ML16076A357

Changes to Technical Specification Bases - Revisions 67 Through 73

ML16076A357
Person / Time
Site:	Wolf Creek
Issue date:	03/10/2016
From:	Hafenstine C Wolf Creek
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
RA 16-0008
Download: ML16076A357 (85)

Text

W0LF CREEK 7 NUCLEAR OPERATING CORPORATION Cynthia R. Hafenstine Manager Regulatory Affairs March 10, 2016 RA 16-0008 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Subject:

Docket No. 50-482: Wolf Creek Generating Station Changes to Technical Specification Bases - Revisions 67 through 73 Gentlemen:

The Wolf Creek Generating Station (WCGS) Unit 1 Technical Specifications (TS), Section 5.5.14, "Technical Specifications (TS) Bases Control Program," provide the means for making changes to the Bases without prior Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approval. In addition, TS Section 5.5.14 requires that changes made without NRC approval be provided to the NRC on a frequency consistent with 10 CFR 50.71(e). The Enclosure provides those changes made to the WCGS TS Bases (Revisions 67 through 73) under the provisions to TS Section 5.5.14 and a List of Effective Pages. This submittal reflects changes from January 1, 2015 through December 31, 2015.

This letter contains no commitments. If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact me at (620) 364-4204.

Sincerely, Cynthia R. Hafenstine CRH/rlt Enclosure cc: M. L. Dapas (NRC), w/e C. F. Lyon (NRC), w/e N. H. Taylor (NRC), w/e 0 Senior Resident Inspector (NRC), w/e - J#*-

P.O. Box 411 / Burlington, KS 66839 / Phone: (620) 364-8831 An Equal Opportunity Employer MIFIHC/VET

Enclosure to IRA 16-0008 Wolf Creek Generating Station Changes to the Technical Specification Bases (44 pages)

FQ(Z) (EQ Methodology)

B 3.2.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.2.1.2 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS a precise measurement in these regions. It should be noted that while the transient FQ(Z) limits are not measured in these axial core regions, the analytical transient FQ(Z) limits in these axial core regions are demonstrated to be satisfied during the core reload design process.

This Surveillance has been modified by a Note that may require more frequent surveillances be performed. When FQc(Z) is measured, an evaluation of the expression below is required to account for any increase to FQ(Z) that may occur and cause the FQ(Z) limit to be exceeded before the next required FQ(Z) evaluation.

If the two most recent F0 (Z) evaluations show an increase in the expression maximum overz [FQ z) it is required to meet the FQ(Z) limit with the last FQw(Z) increased by the appropriate factor specified in the COLR, or to evaluate FQ(Z) more frequently, each 7 EFPD. These alternative requirements prevent FQ(Z) from exceeding its limit for any significant period of time without detection.

Performing the Surveillance in MODE 1 prior to exceeding 75% RTP ensures that the FQ(Z) limit will be met when RTP is achieved, because peaking factors are generally decreased as power level is increased.

FQ(Z) is verified at power levels > 10% RTP above the THERMAL POWER of its last verification, within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after achieving equilibrium conditions to ensure that FQ(Z) is within its limit at higher power levels.

The Surveillance Frequency of 31 EFPD is adequate to monitor the change of power distribution with core burnup. The Surveillance may be done more frequently if required by the results of FQ(Z) evaluations.

The Frequency of 31 EFPD is adequate to monitor the change of power distribution because such a change is sufficiently slow, when the plant is operated in accordance with the TS, to preclude adverse peaking factors between 31 day surveillances.

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B 3.2.1-9 eiin2 Revision 29

F0 (Z) (F0 Methodology)

B 3.2.1 BASES REFERENCES °. 10 CFR 50.46, 1974.

2. USAR, Section 15.4.8.

3. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 26.

4. WCAP-7308-L-P-A, "Evaluation of Nuclear Hot Channel Factor Uncertainties," June 1988.

5. Performance Improvement Request 2005-3311.

6. WCAP-1 2472-P-A, "BEACON Core Monitoring and Operations Support System," August 1994 (including Addendum 4, September 2012).

Wolf Creek.- Unit I B 3.2.1-10 B3211 eiin770 Revision

F*,H B 3.2.2 BASES ACTIONS A.1.2.1 and A.1.2.2 (continued) condition for an extended period of time. The Completion Times of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> for Required Actions A.1 .1 and A.1 .2.1 are not additive.

The allowed Completion Time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to reset the trip setpoints per Required Action A.1 .2.2 recognizes that, once power is reduced, the safety analysis assumptions are satisfied and there is no urgent need to reduce the trip setpoints.

A..22 Once the power level has been reduced to < 50% RTP per Required Action A.1 .2.1, a power distribution measurement (SR 3.2.2.1 ) must be obtained and the measured value of FNA*H verified not to exceed the allowed limit at the lower power level. The unit is provided 68 additional hours to perform this task over and above the 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> allowed by either Action A.1 .1 or Action A.1 .2.1. The Completion Time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> is acceptable because of the increase in the DNB margin, which is obtained at lower power levels, and the low probability of having a DNB limiting event within this 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> period. Additionally, operating experience has indicated that this Completion Time is sufficient to obtain the power distribution measurement, perform the required calculations, and evaluateI F*H

• A.3 Verification that FNAI*H is within its specified limits after an out of limit occurrence ensures that the cause that led to the FNAJH exceeding its limit is identified, to the extent necessary, and corrected, and that subsequent operation proceeds within the LCO limit. This Action demonstrates that the FNAN limit is within the LCO limits prior to exceeding 50% RTP, again prior to exceeding 75% RTP, and within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after THERMAL POWER is >Ž95% RTP.

This Required Action is modified by a Note that states that THERMAL POWER does not have to be reduced prior to performing this Action.

B.._I When Required Actions A.1.1 through A.3 cannot be completed within their required Completion Times, the plant must be placed in a mode in which the LCO requirements are not applicable. This is done by placing the plant in at least MODE 2 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. The allowed Completion Wolf Creek - Unit 1 ..-

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F*,H B 3.2.2 BASES ACTIONS 8.1 (continued)

Time of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> is reasonable, based on operating experience regarding the time required to reach MODE 2 from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.2.2.1 REQUIREMENTS SR 3.2.2.1 is modified by a Note. The Note applies during power ascensions following a plant shutdown (leaving MODE 1). The Note allows for power ascensions ifthe surveillances are not current. Itstates that THERMAL POWER may be increased until an equilibrium power level has been achieved at which a power distribution measurement can be obtained. Equilibrium conditions are achieved when the core is sufficiently stable at the intended operating conditions to perform the measurement.

The value of FNAH is determined by using either the movable incore detector system or the Power Distribution Monitoring System to obtain a power distribution measurement. A calculation determines the maximum value of FNAH- from the measured power distribution. The measured value of FNAH must be increased by 4% (ifusing the movable incore detector system) or increased by U*% (if using the Power Distribution Monitoring System, where UAH is determined as described in Reference 4, with a minimum value of 4%) to account for measurement uncertainty before making comparisons to the FNA*H limit After each refueling, FNAN must be determined in MODE I prior to exceeding 75% RTP. This requirement ensures that FNAH~ limits are met at the beginning of each fuel cycle.

The 31 EFPD Frequency is acceptable because the power distribution changes relatively slowly over this amount of fuel burnup. Accordingly, this Frequency is short enough that the FN*l~ limit cannot be exceeded for any significant period of operation.

REFERENCES 1. USAR, Section 15.4.8.

2. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 26.

3. 10 CFR 50.46.

4. WCAP-1 2472-P-A, "BEACON Core Monitoring and Operations Support System," August 1994 (including Addendum 4, September 2012).

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RCS P/T Limits B 3.4.3 B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

B 3.4.3 RCS Pressure and Temperature (PIT) Limits BASES BACKGROUND All components of the RCS are designed to withstand effects of cyclic loads due to system pressure and temperature changes. These loads are introduced by startup (heatup) and shutdown (cooldown) operations, power transients, and reactor trips. This LCO limits the pressure and temperature changes during RCS heatup and cooldown, within the design assumptions and the stress limits for cyclic operation.

The PTLR contains P/T limit curves for heatup, cooldown, inservice leak and hydrostatic (ISLH) testing, and data for the maximum rate of change of reactor coolant temperature (Ref. 1).

Each PIT limit curve defines an acceptable region for normal operation.

The usual use of the curves is operational guidance during heatup or cooldown maneuvering, when pressure and temperature indications are monitored and compared to the applicable curve to determine that operation is within the allowable region. Vacuum fill of the RCS is normally performed in MODE 5 under sub-atmospheric pressure and isothermal RCS conditions. Vacuum fill is an acceptable condition since the resulting pressure/temperature combination is located in the region to the right and below the operating limits provided in Figures 2.1-1 and 2.1-2 of the PTLR.

The LCO establishes operating limits that provide a margin to brittle failure of the reactor vessel and piping of the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB). The vessel is the component most subject to brittle failure, and the LCO limits apply mainly to the vessel. The limits do not apply to the pressurizer, which has different design characteristics and operating functions.

10 CFR 50, Appendix G (Ref. 2), requires the establishment of PIT limits for specific material fracture toughness requirements of the RCPB materials. Reference 2 requires an adequate margin to brittle failure during normal operation, anticipated operational occurrences, and system hydrostatic tests. It mandates the use of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code,Section III, Appendix G (Ref. 3).

The neutron embrittlement effect on the material toughness is reflected by increasing the nil ductility reference temperature (RTNDT) as exposure to neutron fluence increases.

The actual shift in the RTNDT of the vessel material will be established periodically by removing and evaluating the irradiated reactor vessel material specimens, in accordance with ASTM E 185 (Ref. 4) and Wolf Creek - Unit IB343-Reion6 B3.4.3-1 Revision 67

RCS P/T Limits B 3.4.3 BASES BACKGROUND Appendix H of 10 CFR 50 (Ref. 5). The operating P/T limit curves will be (continued) adjusted, as necessary, based on the evaluation findings and the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.99 (Ref. 6).

The P/T limit curves are composite curves established by superimposing limits derived from stress analyses of those portions of the reactor vessel and head that are the most restrictive. At any specific pressure, temperature, and temperature rate of change, one location within the reactor vessel will dictate the most restrictive limit. Across the span of the P/T limit curves, different locations are more restrictive, and, thus, the curves are composites of the most restrictive regions.

The heatup curve represents a different set of restrictions than the cooldown curve because the directions of the thermal gradients through the vessel wall are reversed. The thermal gradient reversal alters the location of the tensile stress between the outer and inner walls.

The criticality limit curve includes the Reference 2 requirement that it be

> 40°F above the heatup curve or the cooldown curve, and not less than the minimum permissible temperature for ISLH testing. However, the criticality curve is not operationally limiting; a more restrictive limit exists in LCO 3.4.2, "RCS Minimum Temperature for Criticality."

The consequence of violating the LCO limits is that the RCS has been operated under conditions that can result in brittle failure of the RCPB, possibly leading to a nonisolable leak or loss of coolant accident. In the event these limits are exceeded, an evaluation must be performed to determine the effect on the structural integrity of the RCPB components.

The ASME Code, Section Xl, Appendix E (Ref. 7), provides a recommended methodology for evaluating an operating event that causes an excursion outside the limits.

APPLICABLE The P/T limits are not derived from Design Basis Accident (DBA)

SAFETY ANALYSES analyses. They are prescribed during normal operation to avoid encountering pressure, temperature, and temperature rate of change conditions that might cause undetected flaws to propagate and cause nonductile failure of the RCPB, an unanalyzed condition. Reference 1 establishes the methodology for determining the P/T limits. Although the P/T limits are not derived from any DBA, the P/T limits are acceptance limits since they preclude operation in an unanalyzed condition.

RCS P/T limits satisfy Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

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RCS Loops - MODE 4 B 3.4.6 B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

B 3.4.6 RCS Loops - MODE 4 BASES BACKGROUND In MODE 4, the primary function of the reactor coolant is the removal of decay heat and the transfer of this heat to either the steam generator (SG) secondary side coolant or the component cooling water via the residual heat removal (RHR) heat exchangers. The secondary function of the reactor coolant is to act as a carrier for soluble neutron poison, boric acid.

The reactor coolant is circulated through four RCS loops connected in parallel to the reactor vessel, each loop containing an SG, a reactor coolant pump (RCP), and appropriate flow, pressure, level, and temperature instrumentation for control, protection, and indication. The RCPs circulate the coolant through the reactor vessel and SGs at a sufficient rate to ensure proper heat transfer and to prevent boric acid stratification.

In MODE 4, either RCPs or RHR loops can be used to provide forced circulation. The intent of this LCO is to provide forced flow from at least one RCP or one RHR loop for decay heat removal and transport. The flow provided by one RCP loop or RHR loop is adequate for decay heat removal. The other intent of this LCO is to require that two paths be available to provide redundancy for decay heat removal.

APPLICABLE In MODE 4, RCS circulation is considered in the determination of the time SAFETY ANALYSES available for mitigation of the accidental boron dilution event.

The operation of one RCP in MODES 3, 4, and 5 provides adequate flow to ensure mixing, prevent stratification, and produce gradual reactivity changes during RCS boron concentrationi reductions. With no reactor coolant loop in operation in either MODES 3, 4, or 5, dilution sources must be isolated or administratively controlled. The boron dilution analysis in these MODES take credit for the mixing volume associated with having at least one reactor coolant loop in operation (Ref. 1).

RCS Loops- MODE 4 satisfies Criterion 4 of 10 CER 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

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RCS Loops-MODE 4 B 3.4.6 BASES LCO The purpose of this LCO is to require that at least two loops be OPERABLE in MODE 4 and that one of these loops be in operation. The LCO allows the two loops that are required to be OPERABLE to consist of any combination of RCS loops and RHR loops. Any one loop in operation provides enough flow to remove the decay heat from the core with forced circulation. An additional loop is required to be OPERABLE to provide redundancy for heat removal.

Note 1 permits all RCPs or RHR pumps to be removed from operation for

_<1 hour per 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> period. The purpose of the Note is to permit tests that are required to be performed without flow or pump noise. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> time period is adequate to perform the necessary testing, and operating experience has shown that boron stratification is not a problem during this short period with no forced flow.

Utilization of Note I is permitted provided the following conditions are met along with any other conditions imposed by test procedures:

a. No operations are permitted that would dilute the RCS boron concentration with coolant at boron concentrations less than required to assure the SDM of LCO 3.1.1, thereby maintaining the margin to criticality. Boron reduction with coolant at boron concentrations less than required to assure the SDM is maintained is prohibited because a uniform concentration distribution throughout the RCS cannot be ensured when in natural circulation; and

b. Core outlet temperature is maintained at least 10°F below saturation temperature, so that no vapor bubble may form and possibly cause a natural circulation flow obstruction.

Note 2 requires that the secondary side water temperature of each SG be

_<50°F above each of the RCS cold leg temperatures before the start of an RCP with any RCS cold leg temperature _<368°F. This restraint is to prevent a low temperature overpressure event due to a thermal transient when an RCP is started."

An OPERABLE RCS loop is comprised of an OPERABLE RCP and an OPERABLE SG, which has the minimum water level specified in SR 3.4.6.2.

Similarly for the RHR System, an OPERABLE RHR loop comprises an OPERABLE RHR pump capable of providing forced flow to an OPERABLE RHR heat exchanger. RCPs and RHR pumps are OPERABLE if they are capable of being powered and are able to provide forced flow if required. Management of gas voids is important to RHR System Operability.

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RCS Loops - MODE 4 B 3.4.6 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.6.4 REQUIREMENTS (continued) RHR System piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the required RHR loop(s) and may also prevent water hammer, pump cavitation, and pumping of noncondensible gas into the reactor vessel.

Selection of RHR System locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations. The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration. Susceptible locations

..............* ... depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.

The RHR System is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water.

Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump),

the Surveillance is not met. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the RHR System is not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.

RHR System locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative sub-set of susceptible locations.

Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location. Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY. The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.

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RCS Loops - MODE 4 B 3.4.6 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.6.4 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS This SR is modified by a Note that states the SR is not required to be performed until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after entering MODE 4. In a rapid shutdown, there may be insufficient time to verify all susceptible locations prior to entering MODE 4.

The 31 day Frequency takes into consideration the gradual nature of gas accumulation in the RHR System piping and the procedural controls governing system operation.

REFERENCES 1. USAR, Section 15.4.6

/

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RCS Loops - MODE 5, Loops Filled B 3.4.7 BASES LCO b. Core outlet temperature is maintained at least 10°F below (continued) saturation temperature, so that no vapor bubble may form and possibly cause a natural circulation flow obstruction.

Note 2 allows one RHR loop to be inoperable for a period of up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, provided that the other RHR loop is OPERABLE and in operation. This permits periodic surveillance tests to be performed on the inoperable loop during the only time when such testing is safe and possible.

Note 3 requires that the secondary side water temperature of each SG be

_<50°F above each of the RCS cold leg temperatures before the start of a reactor coolant pump (RCP) with any RCS cold leg temperature < 368°F.

This restriction is to prevent a low temperature overpressure event due to a thermal transient when an RCP is started.

Note 4 provides for an orderly transition from MODE 5 to MODE 4 during a planned heatup by permitting removal of RHR loops from operation when at least one RCS loop is in operation. This Note provides for the transition to MODE 4 where an RCS loop is permitted to be in operation and replaces the RCS circulation function provided by the RHR loops.

RHR pumps are OPERABLE ifthey are capable of being powered and are able to provide forced flow if required. When both RHR loops (or trains) are required to be OPERABLE, the associated Component Cooling Water (CCW) train is required to be capable of performing its related support function(s). The heat sink for the CCW System is normally provided by the Service Water System or Essential Service Water (ESW)

System, as determined by system availability. In MODES 5 and 6, one Diesel Generator (DG) is required to be OPERABLE per LCO 3.8.2, "AC Sources - Shutdown." The same ESW train is required to be capable of performing its related support function(s) to support DG OPERABILITY. A Service Water train can be utilized to support RHR OPERABILITY ifthe associated ESW train is not capable of performing its related support function(s). A SG can perform as a heat sink via natural circulation when it has an adequate water level and is OPERABLE. Management of gas voids is important to RHR System OPERABILITY.

APPLICABILITY In MODE 5 with RCS loops filled, this LCO requires forced circulation of the reactor coolant to remove decay heat from the core and to provide proper boron mixing. One loop of RHR provides sufficient circulation for these purposes. However, one additional RHR loop is required to be OPERABLE, or the secondary side wide range water level of at least two SGs is required to be _ 66%.

Operation in other MODES is covered by:

LCO 3.4.4, "RCS Loops -MODES 1 and 2";

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RCS Loops - MODE 5, Loops Filled B 3.4.7 BASES APPLICABILITY LCO 3.4.5, "RCS Loops-MODE 3";

(continued) LCO 3.4.6, "RCS Loops - MODE 4";

LCO 3.4.8, "RCS Loops-MODES5, Loops Not Filled";

LCO 3.9.5, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation - High Water Level" (MODE 6); and LCO 3.9.6, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation - Low Water Level" (MODE 6).

ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 If one RHR loop is inoperable and the required SGs have secondary side wide range water levels < 66%, redundancy for heat removal is lost.

Action must be initiated immediately to restore a second RHR loop to OPERABLE status or to restore the required SG secondary side water levels. Either Required Action A.1 or Required Action A.2 will restore redundant heat removal paths. The immediate Completion Time reflects the importance of maintaining the availability of two paths for heat removal.

B.1 and B.2 If no RHR loop is in operation, except during conditions permitted by Notes I and 4, or if no loop is OPERABLE, all operations involving introduction into the RCS, coolant with boron concentration less than required to meet the minimum SDM of LCO 3.1.1 must be suspended and action to restore one RHR loop to OPERABLE status and operation must be initiated. To prevent inadvertent criticality during a boron dilution, forced circulation from at least one RCP is required to provide proper mixing. Suspending the introduction into the RCS, coolant with boron concentration less than required to meet the minimum SDM of LCO 3.1.1 is required to assure continued safe operation. With coolant added without forced circulation, unmixed coolant could be introduced to the core, however coolant added with boron concentration meeting the minimum SDM maintains acceptable margin to subcritical operations.

The immediate Completion Times reflect the importance of maintaining operation for heat removal.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.7.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR requires verification every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> that the required loop is in operation. Verification may include flow rate, temperature, or pump status monitoring, which help ensure that forced flow is providing heat removal.

The Frequency of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> is sufficient considering other indications and alarms available to the operator in the control room to monitor RHR loop performance.

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RCS Loops - MODE 5, Loops Filled B 3.4.7 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.7.2 REQUIREMENTS (continued) Verifying that at least two SGs are OPERABLE by ensuring their secondary side wide range water levels are >_66% ensures an alternate decay heat removal method is available via natural circulation in the event that the second RHR loop is not OPERABLE. If both RHR loops are OPERABLE, this Surveillance is not needed. The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Frequency is considered adequate in view of other indications available in the control room to alert the operator to the loss of SG level.

SR 3.4.7.3 Verification that a second RHR pump is OPERABLE ensures that an additional pump can be placed in operation, if needed, to maintain decay heat removal and reactor coolant circulation. Verification is performed by verifying proper breaker alignment and power available to the RHR pump.

If secondary side wide range water level is > 66% in at least two SGs, this Surveillance is not needed. The Frequency of 7 days is considered reasonable in view of other administrative controls available and has been shown to be acceptable by operating experience.

SR 3.4.7.4.

RHR System piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the required RHR loop(s) and may also prevent water hammer, pump cavitation, and pumping of noncondensible gas into the reactor vessel.

Selection of RHR System locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations. The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration. Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.

The RHR System is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water.

Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of Wolf Creek - Unit 1 ..-

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..... " ...... RCS Loops - MODE 5, LoopsB Filled 3.4.7 BAS ES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.7.4 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump),

the Surveillance is not met. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the RHR System is not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.

RHR System locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative sub-set of susceptible locations.

Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating

. ................... parameters, remote-monitoring) may be used to monitor-the susceptible-location. Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY. The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.

The 31 day Frequency takes into consideration the gradual nature of gas accumulation in the RHR System piping and the procedural controls governing system operation.

REFERENCES 1. USAR, Section 15.4.6.

2. NRC Information Notice 95-35, "Degraded Ability of SGs to Remove Decay Heat by Natural Circulation."

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-RCS Loops - MODE 5, Loops Not Filled B 3.4.8 B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

B 3.4.8 RCS Loops - MODE 5, Loops Not Filled BASES BACKGROUND In MODE 5 with the RCS loops not filled, the primary function of the reactor coolant is the removal of decay heat generated in the fuel, and the transfer of this heat to the component cooling water via the residual heat removal (RHR) heat exchangers. The steam generators (SGs) are not available as a heat sink when the loops are not filled. The secondary function of the reactor coolant is to act as a carrier for the soluble neutron poison, boric acid.

In MODE 5 with loops not filled, only RHR pumps can be used for coolant circulation. The number of pumps in operation can vary to suit the operational needs. The intent of this LCO is to provide forced flow from at least one RHR pump for decay heat removal and transport and to require that two paths be available to provide redundancy for heat removal.

APPLICABLE In MODE 5, RCS circulation is considered in the determination of the SAFETY ANALYSES time available for mitigation of the accidental boron dilution event. The flow provided by one RHR loop is adequate for decay heat removal.

The operation of one RCP in MODES 3, 4, and 5 provides adequate flow to ensure mixing, prevent stratification, and produce gradual reactivity changes during RCS boron concentration reductions. With no reactor coolant loop in operation in either MODES 3, 4, or 5, dilution sources must be isolated or administratively controlled. The boron dilution analysis in these MODES take credit for the mixing volume associated with having at least one reactor coolant ioop in operation (Ref. 1).

RCS loops in MODE 5 (loops not filled) satisfies Criterion 4 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO The purpose of this LCO is to require that at least two RHR loops be OPERABLE and one of these loops be in operation. An OPERABLE loop is one that has the capability of transferring heat from the reactor coolant at a controlled rate. Heat cannot be removed via the RHR System unless forced flow is used. A minimum of one running RHR pump meets the LCO requirement for one loop in operation. An additional RHR loop is required to be OPERABLE to meet single failure considerations.

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RCS Loops - MODE 5, L~oops Not Filled B 3.4.8 BASES LCO Note 1 permits all RHR pumps to be removed from operation for _<1 hour.

(continued) The circumstances for stopping both RHR pumps are to be limited to situations when the outage time is short and core outlet temperature is maintained at least 10°F below saturation temperature. The Note prohibits boron dilution with coolant at boron concentrations less than required to assure the SDM of LCO 3.1.1 is maintained or draining operations when RHR forced flow is stopped. The Note requires reactor vessel water level be above the vessel flange to ensure the operating RHR pump will not be intentionally deenergized during mid-loop operations.

Note 2 allows one RHR loop to be inoperable for a period of < 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, provided that the other loop is OPERABLE and in operation. This permits periodic surveillance tests to be performed on the inoperable loop during the only time when these tests are safe and possible.

An OPERABLE RHR loop is comprised of an OPERABLE RHR pump capable of providing forced flow to an OPERABLE RHR heat exchanger.

RHR pumps are OPERABLE ifthey are capable of being powered and are able to provide flow if required. The heat sink for the CCW System is normally provided by the Service Water System or Essential Service Water (ESW) System, as determined by system availability. In MODES 5 and 6, one Diesel Generator (DG) is required to be OPERABLE per LCO 3.8.2, "AC Sources - Shutdown." The same ESW train is required to be capable of performing its related support function(s) to support DG OPERABILITY. A Service Water train can be utilized to support RHR OPERABILITY ifthe associated ESW train is not capable of performing its related support function(s). Management of gas voids is important to RHR OPERABILITY.

APPLICABILITY In MODE 5 with loops not filled, this LCO requires core heat removal and coolant circulation by the RHR System. One RHR loop provides sufficient capability for this purpose. However, one additional RHR loop is required to be OPERABLE to meet single failure considerations.

Operation in other MODES is covered by:

LCO 3.4.4, "RCS Loops - MODES 1 and 2";

LCO 3.4.5, "RCS Loops - MODE 3";

LCO 3.4.6, "RCS Loops - MODE 4";

LCO 3.4.7, "RCS Loops - MODE 5, Loops Filled";

LCO 3.9.5, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation - High Water Level" (MODE 6); and LCO 3.9.6, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation - Low Water Level" (MODE 6).

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RCS Loops - MODE 5, Loops Not Filled B 3.4.8 BASES APPLICABILITY Since LCO 3.4.8 contains Required Actions with immediate Completion (continued) Times, it is not permitted to enter LCO 3.4.8 from either LCO 3.4.7, IRCS Loops - MODE 5, Loops Filled," or from MODE 6, unless the requirements of LCO 3.4.8 are met. This precludes removing the heat removal path afforded by the steam generators with the RHR System is degraded.

ACTIONS A._.1 If only one IRHIR loop is OPERABLE and in operation, redundancy for IRHIR is lost. Action must be initiated to restore a second loop to OPERABLE status. The immediate Completion Time reflects the importance of maintaining the availability of two paths for heat removal.

B.1 and B.2

_~I~f n~o required RHRloops are OPERABLE orin operation, except during conditions permitted by Note 1, all operations involving introduction into the RCS, coolant with boron concentration less than required to meet the minimum SDM of LCO 3.1.1 must be suspended and action must be initiated immediately to restore an IRHR loop to OPERABLE status and operation. Boron dilution requires forced circulation from at least one IRCP for proper mixing so that inadvertent criticality can be prevented.

Suspending the introduction into the IRCS, coolant with boron concentration less than required to meet the minimum SDM of LCO 3.1.1 is required to assure continued safe operation. With coolant added without forced circulation, unmixed coolant could be introduced to the core, however coolant added with boron concentration meeting the minimum SDM maintains acceptable margin to subcritical operations.

The immediate Completion Time reflects the importance of maintaining operation for heat removal. The action to restore must continue until one loop is restored to OPERABLE status and operation.

SURVEILLANCE SIR 3.4.8.1 REQUIREMENTS This SIR requires verification every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> that one loop is in operation.

Verification may include flow rate, temperature, or pump status monitoring, which help ensure that forced flow is providing heat removal.

The Frequency of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> is sufficient considering other indications and alarms available to the operator in the control room to monitor IRHR loop performance.

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.... ..... RCS Loops - MODE 5, Loops NotB Filled3.4.8 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.8.2 REQUIREMENTS (continued) Verification that a second RHR pump is OPERABLE ensures that an additional pump can be placed in operation, if needed, to maintain decay heat removal and reactor coolant circulation. Verification is performed by verifying proper breaker alignment and power available to the RHR pump.

The Frequency of 7 days is considered reasonable in view of other administrative controls available and has been shown to be acceptable by operating experience.

SR 3.4.8.3 RHR System piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the RHR loops and may also prevent water hammer, pump cavitation, and pumping of noncondensible gas into the reactor vessel.

Selection of RHR System locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations. The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration. Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.

The RHR System is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water.

Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump), -

the Surveillance is not met. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the RHR System is not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.

RHR System locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow Wolf Creek - Unit 1 ..-

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RCS Loops - MODE 5, Loops Not Filled B 3.4.8 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.8.3 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative sub-set of susceptible locations.

Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location. Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY. The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.

The 31 day Frequency takes into consideration the gradual nature of gas accumulation in the RHR System piping and the procedural controls governing system operation.

REFERENCES 1. USAR, Section 15.4.6.

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Accumulators B 3.5.1 BASES APPLICABLE The worst case small break LOCA analyses also assume a time delay SAFETY ANALYSES before pumped flow reaches the core. For the larger range of small (continued) breaks, the rate of blowdown is such that the increase in fuel clad temperature is terminated primarily by the accumulators, with pumped flow then providing continued cooling. As break size decreases, the accumulators and ECCS pumps play a part in terminating the rise in clad temperature. As break size continues to decrease, the role of the accumulators continues to decrease until they are not required and the centrifugal charging pumps become solely responsible for terminating the temperature increase.

This LCO helps to ensure that the following acceptance criteria established for the ECCS by 10 CFR 50.46 (Ref. 2) will be met following a LOCA:

a. Maximum fuel element cladding temperature is < 2200°F;

b. Maximum cladding oxidation is _< 0.17 times the total cladding

_ thickness before oxidation;

c. Maximum hydrogen generation from a zirconium water reaction is

< 0.01 times the hypothetical amount that would be generated if all of the metal in the cladding cylinders surrounding the fuel, excluding the cladding surrounding the plenum volume, were to react; and

d. Core is maintained in a coolable geometry.

Since the accumulators empty themselves by the beginning stages of the reflood phase of a LOCA, they do not contribute to the long term cooling requirements of 10 CFR 50.46.

For the small break LOCA analysis, a nominal contained accumulator water volume is used, while the large break LOCA analysis samples the accumulator water volume over the specified range of 6122 gallons to 6594 gallons to allow for instrument inaccuracy. The contained water volume is the same as the available deliverable volume for the accumulators. For large breaks, an increase in water volume can be either a peak clad temperature penalty or benefit, depending on downcomer filling and subsequent spill through the break during the core reflooding portion of the transient. The analysis credits the line water volume from the accumulator to the check valve.

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........ Accumulators B 3.5.1 BASES APPLICABLE The minimum boron concentration limit is used in the post LOCA boron SAFETY ANALYSES concentration calculation. The calculation is performed to assure reactor (continued) subcriticality in a post LOCA environment. Of particular interest is the large break LOCA, since no credit is taken for control rod assembly insertion. A reduction in the accumulator minimum boron concentration would produce a subsequent reduction in the available containment sump boron concentration for post LOCA shutdown and an increase in the maximum sump pH. The maximum boron concentration is used in determining the cold leg to hot leg recirculation injection switchover time and minimum sump pH.

The small break LOCA analysis is performed at the minimum nitrogen cover pressure, since sensitivity analyses have demonstrated that higher nitrogen cover pressure results in a computed peak clad temperature benefit. The maximum nitrogen cover Pressure limit prevents accumulator relief valve actuation, and ultimately preserves accumulator integrity. The large break LOCA analysis samples the accumulator pressure over the range of 568.1 psig to 681.9 psig.

The effects on containment mass and energy releases from the accumulators are accounted for in the appropriate analyses (Refs. 1 and 3).

The accumulators satisfy Criterion 2 and Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (c)(2)(ii).

LCO The LCO establishes the minimum conditions required to ensure that the accumulators are available to accomplish their core cooling safety function following a LOCA. Four accumulators are required to ensure that 100% of the contents of three of the accumulators will reach the core during a LOCA. This is consistent with the assumption that the contents of one accumulator spill through the break. If less than three accumulators are injected during the blowdown phase of a LOCA, the ECCS acceptance criteria of 10 CFR 50.46 (Ref. 2) could be violated.

For an accumulator to be considered OPERABLE, the isolation valve must be fully open, power removed above 1000 psig, and the limits established in the SRs for contained volume, boron concentration, and nitrogen cover pressure must be met.

APPLICABILITY In MODES I and 2, and in MODE 3 with RCS pressure > 1000 psig, the accumulator OPERABILITY requirements are based on full power operation. Although cooling requirements decrease as power decreases, Wolf Creek - Unit 1 ..-

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Accumulators B 3.5.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.1.2 and SR 3.5.1.3 REQUIREMENTS (continued) Every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, borated water volume and nitrogen cover pressure are verified for each accumulator. The limit on borated water volume is equivalent to >_30 % and < 70.3 % level. Only one set of non-safety channels (1 of 2) is required for water level and pressure indication. The 12-hour Frequency is sufficient to ensure adequate injection during a LOCA. Because of the static design of the accumulator, a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Frequency usually allows the operator to identify changes before limits are reached. Operating experience has shown this Frequency to be appropriate for early detection and correction of off normal trends.

