ML20214D318
"Draft Meeting" is not in the list (Request, Draft Request, Supplement, Acceptance Review, Meeting, Withholding Request, Withholding Request Acceptance, RAI, Draft RAI, Draft Response to RAI, ...) of allowed values for the "Project stage" property.
| ML20214D318 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 11/18/1986 |
| From: | Tam P Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| TAC-62935, NUDOCS 8611240018 | |
| Download: ML20214D318 (13) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION y
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'/. E WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 November 18, 1986 g,,
Docket No. 50 41?
APPLICANT:
Duquesne Light Company FACILITY:
Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit ? (RVPS-2)
SUBJECT:
SUMMARY
OF MEETfNG ON NOVEMBER 5,1986 FIRE PROTECTION ISSUES The sub,iect meeting was held upon the applicant's request to discuss various fire protection issues at BVPS-P. Enclosure 1 is the agerda of the meeting. is the meeting attendee list.
A copy of Section 9.5.1 (See Enclosure 3) from draft SER Supplement 3 (SSEP-3) was provided by the pro,iect manager. Applicant personnel commented on the draft, indicating that a future submittal would change some of the statements.
The staff heard the comments but stated that the draft was written based on material submitted; any changes as a result of future submittals will be addressed in SER supplements after SSER-3. The staff further stated that a license condition will be imposed on the BVPS-? license, in accordance with current practice, anc' that the provisions in Generic Letter 86-10 should be used in interpreting the license condition.
The applicant provided a list (Enclosure 41 showing all kncwn deviations from Standard Review Plan 9.5.1.
Details of these deviations and their review status were discussed. Those deviations that the applicant has not submitted will be submitted around the end of November. The staff stated that the submittal should clearly identify identical deviations at Unit I that have been approved. The staff would accept these identical deviations based on evaluations performed on Unit 1, sub.iect to findings to be made at the NRR audit.
The applicant informed the staff that the Fire Protection Evaluation Report has been updated and will be submitted as Appendix 9.5A to the FSAR.
The staff stated that Region I and NRP would each conduct a fire protection audit prior to licensing. Applicant personnel requested that the two audits be conducted concurrently, i.e., during the first part of February 1987 kk Dock o
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The staff expressed the desire to publish the evaluation of the applicant's new and revised deviations prior to the audits.
1 Peter S. Tam, Proiect Manager Proiect Directorate No. 2 Division of PWR Licensing-A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosures:
As stated cc: See next page DISTRIBUTION DocketJ1E NRC PDR Local PDR PAD #2 Reading J. Partlow L. Rubenstein P. Tam D. Miller i
OELD E. Jordan B. Grimes ACRS (10)
NRC Participants LA PM: PAD #
C PTam[ab11/4/8 1
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s Mr. J. J. Carey Duquesne Light Company Deaver Vallev 2 Power Station cc:
Gerald Charnoff, Esc.
Mr. R. E. Martin, Manager
.Tay E. Silberg, Esq.
Regulatory Affairs Shaw, Pittman, Potts 1. Trowbridge Duquesne Licht Company 2300 N Street, N.W.
Reaver Valley Two Proiect Washington, PC 20037 P. O. Rox 328 Shioringoort, Pennsylvania 15077 Mr. C. W. Ewing, Quality Assurance Zori Ferkin Manager Assistant Counsel Quality Assurance Department Governor Energy Council Duquesne Light Company 16?5 N. Front Street P. O. Box 186 Harrisburg, PA 15105 Shippingport, Pennsylvania 15077 j
John D. Burrows, P.E.
Director, Pennsylvania Emergency Director of Utilities Manacement Agency State of Ohio Room B-151 Public Utilities Commission Transportation & Safety Puf1 ding 180 East Broad Street Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120 Columbus, Ohio 43266-0573 Mr. T. J. Lex Bureau of Radiation Protection Westinghouse Electric Corporation PA Department of Environmental Power Systems Resources P. O. Box 355 ATTN:
D. Janati Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15?30 P.O. Box 2063 Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17170 Mr. P. RaySircar Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation BVPS-2 Records Management Sunervisor P. O. Box 2325 Duouesne Light Company Roston, Massachusetts 02107 Post Office Box 4 Shippingport, Pennsylvania 15077 Mr. J. Beall U. S. NRC John A. Lee, Esq.
