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| | 's Georg a Power Company |
| | , 333 Psedmont Avenue Atlanta. Georgia 30308 Te:ephone 404 526 6526 Po 1 Of t e x 4545 Atlanta, Georpa 30302 Georgia Power Nuclear Operations Department t. e soufNyn eimtre system SL-4832 0332I X7GJ17-H540 June 22, 1988 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Hashington, D. C. 20555 PLANT HATCH - UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 NRC DOCKETS 50-321 AND 50-366 OPERATING LICENSES DPR-57 AND NPF-5 SPECIAL REPORT 88-004 FIRE DOORS HITH AUTOMATIC HECHANISMS NOT CHECKED EVERY 24 HOURS AS REQUIRED RESULTS IN SPECIAL REPORT AS REQUIRED BY FIRE HAZARDS REPORT Gentlemen: |
| | In accordance with the requirements of the Plant Hatch Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specifications Section 6.9.2, and the Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) Appendix B, Georgia Power Company is submitting the enclosed Special Report (SR) concerning an event where fire doors with automatic mechanisms were not checked every 24 hours as required. This event occurred at Plant Hatch - Unit 1 and Unit 2. |
| | Sincerely, y1. b. l$ |
| | l H. G. Hairston, III I |
| | Senior Vice President JJP/lg l |
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| | ==Enclosure:== |
| | SR 50-321/1988-004 c: (see next page) % |
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| | lGeorgiaPower A U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission June 22, 1988 Page Two c: Georaia Power Comoany Mr. J. T. Beckham, Jr., Vice President.- Plant Hatch Mr. L. T. Gucwa, Manager Nuclear Safety and Licensing GO-NORMS U. S. Nuclear Reaulatory Commission. HashingtqD&D. C. |
| | Mr. L. P. Crocker, Licensing Project Manager - Hatch U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Region II Dr. J. N. Grace, Regional Administrator Mr. P. Holmes-Ray, Senior Resident Inspector - Hatch 0332I 7m"5 _ _ _ . _ _ . _ |
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| | GeorgiaPower d ENCLOSURE PLANT HATCH - UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 NRC DOCKETS 50-321 AND 50-366 OPERATING LICENSES DPR-57 AND NPF-5 SPECIAL REPORT 88-004 FIRE DOORS HITH AUTOMATIC HECHANISMS NOT CHECKED EVERY 24 HOURS AS REQUIRED RESULTS IN SPECIAL REPORT AS REQUIRED BY FIRE HAZARDS REPORT A. REQUIREMENT FOR REPORT This report is required per the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specifications section 6.9.2. This section of the Technical Specifications states that special reports for fire protection equipment operating and surveillance requirements shall be submitted, as required, by the Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) and its Appendix B requirements. |
| | The FHA section 1.1.1 states that all sealing devices in fire rated assembly penetrations (fire doors, fire dampers, cable, piping and ventilation duct penetration seals) shall be operable at all times. The action statement allows for the sealing devices to be inoperable for up to 14 days. If this time period is exceeded, a special report is required. |
| | B. UNIT (s) STATUS AT TIME OF EVENTS On 5/23/88, Unit 1 was in the shutdown mode of operation. The Unit 1 reactor parameters were as follows: thermal power was zero, pressure was approximately 96 psig, and reactor coolant I temperature was approximately 330 degrees Fthrenheit. |
| | On 5/23/88, Unit 2 was in the run mode of operation. The Unit 2 reactor parameters were as follows: thermal power was approximately 1340 MWt, pressure was approximately 930 psig, and reactor coolant temperature was approximately 540 degrees Fahrenheit. |
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| | GeorgiaPower d ENCLOSURE (Continued) |
| | FIRE D0 ORS WITH AUTOMATIC HECHANISHS NOT CHECKED EVERY 24 HOURS AS REQUIRED RESULTS IN SPECIAL REPORT AS REQUIRED BY FIRE HAZARDS REPORT C. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT On 5/23/88 at approximately 1315 CDT, plant fire protection personnel determined that the fire doors with automatic hold-open and release mechanisms were not being verified to be free of obstructions at least once per' 24 hours as required by the FHA, Appendix B, section 2.1.2.b. Deficiency Card 1-88-2255 was written as required by the plant's administrative control procedures to document the condition. |
| | Appendix B of the FHA contains fire protection equipment operability and surveillance requirements. The FHA was effective 12/1/86 and replaced the operability and surveillance requirements contained in the plant's Technical Specifications. |
| | The requirement to verify, once per 24 hours, the fire doors with automatic hold-open and release mechanisms to be free of obstructions was not in the Technical Specifications. This requirement, therefore, was not contained in any plant procedures when Appendix B of the FHA replaced the fire protection equipment Technical Specifications. This new surveillance requirement was not incorporated into plant procedures at this time, thus, it has not been performed, as required, since 12/1/86. |
| | In May of 1988, plant Fire Protection personnel performed a complete review c.' Appendix B requirements against existing plant procedures. The review, initiated by Fire Protection l supervisory personnel, was performed to determine if existing l procedures completely and correctly implemented Appendix B requirements. It was during this review the event was discovered. No other problems with the implementation of Appendix B requirements were found. |
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| | ' Georgia Power d ENCLOSURE (Continued) |
| | FIRE DOORS WITH AUTOMATIC MECHANISMS NOT CHECKED EVERY 24 HOURS AS REQUIRED RESULTS IN SPECIAL REPORT AS REQUIRED BY FIRE HAZARDS REPORT Plant operations personnel, upon notification of this event on 5/23/88, initiated actions to ensure doors were not blocked or obstructed. No obstructions were found upon the initial inspection. The requirement to verify the applicable fire doors were free of obstructions was added temporarily to the "Remarks" section of the daily Plant Equipment Operator (PEO) rounds procedures (34G0-0PS-030-IS, "Daily Inside Rounds," |
| | 34GO-0PS-031-IS, "Daily Outside Rounds," and 34G0-0PS-030-2S, "Daily Inside Rounds") to ensure the surveillance is performed until the procedures can be revised permanently. |