SR 3.5.1.4 The boron concentration should be verified to be within required limits for each accumulator every 31 days since the static design of the accumulators limits the ways in which the concentration can be changed.

The 31 day Frequency is adequate to identify changes that could occur from mechanisms such as dilution or inleakage. Sampling the affected accumulator within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> after a 70 gallon increase (approximately 8%

level) will identify whether inleakage has caused a reduction in boron concentration to below the required limit. It is not necessary to verify boron concentration ifthe added water inventory is from the refueling water storage tank (RWST) and the RWST has not been diluted since verifying that its boron concentration satisfies SR 3.5.4.3, because the water contained in the RWST is normally within the accumulator boron concentration requirements. This is consistent with the recommendation of NUREG-1 366 (Ref. 4).

SR 3.5.1.5 Verification every 31 days that power is removed from each accumulator isolation valve operator when the RCS pressure is > 1000 psig ensures that an active failure could not result in the undetected closure of an accumulator motor operated isolation valve. If this were to occur, only two accumulators would be available for injection given a single failure coincident with a LOCA. Since power is removed under administrative control, the 31 day Frequency will provide adequate assurance that power is removed.

This SR allows power to be supplied to the motor operated isolation valves when RCS pressure is < 1000 psig, thus allowing operational Wolf Creek - Unit 1 ..-

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Accumulators B 3.5.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.1.5 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS flexibility by avoiding unnecessary delays to manipulate the breakers during plant startups or shutdowns.

Should closure of a valve occur in spite of the interlock, the SI signal provided to the valves would open a closed valve in the event of a LOCA.

REFERENCES 1. USAR, Chapter 6.

2. 10OCFR 50.46.

3. USAR, Chapter 15.

4. NUREG-1 366, February 1990.

5. WCAP-1 5049-A, Rev. 1, April 1999.

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ECCS - Operating B 3.5.2 BASES LCO In MODES 1, 2, and 3, two independent (and redundant) ECCS trains are required to ensure that sufficient ECCS flow is available, assuming a single failure affecting either train. Additionally, individual components within the ECCS trains may be called upon to mitigate the consequences of other transients and accidents.

In MODES 1, 2, and 3, an ECCS train consists of a centrifugal charging subsystem, an SI subsystem, and an RHR subsystem. Each train includes the piping, instruments, and controls to ensure an OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the RWST upon an SI signal and automatically transferring suction to the containment sump.

During an event requiring ECCS actuation, a flow path is required to provide an abundant supply of water from the RWST to the RCS via the ECCS pumps and their respective supply headers to each of the four cold leg injection nozzles. In the long term, this flow path may be switched to take its supply from the containment sump and to supply its flow to the RCS hot and cold legs. Management of gas voids is important to ECCS OPERABILITY.

The LCO requires the OPERABILITY of a number of independent subsystems. Due to the redundancy of trains and the diversity of subsystems, the inoperability of one component in a train does not render the ECCS incapable of performing its function. Neither does the inoperability of two different components, each in a different train, necessarily result in a loss of function for the ECCS. Reference 6 describes situations in which one component, such as an RHR crossover valve, can disable both ECCS trains.

During recirculation operation, the flow path for each train must maintain its designed independence to ensure that no single failure can disable both ECCS trains.

As indicated in Note 1, the SI flow paths may be isolated for 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> in MODE 3, under controlled conditions, to perform pressure isolation valve testing per SR 3.4.14.1. The flow path is readily restorable from the control room, and a single active failure is not assumed coincident with this testing (Ref. 7). Therefore, the ECCS trains are considered OPERABLE during this isolation.

As indicated in Note 2, operation in MODE 3 with ECCS pumps made incapable of injecting, pursuant to LCO 3.4.12, "Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) System," is necessary for plants with an LTOP arming temperature at or near the MODE 3 boundary temperature of 350°F. LCO 3.4.12 requires that certain pumps be rendered incapable of injecting at and below the LTOP arming temperature. When this temperature is at or near the MODE 3 boundary temperature, time is needed to restore the inoperable pumps to OPERABLE status.

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ECCS - Operating B 3.5.2 BASES LCO Either of the CCPs may be considered OPERABLE with its associated (continued) discharge to RCP seal throttle valve, BG-HV-8357A or BG-HV-8357B, inoperable.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the ECCS OPERABILITY requirements for the limiting Design Basis Accident, a large break LOCA, are based on full power operation. Although reduced power would not require the same level of performance, the accident analysis does not provide for reduced cooling requirements in the lower MODES. The centrifugal charging pump performance is based on a small break LOCA, which establishes the pump performance curve and has less dependence on power. The SI pump performance requirements are based on a small break LOCA.

MODE 2 and MODE 3 requirements are bounded by the MODE 1 analysis.

This LCO is only applicable in MODE 3 and above. Below MODE 3, the system functional requirements are relaxed as described in LCO 3.5.3, "ECCS -Shutdown."

In MODES 5 and 6, plant conditions are such that the probability of an event requiring ECCS injection is extremely low. Core cooling requirements in MODE 5 are addressed by LCO 3.4.7, "RCS Loops -

MODE 5, Loops Filled," and LCO 3.4.8, "RCS Loops - MODE 5, Loops Not Filled." MODE 6 core cooling requirements are addressed by LCO 3.9.5, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation - High Water Level," and LCO 3.9.6, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation - Low Water Level."

ACTIONS A.__1 With one toorOPERABLE returned more trains inoperable, status withinthe 72 inoperable hours. Thecomponents must be 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Completion Time is based on an NRC reliability evaluation (Ref. 5) and is a reasonable time for repair of many ECCS components.

An ECCS train is inoperable if it is not capable of delivering design flow to the RCS. Individual components are inoperable ifthey are not capable of performing their design function or supporting systems are not available.

The LCO requires the OPERABILITY of a number of independent subsystems. Due to the redundancy of trains and the diversity of subsystems, the inoperability of one component in a train does not render Wolf Creek - Unit 1 ..-

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ECCS - Operating B 3.5.2 BASES ACTIONS A.1 (continued) the ECCS incapable of performing its function. Neither does the inoperability of two different components, each in a different train, necessarily result in a loss of function for the ECCS. This allows increased flexibility in plant operations under circumstances when components in opposite trains are inoperable.

An event accompanied by a loss of offsite power and the failure of an EDG can disable one ECCS train until power is restored. A reliability analysis (Ref. 5) has shown that the impact of having one full ECCS train inoperable is sufficiently small to justify continued operation for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

B.1 and B.2 If the inoperable trains cannot be returned to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and MODE 4 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

C.1l Condition A is applicable with one or more trains inoperable. The allowed Completion Time is based on the assumption that at least 100% of the ECCS flow equivalent to a single OPERABLE ECCS train is available.

With less than 100% of the ECCS flow equivalent to a single OPERABLE ECCS train available, the unit is in a condition outside of the accident analyses. Therefore, LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.2.1 REQUIREMENTS Verification of proper valve position ensures that the flow path from the ECCS pumps to the RCS is maintained. Misalignment of these valves could render both ECCS trains inoperable. Securing these valves in the correct position by a power lockout isolation device ensures that they cannot change position as a result of an active failure or be inadvertently misaligned. These valves are of the type, described in References 7 and 8, that can disable the function of both ECCS trains and invalidate the accident analyses. A 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Frequency is considered reasonable in view of other administrative controls that will ensure a mispositioned valve is unlikely.

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ECCS - Operating B 3.5.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.2.2 REQUIREMENTS (continued) Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the ECCS flow paths provides assurance that the proper flow paths will exist for ECCS operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since these were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing.

This SR does not apply to manual vent/drain valves, and to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned such as check valves. A valve that receives an actuation signal is allowed to be in a nonaccident position provided the valve will automatically reposition within the proper stroke time. This Surveillance does not require any testing or valve manipulation. Rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. The 31 day Frequency is appropriate because the valves are operated under administrative control, and an improper valve position would only affect a single train. This Frequency has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.

The Surveillance is modified by a Note which exempts system vent flow paths opened under administrative control. The administrative control should be proceduralized and include stationing a dedicated individual at the system vent flow path who is in continuous communication with the operators in the control room. This individual will have a method to rapidly close the system vent flow path if directed.

SR 3.5.2.3 ECCS piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the EGCS and may also prevent water hammer, pump cavitation, and pumping of noncondensible gas into the reactor vessel.

Selection of ECCS locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations. The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration. Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.

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ECCS - Operating B 3.5.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.2.3 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS The ECCS is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water.

Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. In conjunction with or in lieu of venting, Ultrasonic Testing (UT) may be performed to verify the ECCS pumps and associated piping are sufficiently full of water. The design of the centrifugal charging pump is such that significant noncondensible gases do not collect in the pump. Therefore, it is unnecessary to require periodic pump casing venting to ensure the centrifugal charging pump will remain OPERABLE.

If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump), the Surveillance is not met. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the ECCS is not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.

ECCS locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative sub-set of susceptible locations. Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety.

For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location.

Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY. The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.

The 92 day Frequency takes into consideration the plant specific nature of gas accumulation in the ECCS piping and the procedural controls governing system operation.

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ECCS - Operating B 3.5.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.2.4 REQUIREMENTS (continued) Periodic surveillance testing of ECCS pumps to detect gross degradation caused by impeller structural damage or other hydraulic component problems is required by the ASME Code. This type of testing may be accomplished by measuring the pump developed head at only one point of the pump characteristic curve. The following ECCS pumps are required to develop the indicated differential pressure on recirculation flow:

Centrifugal Charging Pump > 2490 psid Safety Injection Pump >_1468.9 psid RHR Pump >_ 183.6 psid This verifies both that the measured performance is within an acceptable tolerance of the original pump baseline performance and that the performance at the test flow is greater than or equal to the performance assumed in the plant safety analysis. SRs are specified in the applicable portions of the Inservice Testing Program, which encompasses the ASME Code. The ASME Code provides the activities and Frequencies necessary to satisfy the requirements.

SR 3.5.2.5 and SR 3.5.2.6 These Surveillances demonstrate that each automatic ECCS valve actuates to the required position on an actual or simulated SI signal and on an actual or simulated RWST Level Low-Low I Automatic Transfer signal coincident with an SI signal and that each ECCS pump starts on receipt of an actual or simulated SI signal. This Surveillance is not required for valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the required position under administrative controls. The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform these Surveillances under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for unplanned plant transients ifthe Surveillances were performed with the reactor at power.

The 18 month Frequency is also acceptable based on consideration of the design reliability (and confirming operating experience) of the equipment.

The actuation logic is tested as part of ESF Actuation System testing, and equipment performance is monitored as part of the Inservice Testing Program.

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ECCS - Operating B 3.5.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.2.7 REQUIREMENTS (continued) The position of throttle valves in the flow path is necessary for proper ECCS performance. These valves are necessary to restrict flow to a ruptured cold leg, ensuring that the other cold legs receive at least the required minimum flow. The 18 month Frequency is based on the same reasons as those stated in SR 3.5.2.5 and SR 3.5.2.6. The ECCS throttle valves are set to ensure proper flow resistance and pressure drop in the piping to each injection point in the event of a LOCA. Once set, these throttle valves are secured with locking devices and mechanical position stops. These devices help to ensure that the following safety analyses assumptions remain valid: (1) both the maximum and minimum total system resistance; (2) both the maximum and minimum branch injection line resistance; and (3) the maximum and minimum ranges of potential pump performance. These resistances and pump performance ranges are used to calculate the maximum and minimum ECCS flows assumed in the LOCA analyses of Reference 3.

SR 3.5.2.8 This SR requires verification that each ECCS train containment sump inlet is not restricted by debris and the suction inlet strainers show no evidence of structural distress or abnormal corrosion. A visual inspection of the suction inlet piping verifies the piping is unrestricted. A visual inspection of the accessible portion of the containment sump strainer assembly verifies no evidence of structural distress or abnormal corrosion.

Verification of no evidence of structural distress ensures there are no openings in excess of the maximum designed strainer opening. The 18 month Frequency has been found to be sufficient to detect abnormal degradation and is confirmed by operating experience.

REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 35.

2. 10 CFR 50.46.

3. USAR, Sections 6.3 and 15.6.

4. USAR, Chapter 15, "Accident Analysis."

5. NRC Memorandum to V. Stello, Jr., from R.L. Baer, "Recommended Interim Revisions to LCOs for ECCS Components,"

December 1, 1975.

6. IE Information Notice No. 87-01.

Wolf Creek - Unit 1 B3521 B 3.5.2-11 eiin7

ECCS - Operating B 3.5.2 BASES REFERENCES 7. BTP EICSB-18, Application of the Single Failure Criteria to (continued) Manually-Controlled Electrically-Operated Valves.

8. WCAP-9207, "Evaluation of Mispositioned ECCS Valves,"

September 1977.

Wolf Creek - Unit 1 ..- 2Reiin7 B 3.5.2-12

ECCS - Shutdown B 3.5.3 B 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)

B 3.5.3 ECCS - Shutdown BASES BACKGROUND The Background section for Bases 3.5.2, "ECCS - Operating," is applicable to these Bases, with the following modifications.

In MODE 4, the required ECCS train consists of two separate subsystems: centrifugal charging (high head) and residual heat removal (RHR) (low head).

The ECCS flow paths consist of piping, valves, heat exchangers, and pumps such that water from the refueling water storage tank (RWST) can be injected into the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) following the accidents described in Bases 3.5.2.

APPLICABLE The Applicable Safety Analyses section of Bases 3.5.2 also applies SAFETY ANALYSES to this Bases section.

Due to the stable conditions associated with operation in MODE 4 and the reduced probability of occurrence of a Design Basis Accident (DBA), the ECCS operational requirements are reduced. It is understood in these reductions that certain automatic safety injection (SI) actuation is not available. In this MODE, sufficient time exists for manual actuation of the required ECCS to mitigate the consequences of a DBA.

For MODE 3, with the accumulators blocked, and MODE 4, the parameters assumed in the generic bounding thermal hydraulic analysis for the limiting DBA (Reference 1) are based on a combination of limiting parameters for MODE 3, with the accumulators blocked, and parameters for MODE 4. However, assumed ECCS availability is based on MODE 4 conditions; the minimum available ECCS flow is calculated assuming only one OPERABLE ECCS train.

Only one tr'ain-of ECCS is required for MODE 4. This requirement dictates that single failures are not considered during this MODE of operation. The ECCS trains satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO In MODE 4, one of the two independent (and redundant) ECCS trains is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that sufficient ECCS flow is available to the core following a DBA.

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B3.5.3-1 eiin5 Revision 56

.. .. " . . . ' .... EGCS - Shutdown B 3.5.3 BASES LCO In MODE 4, an EGGS train consists of a centrifugal charging subsystem (continued) and an RHR subsystem. Each train includes the piping, instruments, and controls to ensure an OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the RWST and transferring suction to the containment sump.

During an event requiring ECGS actuation, a flow path is required to provide an abundant supply of water from the RWST to the RCS via the EGGS pumps and their respective supply headers to two cold leg injection nozzles. In the long term, this flow path may be switched to take its supply from the containment sump and to deliver its flow to the RCS hot and cold legs. Management of gas voids is important to ECCS OPERABILITY.

This LCO is modified by a Note that allows an RHR train to be considered OPERABLE during alignment and operation for decay heat removal, if capable of being manually realigned (remote or local) to the ECCS mode of operation and not otherwise inoperable. This allows operation in the RHR mode during MODE 4. Only one RHR train is placed into operation to reduce RGS temperature. For an RHR train to be considered OPERABLE during shutdown, the train cannot be placed in service until RCS temperature is less than 225 0 F (plant computer)/21 5 0 F (main control board). For an RHR train to be considered OPERABLE during startup, the train must be isolated from the RCS prior to RCS temperature exceeding 225 0 F (plant computer)/215 °F (main control board).

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the OPERABILITY requirements for EGGS are covered by LCO 3.5.2.

In MODE 4 with RCS temperature below 350°F, one OPERABLE EGGS train is acceptable without single failure consideration, on the basis of the stable reactivity of the reactor and the limited core cooling requirements.

In MODES 5 and 6, plant conditions are such that the probability of an event requiring EGGS injection is extremely low. Gore cooling requirements in MODE 5 are addressed by LGO 3.4.7, "RGS Loops -

MODE 5, Loops Filled," and LCO 3.4.8, "RGS Loops - MODE 5, Loops Not Filled." MODE 6 core cooling requirements are addressed by LGO 3.9.5, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Goolant Girculation - High Water Level," and LGO 3.9.6, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Goolant Girculation - Low Water Level."

AGTIONS A Note prohibits the application of LGO 3.0.4b. to an inoperable EGGS centrifugal charging pump subsystem when entering MODE 4. There is an increased risk associated with entering MODE 4 from MODE 5 with an Wolf Greek - Unit 1 ..-

B 3.5.3-2 eiin7 Revision 72

Containment Spray and Cooling Systems B 3.6.6 BASES BACKGROUND Containment Coolinq System (continued)

In post accident operation following an actuation signal, the Containment Cooling System fans are designed to start automatically in slow speed if not already running. If running in high (normal) speed, the fans automatically shift to slow speed. The fans are operated at the lower speed during accident conditions to prevent motor overload from the higher mass atmosphere. The temperature of the ESW is an important factor in the heat removal capability of the fan units.

APPLICABLE The Containment Spray System and Containment Cooling System limits SAFETY ANALYSES the temperature and pressure that could be experienced following a DBA.

The limiting DBAs considered are the loss of coolant accident (LOCA) and the steam line break (SLB). The LOCA and SLB are analyzed using computer codes designed to predict the resultant containment pressure and temperature transients. No DBAs are assumed to occur simultaneously or consecutively. The postulated DBAs are analyzed with regards to containment ESF systems, assuming the loss of one ESE bus, which is the worst case single active failure and results in one train of the Containment Spray System and Containment Cooling System being rendered inoperable.

The analysis and evaluation show that under the worst case scenario, the highest peak containment pressure is 51.5 psig and the peak containment temperature is 360.0°F (experienced during an SLB). Both results meet the intent of the design basis. (See the Bases for LCO 3.6.4, "Containment Pressure," and LCO 3.6.5 for a detailed discussion.) The analyses and evaluations assume a unit specific power level ranging to 102%, one containment spray train and one containment cooling train operating, and initial (pre-accident) containment conditions of 120°F and 0 psig. The analyses also assume a response time delayed initiation to provide conservative peak calculated containment pressure and temperature responses.

For certain aspects of transient accident analyses, maximizing the calculated containment pressure is not conservative. In particular, the effectiveness of the Emergency Core Cooling System during the core reflood phase of a LOCA analysis increases with increasing containment backpressure. For these calculations, the containment backpressure is calculated in a manner designed to conservatively minimize, rather than maximize, the calculated transient containment pressures in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix K (Ref. 2).

The effect of an inadvertent containment spray actuation has been analyzed. An inadvertent spray actuation results in a -2.72 psig containment pressure and is associated with the sudden cooling effect in the interior of the leak tight containment. Additional discussion is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.6.4.

Wolf Creek - Unit 1B366-Reion7 B 3.6.6-3 Revision 37

• - "* - Containment SI5ray and Cooling Systems B 3.6.6 BASES APPLICABLE The modeled Containment Spray System actuation from the containment SAFETY ANALYSES analysis is based on a response time associated with exceeding the (continued) containment High-3 pressure setpoint to achieving full flow through the containment spray nozzles.

The Containment Spray System total response time includes diesel generator (DG) startup (for loss of offsite power), sequenced loading of equipment, containment spray pump startup, and spray line filling (Ref. 4).

Containment cooling .train performance for post accident conditions is given in Reference 4. The result of the analysis is that each train can provide 100% of the required peak cooling capacity during the post accident condition. The train post accident cooling capacity under varying containment ambient conditions, required to perform the accident analyses, is also shown in Reference 4.

The modeled Containment Cooling System actuation from the containment analysis is based upon a response time associated with receipt of an SI signal to achieving full Containment Cooling System air and safety grade cooling water flow. The Containment Cooling System total response time of 70 seconds, includes signal delay, OG startup (for loss of offsite power), and Essential Service Water pump startup times and line refill (Ref. 4).

The Containment Spray System and the Containment Cooling System satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO During a DBA, a minimum of one containment cooling train and one containment spray train is required to maintain the containment peak pressure and temperature below the design limits (Ref. 3). Additionally, one containment spray train is also required to remove iodine from the containment atmosphere and maintain concentrations below those assumed in the safety analysis. With the Spray Additive System inoperable, a containment spray train is still available and would remove some iodine from the containment atmosphere in the event of a DBA. To ensure that these requirements are met, two containment spray trains and two containment cooling trains must be OPERABLE. Therefore, in the event of an accident, at least one train in each system operates, assuming the worst case single active failure occurs.

Each Containment Spray System typically includes a spray pump, spray headers, eductor, nozzles, valves, piping, instruments, and controls to ensure an OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the RWST upon an ESF actuation signal and manually transferring to the containment sump. Management of gas voids is important to Containment Spray System OPERABILITY.

A containment cooling train typically includes cooling coils, dampers, two fans, instruments, and controls to ensure an OPERABLE flow path.

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B 3.6.6-4 eiin7 72 Revision

Containment Spray and Cooling Systems B 3.6.6 BASES ACTIONS F.1 (continued)

With two containment spray trains or any combination of three or more containment spray and cooling trains inoperable, the unit is in a condition outside the accident analysis. Therefore, LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.6.1 REQUIREMENTS Verifying the correct alignment' for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the containment spray flow path provides assurance that the proper flow paths will exist for Containment Spray System operation. The correct alignment for the Containment Cooling System valves is provided in SR 3.7.8.1. This SR does not apply to manual vent/drain valves and to valves that cannot be advertently misaligned such as check valves. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since these were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation. Rather, it involves .....

verification, through a system walkdown (which may include the use of local or remote indicators), that those valves outside containment and capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position. The 31 day Frequency is based on engineering judgement, is consistent with administrative controls governing valve operation, and ensures correct valve positions.

The Surveillance is modified by a Note which exempts system vent flow paths opened under administrative control. The administrative control should be proceduralized and include stationing a dedicated individual at the system vent flow path who is in continuous communication with the operators in the control room. This individual will have a method to rapidly close the system vent flow path if directed.

SR 3.6.6.2 Operating each containment cooling train fan unit for > 15 minutes -

ensures that all fan units are OPERABLE. Italso ensures the abnormal conditions or degradation of the fan unit can be detected for corrective action. The 31 day Frequency was developed considering the known reliability of the fan units and controls, the two train redundancy available, and the low probability of significant degradation of the containment cooling train occurring between surveillances. It has also been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.

SR 3.6.6.3 Not Used.

Wolf Creek - Unit IB366-Reion7 B3.6.6-7 Revision 72

... Containment Spray and Cooling Systems B 3.6.6 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.6.4 REQUIREMENTS (continued) Verifying each containment spray pump's developed head at the flow test point is greater than or equal to the required developed head ensures that spray pump performance has not degraded during the cycle. Flow and differential pressure are normal tests of centrifugal pump performance required by the ASME Code (Ref. 5). Since the containment spray pumps cannot be tested with flow through the spray headers, they are tested on recirculation flow. This test confirms one point on the pump design curve and is indicative of overall performance. Such inservice tests confirm component OPERABILITY, trend performance, and detect incipient failures by abnormal performance. The Frequency of the SR is in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program.

This test ensures that each pump develops a differential pressure of greater than or equal to 219 psid at a nominal flow of 300 gpm when on recirculation (Ref. 6).

SR 3.6.6.5 and SR 3.6.6.6 These SRs require verification that each automatic containment spray valve actuates to its correct position and that each containment spray pump starts upon receipt of an actual or simulated actuation of a containment High-3 pressure signal. This Surveillance is not required for valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the required position under administrative controls. The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform these Surveillances under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillances were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillances when performed at the 18 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

The surveillance of containment sump isolation valves is also required by SR 3.5.2.5. A single surveillance may be used to satisfy both requirements.

SR 3.6.6.7 This SR requires verification that each containment cooling train actuates upon receipt of an actual or simulated safety injection signal. Upon actuation, each fan in the train starts in slow speed or, ifoperating, shifts to slow speed and the Cooling water flow rate increases to _> 2000 gpm to each cooler train. The 18 month Frequency is based on engineering judgment and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience. See SR 3.6.6.5 and SR 3.6.6.6, above, for further discussion of the basis for the 18 month Frequency.

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B 3.6.6-8 eiin7

Containment Spray and Cooling Systems B 3.6.6 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.6.8 REQUIREMENTS (continued) With the containment spray inlet valves closed and the spray header drained of any solution, low pressure air or smoke can be blown through test connections. This SR ensures that each spray nozzle is unobstructed and provides assurance that spray coverage of the containment during an accident is not degraded. Due to the passive design of the nozzle, a confirmation of OPERABILITY following maintenance activities that can result in obstruction of spray nozzle flow is considered adequate to detect obstruction of the nozzles. Confirmation that the spray nozzles are unobstructed may be obtained by utilizing foreign material exclusion (FME) controls during maintenance, a visual inspection of the affected portions of the system, or by an air or smoke flow test following maintenance involving opening portions of the system downstream of the containment isolation valves or draining of the filled portions of the system inside containment. Maintenance that could result in nozzle blockage is generally a result of a loss of foreign material control or a flow of borated water through a nozzle. Should either of these events occur, a supervisory evaluation will be required to determine whether nozzle blo0ckage is a possible result of the event. For the loss of FME event, an inspection or flush of the affected portions of the system should be adequate to confirm that the spray nozzles are unobstructed since water flow would be required to transport any debris to the spray nozzles. An air flow or smoke test may not be appropriate for a loss of FME event but may be appropriate for the case where borated water inadvertently flows through the nozzles.

SR 3.6.6.9 Containment Spray System piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the containment spray trains and may also prevent water hammer and pump cavitation.

Selection of Containment Spray System locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations. The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration. Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.

Revision 72 B 3.6.6-9 Wolf Creek Unit I

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B 3.6.6-9 Revision 72

'"; ...... *Containment Sprayi and Cooling Systems B 3.6.6 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.6.9 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS The Containment Spray System is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water. Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump), the Surveillance is not met. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the Containment Spray System is not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met.

Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.

Containment Spray System locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same sYstem flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative sub-set of susceptible locations. Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location. Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY.

The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.

The 92 day Frequency takes into consideration the plant specific nature of gas accumulation in the Containment Spray System piping and the procedural controls governing system operation.

REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 38, GDC 39, GDC 40, GDC 41. GDC 42, and GDC 43, and GDC 50.

2. 10 CFR 50, Appendix K.

3. USAR, Section 6.2.1.

4. USAR, Section 6.2.2.

5. ASME Code for Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants.

6. Performance Improvement Request 2002-0945.

Wolf Creek- Unit 1 B 3.6.6-10 Revision 72

AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES APPLICABLE meeting the design basis of the unit. This results in maintaining at least SAFETY ANALYSES one train of the onsite or offsite AC sources OPERABLE during Accident (continued) conditions in the event of:

a. An assumed loss of all offsite power or all onsite AC power; and

b. A worst case single failure.

The AC sources satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO Two qualified circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E Electrical Power System, separate and independent DGs for each train, and redundant LSELS for each train ensure availability of the required power to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition after an anticipated operational occurrence (AOO) or a postulated DBA.

Each offsite circuit must be capable of maintaining rated frequency and voltage, and accepting required loads during an accident, while connected to the ESF buses.

One offsite circuit consists of the #7 transformer feeding through the 13-48 breaker power the ESE transformer XNB01, which, in turn powers the NB01 bus through its normal feeder breaker. Transformer XNB01 may also be powered from the SL-7 supply through the 13-8 breaker provided the offsite 69 Ky line is not connected to the 345 kV system.

The offsite circuit energizing NB01 is considered inoperable when the East 345 kV bus is only energized from the transmission network through the 345-50 and 345-60 main generator breakers. For this configuration, switchyard breakers 345-120 and 345-90 OR 345-120 and 345-80 are open.

Another offsite circuit consists of the startup transformer feeding through breaker PA201 powering the ESF transformer XNB02, which, in turn powers the NB02 bus through its normal feeder breaker.

Each DG must be capable of starting, accelerating to rated speed and voltage, and connecting to its respective ESF bus on detection of bus undervoltage. This will be accomplished within 12 seconds. Each DG must also be capable of accepting required loads within the assumed loading sequence intervals, and continue to operate until offsite power can be restored to the ESF buses. These capabilities are required to be met from a variety of initial conditions such as DG in standby with the engine hot and DG in standby with the engine at ambient conditions.

Additional DG capabilities must be demonstrated to meet required Surveillance, e.g., capability of the DG to revert to standby status on an ECCS signal while operating in parallel test mode.

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B 3.8.1-3 eiin4 Revision 47

AC sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES LCO Upon failure of the DG lube oil keep warm system when the DO is in the (continued) standby condition, the DO remains OPERABLE if lube oil temperature is

> 115 0F and engine lubrication (i.e., flow of lube oil to the DO engine) is maintained. Upon failure of the DG jacket water keep warm system, the DG remains OPERABLE as long as jacket water temperature is _>105 °F (Ref. 13).

Initiating an EDO start upon a detected undervoltage or degraded voltage condition, tripping of nonessential loads, and proper sequencing of loads, is a required function of LSELS and required for DO OPERABILtITY. In addition, the LSELS Automatic Test Indicator (ATI) is an installed testing aid and is not required to be OPERABLE to support the sequencer function. Absence of a functioning ATI does not render LSELS inoperable.

The AC sources in one train must be separate and independent of the AC sources in the other train. For the D~s, separation and independence are complete. For the offsite AC source, separation and independence are to the extent practical. -

APPLICABILITY The AC sources and LSELS are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 to ensure that:

a. Acceptable fuel design limits and reactor coolant pressure boundary limits are not exceeded as a result of AOOs or abnormal transients; and

b. Adequate core cooling is provided and containment OPERABILITY and other vital functions are maintained in the event of a postulated DBA.

The AC power requirements for MODES 5 and 6 are covered in LCO 3.8.2, "AC Sources - Shutdown."

ACTIONS A Note prohibits the application of LCO 3.0.4b. to an inoperable DG.

There is an increased risk associated with entering a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with an inoperable DO and the provisions of LCO 3.0.4b., which allow entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with the LCO not met after performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, should not be applied in this circumstance.

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..- eiin7 71 Revision

AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.21 REQUIREMENTS (continued) SR 3.8.1.21 is the performance of an ACTUATION LOGIC TEST using the LSELS automatic tester for each load shedder and emergency load sequencer train except that the continuity check does not have to be performed, as explained in the Note. This test is performed every 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS. The Frequency is adequate based on industry operating experience, considering instrument reliability and operating history data.

REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 17.

2. USAR, Chapter 8.

3. Regulatory Guide 1.9, Rev. 3.

4. USAR, Chapter 6.

5. USAR, Chapter 15.

6. Regulatory Guide 1.93, Rev. 0, December 1974.

7. Generic Letter 84-15, "Proposed Staff Actions to Improve and Maintain Diesel Generator Reliability," July 2, 1984.

8. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 18.

9. Regulatory Guide 1.108, Rev. 1, August 1977.

10. Regulatory Guide 1.137, Rev. 0, January 1978.

11. ANSI C84.1-1 982.

12. IEEE Standard 308-1978.

13. Configuration Change Package (CCP) 08052, Revision 1, April 23, 1999.

14.

Amendment No. 161, April 21, 2005.

15. Not used.

16. Amendment No. 163, April 26, 2006.

17. Amendment No. 154, August 4, 2004.

Wolf Creek - Unit 1 B3813 B 3.8.1-33 eiin7 Revision 71

AC Sou~rces - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES REFERENCES 18. Amendment No. 8, May 29, 1987.

(continued)

19. Condition Report 15727.

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..- 4 eiin4 Revision 47

Inverters - Operating B 3.8.7 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS B 3.8.7 Inverters Operating

-

BASES BACKGROUND The inverters are the preferred source of power for the AC vital buses because of the stability and reliability they achieve. The function of the inverter is to provide AC electrical power to the vital buses. The inverters are normally powered from the respective 125 VDC bus. An alternate source of power to the AC vital buses is provided from Class 1E bypass constant voltage transformers. The battery bus provides an uninterruptible power source for the instrumentation and controls for the Reactor Protection System (RPS) and the Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS). There are two required inverters per train.

Two spare inverters (one per train) are provided for alignment to the 120 VAC vital bus when an associated inverter is taken out of service. If the spare inverter is placed in service, requirements of independence and redundancy between trains are maintained. Specific details on inverters and their operating characteristics are found in the USAR, Chapter 8 (Ref. 1).

APPLICABLE The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident (DBA) and transient SAFETY ANALYSES analyses in the USAR, Chapter 6 (Ref. 2) and Chapter 15 (Ref. 3),

assume Engineered Safety Feature systems are OPERABLE. The inverters are designed to provide the required capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to the RPS and ESFAS instrumentation and controls so that the fuel, Reactor Coolant System, and containment design limits are not exceeded. These limits are discussed in more detail in the Bases for Section 3.2, Power Distribution Limits; Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant System (RCS); and Section 3.6, Containment Systems.

The OPERABILITY of the inverters is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and is based on meeting the design basis of the unit. This includes maintaining required AC vital buses OPERABLE during accident conditions in the event of:

a. An assumed loss of all offsite AC electrical power or all onsite AC electrical power; and

b. A worst case single failure.

Inverters satisfy Criterion 3 of the 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

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B 3.8.7-1 eiin6 69 Revision

Inverters -"Operating B 3.8.7 BASES LCO The inverters ensure the availability of AC electrical power for the systems instrumentation required to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition after an anticipated operational occurrence (AQO) or a postulated DBA.