P. O. 181 Ouquesne Light Company Shippingport, Pennsylvania 15077 1 0xford Centre 301 Grant Street Mr. Thomas E. Purley, Degional Admin.
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15?79
!!. S. NRC, Region I i
631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 15?29 a
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BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION - UNIT 2 Meeting on Fire Protection Issues November 5, 1986 I. Opening statements (P. Tam, NRC; J. O'Neal, Duquesne Light Co. )
II. Technical Presentation (Duquesne Light Company personnel)
- 1. Draft SSER-3
- 2. FSAR Update:
- a. New arrangement of material
- b. Schedule for submittal to NRC
- 3. SRP 9.5.1 differences III. NRC staff / consultant caucus IV.
Closing statenents
- NRC site visit date
- submittal on cable spreading room backfit issue
- others.
E*1C lo s 'tra 1 Beaver Valley Unit 2 Meeting November 5,1986 Attendee Organization
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4 9 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS 9.5 Other Auxiliary Systems 9.5.1 Fire Protection Program In the SER, the staff identified two unresolved fire protection issues (open issue 5 and backfit issue 7).
The applicant still has not provided the infor-mation needed to resolve these issues.
However, by letters dated March 17, May 24, and October 8, 1985, the applicant provided additional information and requested approval of additional deviations fro'm Branch Technical Position (BTP)
CMEB 9.5-1.
This supplement includes the staff's evaluation of this information and of the Final Safet.y Analysis Report up to Amendment 12.
The staff will condition, in accordance with current standard practice, the Beaver Valley Unit 2 operating license to require that the applicant implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program.
This is tracked as license condition 2.
9.5.1.4 General Plant Guidelines Building Design In the SER, the staff stated that 3-hour fi.re-rated damper assemblies are pro-vided in all ventilation ducts that penetrate 3-hour fire-rated barriers and that the damper assemblies are Underwriters Laboratories,'Inc. (UL) labeled.
By letter dated March 27, 1985, the applicant informed the staff that the 1- -hour-rated fire damper assemblies are installed in series in each duct penetrating a 3-hour fire rated barrier, Moreover, because the applicant redefined the fire area boundaries, some damper assemblies had to be installed within completed heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HAVC) systems.
These damper assemblies are located close to, but not within,.the fire barrier penetration.
To compensate for the damper location, the applicant enclosed the ductwork from the fire barrier to the fire damper assembly with 3-hour fire-rated barrier material.
Beaver Valley 2 SSER 3 9-1
In-the March 27, 1985, letter, the applicant also informed the staff that although all of the fire damper assemblies were purchased as UL-labeled units, the manufacturer had removed the UL label from the assemblies because they were not tested in the series configuration, and because they were not tested with carbon dioxide fire-suppression-system-actuated release devices.
For a fire to spread between fire areas through an HVAC system duct, it would have to burn through the duct in one fire area, through two 1\\-hour fire rated dampers, and finally, through the duct in the adjoining area.
In the staff's opinion, the two 1 -hour fire-rated dampers will provide the equivalent fire resistance of one 3-hour fire-rated damper.
The 3-hour fire rated wrap around the ducts constitutes continuous fire-rated construction which will prevent fire spread through the ductwork between the fire barrier and the fire dampers.
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The release device is a plunger operated pin that 1:E:: "^ niace af the fusible link for damper actuation.
The device is UL-listed for this service and, in the staff's opinion, will not reduce the effectiveness of the dampers actuated by the devices.
The staff concludes that the fire dampers, as installed, will prevent fire spread from onc fire area,to another.
The damper installation is, therefore, an acceptable deviation from Section C.5.a(4) of BTP CMEB 9.5-1.