| | D. CAUSE OF EVENT The event occurred as a result of inadequate administrative controls. Specifically, no controls were in place to ensure new and revised requirements contained in Appendix B of the FHA were reviewed by the appropriate plant personnel for necessary procedure changes. |
| | E. ANALYSIS OF EVENT In protecting Plant Hatch against significant damage from fire (i.e., damage that would prevent the performance of necessary safe plant shutdown functions or would significantly increase the risk of radioactive releases to the environment), primary design consideration has been given to locating redundant safe shutdown circuits and components in distinct areas separated by fire barriers. The fire barriers prevent the propagation of fire to adjacent areas. The barriers, which include fire doors l |
| | with automatic hold-open and release mechanisms, are designed to contain a design basis fire which totally involves the combustibles in the given area. |
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| | GeorgiaPower A l |
| | l ENCLOSURE (Continued) |
| | FIRE DOORS HITH AUTOMATIC MECHANISMS NOT CHECKED EVERY 24 HOURS AS REQUIRED RESULTS IN SPECIAL REPORT AS REQUIRED BY FIRE HAZARDS REPORT In this event, 28 fire doors which close automatically were a fire to occur in their area were not checked once per 24 hours to ensure they were not prevented from closing, i.e., |
| | obstructed. Although this surveillance was not performed, other required surveillances were performed on these doors as required by Appendix B of the FHA. Specifically, once per 18 months these 28 fire doors are functionally tested as required by section 2.1.2.b. of Appendix B. The functional test verifies |
| | ,the doors will close automatically upon receipt of the proper signal. At this time, they are verified to be free from obstruction. |
| | The 28 automatic fire doors in question are not the only type of fire doors used to prevent the propagation of fires. In fact, they comprise only a small percentage of the total number of fire doors located within the plant. Further, the areas in which the 28 automatic fi re doors are located contain fire detectors. In the event of a fire, an alarm is received in the Main Control Room. The Fire Brigade would respond in. mediately to the alarm and extinguish the fire. Some of these areas are equipped with automatic sprinkler systems in addition to fire detectors. The sprinklers act to extinguish or limit the spread of the fire until the Fire Brigade responds. |
| | In the unlikely event an automatic fire door failed to close due to an obstruction, other fire barriers would limit a fire's spread and damage. Non-automatic, normally closed fire doors, fire rated walls, and fire wrap are fire barriers which would limit a fire's spread and damage. These are passive barriers which require no automatic or manual action to perform their function. |
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| | '1, GeorgiaPower A ENCLOSURE (Continued) |
| | FIRE DOORS HITH AUTOMATIC HECHANISMS FOT CHECKED EVERY 24 HOURS AS REQUIRED rESULTS IN SPECIAL REPORT AS REQUIRED BY FIRE HAZARDS REPORT Based on the above analysis, it is concluded that this event had no adverse impact on nuclear safety. Additionally, since the size of and damage from a fire are independent of power level, it is believed that the consequences of this event would not be more severe under other power conditions. |
| | F. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS Corrective actions for this event included: |
| | : 1. Immediately verifying the 28 automatic fire doors were not obstructed. |
| | : 2. Temporarily adding a note to the remarks section of the PE0 rounds procedures 34G0-0PS-030-1S, 34G0-0PS-030-2S, and 34GO-0PS-031-IS to ensure the inspection is performed until the procedures can revised permanently. It is anticipated these procedures will be revised permanently by approximately 8/1/88. |
| | : 3. As stated previously, this event was discovered by Fire Protection personnel during a complete review of Appendix B requirements. No other problems were found during this review. However, to ensure future revisions to Appendix B requirements are reviewed for necessary procedure changes, existing administrative controls covering review of Technical Specification Amendments will be revised to include reviews of revisions to Appendix B of the FHA. It is anticipated the existing administrative controls will be revised by approximately 9/1/88. |
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Category:REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT (SEE ALSO AO LER)
MONTHYEARHL-5657, Ro:On 980626,noted That Pami Channels Had Been Inoperable for More than Thirty Days.Cause Indeterminate.Licensee Will Replace Automatic Function W/Five Other Qualified Pamis of Like Kind in Drywell & Revised Procedures1998-07-30030 July 1998 Ro:On 980626,noted That Pami Channels Had Been Inoperable for More than Thirty Days.Cause Indeterminate.Licensee Will Replace Automatic Function W/Five Other Qualified Pamis of Like Kind in Drywell & Revised Procedures HL-5278, Special Rept:On 961203,30 Days Elapsed Since Position Indication Light for MSIV 1B21-F022D Declared Inoperable. Caused by Limit Switch Out of Proper Adjustment for Power Conditions.Light Will Be Restored During Next Outage1996-12-11011 December 1996 Special Rept:On 961203,30 Days Elapsed Since Position Indication Light for MSIV 1B21-F022D Declared Inoperable. Caused by Limit Switch Out of Proper Adjustment for Power Conditions.Light Will Be Restored During Next Outage HL-5212, Special Rept:On 960721,flood-up Range Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrument 1B21-R605 Out of Svc for Greater than 30 Days.Caused by Packing Leak on Equalizing Valve.Packing Leak on Equalizing Valve Repaired1996-07-30030 July 1996 Special Rept:On 960721,flood-up Range Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrument 1B21-R605 Out of Svc for Greater than 30 Days.Caused by Packing Leak on Equalizing Valve.Packing Leak on Equalizing Valve Repaired HL-5096, Special Rept 1-95-004:on 951215,emergency Light 1R42-E125 Declared Inoperable for More than 14 Days.Caused by Result