Maintaining the required inverters OPERABLE ensures that the redundancy incorporated into the design of the RPS and ESFAS instrumentation and controls is maintained. The four inverters (two per train) ensure an uninterruptible supply of AC electrical power to the AC vital buses even if the 4.16 kV safety buses are de-energized.

OPERABLE inverters require the associated vital bus to be powered by the inverter with output voltage within tolerances, and power input to the inverter from the 125 VDC battery bus of the same separation group.

The required inverters/AC vital buses are associated with the AC load group subsystems (Train A and Train B) as follows:

TRAIN A TRAIN B Bus NN01 Bus NN03 Bus NN02 Bus NN04 energized from energized from energized from energized from Invert. NN11 Invert. NN13 Invert. NN12 Invert. NN14 orNNl15 or NN 15 or NNl16 or NNl16 connected to connected to connected to connected to DC bus NK01 DC bus NK03 DC bus NK02 DC bus NK04 APPLICABILITY The inverters are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 to ensure that:

a. Acceptable fuel design limits and reactor coolant pressure boundary limits are not exceeded as a result of AOOs or abnormal transients; and

b. Adequate core cooling is provided, and containment OPERABILITY and other vital functions are maintained in the event of a postulated DBA.

Inverter requirements for MODES 5 and 6 are covered in the Bases for LCO 3.8.8, "Inverters - Shutdown."

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B 3.8.7-2 eiin6 Revision 69

Inverters - Operating B 3.8.7 BASES ACTIONS A.1 With a required inverter inoperable, its associated AC vital bus is inoperable until it is re-energized from its bypass constant voltage transformer or the bypass constant voltage transformer of the respective spare inverter. The bypass constant voltage transformers are powered from a Class 1 E bus.

For this reason a Note has been included in Condition A requiring the entry into the Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.9, "Distribution Systems - Operating," with any vital bus de-energized. This ensures that the vital bus is re-energized within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

Required Action A.1 allows 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to fix the inoperable inverter or place the associated train spare inverter in service. The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> limit is based upon engineering judgment, taking into consideration the time required to repair an inverter and the additional risk to which the unit is exposed because of the inverter inoperability. This has to be balanced against the risk of an immediate shutdown, along with the potential challenges to safety systems such a shutdown might entail. When the AC vital bus is powered from its bypass constant voltage transformer, it is relying upon interruptible AC electrical power sources (offsite and onsite). The uninterruptible inverter source to the AC vital buses is the preferred source for powering instrumentation trip setpoint devices.

B.1 and B.2 If the inoperable devices or components cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the unit must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and to MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.7.1 REQUIREMENTS This Surveillance verifies that the inverters are functioning properly with all required circuit breakers closed and AC vital buses energized from the inverter. The verification of proper voltage output ensures that the required power is readily available for the instrumentation of the RPS and ESFAS connected to the AC vital buses. The 7 day Frequency takes into account the redundant capability of the inverters and other indications available in the control room that alert the operator to inverter malfunctions.

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Inverter's - Operating B 3.8.7 BASES REFERENCES 1. USAR, Chapter 8.

2. USAR, Chapter 6.

3. USAR, Chapter 15.

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Inverters - Shutdown B 3.8.8 BASES APPLICABLE distribution systems are available and reliable. When portions of the SAFETY ANALYSES Class 1 E power or distribution systems are not available (usually as a (continued) result of maintenance or modifications), other reliable power sources or distribution are used to provide the needed electrical support. The plant staff assesses these alternate power sources and distribution systems to assure that the desired level of minimal risk is maintained (frequently referred to as maintaining a desired defense in depth). The level of detail involved in the assessment will vary with the significance of the equipment being supported. In some cases, prepared guidelines are used which include controls designed to manage risk and retain the desired defense in depth.

The inverters satisfy Criterion 3 of the 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO One train of inverters is required to be OPERABLE to support one train of the onsite Class 1E AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystems required by LCO 3.8.10, "Distribution Systems - Shutdown." The required train of inverters (Train A or Train B) consists of two AC vital buses energized from the associated inverters with each inverter connected to the respective DC bus. Each train includes one spare inverter that can be aligned to power either AC vital bus in its associated load group. Each spare inverter shall be powered from the 125 VDC bus in the separation group to which the spare inverter is connected. The inverters ensure the availability of electrical power for the instrumentation for systems required to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition after an anticipated operational occurrence or a postulated DBA. The battery powered inverters provide uninterruptible supply of AC electrical power to the AC vital buses even ifthe 4.16 kV safety buses are de-energized.

OPERABILITY of the inverters requires that the AC vital bus be powered by the inverter. This ensures the availability of sufficient inverter power sources to operate the unit in a safe manner and to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g., fuel handling accidents).

The required AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystem is supported by one train of inverters. When the second (subsystem) of AC vital bus electrical power distribution is needed to support redundant required systems, equipment and components, the second train may be energized from any available source. The available source must be Class 1E or another reliable source. The available source must be capable of supplying sufficient AC electrical power such that the redundant components are capable of performing their specified safety function(s)

(implicitly required by the definition of OPERABILITY). Otherwise, the supported components must be declared inoperable and the appropriate conditions of the LCOs for the redundant components must be entered.

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Inverters - Shutdown B 3.8.8 BASES APPLICABILITY The inverters required to be OPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6 provide assurance that:

a. Systems to provide adequate coolant inventory makeup are available for the irradiated fuel in the core;

b. Systems needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident are available;

c. Systems necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available; and

d. Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown condition or refueling condition.

Inverter requirements for MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 are covered in LCO 3.8.7.

ACTIONS LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable while in MODE 5 or 6. However, since irradiated fuel assembly movement can occur in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, the ACTIONS have been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 5 or 6, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Entering LCO 3.0.3, while in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4 would require the unit to be shutdown unnecessarily.

A.1, A.2.1. A.2.2. A.2.3. and A.2.4 By the allowance of the option to declare required features inoperable with the associated inverter(s) inoperable, appropriate restrictions will be implemented in accordance with the affected required features LCOs' Required Actions. In many instances, this option may involve undesired administrative efforts. Therefore, the allowance for sufficiently conservative actions is~made-(i.e., to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, and operations involving positive reactivity additions that could result in loss of required SDM (MODE 5) of LCO 3.1.1 or boron concentration (MODE 6) of LCO 3.9.1). Suspending positive reactivity additions that could result in failure to meet the minimum SDM or boron concentration limit is required to assure continued safe operation. Introduction of coolant inventory must be from sources that have a boron concentration greater than that required in the RCS for minimum SDM or refueling boron concentration. This may result in an overall reduction in RCS boron concentration, but provides acceptable Wolf Creek - Unit 1B388-Reion5 B 3.8.8-4 Revision 57

Inverters - Shutdown B 3.8.8 BAS ES ACTIONS A.1, A.2.1, A.2.2, A.2.3. and A.2.4 (continued) margin to maintaining subcritical operation. Introduction of temperature changes, including temperature increases when operating with a positive MTC, must also be evaluated to ensure they do not result in a loss of required SDM.

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition. These actions minimize the probability of the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required inverters and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary inverter power to the unit safety systems.

The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required inverters should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time the unit safety systems may be without power or powered from a bypass constant voltage transformer.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.8.1 REQUIREMENTS This Surveillance verifies that the inverters are functioning properly with all required circuit breakers closed and AC vital buses energized from the inverter. The verification of proper voltage output ensures that the required power is readily available for the instrumentation connected to the AC vital buses. The 7 day Frequency takes into account the redundant capability of the inverters and other indications available in the control room that alert the operator to inverter malfunctions.

REFERENCES 1. USAR, Chapter 6.

2. USAR, Chapter 15.

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Distribution Systems - Operating B 3.8.9 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS B 3.8.9 Distribution Systems Operating

-

BASES BACKGROUND The onsite Class 1E AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution systems are divided by train into two redundant and independent AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystems as defined in Table B 3.8.9-1. Train A is associated with AC load group 1; Train B, with AC load group 2.

The AC electrical power subsystem for each train consists of an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) 4.16 kV bus and 480 buses and load centers. Each 4.16 kV ESE bus has one separate and independent offsite source of power as well as a dedicated onsite diesel generator (DG) source. Each 4.16 kV ESE bus is normally connected to a preferred offsite source. After a loss of the preferred offsite power source to a 4.16 kV ESF bus, the onsite emergency DG supplies power to the bus.

Control power for the 4.16 kV breakers is supplied from the Class 1E batteries. Additional description of this system may be found in the Bases for LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources - Operating," and the Bases for LCO 3.8.4, "DC Sources - Operating."

The 120 VAC vital buses are arranged in two load groups per train and are normally powered through the inverters from the 125 VDC electrical power subsystem. Refer to Bases B 3.8.7 for further information on the 120 VAC vital system.

The 125 VDC electrical power distribution system is arranged into two buses per train. Refer to Bases B 3.8.4 for further information on the 125 VDC electrical power subsystem.

The list of all required distribution buses is presented in Table B 3.8.9-1.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES The initial inconditions ainalyses the-USAR,of Chapter Design Basis 6 (Ref.Accident 1), and (DBA) and transient in the USAR, Chapter 15 (Ref. 2), assume ESF systems are OPERABLE. The AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution systems are designed to provide sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, Reactor Coolant System, and containment design limits are not exceeded. These limits are discussed in more detail in the Bases for Section 3.2, Power Wolf Creek - Unit 1 ..-

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.... Distribution Systems - Operating B 3.8.9 BASES APPLICABLE Distribution Limits; Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant System (RCS); and SAFETY ANALYSES Section 3.6, Containment Systems.

(continued)

The OPERABILITY of the AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution systems is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and is based upon meeting the design basis of the unit.

This includes maintaining power distribution systems OPERABLE during accident conditions in the event of:

a. An assumed loss of all offsite power or all onsite AC electrical power; and

b. A worst case single failure.

The distribution systems satisfy Criterion 3 of the 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO The required power distribution subsystems listed in Table B 3.8.9-1 ensure the availability of AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power for the systems required to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition after an anticipated operational occurrence (AOO) or a postulated DBA. The AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystems are required to be OPERABLE.

Maintaining the Train A and Train B AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystems OPERABLE ensures that the redundancy incorporated into the design of ESF is not defeated. Therefore, a single failure within any system or within the electrical power distribution subsystems will not prevent safe shutdown of the reactor.

OPERABLE AC electrical power distribution subsystems require the associated buses and load centers to be energized to their proper voltages. OPERABLE DC electrical power distribution subsystems require the associated buses to be energized to their proper voltage from either the associated battery or charger. OPERABLE vital bus electrical power distribution subsystems require the associated buses to be energized to their proper voltage from the associated inverter via inverted DC voltage, or bypass constant voltage transformer.

In addition, no tie breakers between redundant safety related AC, DC, and AC vital bus power distribution subsystems exist. This prevents any electrical malfunction in any power distribution subsystem from propagating to the redundant subsystem, that could cause the failure of a redundant subsystem and a loss of essential safety function(s).

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Distribution Systems - Operating B 3.8.9 BASES ACTIONS C.1 (continued) status within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> by powering the bus from the associated inverter via inverted DC or bypass constant voltage transformer. The required AC vital bus may also be restored to OPERABLE status through alignment to the spare inverter powered from the 125 VDC bus in the same separation group.

Condition C represents one AC vital bus without power; potentially both the DC source and the associated AC source are nonfunctioning. In this situation, the unit is significantly more vulnerable to a complete loss of all noninterruptible power. It is, therefore, imperative that the operator's attention focus on stabilizing the unit, minimizing the potential for loss of power to the remaining vital buses and restoring power to the affected vital bus.

This 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> limit is more conservative than Completion Times allowed for the vast majority of components that are without adequate vital AC power.

Taking exceptionto LCO 3.0.2 for components without adequate vital AC power, that would have the Required Action Completion Times shorter than 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> if declared inoperable, is acceptable because of:

a. The potential for decreased safety by requiring a change in unit conditions (i.e., requiring a shutdown) and not allowing stable operations to continue;

b. The potential for decreased safety by requiring entry into numerous applicable Conditions and Required Actions for components without adequate vital AC power and not providing sufficient time for the operators to perform the necessary evaluations and actions for restoring power to the affected train; and

c. The potential for an event in conjunction with a single failure of a redundant component.

The 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> Completion Time takes into account the importance to safety of restoring the AC vital bus to OPERABLE status, the redundant capability afforded by the other OPERABLE vital buses, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

The second Completion Time for Required Action C.1 establishes a limit on the maximum allowed for any combination of required distribution subsystems to be inoperable during any single contiguous occurrence of failing to meet the LCO. If Condition C is entered while, for instance, an AC bus is inoperable and subsequently returned OPERABLE, the LCO may already have been not met for up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. This could lead to a total of 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />, since initial failure of the LCO, to restore the vital bus distribution system. At this time, an AC train could again become Wolf Creek- Unit IB389-Reion6 B 3.8.9-5 Revision 69

• ....... Distribution Systems - Operating B 3.8.9 BASES ACTIONS C.__I (continued) inoperable, and vital bus distribution restored OPERABLE. This could continue indefinitely.

This Completion Time allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." This will result in establishing the "time zero" at the time the LCO was initially not met, instead of the time Condition B was entered. The 16 hour1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> Completion Time is an acceptable limitation on this potential to fail to meet the LCO indefinitely.

0.1_.

With DC bus(es) in one train inoperable, the remaining DC electrical power distribution subsystems are capable of supporting the minimum safety functions necessary to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, assuming no single failure. The overall reliability is reduced, however, because a single failure in the remaining DC electrical power distribution subsystem could result in the minimum required ESF functions not being supported. Therefore, the required DC buses must be restored to OPERABLE status within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> by powering the bus from the associated battery or charger.

Condition 0 represents one train without adequate DC power; potentially both with the battery significantly degraded and the associated charger nonfunctioning. In this situation, the unit is significantly more vulnerable to a complete loss of all DC power. It is, therefore, imperative that the operator's attention focus on stabilizing the unit, minimizing the potential for loss of power to the remaining trains and restoring power to the affected train.

This 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> limit is more conservative than Completion Times allowed for the vast majority of components that would be without power. Taking Sexception to LCO 3.0.2 for components without adequate DC power,

...which-would have Required Action Completion Times shorter than 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, is acceptable because of:

a. The potential for decreased safety by requiring a change in unit conditions (i.e., requiring a shutdown) while allowing stable operations to continue; Wolf Creek - Unit 1 ..-

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Nuclear Instrumentation B 3.9.3 B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS B 3.9.3 Nuclear Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND The source range neutron flux monitors are used during refueling operations to monitor the core reactivity condition. The installed source range neutron flux monitors are part of the Nuclear Instrumentation System (NIS). These detectors are located external to the reactor vessel and detect neutrons leaking from the core. There are two sets of source range neutron flux monitors: (1) Westinghouse source range neutron flux monitors and (2) Gamma-Metrics source range neutron flux monitors.

The Westinghouse source range neutron flux monitors (SE-NI-0031 and SE-NI1-0032) are BE3 detectors operating in the proportional region of the gas filled detector characteristic curve. The detectors monitor the neutron flux in counts per second. The instrument range covers six decades of neutron flux (1 to 1 E+6 cps). The detectors also provide continuous visual indication in the control room. The NIS is designed in accordance with the criteria presented in Reference 1.

The Gamma-Metrics source range neutron flux monitors (SE-NI-0060A and SE-NIl-0061A) are fission chambers that provide indication over six decades of neutron flux (1E-1 to 1E+5 cps). The monitors provide continuous visual indication in the control room to allow operators to monitor core flux.

APPLICABLE Two OPERABLE source range neutron flux monitors are required to SAFETY ANALYSES provide a signal to alert the operator to unexpected changes in core reactivity such as an improperly loaded fuel assembly.

The source range neutron flux monitors satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50 .36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO This LCO requires that two source range neutron flux monitors be OPERABLE to ensure that redundant monitoring capability is available to detect changes in core reactivity. To be OPERABLE, each monitor must provide visual indication in the control room.

When any of the safety related busses supplying power to one of the detectors (SE-NI-31 or 32) associated with the Westinghouse source range neutron flux monitors are taken out of service, the corresponding source range neutron flux monitor may be considered OPERABLE when its detector is powered from a temporary nonsafety related source of Wolf Creek - Unit 1B393-Reion6 B3.9.3-1 Revision 68

Nuclear Instrumentation B 3.9.3 BASES LCO power, provided the detector for the opposite source range neutron flux (continued) monitor is powered from its normal source. (Ref. 2) This allowance to power a detector from a temporary non-safety related source of power is also applicable to the Gamma-Metrics source range monitors. (Ref. 4)

The Westinghouse monitors are the normal source range monitors used during refueling activities. The Gamma-Metrics source range monitors provide an acceptable equivalent control room visual indication to the Westinghouse monitors in MODE 6, including CORE ALTERATIONS.

(Ref. 4) Either the set of two Westinghouse source range neutron flux monitors or the set of two Gamma-Metrics source range monitors may be used to perform this reactivity-monitoring function. The use of one BE3 detector and one Gamma-Metrics detector is not permitted due to the importance of using detectors on opposing sides of the core to effectively monitor the core reactivity. (Ref. 3)

APPLICABILITY In MODE 6, the source range neutron flux monitors must be OPERABLE to determine changes in core reactivity. There are no other direct means available to check core reactivity levels. In MODES 2, 3, 4, and 5, these same installed source range detectors and circuitry are also required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.3.1, "Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation."

ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 With only one source range neutron flux monitor OPERABLE, redundancy has been lost. Since these instruments are the only direct means of monitoring core reactivity conditions, CORE ALTERATIONS and introduction into the RCS, coolant with boron concentration less than required to meet the minimum boron concentration of LCO 3.9.1 must be suspended immediately. Suspending positive reactivity additions that could result in failure to meet the minimum boron concentration limit is required to assure continued safe operation. Introduction of coolant inventory must be from sources that have a boron concentration greater-than that required in the RCS for minimum refueling boron concentration.

This may result in an overall reduction in RCS boron concentration, but provides acceptable margin to maintaining subcritical operation.

Performance of Required Action A.1 shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position.

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Nuclear Instrumentation B 3.9.3 BASES ACTIONS B.1 (continued)

With no source range neutron flux monitor OPERABLE action to restore a monitor to OPERABLE status shall be initiated immediately. Once initiated, action shall be continued until a source range neutron flux monitor is restored to OPERABLE status.

B..22 With no source range n~eutron flux monitor OPERABLE, there are no direct means of detecting changes in core reactivity. However, since CORE ALTERATIONS and boron concentration changes inconsistent with Required Action A.2 are not to be made, the core reactivity condition is stabilized until the source range neutron flux monitors are OPERABLE. This stabilized condition is determined by performing SR 3.9.1.1 to ensure that the required boron concentration exists.

~The Completion Time of once per-12 hours is sufficient to obtain and analyze a reactor coolant sample for boron concentration and ensures that unplanned changes in boron concentration would be identified. The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Frequency is reasonable, considering the low probability of a change in core reactivity during this time period.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.9.3.1 REQUIREMENTS SR 3.9.3.1 is the performance of a CHANNEL CHECK, which is a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that the two indication channels should be consistent with core conditions.

Changes in fuel loading and core geometry can result in significant differences between source range channels, but each channel should be consistent with its local conditions.

The Frequency of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> is consistent with the CHANNEL CHECK Frequency specified similarly for the same instruments in LCO 3.3.1.

SR 3.9.3.2 SR 3.9.3.2 is the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION every 18 months. This SR is modified by a Note stating that neutron detectors are excluded from the CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The source range neutron detectors are maintained based on manufacturer's Wolf Creek - Unit 1B393-Reion5 B 3.9.3-3

N uclearlInstrumentation B 3.9.3 BASES TECHNICAL SR 3.9.3.2 (continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS recommendations. The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage. Operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 18 month Frequency.

REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 13, GDC 26, GOC 28, and

. GDC 29.

2. NRC letter (J. Stone to 0. Maynard) dated October 3, 1997:

"Wolf Creek Generating Station - Technical Specification Bases Change, Source Range Nuclear Instruments Power Supply Requirements."

3. Engineering Disposition for WO 11-339015-002, "Changes to TRM 3.3.15," March 21, 2011.

4. PIR 2004-1625, "Gamma-Metrics Detectors for Core Alterations,"

October 5, 2005.

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...RHR and Coolant Circulation - High Water Level B 3.9.5 B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS B 3.9.5 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation - High Water Level BASES BACKGROUND The purpose of the RHR System in MODE 6 is to remove decay heat and sensible heat from the Reactor Coolant System (RCS), as required by GDC 34, to provide mixing of borated coolant and to prevent boron stratification (Ref. 1). Heat is removed from the RCS by circulating reactor coolant through the RHR heat exchanger(s), where the heat is transferred to the Component Cooling Water System. The coolant is then returned to the RCS via the RCS cold leg(s). Operation of the RHR System for normal cooldown or decay heat removal is manually accomplished from the control room. The heat removal rate is adjusted by controlling the flow of reactor coolant through the RHR heat exchanger(s) and the bypass lines. Mixing of the reactor coolant is maintained by this continuous circulation of reactor coolant through the RHR System.

APPLICABLE If the reactor coolant temperature is not maintained below 200°F, boiling SAFETY ANALYSES of the reactor coolant could result. This could lead to a loss of coolant in the reactor vessel. Additionally, boiling of the reactor coolant could lead to boron plating out on components near the areas of the boiling activity.

The loss of reactor coolant and the subsequent plate out of boron would eventually challenge the integrity of the fuel cladding, which is a fission product barrier. One train of the RHR System is required to be operational in MODE 6, with the water level > 23 ft above the top of the reactor vessel flange, to prevent this challenge. The LCO does permit de-energizing the RHR pump for short durations, under the condition that the boron concentration is not diluted. This conditional de-energizing of the RHR pump does not result in a challenge to the fission product barrier.

Although the RHR System does not meet a specific criterion of the NRC Policy Statement, it was identified in 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) as an important contributor to risk reduction. Therefore, the RHR System is retained as a Specification.

LCO Only one RHR loop is required for decay heat removal in MODE 6, with the water level > 23 ft above the top of the reactor vessel flange. Only one RHR loop is required to be OPERABLE, because the volume of water above the reactor vessel flange provides backup decay heat Wolf Creek - Unit 1 ..-

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• R HR and Coolant Cici*:ulation -High Water Level B 3.9.5 BASES LCO removal capability. At least one RHR loop must be OPERABLE (continued) and in operation to provide:

a. Removal of decay heat;

b. Mixing of borated coolant to minimize the possibility of criticality; and

c. Indication of reactor coolant temperature.

An OPERABLE RHR loop includes an RHR pump, a heat exchanger, valves, piping, instruments, and controls to ensure an OPERABLE flow path and to determine the RCS temperature. The flow path starts in one of the RCS hot legs and is returned to the RCS cold legs. Management of gas voids is important to RHR System OPERABILITY.

The LCO is modified by a Note that allows the required operating RHR loop to be removed from service for up to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> per 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> period, provided no operations are permitted that would dilute the RCS boron concentration with coolant at boron concentrations less than required to meet the minimum boron concentration of LCO 3.9.1. Boron concentration reduction with coolant at boron concentrations less than required to assure the minimum required RCS boron concentration is maintained is prohibited because uniform concentration distribution cannot be ensured without forced circulation. This permits operations such as core mapping or alterations in the vicinity of the reactor vessel hot leg nozzles and RCS to RHR isolation valve testing. During this 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> period, decay heat is removed by natural convection to the large mass of water in the refueling pool.

The acceptability of the LCO and the LCO Note is based on preventing core boiling in the event of the loss of RHR cooling. An evaluation (Ref. 2) was performed which demonstrated that there is adequate flow communication to provide sufficient decay heat removal capability and preclude core uncovery, thus preventing core damage, in the event of a loss of RHR cooling with the reactor cavity filled and the upper internals installed in the reactor vessel.

APPLICABILITY One RHR loop must be OPERABLE and in operation in MODE 6, with the water level >_23 ft above the top of the reactor vessel flange, to provide decay heat removal. The 23 ft water level was selected because it corresponds to the 23 ft requirement established for fuel movement in LCO 3.9.7, "Refueling Pool Water Level." Requirements for the RHR System in other MODES are covered by LCOs in Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant System (RCS), and Section 3.5, Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS). RHR loop requirements in MODE 6 with the water level < 23 ft are located in LCO 3.9.6, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation - Low Water Level."

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RHR and Coolant Circulation - High Water Level B 3.9.5 BASES ACTIONS RHR loop requirements are met by having one RHR loop OPERABLE and in operation, except as permitted in the Note to the LCO.

A.1_

If RHR loop requirements are not met, there will be no forced circulation to provide mixing to establish uniform boron concentrations.

Suspending positive reactivity additions that could result in failure to meet the minimum boron concentration limit of LCO 3.9.1 is required to assure continued safe operation. Introduction of coolant inventory must be from sources that have a boron concentration greater than that required in the RCS for minimum refueling boron concentration. This may result in an overall reduction in RCS boron concentration, but provides acceptable margin to maintaining subcritical operation.

A..22 If RHR loop requirements are not met, actions shall be taken immediately to suspend loading of irradiated fuel assemblies in the core.

With no forced circulation cooling, decay heat removal from the core occurs by natural convection to the heat sink provided by the water above the core. A minimum refueling water level of 23 ft above the reactor vessel flange provides an adequate available heat sink.

Suspending any operation that would increase decay heat load, such as loading a fuel assembly, is a prudent action under this condition.

Performance of Required Action A.2 shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe condition.

A.3 If RHR loop requirements are not met, actions shall be initiated and continued in order to satisfy RHR loop requirements. With the unit in MODE 6 and the refueling water level > 23 ft above the top of the reactor vessel flange, corrective actions shall be initiated immediately.

A.4 If RHR loop requirements are not met, all containment penetrations providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere must be closed within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. With the RHR loop requirements not met, the potential exists for the coolant to boil and release radioactive gas to the containment atmosphere. Closing containment penetrations that are open to the outside atmosphere ensures dose limits are not exceeded.

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B 3.9.5-3 eiin3

........

.. '........RHR and Coolant Circulatiorn- High Water Level B 3.9.5 BASES ACTIONS A.4 (continued)

The Completion Time of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is reasonable, based on the low probability of the coolant boiling in that time.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.9.5.1 REQUIREMENTS This Surveillance demonstrates that the RHR loop is in operation and circulating reactor coolant. The flow rate is determined by the flow rate necessary to provide sufficient decay heat removal capability and to prevent thermal and boron stratification in the core. The Frequency of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> is sufficient, considering the flow, temperature, pump control, and alarm indications available to the operator in the control room for monitoring the RHR System.

SR 3.9.5.2 RHR System piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the RHR loops and may also prevent water hammer, pump cavitation, and pumping of noncondensible gas into the reactor vessel.

Selection of RHR System locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations. The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration. Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.

The RHR System is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water.

Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump),

the Surveillance is not met. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the RHR System is not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.

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..- eiin772 Revision

..... RHR and Coolant Circulation - High Water Level B 3.9.5 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.9.5.2 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS RHR System locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative sub-set of susceptible locations.

Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location. Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY. The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.

The 31 day Frequency takes into consideration the gradual nature of gas accumulation in the RHR System piping and the procedural controls governing system operation.

REFERENCES 1. USAR, Section 5.4.7.

2. SAP-06-1 13, "Loss of RHR Analysis with the Refuel Cavity Flooded and Upper Internals Installed," November 16, 2006.

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- ~RHR and Coolant Circulation - Low Water Level B 3.9.6 B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS B 3.9.6 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation - Low Water Level BASES BACKGROUND The purpose of the RHR System in MODE 6 is to remove decay heat and sensible heat from the Reactor Coolant System (RCS), as required by GOC 34, to provide mixing of borated coolant, and to prevent boron stratification (Ref. 1). Heat is removed from the RCS by circulating reactor coolant through the RHR heat exchangers where the heat is transferred to the Component Cooling Water System. The coolant is then returned to the RCS via the RCS cold leg(s). Operation of the RHR System for normal cooldown decay heat removal is manually accomplished from the control room. The heat removal rate is adjusted by controlling the flow of reactor coolant through the RHR heat exchanger(s) and the bypass lines. Mixing of the reactor coolant is maintained by this continuous circulation of reactor coolant through the RHR System.

APPLICABLE If the reactor coolant temperature is not maintained below 200°F, boiling SAFETY ANALYSES of the reactor coolant could result. This could lead to a loss of coolant in the reactor vessel. Additionally, boiling of the reactor coolant could lead to boron plating out on components near the areas of the boiling activity.

The loss of reactor coolant and the subsequent plate out of boron will eventually challenge the integrity of the fuel cladding, which is a fission product barrier. Two trains of the RHR System are required to be OPERABLE, and one train in operation, in order to prevent this challenge.

Although the RHR System does not meet a specific criterion of the NRC Policy Statement, it was identified in 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) as an important contributor to risk reduction. Therefore, the RHR System is retained as a Specification.

In MODE 6, with the water level <23 ft above the top of the reactor LCO vessel flange, both RHR loops must be OPERABLE.

Additionally, one loop of RHR must be in operation in order to provide:

a. Removal of decay heat;

b. Mixing of borated coolant to minimize the possibility of criticality; and Wolf Creek - Unit 1 ..-

B3.9.6-1 Rvso 0 Revision

...- RHR and Coolant Circulation - Low Walter LeVel B 3.9.6 BASES LCO c. Indication of reactor coolant temperature.

(continued)

An OPERABLE RHR loop consists of an RHR pump, a heat exchanger, valves, piping, instruments and controls to ensure an OPERABLE flow path and to determine the RCS temperature. The flow path starts in one of the RCS hot legs and is returned to the RCS cold legs. An OPERABLE RHR loop must be capable of being realigned to provide an OPERABLE flow path. Management of gas voids is important to RHR System OPERABILITY.

When both RHR loops (or trains) are required to be OPERABLE, the associated Component Cooling Water (CCW) train is required to be OPERABLE. The heat sink for the CCW System is normally provided by the Service Water System or Essential Service Water (ESW) System, as determined by system availability. In MODES 5 and 6, one Diesel Generator (DG) is required to be OPERABLE per LCO 3.8.2, "AC Sources

- Shutdown." The same ESW train is required to be capable of performing its related support function(s) to support DG OPERABILITY.

However, a Service Water train can be utilized to support CCW/RHR OPERABILITY if the associated ESW train is not capable of performing its related support function(s).

APPLICABILITY Two must RHR be inloops are required operation in MODEto6,bewith OPERABLE, and one the water level RHR loop

< 23 ft above the top of the reactor vessel flange, to provide decay heat removal.

Requirements for the RHR System in other MODES are covered by LCOs in Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant System (RCS), and Section 3.5, Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS). RHR loop requirements in MODE 6 with the water level >_23 ft are located in LCO 3.9.5, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation - High Water Level."

Since LCO 3.9.6 contains Required Actions with immediate Completion Times related to the restoration of the degraded decay heat removal function, it is not permitted to enter this LCO from either MODE 5 or from LCO 3.9.5, "RHR and Coolant Circulation - High Water Level,"

unless the requirements of LCO 3.9.6 are met. This precludes diminishing the backup decay heat removal capability when the RHR System is degraded.

ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 If less than the required number of RHR loops are OPERABLE, action shall be immediately initiated and continued until the RHR loop is restored to OPERABLE status and to operation in accordance with the LCO or until > 23 ft of water level is established above the reactor Wolf Creek- Unit 1 ..-

B 3.9.6-2 eiin7 72 Revision

...... RHR-and Coolant Circulation - Low Water Level B 3.9.6 BASES ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 (continued) vessel flange. When the water level is > 23 ft above the reactor vessel flange, the Applicability changes to that of LCO 3.9.5, and only one RHR loop is required to be OPERABLE and in operation. An immediate Completion Time is necessary for an operator to initiate corrective actions.

B.1 If no RHR loop is in operation, there will be no forced circulation to provide mixing to establish uniform boron concentrations. Suspending positive reactivity additions that could result in failure to meet the minimum boron concentration limit of LCO 3.9.1 is required to assure continued safe operation. Introduction of coolant inventory must be from sources that have a boron concentration greater than that required in the RCS for minimum refueling boron concentration. This may result in an overall reduction in RCS boron concentration, but provides acceptable margin to maintaining subcritical operation.

B.2 If no RHR loop is in operation, actions shall be initiated immediately, and continued, to restore one RHR loop to operation. Since the unit is in Conditions A and B concurrently, the restoration of two OPERABLE RHR loops and one operating RHR loop should be accomplished expeditiously.

B.3 If no RHR loop is in operation, all containment penetrations providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere must be closed within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. With the RHR loop requirements not met, the potential exists for the coolant to boil and release radioactive gas to the containment atmosphere. Closing containment penetrations that are open to the outside atmosphere ensures that dose limits are not exceeded.

The Completion Time of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is reasonable at water levels above reduced inventory, based on the low probability of the coolant boiling in that time. At reduced inventory conditions, additional actions are taken to provide containment closure in a reduced period of time (Reference 2). Reduced inventory is defined as RCS level lower than 3 feet below the reactor vessel.

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B 3.9.6-3 eiin4

"'* ........... RHRand Coo~lant Circulation -Lbw Water Level B 3.9.6 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.9.6.1 REQUIREMENTS This Surveillance demonstrates that one RHR loop is in operation and circulating reactor coolant. The flow rate is determined by the flow rate necessary to provide sufficient decay heat removal capability and to prevent thermal and boron stratification in the core. The Frequency of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> is sufficient, considering the flow, temperature, pump control,and alarm indications available to the operator for monitoring the RHR System in the control room.

SR 3.9.6.2 Verification that the required pump is OPERABLE ensures that an additional RHR pump can be placed in operation, if needed, to maintain decay heat removal and reactor coolant circulation. Verification is performed by verifying proper breaker alignment and power available to the required pump. The Frequency of 7 days is considered reasonable in view of other administrative controls available and has been shown to be acceptable by operating experience.

