sumA S. FAITSEE,30fARV PUEUC suirrimsresiese,sEMER COestV rY cossessies EIPseES SCT. 23,1950

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M6 BVPS-2 FSAR r -

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SUBJECT:

Modified Fire Doors Q/ 947/ [/C ,

Item C.5.a(5):

The Standard Review Plan states that door openings in fire barriers should be protected with equivalently rated doors, frames, and hardware. that have been tested and approved by . a nationally recognized laboratory. Such doors should be.self-closing or provided with closing mechanisms and ~ should be inspected semiannually to verify that automatic hold-open, release, and closing mechanisms and latches are operable. (See NFPA 80, " Fire Doors and Windows.")

Differences from the SRP:

, a. Fire door assemblies have been modified from their tested configuration by the addition of security hardware and alarm equipment as required.by NRt: regulation,

b. Rolling steel fire doors in the safeguards building have had the lower jam modified fre n the tested configuration to allow for the installation and removal of equipment. The rolling steel door separat.ing the turbine building and South office Shops Building (SOSB) is not fire-rated,

c. Special purpose-type door assemblies (containment access doors / hatches) are not UL rated.

, Justifications:

a. These modifications were made following the guidelines suggested by Underwriters Laboratories. They are similar to those made on BVPS-1 which were reviewed and found acceptable by the NRC. The door areas have either automatic detection and suppression or manual fire fighting equipment available in the areas. The security alarmed doors also have remote monitoring -capability via the security system video monitors and the alarm function in the event the door is left open, which would alert personnel of an abnormal condition in these areas.

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- hac.c.L,ik Fire door assemblies in fire barriers separating safety- N

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[W4 54-% related areas will bear a UL label denoting the required fire rating or the door will have certification from the

( vendor identifying the fire rating. ,

Table 9.5A-2 provides the list of fire doors with security modifications including the fire severities and methods of fire suppression for the areas separated by these doors.

b. The rolling steel doors in the north and south safeguards areas are not used to separate adjacent fire areas but are used to separate the stairwell within a fire area from the Amendment 16 9.5A-126 April 1987 4

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SUBJECT:

Safe Shutdown Components Item C.S.b The Standard Review Plan states that one of the redundant trains is to be free of fire damage so that safe shutdown can be . achieved.

This can be a,chieved by: '

a) Separating redundant trains by a fire barrier having a 3-hour rating.

b) Separating redundant trains by a horizontal distance of more than 20 feet with no intervening. combustibles or fire hazards. In addition, fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system should be installed in the fire area.

c) Enclosing one redundant train in a fire barrier having a 1-hour rating. In addition, fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system should be installed in the fire area.

Differences from the SRP:

The following safe shutdown components have not been provided with edequate separation as noted above:

DESCRIPTION MARK NUMBER FIRE AREA (1) Charging Pumps 2CHS*P21A,B,C PA-3 (2) Component Cooling Water Pumps 2CCP*P21A,B,C PA-3 (3) Boric Acid Transfer Pumps and 2CHS*P22A,B PA-4 Storage Tanks TK21A,B PA-4 (4) Charging System Control Valves 2CHS*LCV1158,D .PA-3 2CHS*FCV113A PA-3 2CHS*MOV350 PA-3 (5) Emergency Switchgear Supply 2HVZ*FN261A,8 CV-4 and Exhaust Fans 2HVZ*FN262A,5 CV-4 (C) Emergency Switchgear Supply 2HVZ* MOD 21A,8 CV-4 and Exhaust Dampers 2HVZ* MOD 22A,B (7) Emergency Exhaust Fans CV-4 2HVP*FN264A,8 PA-4 (8) Auxiliary Feedwater Control Valves 2FWE*HVC100A,B,C,D,E F SG-15 (9) Atmospheric Steam Dump Valves 2SVS*PCV101A,B,C MS-1 2SVS*HVC104 4y7 MS-1 (10) Main Steam Isolation valves 2 MSS

• 1A,B,C . MS-1 (11) Equipment inside containment (Various) RC-1 Justifications:

1. The charging pumps (2CHS*P21A,B,C) are located in three cubicles adjacent to each other in the auxiliary. building, el. 735 ft-6 in. The. communicating walls between the

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Amendment 14 9.5A-129 February 1987 I

EVPS-2 FSAR j cubicles are 2-foot-thick concrete _ walls with " all penetrations sealed with 3-hour fire seals.