of Broken Battery Terminal Discovered During Routine Surveillance Testing.Battery Replaced1996-01-0909 January 1996 Special Rept 1-95-004:on 951215,emergency Light 1R42-E125 Declared Inoperable for More than 14 Days.Caused by Result of Broken Battery Terminal Discovered During Routine Surveillance Testing.Battery Replaced HL-5082, Special Rept I-95-003:on 951117,fire Door 1L-48-1C50 Remained Inoperable for Longer than 14 Days.Caused by Component Failure Resulting from High Usage.Appropriate Fire Detectors Verified1995-12-0707 December 1995 Special Rept I-95-003:on 951117,fire Door 1L-48-1C50 Remained Inoperable for Longer than 14 Days.Caused by Component Failure Resulting from High Usage.Appropriate Fire Detectors Verified HL-5073, Special Rept 2-95-003:on 951029,fire Door 2L48-2R23 Had Remained Inoperable for More than 14 Days to Support Scheduled Refueling Outage Work.Fire Door 2L48-2R23 Restored to Operable Status on 9510311995-11-28028 November 1995 Special Rept 2-95-003:on 951029,fire Door 2L48-2R23 Had Remained Inoperable for More than 14 Days to Support Scheduled Refueling Outage Work.Fire Door 2L48-2R23 Restored to Operable Status on 951031 HL-4876, Special Rept:On 950516,fire Doors Blocked Open in Controlled Manner to Provide Addl Cooling for Plant RPS motor-generator Set Rooms.Cause Due to Controlled Actions of Appropriate Personnel.Doors Restored to Operable Status1995-06-21021 June 1995 Special Rept:On 950516,fire Doors Blocked Open in Controlled Manner to Provide Addl Cooling for Plant RPS motor-generator Set Rooms.Cause Due to Controlled Actions of Appropriate Personnel.Doors Restored to Operable Status HL-4773, Special Rept:On 950113,monitor Displayed Microcomputer Error Code Indicating Inoperability of Flow Transducer in Sampling Sys.Caused by Component Failure.Several Components Replaced or Adjusted in Accordance W/Mfg Recommendations1995-01-27027 January 1995 Special Rept:On 950113,monitor Displayed Microcomputer Error Code Indicating Inoperability of Flow Transducer in Sampling Sys.Caused by Component Failure.Several Components Replaced or Adjusted in Accordance W/Mfg Recommendations HL-0476, Special Rept 2-95-01:on 950110 Unit 2 Drywell High Range Radiation Inoperable Longer than 7 Days.Caused by Exceeding Procedural Limits of 34SV-SUV-019-2S.Technicians Checked High Voltage Power Supply Which Powers Radiation Detectors1995-01-17017 January 1995 Special Rept 2-95-01:on 950110 Unit 2 Drywell High Range Radiation Inoperable Longer than 7 Days.Caused by Exceeding Procedural Limits of 34SV-SUV-019-2S.Technicians Checked High Voltage Power Supply Which Powers Radiation Detectors HL-4727, Special Rept:On 941007,discovered That Required Hourly Fire Watch Patrol Initiated for Fire Area 0040 on 920629 Inappropriately Terminated Due to Personnel Error.Hourly Fire Watch Patrol for Affected Area re-established1994-10-31031 October 1994 Special Rept:On 941007,discovered That Required Hourly Fire Watch Patrol Initiated for Fire Area 0040 on 920629 Inappropriately Terminated Due to Personnel Error.Hourly Fire Watch Patrol for Affected Area re-established HL-4693, Special Rept 1-94-001:on 940911,seven Days Elapsed Since Main Stack post-accident Effluent Monitoring Sys Declared Inoperable Due to Damage to Sys Electronics by Lightning. Sys Expected to Be Returned to Svc by 9409211994-09-15015 September 1994 Special Rept 1-94-001:on 940911,seven Days Elapsed Since Main Stack post-accident Effluent Monitoring Sys Declared Inoperable Due to Damage to Sys Electronics by Lightning. Sys Expected to Be Returned to Svc by 940921 HL-4590, Special Rept 2-94-001:on 940517,fire Rated Assembly Was Inoperable for Longer than 14 Days as Result of Planned Activities.Caused by Affected Assemblies & Sealed Devices1994-05-17017 May 1994 Special Rept 2-94-001:on 940517,fire Rated Assembly Was Inoperable for Longer than 14 Days as Result of Planned Activities.Caused by Affected Assemblies & Sealed Devices HL-3434, Special Rept 1-93-004:on 930512,discovered That Cable Trays TFQ5-01 & TFR3-01 Were Not Enclosed in Thermo-Lag 330-1 Fire Barrier Matl,Per Safe Shutdown Analysis Rept.Caused by Inadequate Design.Appropriate Fire Detectors Verified1993-08-30030 August 1993 Special Rept 1-93-004:on 930512,discovered That Cable Trays TFQ5-01 & TFR3-01 Were Not Enclosed in Thermo-Lag 330-1 Fire Barrier Matl,Per Safe Shutdown Analysis Rept.Caused by Inadequate Design.Appropriate Fire Detectors Verified HL-3054, Special Rept 2-92-005:on 921102,battery-powered Emergency Lighting Unit Inoperable for More than 72 H.Caused by Failure of Lighting Unit to Pass Regularly Scheduled Maint. Lighting Unit Replaced & Verified Operable1992-12-0202 December 1992 Special Rept 2-92-005:on 921102,battery-powered Emergency Lighting Unit Inoperable for More than 72 H.Caused by Failure of Lighting Unit to Pass Regularly Scheduled Maint. Lighting Unit Replaced & Verified Operable HL-2937, Special Rept 1-92-002:on 920911,fire Barrier Assembly Inoperable for Longer than 14 Days Due to Cavity in 3 H Fire Rated Wall.Cause of Cavity Unknown.Cavity in Wall Repaired Under Mwo 1-92-4244 on 9209181992-10-0707 October 1992 Special Rept 1-92-002:on 920911,fire Barrier Assembly Inoperable for Longer than 14 Days Due to Cavity in 3 H Fire Rated Wall.Cause of Cavity Unknown.Cavity in Wall Repaired Under Mwo 1-92-4244 on 920918 HL-2380, Special Rept 1-92-001:on 920804,during Monthly Operability Test on Lighting Unit 1R42-E130,light Failed to Illuminate. Caused by Failure of battery-powered Emergency Lighting Unit to Pass Scheduled Surveillance.Subj Unit Replaced1992-08-28028 August 1992 Special Rept 1-92-001:on 920804,during Monthly Operability Test on Lighting Unit 1R42-E130,light Failed to Illuminate. Caused by Failure of battery-powered Emergency Lighting Unit to Pass Scheduled Surveillance.Subj Unit Replaced HL-2341, Special Rept 2-92-004:on 920630,battery Powered Emergency Lighting Units Inoperable for Period Greater than 72 H.Event Had No Adverse Impact on Nuclear Safety.Battery Discharge Test Performed1992-07-30030 July 1992 Special Rept 2-92-004:on 920630,battery Powered Emergency Lighting Units Inoperable for Period Greater than 72 H.Event Had No Adverse Impact on Nuclear Safety.Battery Discharge Test Performed HL-2247, Special Rept:On 920506,discovered