SR 3.9.6.3 RHR System piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the RHR loops and may also prevent water hammer, pump cavitation, and pumping of noncondensible gas into the reactor vessel.

Selection of RHR System locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations. The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration. Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.

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• ..... ...... RHR and Coolant Circulation - Low Water Level B 3.9.6 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.9.6.3. (continued)

REQUIREMENTS The RHR System is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water.

Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump),

the Surveillance is not met. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the RHR System is not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.

RHR System locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be

- "*.....verified by monitoring a representative sub-set of susceptible locations.

Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location. Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY. The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.

The 31 day Frequency takes into consideration the gradual nature of gas accumulation in the RHR System piping and the procedural controls governing system operation.

1. USAR, Section 5.4.7.

2. Generic Letter No. 88-17, "Loss of Decay Heat Removal."

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TAB - Title Page Technical Specification Cover Page Title Page TAB - Table of Contents i34 DRR 07-1 057 7/10/07 ii 29 DRR 06-1984 10/17/06 iii 44 DRR 09-1744 10/28/09 TAB - B 2.0 SAFETY LIMITS (SLs)

B 2.1.1-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 2.1.1-2 14 D RR 03-0102 2/12/03 B 2.1.1-3 14 DRRO03-0102 2/12/03 B 2.1.1-4 0 Amend. No. 123 2/12/03 B 2.1.2-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 2.1.2-2 12 DRR 02-1062 9/26/02 B 2.1.2-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 TAB - B 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILTY B 3.0-1 34 ... . DRR 07-1057 7/10/07 B 3.0-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.0-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.0-4 19 DRRO04-1414 10/12/04 B 3.0-5 19 DRRO04-1414 10/12/04 B 3.0-6 19 DRR 04-1414 10/12/04 B 3.0-7 19 DRRO04-1414 10/12/04 B 3.0-8 19 DRRO04-1414 10/12/04 B 3.0-9 42 DRR 09-1009 7/16/09 B 3.0-10 42 DRR 09-1 009 7/16/09 B 3.0-11 34 DRR 07-1057 7/10/07 B 3.0-12 34 DRR 07-1057 7/10/07 B 3.0-13 34 DRRO07-1057 7/10/07 B 3.0-14 34 DRR 07-1057 7/10/07 B 3.0-15 34 DRR 07-1057 7/10/07 B 3.0-16 34 DRR 07-1 057 7/10/07 TAB -B 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS B 3.1.1-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.1-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.1-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.1-4 19 DRR 04-1414 10/12/04 B 3.1.1-5 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.2-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.2-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.2-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.2-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.2-5 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.3-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.3-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.3-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.3-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 Wolf Creek- Unit 1 eiin7 73 Revision

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TAB - B 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS (continued)

B 3.1.3-5 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.3-6 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.4-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.4-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.4-3 48 DRR 10-3740 12/28/10 B 3.1.4-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.4-5 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.4-6 48 DRR 10-3740 12/28/10 B 3.1.4-7 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.4-8 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.4-9 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.5-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.5-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.5-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.5-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.6-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.6-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.6-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.6-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.6-5 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.6-6 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.7-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.7-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.7-3 48 DRR 10-3740 12/28/10 B 3.1.7-4 48 DRR 10-3740 12/28/10 B 3.1.7-5 48 DRR 10-3740 12/28/10 B 3.1.7-6 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.8-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.8-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.8-3 15 DRR 03-0860 7/10/03 8 3.1.8-4 15 DRR 03-0860 7/10/03 B 3.1.8-5 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 8 3.1.8-6 5 DRR 00-1427 10/12/00 TAB - B 3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS B 3.2.1-1 48 DRR 10-3740 12/28/10 B 3.2.1-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.2.1-3 48 DRR 10-3740 12/28/10 B 3.2.1-4 48 DRR 10-3740 12/28/10 B 3.2.1-5 48 DRR 10-3740 12/28/10 B 3.2.1-6 48 DRR 10-3740 12/28/10 B 3.2.1-7 48 DRR 10-3740 12/28/10 8 3.2.1-8 48 DRR 10-3740 12/28/10 B 3.2.1-9 29 DRR 06-1984 10/17/06 B 3.2.1-10 70 DRR 15-0944 4/28/15 B 3.2.2-1 48 DRR 10-3740 12/28/10 B 3.2.2-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.2.2-3 48 DRR 10-3740 12/28/10 B 3.2.2-4 48 DRR 10-3740 12/28/10 B 3.2.2-5 48 DRR 10-3740 12/28/10 B 3.2.2-6 70 DRR 15-0944 4/28/15 Wolf Creek - Unit 1 iiiRviin7 Revision 73

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TAB - B 3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS (continued)

B 3.2.3-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.2.3-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.2.3-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.2.4-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.2.4-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.2.4-3 48 DRR 10-3740 12/28/10 B 3.2.4-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.2.4-5 48 DRR 10-3740 12/28/10 B 3.2.4-6 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.2.4-7 48 DRR 10-3740 12/28/10 TAB - B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.1-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.1-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.1-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.1-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.1-5 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.1-6 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3:3.1-7 5" DRR 00-1427 10/12/00 -

B 3.3.1-8 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.1-9 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.1-10 29 DRR 06-1984 10/17/06 B 3.3.1-11 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.1-12 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.1-13 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.1-14 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.1-15 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.1-16 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.1-17 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.1-18 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.1-19 66 DRR 14-2329 11/6/14 B 3.3.1-20 66 DRR 14-2329 11/6/14 B 3.3.1-21 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.1-22 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.1-23 9 DRR 02-0123 2/28/02 B 3.3.1-24 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.1-25 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.1-27 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.1-28 2 DRR 00-0147 4/24/00 B 3.3.1-29 1 DRR 99-1 624 12/18/99 B 3.3.1-30 1 DRR 99-1 624 12/18/99 B 3.3.1-31 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.1-32 20 DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3.1-33 48 DRR 10-3740 12/28/10 B 3.3.1-34 20 DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3.1-35 19 DRR 04-1414 10/13/04 B 3.3.1-36 20 DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3.1-37 20 DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3.1-38 20 DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3.1-39 25 DRR 06-0800 5/18/06 Wolf Creek - Unit 1 i iii eiin7 Revision73

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TAB - B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION (continued)

B 3.3.1-40 20 DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3.1-41 20 DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3.1-42 20 DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3.1-43 20 DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3.1-44 20 DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3.1-45 20 DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3.1-46 48 DRR 10-3740 12/28/10 B 3.3.1-47 20 DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3.1-48 48 DRR 10-3740 12/28/10 B 3.3.1-49 20 DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3.1-50 20 DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3.1-51 21 DRR 05-0707 4/20/0 5 B 3.3,1-52 20 DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3.1-53 20 DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3.1-54 20 DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3.1-55 25 DRR 06-0800 5/18/06 B 3.3.1-56 66 DRR 14-2329 11/6/14 B 3.3.1-57 20 DRR 04-1 533 2/16/05 B 3.3.1-58 29 DRR 06-1 984 10/17/06 B 3.3.1-59 20 DRR 04-1 533 2/16/05 B 3.3.2-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.2-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.2-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.2-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.2-5 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.2-6 7 DRR 01-0474 5/1/101 B 3.3.2-7 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.2-8 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.2-9 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.2-10 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.2-11 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.2-12 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.2-13 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.2-14 2 DRR 00-0 147 4/24/00 B 3.3.2-15 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.2-16 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.2-17 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B] 3.3.2-18 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.2-19 37 DRR 08-0503 4/8/08 B] 3.3.2-20 37 DRR 08-0503 4/8/08 B] 3.3.2-21 37 DRR 08-0503 4/8/08 B] 3.3.2-22 37 DRR 08-0503 4/8/08 B] 3.3.2-23 37 DRR 08-0503 4/8/08 B] 3.3.2-24 39 DRR 08-1096 8/28/08 B] 3.3.2-25 39 DRR 08-1096 8/2 8/08 B 3.3.2-26 39 DRR 08-1096 8/28/08 B] 3.3.2-27 37 DRR 08-0503 4/8/08 B] 3.3.2-28 37 DRR 08-0503 4/8/08 B] 3.3.2-29 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B] 3.3.2-30 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.2-3 1 52 DRR 11-0724 4/11/11 Wolf Creek - Unit 1 vRviin7 iv Revision 73

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TAB - B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION (continued)

B 3.3.2-32 52 DRR 11-0724 4/11/11 B 3.3.2-33 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.2-34 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.2-35 20 DRR 04-1 533 2/16/05 B 3.3.2-36 20 DRR 04-1 533 2/16/05 B] 3.3.2-37 20 DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3.2-38 20 DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3.2-39 25 DRR 06-0800 5/18/06 B 3.3.2-40 20 DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3.2-41 45 Amend. No. 187 (ETS) 3/5/10 B 3.3.2-42 45 Amend. No. 187 (ETS) 3/5/10 B 3.3.2-43 20 DRR 04-1 533 2/16/05 B 3.3.2-44 20 DRR 04-1 533 2/16/05 B] 3.3.2-45 20 DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B] 3.3.2-46 54 DRR 11-2394 11/16/111 B 3.3.2-47 43 DRR 09-1416 9/2/09 B] 3.3.2-48 37 DRR 08-0503 4/8/08 B 3.3.2-49 20 DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3..2-50 20- DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3.2-51 43 DRR 09-1416 9/2/09 B 3.3.2-52 43 DRR 09-1416 9/2/09 B 3.3.2-53 43 DRR 09-1416 9/2/09 B 3.3.2-54 43 DRR 09-1416 9/2/09 B 3.3.2-55 43 DRR 09-1416 9/2/09 B 3.3.2-56 43 DRR 09-1416 9/2/0 9 B 3.3.2-57 43 DRR 09-1416 9/2/09 B] 3.3.3-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.3-2 5 DRR 00-1427 10/12/00 B 3.3.3-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B] 3.3.3-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.3-5 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B] 3.3.3-6 8 DRR 01-1235 9/19/01 B] 3.3.3-7 21 DRR 05-0707 4/20/05 B 3.3.3-8 8 DRR 01-1235 9/19/01 B 3.3.3-9 8 DRR 01-1235 9/19/01 B 3.3.3-10 19 DRR 04-1414 10/12/04 B] 3.3.3-11 19 DRR 04-1414 10/12/04 B 3.3.3-12 21 DRR 05-0707 4/20/05 B 3.3.3-13 21 DRR 05-0707 4/20/05 B] 3.3.3-14 8 DRR 01-1235 9/19/01 B 3.3.3-15 8 DRR 01-1235 9/19/01 B] 3.3.4-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.4-2 9 DRR 02-1023 2/28/02 B] 3.3.4-3 15 DRR 03-0860 7/10/03 B 3.3.4-4 19 DRR 04-1414 10/12/04 B] 3.3.4-5 1 DRR 99-1624 12/18/99 B 3.3.4-6 9 DRR 02-0123 2/28/02 B 3.3.5-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.5-2 1 DRR 99-1624 12/18/99 B 3.3.5-3 1 DRR 99-1624 12/18/99 Wolf Creek - Unit 1 V eiin7 Revision 73

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IMPLEMENTED (4)

TAB - B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION (continued)

B 3.3.5-4 1 DRR 99-1 624 12/18/99 B 3.3.5-5 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.5-6 22 DRR 05-1 375 6/28/05 B 3.3.5-7 22 DRR 05-1375 6/28/05 B 3.3.6-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.6-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.6-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.6-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.6-5 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.6-6 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.6-7 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.7-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.7-2 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 B 3.3.7-3 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 B 3.3.7-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.7-5 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.7-6 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 B 3.3.7-7 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.7-8 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.8-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.8-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.8-3 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 B 3.3.8-4 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 B 3.3.8-5 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.8-6 24 DRR 06-0051 2/28/06 B 3.3.8-7 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 TAB -B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

B 3.4.1-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.1-2 10 DRR 02-0411 4/5/02 B 3.4.1-3 10 DRR 02-0411 4/5/02 B 3.4.1-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.1-5 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.1-6 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.2-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.2-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.2-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.3-1 67 DRR 15-0116 2/10/15 B 3.4.3-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.3-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.3-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.3-5 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.3-6 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.3-7 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.4-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.4-2 29 DRR 06-1 984 10/17/06 B 3.4.4-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.5-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.5-2 53 DRR 11-1513 7/18/11 B 3.4.5-3 29 DRR 06-1 984 10/17/06 B 3.4.5-4 " 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 Wolf Creek - Unit I vvi eiin7 Revision 73

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PAGE (1) REVISION NO. (2) CHANGE DOCUMENT (3) DATE EFFECTIVE/

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TAB - B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) (continued)

B 3.4.5-5 12 DRR 02-1 062 9/26/02 B 3.4.5-6 12 DRR 02-1 062 9/26/02 B 3.4.6-1 53 DRR 11-1513 7/18/11 B 3.4.6-2 72 DRR 15-1918 10/26/15 B 3.4.6-3 12 DRR 02-1062 9/26/02 B 3.4.6-4 72 DRR 15-1918 10/26/15 B 3.4.6-5 72 DRR 15-1918 10/26/15 B 3.4.6-6 72 DRR 15-1918 10/26/15 B 3.4.7-1 12 DRR 02-1062 9/26/02 B 3.4.7-2 17 DRR 04-0453 5/26/04 B 3.4.7-3 72 DRR 15-1918 10/26/15 B 3.4.7-4 42 DRR 09-1009 7/16/09 B 3.4.7-5 72 DRR 15-1918 10/26/15 B 3.4.7-6 72 DRR 15-1918 10/26/15 B 3.4.8-1 53 DRR 11-1513 7/18/111 B 3.4.8-2 72 DRR 15-1918 10/26/15 B 3.4.8-3 42 DRR 09-1009 7/16/09 B 3.4.8-4 72 DRR 15-1918 10/26/15 B 3.4.8-5 72 DRR 15-1918 10/26/15 -,

B 3.4.9-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.9-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.9-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.9-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.10-1 5 DRR 00-1427 10/12/00 B 3.4.10-2 5 DRR 00-1427 10/12/00 B 3.4.10-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.10-4 32 DRR 07-01 39 2/7/07 B 3.4.11-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.11-2 1 DRR 99-1624 12/18/99 B 3.4.11-3 19 DRR 04-1414 10/12/04 B 3.4.11-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.11-5 1 DRR 99-1624 12/18/99 B 3.4.11-6 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.11-7 32 DRR 07-0139 2/7/07 B 3.4.12-1 61 DRR 14-0346 2/27/14 B 3.4.12-2 61 DRR 14-0346 2/27/14 B 3.4..12-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.12-4~ 61 DRR 14-0346 2/27/14 B 3.4.12-5 61 DRR 14-0346 2/27/14 B 3.4.12-6 56 DRR 12-1792 11/7/12 B 3.4.12-7 61 DRR 14-0346 2/27/14 B 3.4.12-8 1 DRR 99-1624 12/18/99 B 3.4.12-9 56 DRR 12-1 792 11/7/12 B 3.4.12-10 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.12-11 61 DRR 14-0346 2/27/14 B 3.4.12-12 32 DRR 07-01 39 2/7/07 B 3.4.12-13 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.12-14 32 DRR 07-01 39 2/7/07 B 3.4.13-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.13-2 29 DRR 06-1984 10/17/06 B 3.4.13-3 29 DRR 06-1984 10/17/06 Wolf Creek - Unit 1 viiiReson3 Revision 73

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PAGE (1) REVISION NO. (2) CHANGE DOCUMENT (3) DATE EFFECTIVE/

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TAB - B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) (continued)

B 3.4.13-4 35 DRR 07-1553 9/28/07 B 3.4.13-5 35 DRR 07-1553 9/28/07 B 3.4.13-6 29 DRR 06-1984 10/17/06 B 3.4.14-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.14-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.14-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.14-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.14-5 32 DRR 07-0139 2/7/07 B 3.4.14-6 32 DR R 07-0139 2/7/07 B 3.4.15-1 31 DRR 06-2494 12/13/06 B 3.4.15-2 31 *DRR 06-2494 12/13/06 B 3.4.15-3 33 DRR 07-0656 5/1/107 B 3.4.15-4 33 DRR 07-0656 5/1/07 B 3.4.15-5 65 DRR 14-2146 9/30/14 B 3.4.15-6 31 DRR 06-2494 12/13/06 B 3.4.15-7 31 DRR 06-2494 12/13/06 B 3.4.15-8 31 DRR 06-2494 12/13/06 B 3.4.16-1 31 DR R 06-2494 12/13/06 B 3.4.16-2 31. DR R 06-2494 -- 12/13/06 B 3.4.16-3 31 D RR 06-2494 12/13/06 B 3.4.16-4 31 DRR 06-2494 12/13/06 B 3.4.16-5 31 DRR 06-2494 12/13/06 B 3.4.17-1 29 DRR 06-1984 10/17/06 B 3.4.17-2 58 DRR 13-0369 02/26/13 B 3.4.17-3 52 DR RI1-0724 4/11/111 B 3.4.17-4 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 B 3.4.17-5 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 B 3.4.17-6 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 B 3.4.17-7 58 DRR 13-0369 02/26/13 TAB - B 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)

B 3.5.1-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.5.1-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.5.1-3 73 DRR 15-21 35 11/17/15 B 3.5.1-4 73 DRR 15-21 35 11/17/15 B 3.5.1-5 1 DRR 99-1624 12/18/9 9 B 3.5.1-6 1 DRR 99-1 624 12/18/99 B 3.5.1-7 71 DRR 15-1528 7/30/15 B 3.5.1-8 1 DRR 99-1624 12/18/99 B 3.5.2-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.5.2-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.5.2-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.5.2-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.5.2-5 72 DRR 15-1918 10/26/15 B 3.5.2-6 42 DRR 09-1009 7/16/09 B 3.5.2-7 42 DRR 09-1009 7/16/09 B 3.5.2-8 72 DRR 15-1918 10/26/15 B 3.5.2-9 72 DRR 15-1918 10/26/15 B 3.5.2-10 72 DRR 15-1918 10/26/15 B 3.5.2-11 72 DRR 15-1918 10/26/15 B 3.5.2-12 72 DRR 15-1918 10/26/15 Wolf Creek - Unit I1iiRviin7 viii Revision 73

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PAGE (! REVISION NO. (2) CHANGE DOCUMENT (3) DATE EFFECTIVE/

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TAB - B 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) (continued)

B 3.5.3-1 56 DRR 12-1792 11/7/12 B 3.5.3-2 72 DRR 15-1918 10/26/15 B 3.5.3-3 56 DRR 12-1792 11/7/12 B 3.5.3-4 56 DRR 12-1792 11/7/12 B 3.5.4-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.5.4-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.5.4-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.5.4-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.5.4-5 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.5.4-6 26 DRR 06-1 350 7/24/06 B 3.5.5-1 21 DRR 05-0707 4/20/05 B 3.5.5-2 21 DRR 05-0707 4/20/05 B 3.5.5-3 2 Amend. No. 132 4/24/00 B 3.5.5-4 21 DRR 05-0707 4/20/05 TAB - B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS B 3.6.1-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 8 3.6.1-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.6.1-3 0O Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.6.1-4 17 DRR 04-0453 5/26/04 B 3.6.2-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.6.2-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.6.2-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.6.2-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.6.2-5 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.6.2-6 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.6.2-7 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.6.3-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.6.3-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.6.3-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.6.3-4 49 DRR 11-0014 1/31/11 B 3.6.3-5 49 DRR 11-0014 1/31/11 B 3.6.3-6 49 DRR 11-0014 1/31/11 B 3.6.3-7 41 DRR 09-0288 3/20/09 B 3.6.3-8 36 DRR 08-0255 3/11/08 B 3.6.3-9 36 DRR 08-0255 3/11/08 8 3.6.3-10 8 DRR 01-1235 9/19/01 B 3.6.3-11 36 DRR 08-0255 3/11/08 B 3.6.3-12 36 DRR 08-0255 3/11/08 B 3.6.3-13 50 DRR 11-0449 3/9/111 B 3.6.3-14 36 DRR 08-0255 3/11/08 B 3.6.3-15 39 DRR 08-1 096 8/28/08 B 3.6.3-16 39 DRR 08-1096 8/28/08 B 3.6.3-17 36 DRR 08-0255 3/11/08 B 3.6.3-18 36 DRR 08-0255 3/11/08 B 3.6.3-19 36 DRR 08-0255 3/11/08 B 3.6.4-1 39 DRR 08-1096 8/28/08 B 3.6.4-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.6.4-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.6.5-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.6.5-2 37 DRR 08-0503 4/8/08 Wolf Creek - Unit 1 xRviin7 ix Revision 73

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PAGE (1 REVISION NO. (2) CHANGE DOCUMENT (3) DATE EFFECTIVE/

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TAB - B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS (continued)

B 3.6.5-3 13 DRR 02-1458 12/03/02 B 3.6.5-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.6.6-1 42 DRR 09-1 009 7/16/09 B 3.6.6-2 63 DRR 14-1572 7/1/114 B 3.6.6-3 37 DRR 08-0503 4/8/08 B 3.6.6-4 72 DRR 15-1918 10/26/15 B 3.6.6-5 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.6.6-6 18 DRR 04-1018 9/1/104 B 3.6.6-7 72 DRR 15-1918 10/26/15 B 3.6.6-8 72 DRR 15-1918 10/26/15 B 3.6.6-9 72 DRR 15-1918 10/26/15 B 3.6.6-10 72 DRRI15-1918 10/26/15 B 3.6.7-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.6.7-2 42 DRR 09-1009 7/16/09 B 3.6.7-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.6.7-4 29 DRR 06-1 984 10/17/06 B 3.6.7-5 42 DRR 09-1 009 7/16/09 TAB - B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.1-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.7.1-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.7.1-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.7.1-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.7.1-5 32 DRR 07-01 39 2/7/07 B 3.7.1-6 32 DRR 07-0139 2/7/07 B 3.7.2-1 44 DRR 09-1744 10/28/09 B 3.7.2-2 44 DRR 09-1744 10/28/09 B 3.7.2-3 44 DRR 09-1 744 10/28/09 B 3.7.2-4 44 DRR 09-1 744 10/28/09 B 3.7.2-5 44 DRRO09-1744 10/28/09 B 3.7.2-6 44 DRR 09-1 744 10/28/09 B 3.7.2-7 44 DRRO09-1744 10/28/09 B 3.7.2-8 44 DRRO09-1744 10/28/09 B 3.7.2-9 44 DRR 09-1744 10/28/09 B 3.7.2-10 44 DRRO09-1744 10/28/09 B 3.7.2-11 44 DRRO09-1744 10/28/09 B 3.7.3-1 37 DRR 08-0503 4/8/08 B 3.7.3-2 50 DRRI11-0449 3/9/111 B 3.7.3-3 37 DRR 08-0503 4/8/08 B 3.7.3-4 37 DRR 08-0503 4/8/08 B 3.7.3-5 37 DRR 08-0503 4/8/08 B 3.7.3-6 37 DRR 08-0503 4/8/08 B 3.7.3-7 37 DRR 08-0503 4/8/08 B 3.7.3-8 37 DRR 08-0503 4/8/08 B 3.7.3-9 66 DRRI14-2329 11/6/14 B 3.7.3-10 66 DRRI14-2329 11/6/14 B 3.7.3-11 37 DRR 08-0503 4/8/08 B 3.7.4-1 1 DRR 99-1624 12/18/99 B 3.7.4-2 1 DRR 99-1624 12/18/99 B 3.7.4-3 19 DRRO04-1414 10/12/04 Wolf Creek - Unit 1 X eiin7 Revision 73

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES - TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES.- .-.

• PAGE (1) REVISION NO. (2) CHANGE DOCUMENT (3) DATE EFFECTIVE/

IMPLEMENTED (4)

TAB - B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS (continued)

B 3.7.4-4 19 DRR 04-1414 10/12/04 B 3.7.4-5 1 DRR 99-1 624 12/18/99 B 3.7.5-1 54 DRR 11-2394 11/16/11 B 3.7.5-2 54 DRR 11-2394 11/16/11 B 3.7.5-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.7.5-4 60 DRR 13-2562 10/25/13 B 3.7.5-5 44 DRR 09-1 744 10/28/09 B 3.7.5-6 44 DRR 09-1744 10/28/09 B 3.7.5-7 32 DRR 07-01 39 2/7/07 B 3.7.5-8 14 DRR 03-01 02 2/12/03 B 3.7.5-9 32 DRR 07-0139 2/7/07 B 3.7.6-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.7.6-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.7.6-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.7.7-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.7.7-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.7.7-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.7.7-4 1 DRR 99-1624 12/18/99 B 3.7.8-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99

• B 3.7.8-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.7.8-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.7.8-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.7.8-5 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.7.9-1 3 Amend. No. 134 7/14/00 B 3.7.9-2 3 Amend. No. 134 7/14/00 B 3.7.9-3 3 Amend. No. 134 7/14/00 B 3.7.9-4 3 Amend. No. 134 7/14/00 B 3.7.10-1 64 DRR 14-1822 8/28/14 B 3.7.10-2 41 DRR 09-0288 3/20/09 B 3.7.10-3 41 DRR 09-0288 3/20/09 B 3.7.10-4 41 DRR 09-0288 3/20/09 B 3.7.10-5 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 B 3.7.10-6 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 B 3.7.10-7 64 DRR 14-1822 8/28/14 B 3.7.10-8 41 DRR 09-0288 3/20/09 B 3.7.10-9 64 DRR 14-1822 8/28/14 B 3.7.11-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.7.11-2* 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 B 3.7.11-3 63 DRR 14-1572 7/1/114 B 3.7.11-4 63 DRR 14-1572 7/1/114 B 3.7.12-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.7.13-1 24 DRR 06-0051 2/28/06 B 3.7.13-2 1 DRR 99-1 624 12/18/99 B 3.7.13-3 42 DRR 09-1009 7/16/09 B 3.7.13-4 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 B 3.7.13-5 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 B 3.7.13-6 64 DRR 14-1 822 8/28/14 B 3.7.13-7 64 DRR 14-1822 8/28/14 B 3.7.13-8 64 DRR 14-1822 8/28/14 B 3.7.14-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.7.15-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 Wolf Creek - Unit 1 xiiRviin7 Revision 73

"::' LIST

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TAB - B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS (continued)

B 3.7.15-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.7.15-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.7.16-1 5 DRR 00-1427 10/12/00 B 3.7.16-2 23 DRR 05-1995 9/28/05 B 3.7.16-3 5 DRR 00-1427 10/12/00 B 3.7.17-1 7 DRR 01-0474 5/1/01 B 3.7.17-2 7 DRRO01-0474 5/1/01 B 3.7.17-3 '5 DRR 00-1427 10/12/00 B 3.7.18-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.7.18-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.7.18-3 0 Am end. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.7.19-1 44 DRR 09-1744 10/28/09 B 3.7.19-2 54 DRR 11-2394 11/16/11 B 3.7.19-3 54 DRRI11-2394 11/16/11 B 3.7.19-4 61 DRR 14-0346 2/27/14 B 3.7.19-5 61 DRR 14-0346 2/27/14 B 3.7.19-6 54 DRR 11-2394 11/16/11 B 3.7.19-7 54 DRR 11-2394 11/16/11 TAB - B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS B 3.8.1-1 54 DRR 11-2394 11/16/11 B 3.8.1-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.1-3 47 DRR 10-1089 6/16/10 B 3.8.1-4 71 DRR 15-1528 7/30/15 B 3.8.1-5 59 DRR 13-1524 6/26/13 B 3.8.1-6 25 DRR 06-0800 5/18/06 B 3.8.1-7 26 DRR 06-1350 7/24/06 B 3.8.1-8 35 DRR 07-1553 9/28/07 B 3.8.1-9 42 DRR 09-1 009 7/16/09 B 3.8.1-10 39 DRR 08-1 096 8/28/08 B 3.8.1-11 36 DRR 08-0255 3/11/08 B 3.8.1-12 47 DRR 10-1 089 6/16/10 B 3.8.1-13 47 DRR 10-1089 6/16/10 B 3.8.1-14 47 DRR 10-1089 6/16/10 B 3.8.1-15 47 DRR 10-1089 6/16110 B 3.8.1-16 26 DRR 06-1350 7/24/06 B 3.8.1-17 26 .DRR 06-1350 7/24/06 B 3.8.1-18 59 DRR 13-1 524 6/26/13 B 3.8.1-19 26 DRR 06-1 350 7/24/06 B 3.8.1-20 26 DRR 06-1 350 7/24/06 B 3.8.1-21 33 DRR 07-0656 5/1/07 B 3.8.1-22 33 DRR 07-0656 5/1/07 B 3.8.1-23 40 DRR 08-1846 12/9/08 B 3.8.1-24 33 DRR 07-0656 5/1/07 B 3.8.1-25 33 DRR 07-0656 5/1/07 B 3.8.1-26 33 DRR 07-0656 5/1/07 B 3.8.1-27 59 DRR 13-1524 6/26/13 B 3.8.1-28 59 DRR 13-1524 6/26/13 B 3.8.1-29 54 DRR 11-2394 11/16/111 B 3.8.1-30 33 DRR 07-0656 5/1/07 B 3.8.1-31 33 DRR 07-0656 5/1/07 Wolf Creek - Unit 1 xiii eiin7 Revision 73

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TAB - B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS (continued)

B 3.8.1-32 33 DRR 07-0656 5/1/107 B 3.8.1-33 71 DRR 15-1528 7/30/15 B 3.8.1-34 47 DRR 10-1 089 6/16/10 B 3.8.2-1 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 B 3.8.2-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.2-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.2-4 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 B 3.8.2-5 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 B 3.8.2-6 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 B 3.8.2-7 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 B 3.8.3-1 1 DRR 99-1624 12/18/99 B 3.8.3-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.3-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.3-4 1 DRR 99-1624 12/18/99 B 3.8.3-5 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.3-6 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.3-7 12 DRR 02-1062 9/26/02 B 3.8.3-8 1 DRR 99-1624 12/18/99 B 3.8.3-9 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.4-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.4-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.4-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.4-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.4-5 50 DRR 11-0449 3/9/11 B 3.8.4-6 50 DRR 11-0449 3/9/111 B 3.8.4-7 6 DRR 00-1 541 3/13/01 B 3.8.4-8 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.4-9 2 DRR 00-0147 4/24/00 B 3.8.5-1 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 B 3.8.5-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.5-3 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 B 3.8.5-4 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 B 3.8.5-5 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 B 3.8.6-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.6-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.6-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.6-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.6-5 -0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.6-6 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.7-1 69 DRR 15-0493 3/26/15 B 3.8.7-2 69 DRR 15-0493 3/26/15 B 3.8.7-3 69 DRR 15-0493 3/26/15 B 3.8.7-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.8-1 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 B 3.8.8-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.8-3 69 DRR 15-0493 3/26/15 B 3.8.8-4 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 B 3.8.8-5 69 DRR 15-0493 3/26/15 B 3.8.9-1 54 DRR 11-2394 11/16/11 B 3.8.9-2 69 DRR 15-0493 3/26/15 B 3.8.9-3 54 DRR 11-2394 11/16/111 Wolf Creek - Unit 1 iiRviin7 xiii Revision 73

...LIST OF EF~FECTIVE PAGES - TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES .. ....

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TAB - B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS (continued)

B 3.8.9-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.9-5 69 DRR 15-0493 3/26/15 B 3.8.9-6 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.9-7 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.9-8 1 DRR 99-1624 12/18/99 B 3.8.9-9 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.10-1 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 B 3.8.10-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.,8.10-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.10-4 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 B 3.8.10-5 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 B 3.8.10-6 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 TAB - B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS B 3.9.1-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.9.1-2 19 DRRO04-1414 10/12/04 B 3.9.1-3 19 DRR 04-1414 10/12/04 B 3.9.1-4 19 DRR 04-1414 10/12/04 B 3.9.2-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.9.2-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.9.2-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.9.3-1 68 DRR 15-0248 2/26/15 B 3.9.3-2 68 DRR 15-0248 2/26/15 B 3.9.3-3 51 DRR 11-0664 3/21/11 B 3.9.3-4 68 DRR 15-0248 2/26/15 B 3.9.4-1 23 DRR 05-1 995 9/28/05 B 3.9.4-2 13 DRR 02-1458 12/03/02 B 3.9.4-3 25 DRR 06-0800 5/18/06 B 3.9.4-4 23 DRR 05-1995 9/28/05 B 3.9.4-5 33 DRR 07-0656 5/1/107 B 3.9.4-6 23 DRR 05-1995 9/28/05 B 3.9.5-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.9.5-2 72 DRRI15-1918 10/26/15 B 3.9.5-3 32 DRR 07-0139 2/7/07 B 3.9.5-4 72 DRRI15-1918 10/26/15 B 3.9.5-5 72 DRR 15-1918 10/26/15 B 3.9.6-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.9.6-2 72 DRRI15-1918 10/26/15 B 3.9.6-3 42 DRR 09-1009 7/16/09 B 3.9.6-4 72 DRR 15-1918 10/26/15 B 3.9.6-5 72 DRR 15-1918 10/26/15 B 3.9.7-1 25 DRR 06-0800 5/18/06 B 3.9.7-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.9.7-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 Wolf Creek - Unit 1 i xiv eiin7 Revision 73

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PAGE (1) REVISION NO. (2) CHANGE DOCUMENT (3) DATE EFFECTIVE/

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Note 1 The page number is listed on the center of the bottom of each page.

Note 2 The revision number is listed in the lower right hand corner of each page. The Revision number will be page specific.

Note 3 The change document will be the document requesting the change. Amendment No.

123 issued the improved Technical Specifications and associated Bases which affected each page. The NRC has indicated that Bases changes will not be issued with License Amendments. Therefore, the change document should be a DRR number in accordance with AP 26A-002.