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e west wall of each cubicle is composed of a 4 roos- m T concrete block wall with a small' opening at the top for the crane . rail to pass through. The wall is built up of removable concrete - sections to facilitna --- -I ^F a-(

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charcina pump for maistenance T The- east wall of each cubicle is a 2-foot-thick concrete wall and has a labyrinth-type opening for missile and radiation scatter protection.

Charging pumps are arranged such that the "A" pump is separated by more than 20 feet from the "B" pump with the "C" pump (swing pump) in between. Walls extend from a 3-hour rated floor to a 3-hou'r rated ceiling. Power cables to l' redundant pump trains are provided with full 3-hour

separation. A curb.is provided in each opening to contain

' any oil spills within the cubicle. Each cubicle is provided with a drain to prevent accumulation of spilled oil.

i Additionally, the entire area of PA-3 including the cubicles is protected by an early warning smoke detection system.

.The total combustible loading for the PA-3 area in which the-three cubicles are located is less than 1-hour duration.

Each charging pump contains 51 gallons of lube oil which equates to a less than 1/2-hour fire duration.- Note that this assumes a total burnout of the entire inventory of oil which could only be coincident with a total failure of the cubicle drainage system.

Cable insulation composes the majority of the fire loading in PA-3. All cables not in conduit are IEEE-383-1974 rated, which inhibits fire spread. This cable will not propagate fire even if its outer covering and insulation have been destroyed in the area of flame impingement. BVPS-2 postulates the worst possible fire in ~ 'thi's area to be a slow-developing cable type of fire. This type of fire would be detected in its incipient stages by the early warning smoke detection system and responded to by the plant fire brigade prior to the development of any major fire involvement.

DLC administratively controls all flammable liquids. For radiological reasons, these cubicles are restricted access and out of normal travel routes.

Therefore, considering the original des'ign philosophies, the type of fire hazard, the worst postulated fire, the separation of the cubicles, the smoke detection system, and the lack of transient combustibles, this configuration i ensures that at least one train will be free of fire damage  !

to achieve safe shutdown. i I

Amendment 14 9.5A-130 February 1987

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B'JPS-2 FSAR hh cubiele would be controlled and extinguished within the cubicle.

4. Charging System Suction Valves-The charging system is used to previde borated water to the reactor coolant system using the charging pumps. The charging pumps are provided with four suction paths for safe shutdown. Two paths are from the refueling water storage tank (suction isolation 2CHS*HOV350 and 2CHS*FCV113A). The refueling water suction valves (2CHS*LCV115B and D) are located together in the valve cubicle on the 718 ft-6 in.

d elevation of the auxiliary building. The boric acid storage tank suction valves (2CHS*MOV350 and 2CHS*FCV113A) are located together on the 710 ft-6 in. elevation of the auxiliary building. These valves are not separated by 3-hour fire. barrier and there is approximately 15 feet between the 2CHS*LCV115B and D valves and the 2CHS*MOV350 and 2CHS*FCV113A valves. For radiation hazard reasons, these areas are restricted access and are out of normal plant travel routes. The only combustible within the area are the motor cperators on the valves. The motors are totally enclosed and a total burnout of one motor would not affect the operation of the other motors. The valves can be ppened manually if required and the cables to 2CHS*LCV11$Dhavear 15 been protected in place by a 1-hour' fire-rated material.

Due to the fact that only one out of the four valves has to operate, the area contains negligible combustibles (all cables'in the area are in conduits), and the area is provided with general area fire detection and hose racks and portable fire extinguishers, a fire in the area will not prevent safe shutdown.

5. Emergency Switchgear Room Supply and Exhaust Fans (2HVZ*FN261A,B and 262A,B)

The supply fans (2HVZ"FN261A,B) supply air to the emergency switchgear rooms (SB-1 and SB-2). These fans are axial fans and are located (along with the motors) in the ductwork in the cable vault rod control area, el 773 ft-6 in. (CV-4).

The fans are parallel to one another and only one fan is required for shutdown. The motors for the fans are totally enclosed motors and the cables for 2HVZ*FN261A are protected in place with a 1-hour fire-rated material in the area outside of the ductwork.

Based on the design of the ductwork, the negligible combustible loading (all cables are in conduits in this area), the fire detection system, and manual hose racks, adequate protection is provided to prevent the spread of a fire from one fan to the other.