By letter dated March 27, 1985, the applicant requested ten deviations from BTP CMEB 9.5-1 to the extent that it requires the separation of safety-related systems by 3-hour fire-rated barriers.
By telephone conversation of September 24, 1985, the staff informed the applicant that sufficient informa-tion had not been provided for the staff to complete its review of the devia-tion requests.
On October 22, 1985, the staff met with the applicant to discuss the deviations from BTP CMEB 9.5-1.
At the close of the meeting, the applicant agreed to revise and resubmit the deviation requests for staff review.
Pending staff receipt and review of the revised deviation requests, this action will be added to confirmatory issue 48, part (c).
In the SER, the staff stated that the main transformer is located more than 50 feet from any building or is separated from the building by 3-hour fire i
1 Beaver Valley 2 SSER 3 9-2
walls.
In FSAR Amendment 12, the applicant stated that the main transformer is located less than 50 feet from the turbine building and that the exterior tur-bine building wall in this area is 2-hour fire rated.
However, on the basis of the evaluation of the station service transformers stated in the SER, the' staff finds this acceptable.
This closes part (a) of confirmatory issue 48.
Safe-Shutdown Capability / Alternate or Dedicated Shutdown Capability The applicant still has not provided additional information required for the staff to complete its review.
Open issue 5, therefore, remains unresolved.
Safe-Shutdown Components By letter dated March 27, 1985, the applicant requested a deviation from Sec-tion C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 for fire area PA-3 to the extent that it requires the separation of redundant safe-shutdown components by 3-hour fire rated barriers.
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This fire area is located on auxiliary bliilding elevation 735 feet 6 inches.
The two redundant and one swing charging pumps are located in this area, one in each of three adjacent cubicles.
The walls between cubicles are reinforced concrete with 3-hour fire-rated penetration seals.
The west wall of each cubicle is concrete block with a small crane rail opening; the east wall of each cubicle is reinforced concrete with a labyrinth-type opening.
A curb is provided across each opening and a drain is provided in each cubicle.
The equivalent fire severity per cubicle is less than hour.
Existing fire pro-tection consists of portable extinguishers, hose stations, and an areawide ionization-type smoke-detection system.
The staff was concerned that a fire originating either outside of or within one of the pump cubicles would result in loss of safe-shutdown capability.
- However, because the fuel load in each cubicle is low, the staff does not expect a fire of significant magnitude or duration to occur.
If a fire occurs anywhere in the fire area, it would be detected by the ionization detectors and extinguished by the plant's fire brigade before spreading into or from a pump cubicle.
In the staff's opinion, any fire would, at most, cause damage to one shutdown l
l Beaver Valley 2 SSER 3 9-3
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system, but *wuld not propagate horizontally and damage the redundant pump before self-extinguishing or being extinguished by the plant's fire brigade.
On the basis of this evaluation, the staff concludes that the lack of complete 3-hour fire-rated barriers around each redundant charging pump is an acceptable deviation from Section C.S.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1.
9.5.1.5 Fire Detection and Suppression Fire Detection In the SER, the staff stated that the fire detection alarm system complied with National Fire Protection Association Standard NFPA 72D for a Class A system.
During the December 5, 1984, site visit, the staff raised concerns about com-pliance of the fire alarm system with NFPA 72D with regard to circuit super-vision.
By [[letter::05000334/LER-1985-007, :on 841130,during QC Insp of Hydraulic Snubbers,Oil Reservoirs to Four Snubbers Positioned So That Existence of Positive Fluid Head to Snubber Seals Could Not Be Verified.Two Snubbers Found Inoperable|letter dated May 24, 1985]], the applicant verified that all circuits of the fire-detection system are Class A.
This resolves the staff's concerns.
CarbonDioxideFire-SuppreskionSystems l
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i In the SER, the staff stated that the carbon dioxide fire-suppression systems comply with Section C.6.e of:BTP CMEB 9.5-1 and are, therefore, acceptable.
However, during the December 5, 1984, plant site visit, the staff observed that the manual release stations and the fire alarm control panels were not listed for use with carbon dioxide fire-suppression systems.