Note 4 The date effective or implemented is the date the Bases pages are issued by Document Control.

Wolf Creek - Unit 1 vRviin7 XV Revision 73

W0LF CREEK 7 NUCLEAR OPERATING CORPORATION Cynthia R. Hafenstine Manager Regulatory Affairs March 10, 2016 RA 16-0008 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Subject:

Docket No. 50-482: Wolf Creek Generating Station Changes to Technical Specification Bases - Revisions 67 through 73 Gentlemen:

The Wolf Creek Generating Station (WCGS) Unit 1 Technical Specifications (TS), Section 5.5.14, "Technical Specifications (TS) Bases Control Program," provide the means for making changes to the Bases without prior Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approval. In addition, TS Section 5.5.14 requires that changes made without NRC approval be provided to the NRC on a frequency consistent with 10 CFR 50.71(e). The Enclosure provides those changes made to the WCGS TS Bases (Revisions 67 through 73) under the provisions to TS Section 5.5.14 and a List of Effective Pages. This submittal reflects changes from January 1, 2015 through December 31, 2015.

This letter contains no commitments. If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact me at (620) 364-4204.

Sincerely, Cynthia R. Hafenstine CRH/rlt Enclosure cc: M. L. Dapas (NRC), w/e C. F. Lyon (NRC), w/e N. H. Taylor (NRC), w/e 0 Senior Resident Inspector (NRC), w/e - J#*-

P.O. Box 411 / Burlington, KS 66839 / Phone: (620) 364-8831 An Equal Opportunity Employer MIFIHC/VET

Enclosure to IRA 16-0008 Wolf Creek Generating Station Changes to the Technical Specification Bases (44 pages)

FQ(Z) (EQ Methodology)

B 3.2.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.2.1.2 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS a precise measurement in these regions. It should be noted that while the transient FQ(Z) limits are not measured in these axial core regions, the analytical transient FQ(Z) limits in these axial core regions are demonstrated to be satisfied during the core reload design process.

This Surveillance has been modified by a Note that may require more frequent surveillances be performed. When FQc(Z) is measured, an evaluation of the expression below is required to account for any increase to FQ(Z) that may occur and cause the FQ(Z) limit to be exceeded before the next required FQ(Z) evaluation.

If the two most recent F0 (Z) evaluations show an increase in the expression maximum overz [FQ z) it is required to meet the FQ(Z) limit with the last FQw(Z) increased by the appropriate factor specified in the COLR, or to evaluate FQ(Z) more frequently, each 7 EFPD. These alternative requirements prevent FQ(Z) from exceeding its limit for any significant period of time without detection.

Performing the Surveillance in MODE 1 prior to exceeding 75% RTP ensures that the FQ(Z) limit will be met when RTP is achieved, because peaking factors are generally decreased as power level is increased.

FQ(Z) is verified at power levels > 10% RTP above the THERMAL POWER of its last verification, within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after achieving equilibrium conditions to ensure that FQ(Z) is within its limit at higher power levels.

The Surveillance Frequency of 31 EFPD is adequate to monitor the change of power distribution with core burnup. The Surveillance may be done more frequently if required by the results of FQ(Z) evaluations.

The Frequency of 31 EFPD is adequate to monitor the change of power distribution because such a change is sufficiently slow, when the plant is operated in accordance with the TS, to preclude adverse peaking factors between 31 day surveillances.

Wolf Creek - Unit 1 ..-

B 3.2.1-9 eiin2 Revision 29

F0 (Z) (F0 Methodology)

B 3.2.1 BASES REFERENCES °. 10 CFR 50.46, 1974.

2. USAR, Section 15.4.8.

3. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 26.

4. WCAP-7308-L-P-A, "Evaluation of Nuclear Hot Channel Factor Uncertainties," June 1988.

5. Performance Improvement Request 2005-3311.

6. WCAP-1 2472-P-A, "BEACON Core Monitoring and Operations Support System," August 1994 (including Addendum 4, September 2012).

Wolf Creek.- Unit I B 3.2.1-10 B3211 eiin770 Revision

F*,H B 3.2.2 BASES ACTIONS A.1.2.1 and A.1.2.2 (continued) condition for an extended period of time. The Completion Times of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> for Required Actions A.1 .1 and A.1 .2.1 are not additive.

The allowed Completion Time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to reset the trip setpoints per Required Action A.1 .2.2 recognizes that, once power is reduced, the safety analysis assumptions are satisfied and there is no urgent need to reduce the trip setpoints.

A..22 Once the power level has been reduced to < 50% RTP per Required Action A.1 .2.1, a power distribution measurement (SR 3.2.2.1 ) must be obtained and the measured value of FNA*H verified not to exceed the allowed limit at the lower power level. The unit is provided 68 additional hours to perform this task over and above the 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> allowed by either Action A.1 .1 or Action A.1 .2.1. The Completion Time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> is acceptable because of the increase in the DNB margin, which is obtained at lower power levels, and the low probability of having a DNB limiting event within this 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> period. Additionally, operating experience has indicated that this Completion Time is sufficient to obtain the power distribution measurement, perform the required calculations, and evaluateI F*H

• A.3 Verification that FNAI*H is within its specified limits after an out of limit occurrence ensures that the cause that led to the FNAJH exceeding its limit is identified, to the extent necessary, and corrected, and that subsequent operation proceeds within the LCO limit. This Action demonstrates that the FNAN limit is within the LCO limits prior to exceeding 50% RTP, again prior to exceeding 75% RTP, and within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after THERMAL POWER is >Ž95% RTP.

This Required Action is modified by a Note that states that THERMAL POWER does not have to be reduced prior to performing this Action.

B.._I When Required Actions A.1.1 through A.3 cannot be completed within their required Completion Times, the plant must be placed in a mode in which the LCO requirements are not applicable. This is done by placing the plant in at least MODE 2 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. The allowed Completion Wolf Creek - Unit 1 ..-

B 3.2.2-5 eiin4 Revision 48

F*,H B 3.2.2 BASES ACTIONS 8.1 (continued)

Time of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> is reasonable, based on operating experience regarding the time required to reach MODE 2 from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.2.2.1 REQUIREMENTS SR 3.2.2.1 is modified by a Note. The Note applies during power ascensions following a plant shutdown (leaving MODE 1). The Note allows for power ascensions ifthe surveillances are not current. Itstates that THERMAL POWER may be increased until an equilibrium power level has been achieved at which a power distribution measurement can be obtained. Equilibrium conditions are achieved when the core is sufficiently stable at the intended operating conditions to perform the measurement.

The value of FNAH is determined by using either the movable incore detector system or the Power Distribution Monitoring System to obtain a power distribution measurement. A calculation determines the maximum value of FNAH- from the measured power distribution. The measured value of FNAH must be increased by 4% (ifusing the movable incore detector system) or increased by U*% (if using the Power Distribution Monitoring System, where UAH is determined as described in Reference 4, with a minimum value of 4%) to account for measurement uncertainty before making comparisons to the FNA*H limit After each refueling, FNAN must be determined in MODE I prior to exceeding 75% RTP. This requirement ensures that FNAH~ limits are met at the beginning of each fuel cycle.

The 31 EFPD Frequency is acceptable because the power distribution changes relatively slowly over this amount of fuel burnup. Accordingly, this Frequency is short enough that the FN*l~ limit cannot be exceeded for any significant period of operation.

REFERENCES 1. USAR, Section 15.4.8.

2. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 26.

3. 10 CFR 50.46.

4. WCAP-1 2472-P-A, "BEACON Core Monitoring and Operations Support System," August 1994 (including Addendum 4, September 2012).

Wolf Creek - Unit 1B3226Reion7 B 3.2.2-6 Revision 70

RCS P/T Limits B 3.4.3 B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

B 3.4.3 RCS Pressure and Temperature (PIT) Limits BASES BACKGROUND All components of the RCS are designed to withstand effects of cyclic loads due to system pressure and temperature changes. These loads are introduced by startup (heatup) and shutdown (cooldown) operations, power transients, and reactor trips. This LCO limits the pressure and temperature changes during RCS heatup and cooldown, within the design assumptions and the stress limits for cyclic operation.

The PTLR contains P/T limit curves for heatup, cooldown, inservice leak and hydrostatic (ISLH) testing, and data for the maximum rate of change of reactor coolant temperature (Ref. 1).

Each PIT limit curve defines an acceptable region for normal operation.

The usual use of the curves is operational guidance during heatup or cooldown maneuvering, when pressure and temperature indications are monitored and compared to the applicable curve to determine that operation is within the allowable region. Vacuum fill of the RCS is normally performed in MODE 5 under sub-atmospheric pressure and isothermal RCS conditions. Vacuum fill is an acceptable condition since the resulting pressure/temperature combination is located in the region to the right and below the operating limits provided in Figures 2.1-1 and 2.1-2 of the PTLR.

The LCO establishes operating limits that provide a margin to brittle failure of the reactor vessel and piping of the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB). The vessel is the component most subject to brittle failure, and the LCO limits apply mainly to the vessel. The limits do not apply to the pressurizer, which has different design characteristics and operating functions.

10 CFR 50, Appendix G (Ref. 2), requires the establishment of PIT limits for specific material fracture toughness requirements of the RCPB materials. Reference 2 requires an adequate margin to brittle failure during normal operation, anticipated operational occurrences, and system hydrostatic tests. It mandates the use of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code,Section III, Appendix G (Ref. 3).

The neutron embrittlement effect on the material toughness is reflected by increasing the nil ductility reference temperature (RTNDT) as exposure to neutron fluence increases.

The actual shift in the RTNDT of the vessel material will be established periodically by removing and evaluating the irradiated reactor vessel material specimens, in accordance with ASTM E 185 (Ref. 4) and Wolf Creek - Unit IB343-Reion6 B3.4.3-1 Revision 67

RCS P/T Limits B 3.4.3 BASES BACKGROUND Appendix H of 10 CFR 50 (Ref. 5). The operating P/T limit curves will be (continued) adjusted, as necessary, based on the evaluation findings and the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.99 (Ref. 6).

The P/T limit curves are composite curves established by superimposing limits derived from stress analyses of those portions of the reactor vessel and head that are the most restrictive. At any specific pressure, temperature, and temperature rate of change, one location within the reactor vessel will dictate the most restrictive limit. Across the span of the P/T limit curves, different locations are more restrictive, and, thus, the curves are composites of the most restrictive regions.

The heatup curve represents a different set of restrictions than the cooldown curve because the directions of the thermal gradients through the vessel wall are reversed. The thermal gradient reversal alters the location of the tensile stress between the outer and inner walls.

The criticality limit curve includes the Reference 2 requirement that it be

> 40°F above the heatup curve or the cooldown curve, and not less than the minimum permissible temperature for ISLH testing. However, the criticality curve is not operationally limiting; a more restrictive limit exists in LCO 3.4.2, "RCS Minimum Temperature for Criticality."

The consequence of violating the LCO limits is that the RCS has been operated under conditions that can result in brittle failure of the RCPB, possibly leading to a nonisolable leak or loss of coolant accident. In the event these limits are exceeded, an evaluation must be performed to determine the effect on the structural integrity of the RCPB components.

The ASME Code, Section Xl, Appendix E (Ref. 7), provides a recommended methodology for evaluating an operating event that causes an excursion outside the limits.

APPLICABLE The P/T limits are not derived from Design Basis Accident (DBA)

SAFETY ANALYSES analyses. They are prescribed during normal operation to avoid encountering pressure, temperature, and temperature rate of change conditions that might cause undetected flaws to propagate and cause nonductile failure of the RCPB, an unanalyzed condition. Reference 1 establishes the methodology for determining the P/T limits. Although the P/T limits are not derived from any DBA, the P/T limits are acceptance limits since they preclude operation in an unanalyzed condition.

RCS P/T limits satisfy Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

Wolf Creek - Unit 1 ..-

B3.4.3-2 Rvso Revision 0

RCS Loops - MODE 4 B 3.4.6 B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

B 3.4.6 RCS Loops - MODE 4 BASES BACKGROUND In MODE 4, the primary function of the reactor coolant is the removal of decay heat and the transfer of this heat to either the steam generator (SG) secondary side coolant or the component cooling water via the residual heat removal (RHR) heat exchangers. The secondary function of the reactor coolant is to act as a carrier for soluble neutron poison, boric acid.

The reactor coolant is circulated through four RCS loops connected in parallel to the reactor vessel, each loop containing an SG, a reactor coolant pump (RCP), and appropriate flow, pressure, level, and temperature instrumentation for control, protection, and indication. The RCPs circulate the coolant through the reactor vessel and SGs at a sufficient rate to ensure proper heat transfer and to prevent boric acid stratification.

In MODE 4, either RCPs or RHR loops can be used to provide forced circulation. The intent of this LCO is to provide forced flow from at least one RCP or one RHR loop for decay heat removal and transport. The flow provided by one RCP loop or RHR loop is adequate for decay heat removal. The other intent of this LCO is to require that two paths be available to provide redundancy for decay heat removal.

APPLICABLE In MODE 4, RCS circulation is considered in the determination of the time SAFETY ANALYSES available for mitigation of the accidental boron dilution event.

The operation of one RCP in MODES 3, 4, and 5 provides adequate flow to ensure mixing, prevent stratification, and produce gradual reactivity changes during RCS boron concentrationi reductions. With no reactor coolant loop in operation in either MODES 3, 4, or 5, dilution sources must be isolated or administratively controlled. The boron dilution analysis in these MODES take credit for the mixing volume associated with having at least one reactor coolant loop in operation (Ref. 1).

RCS Loops- MODE 4 satisfies Criterion 4 of 10 CER 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

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RCS Loops-MODE 4 B 3.4.6 BASES LCO The purpose of this LCO is to require that at least two loops be OPERABLE in MODE 4 and that one of these loops be in operation. The LCO allows the two loops that are required to be OPERABLE to consist of any combination of RCS loops and RHR loops. Any one loop in operation provides enough flow to remove the decay heat from the core with forced circulation. An additional loop is required to be OPERABLE to provide redundancy for heat removal.

Note 1 permits all RCPs or RHR pumps to be removed from operation for

_<1 hour per 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> period. The purpose of the Note is to permit tests that are required to be performed without flow or pump noise. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> time period is adequate to perform the necessary testing, and operating experience has shown that boron stratification is not a problem during this short period with no forced flow.

Utilization of Note I is permitted provided the following conditions are met along with any other conditions imposed by test procedures:

a. No operations are permitted that would dilute the RCS boron concentration with coolant at boron concentrations less than required to assure the SDM of LCO 3.1.1, thereby maintaining the margin to criticality. Boron reduction with coolant at boron concentrations less than required to assure the SDM is maintained is prohibited because a uniform concentration distribution throughout the RCS cannot be ensured when in natural circulation; and

b. Core outlet temperature is maintained at least 10°F below saturation temperature, so that no vapor bubble may form and possibly cause a natural circulation flow obstruction.

Note 2 requires that the secondary side water temperature of each SG be

_<50°F above each of the RCS cold leg temperatures before the start of an RCP with any RCS cold leg temperature _<368°F. This restraint is to prevent a low temperature overpressure event due to a thermal transient when an RCP is started."

An OPERABLE RCS loop is comprised of an OPERABLE RCP and an OPERABLE SG, which has the minimum water level specified in SR 3.4.6.2.

Similarly for the RHR System, an OPERABLE RHR loop comprises an OPERABLE RHR pump capable of providing forced flow to an OPERABLE RHR heat exchanger. RCPs and RHR pumps are OPERABLE if they are capable of being powered and are able to provide forced flow if required. Management of gas voids is important to RHR System Operability.

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RCS Loops - MODE 4 B 3.4.6 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.6.4 REQUIREMENTS (continued) RHR System piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the required RHR loop(s) and may also prevent water hammer, pump cavitation, and pumping of noncondensible gas into the reactor vessel.

Selection of RHR System locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations. The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration. Susceptible locations

..............* ... depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.

The RHR System is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water.

Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump),

the Surveillance is not met. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the RHR System is not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.

RHR System locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative sub-set of susceptible locations.

Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location. Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY. The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.

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RCS Loops - MODE 4 B 3.4.6 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.6.4 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS This SR is modified by a Note that states the SR is not required to be performed until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after entering MODE 4. In a rapid shutdown, there may be insufficient time to verify all susceptible locations prior to entering MODE 4.

The 31 day Frequency takes into consideration the gradual nature of gas accumulation in the RHR System piping and the procedural controls governing system operation.

REFERENCES 1. USAR, Section 15.4.6

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RCS Loops - MODE 5, Loops Filled B 3.4.7 BASES LCO b. Core outlet temperature is maintained at least 10°F below (continued) saturation temperature, so that no vapor bubble may form and possibly cause a natural circulation flow obstruction.

Note 2 allows one RHR loop to be inoperable for a period of up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, provided that the other RHR loop is OPERABLE and in operation. This permits periodic surveillance tests to be performed on the inoperable loop during the only time when such testing is safe and possible.

Note 3 requires that the secondary side water temperature of each SG be

_<50°F above each of the RCS cold leg temperatures before the start of a reactor coolant pump (RCP) with any RCS cold leg temperature < 368°F.

This restriction is to prevent a low temperature overpressure event due to a thermal transient when an RCP is started.

Note 4 provides for an orderly transition from MODE 5 to MODE 4 during a planned heatup by permitting removal of RHR loops from operation when at least one RCS loop is in operation. This Note provides for the transition to MODE 4 where an RCS loop is permitted to be in operation and replaces the RCS circulation function provided by the RHR loops.

RHR pumps are OPERABLE ifthey are capable of being powered and are able to provide forced flow if required. When both RHR loops (or trains) are required to be OPERABLE, the associated Component Cooling Water (CCW) train is required to be capable of performing its related support function(s). The heat sink for the CCW System is normally provided by the Service Water System or Essential Service Water (ESW)

System, as determined by system availability. In MODES 5 and 6, one Diesel Generator (DG) is required to be OPERABLE per LCO 3.8.2, "AC Sources - Shutdown." The same ESW train is required to be capable of performing its related support function(s) to support DG OPERABILITY. A Service Water train can be utilized to support RHR OPERABILITY ifthe associated ESW train is not capable of performing its related support function(s). A SG can perform as a heat sink via natural circulation when it has an adequate water level and is OPERABLE. Management of gas voids is important to RHR System OPERABILITY.

APPLICABILITY In MODE 5 with RCS loops filled, this LCO requires forced circulation of the reactor coolant to remove decay heat from the core and to provide proper boron mixing. One loop of RHR provides sufficient circulation for these purposes. However, one additional RHR loop is required to be OPERABLE, or the secondary side wide range water level of at least two SGs is required to be _ 66%.

Operation in other MODES is covered by:

LCO 3.4.4, "RCS Loops -MODES 1 and 2";

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RCS Loops - MODE 5, Loops Filled B 3.4.7 BASES APPLICABILITY LCO 3.4.5, "RCS Loops-MODE 3";

(continued) LCO 3.4.6, "RCS Loops - MODE 4";

LCO 3.4.8, "RCS Loops-MODES5, Loops Not Filled";

LCO 3.9.5, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation - High Water Level" (MODE 6); and LCO 3.9.6, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation - Low Water Level" (MODE 6).

ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 If one RHR loop is inoperable and the required SGs have secondary side wide range water levels < 66%, redundancy for heat removal is lost.

Action must be initiated immediately to restore a second RHR loop to OPERABLE status or to restore the required SG secondary side water levels. Either Required Action A.1 or Required Action A.2 will restore redundant heat removal paths. The immediate Completion Time reflects the importance of maintaining the availability of two paths for heat removal.

B.1 and B.2 If no RHR loop is in operation, except during conditions permitted by Notes I and 4, or if no loop is OPERABLE, all operations involving introduction into the RCS, coolant with boron concentration less than required to meet the minimum SDM of LCO 3.1.1 must be suspended and action to restore one RHR loop to OPERABLE status and operation must be initiated. To prevent inadvertent criticality during a boron dilution, forced circulation from at least one RCP is required to provide proper mixing. Suspending the introduction into the RCS, coolant with boron concentration less than required to meet the minimum SDM of LCO 3.1.1 is required to assure continued safe operation. With coolant added without forced circulation, unmixed coolant could be introduced to the core, however coolant added with boron concentration meeting the minimum SDM maintains acceptable margin to subcritical operations.

The immediate Completion Times reflect the importance of maintaining operation for heat removal.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.7.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR requires verification every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> that the required loop is in operation. Verification may include flow rate, temperature, or pump status monitoring, which help ensure that forced flow is providing heat removal.

The Frequency of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> is sufficient considering other indications and alarms available to the operator in the control room to monitor RHR loop performance.

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RCS Loops - MODE 5, Loops Filled B 3.4.7 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.7.2 REQUIREMENTS (continued) Verifying that at least two SGs are OPERABLE by ensuring their secondary side wide range water levels are >_66% ensures an alternate decay heat removal method is available via natural circulation in the event that the second RHR loop is not OPERABLE. If both RHR loops are OPERABLE, this Surveillance is not needed. The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Frequency is considered adequate in view of other indications available in the control room to alert the operator to the loss of SG level.

SR 3.4.7.3 Verification that a second RHR pump is OPERABLE ensures that an additional pump can be placed in operation, if needed, to maintain decay heat removal and reactor coolant circulation. Verification is performed by verifying proper breaker alignment and power available to the RHR pump.

If secondary side wide range water level is > 66% in at least two SGs, this Surveillance is not needed. The Frequency of 7 days is considered reasonable in view of other administrative controls available and has been shown to be acceptable by operating experience.

SR 3.4.7.4.

RHR System piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the required RHR loop(s) and may also prevent water hammer, pump cavitation, and pumping of noncondensible gas into the reactor vessel.

Selection of RHR System locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations. The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration. Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.

The RHR System is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water.

Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of Wolf Creek - Unit 1 ..-

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..... " ...... RCS Loops - MODE 5, LoopsB Filled 3.4.7 BAS ES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.7.4 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump),

the Surveillance is not met. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the RHR System is not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.

RHR System locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative sub-set of susceptible locations.

Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating

. ................... parameters, remote-monitoring) may be used to monitor-the susceptible-location. Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY. The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.

The 31 day Frequency takes into consideration the gradual nature of gas accumulation in the RHR System piping and the procedural controls governing system operation.

REFERENCES 1. USAR, Section 15.4.6.

2. NRC Information Notice 95-35, "Degraded Ability of SGs to Remove Decay Heat by Natural Circulation."

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-RCS Loops - MODE 5, Loops Not Filled B 3.4.8 B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

B 3.4.8 RCS Loops - MODE 5, Loops Not Filled BASES BACKGROUND In MODE 5 with the RCS loops not filled, the primary function of the reactor coolant is the removal of decay heat generated in the fuel, and the transfer of this heat to the component cooling water via the residual heat removal (RHR) heat exchangers. The steam generators (SGs) are not available as a heat sink when the loops are not filled. The secondary function of the reactor coolant is to act as a carrier for the soluble neutron poison, boric acid.

In MODE 5 with loops not filled, only RHR pumps can be used for coolant circulation. The number of pumps in operation can vary to suit the operational needs. The intent of this LCO is to provide forced flow from at least one RHR pump for decay heat removal and transport and to require that two paths be available to provide redundancy for heat removal.

APPLICABLE In MODE 5, RCS circulation is considered in the determination of the SAFETY ANALYSES time available for mitigation of the accidental boron dilution event. The flow provided by one RHR loop is adequate for decay heat removal.

The operation of one RCP in MODES 3, 4, and 5 provides adequate flow to ensure mixing, prevent stratification, and produce gradual reactivity changes during RCS boron concentration reductions. With no reactor coolant loop in operation in either MODES 3, 4, or 5, dilution sources must be isolated or administratively controlled. The boron dilution analysis in these MODES take credit for the mixing volume associated with having at least one reactor coolant ioop in operation (Ref. 1).

RCS loops in MODE 5 (loops not filled) satisfies Criterion 4 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO The purpose of this LCO is to require that at least two RHR loops be OPERABLE and one of these loops be in operation. An OPERABLE loop is one that has the capability of transferring heat from the reactor coolant at a controlled rate. Heat cannot be removed via the RHR System unless forced flow is used. A minimum of one running RHR pump meets the LCO requirement for one loop in operation. An additional RHR loop is required to be OPERABLE to meet single failure considerations.

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RCS Loops - MODE 5, L~oops Not Filled B 3.4.8 BASES LCO Note 1 permits all RHR pumps to be removed from operation for _<1 hour.

(continued) The circumstances for stopping both RHR pumps are to be limited to situations when the outage time is short and core outlet temperature is maintained at least 10°F below saturation temperature. The Note prohibits boron dilution with coolant at boron concentrations less than required to assure the SDM of LCO 3.1.1 is maintained or draining operations when RHR forced flow is stopped. The Note requires reactor vessel water level be above the vessel flange to ensure the operating RHR pump will not be intentionally deenergized during mid-loop operations.

Note 2 allows one RHR loop to be inoperable for a period of < 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, provided that the other loop is OPERABLE and in operation. This permits periodic surveillance tests to be performed on the inoperable loop during the only time when these tests are safe and possible.

An OPERABLE RHR loop is comprised of an OPERABLE RHR pump capable of providing forced flow to an OPERABLE RHR heat exchanger.

RHR pumps are OPERABLE ifthey are capable of being powered and are able to provide flow if required. The heat sink for the CCW System is normally provided by the Service Water System or Essential Service Water (ESW) System, as determined by system availability. In MODES 5 and 6, one Diesel Generator (DG) is required to be OPERABLE per LCO 3.8.2, "AC Sources - Shutdown." The same ESW train is required to be capable of performing its related support function(s) to support DG OPERABILITY. A Service Water train can be utilized to support RHR OPERABILITY ifthe associated ESW train is not capable of performing its related support function(s). Management of gas voids is important to RHR OPERABILITY.

APPLICABILITY In MODE 5 with loops not filled, this LCO requires core heat removal and coolant circulation by the RHR System. One RHR loop provides sufficient capability for this purpose. However, one additional RHR loop is required to be OPERABLE to meet single failure considerations.

Operation in other MODES is covered by:

LCO 3.4.4, "RCS Loops - MODES 1 and 2";

LCO 3.4.5, "RCS Loops - MODE 3";

LCO 3.4.6, "RCS Loops - MODE 4";

LCO 3.4.7, "RCS Loops - MODE 5, Loops Filled";

LCO 3.9.5, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation - High Water Level" (MODE 6); and LCO 3.9.6, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation - Low Water Level" (MODE 6).

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RCS Loops - MODE 5, Loops Not Filled B 3.4.8 BASES APPLICABILITY Since LCO 3.4.8 contains Required Actions with immediate Completion (continued) Times, it is not permitted to enter LCO 3.4.8 from either LCO 3.4.7, IRCS Loops - MODE 5, Loops Filled," or from MODE 6, unless the requirements of LCO 3.4.8 are met. This precludes removing the heat removal path afforded by the steam generators with the RHR System is degraded.

ACTIONS A._.1 If only one IRHIR loop is OPERABLE and in operation, redundancy for IRHIR is lost. Action must be initiated to restore a second loop to OPERABLE status. The immediate Completion Time reflects the importance of maintaining the availability of two paths for heat removal.

B.1 and B.2

_~I~f n~o required RHRloops are OPERABLE orin operation, except during conditions permitted by Note 1, all operations involving introduction into the RCS, coolant with boron concentration less than required to meet the minimum SDM of LCO 3.1.1 must be suspended and action must be initiated immediately to restore an IRHR loop to OPERABLE status and operation. Boron dilution requires forced circulation from at least one IRCP for proper mixing so that inadvertent criticality can be prevented.

Suspending the introduction into the IRCS, coolant with boron concentration less than required to meet the minimum SDM of LCO 3.1.1 is required to assure continued safe operation. With coolant added without forced circulation, unmixed coolant could be introduced to the core, however coolant added with boron concentration meeting the minimum SDM maintains acceptable margin to subcritical operations.

The immediate Completion Time reflects the importance of maintaining operation for heat removal. The action to restore must continue until one loop is restored to OPERABLE status and operation.

SURVEILLANCE SIR 3.4.8.1 REQUIREMENTS This SIR requires verification every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> that one loop is in operation.

Verification may include flow rate, temperature, or pump status monitoring, which help ensure that forced flow is providing heat removal.

The Frequency of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> is sufficient considering other indications and alarms available to the operator in the control room to monitor IRHR loop performance.

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.... ..... RCS Loops - MODE 5, Loops NotB Filled3.4.8 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.8.2 REQUIREMENTS (continued) Verification that a second RHR pump is OPERABLE ensures that an additional pump can be placed in operation, if needed, to maintain decay heat removal and reactor coolant circulation. Verification is performed by verifying proper breaker alignment and power available to the RHR pump.

The Frequency of 7 days is considered reasonable in view of other administrative controls available and has been shown to be acceptable by operating experience.

SR 3.4.8.3 RHR System piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the RHR loops and may also prevent water hammer, pump cavitation, and pumping of noncondensible gas into the reactor vessel.

Selection of RHR System locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations. The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration. Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.

The RHR System is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water.

Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump), -

the Surveillance is not met. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the RHR System is not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.

RHR System locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow Wolf Creek - Unit 1 ..-

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RCS Loops - MODE 5, Loops Not Filled B 3.4.8 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.8.3 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative sub-set of susceptible locations.

Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location. Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY. The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.

The 31 day Frequency takes into consideration the gradual nature of gas accumulation in the RHR System piping and the procedural controls governing system operation.

REFERENCES 1. USAR, Section 15.4.6.

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Accumulators B 3.5.1 BASES APPLICABLE The worst case small break LOCA analyses also assume a time delay SAFETY ANALYSES before pumped flow reaches the core. For the larger range of small (continued) breaks, the rate of blowdown is such that the increase in fuel clad temperature is terminated primarily by the accumulators, with pumped flow then providing continued cooling. As break size decreases, the accumulators and ECCS pumps play a part in terminating the rise in clad temperature. As break size continues to decrease, the role of the accumulators continues to decrease until they are not required and the centrifugal charging pumps become solely responsible for terminating the temperature increase.

This LCO helps to ensure that the following acceptance criteria established for the ECCS by 10 CFR 50.46 (Ref. 2) will be met following a LOCA:

a. Maximum fuel element cladding temperature is < 2200°F;

b. Maximum cladding oxidation is _< 0.17 times the total cladding

_ thickness before oxidation;

c. Maximum hydrogen generation from a zirconium water reaction is

< 0.01 times the hypothetical amount that would be generated if all of the metal in the cladding cylinders surrounding the fuel, excluding the cladding surrounding the plenum volume, were to react; and

d. Core is maintained in a coolable geometry.

Since the accumulators empty themselves by the beginning stages of the reflood phase of a LOCA, they do not contribute to the long term cooling requirements of 10 CFR 50.46.

For the small break LOCA analysis, a nominal contained accumulator water volume is used, while the large break LOCA analysis samples the accumulator water volume over the specified range of 6122 gallons to 6594 gallons to allow for instrument inaccuracy. The contained water volume is the same as the available deliverable volume for the accumulators. For large breaks, an increase in water volume can be either a peak clad temperature penalty or benefit, depending on downcomer filling and subsequent spill through the break during the core reflooding portion of the transient. The analysis credits the line water volume from the accumulator to the check valve.

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........ Accumulators B 3.5.1 BASES APPLICABLE The minimum boron concentration limit is used in the post LOCA boron SAFETY ANALYSES concentration calculation. The calculation is performed to assure reactor (continued) subcriticality in a post LOCA environment. Of particular interest is the large break LOCA, since no credit is taken for control rod assembly insertion. A reduction in the accumulator minimum boron concentration would produce a subsequent reduction in the available containment sump boron concentration for post LOCA shutdown and an increase in the maximum sump pH. The maximum boron concentration is used in determining the cold leg to hot leg recirculation injection switchover time and minimum sump pH.

The small break LOCA analysis is performed at the minimum nitrogen cover pressure, since sensitivity analyses have demonstrated that higher nitrogen cover pressure results in a computed peak clad temperature benefit. The maximum nitrogen cover Pressure limit prevents accumulator relief valve actuation, and ultimately preserves accumulator integrity. The large break LOCA analysis samples the accumulator pressure over the range of 568.1 psig to 681.9 psig.

The effects on containment mass and energy releases from the accumulators are accounted for in the appropriate analyses (Refs. 1 and 3).

The accumulators satisfy Criterion 2 and Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (c)(2)(ii).

LCO The LCO establishes the minimum conditions required to ensure that the accumulators are available to accomplish their core cooling safety function following a LOCA. Four accumulators are required to ensure that 100% of the contents of three of the accumulators will reach the core during a LOCA. This is consistent with the assumption that the contents of one accumulator spill through the break. If less than three accumulators are injected during the blowdown phase of a LOCA, the ECCS acceptance criteria of 10 CFR 50.46 (Ref. 2) could be violated.

For an accumulator to be considered OPERABLE, the isolation valve must be fully open, power removed above 1000 psig, and the limits established in the SRs for contained volume, boron concentration, and nitrogen cover pressure must be met.

APPLICABILITY In MODES I and 2, and in MODE 3 with RCS pressure > 1000 psig, the accumulator OPERABILITY requirements are based on full power operation. Although cooling requirements decrease as power decreases, Wolf Creek - Unit 1 ..-

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Accumulators B 3.5.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.1.2 and SR 3.5.1.3 REQUIREMENTS (continued) Every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, borated water volume and nitrogen cover pressure are verified for each accumulator. The limit on borated water volume is equivalent to >_30 % and < 70.3 % level. Only one set of non-safety channels (1 of 2) is required for water level and pressure indication. The 12-hour Frequency is sufficient to ensure adequate injection during a LOCA. Because of the static design of the accumulator, a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Frequency usually allows the operator to identify changes before limits are reached. Operating experience has shown this Frequency to be appropriate for early detection and correction of off normal trends.