Amendment 14 9.5A-132 February 1987

SUPS-2 FSAR

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8. The auxiliary feedwater control valves are located is'the south safeguards building (SG-15). These valves.are hydro-electrically operated, normally open valves, that on loss of electrical control fail as is, and on loss of hydraulic oil,

' auxiliary feedwater flow will open the valve (the desired position). The combustible loading in SG-15 is less than 1/2 hour. Throttling.on the discharge valve for auxiliary feedwater pump 2FWE-P238 can be done to achieve shutdown.

9. The atmospheric steam dump. valves (2SVS*PCV101A, B, and C

' and 2SVS*HCV104) are all located in the main steam valve house and have not been provided with 3-hour separation.

They are partially separated by concrete walls which extend at least 2 feet beyond the valves. The valves are' located approximately 25 feet above the floor. The main steam valve house has a combustible loading of less than 1/2 hour.

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, 10. The mainsteamisolationvalves(2 MSS 9([FICIA,B,andC)are located in the main steam valve house. The valves are-

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required to close to provide isolation for the steam generators.

ine main steam valves are normally latenen open-a w-f during p operation. The valves are closed by springs f when the latch is released.. Only one out of the three solenoid operated valves per main steam valves is required to operate to close .the main steam valve. . Two of the edG/ j$ solenoids are designed *n Am-enorcize while the third 1 3/

desianed to energize.1 The main steam valve house.has a fire l Skete/ severity rating of <1/2 hour and automatic fire detection 1

ggj_jyy with hose racks and portable fire extinguishers has been; 4#'*~ provided. Therefore a fire in the area will not prevent the main steam isolation valves from closing.

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11. The following systems have equipment located in the primary-3 reactor containment (RC-1):

a. Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Letdown j b. RCS Depressurization i

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c. Process Instrumentation

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j d.* Residual Heat Removal (RHS) e' . Safety Injection Accumulator Isolation / Venting The following assumptions were used in evaluating system i

availability and dictating manual actions.

a. The plant experiences a fire in Fire. Area RC-1.

! b. The fire is localized in nature and fires are not postulated from transient sources.

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Amendment 14 9.5A-134 February 1987

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SUBJECT:

Safe Shutdown Circuitry, ,

Item C.5.b: ,

h The Standard Review Plan states that one of the redundant trains is to be, free of fire damage so that safe shutdown can be achieved.

This can be achieved by:

i .

a) Separating redundant trains by a fire barrier having a 3-

, hour rating. 1 b) Separating redundant trains by a horizontal distance of more than 20 feet with no intervening combustibles or fire hazards. In addition, fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system should be installed in the fire area.

c) Enclosing one redundant train in a fire barrier having a 1-hour rating. In addition, fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system should be installed in the fire area.

Differences from the SRP: ,

The following areas have redundant circuitry and do.not meet the j guidelines of C.S.b, nor is alternate shutdown capability provided (1) Cable Vaults (CV-4 and CV-5)

(2) Primary Auxiliary Building (PA-4)-

(3) South Safeguards Building (SG-15)

(4) Service Building Normal Switchgear (55-4)

C5 CAs p.;.p .s~ pas s .G- sehe om (M-tJ Justif cation:

3,5 (1) Fire Areas CV-4 and CV-5 contain redundant circuitry for various components of the emergency switchgear ventilation systems. The i

combustible loading for each area is less than 1/2 hour. All cables in these areas are routed in conduit. In addition, orange 4

' cables for the equipment have been protected using a 1-hour fire-wrap material. Fire detection for these areas consists of area i

ionization detectors which alarm locally and in the control room.

Portable fire extinguishers are located in these areas with manual hose stations located immediately adjacent to these areas.

Based'en the low combustible loading fire detection present, and the fact that redundant cabling required for shutdown has been provided with additional protection, the means of suppression is adequate to protect the hazard and provide the required separation. N _

(2) The auxiliary building, elevation 755 ft-6 in contains redundant circuitry for various shutdown components. The combustible  !

loading for this area is less than 1/2 hour. This area is compartmentalized for radiological and safety-related concerns.

Various cabling has been protected using a 1-hour fire-wrap Amendment 16 9.5A-144 April 1987 i

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BVPS-2 FSAR f[

material. Fire detection for these areas consists of area ionization detectors which alarm locally and in the control room.