That Annual 8 H Battery Discharge Test on Lighting Unit 2R242-E104 Had Not Been Performed in 1991.Caused by Personnel error.Battery-powered Emergency Lighting Demonstrated Operable1992-06-0505 June 1992 Special Rept:On 920506,discovered That Annual 8 H Battery Discharge Test on Lighting Unit 2R242-E104 Had Not Been Performed in 1991.Caused by Personnel error.Battery-powered Emergency Lighting Demonstrated Operable HL-2203, Special Rept 2-92-002:on 920407,signal from Triaxial Time History Accelerometer Contained Excessive Amount of Noise & Instrument Declared Inoperable for More than 30 Days.Cause Not Determined.Root Cause Analysis Underway1992-05-11011 May 1992 Special Rept 2-92-002:on 920407,signal from Triaxial Time History Accelerometer Contained Excessive Amount of Noise & Instrument Declared Inoperable for More than 30 Days.Cause Not Determined.Root Cause Analysis Underway HL-1967, Special Rept 1-91-010:on 911121,discovered That Blue Pen of post-accident Effluent Monitoring Sys Recorder 1D11-R631 Spiking Upscale at Regular Interval.Caused by Failed Flow Transducer.Flow Transducer Replaced1991-12-0505 December 1991 Special Rept 1-91-010:on 911121,discovered That Blue Pen of post-accident Effluent Monitoring Sys Recorder 1D11-R631 Spiking Upscale at Regular Interval.Caused by Failed Flow Transducer.Flow Transducer Replaced HL-1941, Special Rept 1-91-009:from 910929-1029,all Fuel Removed from Reactor Vessel & Fire Barriers Inoperable for More than 14 Days.Caused by Need to Install Support Plates,Platforms & Conduits.Structural Beams Restored to Operable Status1991-11-22022 November 1991 Special Rept 1-91-009:from 910929-1029,all Fuel Removed from Reactor Vessel & Fire Barriers Inoperable for More than 14 Days.Caused by Need to Install Support Plates,Platforms & Conduits.Structural Beams Restored to Operable Status HL-1916, Special Rept 1-91-008:on 911014,four Suppression Sys Flooding Valves in Fixed Water Suppression Sys Not Surveilled Once Per 18 Months.Caused by Less than Adequate Procedure.Valves Tested & Inspected Per Revised Procedures1991-11-0808 November 1991 Special Rept 1-91-008:on 911014,four Suppression Sys Flooding Valves in Fixed Water Suppression Sys Not Surveilled Once Per 18 Months.Caused by Less than Adequate Procedure.Valves Tested & Inspected Per Revised Procedures HL-1891, Special Rept 2-91-003:on 911003,during Performance of Battery Discharge Test,Two Emergency Lighting Units Failed to Illuminate for 8 H & Could Not Be Restored within 72 H. Lighting Units Repaired & Discharge Test Performed1991-10-31031 October 1991 Special Rept 2-91-003:on 911003,during Performance of Battery Discharge Test,Two Emergency Lighting Units Failed to Illuminate for 8 H & Could Not Be Restored within 72 H. Lighting Units Repaired & Discharge Test Performed HL-1682, Rev 2 to Special Rept 1-91-005:on 910515,discovered That Cable Penetration Seal Assembly Not Installed Per Mfg Instructions & Barrier Inoperable for More than 14 Days. Hourly Fire Watch Established & Thermolag Barrier Installed1991-10-0909 October 1991 Rev 2 to Special Rept 1-91-005:on 910515,discovered That Cable Penetration Seal Assembly Not Installed Per Mfg Instructions & Barrier Inoperable for More than 14 Days. Hourly Fire Watch Established & Thermolag Barrier Installed HL-1861, Special Rept 1-91-007:on 910909 & 16,fire Barrier Assemblies Inoperable for More than 14 Days When Unsealed Drilled Hole & Unsealed Penetration Discovered.Caused by Personnel Error.Hole Repaired & Penetration Sealed1991-10-0808 October 1991 Special Rept 1-91-007:on 910909 & 16,fire Barrier Assemblies Inoperable for More than 14 Days When Unsealed Drilled Hole & Unsealed Penetration Discovered.Caused by Personnel Error.Hole Repaired & Penetration Sealed ML20082B7301991-07-0909 July 1991 Special Rept:On 910515 & 0613,cable Penetration Seals Discovered Inoperable & Left in Untested Configuration. Caused by Personnel Error.Hourly Fire Watch Initiated & Penetrations Covered W/Thermolag Fire Barrier Matl HL-1691, Special Rept:On 910526,fixed Water Spray Nozzles Inoperable for Longer than 14 Days Identified During Insp of Fire Sprinkler Sys.Cause Indeterminate.Conduits Routed Away from Vicinity of Spray Nozzles1991-06-21021 June 1991 Special Rept:On 910526,fixed Water Spray Nozzles Inoperable for Longer than 14 Days Identified During Insp of Fire Sprinkler Sys.Cause Indeterminate.Conduits Routed Away from Vicinity of Spray Nozzles ML20079B9181991-06-14014 June 1991 Special Rept 1-91-005:on 910515,fire Barrier Assemblies Inoperable for Longer than 14 Days.Caused by Personnel Error.Penetration Declared Inoperable & Required Hourly Fire Watch Established HL-1674, Special Rept 2-91-001:on 910320 & 0401,fire-rated Assemblies Inoperable for More than 14 Days Due to Reloading of Reactor Core & Planned Maint Activity,Respectively.Hourly Fire Watch Initiated & Set Room Walls Reinstalled1991-06-0707 June 1991 Special Rept 2-91-001:on 910320 & 0401,fire-rated Assemblies Inoperable for More than 14 Days Due to Reloading of Reactor Core & Planned Maint Activity,Respectively.Hourly Fire Watch Initiated & Set Room Walls Reinstalled HL-1667, Special Rept 1-91-004:on 910502 & 06,listed battery-powered Emergency Lighting Units Inoperable for More than 72 H. Affected battery-powered Emergency Lighting Units Verified Operable by Performing Monthly Insp1991-06-0606 June 1991 Special Rept 1-91-004:on 910502 & 06,listed battery-powered Emergency Lighting Units Inoperable for More than 72 H. Affected battery-powered Emergency Lighting Units Verified Operable by Performing Monthly Insp HL-1649, Special Rept:On 910420,fire Barrier Assemblies Inoperable for Period Longer than 14 Days Discovered During Insp.Caused by Personnel Error.Penetrations 2Z43-H66OC & 2Z43-HO27C Resealed & Partially Drilled Hole Repaired1991-05-21021 May 1991 Special Rept:On 910420,fire Barrier Assemblies Inoperable for Period Longer than 14 Days Discovered During Insp.Caused by Personnel Error.Penetrations 2Z43-H66OC & 2Z43-HO27C Resealed & Partially Drilled Hole Repaired HL-1547, Special Rept 1-91-003:on 910318,during Monthly Insp of Fire Door 1L48-1C22,discovered That Door Inoperable for More than 14 Days Due to Worn Hinges,Plates & Shins.Caused by Normal Wear.Fire Watch Established & New Door