SR 3.5.1.4 The boron concentration should be verified to be within required limits for each accumulator every 31 days since the static design of the accumulators limits the ways in which the concentration can be changed.

The 31 day Frequency is adequate to identify changes that could occur from mechanisms such as dilution or inleakage. Sampling the affected accumulator within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> after a 70 gallon increase (approximately 8%

level) will identify whether inleakage has caused a reduction in boron concentration to below the required limit. It is not necessary to verify boron concentration ifthe added water inventory is from the refueling water storage tank (RWST) and the RWST has not been diluted since verifying that its boron concentration satisfies SR 3.5.4.3, because the water contained in the RWST is normally within the accumulator boron concentration requirements. This is consistent with the recommendation of NUREG-1 366 (Ref. 4).

SR 3.5.1.5 Verification every 31 days that power is removed from each accumulator isolation valve operator when the RCS pressure is > 1000 psig ensures that an active failure could not result in the undetected closure of an accumulator motor operated isolation valve. If this were to occur, only two accumulators would be available for injection given a single failure coincident with a LOCA. Since power is removed under administrative control, the 31 day Frequency will provide adequate assurance that power is removed.

This SR allows power to be supplied to the motor operated isolation valves when RCS pressure is < 1000 psig, thus allowing operational Wolf Creek - Unit 1 ..-

B 3.5.1-7 eiin7 Revision 71

Accumulators B 3.5.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.1.5 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS flexibility by avoiding unnecessary delays to manipulate the breakers during plant startups or shutdowns.

Should closure of a valve occur in spite of the interlock, the SI signal provided to the valves would open a closed valve in the event of a LOCA.

REFERENCES 1. USAR, Chapter 6.

2. 10OCFR 50.46.

3. USAR, Chapter 15.

4. NUREG-1 366, February 1990.

5. WCAP-1 5049-A, Rev. 1, April 1999.

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B 3.5.1-8 Rvso 1 Revision

ECCS - Operating B 3.5.2 BASES LCO In MODES 1, 2, and 3, two independent (and redundant) ECCS trains are required to ensure that sufficient ECCS flow is available, assuming a single failure affecting either train. Additionally, individual components within the ECCS trains may be called upon to mitigate the consequences of other transients and accidents.

In MODES 1, 2, and 3, an ECCS train consists of a centrifugal charging subsystem, an SI subsystem, and an RHR subsystem. Each train includes the piping, instruments, and controls to ensure an OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the RWST upon an SI signal and automatically transferring suction to the containment sump.

During an event requiring ECCS actuation, a flow path is required to provide an abundant supply of water from the RWST to the RCS via the ECCS pumps and their respective supply headers to each of the four cold leg injection nozzles. In the long term, this flow path may be switched to take its supply from the containment sump and to supply its flow to the RCS hot and cold legs. Management of gas voids is important to ECCS OPERABILITY.

The LCO requires the OPERABILITY of a number of independent subsystems. Due to the redundancy of trains and the diversity of subsystems, the inoperability of one component in a train does not render the ECCS incapable of performing its function. Neither does the inoperability of two different components, each in a different train, necessarily result in a loss of function for the ECCS. Reference 6 describes situations in which one component, such as an RHR crossover valve, can disable both ECCS trains.

During recirculation operation, the flow path for each train must maintain its designed independence to ensure that no single failure can disable both ECCS trains.

As indicated in Note 1, the SI flow paths may be isolated for 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> in MODE 3, under controlled conditions, to perform pressure isolation valve testing per SR 3.4.14.1. The flow path is readily restorable from the control room, and a single active failure is not assumed coincident with this testing (Ref. 7). Therefore, the ECCS trains are considered OPERABLE during this isolation.

As indicated in Note 2, operation in MODE 3 with ECCS pumps made incapable of injecting, pursuant to LCO 3.4.12, "Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) System," is necessary for plants with an LTOP arming temperature at or near the MODE 3 boundary temperature of 350°F. LCO 3.4.12 requires that certain pumps be rendered incapable of injecting at and below the LTOP arming temperature. When this temperature is at or near the MODE 3 boundary temperature, time is needed to restore the inoperable pumps to OPERABLE status.

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..- eiin7 Revision 72

ECCS - Operating B 3.5.2 BASES LCO Either of the CCPs may be considered OPERABLE with its associated (continued) discharge to RCP seal throttle valve, BG-HV-8357A or BG-HV-8357B, inoperable.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the ECCS OPERABILITY requirements for the limiting Design Basis Accident, a large break LOCA, are based on full power operation. Although reduced power would not require the same level of performance, the accident analysis does not provide for reduced cooling requirements in the lower MODES. The centrifugal charging pump performance is based on a small break LOCA, which establishes the pump performance curve and has less dependence on power. The SI pump performance requirements are based on a small break LOCA.

MODE 2 and MODE 3 requirements are bounded by the MODE 1 analysis.

This LCO is only applicable in MODE 3 and above. Below MODE 3, the system functional requirements are relaxed as described in LCO 3.5.3, "ECCS -Shutdown."

In MODES 5 and 6, plant conditions are such that the probability of an event requiring ECCS injection is extremely low. Core cooling requirements in MODE 5 are addressed by LCO 3.4.7, "RCS Loops -

MODE 5, Loops Filled," and LCO 3.4.8, "RCS Loops - MODE 5, Loops Not Filled." MODE 6 core cooling requirements are addressed by LCO 3.9.5, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation - High Water Level," and LCO 3.9.6, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation - Low Water Level."

ACTIONS A.__1 With one toorOPERABLE returned more trains inoperable, status withinthe 72 inoperable hours. Thecomponents must be 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Completion Time is based on an NRC reliability evaluation (Ref. 5) and is a reasonable time for repair of many ECCS components.

An ECCS train is inoperable if it is not capable of delivering design flow to the RCS. Individual components are inoperable ifthey are not capable of performing their design function or supporting systems are not available.

The LCO requires the OPERABILITY of a number of independent subsystems. Due to the redundancy of trains and the diversity of subsystems, the inoperability of one component in a train does not render Wolf Creek - Unit 1 ..-

B 3.5.2-6 eiin4 Revision 42

ECCS - Operating B 3.5.2 BASES ACTIONS A.1 (continued) the ECCS incapable of performing its function. Neither does the inoperability of two different components, each in a different train, necessarily result in a loss of function for the ECCS. This allows increased flexibility in plant operations under circumstances when components in opposite trains are inoperable.

An event accompanied by a loss of offsite power and the failure of an EDG can disable one ECCS train until power is restored. A reliability analysis (Ref. 5) has shown that the impact of having one full ECCS train inoperable is sufficiently small to justify continued operation for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

B.1 and B.2 If the inoperable trains cannot be returned to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and MODE 4 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

C.1l Condition A is applicable with one or more trains inoperable. The allowed Completion Time is based on the assumption that at least 100% of the ECCS flow equivalent to a single OPERABLE ECCS train is available.

With less than 100% of the ECCS flow equivalent to a single OPERABLE ECCS train available, the unit is in a condition outside of the accident analyses. Therefore, LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.2.1 REQUIREMENTS Verification of proper valve position ensures that the flow path from the ECCS pumps to the RCS is maintained. Misalignment of these valves could render both ECCS trains inoperable. Securing these valves in the correct position by a power lockout isolation device ensures that they cannot change position as a result of an active failure or be inadvertently misaligned. These valves are of the type, described in References 7 and 8, that can disable the function of both ECCS trains and invalidate the accident analyses. A 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Frequency is considered reasonable in view of other administrative controls that will ensure a mispositioned valve is unlikely.

Wolf Creek - Unit IB3.27Reion4 B 3.5.2-7 Revision 42

ECCS - Operating B 3.5.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.2.2 REQUIREMENTS (continued) Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the ECCS flow paths provides assurance that the proper flow paths will exist for ECCS operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since these were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing.

This SR does not apply to manual vent/drain valves, and to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned such as check valves. A valve that receives an actuation signal is allowed to be in a nonaccident position provided the valve will automatically reposition within the proper stroke time. This Surveillance does not require any testing or valve manipulation. Rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. The 31 day Frequency is appropriate because the valves are operated under administrative control, and an improper valve position would only affect a single train. This Frequency has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.

The Surveillance is modified by a Note which exempts system vent flow paths opened under administrative control. The administrative control should be proceduralized and include stationing a dedicated individual at the system vent flow path who is in continuous communication with the operators in the control room. This individual will have a method to rapidly close the system vent flow path if directed.

SR 3.5.2.3 ECCS piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the EGCS and may also prevent water hammer, pump cavitation, and pumping of noncondensible gas into the reactor vessel.

Selection of ECCS locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations. The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration. Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.

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ECCS - Operating B 3.5.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.2.3 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS The ECCS is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water.

Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. In conjunction with or in lieu of venting, Ultrasonic Testing (UT) may be performed to verify the ECCS pumps and associated piping are sufficiently full of water. The design of the centrifugal charging pump is such that significant noncondensible gases do not collect in the pump. Therefore, it is unnecessary to require periodic pump casing venting to ensure the centrifugal charging pump will remain OPERABLE.

If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump), the Surveillance is not met. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the ECCS is not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.

ECCS locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative sub-set of susceptible locations. Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety.

For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location.

Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY. The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.

The 92 day Frequency takes into consideration the plant specific nature of gas accumulation in the ECCS piping and the procedural controls governing system operation.

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ECCS - Operating B 3.5.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.2.4 REQUIREMENTS (continued) Periodic surveillance testing of ECCS pumps to detect gross degradation caused by impeller structural damage or other hydraulic component problems is required by the ASME Code. This type of testing may be accomplished by measuring the pump developed head at only one point of the pump characteristic curve. The following ECCS pumps are required to develop the indicated differential pressure on recirculation flow:

Centrifugal Charging Pump > 2490 psid Safety Injection Pump >_1468.9 psid RHR Pump >_ 183.6 psid This verifies both that the measured performance is within an acceptable tolerance of the original pump baseline performance and that the performance at the test flow is greater than or equal to the performance assumed in the plant safety analysis. SRs are specified in the applicable portions of the Inservice Testing Program, which encompasses the ASME Code. The ASME Code provides the activities and Frequencies necessary to satisfy the requirements.

SR 3.5.2.5 and SR 3.5.2.6 These Surveillances demonstrate that each automatic ECCS valve actuates to the required position on an actual or simulated SI signal and on an actual or simulated RWST Level Low-Low I Automatic Transfer signal coincident with an SI signal and that each ECCS pump starts on receipt of an actual or simulated SI signal. This Surveillance is not required for valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the required position under administrative controls. The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform these Surveillances under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for unplanned plant transients ifthe Surveillances were performed with the reactor at power.

The 18 month Frequency is also acceptable based on consideration of the design reliability (and confirming operating experience) of the equipment.

The actuation logic is tested as part of ESF Actuation System testing, and equipment performance is monitored as part of the Inservice Testing Program.

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ECCS - Operating B 3.5.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.2.7 REQUIREMENTS (continued) The position of throttle valves in the flow path is necessary for proper ECCS performance. These valves are necessary to restrict flow to a ruptured cold leg, ensuring that the other cold legs receive at least the required minimum flow. The 18 month Frequency is based on the same reasons as those stated in SR 3.5.2.5 and SR 3.5.2.6. The ECCS throttle valves are set to ensure proper flow resistance and pressure drop in the piping to each injection point in the event of a LOCA. Once set, these throttle valves are secured with locking devices and mechanical position stops. These devices help to ensure that the following safety analyses assumptions remain valid: (1) both the maximum and minimum total system resistance; (2) both the maximum and minimum branch injection line resistance; and (3) the maximum and minimum ranges of potential pump performance. These resistances and pump performance ranges are used to calculate the maximum and minimum ECCS flows assumed in the LOCA analyses of Reference 3.

SR 3.5.2.8 This SR requires verification that each ECCS train containment sump inlet is not restricted by debris and the suction inlet strainers show no evidence of structural distress or abnormal corrosion. A visual inspection of the suction inlet piping verifies the piping is unrestricted. A visual inspection of the accessible portion of the containment sump strainer assembly verifies no evidence of structural distress or abnormal corrosion.

Verification of no evidence of structural distress ensures there are no openings in excess of the maximum designed strainer opening. The 18 month Frequency has been found to be sufficient to detect abnormal degradation and is confirmed by operating experience.

REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 35.

2. 10 CFR 50.46.

3. USAR, Sections 6.3 and 15.6.

4. USAR, Chapter 15, "Accident Analysis."

5. NRC Memorandum to V. Stello, Jr., from R.L. Baer, "Recommended Interim Revisions to LCOs for ECCS Components,"

December 1, 1975.

6. IE Information Notice No. 87-01.

Wolf Creek - Unit 1 B3521 B 3.5.2-11 eiin7

ECCS - Operating B 3.5.2 BASES REFERENCES 7. BTP EICSB-18, Application of the Single Failure Criteria to (continued) Manually-Controlled Electrically-Operated Valves.

8. WCAP-9207, "Evaluation of Mispositioned ECCS Valves,"

September 1977.

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ECCS - Shutdown B 3.5.3 B 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)

B 3.5.3 ECCS - Shutdown BASES BACKGROUND The Background section for Bases 3.5.2, "ECCS - Operating," is applicable to these Bases, with the following modifications.

In MODE 4, the required ECCS train consists of two separate subsystems: centrifugal charging (high head) and residual heat removal (RHR) (low head).

The ECCS flow paths consist of piping, valves, heat exchangers, and pumps such that water from the refueling water storage tank (RWST) can be injected into the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) following the accidents described in Bases 3.5.2.

APPLICABLE The Applicable Safety Analyses section of Bases 3.5.2 also applies SAFETY ANALYSES to this Bases section.

Due to the stable conditions associated with operation in MODE 4 and the reduced probability of occurrence of a Design Basis Accident (DBA), the ECCS operational requirements are reduced. It is understood in these reductions that certain automatic safety injection (SI) actuation is not available. In this MODE, sufficient time exists for manual actuation of the required ECCS to mitigate the consequences of a DBA.

For MODE 3, with the accumulators blocked, and MODE 4, the parameters assumed in the generic bounding thermal hydraulic analysis for the limiting DBA (Reference 1) are based on a combination of limiting parameters for MODE 3, with the accumulators blocked, and parameters for MODE 4. However, assumed ECCS availability is based on MODE 4 conditions; the minimum available ECCS flow is calculated assuming only one OPERABLE ECCS train.

Only one tr'ain-of ECCS is required for MODE 4. This requirement dictates that single failures are not considered during this MODE of operation. The ECCS trains satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO In MODE 4, one of the two independent (and redundant) ECCS trains is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that sufficient ECCS flow is available to the core following a DBA.

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.. .. " . . . ' .... EGCS - Shutdown B 3.5.3 BASES LCO In MODE 4, an EGGS train consists of a centrifugal charging subsystem (continued) and an RHR subsystem. Each train includes the piping, instruments, and controls to ensure an OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the RWST and transferring suction to the containment sump.

During an event requiring ECGS actuation, a flow path is required to provide an abundant supply of water from the RWST to the RCS via the EGGS pumps and their respective supply headers to two cold leg injection nozzles. In the long term, this flow path may be switched to take its supply from the containment sump and to deliver its flow to the RCS hot and cold legs. Management of gas voids is important to ECCS OPERABILITY.

This LCO is modified by a Note that allows an RHR train to be considered OPERABLE during alignment and operation for decay heat removal, if capable of being manually realigned (remote or local) to the ECCS mode of operation and not otherwise inoperable. This allows operation in the RHR mode during MODE 4. Only one RHR train is placed into operation to reduce RGS temperature. For an RHR train to be considered OPERABLE during shutdown, the train cannot be placed in service until RCS temperature is less than 225 0 F (plant computer)/21 5 0 F (main control board). For an RHR train to be considered OPERABLE during startup, the train must be isolated from the RCS prior to RCS temperature exceeding 225 0 F (plant computer)/215 °F (main control board).

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the OPERABILITY requirements for EGGS are covered by LCO 3.5.2.

In MODE 4 with RCS temperature below 350°F, one OPERABLE EGGS train is acceptable without single failure consideration, on the basis of the stable reactivity of the reactor and the limited core cooling requirements.

In MODES 5 and 6, plant conditions are such that the probability of an event requiring EGGS injection is extremely low. Gore cooling requirements in MODE 5 are addressed by LGO 3.4.7, "RGS Loops -

MODE 5, Loops Filled," and LCO 3.4.8, "RGS Loops - MODE 5, Loops Not Filled." MODE 6 core cooling requirements are addressed by LGO 3.9.5, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Goolant Girculation - High Water Level," and LGO 3.9.6, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Goolant Girculation - Low Water Level."

AGTIONS A Note prohibits the application of LGO 3.0.4b. to an inoperable EGGS centrifugal charging pump subsystem when entering MODE 4. There is an increased risk associated with entering MODE 4 from MODE 5 with an Wolf Greek - Unit 1 ..-

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Containment Spray and Cooling Systems B 3.6.6 BASES BACKGROUND Containment Coolinq System (continued)

In post accident operation following an actuation signal, the Containment Cooling System fans are designed to start automatically in slow speed if not already running. If running in high (normal) speed, the fans automatically shift to slow speed. The fans are operated at the lower speed during accident conditions to prevent motor overload from the higher mass atmosphere. The temperature of the ESW is an important factor in the heat removal capability of the fan units.

APPLICABLE The Containment Spray System and Containment Cooling System limits SAFETY ANALYSES the temperature and pressure that could be experienced following a DBA.

The limiting DBAs considered are the loss of coolant accident (LOCA) and the steam line break (SLB). The LOCA and SLB are analyzed using computer codes designed to predict the resultant containment pressure and temperature transients. No DBAs are assumed to occur simultaneously or consecutively. The postulated DBAs are analyzed with regards to containment ESF systems, assuming the loss of one ESE bus, which is the worst case single active failure and results in one train of the Containment Spray System and Containment Cooling System being rendered inoperable.

The analysis and evaluation show that under the worst case scenario, the highest peak containment pressure is 51.5 psig and the peak containment temperature is 360.0°F (experienced during an SLB). Both results meet the intent of the design basis. (See the Bases for LCO 3.6.4, "Containment Pressure," and LCO 3.6.5 for a detailed discussion.) The analyses and evaluations assume a unit specific power level ranging to 102%, one containment spray train and one containment cooling train operating, and initial (pre-accident) containment conditions of 120°F and 0 psig. The analyses also assume a response time delayed initiation to provide conservative peak calculated containment pressure and temperature responses.

For certain aspects of transient accident analyses, maximizing the calculated containment pressure is not conservative. In particular, the effectiveness of the Emergency Core Cooling System during the core reflood phase of a LOCA analysis increases with increasing containment backpressure. For these calculations, the containment backpressure is calculated in a manner designed to conservatively minimize, rather than maximize, the calculated transient containment pressures in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix K (Ref. 2).

The effect of an inadvertent containment spray actuation has been analyzed. An inadvertent spray actuation results in a -2.72 psig containment pressure and is associated with the sudden cooling effect in the interior of the leak tight containment. Additional discussion is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.6.4.

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• - "* - Containment SI5ray and Cooling Systems B 3.6.6 BASES APPLICABLE The modeled Containment Spray System actuation from the containment SAFETY ANALYSES analysis is based on a response time associated with exceeding the (continued) containment High-3 pressure setpoint to achieving full flow through the containment spray nozzles.

The Containment Spray System total response time includes diesel generator (DG) startup (for loss of offsite power), sequenced loading of equipment, containment spray pump startup, and spray line filling (Ref. 4).

Containment cooling .train performance for post accident conditions is given in Reference 4. The result of the analysis is that each train can provide 100% of the required peak cooling capacity during the post accident condition. The train post accident cooling capacity under varying containment ambient conditions, required to perform the accident analyses, is also shown in Reference 4.

The modeled Containment Cooling System actuation from the containment analysis is based upon a response time associated with receipt of an SI signal to achieving full Containment Cooling System air and safety grade cooling water flow. The Containment Cooling System total response time of 70 seconds, includes signal delay, OG startup (for loss of offsite power), and Essential Service Water pump startup times and line refill (Ref. 4).

The Containment Spray System and the Containment Cooling System satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO During a DBA, a minimum of one containment cooling train and one containment spray train is required to maintain the containment peak pressure and temperature below the design limits (Ref. 3). Additionally, one containment spray train is also required to remove iodine from the containment atmosphere and maintain concentrations below those assumed in the safety analysis. With the Spray Additive System inoperable, a containment spray train is still available and would remove some iodine from the containment atmosphere in the event of a DBA. To ensure that these requirements are met, two containment spray trains and two containment cooling trains must be OPERABLE. Therefore, in the event of an accident, at least one train in each system operates, assuming the worst case single active failure occurs.

Each Containment Spray System typically includes a spray pump, spray headers, eductor, nozzles, valves, piping, instruments, and controls to ensure an OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the RWST upon an ESF actuation signal and manually transferring to the containment sump. Management of gas voids is important to Containment Spray System OPERABILITY.

A containment cooling train typically includes cooling coils, dampers, two fans, instruments, and controls to ensure an OPERABLE flow path.

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Containment Spray and Cooling Systems B 3.6.6 BASES ACTIONS F.1 (continued)

With two containment spray trains or any combination of three or more containment spray and cooling trains inoperable, the unit is in a condition outside the accident analysis. Therefore, LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.6.1 REQUIREMENTS Verifying the correct alignment' for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the containment spray flow path provides assurance that the proper flow paths will exist for Containment Spray System operation. The correct alignment for the Containment Cooling System valves is provided in SR 3.7.8.1. This SR does not apply to manual vent/drain valves and to valves that cannot be advertently misaligned such as check valves. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since these were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation. Rather, it involves .....

verification, through a system walkdown (which may include the use of local or remote indicators), that those valves outside containment and capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position. The 31 day Frequency is based on engineering judgement, is consistent with administrative controls governing valve operation, and ensures correct valve positions.

The Surveillance is modified by a Note which exempts system vent flow paths opened under administrative control. The administrative control should be proceduralized and include stationing a dedicated individual at the system vent flow path who is in continuous communication with the operators in the control room. This individual will have a method to rapidly close the system vent flow path if directed.

SR 3.6.6.2 Operating each containment cooling train fan unit for > 15 minutes -

ensures that all fan units are OPERABLE. Italso ensures the abnormal conditions or degradation of the fan unit can be detected for corrective action. The 31 day Frequency was developed considering the known reliability of the fan units and controls, the two train redundancy available, and the low probability of significant degradation of the containment cooling train occurring between surveillances. It has also been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.

SR 3.6.6.3 Not Used.

Wolf Creek - Unit IB366-Reion7 B3.6.6-7 Revision 72

... Containment Spray and Cooling Systems B 3.6.6 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.6.4 REQUIREMENTS (continued) Verifying each containment spray pump's developed head at the flow test point is greater than or equal to the required developed head ensures that spray pump performance has not degraded during the cycle. Flow and differential pressure are normal tests of centrifugal pump performance required by the ASME Code (Ref. 5). Since the containment spray pumps cannot be tested with flow through the spray headers, they are tested on recirculation flow. This test confirms one point on the pump design curve and is indicative of overall performance. Such inservice tests confirm component OPERABILITY, trend performance, and detect incipient failures by abnormal performance. The Frequency of the SR is in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program.

This test ensures that each pump develops a differential pressure of greater than or equal to 219 psid at a nominal flow of 300 gpm when on recirculation (Ref. 6).

SR 3.6.6.5 and SR 3.6.6.6 These SRs require verification that each automatic containment spray valve actuates to its correct position and that each containment spray pump starts upon receipt of an actual or simulated actuation of a containment High-3 pressure signal. This Surveillance is not required for valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the required position under administrative controls. The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform these Surveillances under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillances were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillances when performed at the 18 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

The surveillance of containment sump isolation valves is also required by SR 3.5.2.5. A single surveillance may be used to satisfy both requirements.

SR 3.6.6.7 This SR requires verification that each containment cooling train actuates upon receipt of an actual or simulated safety injection signal. Upon actuation, each fan in the train starts in slow speed or, ifoperating, shifts to slow speed and the Cooling water flow rate increases to _> 2000 gpm to each cooler train. The 18 month Frequency is based on engineering judgment and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience. See SR 3.6.6.5 and SR 3.6.6.6, above, for further discussion of the basis for the 18 month Frequency.

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B 3.6.6-8 eiin7

Containment Spray and Cooling Systems B 3.6.6 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.6.8 REQUIREMENTS (continued) With the containment spray inlet valves closed and the spray header drained of any solution, low pressure air or smoke can be blown through test connections. This SR ensures that each spray nozzle is unobstructed and provides assurance that spray coverage of the containment during an accident is not degraded. Due to the passive design of the nozzle, a confirmation of OPERABILITY following maintenance activities that can result in obstruction of spray nozzle flow is considered adequate to detect obstruction of the nozzles. Confirmation that the spray nozzles are unobstructed may be obtained by utilizing foreign material exclusion (FME) controls during maintenance, a visual inspection of the affected portions of the system, or by an air or smoke flow test following maintenance involving opening portions of the system downstream of the containment isolation valves or draining of the filled portions of the system inside containment. Maintenance that could result in nozzle blockage is generally a result of a loss of foreign material control or a flow of borated water through a nozzle. Should either of these events occur, a supervisory evaluation will be required to determine whether nozzle blo0ckage is a possible result of the event. For the loss of FME event, an inspection or flush of the affected portions of the system should be adequate to confirm that the spray nozzles are unobstructed since water flow would be required to transport any debris to the spray nozzles. An air flow or smoke test may not be appropriate for a loss of FME event but may be appropriate for the case where borated water inadvertently flows through the nozzles.

SR 3.6.6.9 Containment Spray System piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the containment spray trains and may also prevent water hammer and pump cavitation.

Selection of Containment Spray System locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations. The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration. Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.

Revision 72 B 3.6.6-9 Wolf Creek Unit I

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B 3.6.6-9 Revision 72

'"; ...... *Containment Sprayi and Cooling Systems B 3.6.6 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.6.9 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS The Containment Spray System is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water. Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump), the Surveillance is not met. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the Containment Spray System is not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met.

Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.

Containment Spray System locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same sYstem flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative sub-set of susceptible locations. Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location. Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY.

The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.

The 92 day Frequency takes into consideration the plant specific nature of gas accumulation in the Containment Spray System piping and the procedural controls governing system operation.

REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 38, GDC 39, GDC 40, GDC 41. GDC 42, and GDC 43, and GDC 50.

2. 10 CFR 50, Appendix K.

3. USAR, Section 6.2.1.

4. USAR, Section 6.2.2.

5. ASME Code for Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants.

6. Performance Improvement Request 2002-0945.

Wolf Creek- Unit 1 B 3.6.6-10 Revision 72

AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES APPLICABLE meeting the design basis of the unit. This results in maintaining at least SAFETY ANALYSES one train of the onsite or offsite AC sources OPERABLE during Accident (continued) conditions in the event of:

a. An assumed loss of all offsite power or all onsite AC power; and

b. A worst case single failure.

The AC sources satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO Two qualified circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E Electrical Power System, separate and independent DGs for each train, and redundant LSELS for each train ensure availability of the required power to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition after an anticipated operational occurrence (AOO) or a postulated DBA.

Each offsite circuit must be capable of maintaining rated frequency and voltage, and accepting required loads during an accident, while connected to the ESF buses.

One offsite circuit consists of the #7 transformer feeding through the 13-48 breaker power the ESE transformer XNB01, which, in turn powers the NB01 bus through its normal feeder breaker. Transformer XNB01 may also be powered from the SL-7 supply through the 13-8 breaker provided the offsite 69 Ky line is not connected to the 345 kV system.

The offsite circuit energizing NB01 is considered inoperable when the East 345 kV bus is only energized from the transmission network through the 345-50 and 345-60 main generator breakers. For this configuration, switchyard breakers 345-120 and 345-90 OR 345-120 and 345-80 are open.

Another offsite circuit consists of the startup transformer feeding through breaker PA201 powering the ESF transformer XNB02, which, in turn powers the NB02 bus through its normal feeder breaker.

Each DG must be capable of starting, accelerating to rated speed and voltage, and connecting to its respective ESF bus on detection of bus undervoltage. This will be accomplished within 12 seconds. Each DG must also be capable of accepting required loads within the assumed loading sequence intervals, and continue to operate until offsite power can be restored to the ESF buses. These capabilities are required to be met from a variety of initial conditions such as DG in standby with the engine hot and DG in standby with the engine at ambient conditions.

Additional DG capabilities must be demonstrated to meet required Surveillance, e.g., capability of the DG to revert to standby status on an ECCS signal while operating in parallel test mode.

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B 3.8.1-3 eiin4 Revision 47

AC sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES LCO Upon failure of the DG lube oil keep warm system when the DO is in the (continued) standby condition, the DO remains OPERABLE if lube oil temperature is

> 115 0F and engine lubrication (i.e., flow of lube oil to the DO engine) is maintained. Upon failure of the DG jacket water keep warm system, the DG remains OPERABLE as long as jacket water temperature is _>105 °F (Ref. 13).

Initiating an EDO start upon a detected undervoltage or degraded voltage condition, tripping of nonessential loads, and proper sequencing of loads, is a required function of LSELS and required for DO OPERABILtITY. In addition, the LSELS Automatic Test Indicator (ATI) is an installed testing aid and is not required to be OPERABLE to support the sequencer function. Absence of a functioning ATI does not render LSELS inoperable.

The AC sources in one train must be separate and independent of the AC sources in the other train. For the D~s, separation and independence are complete. For the offsite AC source, separation and independence are to the extent practical. -

APPLICABILITY The AC sources and LSELS are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 to ensure that:

a. Acceptable fuel design limits and reactor coolant pressure boundary limits are not exceeded as a result of AOOs or abnormal transients; and

b. Adequate core cooling is provided and containment OPERABILITY and other vital functions are maintained in the event of a postulated DBA.

The AC power requirements for MODES 5 and 6 are covered in LCO 3.8.2, "AC Sources - Shutdown."

ACTIONS A Note prohibits the application of LCO 3.0.4b. to an inoperable DG.

There is an increased risk associated with entering a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with an inoperable DO and the provisions of LCO 3.0.4b., which allow entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with the LCO not met after performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, should not be applied in this circumstance.

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..- eiin7 71 Revision

AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.21 REQUIREMENTS (continued) SR 3.8.1.21 is the performance of an ACTUATION LOGIC TEST using the LSELS automatic tester for each load shedder and emergency load sequencer train except that the continuity check does not have to be performed, as explained in the Note. This test is performed every 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS. The Frequency is adequate based on industry operating experience, considering instrument reliability and operating history data.

REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 17.

2. USAR, Chapter 8.

3. Regulatory Guide 1.9, Rev. 3.

4. USAR, Chapter 6.

5. USAR, Chapter 15.

6. Regulatory Guide 1.93, Rev. 0, December 1974.

7. Generic Letter 84-15, "Proposed Staff Actions to Improve and Maintain Diesel Generator Reliability," July 2, 1984.

8. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 18.

9. Regulatory Guide 1.108, Rev. 1, August 1977.

10. Regulatory Guide 1.137, Rev. 0, January 1978.

11. ANSI C84.1-1 982.

12. IEEE Standard 308-1978.

13. Configuration Change Package (CCP) 08052, Revision 1, April 23, 1999.

14.

Amendment No. 161, April 21, 2005.

15. Not used.

16. Amendment No. 163, April 26, 2006.

17. Amendment No. 154, August 4, 2004.

Wolf Creek - Unit 1 B3813 B 3.8.1-33 eiin7 Revision 71

AC Sou~rces - Operating B 3.8.1 BASES REFERENCES 18. Amendment No. 8, May 29, 1987.

(continued)

19. Condition Report 15727.

Woif Creek - Unit 1 B 3.8.1-34

..- 4 eiin4 Revision 47

Inverters - Operating B 3.8.7 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS B 3.8.7 Inverters Operating

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BASES BACKGROUND The inverters are the preferred source of power for the AC vital buses because of the stability and reliability they achieve. The function of the inverter is to provide AC electrical power to the vital buses. The inverters are normally powered from the respective 125 VDC bus. An alternate source of power to the AC vital buses is provided from Class 1E bypass constant voltage transformers. The battery bus provides an uninterruptible power source for the instrumentation and controls for the Reactor Protection System (RPS) and the Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS). There are two required inverters per train.

Two spare inverters (one per train) are provided for alignment to the 120 VAC vital bus when an associated inverter is taken out of service. If the spare inverter is placed in service, requirements of independence and redundancy between trains are maintained. Specific details on inverters and their operating characteristics are found in the USAR, Chapter 8 (Ref. 1).

APPLICABLE The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident (DBA) and transient SAFETY ANALYSES analyses in the USAR, Chapter 6 (Ref. 2) and Chapter 15 (Ref. 3),

assume Engineered Safety Feature systems are OPERABLE. The inverters are designed to provide the required capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to the RPS and ESFAS instrumentation and controls so that the fuel, Reactor Coolant System, and containment design limits are not exceeded. These limits are discussed in more detail in the Bases for Section 3.2, Power Distribution Limits; Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant System (RCS); and Section 3.6, Containment Systems.

The OPERABILITY of the inverters is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and is based on meeting the design basis of the unit. This includes maintaining required AC vital buses OPERABLE during accident conditions in the event of:

a. An assumed loss of all offsite AC electrical power or all onsite AC electrical power; and

b. A worst case single failure.

Inverters satisfy Criterion 3 of the 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

Wolf Creek- Unit 1 ..-

B 3.8.7-1 eiin6 69 Revision

Inverters -"Operating B 3.8.7 BASES LCO The inverters ensure the availability of AC electrical power for the systems instrumentation required to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition after an anticipated operational occurrence (AQO) or a postulated DBA.