Portable fire extinguishers are located in the' -area and manual hose stations are located in the stairwells adjacent to this area. Based on the low amount of combustible loading, the fire detection present, and the fact that redundant cabling required  ;

for shutdown has been provided with additional protection, the means of suppression available is adequate to protect the hazard and provide the required separation.

(3) The south safeguards building contains redundant circuitry for  !

various components of the auxiliary feedwater system. The I loading for the combustible fire area is less than 1/2 hour.

Purple cables for this equipment have been protected using 1-hour fire-wrap material.

Fire detection for this area consists of area ionization detectors which alarm locally and in the control room. Portable fire extinguishers and manual hose stations are located in this area. Based on the low combustible loading, the fire detection present, and the fact that redundant cabling required for shutdown has been provided with additional protection, the means of suppression is adequate to protect the hazard and provide the required separation.

(4) The service building normal switchgear room contains redundant circuitry for the ventilation systems to the emergency diesel generator. building. The combustible loading for this fire area is less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. Orange cables for the equipment have been protected in place using a 1-hour fire-rated material. Fire detection for this area consists of area . ionization smoke detectors which alarm locally and in the control room. Portable fire extinguishers and manual hota stations are located in the area. Based on the low combunible loading, the fire detection present, and the fact that redundant cabling required for i

shutdown has been provided with additional protection, the means of suppression is adequate to protect the hazard and provide the required separation.

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• 9.5A-145 April 1987 i

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BUPS-2 FSAR

SUBJECT:

Cable Rooms: CO 2 Vs Water  !

Item C.S.e(2):

The SRP states that in other areas where it may not be possible because of other overriding design features necessary for reasons of nuclear safety to separate redundant safety-related cable systems by 3-hour-rated fire barriers, cable trays should be protected by an automatic water system with open-head deluge or open directional spray nozzles arranged so that adequate water coverage is provided for each cable tray. Such cable trays should also be protected from the effects of a potential exposure fire by providing automatic water suppression in the area where such a fire could occur. The capability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown considering the effects of a fire involving fixed and potential transient combustibles should be evaluated with and without actuation of the automatic suppression system and should be justified on a suitably defined basis.

Difference from the SRP The following fire areas use CO, as the primary automatic suppressant '

instead of waters a) Control Building' (Fire Areas CB-1, CB-2, and CT-1) b) Cable Vaults (CV-1, 2, and 3)

{ c) Service Building Elevation 745 ft-6 in. (SB-4)

Justification:

The automatic or manual, double-capacity, total flooding CO 2 system, in conjunction with the hose rack stations and portable fire extinguishers, provides adequate protection to extinguish fires and ensure the safety of these areas.

Two potential fires are postulated for these areas: a short-circuit-induced cable fire and a fire involving transient combustibles.

Hazardous quantities of transient combustibles are not expected in these areas for several reasons. First, the areas are not near any major plant traffic route. Second, maintenance and operations in these areas do not involve the use of combustible materials. Third, accessibility to these areas is restricted to personnel performing essential duties. The potential for a cable fir limited by the use of IEEE 363 qualified cable throughout.

dditionally,allpoweb caDAe in enese areas is run in coliauits; only low nower control or/

instrumentation cabling is run in trays. The cable trays ari Ided wittli cable tray covers and/or ottoms to conform with Regulatory Guide 1.75.

i Fire detection is provided by the early warning fire detection system  !

which provides fire alarms locally and in the control room. '

Qiuli ply capacIfis~ available for a secoiid shual appli' cati ~o~n,/ o a'The$ l

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Amendment 14

' ht f'7 9.5A-150 February 1987 l l

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.t 1 j n ".r. ,

A q l s / BVPS-2 F5AR f,.,:.n,

'l Coa qsystto is ' f. designed to attain a 50-peident 1 \Q.I concentratten j ,

as

/g f

/

. secommended for cable fires (NFPA-12). Automatic actuation of the CO systes,is provided by the "XL-3" fire detection system which is a

-3 j i_I " Priority

• system with local and cortrol room. alarms. The alarms

.i I

Q enaoLe the.; control room to be aware of the status and availability of

'c /- ,

the con system et all times. A timed delay is provided in the co it.itiation cycle to provide for personnel encuation. co, supply capacity-is available for a sectsd manual application. Co, will y penetrate to *he source of the fire and is less likely to cause