Ordered1991-04-0202 April 1991 Special Rept 1-91-003:on 910318,during Monthly Insp of Fire Door 1L48-1C22,discovered That Door Inoperable for More than 14 Days Due to Worn Hinges,Plates & Shins.Caused by Normal Wear.Fire Watch Established & New Door Ordered HL-1542, Special Rept:On 910301,battery-powered Emergency Lighting Units Inoperable for Period Greater than 72 H.Caused by Personnel Error.Units Restored to Operable Status on 910302 & Surveillance Procedure 42SV-FPX-003-0S Revised1991-03-25025 March 1991 Special Rept:On 910301,battery-powered Emergency Lighting Units Inoperable for Period Greater than 72 H.Caused by Personnel Error.Units Restored to Operable Status on 910302 & Surveillance Procedure 42SV-FPX-003-0S Revised HL-1492, Ro:On 910214,potential Malfunction of SRVs Suspected. Caused by Turbine Trip & Reactor Scram Valve Testing. Investigation of Malfunction Planned1991-02-15015 February 1991 Ro:On 910214,potential Malfunction of SRVs Suspected. Caused by Turbine Trip & Reactor Scram Valve Testing. Investigation of Malfunction Planned HL-1470, Special Rept:On 901119,discrepancy Noted in Number of SRM & IRM Detectors During Inventory.Caused by Inadequate Recordkeeping Controls.Responsibility for Control & Accountability of Detectors Returned to Reactor Engineering1991-02-14014 February 1991 Special Rept:On 901119,discrepancy Noted in Number of SRM & IRM Detectors During Inventory.Caused by Inadequate Recordkeeping Controls.Responsibility for Control & Accountability of Detectors Returned to Reactor Engineering HL-1488, Ro:On 910212,potential Malfunction of SRVs Suspected.Caused by Turbine Trip & Re Actor Scram.Investigation of Malfunction Planned1991-02-13013 February 1991 Ro:On 910212,potential Malfunction of SRVs Suspected.Caused by Turbine Trip & Re Actor Scram.Investigation of Malfunction Planned ML20062G3641990-11-16016 November 1990 Special Rept:On 901108,reactor Bldg Ventilation Accident Range Radiation Monitor Inoperable for More than Seven Days. Caused by Component Failure.Reactor Bldg Accident Range Radiation Monitor Declared Inoperable HL-1353, Special Rept 2-90-003 Re fire-rated Assemblies Inoperable W/O Hourly Fire Watch Maintained.Caused by Personnel Error. License Condition 2-90-332 Initiated1990-11-15015 November 1990 Special Rept 2-90-003 Re fire-rated Assemblies Inoperable W/O Hourly Fire Watch Maintained.Caused by Personnel Error. License Condition 2-90-332 Initiated ML20059G3131990-09-0404 September 1990 Special Rept 90-004:on 900810,fire-rated Assembly Inoperable for Longer than 14 Days.Caused by Component Failure.Hourly Fire Watch Maintained & Fire Damper Replaced HL-1259, Special Rept 90-001:on 900730,fire-rated Assembly Declared Inoperable for More than 14 Days.Caused by Personnel Error. Hourly Fire Watch Initiated1990-08-29029 August 1990 Special Rept 90-001:on 900730,fire-rated Assembly Declared Inoperable for More than 14 Days.Caused by Personnel Error. Hourly Fire Watch Initiated ML20246J2841989-08-28028 August 1989 Special Rept 1-89-002:on 890803,power Cables to Battery Powered Emergency Lighting Units Disconnected.Caused by Plant Mod Activity Which Resulted in Inoperability of Several Battery Powered Emergency Lighting Units for 72 H ML20246F7541989-07-0505 July 1989 Special Rept 89-004:on 890525,sealing Devices for Penetrations in 3 H fire-rated East Wall Breached in Excess of 14 Days.Breach Necessitated by Scheduled Work Activities. Penetrations Sealed,Inspected & Declared Operable on 890608 ML20244B8061989-06-0808 June 1989 Special Rept 89-003:on 890509,smoke Detectors Left Inoperable W/O Compensatory Measures Being Taken.Caused by Failure to Reset Alarm at Slave Panel.Smoke Detectors in Battery Rooms Replaced W/Heat Detectors ML20247K4121989-05-24024 May 1989 Special Rept 89-002:on 890414,signal from Triaxial Time History Accelerograph Located Inside Drywell Determined to Contain Excessive Amount of Noise & Declared Inoperable for More than 30 Days.Cause of Event Not Determined ML20236B5071989-03-14014 March 1989 Special Rept 89-001:on 890216,fire Door Not Restored to Operable Status within 14 Days.Caused by Use of Structural Grouting Procedure Instead of Cosmetic Grouting Procedure. Grouting Placed Underneath Door & Individuals Counseled ML20235U8201989-02-28028 February 1989 Special Rept 89-001:on 890120,fire-rated Assemblies Inoperable for More than 14 Days.Caused by Inadequate Design.Limiting Condition for Operation Established for Each Identified Deficiencies ML20196F0181988-12-0707 December 1988 Special Rept 88-008:on 881101,fire Watch Not Established & Fire Rated Assembly Not Restored to Operable Condition within 14 Days as Required.Event Had No Adverse Impact on Plant Safety.Personnel Counseled & Cable Tray Encl Modified ML20196E4721988-12-0202 December 1988 Special Rept 88-005:on 881105,emergency Light Inoperable for Longer than 24 H Period.Caused by Depleted/Dead Battery. Maint Personnel Replaced Dead Battery Under MWO-2-88-4353 ML20151F0081988-07-21021 July 1988 Special Rept 88-005:on 880505,fire Wrap Not Installed on Cable Raceways.Caused by Inadequate Guidance Re Application of App R Requirements.Limiting Condition for Operation Established for Each Individual Raceways ML20196C2871988-06-22022 June 1988 Special Rept 88-004:on 880523,determined That Fire Doors W/ Automatic hold-open & Release Mechanisms Were Not Being Verified to Be Free of Obstructions at Least Once Per 24 H as Required.Caused by Inadequate Administrative Controls 1998-07-30