Maintaining the required inverters OPERABLE ensures that the redundancy incorporated into the design of the RPS and ESFAS instrumentation and controls is maintained. The four inverters (two per train) ensure an uninterruptible supply of AC electrical power to the AC vital buses even if the 4.16 kV safety buses are de-energized.

OPERABLE inverters require the associated vital bus to be powered by the inverter with output voltage within tolerances, and power input to the inverter from the 125 VDC battery bus of the same separation group.

The required inverters/AC vital buses are associated with the AC load group subsystems (Train A and Train B) as follows:

TRAIN A TRAIN B Bus NN01 Bus NN03 Bus NN02 Bus NN04 energized from energized from energized from energized from Invert. NN11 Invert. NN13 Invert. NN12 Invert. NN14 orNNl15 or NN 15 or NNl16 or NNl16 connected to connected to connected to connected to DC bus NK01 DC bus NK03 DC bus NK02 DC bus NK04 APPLICABILITY The inverters are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 to ensure that:

a. Acceptable fuel design limits and reactor coolant pressure boundary limits are not exceeded as a result of AOOs or abnormal transients; and

b. Adequate core cooling is provided, and containment OPERABILITY and other vital functions are maintained in the event of a postulated DBA.

Inverter requirements for MODES 5 and 6 are covered in the Bases for LCO 3.8.8, "Inverters - Shutdown."

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B 3.8.7-2 eiin6 Revision 69

Inverters - Operating B 3.8.7 BASES ACTIONS A.1 With a required inverter inoperable, its associated AC vital bus is inoperable until it is re-energized from its bypass constant voltage transformer or the bypass constant voltage transformer of the respective spare inverter. The bypass constant voltage transformers are powered from a Class 1 E bus.

For this reason a Note has been included in Condition A requiring the entry into the Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.9, "Distribution Systems - Operating," with any vital bus de-energized. This ensures that the vital bus is re-energized within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

Required Action A.1 allows 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to fix the inoperable inverter or place the associated train spare inverter in service. The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> limit is based upon engineering judgment, taking into consideration the time required to repair an inverter and the additional risk to which the unit is exposed because of the inverter inoperability. This has to be balanced against the risk of an immediate shutdown, along with the potential challenges to safety systems such a shutdown might entail. When the AC vital bus is powered from its bypass constant voltage transformer, it is relying upon interruptible AC electrical power sources (offsite and onsite). The uninterruptible inverter source to the AC vital buses is the preferred source for powering instrumentation trip setpoint devices.

B.1 and B.2 If the inoperable devices or components cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the unit must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and to MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.7.1 REQUIREMENTS This Surveillance verifies that the inverters are functioning properly with all required circuit breakers closed and AC vital buses energized from the inverter. The verification of proper voltage output ensures that the required power is readily available for the instrumentation of the RPS and ESFAS connected to the AC vital buses. The 7 day Frequency takes into account the redundant capability of the inverters and other indications available in the control room that alert the operator to inverter malfunctions.

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Inverter's - Operating B 3.8.7 BASES REFERENCES 1. USAR, Chapter 8.

2. USAR, Chapter 6.

3. USAR, Chapter 15.

Wolf Creek - Unit 1 B3874Rvso B3.8.7-4 Revision 0

Inverters - Shutdown B 3.8.8 BASES APPLICABLE distribution systems are available and reliable. When portions of the SAFETY ANALYSES Class 1 E power or distribution systems are not available (usually as a (continued) result of maintenance or modifications), other reliable power sources or distribution are used to provide the needed electrical support. The plant staff assesses these alternate power sources and distribution systems to assure that the desired level of minimal risk is maintained (frequently referred to as maintaining a desired defense in depth). The level of detail involved in the assessment will vary with the significance of the equipment being supported. In some cases, prepared guidelines are used which include controls designed to manage risk and retain the desired defense in depth.

The inverters satisfy Criterion 3 of the 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO One train of inverters is required to be OPERABLE to support one train of the onsite Class 1E AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystems required by LCO 3.8.10, "Distribution Systems - Shutdown." The required train of inverters (Train A or Train B) consists of two AC vital buses energized from the associated inverters with each inverter connected to the respective DC bus. Each train includes one spare inverter that can be aligned to power either AC vital bus in its associated load group. Each spare inverter shall be powered from the 125 VDC bus in the separation group to which the spare inverter is connected. The inverters ensure the availability of electrical power for the instrumentation for systems required to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition after an anticipated operational occurrence or a postulated DBA. The battery powered inverters provide uninterruptible supply of AC electrical power to the AC vital buses even ifthe 4.16 kV safety buses are de-energized.

OPERABILITY of the inverters requires that the AC vital bus be powered by the inverter. This ensures the availability of sufficient inverter power sources to operate the unit in a safe manner and to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g., fuel handling accidents).

The required AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystem is supported by one train of inverters. When the second (subsystem) of AC vital bus electrical power distribution is needed to support redundant required systems, equipment and components, the second train may be energized from any available source. The available source must be Class 1E or another reliable source. The available source must be capable of supplying sufficient AC electrical power such that the redundant components are capable of performing their specified safety function(s)

(implicitly required by the definition of OPERABILITY). Otherwise, the supported components must be declared inoperable and the appropriate conditions of the LCOs for the redundant components must be entered.

Wolf Creek - Unit 1B388-Reion6 B3.8.8-3 Revision 69

Inverters - Shutdown B 3.8.8 BASES APPLICABILITY The inverters required to be OPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6 provide assurance that:

a. Systems to provide adequate coolant inventory makeup are available for the irradiated fuel in the core;

b. Systems needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident are available;

c. Systems necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available; and

d. Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown condition or refueling condition.

Inverter requirements for MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 are covered in LCO 3.8.7.

ACTIONS LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable while in MODE 5 or 6. However, since irradiated fuel assembly movement can occur in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, the ACTIONS have been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 5 or 6, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Entering LCO 3.0.3, while in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4 would require the unit to be shutdown unnecessarily.

A.1, A.2.1. A.2.2. A.2.3. and A.2.4 By the allowance of the option to declare required features inoperable with the associated inverter(s) inoperable, appropriate restrictions will be implemented in accordance with the affected required features LCOs' Required Actions. In many instances, this option may involve undesired administrative efforts. Therefore, the allowance for sufficiently conservative actions is~made-(i.e., to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, and operations involving positive reactivity additions that could result in loss of required SDM (MODE 5) of LCO 3.1.1 or boron concentration (MODE 6) of LCO 3.9.1). Suspending positive reactivity additions that could result in failure to meet the minimum SDM or boron concentration limit is required to assure continued safe operation. Introduction of coolant inventory must be from sources that have a boron concentration greater than that required in the RCS for minimum SDM or refueling boron concentration. This may result in an overall reduction in RCS boron concentration, but provides acceptable Wolf Creek - Unit 1B388-Reion5 B 3.8.8-4 Revision 57

Inverters - Shutdown B 3.8.8 BAS ES ACTIONS A.1, A.2.1, A.2.2, A.2.3. and A.2.4 (continued) margin to maintaining subcritical operation. Introduction of temperature changes, including temperature increases when operating with a positive MTC, must also be evaluated to ensure they do not result in a loss of required SDM.

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition. These actions minimize the probability of the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required inverters and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary inverter power to the unit safety systems.

The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required inverters should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time the unit safety systems may be without power or powered from a bypass constant voltage transformer.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.8.1 REQUIREMENTS This Surveillance verifies that the inverters are functioning properly with all required circuit breakers closed and AC vital buses energized from the inverter. The verification of proper voltage output ensures that the required power is readily available for the instrumentation connected to the AC vital buses. The 7 day Frequency takes into account the redundant capability of the inverters and other indications available in the control room that alert the operator to inverter malfunctions.

REFERENCES 1. USAR, Chapter 6.

2. USAR, Chapter 15.

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Distribution Systems - Operating B 3.8.9 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS B 3.8.9 Distribution Systems Operating

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BASES BACKGROUND The onsite Class 1E AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution systems are divided by train into two redundant and independent AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystems as defined in Table B 3.8.9-1. Train A is associated with AC load group 1; Train B, with AC load group 2.

The AC electrical power subsystem for each train consists of an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) 4.16 kV bus and 480 buses and load centers. Each 4.16 kV ESE bus has one separate and independent offsite source of power as well as a dedicated onsite diesel generator (DG) source. Each 4.16 kV ESE bus is normally connected to a preferred offsite source. After a loss of the preferred offsite power source to a 4.16 kV ESF bus, the onsite emergency DG supplies power to the bus.

Control power for the 4.16 kV breakers is supplied from the Class 1E batteries. Additional description of this system may be found in the Bases for LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources - Operating," and the Bases for LCO 3.8.4, "DC Sources - Operating."

The 120 VAC vital buses are arranged in two load groups per train and are normally powered through the inverters from the 125 VDC electrical power subsystem. Refer to Bases B 3.8.7 for further information on the 120 VAC vital system.

The 125 VDC electrical power distribution system is arranged into two buses per train. Refer to Bases B 3.8.4 for further information on the 125 VDC electrical power subsystem.

The list of all required distribution buses is presented in Table B 3.8.9-1.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES The initial inconditions ainalyses the-USAR,of Chapter Design Basis 6 (Ref.Accident 1), and (DBA) and transient in the USAR, Chapter 15 (Ref. 2), assume ESF systems are OPERABLE. The AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution systems are designed to provide sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, Reactor Coolant System, and containment design limits are not exceeded. These limits are discussed in more detail in the Bases for Section 3.2, Power Wolf Creek - Unit 1 ..-

B 3.8.9-1 eiin5 Revision 54

.... Distribution Systems - Operating B 3.8.9 BASES APPLICABLE Distribution Limits; Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant System (RCS); and SAFETY ANALYSES Section 3.6, Containment Systems.

(continued)

The OPERABILITY of the AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution systems is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and is based upon meeting the design basis of the unit.

This includes maintaining power distribution systems OPERABLE during accident conditions in the event of:

a. An assumed loss of all offsite power or all onsite AC electrical power; and

b. A worst case single failure.

The distribution systems satisfy Criterion 3 of the 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO The required power distribution subsystems listed in Table B 3.8.9-1 ensure the availability of AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power for the systems required to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition after an anticipated operational occurrence (AOO) or a postulated DBA. The AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystems are required to be OPERABLE.

Maintaining the Train A and Train B AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystems OPERABLE ensures that the redundancy incorporated into the design of ESF is not defeated. Therefore, a single failure within any system or within the electrical power distribution subsystems will not prevent safe shutdown of the reactor.

OPERABLE AC electrical power distribution subsystems require the associated buses and load centers to be energized to their proper voltages. OPERABLE DC electrical power distribution subsystems require the associated buses to be energized to their proper voltage from either the associated battery or charger. OPERABLE vital bus electrical power distribution subsystems require the associated buses to be energized to their proper voltage from the associated inverter via inverted DC voltage, or bypass constant voltage transformer.

In addition, no tie breakers between redundant safety related AC, DC, and AC vital bus power distribution subsystems exist. This prevents any electrical malfunction in any power distribution subsystem from propagating to the redundant subsystem, that could cause the failure of a redundant subsystem and a loss of essential safety function(s).

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..- eiin6 69 Revision

Distribution Systems - Operating B 3.8.9 BASES ACTIONS C.1 (continued) status within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> by powering the bus from the associated inverter via inverted DC or bypass constant voltage transformer. The required AC vital bus may also be restored to OPERABLE status through alignment to the spare inverter powered from the 125 VDC bus in the same separation group.

Condition C represents one AC vital bus without power; potentially both the DC source and the associated AC source are nonfunctioning. In this situation, the unit is significantly more vulnerable to a complete loss of all noninterruptible power. It is, therefore, imperative that the operator's attention focus on stabilizing the unit, minimizing the potential for loss of power to the remaining vital buses and restoring power to the affected vital bus.

This 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> limit is more conservative than Completion Times allowed for the vast majority of components that are without adequate vital AC power.

Taking exceptionto LCO 3.0.2 for components without adequate vital AC power, that would have the Required Action Completion Times shorter than 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> if declared inoperable, is acceptable because of:

a. The potential for decreased safety by requiring a change in unit conditions (i.e., requiring a shutdown) and not allowing stable operations to continue;

b. The potential for decreased safety by requiring entry into numerous applicable Conditions and Required Actions for components without adequate vital AC power and not providing sufficient time for the operators to perform the necessary evaluations and actions for restoring power to the affected train; and

c. The potential for an event in conjunction with a single failure of a redundant component.

The 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> Completion Time takes into account the importance to safety of restoring the AC vital bus to OPERABLE status, the redundant capability afforded by the other OPERABLE vital buses, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

The second Completion Time for Required Action C.1 establishes a limit on the maximum allowed for any combination of required distribution subsystems to be inoperable during any single contiguous occurrence of failing to meet the LCO. If Condition C is entered while, for instance, an AC bus is inoperable and subsequently returned OPERABLE, the LCO may already have been not met for up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. This could lead to a total of 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />, since initial failure of the LCO, to restore the vital bus distribution system. At this time, an AC train could again become Wolf Creek- Unit IB389-Reion6 B 3.8.9-5 Revision 69

• ....... Distribution Systems - Operating B 3.8.9 BASES ACTIONS C.__I (continued) inoperable, and vital bus distribution restored OPERABLE. This could continue indefinitely.

This Completion Time allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." This will result in establishing the "time zero" at the time the LCO was initially not met, instead of the time Condition B was entered. The 16 hour1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> Completion Time is an acceptable limitation on this potential to fail to meet the LCO indefinitely.

0.1_.

With DC bus(es) in one train inoperable, the remaining DC electrical power distribution subsystems are capable of supporting the minimum safety functions necessary to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, assuming no single failure. The overall reliability is reduced, however, because a single failure in the remaining DC electrical power distribution subsystem could result in the minimum required ESF functions not being supported. Therefore, the required DC buses must be restored to OPERABLE status within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> by powering the bus from the associated battery or charger.

Condition 0 represents one train without adequate DC power; potentially both with the battery significantly degraded and the associated charger nonfunctioning. In this situation, the unit is significantly more vulnerable to a complete loss of all DC power. It is, therefore, imperative that the operator's attention focus on stabilizing the unit, minimizing the potential for loss of power to the remaining trains and restoring power to the affected train.

This 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> limit is more conservative than Completion Times allowed for the vast majority of components that would be without power. Taking Sexception to LCO 3.0.2 for components without adequate DC power,

...which-would have Required Action Completion Times shorter than 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, is acceptable because of:

a. The potential for decreased safety by requiring a change in unit conditions (i.e., requiring a shutdown) while allowing stable operations to continue; Wolf Creek - Unit 1 ..-

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Nuclear Instrumentation B 3.9.3 B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS B 3.9.3 Nuclear Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND The source range neutron flux monitors are used during refueling operations to monitor the core reactivity condition. The installed source range neutron flux monitors are part of the Nuclear Instrumentation System (NIS). These detectors are located external to the reactor vessel and detect neutrons leaking from the core. There are two sets of source range neutron flux monitors: (1) Westinghouse source range neutron flux monitors and (2) Gamma-Metrics source range neutron flux monitors.

The Westinghouse source range neutron flux monitors (SE-NI-0031 and SE-NI1-0032) are BE3 detectors operating in the proportional region of the gas filled detector characteristic curve. The detectors monitor the neutron flux in counts per second. The instrument range covers six decades of neutron flux (1 to 1 E+6 cps). The detectors also provide continuous visual indication in the control room. The NIS is designed in accordance with the criteria presented in Reference 1.

The Gamma-Metrics source range neutron flux monitors (SE-NI-0060A and SE-NIl-0061A) are fission chambers that provide indication over six decades of neutron flux (1E-1 to 1E+5 cps). The monitors provide continuous visual indication in the control room to allow operators to monitor core flux.

APPLICABLE Two OPERABLE source range neutron flux monitors are required to SAFETY ANALYSES provide a signal to alert the operator to unexpected changes in core reactivity such as an improperly loaded fuel assembly.

The source range neutron flux monitors satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50 .36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO This LCO requires that two source range neutron flux monitors be OPERABLE to ensure that redundant monitoring capability is available to detect changes in core reactivity. To be OPERABLE, each monitor must provide visual indication in the control room.

When any of the safety related busses supplying power to one of the detectors (SE-NI-31 or 32) associated with the Westinghouse source range neutron flux monitors are taken out of service, the corresponding source range neutron flux monitor may be considered OPERABLE when its detector is powered from a temporary nonsafety related source of Wolf Creek - Unit 1B393-Reion6 B3.9.3-1 Revision 68

Nuclear Instrumentation B 3.9.3 BASES LCO power, provided the detector for the opposite source range neutron flux (continued) monitor is powered from its normal source. (Ref. 2) This allowance to power a detector from a temporary non-safety related source of power is also applicable to the Gamma-Metrics source range monitors. (Ref. 4)

The Westinghouse monitors are the normal source range monitors used during refueling activities. The Gamma-Metrics source range monitors provide an acceptable equivalent control room visual indication to the Westinghouse monitors in MODE 6, including CORE ALTERATIONS.

(Ref. 4) Either the set of two Westinghouse source range neutron flux monitors or the set of two Gamma-Metrics source range monitors may be used to perform this reactivity-monitoring function. The use of one BE3 detector and one Gamma-Metrics detector is not permitted due to the importance of using detectors on opposing sides of the core to effectively monitor the core reactivity. (Ref. 3)

APPLICABILITY In MODE 6, the source range neutron flux monitors must be OPERABLE to determine changes in core reactivity. There are no other direct means available to check core reactivity levels. In MODES 2, 3, 4, and 5, these same installed source range detectors and circuitry are also required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.3.1, "Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation."

ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 With only one source range neutron flux monitor OPERABLE, redundancy has been lost. Since these instruments are the only direct means of monitoring core reactivity conditions, CORE ALTERATIONS and introduction into the RCS, coolant with boron concentration less than required to meet the minimum boron concentration of LCO 3.9.1 must be suspended immediately. Suspending positive reactivity additions that could result in failure to meet the minimum boron concentration limit is required to assure continued safe operation. Introduction of coolant inventory must be from sources that have a boron concentration greater-than that required in the RCS for minimum refueling boron concentration.

This may result in an overall reduction in RCS boron concentration, but provides acceptable margin to maintaining subcritical operation.

Performance of Required Action A.1 shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position.

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Nuclear Instrumentation B 3.9.3 BASES ACTIONS B.1 (continued)

With no source range neutron flux monitor OPERABLE action to restore a monitor to OPERABLE status shall be initiated immediately. Once initiated, action shall be continued until a source range neutron flux monitor is restored to OPERABLE status.

B..22 With no source range n~eutron flux monitor OPERABLE, there are no direct means of detecting changes in core reactivity. However, since CORE ALTERATIONS and boron concentration changes inconsistent with Required Action A.2 are not to be made, the core reactivity condition is stabilized until the source range neutron flux monitors are OPERABLE. This stabilized condition is determined by performing SR 3.9.1.1 to ensure that the required boron concentration exists.

~The Completion Time of once per-12 hours is sufficient to obtain and analyze a reactor coolant sample for boron concentration and ensures that unplanned changes in boron concentration would be identified. The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Frequency is reasonable, considering the low probability of a change in core reactivity during this time period.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.9.3.1 REQUIREMENTS SR 3.9.3.1 is the performance of a CHANNEL CHECK, which is a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that the two indication channels should be consistent with core conditions.

Changes in fuel loading and core geometry can result in significant differences between source range channels, but each channel should be consistent with its local conditions.

The Frequency of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> is consistent with the CHANNEL CHECK Frequency specified similarly for the same instruments in LCO 3.3.1.

SR 3.9.3.2 SR 3.9.3.2 is the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION every 18 months. This SR is modified by a Note stating that neutron detectors are excluded from the CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The source range neutron detectors are maintained based on manufacturer's Wolf Creek - Unit 1B393-Reion5 B 3.9.3-3

N uclearlInstrumentation B 3.9.3 BASES TECHNICAL SR 3.9.3.2 (continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS recommendations. The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage. Operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 18 month Frequency.

REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 13, GDC 26, GOC 28, and

. GDC 29.

2. NRC letter (J. Stone to 0. Maynard) dated October 3, 1997:

"Wolf Creek Generating Station - Technical Specification Bases Change, Source Range Nuclear Instruments Power Supply Requirements."

3. Engineering Disposition for WO 11-339015-002, "Changes to TRM 3.3.15," March 21, 2011.

4. PIR 2004-1625, "Gamma-Metrics Detectors for Core Alterations,"

October 5, 2005.

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...RHR and Coolant Circulation - High Water Level B 3.9.5 B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS B 3.9.5 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation - High Water Level BASES BACKGROUND The purpose of the RHR System in MODE 6 is to remove decay heat and sensible heat from the Reactor Coolant System (RCS), as required by GDC 34, to provide mixing of borated coolant and to prevent boron stratification (Ref. 1). Heat is removed from the RCS by circulating reactor coolant through the RHR heat exchanger(s), where the heat is transferred to the Component Cooling Water System. The coolant is then returned to the RCS via the RCS cold leg(s). Operation of the RHR System for normal cooldown or decay heat removal is manually accomplished from the control room. The heat removal rate is adjusted by controlling the flow of reactor coolant through the RHR heat exchanger(s) and the bypass lines. Mixing of the reactor coolant is maintained by this continuous circulation of reactor coolant through the RHR System.

APPLICABLE If the reactor coolant temperature is not maintained below 200°F, boiling SAFETY ANALYSES of the reactor coolant could result. This could lead to a loss of coolant in the reactor vessel. Additionally, boiling of the reactor coolant could lead to boron plating out on components near the areas of the boiling activity.

The loss of reactor coolant and the subsequent plate out of boron would eventually challenge the integrity of the fuel cladding, which is a fission product barrier. One train of the RHR System is required to be operational in MODE 6, with the water level > 23 ft above the top of the reactor vessel flange, to prevent this challenge. The LCO does permit de-energizing the RHR pump for short durations, under the condition that the boron concentration is not diluted. This conditional de-energizing of the RHR pump does not result in a challenge to the fission product barrier.

Although the RHR System does not meet a specific criterion of the NRC Policy Statement, it was identified in 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) as an important contributor to risk reduction. Therefore, the RHR System is retained as a Specification.

LCO Only one RHR loop is required for decay heat removal in MODE 6, with the water level > 23 ft above the top of the reactor vessel flange. Only one RHR loop is required to be OPERABLE, because the volume of water above the reactor vessel flange provides backup decay heat Wolf Creek - Unit 1 ..-

B3.9.5-1 Rvso 0 Revision

• R HR and Coolant Cici*:ulation -High Water Level B 3.9.5 BASES LCO removal capability. At least one RHR loop must be OPERABLE (continued) and in operation to provide:

a. Removal of decay heat;

b. Mixing of borated coolant to minimize the possibility of criticality; and

c. Indication of reactor coolant temperature.

An OPERABLE RHR loop includes an RHR pump, a heat exchanger, valves, piping, instruments, and controls to ensure an OPERABLE flow path and to determine the RCS temperature. The flow path starts in one of the RCS hot legs and is returned to the RCS cold legs. Management of gas voids is important to RHR System OPERABILITY.

The LCO is modified by a Note that allows the required operating RHR loop to be removed from service for up to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> per 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> period, provided no operations are permitted that would dilute the RCS boron concentration with coolant at boron concentrations less than required to meet the minimum boron concentration of LCO 3.9.1. Boron concentration reduction with coolant at boron concentrations less than required to assure the minimum required RCS boron concentration is maintained is prohibited because uniform concentration distribution cannot be ensured without forced circulation. This permits operations such as core mapping or alterations in the vicinity of the reactor vessel hot leg nozzles and RCS to RHR isolation valve testing. During this 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> period, decay heat is removed by natural convection to the large mass of water in the refueling pool.

The acceptability of the LCO and the LCO Note is based on preventing core boiling in the event of the loss of RHR cooling. An evaluation (Ref. 2) was performed which demonstrated that there is adequate flow communication to provide sufficient decay heat removal capability and preclude core uncovery, thus preventing core damage, in the event of a loss of RHR cooling with the reactor cavity filled and the upper internals installed in the reactor vessel.

APPLICABILITY One RHR loop must be OPERABLE and in operation in MODE 6, with the water level >_23 ft above the top of the reactor vessel flange, to provide decay heat removal. The 23 ft water level was selected because it corresponds to the 23 ft requirement established for fuel movement in LCO 3.9.7, "Refueling Pool Water Level." Requirements for the RHR System in other MODES are covered by LCOs in Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant System (RCS), and Section 3.5, Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS). RHR loop requirements in MODE 6 with the water level < 23 ft are located in LCO 3.9.6, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation - Low Water Level."

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RHR and Coolant Circulation - High Water Level B 3.9.5 BASES ACTIONS RHR loop requirements are met by having one RHR loop OPERABLE and in operation, except as permitted in the Note to the LCO.

A.1_

If RHR loop requirements are not met, there will be no forced circulation to provide mixing to establish uniform boron concentrations.

Suspending positive reactivity additions that could result in failure to meet the minimum boron concentration limit of LCO 3.9.1 is required to assure continued safe operation. Introduction of coolant inventory must be from sources that have a boron concentration greater than that required in the RCS for minimum refueling boron concentration. This may result in an overall reduction in RCS boron concentration, but provides acceptable margin to maintaining subcritical operation.

A..22 If RHR loop requirements are not met, actions shall be taken immediately to suspend loading of irradiated fuel assemblies in the core.

With no forced circulation cooling, decay heat removal from the core occurs by natural convection to the heat sink provided by the water above the core. A minimum refueling water level of 23 ft above the reactor vessel flange provides an adequate available heat sink.

Suspending any operation that would increase decay heat load, such as loading a fuel assembly, is a prudent action under this condition.

Performance of Required Action A.2 shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe condition.

A.3 If RHR loop requirements are not met, actions shall be initiated and continued in order to satisfy RHR loop requirements. With the unit in MODE 6 and the refueling water level > 23 ft above the top of the reactor vessel flange, corrective actions shall be initiated immediately.

A.4 If RHR loop requirements are not met, all containment penetrations providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere must be closed within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. With the RHR loop requirements not met, the potential exists for the coolant to boil and release radioactive gas to the containment atmosphere. Closing containment penetrations that are open to the outside atmosphere ensures dose limits are not exceeded.

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B 3.9.5-3 eiin3

........

.. '........RHR and Coolant Circulatiorn- High Water Level B 3.9.5 BASES ACTIONS A.4 (continued)

The Completion Time of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is reasonable, based on the low probability of the coolant boiling in that time.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.9.5.1 REQUIREMENTS This Surveillance demonstrates that the RHR loop is in operation and circulating reactor coolant. The flow rate is determined by the flow rate necessary to provide sufficient decay heat removal capability and to prevent thermal and boron stratification in the core. The Frequency of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> is sufficient, considering the flow, temperature, pump control, and alarm indications available to the operator in the control room for monitoring the RHR System.

SR 3.9.5.2 RHR System piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the RHR loops and may also prevent water hammer, pump cavitation, and pumping of noncondensible gas into the reactor vessel.

Selection of RHR System locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations. The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration. Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.

The RHR System is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water.

Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump),

the Surveillance is not met. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the RHR System is not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.

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..- eiin772 Revision

..... RHR and Coolant Circulation - High Water Level B 3.9.5 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.9.5.2 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS RHR System locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative sub-set of susceptible locations.

Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location. Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY. The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.

The 31 day Frequency takes into consideration the gradual nature of gas accumulation in the RHR System piping and the procedural controls governing system operation.

REFERENCES 1. USAR, Section 5.4.7.

2. SAP-06-1 13, "Loss of RHR Analysis with the Refuel Cavity Flooded and Upper Internals Installed," November 16, 2006.

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- ~RHR and Coolant Circulation - Low Water Level B 3.9.6 B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS B 3.9.6 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation - Low Water Level BASES BACKGROUND The purpose of the RHR System in MODE 6 is to remove decay heat and sensible heat from the Reactor Coolant System (RCS), as required by GOC 34, to provide mixing of borated coolant, and to prevent boron stratification (Ref. 1). Heat is removed from the RCS by circulating reactor coolant through the RHR heat exchangers where the heat is transferred to the Component Cooling Water System. The coolant is then returned to the RCS via the RCS cold leg(s). Operation of the RHR System for normal cooldown decay heat removal is manually accomplished from the control room. The heat removal rate is adjusted by controlling the flow of reactor coolant through the RHR heat exchanger(s) and the bypass lines. Mixing of the reactor coolant is maintained by this continuous circulation of reactor coolant through the RHR System.

APPLICABLE If the reactor coolant temperature is not maintained below 200°F, boiling SAFETY ANALYSES of the reactor coolant could result. This could lead to a loss of coolant in the reactor vessel. Additionally, boiling of the reactor coolant could lead to boron plating out on components near the areas of the boiling activity.

The loss of reactor coolant and the subsequent plate out of boron will eventually challenge the integrity of the fuel cladding, which is a fission product barrier. Two trains of the RHR System are required to be OPERABLE, and one train in operation, in order to prevent this challenge.

Although the RHR System does not meet a specific criterion of the NRC Policy Statement, it was identified in 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) as an important contributor to risk reduction. Therefore, the RHR System is retained as a Specification.

In MODE 6, with the water level <23 ft above the top of the reactor LCO vessel flange, both RHR loops must be OPERABLE.

Additionally, one loop of RHR must be in operation in order to provide:

a. Removal of decay heat;

b. Mixing of borated coolant to minimize the possibility of criticality; and Wolf Creek - Unit 1 ..-

B3.9.6-1 Rvso 0 Revision

...- RHR and Coolant Circulation - Low Walter LeVel B 3.9.6 BASES LCO c. Indication of reactor coolant temperature.

(continued)

An OPERABLE RHR loop consists of an RHR pump, a heat exchanger, valves, piping, instruments and controls to ensure an OPERABLE flow path and to determine the RCS temperature. The flow path starts in one of the RCS hot legs and is returned to the RCS cold legs. An OPERABLE RHR loop must be capable of being realigned to provide an OPERABLE flow path. Management of gas voids is important to RHR System OPERABILITY.

When both RHR loops (or trains) are required to be OPERABLE, the associated Component Cooling Water (CCW) train is required to be OPERABLE. The heat sink for the CCW System is normally provided by the Service Water System or Essential Service Water (ESW) System, as determined by system availability. In MODES 5 and 6, one Diesel Generator (DG) is required to be OPERABLE per LCO 3.8.2, "AC Sources

- Shutdown." The same ESW train is required to be capable of performing its related support function(s) to support DG OPERABILITY.

However, a Service Water train can be utilized to support CCW/RHR OPERABILITY if the associated ESW train is not capable of performing its related support function(s).

APPLICABILITY Two must RHR be inloops are required operation in MODEto6,bewith OPERABLE, and one the water level RHR loop

< 23 ft above the top of the reactor vessel flange, to provide decay heat removal.

Requirements for the RHR System in other MODES are covered by LCOs in Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant System (RCS), and Section 3.5, Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS). RHR loop requirements in MODE 6 with the water level >_23 ft are located in LCO 3.9.5, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation - High Water Level."

Since LCO 3.9.6 contains Required Actions with immediate Completion Times related to the restoration of the degraded decay heat removal function, it is not permitted to enter this LCO from either MODE 5 or from LCO 3.9.5, "RHR and Coolant Circulation - High Water Level,"

unless the requirements of LCO 3.9.6 are met. This precludes diminishing the backup decay heat removal capability when the RHR System is degraded.

ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 If less than the required number of RHR loops are OPERABLE, action shall be immediately initiated and continued until the RHR loop is restored to OPERABLE status and to operation in accordance with the LCO or until > 23 ft of water level is established above the reactor Wolf Creek- Unit 1 ..-

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...... RHR-and Coolant Circulation - Low Water Level B 3.9.6 BASES ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 (continued) vessel flange. When the water level is > 23 ft above the reactor vessel flange, the Applicability changes to that of LCO 3.9.5, and only one RHR loop is required to be OPERABLE and in operation. An immediate Completion Time is necessary for an operator to initiate corrective actions.

B.1 If no RHR loop is in operation, there will be no forced circulation to provide mixing to establish uniform boron concentrations. Suspending positive reactivity additions that could result in failure to meet the minimum boron concentration limit of LCO 3.9.1 is required to assure continued safe operation. Introduction of coolant inventory must be from sources that have a boron concentration greater than that required in the RCS for minimum refueling boron concentration. This may result in an overall reduction in RCS boron concentration, but provides acceptable margin to maintaining subcritical operation.

B.2 If no RHR loop is in operation, actions shall be initiated immediately, and continued, to restore one RHR loop to operation. Since the unit is in Conditions A and B concurrently, the restoration of two OPERABLE RHR loops and one operating RHR loop should be accomplished expeditiously.

B.3 If no RHR loop is in operation, all containment penetrations providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere must be closed within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. With the RHR loop requirements not met, the potential exists for the coolant to boil and release radioactive gas to the containment atmosphere. Closing containment penetrations that are open to the outside atmosphere ensures that dose limits are not exceeded.

The Completion Time of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is reasonable at water levels above reduced inventory, based on the low probability of the coolant boiling in that time. At reduced inventory conditions, additional actions are taken to provide containment closure in a reduced period of time (Reference 2). Reduced inventory is defined as RCS level lower than 3 feet below the reactor vessel.

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"'* ........... RHRand Coo~lant Circulation -Lbw Water Level B 3.9.6 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.9.6.1 REQUIREMENTS This Surveillance demonstrates that one RHR loop is in operation and circulating reactor coolant. The flow rate is determined by the flow rate necessary to provide sufficient decay heat removal capability and to prevent thermal and boron stratification in the core. The Frequency of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> is sufficient, considering the flow, temperature, pump control,and alarm indications available to the operator for monitoring the RHR System in the control room.