By [[letter::05000334/LER-1985-007, :on 841130,during QC Insp of Hydraulic Snubbers,Oil Reservoirs to Four Snubbers Positioned So That Existence of Positive Fluid Head to Snubber Seals Could Not Be Verified.Two Snubbers Found Inoperable|letter dated May 24, 1985]], the applicant verified that, with the exception of the fire alarm control panel cabinet enclos,ures, all components of the control panel assemblies and all other interrelate'd system components are UL-listed for use in carbon dioxide fire-suppression systems.
The staff finds this acceptable.
9.5.1.6 Fire Protection of Specific Plant Areas Cable Spreading Room In its discussion of the resolution of backfit issue 7, the staff stated in the l
SER that (1) the applicant should implement the recommendations provided by the Beaver Valley 2 SSER 3 9-4
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applicant's human factors expert in his letter dated March 18, 1985 (this letter was submitted to the NRC attached to the applicant's letter dated April 25, 1985; the date quoted in the SER was " April 15, 1985" and was erroneous),
(2) the temporary ramps and platforms needed to facilitate passage should be replaced with permanent installations that are of sufficient size and design to allow safe passage for fire fighters, (3) training should be provided for the fire brigade, and (4) there was not reasonable assurance that a hose stream could reach the dense cable tray array located in the northwest corner of the cable spreading room in order to extinguish deep-seated fires within the array.
The staff identified item 4 as a deviation from BTP CMEB 9-5.1 and requested 4
that the applicant justify the deviation to the staff.
By letter dated October 8, 1985, the applicant informed the staff in response to item 4, above, that several improvements were implemented to enhance manual fire-fighting capabilities for this area..These improvements included the removal of the control room bench board access platforms and the relocation of conduits to improve fire brihade access, and the use of special purpose nozzles to allow the fire brigade to reach this. area with effective hose streams.
The
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applicant has not responded to items 1,/, or 3.
The staff considers fire sup-2 pression for the cable spreading room an unresolved item pending receipt and review of the applicant's response to items 1, 2, and 3, and a plant site visit to evaluate the modifications made to facilitate fire brigade access to the northwest corner of the room.
These actions will continue to be tracked by backfit issue 7 and confirmatory issue 48, part (b), respectively.
9.5.1.7 Summary of Approved Deviations From BTP CMEB 9.5-1 The SER provides details on six deviations from BTP CMEB 9.5-1.
On the basis of the above evaluation, the staff concludes that the following' additional deviations are acceptable (numbered as a continuation of listing in the SER):
(7) HVAC system fire damper assemblies (9.5.1.4)
(8) separation of redundant charging pumps with 3-hour fire-rated barriers (9.5.1.4)
Beaver Valley 2 SSER 3 9-5
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Page 1 of BVPS Unit 2 - SRP 9.5.1 Summarized List of Differences SRP PAGE DESCRIPTION
STATUS Page 21 C.2.e Validity Period of Hot Work Permit PAGE 23 C.3.b Fire brigade (physical exam frequency)
Accepted Page 28 C.S.a(1) Building design (Structural Steel not Protected)
PAGE 29 C.S.a(3) Conduita/ Penetration Seala PAGE 29 C.S.a(4) Ventilation Penetration Openings (Two 1-1/2hr.
Fire Dampera, and CO2 actuated Fire Dampera)
Accepted (1)
PAGE 29 C.5.a(4) One Hour Fire Wrap of Ductwork
- Fire dampera located outside fire barriers.
- No fire dampers at barrier (wrapping entire ductwork in fire area and fire loding less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />)
- No fire dampers at barrier with fire loading less a
than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> with auto supp. and det.