^' . I damage to electrical equipment. Hose racks are provided at the-j entrance to the cak,',.e spreading room, and all trays can be reached by s hose streams'. x /,

'e< j {

Penetruiocs (to. thue areas are sealed to prevent leakage of Coa

~

to occupied spacek Yoperating personnel of Unit 1 have had several 1 years of experien:s with total flooding con systems. All personnel i

are trained in alarn recognition and evacuation procedures. The systems are generally disarmed- only during an outage for major maintenance functions, and a fire watch is posted during the disarmed period. The system is not disarmed during daily operational s activities in the area. In the unlikely event of a fire in this 3',.g/t) area, the fir *>Te9 would be required to have breathing apparatus. .

Ine cable trays located in these areas are utilized largely for y instrumentation and control cables. These trays will be provided '

with flat, unventilated covers and/or bottoms. dower r =m a = =ra (2n riola conouit.y The presence of tray covers inhibits the ability PN of water to reach potential tray fires. co nby virtue of its gaseous  ;

' state, will penetrate into the -cable trays and provide fire suppression' to the fire in its incipient stage and will prevent a deep-seated fire from occurrir.g. Due to the stack arrangements of the cable trays and the fact that the trays are provided with covers 2<

3 e

and/or' bottoms, a ceiling-mounted automatic water suppression system y would not provide adequate

? extinguished. assurance that- a fire will be

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i Amendment 16 9.54-151 April 1987 l

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l BVPS-2 FSAR '

SUBJECT:

Cable Spreading Room /W51  !

Item C.7.c:

, The Standard Review Plan states thats

a. The primary fire suppression in the cable spreading room. -

should be an automatic water system.

b. A 3 feet wide by 8 feet high aisle separation should be provided between tray stacks.

c. Continuous line-type heat detectors should be provided for cable trays. -

Differences from the SRP:

a. The primary fire suppression system for the BVPS-2 cable spreading room is an automatic or manual, double-capacity, total flooding CO 2 system. Mose rack stations and portable fire extinguishers are provided as backup suppression.

[ b. There are certain aisles in the cable spreading room which are partially blocked by structural members resulting in 1

aisle dimensions which are less than the 3 feet wide by 8 feet high criterion.

c.

i BVPS-2 has been equipped with alternate means of detecting cable fires.

Justification:

a. The automatic or manual, double-capacity, total flooding Coa system, in conjunction with the hose rack stations and portable fire extinguishers, provides. adequate protection to extinguish fires and ensure the safety of the cable spreading room.

l

Two potential fires are postulated for the. cable spreading areas a short-circuit-induced cable fire' and 'a fire involving transient combustibles. Hazardous quantities of transient combustibles are not expected in these areas for several reasons. First, the areas are not near any major plant traffic route. Second,-maintenance and operations 'in these areas do not involve the use of combustible materials.

Third, accessibility to these areas ~is restricted . to -  ;

personnel performing essential duties. The potential for a  !

cable fire is limited by the use of IEEE 383 qualified cable-throuchout. [Auw haunally, all power cacAe an enese areas is l run in conVuits: only low power control or instrumentati- 4 cabling is run in traysf The cable trays are provided with j Amendment 14 9.5A-158 February 1987 i

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. BUPS-2 FSAR

SUBJECT:

Safety-Related Pumps Item C.7.k:

The Standard Review Plan recommends that pump houses and rooms housing each redundant safety-related pump trains should be separated from other and from other areas of the plant by fire barriers having at least 3-hour ratings.

{

Difference from the SRP:

)

The fuel pool cooling pumps are not_ required for safe shutdown following a fire and are protected by means other than 3-hour barriers. (For safety-related pumps and tanks used for safe shutdown, see Item c.5.b - Safe Shutdown components.) f Justification:

The fuel pool cooling pumps are not required for safe shutdown as a result of fire in any plant area. Fire detection is accomplished by the use of ionization detectors, which have audible alarms locally and audiovisual annunciation in the main control room. Portable extinguishers and suppression. hose rack stations are available for fire These pumps are located in areas with low comhustible loading. Refer J

- to the fire hazards analysis for area (@N, SG-15, au g FB-1. In the event s that both fuel pool cooling pumps are lost, the fuel pool 7 [C can this purpose. with service water through a connection provided for be cooled Amendment 14 9.5A-161 February 1987

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