SR 3.9.6.2 Verification that the required pump is OPERABLE ensures that an additional RHR pump can be placed in operation, if needed, to maintain decay heat removal and reactor coolant circulation. Verification is performed by verifying proper breaker alignment and power available to the required pump. The Frequency of 7 days is considered reasonable in view of other administrative controls available and has been shown to be acceptable by operating experience.

SR 3.9.6.3 RHR System piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the RHR loops and may also prevent water hammer, pump cavitation, and pumping of noncondensible gas into the reactor vessel.

Selection of RHR System locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations. The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration. Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.

Wolf Creek - Unit 1 B 3.9.6-4

..- eiin772 Revision

• ..... ...... RHR and Coolant Circulation - Low Water Level B 3.9.6 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.9.6.3. (continued)

REQUIREMENTS The RHR System is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water.

Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump),

the Surveillance is not met. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the RHR System is not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.

RHR System locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be

- "*.....verified by monitoring a representative sub-set of susceptible locations.

Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location. Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY. The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.

The 31 day Frequency takes into consideration the gradual nature of gas accumulation in the RHR System piping and the procedural controls governing system operation.

1. USAR, Section 5.4.7.

2. Generic Letter No. 88-17, "Loss of Decay Heat Removal."

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TAB - Title Page Technical Specification Cover Page Title Page TAB - Table of Contents i34 DRR 07-1 057 7/10/07 ii 29 DRR 06-1984 10/17/06 iii 44 DRR 09-1744 10/28/09 TAB - B 2.0 SAFETY LIMITS (SLs)

B 2.1.1-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 2.1.1-2 14 D RR 03-0102 2/12/03 B 2.1.1-3 14 DRRO03-0102 2/12/03 B 2.1.1-4 0 Amend. No. 123 2/12/03 B 2.1.2-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 2.1.2-2 12 DRR 02-1062 9/26/02 B 2.1.2-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 TAB - B 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILTY B 3.0-1 34 ... . DRR 07-1057 7/10/07 B 3.0-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.0-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.0-4 19 DRRO04-1414 10/12/04 B 3.0-5 19 DRRO04-1414 10/12/04 B 3.0-6 19 DRR 04-1414 10/12/04 B 3.0-7 19 DRRO04-1414 10/12/04 B 3.0-8 19 DRRO04-1414 10/12/04 B 3.0-9 42 DRR 09-1009 7/16/09 B 3.0-10 42 DRR 09-1 009 7/16/09 B 3.0-11 34 DRR 07-1057 7/10/07 B 3.0-12 34 DRR 07-1057 7/10/07 B 3.0-13 34 DRRO07-1057 7/10/07 B 3.0-14 34 DRR 07-1057 7/10/07 B 3.0-15 34 DRR 07-1057 7/10/07 B 3.0-16 34 DRR 07-1 057 7/10/07 TAB -B 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS B 3.1.1-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.1-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.1-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.1-4 19 DRR 04-1414 10/12/04 B 3.1.1-5 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.2-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.2-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.2-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.2-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.2-5 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.3-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.3-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.3-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.3-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 Wolf Creek- Unit 1 eiin7 73 Revision

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TAB - B 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS (continued)

B 3.1.3-5 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.3-6 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.4-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.4-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.4-3 48 DRR 10-3740 12/28/10 B 3.1.4-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.4-5 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.4-6 48 DRR 10-3740 12/28/10 B 3.1.4-7 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.4-8 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.4-9 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.5-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.5-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.5-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.5-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.6-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.6-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.6-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.6-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.6-5 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.6-6 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.7-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.7-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.7-3 48 DRR 10-3740 12/28/10 B 3.1.7-4 48 DRR 10-3740 12/28/10 B 3.1.7-5 48 DRR 10-3740 12/28/10 B 3.1.7-6 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.8-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.8-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.1.8-3 15 DRR 03-0860 7/10/03 8 3.1.8-4 15 DRR 03-0860 7/10/03 B 3.1.8-5 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 8 3.1.8-6 5 DRR 00-1427 10/12/00 TAB - B 3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS B 3.2.1-1 48 DRR 10-3740 12/28/10 B 3.2.1-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.2.1-3 48 DRR 10-3740 12/28/10 B 3.2.1-4 48 DRR 10-3740 12/28/10 B 3.2.1-5 48 DRR 10-3740 12/28/10 B 3.2.1-6 48 DRR 10-3740 12/28/10 B 3.2.1-7 48 DRR 10-3740 12/28/10 8 3.2.1-8 48 DRR 10-3740 12/28/10 B 3.2.1-9 29 DRR 06-1984 10/17/06 B 3.2.1-10 70 DRR 15-0944 4/28/15 B 3.2.2-1 48 DRR 10-3740 12/28/10 B 3.2.2-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.2.2-3 48 DRR 10-3740 12/28/10 B 3.2.2-4 48 DRR 10-3740 12/28/10 B 3.2.2-5 48 DRR 10-3740 12/28/10 B 3.2.2-6 70 DRR 15-0944 4/28/15 Wolf Creek - Unit 1 iiiRviin7 Revision 73

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TAB - B 3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS (continued)

B 3.2.3-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.2.3-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.2.3-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.2.4-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.2.4-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.2.4-3 48 DRR 10-3740 12/28/10 B 3.2.4-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.2.4-5 48 DRR 10-3740 12/28/10 B 3.2.4-6 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.2.4-7 48 DRR 10-3740 12/28/10 TAB - B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.1-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.1-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.1-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.1-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.1-5 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.1-6 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3:3.1-7 5" DRR 00-1427 10/12/00 -

B 3.3.1-8 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.1-9 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.1-10 29 DRR 06-1984 10/17/06 B 3.3.1-11 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.1-12 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.1-13 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.1-14 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.1-15 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.1-16 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.1-17 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.1-18 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.1-19 66 DRR 14-2329 11/6/14 B 3.3.1-20 66 DRR 14-2329 11/6/14 B 3.3.1-21 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.1-22 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.1-23 9 DRR 02-0123 2/28/02 B 3.3.1-24 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.1-25 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.1-27 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.1-28 2 DRR 00-0147 4/24/00 B 3.3.1-29 1 DRR 99-1 624 12/18/99 B 3.3.1-30 1 DRR 99-1 624 12/18/99 B 3.3.1-31 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.1-32 20 DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3.1-33 48 DRR 10-3740 12/28/10 B 3.3.1-34 20 DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3.1-35 19 DRR 04-1414 10/13/04 B 3.3.1-36 20 DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3.1-37 20 DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3.1-38 20 DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3.1-39 25 DRR 06-0800 5/18/06 Wolf Creek - Unit 1 i iii eiin7 Revision73

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TAB - B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION (continued)

B 3.3.1-40 20 DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3.1-41 20 DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3.1-42 20 DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3.1-43 20 DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3.1-44 20 DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3.1-45 20 DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3.1-46 48 DRR 10-3740 12/28/10 B 3.3.1-47 20 DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3.1-48 48 DRR 10-3740 12/28/10 B 3.3.1-49 20 DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3.1-50 20 DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3.1-51 21 DRR 05-0707 4/20/0 5 B 3.3,1-52 20 DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3.1-53 20 DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3.1-54 20 DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3.1-55 25 DRR 06-0800 5/18/06 B 3.3.1-56 66 DRR 14-2329 11/6/14 B 3.3.1-57 20 DRR 04-1 533 2/16/05 B 3.3.1-58 29 DRR 06-1 984 10/17/06 B 3.3.1-59 20 DRR 04-1 533 2/16/05 B 3.3.2-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.2-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.2-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.2-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.2-5 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.2-6 7 DRR 01-0474 5/1/101 B 3.3.2-7 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.2-8 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.2-9 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.2-10 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.2-11 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.2-12 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.2-13 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.2-14 2 DRR 00-0 147 4/24/00 B 3.3.2-15 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.2-16 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.2-17 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B] 3.3.2-18 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.2-19 37 DRR 08-0503 4/8/08 B] 3.3.2-20 37 DRR 08-0503 4/8/08 B] 3.3.2-21 37 DRR 08-0503 4/8/08 B] 3.3.2-22 37 DRR 08-0503 4/8/08 B] 3.3.2-23 37 DRR 08-0503 4/8/08 B] 3.3.2-24 39 DRR 08-1096 8/28/08 B] 3.3.2-25 39 DRR 08-1096 8/2 8/08 B 3.3.2-26 39 DRR 08-1096 8/28/08 B] 3.3.2-27 37 DRR 08-0503 4/8/08 B] 3.3.2-28 37 DRR 08-0503 4/8/08 B] 3.3.2-29 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B] 3.3.2-30 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.2-3 1 52 DRR 11-0724 4/11/11 Wolf Creek - Unit 1 vRviin7 iv Revision 73

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TAB - B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION (continued)

B 3.3.2-32 52 DRR 11-0724 4/11/11 B 3.3.2-33 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.2-34 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.2-35 20 DRR 04-1 533 2/16/05 B 3.3.2-36 20 DRR 04-1 533 2/16/05 B] 3.3.2-37 20 DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3.2-38 20 DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3.2-39 25 DRR 06-0800 5/18/06 B 3.3.2-40 20 DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3.2-41 45 Amend. No. 187 (ETS) 3/5/10 B 3.3.2-42 45 Amend. No. 187 (ETS) 3/5/10 B 3.3.2-43 20 DRR 04-1 533 2/16/05 B 3.3.2-44 20 DRR 04-1 533 2/16/05 B] 3.3.2-45 20 DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B] 3.3.2-46 54 DRR 11-2394 11/16/111 B 3.3.2-47 43 DRR 09-1416 9/2/09 B] 3.3.2-48 37 DRR 08-0503 4/8/08 B 3.3.2-49 20 DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3..2-50 20- DRR 04-1533 2/16/05 B 3.3.2-51 43 DRR 09-1416 9/2/09 B 3.3.2-52 43 DRR 09-1416 9/2/09 B 3.3.2-53 43 DRR 09-1416 9/2/09 B 3.3.2-54 43 DRR 09-1416 9/2/09 B 3.3.2-55 43 DRR 09-1416 9/2/09 B 3.3.2-56 43 DRR 09-1416 9/2/0 9 B 3.3.2-57 43 DRR 09-1416 9/2/09 B] 3.3.3-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.3-2 5 DRR 00-1427 10/12/00 B 3.3.3-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B] 3.3.3-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.3-5 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B] 3.3.3-6 8 DRR 01-1235 9/19/01 B] 3.3.3-7 21 DRR 05-0707 4/20/05 B 3.3.3-8 8 DRR 01-1235 9/19/01 B 3.3.3-9 8 DRR 01-1235 9/19/01 B 3.3.3-10 19 DRR 04-1414 10/12/04 B] 3.3.3-11 19 DRR 04-1414 10/12/04 B 3.3.3-12 21 DRR 05-0707 4/20/05 B 3.3.3-13 21 DRR 05-0707 4/20/05 B] 3.3.3-14 8 DRR 01-1235 9/19/01 B 3.3.3-15 8 DRR 01-1235 9/19/01 B] 3.3.4-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.4-2 9 DRR 02-1023 2/28/02 B] 3.3.4-3 15 DRR 03-0860 7/10/03 B 3.3.4-4 19 DRR 04-1414 10/12/04 B] 3.3.4-5 1 DRR 99-1624 12/18/99 B 3.3.4-6 9 DRR 02-0123 2/28/02 B 3.3.5-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.5-2 1 DRR 99-1624 12/18/99 B 3.3.5-3 1 DRR 99-1624 12/18/99 Wolf Creek - Unit 1 V eiin7 Revision 73

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TAB - B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION (continued)

B 3.3.5-4 1 DRR 99-1 624 12/18/99 B 3.3.5-5 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.5-6 22 DRR 05-1 375 6/28/05 B 3.3.5-7 22 DRR 05-1375 6/28/05 B 3.3.6-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.6-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.6-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.6-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.6-5 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.6-6 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.6-7 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.7-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.7-2 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 B 3.3.7-3 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 B 3.3.7-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.7-5 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.7-6 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 B 3.3.7-7 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.7-8 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.8-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.8-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.8-3 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 B 3.3.8-4 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 B 3.3.8-5 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.3.8-6 24 DRR 06-0051 2/28/06 B 3.3.8-7 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 TAB -B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

B 3.4.1-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.1-2 10 DRR 02-0411 4/5/02 B 3.4.1-3 10 DRR 02-0411 4/5/02 B 3.4.1-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.1-5 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.1-6 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.2-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.2-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.2-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.3-1 67 DRR 15-0116 2/10/15 B 3.4.3-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.3-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.3-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.3-5 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.3-6 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.3-7 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.4-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.4-2 29 DRR 06-1 984 10/17/06 B 3.4.4-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.5-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.5-2 53 DRR 11-1513 7/18/11 B 3.4.5-3 29 DRR 06-1 984 10/17/06 B 3.4.5-4 " 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 Wolf Creek - Unit I vvi eiin7 Revision 73

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TAB - B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) (continued)

B 3.4.5-5 12 DRR 02-1 062 9/26/02 B 3.4.5-6 12 DRR 02-1 062 9/26/02 B 3.4.6-1 53 DRR 11-1513 7/18/11 B 3.4.6-2 72 DRR 15-1918 10/26/15 B 3.4.6-3 12 DRR 02-1062 9/26/02 B 3.4.6-4 72 DRR 15-1918 10/26/15 B 3.4.6-5 72 DRR 15-1918 10/26/15 B 3.4.6-6 72 DRR 15-1918 10/26/15 B 3.4.7-1 12 DRR 02-1062 9/26/02 B 3.4.7-2 17 DRR 04-0453 5/26/04 B 3.4.7-3 72 DRR 15-1918 10/26/15 B 3.4.7-4 42 DRR 09-1009 7/16/09 B 3.4.7-5 72 DRR 15-1918 10/26/15 B 3.4.7-6 72 DRR 15-1918 10/26/15 B 3.4.8-1 53 DRR 11-1513 7/18/111 B 3.4.8-2 72 DRR 15-1918 10/26/15 B 3.4.8-3 42 DRR 09-1009 7/16/09 B 3.4.8-4 72 DRR 15-1918 10/26/15 B 3.4.8-5 72 DRR 15-1918 10/26/15 -,

B 3.4.9-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.9-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.9-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.9-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.10-1 5 DRR 00-1427 10/12/00 B 3.4.10-2 5 DRR 00-1427 10/12/00 B 3.4.10-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.10-4 32 DRR 07-01 39 2/7/07 B 3.4.11-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.11-2 1 DRR 99-1624 12/18/99 B 3.4.11-3 19 DRR 04-1414 10/12/04 B 3.4.11-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.11-5 1 DRR 99-1624 12/18/99 B 3.4.11-6 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.11-7 32 DRR 07-0139 2/7/07 B 3.4.12-1 61 DRR 14-0346 2/27/14 B 3.4.12-2 61 DRR 14-0346 2/27/14 B 3.4..12-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.12-4~ 61 DRR 14-0346 2/27/14 B 3.4.12-5 61 DRR 14-0346 2/27/14 B 3.4.12-6 56 DRR 12-1792 11/7/12 B 3.4.12-7 61 DRR 14-0346 2/27/14 B 3.4.12-8 1 DRR 99-1624 12/18/99 B 3.4.12-9 56 DRR 12-1 792 11/7/12 B 3.4.12-10 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.12-11 61 DRR 14-0346 2/27/14 B 3.4.12-12 32 DRR 07-01 39 2/7/07 B 3.4.12-13 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.12-14 32 DRR 07-01 39 2/7/07 B 3.4.13-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.13-2 29 DRR 06-1984 10/17/06 B 3.4.13-3 29 DRR 06-1984 10/17/06 Wolf Creek - Unit 1 viiiReson3 Revision 73

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TAB - B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) (continued)

B 3.4.13-4 35 DRR 07-1553 9/28/07 B 3.4.13-5 35 DRR 07-1553 9/28/07 B 3.4.13-6 29 DRR 06-1984 10/17/06 B 3.4.14-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.14-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.14-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.14-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.4.14-5 32 DRR 07-0139 2/7/07 B 3.4.14-6 32 DR R 07-0139 2/7/07 B 3.4.15-1 31 DRR 06-2494 12/13/06 B 3.4.15-2 31 *DRR 06-2494 12/13/06 B 3.4.15-3 33 DRR 07-0656 5/1/107 B 3.4.15-4 33 DRR 07-0656 5/1/07 B 3.4.15-5 65 DRR 14-2146 9/30/14 B 3.4.15-6 31 DRR 06-2494 12/13/06 B 3.4.15-7 31 DRR 06-2494 12/13/06 B 3.4.15-8 31 DRR 06-2494 12/13/06 B 3.4.16-1 31 DR R 06-2494 12/13/06 B 3.4.16-2 31. DR R 06-2494 -- 12/13/06 B 3.4.16-3 31 D RR 06-2494 12/13/06 B 3.4.16-4 31 DRR 06-2494 12/13/06 B 3.4.16-5 31 DRR 06-2494 12/13/06 B 3.4.17-1 29 DRR 06-1984 10/17/06 B 3.4.17-2 58 DRR 13-0369 02/26/13 B 3.4.17-3 52 DR RI1-0724 4/11/111 B 3.4.17-4 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 B 3.4.17-5 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 B 3.4.17-6 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 B 3.4.17-7 58 DRR 13-0369 02/26/13 TAB - B 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)

B 3.5.1-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.5.1-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.5.1-3 73 DRR 15-21 35 11/17/15 B 3.5.1-4 73 DRR 15-21 35 11/17/15 B 3.5.1-5 1 DRR 99-1624 12/18/9 9 B 3.5.1-6 1 DRR 99-1 624 12/18/99 B 3.5.1-7 71 DRR 15-1528 7/30/15 B 3.5.1-8 1 DRR 99-1624 12/18/99 B 3.5.2-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.5.2-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.5.2-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.5.2-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.5.2-5 72 DRR 15-1918 10/26/15 B 3.5.2-6 42 DRR 09-1009 7/16/09 B 3.5.2-7 42 DRR 09-1009 7/16/09 B 3.5.2-8 72 DRR 15-1918 10/26/15 B 3.5.2-9 72 DRR 15-1918 10/26/15 B 3.5.2-10 72 DRR 15-1918 10/26/15 B 3.5.2-11 72 DRR 15-1918 10/26/15 B 3.5.2-12 72 DRR 15-1918 10/26/15 Wolf Creek - Unit I1iiRviin7 viii Revision 73

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TAB - B 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) (continued)

B 3.5.3-1 56 DRR 12-1792 11/7/12 B 3.5.3-2 72 DRR 15-1918 10/26/15 B 3.5.3-3 56 DRR 12-1792 11/7/12 B 3.5.3-4 56 DRR 12-1792 11/7/12 B 3.5.4-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.5.4-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.5.4-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.5.4-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.5.4-5 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.5.4-6 26 DRR 06-1 350 7/24/06 B 3.5.5-1 21 DRR 05-0707 4/20/05 B 3.5.5-2 21 DRR 05-0707 4/20/05 B 3.5.5-3 2 Amend. No. 132 4/24/00 B 3.5.5-4 21 DRR 05-0707 4/20/05 TAB - B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS B 3.6.1-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 8 3.6.1-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.6.1-3 0O Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.6.1-4 17 DRR 04-0453 5/26/04 B 3.6.2-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.6.2-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.6.2-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.6.2-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.6.2-5 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.6.2-6 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.6.2-7 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.6.3-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.6.3-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.6.3-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.6.3-4 49 DRR 11-0014 1/31/11 B 3.6.3-5 49 DRR 11-0014 1/31/11 B 3.6.3-6 49 DRR 11-0014 1/31/11 B 3.6.3-7 41 DRR 09-0288 3/20/09 B 3.6.3-8 36 DRR 08-0255 3/11/08 B 3.6.3-9 36 DRR 08-0255 3/11/08 8 3.6.3-10 8 DRR 01-1235 9/19/01 B 3.6.3-11 36 DRR 08-0255 3/11/08 B 3.6.3-12 36 DRR 08-0255 3/11/08 B 3.6.3-13 50 DRR 11-0449 3/9/111 B 3.6.3-14 36 DRR 08-0255 3/11/08 B 3.6.3-15 39 DRR 08-1 096 8/28/08 B 3.6.3-16 39 DRR 08-1096 8/28/08 B 3.6.3-17 36 DRR 08-0255 3/11/08 B 3.6.3-18 36 DRR 08-0255 3/11/08 B 3.6.3-19 36 DRR 08-0255 3/11/08 B 3.6.4-1 39 DRR 08-1096 8/28/08 B 3.6.4-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.6.4-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.6.5-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.6.5-2 37 DRR 08-0503 4/8/08 Wolf Creek - Unit 1 xRviin7 ix Revision 73

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TAB - B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS (continued)

B 3.6.5-3 13 DRR 02-1458 12/03/02 B 3.6.5-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.6.6-1 42 DRR 09-1 009 7/16/09 B 3.6.6-2 63 DRR 14-1572 7/1/114 B 3.6.6-3 37 DRR 08-0503 4/8/08 B 3.6.6-4 72 DRR 15-1918 10/26/15 B 3.6.6-5 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.6.6-6 18 DRR 04-1018 9/1/104 B 3.6.6-7 72 DRR 15-1918 10/26/15 B 3.6.6-8 72 DRR 15-1918 10/26/15 B 3.6.6-9 72 DRR 15-1918 10/26/15 B 3.6.6-10 72 DRRI15-1918 10/26/15 B 3.6.7-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.6.7-2 42 DRR 09-1009 7/16/09 B 3.6.7-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.6.7-4 29 DRR 06-1 984 10/17/06 B 3.6.7-5 42 DRR 09-1 009 7/16/09 TAB - B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.1-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.7.1-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.7.1-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.7.1-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.7.1-5 32 DRR 07-01 39 2/7/07 B 3.7.1-6 32 DRR 07-0139 2/7/07 B 3.7.2-1 44 DRR 09-1744 10/28/09 B 3.7.2-2 44 DRR 09-1744 10/28/09 B 3.7.2-3 44 DRR 09-1 744 10/28/09 B 3.7.2-4 44 DRR 09-1 744 10/28/09 B 3.7.2-5 44 DRRO09-1744 10/28/09 B 3.7.2-6 44 DRR 09-1 744 10/28/09 B 3.7.2-7 44 DRRO09-1744 10/28/09 B 3.7.2-8 44 DRRO09-1744 10/28/09 B 3.7.2-9 44 DRR 09-1744 10/28/09 B 3.7.2-10 44 DRRO09-1744 10/28/09 B 3.7.2-11 44 DRRO09-1744 10/28/09 B 3.7.3-1 37 DRR 08-0503 4/8/08 B 3.7.3-2 50 DRRI11-0449 3/9/111 B 3.7.3-3 37 DRR 08-0503 4/8/08 B 3.7.3-4 37 DRR 08-0503 4/8/08 B 3.7.3-5 37 DRR 08-0503 4/8/08 B 3.7.3-6 37 DRR 08-0503 4/8/08 B 3.7.3-7 37 DRR 08-0503 4/8/08 B 3.7.3-8 37 DRR 08-0503 4/8/08 B 3.7.3-9 66 DRRI14-2329 11/6/14 B 3.7.3-10 66 DRRI14-2329 11/6/14 B 3.7.3-11 37 DRR 08-0503 4/8/08 B 3.7.4-1 1 DRR 99-1624 12/18/99 B 3.7.4-2 1 DRR 99-1624 12/18/99 B 3.7.4-3 19 DRRO04-1414 10/12/04 Wolf Creek - Unit 1 X eiin7 Revision 73

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TAB - B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS (continued)

B 3.7.4-4 19 DRR 04-1414 10/12/04 B 3.7.4-5 1 DRR 99-1 624 12/18/99 B 3.7.5-1 54 DRR 11-2394 11/16/11 B 3.7.5-2 54 DRR 11-2394 11/16/11 B 3.7.5-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.7.5-4 60 DRR 13-2562 10/25/13 B 3.7.5-5 44 DRR 09-1 744 10/28/09 B 3.7.5-6 44 DRR 09-1744 10/28/09 B 3.7.5-7 32 DRR 07-01 39 2/7/07 B 3.7.5-8 14 DRR 03-01 02 2/12/03 B 3.7.5-9 32 DRR 07-0139 2/7/07 B 3.7.6-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.7.6-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.7.6-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.7.7-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.7.7-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.7.7-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.7.7-4 1 DRR 99-1624 12/18/99 B 3.7.8-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99

• B 3.7.8-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.7.8-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.7.8-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.7.8-5 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.7.9-1 3 Amend. No. 134 7/14/00 B 3.7.9-2 3 Amend. No. 134 7/14/00 B 3.7.9-3 3 Amend. No. 134 7/14/00 B 3.7.9-4 3 Amend. No. 134 7/14/00 B 3.7.10-1 64 DRR 14-1822 8/28/14 B 3.7.10-2 41 DRR 09-0288 3/20/09 B 3.7.10-3 41 DRR 09-0288 3/20/09 B 3.7.10-4 41 DRR 09-0288 3/20/09 B 3.7.10-5 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 B 3.7.10-6 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 B 3.7.10-7 64 DRR 14-1822 8/28/14 B 3.7.10-8 41 DRR 09-0288 3/20/09 B 3.7.10-9 64 DRR 14-1822 8/28/14 B 3.7.11-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.7.11-2* 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 B 3.7.11-3 63 DRR 14-1572 7/1/114 B 3.7.11-4 63 DRR 14-1572 7/1/114 B 3.7.12-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.7.13-1 24 DRR 06-0051 2/28/06 B 3.7.13-2 1 DRR 99-1 624 12/18/99 B 3.7.13-3 42 DRR 09-1009 7/16/09 B 3.7.13-4 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 B 3.7.13-5 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 B 3.7.13-6 64 DRR 14-1 822 8/28/14 B 3.7.13-7 64 DRR 14-1822 8/28/14 B 3.7.13-8 64 DRR 14-1822 8/28/14 B 3.7.14-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.7.15-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 Wolf Creek - Unit 1 xiiRviin7 Revision 73

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TAB - B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS (continued)

B 3.7.15-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.7.15-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.7.16-1 5 DRR 00-1427 10/12/00 B 3.7.16-2 23 DRR 05-1995 9/28/05 B 3.7.16-3 5 DRR 00-1427 10/12/00 B 3.7.17-1 7 DRR 01-0474 5/1/01 B 3.7.17-2 7 DRRO01-0474 5/1/01 B 3.7.17-3 '5 DRR 00-1427 10/12/00 B 3.7.18-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.7.18-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.7.18-3 0 Am end. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.7.19-1 44 DRR 09-1744 10/28/09 B 3.7.19-2 54 DRR 11-2394 11/16/11 B 3.7.19-3 54 DRRI11-2394 11/16/11 B 3.7.19-4 61 DRR 14-0346 2/27/14 B 3.7.19-5 61 DRR 14-0346 2/27/14 B 3.7.19-6 54 DRR 11-2394 11/16/11 B 3.7.19-7 54 DRR 11-2394 11/16/11 TAB - B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS B 3.8.1-1 54 DRR 11-2394 11/16/11 B 3.8.1-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.1-3 47 DRR 10-1089 6/16/10 B 3.8.1-4 71 DRR 15-1528 7/30/15 B 3.8.1-5 59 DRR 13-1524 6/26/13 B 3.8.1-6 25 DRR 06-0800 5/18/06 B 3.8.1-7 26 DRR 06-1350 7/24/06 B 3.8.1-8 35 DRR 07-1553 9/28/07 B 3.8.1-9 42 DRR 09-1 009 7/16/09 B 3.8.1-10 39 DRR 08-1 096 8/28/08 B 3.8.1-11 36 DRR 08-0255 3/11/08 B 3.8.1-12 47 DRR 10-1 089 6/16/10 B 3.8.1-13 47 DRR 10-1089 6/16/10 B 3.8.1-14 47 DRR 10-1089 6/16/10 B 3.8.1-15 47 DRR 10-1089 6/16110 B 3.8.1-16 26 DRR 06-1350 7/24/06 B 3.8.1-17 26 .DRR 06-1350 7/24/06 B 3.8.1-18 59 DRR 13-1 524 6/26/13 B 3.8.1-19 26 DRR 06-1 350 7/24/06 B 3.8.1-20 26 DRR 06-1 350 7/24/06 B 3.8.1-21 33 DRR 07-0656 5/1/07 B 3.8.1-22 33 DRR 07-0656 5/1/07 B 3.8.1-23 40 DRR 08-1846 12/9/08 B 3.8.1-24 33 DRR 07-0656 5/1/07 B 3.8.1-25 33 DRR 07-0656 5/1/07 B 3.8.1-26 33 DRR 07-0656 5/1/07 B 3.8.1-27 59 DRR 13-1524 6/26/13 B 3.8.1-28 59 DRR 13-1524 6/26/13 B 3.8.1-29 54 DRR 11-2394 11/16/111 B 3.8.1-30 33 DRR 07-0656 5/1/07 B 3.8.1-31 33 DRR 07-0656 5/1/07 Wolf Creek - Unit 1 xiii eiin7 Revision 73

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TAB - B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS (continued)

B 3.8.1-32 33 DRR 07-0656 5/1/107 B 3.8.1-33 71 DRR 15-1528 7/30/15 B 3.8.1-34 47 DRR 10-1 089 6/16/10 B 3.8.2-1 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 B 3.8.2-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.2-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.2-4 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 B 3.8.2-5 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 B 3.8.2-6 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 B 3.8.2-7 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 B 3.8.3-1 1 DRR 99-1624 12/18/99 B 3.8.3-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.3-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.3-4 1 DRR 99-1624 12/18/99 B 3.8.3-5 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.3-6 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.3-7 12 DRR 02-1062 9/26/02 B 3.8.3-8 1 DRR 99-1624 12/18/99 B 3.8.3-9 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.4-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.4-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.4-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.4-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.4-5 50 DRR 11-0449 3/9/11 B 3.8.4-6 50 DRR 11-0449 3/9/111 B 3.8.4-7 6 DRR 00-1 541 3/13/01 B 3.8.4-8 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.4-9 2 DRR 00-0147 4/24/00 B 3.8.5-1 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 B 3.8.5-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.5-3 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 B 3.8.5-4 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 B 3.8.5-5 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 B 3.8.6-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.6-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.6-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.6-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.6-5 -0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.6-6 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.7-1 69 DRR 15-0493 3/26/15 B 3.8.7-2 69 DRR 15-0493 3/26/15 B 3.8.7-3 69 DRR 15-0493 3/26/15 B 3.8.7-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.8-1 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 B 3.8.8-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.8-3 69 DRR 15-0493 3/26/15 B 3.8.8-4 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 B 3.8.8-5 69 DRR 15-0493 3/26/15 B 3.8.9-1 54 DRR 11-2394 11/16/11 B 3.8.9-2 69 DRR 15-0493 3/26/15 B 3.8.9-3 54 DRR 11-2394 11/16/111 Wolf Creek - Unit 1 iiRviin7 xiii Revision 73

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TAB - B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS (continued)

B 3.8.9-4 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.9-5 69 DRR 15-0493 3/26/15 B 3.8.9-6 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.9-7 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.9-8 1 DRR 99-1624 12/18/99 B 3.8.9-9 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.10-1 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 B 3.8.10-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.,8.10-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.8.10-4 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 B 3.8.10-5 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 B 3.8.10-6 57 DRR 13-0006 1/16/13 TAB - B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS B 3.9.1-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.9.1-2 19 DRRO04-1414 10/12/04 B 3.9.1-3 19 DRR 04-1414 10/12/04 B 3.9.1-4 19 DRR 04-1414 10/12/04 B 3.9.2-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.9.2-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.9.2-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.9.3-1 68 DRR 15-0248 2/26/15 B 3.9.3-2 68 DRR 15-0248 2/26/15 B 3.9.3-3 51 DRR 11-0664 3/21/11 B 3.9.3-4 68 DRR 15-0248 2/26/15 B 3.9.4-1 23 DRR 05-1 995 9/28/05 B 3.9.4-2 13 DRR 02-1458 12/03/02 B 3.9.4-3 25 DRR 06-0800 5/18/06 B 3.9.4-4 23 DRR 05-1995 9/28/05 B 3.9.4-5 33 DRR 07-0656 5/1/107 B 3.9.4-6 23 DRR 05-1995 9/28/05 B 3.9.5-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.9.5-2 72 DRRI15-1918 10/26/15 B 3.9.5-3 32 DRR 07-0139 2/7/07 B 3.9.5-4 72 DRRI15-1918 10/26/15 B 3.9.5-5 72 DRR 15-1918 10/26/15 B 3.9.6-1 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.9.6-2 72 DRRI15-1918 10/26/15 B 3.9.6-3 42 DRR 09-1009 7/16/09 B 3.9.6-4 72 DRR 15-1918 10/26/15 B 3.9.6-5 72 DRR 15-1918 10/26/15 B 3.9.7-1 25 DRR 06-0800 5/18/06 B 3.9.7-2 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 B 3.9.7-3 0 Amend. No. 123 12/18/99 Wolf Creek - Unit 1 i xiv eiin7 Revision 73

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Note 1 The page number is listed on the center of the bottom of each page.

Note 2 The revision number is listed in the lower right hand corner of each page. The Revision number will be page specific.

Note 3 The change document will be the document requesting the change. Amendment No.

123 issued the improved Technical Specifications and associated Bases which affected each page. The NRC has indicated that Bases changes will not be issued with License Amendments. Therefore, the change document should be a DRR number in accordance with AP 26A-002.

Note 4 The date effective or implemented is the date the Bases pages are issued by Document Control.

Wolf Creek - Unit 1 vRviin7 XV Revision 73