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217D3061999-10-13013 October 1999 SER Accepting Licensee Proposed Changes to Edwin I Hatch Nuclear Plant Emergency Classification Scheme to Add Emergency Action Levels Related to Operation of Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation HL-5845, Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant.With1999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant.With ML20217A1691999-09-22022 September 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Engine Sys,Inc Controllers,Manufactured Between Dec 1997 & May 1999,that May Have Questionable Soldering Workmanship.Caused by Inadequate Personnel Training.Sent Rept to All Nuclear Customers ML20212A6641999-09-13013 September 1999 Safety Evaluation Authorizing Relief Request RR-V-16 for Third 10 Yr Interval Inservice Testing Program HL-5836, Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for Edwin I Hatch Nuclear Plant.With1999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for Edwin I Hatch Nuclear Plant.With ML20210J9271999-08-0202 August 1999 SER Finds That Licensee Performed Appropriate Evaluations of Operational Configurations of safety-related power-operated Gate Valves to Identify Valves at Plant,Susceptible to Pressure Locking or Thermal Binding ML20210J9631999-08-0202 August 1999 SER Finding That Licensee Established Acceptable Program to Verify Periodically design-basis Capability of safety-related MOVs at Edwin I Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 HL-5818, Monthly Operating Repts for July 1999 for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With1999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1999 for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With HL-5805, Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With1999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With ML20207E7631999-06-0303 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Licensee Proposed Alternative to Use Code Case N-509 Contained in RR-4 Provides Acceptable Level of Quality & Safety.Considers Rev 2 to RR-4 & RR-6 Acceptable HL-5795, Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for Ehnp Units 1 & 2. with1999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for Ehnp Units 1 & 2. with ML20206G1691999-05-0404 May 1999 SER Approving Requirements of Istb 4.6.2(b) Pursuant to 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(ii) HL-5784, Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With1999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With HL-5766, Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With1999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With ML20207M1891999-03-11011 March 1999 SER Accepting Relief Request for Authorization of Alternative Reactor Pressure Vessel Exam for Circumferential Weld HL-5755, Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With1999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With ML20206P6981999-01-0707 January 1999 Ehnp Intake Structure Licensing Rept HL-5726, Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With1998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With ML20196J4931998-12-0707 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed Alternatives in Relief Requests RR-V-12,RR-V-15,RR-P-15,RR-V-7,RR-V-12,RR-V-14 & RR-V-15 HL-5714, Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1998 for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With1998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1998 for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With HL-5706, Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for Hatch Nuclear Plant Units 1 & 2.With1998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for Hatch Nuclear Plant Units 1 & 2.With ML20155B6121998-10-28028 October 1998 Safety Evaluation of TR SNCH-9501, BWR Steady State & Transient Analysis Methods Benchmarking Topical Rept. Rept Acceptable HL-5691, Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1998 for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With1998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1998 for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With ML20153G2481998-09-24024 September 1998 SE Concluding That Licensee Implementation Program to Resolve USI A-46 at Plant Adequately Addressed Purpose of 10CFR50.54(f) Request ML20239A2531998-09-0303 September 1998 SER Accepting Licensee Request for Relief Numbers RR-17 & RR-18 for Edwin I Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.Technical Ltr Rept on Third 10-year Interval ISI Request for Reliefs for Plant,Units 1 & 2 Encl ML20238F7131998-08-31031 August 1998 9,change 2 to QAP 1.0, Organization HL-5675, Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1998 for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 21998-08-31031 August 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1998 for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 HL-5667, Monthly Operating Repts for July 1998 for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 21998-07-31031 July 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1998 for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20236W3441998-07-30030 July 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Relief Requests for Second 10-yr ISI for Plant,Units 1 & 2 HL-5657, Ro:On 980626,noted That Pami Channels Had Been Inoperable for More than Thirty Days.Cause Indeterminate.Licensee Will Replace Automatic Function W/Five Other Qualified Pamis of Like Kind in Drywell & Revised Procedures1998-07-30030 July 1998 Ro:On 980626,noted That Pami Channels Had Been Inoperable for More than Thirty Days.Cause Indeterminate.Licensee Will Replace Automatic Function W/Five Other Qualified Pamis of Like Kind in Drywell & Revised Procedures ML20236V5191998-07-28028 July 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed License Amend Power Uprate Review ML20236N6751998-07-0909 July 1998 Part 21 & Deficiency Rept Re Notification of Potential Safety Hazard from Breakage of Cast Iron Suction Heads in Apkd Type Pumps.Caused by Migration of Suction Head Journal Sleeve Along Lower End of Pump Shaft.Will Inspect Pumps ML20236L1821998-07-0707 July 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting 980428 Proposed Alternative to ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code,Section Xi,Repair & Replacement Requirements Under 10CFR50.55a(a)(3) HL-5653, Monthly Operating Repts for June 1998 for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 21998-06-30030 June 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1998 for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 HL-5640, Monthly Operating Repts for May 1998 for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 21998-05-31031 May 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1998 for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20248B8651998-05-15015 May 1998 Quadrennial Simulator Certification Rept HL-5628, Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1998 for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant1998-04-30030 