PAGE 29 C.S.a(5) Fire Doors 1
- Security moda - UL Rating
- Rolling Steel Door in Safeguards Bldg............... Accepted PAGE 31 C.S.a(13) Outdoor Transformera
<<50' distance from Accepted (2) buildings)
- TR-2A and 2B
- TR-2C and 2D
- TR-MT-2 (main transformer)
PAGE 31 C.S.b Safe Shutdown Capability Safe Shutdown Components:
-Chg. Pumps 2CHS=P21A,B C.............................. Accepted (1)
-CCP Pumps 2CCP=P21A,B,C
-Boric Acid Transfer Pumps & Tanka (2CHS P22A OR B, TK21A AND B
-Chg. System Control Valves 2CHS=LCV115B&D,FCV-113A, MOV-350
-Emergency Switchgear Supply and Exhaust Fana (2HV2=FN261A,261B,262A, and 262B
-Emergency Switchgear Supply and Exhaust Dampers (2HV2= MOD 21A&B, and MOD 22A&B,respectively)
-Emergency Exhaust Fana (HVP=FN264A & B)
-Aux FW Control Valves 2FWE=HVC100A,B,C,D.E.F
-Atmospheric Steam Dump Valves 2SVS PCV101A,B and C 2SVS=HCV104 Main Steam Imolation Valves (2 MSS =HYV 101A,B and C
-Control Building HVAC Supply and Exhaust Fana (2HVC=FN265A, 266A and 266B)
-Reactor Containment:
Pega 2 of
+ -
e BVPS Unit 2 - SRP 9.5.1 Summarized List of Differences SRp PAGE DESCRIPTION
STATUS
- RHR Pumps 2RHS*21A&B
- Cable Penetration Aream Inalde Containment (Orange and Purple Treina)
- Pressure Level
- Letdown Page 31 C.5.b Safe Shutdown Capability:
Safe Shutdown Circuitry
- Fire Aream CV-4,CV-5,PT-1.SG-15,PA-4 Page 34 C.5.d(5) Hydrogen Piping (Cleas II)
Accepted Page 34' C.5.e(2) Cable Trays Outside of Cable Spreading area
' Continuous Line-Type Heat Detectora Page 35 C.5.e(2) Concentrated Cable Trey Aress/ Primary Fire Accepted Suppression Manual Home Stations.
Fire Areas:
- RC-1 Reactor Contanment
- PA-3 PAB Elev. 735-6"
- PA-4 PAB Elev. 755-6" Page 35 C.5.e(2) Cable Rooma:
- Primary Suppression la Carbon Dioxide Includes:
-Cable Vaulta (CV-1,2 and 3)
-Elev. 745 of Service Building Page 36 C.S.f(3) Control Room Ventilation
- Power Cables Routed Within Area Accepted Page 36 C.5.g(1) Emergency Lighting
-Use of Security Lighting for outside Yard Areaa Page 37 C.6.a(3) Line-type Heat Detectors N/A Page 43 C.7.a(1)(c) Containment:
-General Area Detection for Containment i
Page 44 C.7b Control Room:
Accepted
-Peripheral Room'a separated by ihr (NSS office)
-Cabling Routed in CR underfloor
-Carpeting Page 45 c.7.c Cable Spdg. Room:
-Primary Suppression la Carbon Dioxide Backfit Item 7
-Alale Separation (3' x 8')
-continuous line-type heat detectors i
l l
Page 3 of BVPS Unit 2 - SRP 9.5.1 Summarized List of Differences SRP PAGE DESCRIPTION
_________________________________________________________________ STATUS Page 48 C.7.k Safety Related Pumps (For list of pumps required for safe S.D.,
see item C.5.b)
List of safety related pumpa not rc. quired for safe S.D.
and not meeting SRP 9.5.1 item C.7.k (3hr barrier separation with suppression and det sction):
-Fuel Pool Cooling Pumpa
-Quench Spray Pumpa
-Recire. Spray Pumpa
-Low Head SI Pumpa Page 48 C.7.1 New Fuel Area (no detection)
Page 48 C.7.m Spent Fuel Pool Area (no detection) e Page 48 C.7.n Radweste and Decon. Arena (no detection)
Notes:
(1) Accepted in Draft SSER-3 (2) SER Information needs u
..............................pdated 1
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