April 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1998 for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant HL-5604, Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1998 for Edwin I Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 21998-03-31031 March 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1998 for Edwin I Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 HL-5585, Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1998 for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 21998-02-28028 February 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1998 for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20216B2711998-02-28028 February 1998 Extended Power Uprate Safety Analysis Rept for Ei Hatch Plant,Units 1 & 2 HL-5571, Monthly Operating Repts for Jan 1998 for Edwin I Hatch Nuclear Plant,Unit 11998-01-31031 January 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Jan 1998 for Edwin I Hatch Nuclear Plant,Unit 1 HL-5551, Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1997 for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 21997-12-31031 December 1997 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1997 for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20199B0561997-12-31031 December 1997 Rev 0 GE-NE-B13-01869-122, Jet Pump Riser Weld Flaw Evaluation Handbook for Hatch Unit 1 HL-5581, Annual Operating Rept for 1997, for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant Units 1 & 21997-12-31031 December 1997 Annual Operating Rept for 1997, for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant Units 1 & 2 HL-5533, Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1997 for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 21997-11-30030 November 1997 Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1997 for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 HL-5514, Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1997 for Edwin I Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 21997-10-31031 October 1997 Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1997 for Edwin I Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20212A1981997-10-16016 October 1997 Safety Evaluation Denying Licensee Request for Relief from Implementation of 10CFR50.55a Requirements Re Use of 1992 Edition of ASME Code Section XI for ISI of Containments ML20211M6491997-10-0808 October 1997 Addenda 1 to Part 21 Rept Re Weldments on Opposed Piston & Coltec-Pielstick Emergency stand-by Diesel gen-set lube-oil & Jacket Water Piping Sys.Revised List of Potentially Affected Utils to Include Asterisked Utils,Submitted ML20211H5311997-10-0101 October 1997 Rev 2 to Unit 1,Cycle 17 Colr ML20211H5251997-10-0101 October 1997 Rev 3 to Unit 1,Cycle 17 Colr 1999-09-30
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's Georg a Power Company
, 333 Psedmont Avenue Atlanta. Georgia 30308 Te:ephone 404 526 6526 Po 1 Of t e x 4545 Atlanta, Georpa 30302 Georgia Power Nuclear Operations Department t. e soufNyn eimtre system SL-4832 0332I X7GJ17-H540 June 22, 1988 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Hashington, D. C. 20555 PLANT HATCH - UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 NRC DOCKETS 50-321 AND 50-366 OPERATING LICENSES DPR-57 AND NPF-5 SPECIAL REPORT 88-004 FIRE DOORS HITH AUTOMATIC HECHANISMS NOT CHECKED EVERY 24 HOURS AS REQUIRED RESULTS IN SPECIAL REPORT AS REQUIRED BY FIRE HAZARDS REPORT Gentlemen:
In accordance with the requirements of the Plant Hatch Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specifications Section 6.9.2, and the Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) Appendix B, Georgia Power Company is submitting the enclosed Special Report (SR) concerning an event where fire doors with automatic mechanisms were not checked every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> as required. This event occurred at Plant Hatch - Unit 1 and Unit 2.
Sincerely, y1. b. l$
l H. G. Hairston, III I
Senior Vice President JJP/lg l
Enclosure:
SR 50-321/1988-004 c: (see next page) %
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\
l 3889888ESi88(ip e
lGeorgiaPower A U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission June 22, 1988 Page Two c: Georaia Power Comoany Mr. J. T. Beckham, Jr., Vice President.- Plant Hatch Mr. L. T. Gucwa, Manager Nuclear Safety and Licensing GO-NORMS U. S. Nuclear Reaulatory Commission. HashingtqD&D. C.
Mr. L. P. Crocker, Licensing Project Manager - Hatch U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Region II Dr. J. N. Grace, Regional Administrator Mr. P. Holmes-Ray, Senior Resident Inspector - Hatch 0332I 7m"5 _ _ _ . _ _ . _
GeorgiaPower d ENCLOSURE PLANT HATCH - UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 NRC DOCKETS 50-321 AND 50-366 OPERATING LICENSES DPR-57 AND NPF-5 SPECIAL REPORT 88-004 FIRE DOORS HITH AUTOMATIC HECHANISMS NOT CHECKED EVERY 24 HOURS AS REQUIRED RESULTS IN SPECIAL REPORT AS REQUIRED BY FIRE HAZARDS REPORT A. REQUIREMENT FOR REPORT This report is required per the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specifications section 6.9.2. This section of the Technical Specifications states that special reports for fire protection equipment operating and surveillance requirements shall be submitted, as required, by the Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) and its Appendix B requirements.
The FHA section 1.1.1 states that all sealing devices in fire rated assembly penetrations (fire doors, fire dampers, cable, piping and ventilation duct penetration seals) shall be operable at all times. The action statement allows for the sealing devices to be inoperable for up to 14 days. If this time period is exceeded, a special report is required.
B. UNIT (s) STATUS AT TIME OF EVENTS On 5/23/88, Unit 1 was in the shutdown mode of operation. The Unit 1 reactor parameters were as follows: thermal power was zero, pressure was approximately 96 psig, and reactor coolant I temperature was approximately 330 degrees Fthrenheit.
On 5/23/88, Unit 2 was in the run mode of operation. The Unit 2 reactor parameters were as follows: thermal power was approximately 1340 MWt, pressure was approximately 930 psig, and reactor coolant temperature was approximately 540 degrees Fahrenheit.
0332I E-1 6/22/88 SL-4832
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GeorgiaPower d ENCLOSURE (Continued)
FIRE D0 ORS WITH AUTOMATIC HECHANISHS NOT CHECKED EVERY 24 HOURS AS REQUIRED RESULTS IN SPECIAL REPORT AS REQUIRED BY FIRE HAZARDS REPORT C. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT On 5/23/88 at approximately 1315 CDT, plant fire protection personnel determined that the fire doors with automatic hold-open and release mechanisms were not being verified to be free of obstructions at least once per' 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> as required by the FHA, Appendix B, section 2.1.2.b. Deficiency Card 1-88-2255 was written as required by the plant's administrative control procedures to document the condition.
Appendix B of the FHA contains fire protection equipment operability and surveillance requirements. The FHA was effective 12/1/86 and replaced the operability and surveillance requirements contained in the plant's Technical Specifications.
The requirement to verify, once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, the fire doors with automatic hold-open and release mechanisms to be free of obstructions was not in the Technical Specifications. This requirement, therefore, was not contained in any plant procedures when Appendix B of the FHA replaced the fire protection equipment Technical Specifications. This new surveillance requirement was not incorporated into plant procedures at this time, thus, it has not been performed, as required, since 12/1/86.
In May of 1988, plant Fire Protection personnel performed a complete review c.' Appendix B requirements against existing plant procedures. The review, initiated by Fire Protection l supervisory personnel, was performed to determine if existing l procedures completely and correctly implemented Appendix B requirements. It was during this review the event was discovered. No other problems with the implementation of Appendix B requirements were found.
0332I E-2 6/22/88 SL-4832 l
era
9
' Georgia Power d ENCLOSURE (Continued)
FIRE DOORS WITH AUTOMATIC MECHANISMS NOT CHECKED EVERY 24 HOURS AS REQUIRED RESULTS IN SPECIAL REPORT AS REQUIRED BY FIRE HAZARDS REPORT Plant operations personnel, upon notification of this event on 5/23/88, initiated actions to ensure doors were not blocked or obstructed. No obstructions were found upon the initial inspection. The requirement to verify the applicable fire doors were free of obstructions was added temporarily to the "Remarks" section of the daily Plant Equipment Operator (PEO) rounds procedures (34G0-0PS-030-IS, "Daily Inside Rounds,"
34GO-0PS-031-IS, "Daily Outside Rounds," and 34G0-0PS-030-2S, "Daily Inside Rounds") to ensure the surveillance is performed until the procedures can be revised permanently.
D. CAUSE OF EVENT The event occurred as a result of inadequate administrative controls. Specifically, no controls were in place to ensure new and revised requirements contained in Appendix B of the FHA were reviewed by the appropriate plant personnel for necessary procedure changes.
E. ANALYSIS OF EVENT In protecting Plant Hatch against significant damage from fire (i.e., damage that would prevent the performance of necessary safe plant shutdown functions or would significantly increase the risk of radioactive releases to the environment), primary design consideration has been given to locating redundant safe shutdown circuits and components in distinct areas separated by fire barriers. The fire barriers prevent the propagation of fire to adjacent areas. The barriers, which include fire doors l
with automatic hold-open and release mechanisms, are designed to contain a design basis fire which totally involves the combustibles in the given area.
0332I E-3 6/22/88 SL-4832 f
f f
GeorgiaPower A l
l ENCLOSURE (Continued)
FIRE DOORS HITH AUTOMATIC MECHANISMS NOT CHECKED EVERY 24 HOURS AS REQUIRED RESULTS IN SPECIAL REPORT AS REQUIRED BY FIRE HAZARDS REPORT In this event, 28 fire doors which close automatically were a fire to occur in their area were not checked once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to ensure they were not prevented from closing, i.e.,
obstructed. Although this surveillance was not performed, other required surveillances were performed on these doors as required by Appendix B of the FHA. Specifically, once per 18 months these 28 fire doors are functionally tested as required by section 2.1.2.b. of Appendix B. The functional test verifies
,the doors will close automatically upon receipt of the proper signal. At this time, they are verified to be free from obstruction.
The 28 automatic fire doors in question are not the only type of fire doors used to prevent the propagation of fires. In fact, they comprise only a small percentage of the total number of fire doors located within the plant. Further, the areas in which the 28 automatic fi re doors are located contain fire detectors. In the event of a fire, an alarm is received in the Main Control Room. The Fire Brigade would respond in. mediately to the alarm and extinguish the fire. Some of these areas are equipped with automatic sprinkler systems in addition to fire detectors. The sprinklers act to extinguish or limit the spread of the fire until the Fire Brigade responds.
In the unlikely event an automatic fire door failed to close due to an obstruction, other fire barriers would limit a fire's spread and damage. Non-automatic, normally closed fire doors, fire rated walls, and fire wrap are fire barriers which would limit a fire's spread and damage. These are passive barriers which require no automatic or manual action to perform their function.
0332I E-4 6/22/88 SL-4832 mrrs
'1, GeorgiaPower A ENCLOSURE (Continued)
FIRE DOORS HITH AUTOMATIC HECHANISMS FOT CHECKED EVERY 24 HOURS AS REQUIRED rESULTS IN SPECIAL REPORT AS REQUIRED BY FIRE HAZARDS REPORT Based on the above analysis, it is concluded that this event had no adverse impact on nuclear safety. Additionally, since the size of and damage from a fire are independent of power level, it is believed that the consequences of this event would not be more severe under other power conditions.
F. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS Corrective actions for this event included:
- 1. Immediately verifying the 28 automatic fire doors were not obstructed.
- 2. Temporarily adding a note to the remarks section of the PE0 rounds procedures 34G0-0PS-030-1S, 34G0-0PS-030-2S, and 34GO-0PS-031-IS to ensure the inspection is performed until the procedures can revised permanently. It is anticipated these procedures will be revised permanently by approximately 8/1/88.
- 3. As stated previously, this event was discovered by Fire Protection personnel during a complete review of Appendix B requirements. No other problems were found during this review. However, to ensure future revisions to Appendix B requirements are reviewed for necessary procedure changes, existing administrative controls covering review of Technical Specification Amendments will be revised to include reviews of revisions to Appendix B of the FHA. It is anticipated the existing administrative controls will be revised by approximately 9/1/88.
0332I E-5 6/22/88 SL-4832 rwns . _